The document provides an overview of process safety and barrier thinking. It discusses the differences between personal and process safety, with process safety having higher impacts. Barriers are measures to prevent hazards from being released or limit consequences, and must be effective, independent and auditable. There are equipment barriers like relief valves and human barriers like following procedures. Safety critical elements are equipment whose failure could cause a release, and have performance standards. Safety critical positions and activities help maintain barriers.

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Design
Integrity
Technica
l
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Integrity
Leadershi
p
Process Safety and
Barrier Thinking
Awareness Campaign
By
UIO/G/SHMP

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Table of Content
February 5, 2023
2
MBT Tank Overfill - briefing by Technologist
AI – PSM
Barrier Thinking
SCE & Performance Standard
Safety Critical Position & Safety Critical Activity
Common Failures
Swiss Cheese Model
Conclusion
Quiz
Group activity

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The Relationship
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PRODUCTION PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENT
LEVERS
CAPACITY AVAILABILITY
RELIABILITY /
UPTIME
MAKE IT
SAFE
MAKE IT
GROW
MAKE IT
WORK
CASH

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AIPSM Structure : 4 main aspects
Our Assets are safe and we know it.
Design
Integrity
Technical
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Integrity
Leadership
Maintain the
hardware barriers
Design and build so
that AI-PS risks are
ALARP
Work within the
operational
envelopes
Design HSE Case
Design & Engineering
Practices
Ops. HSE Case
Processes and
Procedures
 Assessment & assurance processes
 Integrity Leadership engagement
 Learning From Incidents
 Competency assurance programme

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Requirements Handled by Workstream
HSE Case
#1 Identify and document PS hazards
#2 Manage risks to ALARP
#3 Manage competencies in HSSE Critical Positions
#6 Supervision of HSE Critical Activities (Identify)
#12 Process Safety Reviews (PSRs)
Maintenance and Integrity Execution (MIE)
#15 Technical Integrity of HSSE Critical Equipment
#16 Maintain HSSE Critical Equipment
Operating Integrity (OI)
#7 SoF (restart of Existing Asset)
#13 Work in Classified Areas
#14 Operate within Operational Limits
#17 Permit to Work
Well Integrity
All requirements covered via Well Integrity Management Manual (WIMM)
Projects and Engineering Integrity (PEI)
#7 SoF – Start-up of New Assets / Modes
#8 Technical Integrity in Design / Construction
#9 Use of DEM 1s
#10 PSBR Requirements
#11 Documentation for HSSE Critical Equipment
Management of Change
Integrity Leadership
#22 Demonstrate Leadership in PS
Requirements Handled by Workstream
#4 Fitness to Work by employer
#5 Contract Holders role in HSSE
#6 Supervision of HSE Critical Activities (Execute)
#18 Single Point Accountability for PS
#18 Annual Review of PS Risks to the Business
#20 Annual Review of PS risks to the Asset
#21 Risks Managed to ALARP
OUR ASSETS
ARE SAFE
AND
WE KNOW IT
Vision / Goal
Integrity
Leadership
Technical
Integrity
Design
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Workstreams and 22 AIPSM Manual Requirement

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GOAL ZERO = NO HARM + NO LEAKS.
How do you
deliver goal
zero?

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Footer: Title may be placed here or disclaimer if required. May sit up to two lines in depth.
Because we want to prevent scenes like this ...
Design
Integrity
Technical
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Integrity
Leadership
Design
Integrity
Technical
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Integrity
Leadership
Why are we focusing on Asset Integrity Process Safety?

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Process Safety vs Personal Safety
 What are the differences between Personal
Safety and Process Safety?
 Which one is more critical?

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Personal vs. Process Safety
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 Personal and Process Safety describe two different types of risk
that can lead to injury and/or fatality.
PERSONAL SAFETY
INCIDENTS
PROCESS SAFETY INCIDENTS
Typically workplace accidents
(slips/trips/falls)
Typically major release of flammable or
toxic material from process facilities.
Typically unsafe work behaviors or
unsafe working environment
Typically failure in engineering or human
controls/recovery
Typically low impact (personnel, asset) Typically high impact (people, asset)
High probability Low probability
Can be Deadly Can be Deadly

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Process Safety versus Personal Safety
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Design
Integrity
Technica
l
Integrity
Operating
Integrity
Integrity
Leadershi
p
Barrier Thinking Training
12

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Video of EA Asset HSE Case Operationalisation
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VIDEO

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Objectives
 Understanding Risk.
 Learn about the steps of Risk Assessment
 Barrier thinking.
 Learn what barriers are, how to support and maintain
them, as well as what will weaken or remove them.
 Threat Line and Bow Tie Analysis.
 Learn how critical equipment barriers, critical human
barriers, and critical activities link together to provide
an effective barrier against threats.
 Swiss Cheese Model of Risk Analysis.
 Learn how multiple barriers are used to separate
people form harm.

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Hazard Effects Management Process
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Risk Assessment Matrix
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Control Hierarchy
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Asset Integrity – Process Safety
AI-PS is about preventing process safety incidents resulting from the
unintentional release of energy or hazardous substances.
Keeping It In The Pipe
(Control)
Dealing With Releases
(Recovery)

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Bow Tie
 A pictorial presentation of how a hazard can be
hypothetically released and further developed into a number
of consequences.
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The Concept
 For risk to exist, four elements must be present:
 Hazard
 Threats
 Top Event
 Consequence
 Threat release scenario are called ‘Initiating events’.
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Threats
 Threats : a possible cause that will potentially release
a hazard and produce an incident.
 Identifying threats is an essential step in the prevention
and mitigation of incidents.
Eg : Consider
a. the loss of a hydrocarbon (hazard) containment due to the corrosion of a
pipe,
b. the brittle fracture of a pipe
c. a tank overfill.
These are three different threats.
 The barriers to be implemented to prevent the release of the hazard will
be significantly different for these three threats.
 A high level alarm may be essential to prevent tank overfills, but will not
in any case help address corrosion.
 Barriers are thus, often only valid for the threat being considered.
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What are Barriers ?
 Measures to prevent threats from releasing a hazard or
measures to limit the consequences arising from the top
event.
 Barriers need to be put in place to control risks, through
the HEMP process. Within our business processes and
activities, there are tasks which maintain these barriers.

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Barrier Expectations
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To work, a barrier in itself must be able to:
 Stop the threat from releasing the top event
 Mitigate or reduce the consequences after the top event
 Effective, Independent, Auditable

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Barriers Failures
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Intentional removal for maintenance (MoC, PTW, replace by using operator)

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Barrier Types
 Equipment barriers (hardware)
– eg, a pressure relief valve
 Human barriers (human interventions)
– eg, following a procedure
 Combination of both
– eg, a high level alarm & the operator responding

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Equipment Barriers
 Equipment Barriers
– equipment/hardware/software/assets that are
intended to prevent or reduce the harm from a hazard
 Examples : High level alarm + Operator Action for a tank, a
bund wall, a relief valve, an electrical grounding wire)
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Equipment Barriers in our business…
 High pressure trip system
 Tank high level alarm systems + Operator Action
 Automatic valve shutdown systems
 Pressure relief valves
 Fire & Gas Detection System
 Fire deluge system
 Corrosion injection system
 Open hazardous drains
 Control valves to control flow or pressure
 Fences
 Signs
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Human Barriers
 Human Barriers – a person performing an action that
prevents or reduces the harm from a hazard.
 Example: A person checking to make sure there is enough
room in a tank prior to receipt.
Note : a people barrier is not a barrier unless the person is
performing some action! A manual is not a barrier because it
does nothing by itself!)
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Human Barriers in Our Business
• Operator de-pressurising an equipment using a procedure
• Operator following a tank inventory procedure before filing tank
• Responding to a tank high level alarm
• Completing a Permit to Work
• Taking corrective action in abnormal situation
• Closing manifold valves after a tank receipt
• Communicating with third party prior to pipeline or vessel receipt
to tankage
• Shift change documentation and communication
• An operator following an emergency response containment
procedure
• Site guard checking credentials before allowing entrance to site
if there is no action being performed there is no barrier (a manual itself is not a barrier)!
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Control Barrier (1)
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Barriers that prevent threats from
releasing the hazard are called Control
Barriers.

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Control Barrier (2)
 Controls Barriers
Examples :
 Design: Guards, shields, threat elimination, or automatic process
shutdown
 Operations: The people and equipment that allow you to operate
within the operation envelope, or operations intervention activities.
 Management System Processes /Control
(Eg, MOC or Technical Integrity Management)
 Management System Processes are not barriers
 Critical Business Processes in HSE MS
 Are supporting Activities /Processes to a design/operations barrier
on the bowtie. Following these processes can be a barrier.
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Recovery Barrier (1)
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 Barriers that limit or mitigate the consequences arising
from the top event are called Recovery Barriers.
 They sit between the top event and the possible
consequences.

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Recovery Barrier (2)
 Recovery Barrier
Examples :
 Design: Spill containment, dikes, automatic water spray, or ignition
control
 Operations: Operations intervention, rescue team response.
 Management System Processes / Control (Eg, Emergency Response
Mgt)
 Management System Processes are not barriers
 Critical Business Processes in HSE MS
 Are supporting Activities /Processes to a design/operations barrier
on the bowtie. Following these processes can be a barrier.
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10 MINUTES
Break
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Barrier Effectiveness (1)
 Effective – The barrier prevents the consequence when it
functions as designed (ie, big enough, fast enough, strong
enough).
 An effective barrier shall have the following three elements:
I. A detector- detects the condition that requires action
II. A logic solver- decides action is to be taken
III. An actuator – action taken to address the condition
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Barrier Effectiveness (2)
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Barrier Independency
 Independent
 Independent of the initiating event (threat) and the
components if any other barrier already validated for the
same condition.
 The barrier can not be considered independent from one
another if there is a common cause failure.
 Example of dependence:
Threat: Instrument air failure, all barriers that need
instrument air are dependent and thus not valid.
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Barrier Auditability
 Auditable - The barrier can be evaluated to assure that it
can operate correctly when it is called upon.
 A critical activity shall be available to maintain the
barrier.
This links to accountability, responsibility & competence
assurance .
 The barrier shall reduce the risks by a factor at least 10,
the Probability of Failure on Demand (PFD) is maintained
at no greater than10 %.
This link to requirements for maintenance & inspection in
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Maintaining Effective Barriers
Hazard/
Risk
Undesirable
Outcome
Barriers must be healthy and effective to avoid incidents (“Swiss
cheese”)
Process Safety Risks are managed with
Barriers
Hardware Barrier (8 SCE systems)
Human Barrier
Safety critical
Roles & positions
Safety critical tasks

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SCE Hardware barriers categories
19-Nov-14
The Safety Critical Equipment (SCE) hardware
barriers are divided in 8 (eight categories).
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Equipment Barriers : SCE
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Safety Critical Element SCE (1)
 SCE : An item of equipment or structure whose failure could
lead to the release of a Major Hazard or whose purpose is
to prevent or limit the consequences of a major incident,
excluding business loss.
 Performance standard (PS) : A statement, which can be
expressed in qualitative or quantitative terms, of the
functional performance required of a system or item of
equipment, and which is used as the basis for managing the
risk from the Major Hazards.
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Safety Critical Element SCE (2)
SCE Features
 Reliable / Robust : SIL, Redundancy
 Availability : Spares stock, stringent assurance requirements
(PMs, CMs) more frequent maintenance
 Standardization : Inter changeability
SCE Management tools
 CMMS - for managing the tasks and results recording.
 Total Reliability (TR) Measures dashboard - for performance
indicator reporting and trending.
 Facilities Status Reporting (FSR) tool - for status reporting and
deviation management.
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Performance Standard
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 Describes the minimum performance criteria for a Safety
Critical Element
 is used as the basis for verification throughout the lifecycle of
the facility
 is a statement, which can be expressed in qualitative or
quantitative terms, of the performance required of a system,
item of equipment, person or procedure
 used as the basis for managing the Hazard according to the
HSSE Case (e.g. planning, measuring, control or audit through the
lifecycle of the installation).
 Each SCE has a Performance Standard
 The Technical Authorities shall own Performance Standards

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Safety Critical Positions
An HSSE Critical Position is :
 a position that can impact significantly on the execution
of HSSE Critical Activities at the operational level or
management level,
 or at both levels, because the position has
responsibility for performing Level 1 or Level 2 HSSE
Critical Tasks or a combination of Level 1 and Level 2
HSSE Critical Tasks, as documented in the Business
Unit HSE-MS or HSE Cases.
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Safety Critical Activities
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 HSSE critical activity :activity that can impact significantly on the
control of the hazards & risks. Necessary to provide or maintain
barriers and recovery measures to assure that HSSE risk
objectives are continuously met.
 An HSSE critical task : action required for the execution of an
HSSE critical activity.
Critical activities maintain
barriers to keep them from
deteriorating.

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HSSE critical tasks are divided into two types :
 Level 1 : Tasks are ones where a mistake can directly
cause an accident. Operational tasks required for the
execution of HSSE Critical Activities, where actions (or
inactions) taken while performing such tasks could lead
directly to a significant incident. associated with the Control
or Recovery elements of HEMP.
 Level 2 : Tasks where a mistake can make an accident
more likely. Tasks required for the execution of HSSE
Critical Activities, where action (or inaction) while
performing such tasks could lead indirectly to a significant
incident.
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Examples
 Level 1 : HSSE Critical Tasks performed by plant operators,
technicians, vehicle drivers, aircraft pilots, ship’s captains,
emergency response, and recovery from emergency.
 Level 2 : Normally supervisory-related, such as identifying
/assessing staffing requirements to implement processes,
and the Control and Recovery elements of HEMP. Refer to
the appropriate HSE-MS and HSE Cases to identify these
tasks.
 Competence requirements for these tasks have to be
defined in the Job Competence Profiles. These will be
loaded into the Shell People competence system.
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Re-cap: Bow Tie
BACK UP
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Bow-tie link to Critical Activities, Process & Equipment
 Each barrier has to be assigned to a critical activity to ensure it
will work when the situation needs it.
P:5B A:5C
Unrefined
Hydrocarbon
Material
selection
of piping
LOPC
Internal
corrosion
(piping)
Fire
Chemica
l
injection
system
Emergency
Response
Design & operation
in compliance with
DEP
Critical Process
(RBI)
Critical Eq – Piping
Critical activity –
carry out the
maintenance
Chemical Injection
program
Critical Process
(Operation)
Critical Eq – injection
skid
Critical activity –
monitoring injection
rate, chemical
consumption
Emergency
Response
Critical Process
(ER)
Critical Eq – F&G
detectors, fire
fighting equipment
Critical activity –
PIP review, training
for response team

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Some Common Failures
Where we usually go wrong?
 Poor line of sight,
 Assignment to incompetent / inappropriate workforce
 Susceptibility : Maintenance overrides/bypass, malfunction,
overdue PMs/CMs, obsolescence, Spare and availability,
destruction in incidences, use under excessive/beyond
design/operating envelopes
 delegation without considerations (sit ins, turnovers,
resignations, manpower, vacations substitutes, etc)
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Swiss Cheese Model
If the holes in the barrier walls
(holes in the slices of Swiss
cheese) line up, and the hazard
“escapes”, an incident may occur.
This is why we have multiple
barriers and why we maintain the
barriers.
Swiss Cheese has holes; barriers can have “holes” or deficiencies
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Swiss Cheese Model
“Barrier thinking” includes
addressing small holes at each
level. This keeps a series of small
holes from lining up and leading to
an incident.
20
The “Swiss Cheese Model” is a visual way to think about making sure
barrier holes are prevented

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Conclusion
 Barrier thinking is a way of thinking that helps us:
 Identify hazards
 Put appropriate controls in place to prevent and contain
incidents
 Ask what hazards we face and what controls can be initiated.
 Encourage mind-sets that will:
 Make sure effective barriers are in place.
 Ask the right questions to put safety first.
 Check effective barriers are in place.
 Don’t assume it will be OK (based on previous experience)
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Recap
 What are barriers ?
 Types of barriers
 When are SCEs compromised :
 How do we assure the SCEs are healthy :
 Common Failures : Where we usually go wrong?
 Ask yourself : What role do you play ?
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Critical Equipment Barrier, Critical Human Barrier, or combination of
both
Measures to prevent threats from releasing a hazard or measures to limit
the consequences arising from the top event
Maintenance overrides/bypass, malfunction, overdue PMs/CMs, obsolescence,
SPIRs unavailability, destruction in incidences, use under excessive/beyond
design/operating envelopes
PM/CM : Assigning the task to a competent person – SCE positions (Level 1 /
2 )
Line of sight, delegation without considerations (sit ins, turnovers,
resignations, manpower, vacations substitutes, etc)

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Questions?

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Quiz
QUIZ
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Question 1
 What is Process Safety? (Choose the correct answer.)
a. Process Safety involves things that happen only
outside the boundary of the plant.
b. Process Safety includes things that happen at
home
c. Process Safety is about protecting you, your co-
worker, the plant and the community
d. Process Safety is mostly about protecting the
individual


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Question 2
 What is Personal Safety? (Choose the correct answer)
a. Personal Safety involves things that happen only
outside the boundary of the plant
b. Personal Safety includes things that happen at home
c. Personal Safety is about protecting you, your co-
worker, the plant and the community
d. Personal Safety is mostly about protecting the
individual


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Question 3
 Which of these activities is predominantly related to Process
Safety? Select all correct answer.
a. Putting on a safety harness
b. Conducting operator rounds
c. Responding to alarms
d. Selecting appropriate PPE
e. Selecting proper gasket
f. Following Emergency procedures
g. Function test of a shutdown device
h. Proper foot placement
i. Wearing a seatbelt






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Question 4
 What is the purpose of Understanding Risk?
a. To protect the individual against slips, trips, and
falls
b. To distinguish between critical equipment and
human barriers
c. To provide a structured approach to managing
hazards in the workplace
d. To establish healthy and safety procedures


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Question 5
 What is the proper order of the components for
Understanding Risk?
a. Assess, Recover, Control, Identify
b. Control, Recover, Assess, Identify
c. Identify, Assess, Control, Recover
d. Recover, Assess, Identify, Control


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Question 6
 Which of the following accurately describes a barrier?
a. Process safety barriers prevent hazards from being
released or minimize the effect
b. Barriers never have weaknesses
c. Process safety barriers make my job more dangerous
d. A barrier often causes fire or explosion


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Question 7
 There are two main types of barriers :
Critical _____ Barriers and Critical Human Barriers
a. Process
b. Equipment
c. Hazard


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Question 8
 The Swiss Cheese model demonstrates how holes or
weaknesses in barriers line up to allow undesirable
events to occur
a. True
b. False


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Question 9
 Compliance creates holes in our barriers
a. True
b. False


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Question 10
 Preventing Abnormal Situations includes :
(Please select all appropriate answers)
a. Reporting or fixing small things before they become
bigger
b. Listening to your intuitions, sights, sounds and smells
c. Proactively communicating
d. Constant vigilance





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Question 11
 The Bow Tie model is a tool used to analyse how we
manage hazards and potential consequences.
a. True
b. False
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Question 12
 When multiple threat lines for a hazard are shown, they
appear in the shape of a ____
a. Brick wall
b. Swiss Cheese
c. Bow Tie
d. Triangle


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EXERCISES
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Barrier Exercise: “LINE OF FIRE” : Mobile Heavy
Equipment
What happened?
Worker run over by truck and injured, leads to fatality.
The Injured Party (IP) was walking on a road in sand quarry adjacent
to the accommodation site.
 The IP stopped in the middle of the road behind a truck with his back to
it.
 At the same time the truck started to reverse in preparation for sand
loading and knocked over and crushed the IP under its wheels.
 The medics were on site immediately to apply first aid but were unable
to save the IP’s life.
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Why did it happen ? (1)
Underlying causes :
 Unclear accountability for managing (sand storage) site
access and sand loading activities.
 Failures in applying safe worksite practices like
segregation of pedestrians and heavy goods vehicles
on project sites.
 Allowing lower standards for visitors into the field area,
for the purpose of goods
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Why did it happen ? (2)
Immediate causes
 IP neither saw nor heard the project truck reversing.
 The truck had a faulty reversing alarm; the driver had not
completed defensive driver training (which includes the
requirement to check behind/under the vehicle before
reversing).
 On the day of the incident there were significantly more heavy
transport activities in the quarry than normally and therefore
higher noise levels.
 Pedestrians and vehicles used the same road at the same time
(no segregation).
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Barrier Exercise: “LINE OF FIRE”
“LINE OF FIRE” situation : Mobile Heavy Equipment
Review the incident below
 Which hardware barriers are missing?
 Which human barriers are missing?
 Which process barriers are missing?
Class divide into 3 groups, each take one question. 5 mins for
discussion
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HARDWARE Barrier failures
Barrier : Site Planning & Design Layout
 No formal risk assessment was performed, which would have revealed
that the sand storage area was occasionally used heavily, as on the day
of the incident.
Barrier: Equipment
 The truck was fitted with an automatic reversing alarm but this was not
working.
 Having delivered goods to site, the truck was requested to do an extra
job. The normal and compliant sand truck was broken, hence the request.
Barrier: Equipment Monitoring Systems
 A system such as Collision Avoidance Devices, was not present.
Barrier: Physical Barriers
 Physical Barriers such as Exclusion Zones, Boundary Markers, Hard
and/or Soft Barriers or Berms were not present at the time of the incident.
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HUMAN Barrier failures
Barrier : Hazard awareness
 Not all involved were aware of the hazards behind the vehicle and no
checks were done before reversing.
Barrier: Following Procedures/Rules
 The driver was also delivering goods to a contractor working at another
site. On that site he had been instructed to use the horn when reversing.
Local requirements were not known.
Barrier: Supervision
 The nominated construction contractor supervisor was not seen on the
site, even on a day of heavy use.
 While each site in the large area has an owner there is no overall owner
who takes accountability for coordinating and planning across the various
sites.
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CRITICAL PROCESS Barrier failure
Barrier: Training & Competency
 The driver had not passed the required defensive driving training,
he was on waiting list for training in September.
Barrier: Contractor Management
 There was no contract holder review/audit or enforcement of
supervision on site.
Barrier: Company Standards – & Operating Procedures
 The truck was allowed on to the site after inspection, on a
temporary visitor pass.
 Failure to ensure that heavy machinery operating at construction
worksites met company standards. While there was a traffic flow
plan for the sand storage site and this was in the working
instructions, there were no signs at the site showing the planned
traffic flow or any other warnings, e.g.: no signs barring pedestrian
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Team Activity: Identifying Barriers
Can you identify at least six specific
barriers in the diagram?
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Team Activity: Identifying Barriers
Some of the barriers include:
 pressure reliefs
 pressure indicators
 level transmitters
 low level trip
 site glasses
 piping and valves
 temperature and pressure gauges
 inspection points
 fire detection system
 coupling guard
 vibration measuring points
 breaker
 start/stop switch
 asset integrity
 various maintenance/inspection tasks
As you can see, there
are a lot of barriers out
there protecting us!
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Q & A
Feedback/comments?
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THANK YOU
END
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