• Jenis narasi: • Ketidakpercayaan kepada KPU dan Pemerintah • Kampanye hitam dan kampanye negatif terhadap lawan politik • Fitnah dan memecah belah kelompok • Goal: • Elektoral • Polarisasi dan instabilitas • Ancaman: • Media ’click bait’ • Media mainstream yang tidak “cover all sides” • Polarisasi di masyarakat produk kontestasi sebelumnya

1. ANALISIS DISINFORMASI
DALAM PEMILU 2019
DAN POTENSINYA DALAM
PEMILU 2024
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Direktur Media Kernels Indonesia (Drone Emprit)
Dosen Universitas Islam Indonesia
Wakil Ketua Komisi Infokom MUI Pusat
WORKSHOP PERLUDEM
22 DESEMBER 2021

2. 2
1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia
2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2004 – 2009 Doctor, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2009 – Now Engineer at Weborama (Paris/Amsterdam)
2014 – Now Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company
2015 – Now Consultant at Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch
2017 – Now Lecturer at the IT Magister Program of the Universitas Islam Indonesia
2021 – Now Wakil Ketua Komisi Infokom, Majelis Ulama Indonesia Pusat
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com

3. PELAKU DAN POLA ”CYBER WAR” SAAT
KONTESTASI POLITIK

4. CYBER TROOPS
4
CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public opinion
over social media.

5. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
5
Since 2012 until now, we
have seen bots, algorithms
and other forms of
automation are used by
political actors in countries
around the world to
manipulate public opinion
over major social networking
platforms, such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube.

6. PENGGUNA TWITTER DI INDONESIA
NAIK DARI 27% (2018) MENJADI 56% (2020)
6
27%
52%
56%
2018
2019
2020

7. MEMAHAMI MEDIA SOSIAL:
ATTENTION ECONOMY

8. ATTENTION ECONOMY
8

9. MOBOKRASI DALAM SOSIAL MEDIA
9

10. HOAKS MUDAH MENYEBAR DI “HIGHLY
CONNECTED AND POLARIZED NETWORK”
10
MIT researchers built a theoretical model
to study how news spreads on a Twitter-
like social network and found that when a
network is highly connected or when
the views of its members are sharply
polarized, false news will spread wider
than news that is seen as more credible.
Contoh highly connected network:
WhatsApp Group, FB Group, Telegram
channel, cluster user di Twitter, dll.
Warganet hanya menyebarkan konten
yang dianggap menarik, sesuai dengan
pandangannya, dan bisa
mempengaruhi orang lain.
https://news.mit.edu/2021/systems-false-news-
social-media-1215

11. DISINFORMATION-FOR-PROFIT BUSINESS MODEL
Logic dalam sistem rekomendasi di Twitter dan Facebook lebih memberi kemudahan bagi
berita kontroversial untuk menyebar lebih cepat dari berita benar. Di Twitter hingga 6x lebih
cepat. Mereka dapat profit. ~ The Social Dilemma, Film (Netflix)
11

12. DEEP POLARIZATION
12
Polarization Polarization
Polarization
INDONESIA

13. PROBLEM WITH SOCIAL MEDIA
•It is designed to favor:
• broadcasting over engagement,
• posts over discussions
• shallow comments over deep conversations.
•Results: deep polarization.
13

14. THE DEVELOPMENT OF POLITICAL
SOCIAL MEDIA POLARIZATION IN 2014 - 2017

15. JANUARY 2014, JOKOWI AS THE JAKARTA’S GOVERNOR
MEDIA AND CYBER TROOP SUPPORTS
PRO
KONTRA
2014

16. JUNE-JULY 2014, JOKOWI AS A PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATE
DURING A CAMPAIGN PERIOD
PRO
KONTRA
2014

17. APRIL 2015, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
FIRST YEAR
PRO
KONTRA
2015

18. SEPTEMBER-OCTOBER 2017, JOKOWI AS THE PRESIDENT
AFTER THE JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
PRO
KONTRA
2017
PRO

19. CYBER TROOPS IN
2017 DKI JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION

20. 20

21. 7-8 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
SECOND DEBATE
21
Ahok-Djarot
Anies-Sandi
Agus-Sylvi
MCA
2017

22. 12 FEB 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 1ST ROUND ELECTION
22
Agus-Sylvi
Anies-Sandy
Ahok-Djarot
MCA
2017

23. 17 MAR 2017: JAKARTA GOVERNOR ELECTION 2017
BEFORE THE 2ND ROUND ELECTION
23
Pro Anies
Pro Ahok

24. PROBLEM DENGAN MEDIA

25. 25

26. 26

27. 27

28. 28

29. 29

30. 30

31. ISSUES DURING 2019 PRESIDENTIAL
ELECTION CAMPAIGN

32. ISSUES ON JOKOWI
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama
PKI
China
Leadership

33. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI

34. ISSUES ON PRABOWO
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Temperamental
Human Rights

35. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO

36. CONTOH: HOAX 7 KONTAINER SURAT
SUARA

37. 37
https://pers.droneemprit.id/hoax-7-kontainer-stop-hoax-mari-kawal-suara/

38. 38

39. 39

40. 40

41. 41

42. MEDIA CEK FAKTA

43. SOCIAL NETWORK BEFORE DEBATE
02
01

44. SOCIAL NETWORK DURING DEBATE WITH TOPICS
02
01
01 EXTRA
CYBER TROOPS

45. ONLINE NEWS: INFORMATION ARBITRAGE

46. POTENSI DISINFORMASI DALAM PEMILU
2024

47. NARASI DISINFORMASI
• Jenis narasi:
• Ketidakpercayaan kepada KPU dan Pemerintah
• Kampanye hitam dan kampanye negatif terhadap lawan politik
• Fitnah dan memecah belah kelompok
• Goal:
• Elektoral
• Polarisasi dan instabilitas
• Ancaman:
• Media ’click bait’
• Media mainstream yang tidak “cover all sides”
• Polarisasi di masyarakat produk kontestasi sebelumnya
47

48. SOLUSI

49. Hasil penelitian dari sebuah Tim dari Universitas Kolumbia:
Di Twittersphere, titik ungu = orang yg menyebar berita hoax. Titik kuning =
orang yang mengcounter. Ternyata: di cluster kanan (tanpa counter) hoax
menyebar luar biasa, di cluster kiri (dg 2 counter) hoax lebih sedikit disebar.
PENTINGNYA HOAX BUSTER
PENELITIAN
Hoax Buster

50. KECEPATAN CEK FAKTA
50
AWAL ISU
CONCERN:
Pro-Kontra berhari-hari
(media tidak cover all sides) KLARIFIKASI
Perlu cek fakta
yang lebih cepat

51. THANK YOU
51