This document summarizes a research paper on the first stage ("Explore") of Critical Systems Practice (CSP), a multimethodology approach for intervening in complex real-world problems. The Explore stage involves starting a multimethodological study of the problem situation. It is important to properly explore the problem upfront in order to identify opportunities for an effective, in-depth systems intervention and avoid approaches that could worsen the problem. The document provides background on CSP and critical systems thinking, and describes the latest version of the Explore stage, illustrating it with examples of applying it to study the UK health system's response to COVID-19 and creating a new business school.

1. R E S E A R C H P A P E R
Critical systems practice 1: Explore—Starting a
multimethodological intervention
Michael C. Jackson
Centre for Systems Studies, University of
Hull, Hull, UK
Correspondence
Michael C. Jackson, Centre for Systems
Studies, University of Hull, Hull HU6
7RX, UK.
Email: M.C.Jackson@hull.ac.uk
Abstract
This is the first of a series of papers on the stages of critical systems practice.
Critical systems practice is a multimethodology that seeks to employ the ideas
developed in critical systems thinking to intervene in and improve complex
real-world problem situations. It has four stages—Explore (the problem situa-
tion), Produce (an intervention strategy), Intervene (flexibly) and Check
(on progress)—called to mind as EPIC. The aim is to set out where thinking
has reached on the best way to carry out each of these stages and to invite
comment on what more needs doing. The first stage, Explore, is concerned
with how to start a multimethodological study. If this is done well, it can bring
to the fore opportunities for a full and in-depth systems intervention. If done
badly, it can lead to practice that makes the problem situation worse.
K E Y W O R D S
complexity, critical systems practice, critical systems thinking, Explore
1 | INTRODUCTION
It is necessary to orientate the reader by considering what
the critical systems practice (CSP) multimethodology is
designed for, how it is structured and how it can be used.
Next, a brief overview is provided of critical systems
thinking and of how the principles to which it gives rise
underpin CSP. This makes it possible to see how Explore
relates to the whole multimethodology and what its pur-
pose is. The paper goes on to consider how ‘false starts’ at
the beginning can hinder the breadth and depth of an
intervention. This directs attention to some theoretical
contributions that can help make a better job of starting
a systems study. Various precursors of Explore, from the
systems thinking tradition, are then set out. Finally, on
the basis of all that has gone before, the latest version of
Explore is described and illustrated through two
examples—the UK health system's performance in rela-
tion to Covid-19 and the creation of a business school. A
conclusion considers the relevance of the argument for
the management sciences generally.
2 | ORIENTATION
The modern world is frequently described as exhibiting
VUCA characteristics—volatility, uncertainty, complexity
and ambiguity. Mingers (2006, p. 201), drawing upon
Habermas, calls it ‘multidimensional’. It consists of a
‘complex interaction of substantively different elements’,
some physical and material, some socially constituted
such as cultures and power structures, and others per-
sonal such as beliefs, values, fears and emotions.
According to Morin (2006), such a world confronts us
with a ‘general complexity’ that resists universal truth.
All models of such complexity are partial and, therefore,
the fundamental problem of general complexity ‘is episte-
mological, cognitive, paradigmatic’ (Morin, 2006, p. 6);
concerned with the ways we seek to understand and
manage the complexity. Snowden and Boone's (2007)
Cynefin framework identifies ‘chaotic’ domains pre-
senting ‘unknowables’, ‘complex domains’ displaying
‘unknown unknowns’, ‘complicated’ domains of ‘known
unknowns’ and ‘simple’ domains of ‘known knowns’. In
DOI: 10.1002/sres.2746
Syst Res Behav Sci. 2020;1–20. wileyonlinelibrary.com/journal/sres © 2020 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. 1

2. the first two, things are in constant flux, nothing is pre-
dictable, and ‘black swan’ events (Taleb, 2007) can occur.
Kay and King (2020) distinguish ‘radical uncertainty’ and
‘resolvable uncertainty’. The world of radical uncertainty,
which we increasingly inhabit, is characterized by obscu-
rity, ignorance, vagueness, ambiguity, ill-defined prob-
lems and a lack of information that cannot be rectified.
We simply do not know how to act. The problem situa-
tions produced by general complexity cannot, as
Woermann, Human, and Preiser (2018) argue, be solved,
only transformed or modified. In systems thinking, we
are used, following Ackoff (1999, p. 116), to describing
complex systems of strongly interacting problems as
messes. They produce what Rittel and Webber (1981) call
‘wicked problems’, which are intractable for decision
makers:
The planner who works with open systems is
caught up in the ambiguity of their causal
webs. Moreover, his would-be solutions are
confounded by a still further set of dilemmas
posed by the growing pluralism of the con-
temporary publics, whose valuation of his
proposals are judged against an array of dif-
ferent and contradicting scales. (Rittel &
Webber, 1981, p. 99)
It is to this VUCA world of general complexity and
wicked problems that CSP seeks to make its contribu-
tion. Primarily, it is designed for the big issues, for
example, when companies are facing a crisis, rethinking
their strategies, considering risk and addressing their
social and environmental responsibilities; when local
authorities are restructuring, redesigning their services
and seeking to work in partnership or engage citizens;
governments are confronted by ‘black swan’ events or
trying to get to grips with educational reform, transpor-
tation, issues posed by an ageing population, inequality
and health care; and environmentalists are tackling pol-
lution, climate change and reductions in species diver-
sity. CSP is not designed for problem situations when
there is agreement on what needs doing and decision
makers can use best practice or simple techniques to
achieve results. However, as Boulding (1956) pointed
out, few errors are more costly than treating systems
that possess a high level of complexity with models and
methodologies that lack the appropriate sophistication.
Problem situations that initially appear ‘simple’ or
‘complicated’ often turn out ‘complex’ or ‘chaotic’ when
examined more closely and/or are prodded as part of
an intervention. There is always a strong case for run-
ning through the Explore stage of CSP before jumping
to conclusions.
A few points on the structure of the multi-
methodology. CSP seeks to translate the philosophy
and principles of critical systems thinking into practi-
cal application. It sets out four stages that are
necessary to ensure this happens (see Figure 1). We
are dealing with these in turn, but they are
interdependent. Every stage must be true to the philos-
ophy and principles. If one is not, it will prevent the
others from being so. Explore must, therefore, be con-
ducted in a manner that allows later stages to be true
to critical systems thinking. To take an example, it
must be designed to ensure that advantage can be
taken of the capabilities of the full range of systems
methodologies at the Produce stage. None should be
proscribed because Explore itself is narrowly bounded.
A further consideration is that the multimethodology
is iterative. Intervene should follow critical systems
principles so that it possible to re-enter the multi-
methodological cycle and track the problem situation
as it changes, not least as a result of the intervention
taking place. Check should produce outcomes that feed
easily into another round of Explore.
CSP can be used for both diagnosis and design. In the
former case, for example, to help investigate why a health
system, broadly defined, has met problems dealing with
an unexpected disease outbreak. In the latter, to plan and
bring into being a new organization, such as a business
school. It can be employed by decision makers, man-
agers, consultants and those without formal power. Fol-
lowing Checkland and Scholes' (1990) terminology, CSP
offers ‘Mode 1’ and ‘Mode 2’ alternatives. In Mode 1, the
multimethodology governs the intervention in a struc-
tured and often sequential way. In Mode 2, it ceases to
dominate. The intervention becomes more situation
driven, and CSP breaks the surface only occasionally to
help reflect upon, and sometimes drive forward, what is
happening in the everyday flux of events. In Mode
2 usage, the stages do not have to follow the normal
order.
In this paper, I present CSP as an ‘ideal type’ of the
good practice necessary to put critical systems thinking
into effect. I concentrate on the philosophy and princi-
ples necessary to guide a successful systems intervention
while giving appropriate attention to what can realisti-
cally be achieved in practice. Other researchers point to
different aspects of successful systems practice.
Ison (2017) focuses on the systems practitioner—their
history, skills and the way they engage with the problem
situation. Chowdhury (2019) highlights the ‘cognitive
flexibility’ that critical systems thinking consultants must
have. Gregory, Atkins, Midgley, and Hodgson (2020)
reflect on ‘stakeholder identification and engagement in
problem structuring interventions’. All these are
2 JACKSON

3. important, and CSP should incorporate this research, as
necessary.
Finally, it must be acknowledged that CSP is a prod-
uct of the Western systems tradition. In the Chinese con-
text, for example, it may be more appropriate to employ a
multimethodological approach with Eastern roots—such
as Gu and Zhu's (2000) wuli, shili, renli (WSR).
We now turn to the philosophy and principles of criti-
cal systems thinking that need embedding throughout
the CSP process.
3 | CRITICAL SYSTEMS THINKING
AND CSP
Critical systems thinking began in the 1980s with
accounts of how the theoretical partiality of existing sys-
tems methodologies limited their ability to guide inter-
ventions in the full range of problem situations
(Jackson, 1982, 1985; Mingers, 1980, 1984); calls for
complementarism and pluralism in systems practice
(Jackson & Keys, 1984; Jackson, 1987a) and suggestions
about how those disadvantaged by systems designs could
be given a voice and have impact (Jackson, 1985;
Ulrich, 1983). The primary inspiration outside systems
thinking, for taking the field in this ‘critical’ direction,
was the work of the Frankfurt School, especially that of
Habermas. The Frankfurt School of social theorists was
committed to interdisciplinarity, a dialectical understand-
ing of the relationship between theory and society,
respect for traditional methods of enquiry but only if
employed in the right context, and a critique of society
with a view to transforming it for the better
(Finlayson, 2005; Habermas, 2018; Held, 1980;
Horkheimer, 1937). All these characteristics became
embedded in critical systems thinking.
Critical systems thinking came to prominence in 1991
with the publication of three books—Critical Systems
Thinking: Directed Readings (Flood & Jackson, 1991a,
eds.), Systems Methodology for the Management Sciences
(Jackson, 1991), and Creative Problem Solving: Total Sys-
tems Intervention (Flood & Jackson, 1991b). The first was
a collection of papers, accompanied by a commentary,
which traced the origins and outlined the major themes
FIGURE 1 The four key EPIC
stages of critical systems practice.
Abbreviation: EPIC, Explore, Produce,
Intervene and Check [Colour figure
can be viewed at wileyonlinelibrary.
com]
JACKSON 3

4. of the approach. It highlighted the contributions of
authors such as Flood, Fuenmayor, Jackson, Mingers,
Oliga and Ulrich. The second offered a critique of existing
systems approaches from the perspective of social theory,
made the case for critical systems thinking and sought to
demonstrate that it could take the lead in enriching the-
ory and practice in the management sciences. The third
was the first attempt to show how critical systems think-
ing could be used in practice. Since 1991, critical systems
thinking has been taken in somewhat different directions
by Flood (1995, 1999), Jackson (2000, 2003, 2019),
Mingers (2006, 2014) and Midgley (2000). Nevertheless, it
retains a strong identity and common themes, recogniz-
able in its commitments to ‘systems thinking’, ‘critical
awareness’, ‘pluralism’ and ‘improvement’. It is these
commitments that must be respected in translating criti-
cal systems thinking into CSP.
CSP espouses systems thinking. It argues that the tra-
ditional scientific method, based upon reductionism and
objectivity, is inappropriate in confronting complexity.
CSP respects the exponential growth in knowledge the
method has yielded in physics, astronomy and chemistry
and the technological advances it has enabled in agricul-
ture, industry, transportation and medicine. But it won-
ders whether, after centuries of dominance, it needs
complementing with an alternative based on systems
thinking. Perhaps it is now hindering progress in the life,
social and management sciences. Perhaps the unintended
consequences of the scientific and industrial revolutions
have caused many of the intractable problems that now
confront us, for example, environmental degradation,
pollution, climate change, inequality, exclusion, the dan-
ger of global pandemics and nuclear proliferation. CSP
sees systems thinking as an appropriate complement to
reductionism and objectivity because it promotes the
importance of holism, interrelationships and emergence
and values a pluralism of theoretical and methodological
perspectives. Further, it takes Ackoff's (1999, p. 163) mes-
sage that the world is not divided into academic disci-
plines and rejects any claim that they can, individually,
provide successful guidance in intervening in complex
real-world problem situations. Instead, CSP promotes a
transdisciplinary approach that provides a common lan-
guage through which the insights of the different disci-
plines can be expressed, thus promoting fruitful
communication.
The second commitment CSP must honour is to criti-
cal awareness. Following Churchman (1971), CSP recog-
nizes that it is impossible for any systems approach to
understand the whole system. In The Design of Inquiring
Systems (Churchman, 1971), Churchman argues that
each of the five designs for acquiring useful knowledge
(derived from Leibniz, Locke, Kant, Hegel and Singer) is
incomplete in itself, resting upon assumptions that can-
not be proved using its own logic. Ulrich (1983) offers a
way forward for systems designers. The ideal standard of
whole system design should be used as a spur to reflec-
tion on the lack of comprehensiveness of any existing or
proposed design. The way to reveal this lack of compre-
hensiveness is to interrogate and challenge the assump-
tions underpinning that design. For Ulrich, that
translates into unearthing the ‘boundary judgements’ it
makes. Critical systems thinking directs the analysis at
existing systems approaches and methodologies and con-
ducts a ‘second-order’ critique, often using social theory,
of the assumptions they make in framing the world and
seeking to change it. Recently (Jackson, 2019), for exam-
ple, I undertook a second-order critique of 10 well-
established systems methodologies to show what aspects
of complexity they give priority to in examining and seek-
ing to improve problem situations.
Critical awareness furnishes CSP with an apprecia-
tion of the theoretical distinctions made by the various
systems approaches it has in its armoury. It has also
sought, following the Frankfurt School, to provide an
understanding of the dialectical relationship between dif-
ferent systems methodologies and society. Critical sys-
tems thinking has never regarded systems methodologies
as ‘innocent’. They emerge from particular social and
economic circumstances and, in turn, contribute to
maintaining or changing them. The implications should
be taken into account. It is also essential to extend critical
awareness to incorporate an ‘ecological awareness’ of
how different systems approaches, and the designs they
produce, impact the natural world and people's relation-
ship with it (see Jackson, 2019, for more details on the
various aspects of critical awareness).
The third commitment of critical systems thinking, to
which CSP must show respect, follows from the finding
of critical awareness that different systems methodologies
see the world differently and recommend intervening in
problem situations in a wide variety of ways. CSP must
embrace pluralism—using the range of systems
approaches and methodologies in a way that maximizes
the strengths and compensates for the weaknesses of
each of them. How it tries to do this will be dealt with in
later papers detailing the Produce, Intervene and Check
stages. It is enough to say here that Explore must be so
designed to ensure that it inspires pluralism at those later
stages.
The final commitment of critical systems thinking is
to bring about improvement in the real world. CSP,
therefore, cannot be an exercise conducted just to satisfy
academic interests. It must be carried out in the context
of application to meet the needs of users and other stake-
holders. From its very beginnings, employing
4 JACKSON

5. methodologies such as operational research and systems
engineering, the emphasis in systems practice has been
on meeting the requirements of clients. CSP draws on
this experience while insisting that what is taken to be
improvement must be broadened to embrace the con-
cerns of the greater variety of systems approaches now
available. Not just increased efficiency and efficacy but
also, for example, effectiveness (are we doing the right
things), mutual understanding, resilience, antifragility,
empowerment and sustainability. In particular, although
CSP has tempered the hyperbole associated with its early
calls for ‘emancipation’, it still regards putting fairness
and empowerment on the agenda of systems thinkers as
one of its major achievements and continues to insist that
such matters receive constant attention.
Explore must embrace these four commitments and
ensure it provides an appropriate starting point to enable
the later stages of CSP to do the same. Before considering
in detail how it does this, we will look at some pitfalls it
has to avoid and at some relevant theory it can
learn from.
4 | FALSE STARTS
We can divide the false starts that Explore might make
into two kinds. It might fail to provide an in-depth explo-
ration of the problem situation, leading to a lack of
insight. Or it might fail in terms of breadth—providing
only a narrow purview, which restricts the scope of the
intervention that follows.
The first is the case with standard methods for
starting a problem-solving exercise, such as ‘brainstorm-
ing’ and the ‘nominal group technique’. They draw upon
the existing ideas of those in a group but fail the test of
deepening their thinking. They fall foul of Einstein's
much quoted dictum that ‘no problem can be solved from
the same level of consciousness that created it’. The
drawing of ‘rich pictures’, a method recommended at the
beginning of Checkland's (1981) ‘soft systems methodol-
ogy’, can be similarly criticized. Sketching cartoon-like
representations of a problem situation is a good way of
stimulating creativity but can fail to lead participants
towards a more in-depth understanding of where their
issues originate. This poses no problems for soft systems
methodology because it is based on the interpretive para-
digm, which does not recognize the existence of any
deeper aspects of social reality producing the surface
appearances (Jackson, 1982). But it does for CSP because
it restricts access to other systems methodologies that do.
In seeking greater depth from Explore, we must not
sacrifice breadth. We should ensure that the problem sit-
uation is viewed through a wide range of insightful
lenses. The kind of pluralism of perspectives required is
threatened in systems thinking by the temptations
offered by ‘isolationist’, ‘imperialist’ and ‘pragmatist’
positions (Jackson, 1987a).
Isolationists adopt one systems approach in all cir-
cumstances and, in doing so, privilege the limited world-
view underpinning it. This is often because they are
convinced of its universal applicability. Operational
Research and Systems Engineering have long been
accused, by soft systems thinkers (e.g., Checkland, 1981),
of grossly simplifying social reality because they believe
in a mechanistic world in which systems can be identi-
fied, modeled and optimized in pursuit of agreed goals.
At other times, researchers are isolationists because they
are simply ignorant of alternatives to their favoured
approach. An analysis of ‘health systems research’ from a
critical systems thinking perspective (Jackson &
Sambo, 2020) reveals that although most of the main pro-
tagonists conceptualize their field as dealing with ‘com-
plex adaptive systems’, they then go on to address the
wicked problems it poses using system dynamics. The
world is reduced to the interactions between feedback
and feedforward loops. Morin's ‘general complexity’ is
thereby mistreated as ‘restricted complexity’; Snowden's
‘complex’ domain is addressed as ‘complicated’.
Some see the solution to isolationism as integrating
the perspectives of different systems methodologies to get
a broader grasp of a problem situation. However, this
strategy falls victim to imperialism, with one approach
inevitably dominating the analysis and the other losing
its potency. The strategy fails because of ‘paradigm
incommensurability’. The paradigm incommensurability
thesis, as articulated by Kuhn (1970), insists that para-
digms are based on different conceptual frameworks that
are untranslatable one to the other. They cannot, there-
fore, be combined without the categories and terms of
one being denatured to fit into the other. Because differ-
ent systems methodologies reflect different paradigms, it
follows that, in any integration, one methodology and its
view of the world will dominate at the expense of what
the other might offer. There is a loss of breadth. I have
never come across an attempt to integrate systems meth-
odologies when it has not been obvious which methodol-
ogy, and associated worldview, is dominant.
Even some critical systems thinkers fall into the trap
of imperialism. They identify the problem of paradigm
incommensurability and correctly argue that critical sys-
tems thinking cannot solve this by declaring itself a
meta-paradigm standing above all the others. But they
argue that the only solution is to declare critical systems
thinking itself a paradigm. The search is then on for a
paradigm that can embrace the commitment that critical
systems thinking has to pluralism. Midgley (2000)
JACKSON 5

6. suggests his own ‘process paradigm’ because he thinks it
can offer a home for other paradigms without distorting
them too much. This is not a view that positivists, inter-
pretivists or Marxists would share. He goes on to make
examination of ‘boundary judgements’ the starting point
for any systems intervention, severely compromising the
breadth of exploration possible. Mingers (2014) feels that
‘critical realism’ is a paradigm ready-made for critical sys-
tems thinking because, in his view, it is pluralist in terms
of both ontology and epistemology. Unfortunately, far
from being a paradigm that is welcoming of other theo-
ries, critical realism occupies quite a restricted space in
social theory. Other traditions would strongly resist its
embrace and object to being used, at the initial stage of a
systems study, as means to meet critical realism's ends.
Fundamentally, one paradigm pluralism is constraining,
and critical systems thinkers who promote it are endan-
gering breadth.
Pragmatism, in its everyday meaning, confers the
right to use whatever approach seems best for the cir-
cumstances. Taket and White (1995) advocate a strategy
of ‘pragmatic pluralism’, which demands a ‘judicious mix
and match’ of parts of different operational
research/systems methodologies to fit the requirements
of each situation. Although this may appear to offer great
flexibility to Explore, it endangers pluralism in the critical
systems sense. Without theoretical oversight, there can
be no guarantee of a diversity of methodology and para-
digm usage. All the parts of methodologies chosen may
simply be employed in the service of one implicit and
limited worldview.
There is another distinction worth making in seeking
to avoid lack of breadth at the start of a systems interven-
tion. Pollack (2009) identifies what he calls ‘parallel’ and
‘serial’ uses of different methodologies. It is tempting to
adopt a serial approach and allocate different methodolo-
gies to the stages of an intervention that they appear most
suitable for. For example, front-ending a study with a soft
systems approach to reconcile different perspectives
before moving onto a harder approach for implementa-
tion. In this vein, information systems researchers often
suggest bolting soft systems methodology onto the front
of structured design methods (as Mingers, 1992, notices).
But there is no theoretical justification for the procedure.
To those of a ‘hard’ persuasion, carrying out an initial
analysis according to a subjectivist rationale delays action
and distracts attention from what is really going on. To
subjectivists, issues of culture and politics cannot be
made to disappear at the beginning of a project. They
must be attended to continuously as it progresses. CSP,
therefore, insists upon parallel usage of systems
approaches at every stage of an intervention—Explore to
Check. Think2Impact (e.g., Banson, Nguyen, Bosch, &
Nguyen, 2015) is a typical serial approach, allocating
methodologies to the different stages of an intervention
and always using them in the same order. Even critical
systems thinkers, such as Mingers and Brocklesby (1997),
sometimes suggest linking different methodologies to dif-
ferent stages of an intervention. They are all imperilling
breadth, both at the beginning and later in the methodo-
logical cycle.
5 | THEORETICAL POINTERS
There are some suitable theoretical contributions that
can help us avoid the pitfalls of lack of depth and breadth
at the Explore stage and set us on the right path towards
sound CSP.
We will start with Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) Meta-
phors We Live By, because its philosophy chimes well
with contemporary critical systems thinking. The authors
argue for the pervasiveness of metaphor in our thinking,
defining the ‘essence of metaphor’ as ‘understanding and
experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another’
(Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 5, italics in the original). In
their view, metaphors should be seen not just as literary
devices, employed by poets and novelists. Rather, they
dominate and structure our conceptual systems. Meta-
phors create the reality we experience and determine
how we act. New metaphors can create a new reality in
which we think and act differently. Their example of the
‘puzzle metaphor’ illustrates this and is highly relevant to
starting a systems intervention. At present, they argue,
we mostly conceptualize and deal with problems using
the puzzle metaphor:
… in which problems are PUZZLES for
which, typically, there is a correct solution—
and once solved, they are solved forever. The
PROBLEMS ARE PUZZLES metaphor char-
acterizes our present reality. (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980, pp. 144–145, upper case in
the original)
Adopting a ‘chemical metaphor’, they argue, would
create a different reality in which human problems were
seen and addressed differently:
To live by the CHEMICAL metaphor would
be to accept it as a fact that no problem ever
disappears forever. Rather than direct your
energies toward solving your problems once
and for all, you would direct your energies
toward finding out what catalysts will dis-
solve your most pressing problems for the
6 JACKSON

7. longest time without precipitating worse
ones. The reappearance of a problem is
viewed as a natural occurrence rather than a
failure on your part to find “the right way to
solve it”. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980, p. 144,
upper case in the original)
If our thinking and acting is dominated by meta-
phors, Lakoff and Johnson argue, ‘objectivism’ is a myth.
There can be no access to objective or absolute truth
because ‘truth is always relative to a conceptual system
that is defined in large part by metaphor’ (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980, p. 159). Different metaphors present the
world differently, highlighting some aspects and hiding
others. No one metaphor will be sufficient, therefore, but
a range of metaphors at least ensures that we have a vari-
ety of different viewpoints available. Each will provide a
certain structured comprehension of the situation, reveal-
ing some things and suppressing others. If the result is a
set of inconsistent metaphors, then so much the better
because
To operate only in terms of a consistent set
of metaphors is to hide many aspects of real-
ity. Successfully functioning in our daily lives
seems to require a constant shifting of meta-
phors. The use of many metaphors that are
inconsistent with one another seems neces-
sary for us if we are to comprehend the
details of our daily existence. (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980, p. 221)
Many of the metaphors we employ have an objectivist
character. Brown (2003), a follower of Lakoff and John-
son, demonstrates that metaphors are rampant in sci-
ence. It is, indeed, the use of a cohesive set of objectivist
metaphors that allows scientists to produce consistent
results. Such objectivist models have an important role in
restricted situations, even in the human sciences, but also
hide many aspects of reality. In doing so, they can con-
tribute to the ‘degradation’ of humanity and the natural
world—for example, encouraging us to see labour as a
‘resource’ rather than something that should be ‘mean-
ingful’ and the environment as something to ‘control’
rather than ‘interact’ with.
If their analysis precludes objectivism, Lakoff and
Johnson are equally opposed to ‘subjectivism’. For them,
… the system of conceptual metaphors is not
arbitrary or just historically contingent;
rather, it is shaped to a significant extent by
the common nature of our bodies and the
shared ways that we all function in the
everyday world. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980,
p. 245)
We have developed ‘experiential gestalts’, structured
sets of metaphors sufficient for our needs as human
beings:
On the experientialist view, our conceptual
system emerges from our constant successful
functioning in our physical and cultural
environment. (Lakoff & Johnson, 1980,
p. 180)
There is no one truth, but
Metaphor is one of our most important tools
for trying to comprehend partially what can-
not be comprehended totally. (Lakoff &
Johnson, 1980, p. 193)
The experiential gestalts provide ‘truths’, which are
essential for human purposes and the contexts in which
they are enacted. These truths can, of course, vary
between cultures because they reflect different experien-
tial domains, although the ‘natural dimensions’ of reality
will impose some constraints. This is, as Lakoff and John-
son (1980, p. 181) state, a ‘pragmatic theory’ with some
elements of ‘realism’.
The logical next step in the argument is to ask which
experiential gestalts have proved useful to humans in
finding their way in the world. An excellent guide is Pep-
per's (1942) ‘complete survey of metaphysics’. Pepper's
survey reveals just four adequate ‘world hypotheses’,
which seek to illuminate the structure of the world.
These he labels ‘formism’, ‘mechanism’, ‘contextualism’
and ‘organicism’. He is convinced that
… these four keys will open any closet now
built that is worth opening. (Pepper, 1942,
p. 149)
They have distinguished themselves as ‘adequate’
because they are based on ‘root metaphors’, which, over
time, have proved more fertile in depth and breadth than
other metaphors. They have generated refined knowledge
in the form of cohesive theories supported by an array of
observations and evidence and yielding better predic-
tions. Formism is underpinned by the root metaphor of
‘similarity’. It emphasizes the regularity of pure forms,
structural points of balance and stability, produced by
natural laws. Plato's philosophy is an exemplar. Mecha-
nism sees the world in Newtonian terms, as made up of
objects in space and time determined in their movements
JACKSON 7

8. by causal laws. Its root metaphor is the ‘machine’. The
root metaphor of contextualism is the ‘act in its context’.
This highlights continuous change, unpredictability and
multiple possible interpretations. Pragmatist philoso-
phers, such as Pierce, James and Dewey, are con-
textualists. Organicism is exemplified in Hegel's
philosophy. It is underpinned by the root metaphor of
‘integration’. A process can be identified in which frag-
ments of understanding are progressively integrated into
an organic whole in which there are no contradictions. It
is comforting to note, at this stage, that all these world
hypotheses are reflected in the various systems
approaches available. For example, formism in system
dynamics and the viable system model and contextualism
in soft systems methodologies. Critical systems thinkers,
eager to improve social systems, are in a position to
respond to the quite different views of reality offered by
the four world hypotheses.
According to Pepper (1942),
None of them [the four world hypotheses]
can … support a claim of absolute truth, or
certainty. (p. 73)
Nevertheless, they do represent ‘successes of cognition’,
the ‘creative discoveries of many generations’, and do
contain some knowledge:
The gears grind, the lights flicker, and the
lenses distort. Nevertheless, we do seem to
get some idea of our world from these vehi-
cles, and without them we should have to
walk pretty much in the dark. (Pepper, 1942,
p. 80)
This ‘partial scepticism’, as Pepper calls it, is similar to
Lakoff and Johnson's position, although he cannot follow
them in using pragmatism to justify the range of experi-
ential gestalts because pragmatism constitutes just one of
the world hypotheses.
In Pepper's view, the four world hypotheses demon-
strate ‘equal or nearly equal adequacy’. They stand on a
par, and we cannot afford to lose any of them. Having
four alternative theories supplies us with considerably
more information on a subject than any one alone. In a
nice phrase, he states that ‘four good lights cast fewer
shadows than one when the sun is hid’ (Pepper, 1942,
p. 342). The four world hypotheses are of unlimited scope
and are therefore autonomous and mutually exclusive.
We cannot allocate them to different purposes because
they all have useful things to say about the same object.
Basically, they are irreconcilable. Here, Pepper antici-
pates Kuhn's theory of paradigm incommensurability
(Kuhn, 1970, makes no mention of Pepper). It follows
that we cannot use ‘facts’ to decide between them
because each interprets the facts according to its own
assumptions. Nor is there any higher truth to legislate
over the four world hypotheses—‘there is no authority
but the actual world theories which have achieved … cor-
roboration’ (Pepper, 1942, p. 347). The only legitimate
critics of world theories are, therefore, other world
theories.
In seeking to employ the four world hypotheses,
with their root metaphors, to interpret and act in the
world, Pepper (1942) recommends we proceed with
‘rational clarity in theory and reasonable eclecticism in
practice’ (p. 330, italics in the original). Rational clarity
in theory is necessary for the sake of intellectual trans-
parency and to ensure the future expansion and devel-
opment of each of the equally adequate world
hypotheses. We cannot afford to lose the insights each
of them offers and might bring in the future. Any
attempt to reconcile world hypotheses ‘turns out to be
the judgement of one of the theories on the nature of
the others’ (Pepper, 1942, pp. 105–106). No reconcilia-
tion can do full justice to them all. Any attempt to
cherry pick from them sows confusion and risks cogni-
tive loss, the impact of which we have no means of
estimating, compared with having the pure theories at
our disposal (Pepper, 1942, p. 148). Thus, Pepper rejects
imperialism and pragmatism as we defined them. In
practice, however, we need the benefits all four of the
world hypotheses can bring, and we can afford to be
more eclectic:
In practice, therefore, we shall want to be
not rational but reasonable, and to seek, on
the matter in question, the judgement sup-
plied from each of these relatively adequate
world theories. If there is some difference of
judgement, we shall wish to make our deci-
sion with all these modes of evidence in
mind, just as we should make any other deci-
sions where evidence is conflicting.
(Pepper, 1942, p. 331)
It is clear from this that what Pepper means by ‘rea-
sonable eclecticism’ is not integrating the different world
hypotheses. They must remain distinct. The eclecticism
comes from somehow keeping all four of them at the
forefront of one's mind throughout the course of an
intervention:
Our postrational eclecticism consists simply
in holding these four theories in suspended
judgment as constituting the sum of our
8 JACKSON

9. knowledge on the subject. (Pepper, 1942,
p. 342)
And because only world hypotheses can legitimately
challenge other world hypotheses, conflict between them
is to be encouraged. They act as excellent checks on each
other:
We need all world hypotheses, so far as they
are adequate, for mutual comparison and
correction of interpretative bias. (Pepper,-
1942, p. 101)
There is a final warning from Pepper, which should
be heeded by systems thinkers but rarely is. He uses the
term ‘hypostatization’ for a process in which concepts
can lose contact with their root metaphors and become
empty abstractions (Pepper, 1942, p. 113). Wiktionary
provides an excellent definition of hypostatization: ‘to
construe a contextually-subjective and complex abstrac-
tion, idea, or concept as a universal object without regard
to nuance or change in character’. This is what many sys-
tems thinkers do with the concept ‘system’. It should be
obvious to all that the concept has become thin—used to
describe everything from double glazing to the universe.
In Pepper's (1942) terms, ‘the very emptiness of the con-
cept is used as an argument for its acceptance’ (p. 124).
Systems thinkers treat it as if it has ‘a cosmic glow about
it’ and demand respect for it in its own right. This can
soon lead to earthly scepticism and loss of respect. The
concept ‘system’ cannot be provided with a universal def-
inition. The way forward, as Pepper would say, is to
return it to its original root metaphors: to understand
and use the concept in the context of the various world
theories to which it has provided service and which lend
it meaning and significance.
The argument of this section, so far, is that we need
all four of Pepper's well-formulated world theories to
ensure breadth and depth at the start of a systems inter-
vention. It can be progressed and brought closer to home,
if we relate it to two contributions to organization theory.
Burrell and Morgan (1979) consider the ‘sociological par-
adigms’ that have dominated in organizational analysis,
whereas Morgan (1986) reviews the metaphors behind
our taken-for-granted ‘images of organizations’.
Burrell and Morgan's thesis is that theories about the
social world can be conceived of in terms of four funda-
mental paradigms. It is these paradigms that govern orga-
nizational analysis. The paradigms reflect assumptions
made about social science and society. Social science is
predisposed to being either ‘objective’ or ‘subjective’.
Roughly, it can be pursued on the basis that society
makeswoman/man or woman/man makes society.
Society is seen as in need of either ‘regulation’ or ‘radical
change’. Basically, assumptions are either supportive of
the status quo or challenging of it. If the objective–
subjective and regulation–radical change dimensions are
combined, we can produce a matrix defining the four
paradigms. These are labelled ‘functionalist’ (objective
and regulative), ‘interpretive’ (subjective and regulative),
‘radical structuralist’ (radical change and objective) and
‘radical humanist’ (radical change and subjective). In
these terms, Durkheim is a functionalist, Dilthey an
interpretive thinker, the ‘mature’ Marx a radical structur-
alist and the young Marx a radical humanist. Burrell and
Morgan's matrix has been much used by systems thinkers
to delve into the social theory underpinning different sys-
tems methodologies. Checkland (1981) employed it to dif-
ferentiate the social reality implied by his soft systems
methodology from that assumed in hard systems think-
ing; Jackson (1982) to demonstrate the limitations
imposed on practice by the social theory underpinning
all versions of soft systems thinking. Lane (1999) uses it
to inquire into the social theory implied by system
dynamics.
Burrell and Morgan agree with Pepper and Kuhn in
seeing paradigms as irreconcilable or incommensurable.
They are closer to Pepper than Kuhn in believing they
continue to possess ‘equal or nearly equal adequacy’.
Kuhn came to see progress, at least in problem-solving
capacity, in the sequence of paradigms that have domi-
nated the physical sciences—from Aristotle to Newton to
Einstein. There is no such progress in Pepper's ‘world
hypotheses’, all of which remain ‘relatively adequate’.
The same with Burrell and Morgan's sociological para-
digms. All are still firmly on the table as ways of under-
standing social reality and organizations. The main point,
again, is to insist that the perspectives of the variety of
sociological paradigms are fully represented at the
Explore stage of a systems intervention. From the critical
systems viewpoint, if any paradigm is ignored, our initial
grasp of the problem situation will be too narrow. Burrell
and Morgan assert, in particular, that sufficient space be
afforded to paradigms that risk exclusion because they do
not respond to establishment concerns. It is necessary to
add that a modern account of significant sociological par-
adigms would need to pay greater attention to ‘structural-
ism’ and ‘postmodernism’ (Jackson, 2000).
Morgan's account of different ‘images of organization’
returns us to the crucial role metaphors play in thinking,
as already identified by Lakoff and Johnson. Now, how-
ever, the target is specifically organization theory:
I believe that by building on the use of -
metaphor—which is basic to our way of
thinking generally—we have a means of
JACKSON 9

10. enhancing our capacity for creative yet disci-
plined thought, in a way that allows us to
grasp and deal with the many-sided charac-
ter of organizational life. (Morgan, 1986,
p. 17)
Morgan identifies eight common metaphors in the
literature—organizations as ‘machines’, ‘organisms’,
‘brains’, ‘cultures’, ‘political systems’, ‘psychic prisons’,
‘flux and transformation’ and ‘instruments of domina-
tion’. Each offers a distinctive yet partial view of organi-
zations and yields an alternative understanding of their
nature. He does not regard these metaphors as mutually
exclusive, as incommensurable, but rather as offering dif-
ferent ‘readings’, which provide us with a richer insight
into the ambiguity and complexity of organizational life.
Effective managers and professionals can use metaphors
to
… develop the knack of reading situations
with various scenarios in mind, and of forg-
ing actions that seem appropriate to the
readings thus obtained. (Morgan, 1986,
p. 11)
They can be used to enhance creative insight and develop
critical thinking:
Metaphor encourages us to think and act in
new ways. It extends horizons of insight and
creates new possibilities. As we gain comfort
in using the implications of different meta-
phors in this way, we quickly learn that the
insights of one metaphor can often help us
overcome the limitations of another.… Meta-
phors lead to new metaphors, creating a
mosaic of competing and complementary
insights. This is one of the most powerful
qualities of the approach. (Morgan, 1997,
pp. 351–352)
In Images of Organization (Morgan, 1986), Morgan
offers a comprehensive review of the metaphors that
have proven useful in organizational analysis. This work
can help to ensure breadth and depth during Explore.
Making use of them can also facilitate the shift to Produce
(an intervention strategy) because the same metaphors
can easily be identified in different systems approaches.
In my view, Morgan makes a mistake in his later book,
Imaginization (Morgan, 1993), when he encourages a
kind of postmodern ‘free-for-all’ of metaphor use in
which we ‘trust ourselves in finding imaginative ways of
dealing with the problems we face’. This presents a threat
to both breadth and depth. It does not guarantee that the
range of insights is fully covered. We also lose what Pep-
per calls ‘reasonable eclecticism’ (Morgan's eclecticism is
unreasonable). There is no recognition that some meta-
phors, in Lakoff and Johnson's terms, have been the basis
for more successful experiential gestalts.
6 | PRECURSORS OF EXPLORE IN
THE SYSTEMS TRADITION
In the light of the argument so far, it is interesting to look
at some precursors of Explore, as it might now be concep-
tualized, from within the systems thinking tradition.
In 1984, Linstone released a book, Multiple Perspec-
tives for Decision-Making, showing how taking three dif-
ferent viewpoints could yield a rich appreciation of
problem situations. The Traditional or technical
(T) perspective, dependent on data and model-based
analysis, is augmented by an Organizational (O) or socie-
tal perspective, and a Personal (P) or individual perspec-
tive. The T, O and P perspectives act as filters through
which problem situations are viewed, and each yields
insight that is not attainable with the others. Linstone
argues that the different perspectives are most powerfully
employed when they are clearly differentiated from one
another but are used together to interrogate the same
complex issue. One should not expect consistency in the
findings—different perspectives may reinforce one
another but may equally present quite different apprecia-
tions. Although there is much to applaud in this, we
might criticize the failure to consider whether these per-
spectives achieve sufficient breadth and the absence of
any attempt to relate the perspectives to philosophies and
social theories of proven utility. It is also disappointing
that they are not linked to the range of different systems
methodologies that could help practitioners respond to
their findings.
Ackoff (1999) argues that contemporary corporations
are best viewed as ‘social systems’ with responsibilities to
themselves, their parts and to the wider systems of which
they are part. These responsibilities present organizations
with ‘control’, ‘humanization’ and ‘environmentalization’
issues, respectively. But Ackoff still sees value in the
machine and organism metaphors in appropriate circum-
stances and makes use of methods and techniques associ-
ated with them in the context of his ‘interactive planning’
methodology. This is a powerful combination which
Barabba (2004), for example, employed in helping to turn
General Motors round in the 1990s. Nevertheless,
Ackoff's approach is limited by his imperialism (the
social systems perspective dominating the machine and
organism views) and the narrowness of his social systems
10 JACKSON

11. lens. For example, the lens has been criticized
(e.g., Jackson, 1982) because it does not incorporate the
concerns of the radical structuralist paradigm and the
image of organizations as instruments of domination.
In their early attempt to put critical systems thinking
to work, Flood and Jackson described the first stage of
their ‘total systems intervention’ (TSI) meta-methodol-
ogy—called creativity—in terms of ‘task’, ‘tools’ and ‘out-
come’. The task was to use systems metaphors as
organizing structures to help managers and other stake-
holders think creatively about their enterprises. The tools
were metaphors derived from Morgan's images of
organization—machine, organism, brain, culture, team,
coalition and prison. They were consciously chosen to
cover the ground mapped by social theory and organiza-
tional analysis. Metaphor analysis was selected rather
than paradigm analysis because the language of meta-
phors is easier to understand—a concession to usability.
The outcome was expected to be the identification of a
‘dominant metaphor’, which would be the one highlight-
ing what seemed to be the most significant issues. This
metaphor, along with those issues, would be used to
guide choice of an appropriate systems methodology.
Other metaphors, revealing less-pressing matters, were
called dependent but could become dominant as the inter-
vention proceeded. Such a shift would require a concomi-
tant change in methodology. All this, I think, can provide
Explore with a solid foundation, although certain aspects
need to be better explained and more clearly specified.
In my recent reworking of Flood and Jackson's ‘crea-
tivity’, as part of CSP (Jackson, 2019), it continued to be
described as having three aspects—‘task’, ‘tools’ and
‘desired outcome’. The task was said to be highlighting
significant issues in the problem situation. The tools used
to achieve this were
Systems perspectives, and other creativity-
enhancing devices, employed to ensure that
the viewpoints of different paradigms receive
proper attention. (Jackson, 2019, p. 594)
Seven ‘systems perspectives’ were identified—
machine, organism, cultural, political, coercive system,
environmental and interrelationships. The desired out-
come was the identification of primary and secondary
issues that needed to be addressed. The obvious changes
from TSI were the emphasis on paradigms to check that
the full range of viewpoints was employed, the change in
terminology from metaphors to systems perspectives, the
addition of the environmental and interrelationships per-
spectives, and the replacement of dominant and depen-
dent metaphors with primary and secondary issues.
There was progress here, but the arguments developed in
this paper allow an even clearer statement of the princi-
ples Explore must uphold and how it can to do so as part
of CSP.
7 | EXPLORE IN CSP
Let us assume that a crisis, or a feeling that ‘things could
be better’ in a particular policy area, has provoked a call
for action. After looking at the issues, the decision
makers conclude that they are closely interconnected,
that there is no obvious boundary to their problem and
that any action will have wide ramifications. They are
engaged with a complex problem situation. It is not easy
to untangle and get to grips with such problem situations
because they exhibit VUCA characteristics—volatility,
uncertainty, complexity and ambiguity. This is often
compounded by stakeholder conflict. Complex problem
situations are messes, which give rise to wicked prob-
lems. No one systems approach can understand them as
a whole. Attempts to model them are always partial. The
decision makers determine that a CSP approach is
necessary.
Explore, the first stage of the CSP multimethodology,
aims to provide a rich appreciation of complex problem
situations and insists that this is best done by examining
them through the perspectives provided by a wide variety
of different lenses. The notion of ‘systemic perspectives’
can help to navigate the main points at issue here. Sys-
temic perspectives are not simply metaphors. To carry
weight, they must be based on the ‘successes of cogni-
tion’, the ‘creative discoveries of many generations’ that
make our encounters with reality coherent and have
enabled successful functioning in the physical and cul-
tural worlds. The systemic perspectives chosen should be
checked against the range of world hypotheses and socio-
logical paradigms to ensure that this is the case. This
guarantees that we are not missing any important ‘experi-
ential gestalts’. Breadth is thus ensured. The expression
‘systemic perspectives’ also reminds us that we need well-
formulated, interlinked sets of ideas, making up coherent
wholes, with which to interrogate problem situations.
Rescher (1979) reinforces the point, in his ‘coherentist
theory of knowledge’, when he notes the tendency of
human beings to organize their knowledge in ‘cognitive
systems’. These cognitive systems are structured frame-
works linking various elements of our knowledge into
cohesive wholes. They express certain intellectual
norms—simplicity, regularity, uniformity, comprehen-
siveness, unity, harmony and economy; norms that peo-
ple have found useful in thinking about and making
their way in the world. Cohesive systemic perspectives
allow us to maintain ‘rational clarity’ in theory and
JACKSON 11

12. provide appropriate depth of analysis. Learning can
occur, and parallel usage becomes easier when we adhere
to such precise theoretical constructions. Systemic per-
spectives of this type allow us to avoid the twin dangers
posed to breadth and depth by imperialism and pragma-
tism. The idea of metaphors does not put us on guard to
the same extent and, therefore, does not offer the same
protection. Systemic perspectives can also be framed
without using the specialist language philosophers and
sociologists employ to articulate world hypotheses and
sociological paradigms. That kind of language, employed
in systems interventions, is tortuous and hinders rather
that helps Explore, requiring too much prior learning on
the part of participants. Systemic perspectives should
reflect everyday language, employing concepts that are in
common usage. This facilitates the realization of ‘reason-
able eclecticism’ in practice.
I think we can provide the rational clarity and reason-
able eclecticism necessary for Explore using five systemic
perspectives (reduced from the seven in Jackson, 2019).
These perspectives can be called, drawing their names
from their root metaphors, ‘machine’, ‘organism’,
‘cultural/political’, ‘societal/environmental’ and ‘interre-
lationships’. An outline description of each is now pro-
vided. More could be said, and they do need further
clarification. Wallis' (2019) ‘integrative propositional
analysis’ could usefully be employed to evaluate the
structure and internal coherence of each. But the main
point here is to check for the breadth and depth of the set
of perspectives. And it should be remembered that we are
only at the beginning of the systems intervention. The
role of systemic perspectives, as part of Explore, is simply
to help untangle the complexity of the problem situation.
The next stage of CSP, Produce (an intervention strategy),
is designed to ensure that the methodologies chosen for
use in the intervention are exactly those suitable for a
more in-depth examination of the issues highlighted.
Explore, therefore, requires that we view the problem
situation from five systemic perspectives.
The machine perspective covers the machine meta-
phor (Ackoff and Morgan), Pepper's mechanism, aspects
of the functionalist sociological paradigm and Linstone's
technical perspective. It is used, in Explore, to identify the
causes of faults in an existing problem situation and/or to
design a better system. This perspective views problem
situations as machines made up of parts connected in
pursuit of a goal. The parts must be present and correct
and properly fitted together. Some of these discrete parts
are essential to the process involved in achieving the pur-
pose, including supplying force or energy. Others are
there to apply control and co-ordination in pursuit of a
predictable outcome—in the social context, this trans-
lates into passing instructions down a hierarchy and
setting rules. The machine is judged on whether it dem-
onstrates efficacy (is well organized to achieve its pur-
pose) and efficiency (does so with minimum use of
resources). This perspective dominated traditional man-
agement theory, with its direct antecedents found in
Weber's ‘ideal type’ of bureaucracy, Taylor's ‘scientific
management’ and Fayol's ‘administrative management’.
The organism perspective covers the organism meta-
phor (Ackoff and Morgan), Morgan's brain metaphor,
Pepper's formism (with hints of organicism) and aspects
of the functionalist and structuralist sociological para-
digms. This lens shifts attention from goal seeking to via-
bility. It supplies an ideal-type model of an organism that
is used, in Explore, to diagnose pathologies in a problem
situation and/or suggest how systems should be designed
to survive and thrive. An organism, as it evolves, becomes
differentiated into subsystems, social and technical,
which meet its survival needs. These subsystems only
make sense in terms of the functions they perform for the
whole. The organism is an open system that depends on
its environment and, to survive and thrive, it must main-
tain a dynamic equilibrium with that changing environ-
ment. It is equipped with a brain, or managerial
subsystem, which houses memory, takes decisions and is
capable of learning. This subsystem is responsible for
securing favourable interchanges with the environment
and maintaining a suitable integration and balance
between the other subsystems so that the needs of the
whole are met. At the same time, the subsystems must be
partially autonomous; otherwise, the organism as a
whole would lack the capacity to respond to environmen-
tal shifts. In a turbulent environment, its higher manage-
ment levels would be overwhelmed with exceptional
cases requiring their constant involvement. The organism
is judged on whether the parts are functioning well, on
whether they are properly co-ordinated, control is
exercised, and viability is secured in the face of a turbu-
lent environment. Katz and Kahn's (1978, originally
1966) list of 10 characteristics of all open systems, draw-
ing upon the work of von Bertalanffy, popularized the
organism metaphor in organization theory. Wilden (1972,
pp. 373–374) provides, perhaps, the best technical
description with his model of the ‘goal-seeking adaptive
system’.
The cultural/political perspective covers part of
Ackoff's social systems metaphor (control and humaniza-
tion issues), Morgan's cultures and political systems met-
aphors, Pepper's contextualism (with aspects of
organicism), the interpretive sociological paradigm, ele-
ments of postmodernism and Linstone's organizational
and personal viewpoints. This perspective focuses on
human beings and the way they think, act and interact.
Humans attach meaning to the situations they find
12 JACKSON

13. themselves in. Social reality emerges from processes in
which different perceptions of reality and the interests of
different groups are continuously negotiated and
renegotiated. Such processes can give rise to stable struc-
tures but just as often produce change and novelty. The
world is unpredictable and what has happened, and is
happening, are subject to multiple interpretations. A
shared culture may come into being, which promotes
familiar and persistent ways of seeing and acting. On the
other hand, different individuals often see the world dif-
ferently and pursue different goals. Groups of individuals
with diverse interests can become established, leading to
political shenanigans, conflict and power games. There is
no agreement on what makes for a perfect
cultural/political system. This systemic perspective is not,
therefore, employed in Explore as an exemplar. Rather, it
alerts practitioners to look out for a variety of cultural
and political factors that may require attention in a prob-
lem situation. They will look to see if a culture is in place
that allows shared purposes to emerge. There needs to be
mutual understanding and agreement that the right
things are being done—that the system is effective. On
the other hand, the culture should not be so strong that it
generates groupthink and stifles original thinking and
innovation. It may harbour ‘myths’, which hinder free
thought and discussion. They require exposing and chal-
lenging. Disagreements, pursued through politics, can be
healthy. However, consideration needs to be given to
whether there are means available for reaching accom-
modations and keeping conflict under control.
The societal/environmental perspective covers
Ackoff's environmentalization issue, part of Morgan's
organism metaphor, his psychic prison and instruments
of domination metaphors, the radical humanist and radi-
cal structuralist sociological paradigms and aspects of
postmodernism. It is a lens that points out the potential
societal/environmental shortcomings of systems
interventions—who will benefit from them and who will
suffer. In its mildest form, it draws attention to the wide
variety of stakeholders who might be impacted and
argues, for example, that organizations should consider
the needs of their suppliers, employees, customers and
the communities in which they operate, as well as their
own priorities. This is often couched in terms of corpo-
rate social responsibility. A more radical version of the
lens makes the case for those it sees as disadvantaged by
current social arrangements. This aspect was most fully
developed by Marx in relation to class conflict in capital-
ist society. More recently, race, gender, sexual orientation
and other forms of discrimination have been identified as
providing independent bases for multiple forms of
inequality. Advocates of the perspective argue that
improvement can only come about through the
empowerment and emancipation of oppressed groups.
This requires significant change to the status quo. The
societal/environmental perspective also responds directly
to the environmental crisis facing the planet. We all
depend upon the natural environment, which we endan-
ger when we exploit natural resources and create waste.
The sustainability of life on earth relies upon us nurtur-
ing the natural world and protecting it for future genera-
tions. If we ignore these issues, in addressing problem
situations, the impact on the world's flora and fauna, pol-
lution and climate change will overcome Gaia's regula-
tory capacity, and our blue planet will be no more. The
societal/environmental perspective is used, as part of
Explore, to identify neglected stakeholders, discrimina-
tion and inequality and to suggest that interventions take
into account the lot of the disadvantaged and the conse-
quences for the environment.
The interrelationships perspective covers part of Mor-
gan's flux and transformation metaphor. The issues iden-
tified by other perspectives will, of course, be
interrelated—linked in chains of mutual causality.
Although the VUCA world of general complexity and
wicked problems forestalls the exact mathematical
modelling of these interrelationships, it may occasionally
be possible to identify important linkages, which suggest
some possible unintended consequences of interventions
or constitute leverage points for bringing about improve-
ment. For example, the Munro Review of Child Protection
(Munro, 2010) identified apparent causal linkages from
increased prescription (greater use of the mechanistic
perspective) to various consequences that led to poor out-
comes, for example, a reduction in professional discretion
(impact on autonomy from the organism perspective),
and lower public regard for child protection workers
(influence on their status from the cultural/political per-
spective). The clear representation of these linkages in
causal loop diagrams had sufficient resonance in the pro-
fession, and with politicians, to provoke legislation
designed to create a more ‘child-centred system’. The per-
spective is worth having in the Explore repertoire to
remind us of the interrelationships between the issues
identified and for its occasional capacity to provide use-
able insights, even if we usually have to rest content with
discovering the results of the interactions of the multi-
tudes of causal factors sometime after the event.
These systemic perspectives, drawn from well-
respected classifications of world theories, paradigms and
metaphors, capture the essence of those ‘experiential
gestalts’ that have stood the test of time. They make up a
set, which can help us avoid the traps that catch out the
unwary at the beginning of a systems study. They meet
the requirements of breadth and depth as clarified in the
supportive theoretical pointers. As will become apparent
JACKSON 13

14. in the other papers in this series, they also serve the pur-
poses of later stages of CSP. For example, they are well
aligned to the assumptions made by the different systems
methodologies, which we shall have at our disposal dur-
ing the Produce phase. The issues the different perspec-
tives bring to attention correspond to those prioritized by
the different methodologies.
These perspectives, I would argue, are also easy to
complement with other proven creativity-enhancing
devices. They can, for example, be used hand in hand
with ‘rich pictures’ (Checkland, 1981) to make a creativ-
ity exercise more stimulating and exciting. Once they
have grasped the essentials of the machine perspective,
participants in a study can be asked to draw a rich picture
that shows how their organization is failing as a machine.
Then, perhaps, another one picturing what it would have
to be like to be a successful machine. They could be
asked to produce a rich picture, based on the
societal/environmental systemic perspective, to encour-
age thinking about who is being discriminated against in
tackling a social issue in a particular way. There are
many fruitful avenues to explore using the combination
of systemic perspectives and rich pictures.
The Explore stage ends when the decision makers,
and other stakeholders involved, conclude that they can
‘identify the primary and secondary issues’ in the com-
plex problem situation they are confronting. How these
emerge will depend upon the context of the intervention,
as we shall see in the examples below. In very general
terms, the ‘primary’ issues are those that seem to need
most urgent attention—perhaps they appear to get to the
heart of the matter and scream out at the participants.
The secondary issues are, on the practical grounds that
we cannot do everything at once, ruled out for immediate
action. Nevertheless, CSP insists, they must be kept in
mind and may assume greater importance, later in the
intervention, when a fresh run through Explore brings
them to the fore.
As previously mentioned, CSP can be used in a diag-
nostic mode and in a design mode. It is equally at home
with problem situations that transcend organizational
boundaries—such as social and ecological issues—as
with those arising for individual organizations. The two
examples now presented, of how Explore works, cover
the ground in these respects.
7.1 | Example 1: Diagnosis in a multi-
agency situation: Covid-19
The first example offers a commentary on the difficulties
encountered by a health system (here taken to involve
government, National Health Service [NHS], care homes,
health advisors, health professionals, etc.), confronting a
serious, unexpected disease outbreak. It refers to the
experience of Covid-19 in the United Kingdom but does
so only to indicate how Explore would work if used to
help diagnose the major issues and suggest necessary
actions. It does not seek to make definitive judgements
on decisions made before, or in response to, the crisis.
The information available is currently too sketchy for
such an evaluation.
The Covid-19 pandemic, its progress and the
responses to it represent, in Morin's (2006) terms, a case
of ‘general’ rather than ‘restricted’ complexity. There are
many variables in interaction with one another and sig-
nificant sociocultural and psychological factors at play.
Any models used to predict the course of the outbreak
will be partial and will point decision makers in certain
directions. The models, as well as other preferences of
the decision makers, will therefore impact how the out-
break progresses. This is exactly why Morin identifies the
fundamental problem of general complexity as ‘epistemo-
logical, cognitive, and paradigmatic’. Responses to epi-
demics tend to place significant reliance on
epidemiological models. But these models struggle when
there are many variables and transmission is not random,
that is, in situations of ‘organized complexity’
(Weaver, 1948). Significant psychological and sociocul-
tural factors add more difficulties (Pruyt, Auping, &
Kwakkel, 2015). In the case of Covid-19, when there was
a lack of information on who had the disease, on trans-
mission rates and on processes of infection, as well as
about the reactions of individuals and communities to
the disease and the actions taken to combat it, no model
could be relied upon for accurate predictions. As chaos
theory demonstrates, a small change in the weight
attached to any variable can have a huge impact on the
outcome a model produces. Not surprisingly, similar
models in the United Kingdom showed total deaths rang-
ing from a few thousand to 500,000. Epidemiological
models are useful in situations of ‘restricted complexity’,
but their outputs need treating with extreme caution in
cases of ‘general complexity’.
It is now possible to run through the systemic per-
spectives to identify why a health system might fail in the
face of a novel disease outbreak. In terms of the machine
perspective, we would expect the system to have a clear
objective in the face of a possible emergency, plans in
place to achieve it, the necessary parts available and pro-
cesses designed according to well-specified rules. In the
United Kingdom, with Covid-19, there had been plan-
ning for a possible flu pandemic, but this does not seem
to have been followed through. In any case, Covid-19 rep-
resented a somewhat different challenge. Clearly, some
vital ‘parts’ were missing. There were severe staff
14 JACKSON

15. shortages and, at the beginning of the outbreak, a lack of
hospital beds, ventilators and personal protective equip-
ment (PPE). Microbiology/virology laboratories, neces-
sary to develop and carry out testing, had been closed or
outsourced to the private sector. There were no adequate
arrangements in place to ‘track and trace’ or a workforce
trained to undertake this task. The increased role of the
private sector, which had become dominant in running
care homes, hindered the application of standardized
procedures.
From the point of view of a well-functioning organ-
ism, we would expect learning from past experiences.
This had occurred in countries previously affected by
SARS, such as South Korea, Taiwan and Hong Kong, but
had not, apparently, been absorbed into the United King-
dom's ‘brain’. An organism must pay attention to its envi-
ronment, managing necessary inputs and outputs. In the
case of the United Kingdom, hospitals were already
struggling to cope with existing patient demand, and sup-
ply lines for staffing and vital equipment were not secure.
There were significant issues with ‘bed-blocking’, and
when beds had to be freed up for Covid-19 cases, it was
difficult to provide for the safe discharge of existing
patients. If an organism is to successfully adapt in a fast-
changing environment, it needs sufficient response
capacity. The necessary ‘variety’ (Ashby, 1956) of
response can be achieved using forms of integration and
information management that provide appropriate auton-
omy to subsystems. In England, however, the NHS
remains largely hierarchical, and decisions about how to
respond to the epidemic were taken centrally by the gov-
ernment. This can be compared with the situation in Ger-
many where regions have much more power and
responsibility and were able to redirect local resources to
bolster the ‘track and trace’ system. Government issued
proclamations, which were met with incredulity because
they did not match the reality on the ground. Local bod-
ies, meanwhile, lacked the information and authority to
launch their own initiatives in response to their individ-
ual circumstances (Harris, 2020). This was reinforced
when a centralized ‘track and trace’ system was intro-
duced after little or no consultation, it has been claimed,
with local authority public health teams (McCoy, 2020).
In Leicester, where a second spike in the epidemic
occurred, local leaders were unable to access the data
needed to implement appropriate action. Not that they
had the power to do much anyway. Further, one would
expect a well-functioning organism to have the capacity
to adjust its priorities, to deal with a novel and immediate
threat, without having to abandon other activities
equally essential to its performance (in this case referrals
for cancer screening, treatment for heart disease and can-
cer, etc.). Of course, the argument for greater
decentralization, explicit in this analysis, needs careful
consideration in the light of experiences in the United
States, where the lack of a unified response has been
blamed for many of the problems encountered.
The cultural/political perspective draws attention to
the ‘epistemological, cognitive, and paradigmatic’ factors
that Morin warns about. It has been argued that the UK
Government's response to Covid-19 was permeated by a
culture of ‘English exceptionalism’. This manifested itself
in a slowness to learn from other countries already in
the throes of the epidemic and to listen to advice from
the World Health Organization (WHO). Everything the
United Kingdom did had to be ‘world beating’, whether
that be the ‘track and trace’ system itself or the unique
app that would put the cherry on the cake of that system.
The same perspective reveals groupthink over the
nature of ‘the science’ on which the government placed
so much reliance. It was a very traditional type of science.
There are alternatives. For example, complexity theory
argues that if you are confronted by a chaotic situation,
you do not spend time finessing the mathematics and sta-
tistics. You need to act quickly and decisively
(Snowden & Boone, 2007). As Taleb and Bar-Yam (2020)
put it, in relation to the UK Government's response to
Covid-19, ‘someone watching an avalanche heading in
their direction [does not call] for complicated statistical
models to see if they need to get out of the way’. But that
is the way that establishment science, the basis for epide-
miological models, works. This type of science seems to
have encouraged dithering and delay as models were
argued over and refined. Direct action, such as lock-
downs, closure of airports and seaports, rapid testing and
tracing systems and frank communication, proved to be
effective elsewhere. They were slow to be adopted or
were quickly abandoned in the United Kingdom. Other
countries looked on in amazement at the endless bicker-
ing about the efficacy of face masks. There seems to have
been no challenge to the establishment science. ‘Behav-
ioural scientists’ were asked to comment on psychologi-
cal and sociocultural impacts, but their thinking seems to
have been constrained by the stimulus–response model
that allows them to fit into ‘the science’ paradigm and
makes them attractive to decision makers. This model
detracts from an alternative view that people should be
treated as intelligent, as capable of understanding the sit-
uation and acting reasonably. Information presented at
the daily press conferences was seen by many as mas-
saged to suit the government's agenda and present it in a
good light. For example, comparisons of the United King-
dom's performance against other countries were dropped
when it became obvious that it was worse. Trust was dis-
sipated. Of course, politics was also important. Govern-
ment ministers no doubt found it helpful to accept a view
JACKSON 15

16. of ‘the science’ as something which they were duty bound
to follow.
Another significant cultural factor at work is the
‘myth’ that surrounds the NHS. In the United Kingdom,
it is impossible to win political power without declaring
that the NHS is the best health system in the world and
your party will be its champion and protector.
Davies (2020) argues that the NHS myth has become
‘entangled with a host of other national British icons,
many of which hark back to the second world war’. Gov-
ernment thinking was clearly influenced by this ‘myth’.
Early messages were based on the extraordinary mantra
(viewed from outside the United Kingdom) of ‘save the
NHS’. This may have contributed to a certain fatalism
with regard to the population at large. Notions of ‘herd
immunity’ were entertained. It certainly helped to justify
the decision to shift from a policy of track and trace (for-
mally abandoned as early as the 12th of March) to one of
‘flattening the curve’ to allow the NHS to cope. The alter-
native strategy, successful elsewhere, of eliminating the
virus through rapidly escalating testing capacity and
imposing isolation went by the wayside. Because the
NHS had to be protected, the boundary that already
existed between the NHS and care homes was reinforced.
Drawing upon Midgley's (1992) mode of analysis, the
NHS was regarded as ‘sacred’. Care homes assumed a
‘profane’ status. To free up beds, it appears that patients
were emptied out of hospital back into their care homes
without testing, thus spreading the disease there. The
NHS was prioritized for PPE and testing kits. Care
workers were allowed to move between care homes. A
tragedy began to unfold in the care sector.
From the societal/environmental perspective, a health
system with the capacity to respond successfully to a
novel pandemic must have the trust of its stakeholders.
Otherwise, it will not gain support for the actions it takes.
This is best built from the bottom up, with the participa-
tion of citizens in community health bodies. In the
United Kingdom's centralized system, this has been lac-
king, and central initiatives are greeted with suspicion.
Further, viewing the problem situation through this lens,
a health system equipped to cope with something like
Covid-19 ought to consider in advance, plan for and try
to address the effect that inequalities could have on the
impact and progress of the disease. In the United King-
dom, it seems that insufficient consideration was given to
the likelihood that the poorest, including many from
Black and minority ethnic groupings, would be hardest
hit. Questions have also been asked, from this perspec-
tive, about whether the failure to protect care homes was
the result of ‘systematic ageism’ (see Toynbee, 2020).
The interrelationships perspective focuses attention on
the many connections between the issues highlighted by
the other perspectives. In this case, there were far too
many to make mathematical modelling or computer sim-
ulation a useful exercise. The perspective can only draw
important interactions to the attention of decision
makers. For example, the lack of PPE, and the privileging
of the NHS, contributed to the scale of the outbreak in
care homes. There must be some sympathy for the deci-
sion makers caught in the maelstrom, even if they had a
part in creating it. The system was in crisis from all per-
spectives, and there were no obvious leverage points that
could be targeted to generate overall improvement.
The purpose of this example is not, as was noted, to
apportion blame. I have employed it to show how CSP
might have assisted preparedness, in a multi-agency situ-
ation, for a major disease outbreak. It would have identi-
fied some primary issues that needed immediate action
and some secondary issues deserving of attention when
resources allowed. Once the epidemic had started, it
could have pointed to where best to direct the response.
What were the primary issues then would depend on
where the greatest impact could be had quickly. For
example, a lack of PPE would assume greater immediate
significance than a reorganization of the health service to
promote more effective local autonomy.
7.2 | Example 2: Design of a single
organization: Hull University Business
School
Our second account of Explore in action is designing a
new business school at the University of Hull in the
United Kingdom. It can be short because the case has
been detailed elsewhere as an application of CSP
(Jackson, 2019, 2021). Briefly, Hull University Business
School (HUBS) was founded in 1999 and, by 2011, had
gained accreditation from the three major business
school accrediting bodies—placing it in the top 1% of
business schools worldwide. I was dean during those
12 years and often used CSP, in its Mode 2 guise, to
inform thought and practice. I believe that this contrib-
uted significantly to the success of HUBS. In this account,
we concentrate on how the Explore stage of CSP
influenced the thinking that went into the design
of HUBS.
It was important to recognize that building a new
business school, in the 21st century, takes place in the
context of ‘general complexity’, confronts a multitude of
interacting issues and throws up wicked problems. Any
attempt to treat the problem situation as one of 'restricted
complexity' would have failed. CSP is a multi-
methodology suitable for ‘general complexity’. Explore
ensured that the various ‘systemic perspectives’ were
16 JACKSON

17. always kept in mind and that the problem situation was
constantly observed through the different lenses they
provide.
If HUBS were to become a successful machine, it
would need a clear goal and the resources to pursue that
goal. The initial goal was to gain recognition from the
three main business school accrediting bodies. The signif-
icant resources to achieve this could only come through
growing student numbers and running efficient
programmes of study. From the machine perspective, this
demanded, for example, that student recruitment pro-
cesses be streamlined, modules be shared across
programmes as appropriate and a staff workload model
established. The organism perspective proved particularly
helpful in this greenfield situation. It was possible to
envisage HUBS as a thriving organism, co-evolving with
its environment and learning its way to becoming a top-
rated business school. This perspective ensured that
HUBS identified the primary activities that it wanted to
direct to the market and structured itself around those
activities, providing them with managerial attention and
appropriate resources. The organism perspective also
focused minds on how HUBS could achieve sufficient
autonomy from its host university to respond to the pecu-
liarities of the business school market. For example, by
establishing its own dedicated marketing, recruitment,
finance, alumni and business engagement operations.
The cultural/political perspective promoted the need to
achieve mutual understanding around mission, vision
and objectives. Frequent meetings were held to develop
strategic and operational plans. The strap line ‘responsi-
ble leadership for a complex world’ emerged from a
school open day. Decisions, for example, on the workload
model, were always widely debated and mandated at the
school board. There were teaching conferences, numer-
ous social events and a coffee expanse that became a
forum for open discussion and debate, sometimes of a
challenging nature. Occasionally, time was made for
structured discussion of issues that arose, such as ‘the
multiple pressures on staff in HUBS’. The
societal/environmental perspective had a significant
impact. Business schools have multiple stakeholders, and
HUBS gave due attention to their expectations. An advi-
sory board of stakeholders was established. Attention was
given to the percentage of women in senior posts, to
minority ethnic and LGBT issues and to preventing an
academic/administrative divide. This lens supported the
argument for concessions on admissions requirements
for local students suffering from economic, social and
educational disadvantage. It led to a successful campaign
to ensure that the coffee outlet was ‘fair trade’. HUBS
was an early signatory to the ‘Principles for Responsible
Management Education’ and was one of the first business
schools to introduce an undergraduate module on busi-
ness ethics. Environmental issues were seen as impor-
tant, and many degrees incorporated ‘sustainable
business’ components. The interrelationships perspective
meant a close eye was kept on the possible unintended
consequences of initiatives. For example, it became
apparent that the ‘Research Excellence Framework’
imperative to recruit high-performing researchers could
lead to a neglect of teaching. This would be reflected in
poor results in the National Student Survey, a fall in
league table position, a decrease in applications and
student numbers, a fall in income and, eventually, a
decline in the capacity to sustain high-level research. A
balancing loop was needed to reinforce good teaching
practice.
In this example, the primary issues identified for
immediate attention, in 1999, were derived from the
machine and organism perspectives. The business
school had to be efficient in order to generate the
resources to expand, and it had to be viable in a competi-
tive market. As the intervention progressed, however, all
the different systemic perspectives took their turn at
being dominant.
It is worth, after these examples, reiterating some of
the strengths of Explore. Using the variety of systemic
perspectives proposed reveals an extremely broad range
of matters worthy of attention in any problem situation.
The precise formulation of the perspectives ensures that
they are able to provide explanations of why the issues
arise and point the way forward to what needs doing to
improve things. Of course, the particular issues they
highlight and the explanations they give will conflict.
But this is helpful in gaining a richer appreciation of
the complexity involved and in supporting informed
decision making. We follow Lakoff and Johnson in
believing that using a variety of inconsistent metaphors
is necessary in a world that we cannot comprehend
totally and Pepper in insisting that the only legitimate
critics of world theories are other world theories. The
capacity to inhabit each of the systemic perspectives
and see the world through the lens it offers, and to cri-
tique each from the perspectives of the others, is the
key to successful CSP. And Explore, as formulated here,
makes this possible and encourages it. It enables an
informed decision to be made about the primary and
secondary issues to take forward for further consider-
ation and action.
8 | CONCLUSION
I have long argued (Jackson, 1991) that critical systems
thinking can provide the necessary theoretical
JACKSON 17

18. underpinning for the management sciences. Information
management, knowledge management, logistics and pro-
ject management are just some examples (more are pro-
vided in Jackson, 2019). Their theoretical development
and practical relevance are hindered by a reliance on a
limited number of ‘systemic perspectives’, usually just the
machine. I would like to reinforce this argument by refer-
ence to the Explore stage of CSP. I believe
(Jackson, 1987b) that the opportunities for improving
information management are vast if specialists would just
widen their thinking beyond the traditional model of the
organization as a machine. In the related field of knowl-
edge management, Japanese authors have criticized the
Western approach for its reliance on the model of the
organization as an information processing machine. They
advocate a more organismic perspective. The door is open
for a further broadening of thinking in knowledge man-
agement to embrace the other systemic perspectives
(Jackson, 2005). Mears-Young and Jackson (1997) have
argued that the main problems facing logistics stem from
its adherence to functionalism. Only if logisticians are
willing to explore the viewpoints provided by the range
of systemic perspectives, reflecting alternative paradigms,
will they be able to make progress. It has proved illumi-
nating, I have found, for managers of complex projects to
broaden their horizons beyond the traditional view that
they are machines designed to achieve a purpose. New
insights are gained by viewing complex projects as organ-
isms evolving over time, cultural/political systems in
which a variety of stakeholder needs must be managed
and societal/environmental systems that might be dam-
aging to some affected groupings and to the environment.
And, of course, the interrelationships between the issues
revealed by all the different systemic perspectives must
also be considered.
The next paper in this series will look at how the sec-
ond stage of CSP (see Figure 1) should be conducted to
Produce an intervention strategy. This must be based on
an appropriate choice of systems methodologies, models
and methods, to address the primary and secondary
issues identified during Explore.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Thanks are due to Steven Wallis for insightful comments
on an earlier version of this paper and to Catherine
Hobbs for ideas on how to present the
multimethodology.
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20 JACKSON