Community Based CVE Research and Programming in Kenya
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BRICS works hand-in-hand with partners and leaders at the community level to • Understand the drivers of VE • Learn how and why change happens to at-risk groups • Positively influence the actions of a) at-risk groups and b) the key influencers at community and national level • Help others to apply learning to their CVE approaches – through co-design and networking.
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Community Based CVE Research and Programming in Kenya
- 1. Community-Based CVE Research and Programming Kenya Nathan Kabala, BRICS Presented at CVE workshop on "Understanding the changing nature of Violent Extremism in Kenya“ Nairobi, Kenya, 15th December 2017
- 2. BUILDING RESILIENCE IN CIVIL SOCIETY www.bricspve.com/subscribe Prepared for presentation at CHRIPS CVE Workshop held at Four Points by Sheraton, Nairobi, 15 December 2017
- 3. • BRICS blends CVE programming & research oImplementation Unit (IU) oRegional Research Unit (RRU) • Up to 5 years adaptable programming BUILDING RESILIENCE IN CIVIL SOCIETY (Respondents by country since February 2016) 16 BRICS Partners (15 in Kenya, 1 in Tanzania)
- 4. We work hand-in-hand with partners and leaders at the community level to • Understand the drivers of VE • Learn how and why change happens to at-risk groups • Positively influence the actions of a) at-risk groups and b) the key influencers at community and national level • Help others to apply learning to their CVE approaches – through co-design and networking. EVIDENCE-BASED CVE RESEARCH UNIT
- 5. • More research needed in Kenya, particularly on gender, VE recruitment and radicalisation trends and ‘at risk’ groups • Research quality issues: • Lack of empirical evidence • “Community” perceptions: tends to be elites & respondents connected to CSOs NOT ‘at risk’ groups • Over-researched locations • Research tends to cite general problems/macro-level drivers: • Lack of economic opportunities • Marginalisation and discrimination • Security force abuse • Proposed solutions therefore also focus on the macro-level – responsibility of governments and development actors. STATE OF RESEARCH
- 6. CHALLENGES IN IDENTIFYING ‘AT-RISK’ • At-risk individuals tend to be primarily identified by demographics – where they live, employment status, youth, Muslim, mostly men • Questionable if many CSO organizations reach at-risk groups • Lack of CVE knowledge, capacity, and access • Individual community leaders who engage at –risk groups in personal capacity
- 7. IDENTIFYING AT-RISK POPULATIONS • BRICS defines at-risk through social network links to VE • Intersection of social networks and demographics • At-risk is contextually driven (hyper-micro) • Identifying at-risk populations through: • Family & friend affiliations • Specific madrasas and mosques • Micro neighbourhoods • Maskanis (“hang outs”) • Specific street gangs • And other social networks MACRO
- 8. DRIVERS OF VIOLENT EXTREMISM • Unemployed youth • Lack of ID • Marginalization • Security force abuse • Ideological factors MACRO Most CVE research focus, minimal CSO impact PERSONAL Difficult to research and program, potential impact – timeliness is key • Family crisis (death/illness) • Sense of hopelessness • Anger/fear of security forces SOCIAL/NETWORK Little research and programming, High CSO impact BRICS FOCUS • Family or friend affiliations • Specific madrasas and mosques • Maskanis (“hang outs”)
- 9. LEARNING FROM AT-RISK POPULATIONS Importance of peers in radicalisation • Peers appear to play a key role in recruitment & radicalisation • Recruitment tends to happen in- person through a personalized recruitment strategy • Role of the internet and social media seems less prominent than in other regions Small social networks • At-risk individuals tend to have smaller social networks (social capital) → limited opportunities & increased vulnerability • Limited livelihood opportunities can make VE financially attractive • Deficit of trust • Returnees and their families are often stigmatized, further isolating them
- 10. LEARNING FROM AT-RISK POPULATIONS • Importance of families in CVE • Identifying signs of radicalisation in family members • Able to encourage relatives to return home – particularly mothers • Intergenerational gap between youth and elders • Youth and elders move within increasingly divergent social networks • Youth distrust some established religious organisations/leaders and CSOs • Declining influence of religious leaders with some exceptions eg. some who advocate VE, some who communicate well with youth • Importance of horizontal peer networks in radicalisation, recruitment and CVE efforts
- 11. PROGRAMING IMPLICATIONS • Reaching truly ’at risk’ is critical - ‘do no harm’, avoid alienating the broader community • Small NGOs/CSOs have limited influence on macro- level drivers – domains of government & development actors • Focus on personal and social network-level drivers for biggest impact • Work through peer-networks & local, young leaders who can influence at risk individuals • Influencers must have trust, access & legitimacy • CSOs should adopt a deep rather than broad focus
- 12. RESEARCH NEEDS • Better understand the interaction of macro, social, and personal drivers • Better understand the role of ideology • Identify who is truly at-risk and why • Understand at-risk decision making processes • Understand how peer to peer approaches can be best adopted for CVE purposes • Don’t research general community perceptions that may not be well-informed • Better understand the radicalisation & recruitment process (scale, age groups, trends, which VE groups, recruiters, role of internet/social media, education institutions, prisons etc.) • Understand role of women and families in CVE
- 13. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS • Governments need to focus on macro-level reforms • Security sector reform, broad scale economic empowerment & citizenship rights, such as ID cards • Include measures of CVE impact • More policy and programme coherence between CVE and CT • Securitised and brutal CT responses appears to drive up VE risk • Urgent need for more policy integrity within governments • Returnee programmes which are trusted • Effectively encourage defectors • More voices from ex-fighters/returnees
Editor's Notes
- Good afternoon I will talk about the BRICS research and programming experience over 1.5 years in Kenya – Building Resilience in Civil Society to Violent extremism. BRICS is funded by the UK Government Conflict Security and Stability Fund The focus of this presentation will be on what we have learnt so far from community based CVE/PVE research and programming in Kenya PVE vs CVE- Though BRICS views itself as more of a PVE program, the term CVE is the current umbrella term that is universally understood and thus PVE/CVE will be used interchangeably in the presentation and documentation. VE Definition- Violent extremism Violent extremism is material and/or immaterial support for or engagement in violent acts justified by an inflexible and uncompromising ideology. The extent to which individual actors or supporters embrace this ideology may vary. Drawing on Lauren Van Metre. 2016. “Community Resilience to Violent Extremism in Kenya.” United States Institute of Peace.
- <1 minute BRICS comprises an implementation unit which supports 16 partners in research and community based solutions to VE and the Regional Research Unit which undertakes research with a team - 20 post graduate national researchers from Kenya, Uganda and Tanzania To date some 1600 interviews have been conducted in the region since February 2016
- < 1 minute - Deep systemic analysis, insight and engagement in key networks, partnerships, and institutions - CVE technical guidance and learning to non-BRICS stakeholders (national governments, CSOs, donors, and other research organisations)
- 2 minutes Based on our review of some 150 studies in Kenya since 2012. Mining the gaps; a text mining-based meta-analysis of the current state of research on violent extremism Publisher: RESOLVE (Douglass and Rondeaux) 2017 research is most needed on 10 countries including Somalia, Kenya and Nigeria, and in terms of gaps, that radicalisation and gender do not appear to be a focus of study in these 10 countries. Studies tend to be by NGOs, often not best suited to research and may not have access to at risk groups 7 studies in Kenya in 2016/17 by NGOs, of which one reviewed mentioned at-risk (SFCG). eg Life Peace Initiative, International Alert, Saferworld, Institute for Justice and Reconciliation, SFCG - all in 2016 lack of empirical evidence – perception studies with unclear sampling, same methods - KIIs, FGDs – asking elites, community leaders, respondents selected by CSO partners. Small empirical corpus – little primary data on ‘at risk’ youth, very little on ideological factors too; Most recent of which is Institute for Strategic Studies Annelies Botha 2014 who reports on interviews with former AS fighters. Useful data but with bias since these are self selecting for interview. Over-researched locations finding general respondents for these general studies are; Eastleigh and Pumwani in Nairobi; Majengo, Kisauni and Likoni in Mombasa; and Garissa town. NB Mandera county with the highest number of VE related incidents was the subject of only ONE study this year –study by National Commission for Integration and Cohesion which focused more on clan and community dynamics than on VE risk per se but which holds interesting findings. Ngala Chome Clan Dynamics and Al Shabab 2016– at least did interviews in Garissa, Wajir and Mandera counties. Three macro factors appear in the current lit on Kenya; BRICS has picked up on ID issue which is a strong feature in Garissa and Lamu where our research is focused.
- 1-2 minutes At-risk of recruitment and radicalization determined by DEMOGRAPHICS– employment, counties, youth, Muslim, mostly men 7 studies in Kenya in 2016/17, of which one reviewed mentioned at-risk (SFCG) High risk locations surveyed but not gotten to at-risk Studies that that claim to reach at-risk loosely define them, go through local partners to reach at risk. SFCG Meet me at the Maskani report did social network with 2000 so-called at risk youth found that < 4% of youth mentioned CSOs as being a source of support or advice to whom they would turn. Perceptions on VE are different b/w general public & at-risk group Don’t rely just on community level perception Perceptions vs. realities: drug users – who would actually want to use drug users Research on former fighters who chose to leave – bias in responses? UNDP 2013 and Index Mundi estimates some 8.8 million Kenyans are aged 18-25 year old – the big majority of whom are unwaged (informal economy) and poor – yet a small fraction of them will join a VE organisation such as Al Shabab so we need to move beyond demographics. BRICS’ research model emphasizes the need to move beyond generalized demographic definitions to identifying at-risk individuals based on their embeddedness in existing social networks that are already linked to VE activity or support. BRICS can better inform local CVE efforts by focusing on the experiences of at-risk individuals and the context-specific drivers of VE in local communities.
- 1-2 minutes GOOD TO MAKE THE INTERSECTION OF ALL THREE CIRCLES RED BRICS definition Importance of looking at-risk at the intersection of social networks and demographics Both for research and for programing We’re not the only people working on this, but the true social network lens is being underutilized Contextually driven At-risk is extremely contextually based in different areas and there are different at-risk groups Use some specific examples of geographically contextual - ???? Mosques + Digo = Kwale?; Certain Maskanis; Street gangs – Mjango, Mombasa;
- 4 minutes BRICS HAS DEVELOPED THIS MODEL OF VE WHICH BUILDS ON OUR RESEARCH AT COMMUNITY LEVEL, THIS CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK IDENTIFIES THREE DOMAINS –I and focuses on the importance of looking at-risk at the intersection of social networks, personal factors and macro factors. We’re not the only people working on this, but the true social network lens is being underutilized All agree the three are important, but Intersection of the three areas- the intersection of social networks, personal factors and macro factors. E.g. personal level circumstance – personalized recruitment strategies However, research isn’t being done enough on social/personal THE MACRO WHICH IS CURRENTLY MOST DESCRIBED BY CVE RESEARCH, THIS HAS STRUCTURAL ISSUES SUCH AS LIMITED LIVELIHOOD OPPORTUNITIES – CSOS ARE LEAST SUITED TO CHANGING MACRO/STRUCTURAL ISSUES. FACTORS SUCH AS LACK OF ACCESS TO ID CARDS AND ABUSIVE BEHAVIOUR OF SECURITY GUARDS ARE THE RESPONSIBILITY OF GOVENMENTS. MINIMAL CSO IMPACT. THERE IS THE IMPORTANT SOCIAL NETWORK DOMAIN – OUR RESPONDENTS AND OTHER STUDIES NOTE THAT IT TENDS TO BE FRIENDS OR PEERS WHO PLAY A ROLE IN INTRODUCTION TO VE GROUPS, LIKEWISE CERTAIN MOSQUES AND MADRASSAS MAY FACILITATE ACCESS TO IMAMS OR RECRUITERS WHO WILL INTRODUCE VE groups. RECRUITMENT HAPPENS IN PERSON IN CERTAIN LOCATIONS AND THROUGH CERTAIN NETWORKS. (Kwale) - demographic? - VE: AS, al-mujahiroun, ISIS? Need nuance THEN THERE IS THE PERSONAL – BRICS RESPONDENTS AND THOSE OF OTHER STUDIES TELL US HOW CRISES IN THEIR LIVES CAN PRECIPITATE DECISIONS TO JOIN A VE GROUP – THIS CAN BE A DEATH OR ILLNESS IN THE FAMILY FOR WHICH FUNDS HAVE TO BE FOUND; A SENSE OF NOT GETTING A MEANINGFUL LIFE THROUGH GRINDING POVERTY OR ALIENATION IN SOCIETY, AND ANGER OR FEAR OF SECURITY FORCES WHICH DRIVES YOUNG MEN (MAINLY) TO JOIN VE GROUPS. Here we know that CSOs and leaders at community level do play a role helping individuals with crises in their lives to avoid simply joining a VE group. Timeliness of intervention is probably key so there are challenges Who is at-risk: Network related rather than demographic related - family member/peer/neighbor associated - thought about going, know people who have gone - look at propaganda, exposed to propaganda - live in particular neighborhood, mosques, madrassas, - Specific street gangs are possibly a social route to VE groups – limited evidence and indications of this - Answari ITS IMPORTANT TO RECOGNISE THAT LOCAL CONTEXT MATTERS – Contextually driven At-risk is extremely contextually based in different areas and there are different at-risk groups Use some specific examples of geographically contextual - ???? Mosques + Digo = Kwale?; Certain Maskanis; Street gangs – Majengo, Mombasa, Eastleigh . Macro - most CVE research focus on this arena, minimal impact Unemployed youth Lack of ID Marginalization Security force abuses Ideological influences eg ????? Personal- difficult to research and program for, high impact – TIMELINESS OF INTERVENTIONS IS PROBABLY PARAMOUNT! Death of family member Sense of hopelessness Anger at security forces Stopped education Network/Social- BRICS focus, little research and programming, high impact. Social network easier to research and program with – though still have to be very aware/sensitive to personal factors
- 2.5 minutes TELL A STORY HERE There is some evidence that recruitment tends to happen in-person with recruiters employing “strategic patience” to observe those at-risk and develop personalized recruitment strategies before approaching them. Question of the role of online recruitment? cost of accessing the internet – also concern of surveillance; eg Distribution of DVDs with VE messages rely on in-person networks Maybe not as important in other regions. STORY EXAMPLES; - Some youth in the coast of Kenya have friends who have already gone to Somalia and thus are recruiting their friends through social media, sending them WhatsApp clips showing them how Somalia is good and that they should also consider joining them. Research respondents from the coast of kenya sharing that they know friends who were convinced by their friends who had left forSomalia to join them in Somalia. They persuade them that they live a good life in Somalia The respondents noted that peer influence in Maskanis, where young people (a majority of whom are unemployed) congregate to discuss social issues, provides a platform for sharing ideas, sometimes including joining VE groups or gangs, to put an end to their frustrations and desperation Respondents sharing that peer influence in Maskanis influence young people (a majority of whom are unemployed). They congregate in Maskanis to discuss social issues, provides a platform for sharing ideas, sometimes including joining VE groups or gangs, to put an end to their frustrations and desperation In another incident in Jomvu sub county, a father who took the son to madrassa for Islamic education was later reported to have sent the son to Somalia to join the AS, and himself (the father) also joined the group (Al-Shabaab) Someone who was a senior member of the Al-shabaab persuding his former classmate from Northern kenya to join the Al-shabaab where he was promised to earn 3500 dollars a month A mother in the Coast was promised a lot of money if she let her daughter get married to a wealthy foreigner. After getting married, the lady was shipped to somalia and married off to AS fighters. Not just lack of economic capital but also social capital which is important at looking at unemployment Rarely trust anyone – other people don’t trust them Isolation makes alternatives limited Recruitment centers, economic recruitments – stories Returnees - very strong internal network, but distrusted and with almost no external networks - Hard to reach, stigmatized Youth in Northern Kenya promised 3500 dollars by a friend for joining the AS AS member recruiting unemployed but educated and government trained youth in Northern Kenya promising him business opportunities after joining the AS. Women whose husbands were killed on suspicion of being members of the AS in Kwale stigmatised by communities Members of communities avoid association with returnees because of fear of victimisation by security agencies Returnees reportedly stigmatised when profiled and invited for meetings with NGOs working in the area
- 1 minute Families Parents raising concern regarding change in behavior and radicalisation in a school at the coast of Kenya Women in Kwale who after realizing that their sons could have been radicalised intergenerational gap between youth and their elders, suggesting that CVE efforts need to work within horizontal peer networks and carefully assess which trusted leaders have influence with at-risk youth, while also acknowledging that key influencers may work outside of formal organizational structures. BRICS own research found open hostility and suspicion between elders and youth in Kwale, intergenerational gap is accelerating (USIP 2016) There is evidence of religious leaders’ declining influence among youth in general, except for select religious leaders who, through personality and messaging, are able to influence youth both positively and negatively. Elders in coast of Kenya complaining that the youth do not go to mosques and do not approach them for advice Youth in Kenyan coast mentioning that they do not go to religious leaders because they are not approachable, and do not listen to them. They instead vindicate the youth for how they live Youth in kwale mentioning that they do not have youthful religious leaders who they can comfortably approach and who could understand them as the youth Youth in Northern Kenya also mentioning that they do not approach religious leaders because of their age difference. That older religious leaders may not understand their issues as the youth Youth in Kwale feeling that most organisations have old religious leaders who may not understand them as the youth
- 1-2 minutes Choose trusted CVE partners and the importance of trust in CVE work - fear and mistrust, surveillance. NGOs, CSOs many religious leaders and traditional leaders have little traction with at risk youth. Need for new partners and interlocutors, local young leaders. Reaching ‘at-risk’ populations is hard, slow, and can be dangerous
- 1 minute Understand the decision making processes which the at-risk are facing; interview those who aren’t returnees (bias) – focus on at-risk or those within VEOs to understand decision making process. Don’t fund more general community perceptions reports – respondent fatigue and suspicion, urgent need for governments to focus on macro level reforms such as security sector reform, broad scale economic empowerment and citizenship rights eg IDs. Include measures of CVE impact. Apart from THE FORTHCOMING, AS YET UNPUBLISHED UN Women ISS 2017 study on Role of Women in Kenya, there has been no empirical study on the role of women in East Africa. There is a need for a more gendered anlaysis of women in CVE (FCO RECOMMENDATION TO US, SO WORTH SAYING)
- 1 minute Returnee programmes which are trusted and effectively encourage defectors, more voices from ex-fighters. 1 minute DFID Romaniuk studies on CVE in East Africa recommends inserting CVE measures into development programmes for example. The UNDP 2017 The Road to Extremism in Africa based on research in Nigeria, Sudan, Kenya and Somalia, although flawed methodology, but based on research with former VEO members (AS and Boko Haram) makes some powerful points to governments on CT response driving VE risk, and the urgent need for security sector reform.
- The Different Populations General Population – whole populations in geographical areas (counties/provinces/districts) or social/religious demographics (unemployed youth/Muslim, etc.) Communities where at-risk live: within smaller geographical areas (wards/locations/sub-locations) At-risk networks: Social networks in which at-risk groups may interact with on a frequent basis peer-to-peer influences (e.g. out-of-school youth in maskanis within Likoni sub-county, and aged between 16 – 25 years); Highly at-risk individuals: probably immediate families and direct friends of radicalised individuals BRICS Intervention focus Does not focus on the general population; Four investment areas: At-Risk individuals and networks – Projects building resilience, influencing beliefs, relationships and behaviours of at-risk individuals and their networks to reduce likeness to engage in VE Alternative or Counter VE Narratives – Projects aimed at supporting and empowering religious and other leaders whom have access and influence among specific at-risk networks to articulate credible alternative narratives Community-Security – Projects aimed at building greater trust between select security agents and community members with possible links to at risk networks for the long-term improvement of community-security relation (based on increased trust), overall security policies and circumstances of at-risk populations Government Policy – Initiatives supporting community-led input into the design and content of CVE related laws, policies and government frameworks (including CVE-level country plans) whenever possible.
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- 1-2 minutes BRICS definition Importance of looking at-risk at the intersection of social networks and demographics Both for research and for programing We’re not the only people working on this, but the true social network lens is being underutilized Dangerous- for at-risk and researchers (Do no harm) Contextually driven At-risk is extremely contextually based in different areas and there are different at-risk groups Use some specific examples of geographically contextual - ???? Mosques + Digo = Kwale?; Certain Maskanis; Street gangs – Mjango, Mombasa;
- The Different Populations General Population – whole populations in geographical areas (counties/provinces/districts) or social/religious demographics (unemployed youth/Muslim, etc.) Communities where at-risk live: within smaller geographical areas (wards/locations/sub-locations) At-risk networks: Social networks in which at-risk groups may interact with on a frequent basis peer-to-peer influences (e.g. out-of-school youth in maskanis within Likoni sub-county, and aged between 16 – 25 years); Highly at-risk individuals: probably immediate families and direct friends of radicalised individuals BRICS Intervention focus Does not focus on the general population; Four investment areas: At-Risk individuals and networks – Projects building resilience, influencing beliefs, relationships and behaviours of at-risk individuals and their networks to reduce likeness to engage in VE Alternative or Counter VE Narratives – Projects aimed at supporting and empowering religious and other leaders whom have access and influence among specific at-risk networks to articulate credible alternative narratives Community-Security – Projects aimed at building greater trust between select security agents and community members with possible links to at risk networks for the long-term improvement of community-security relation (based on increased trust), overall security policies and circumstances of at-risk populations Government Policy – Initiatives supporting community-led input into the design and content of CVE related laws, policies and government frameworks (including CVE-level country plans) whenever possible.
- You can reference more details to this in the handouts, thus only spend 30 seconds on this - Applied research integrated with project delivery (BRICS-IU) that enhances CVE partner organisations’ capacity, knowledge and community relationships - Embedded insight and influence of at-risk communities through sustained local engagement using local or long-term researchers and community facilitators - Robust management of high quality research processes, including robust risk management and responsibility - 20 full-time or on-call national researchers (10 Kenya, 3 Uganda, 6 Tanzania); 17 with postgraduate degrees that have years of diverse research, geographic, thematic, and CVE programming expertise - Sustained, multi-year engagement: Up to 5 years of dedicated and ongoing resources and funding - Flexibility and adaptability of approach that responds to changing, on-the-ground contexts - Deep systemic analysis, insight and engagement in key networks, partnerships, and institutions - CVE technical guidance and learning to non-BRICS stakeholders (national governments, CSOs, donors, and other research organisations)