1) The document discusses computational propaganda, cyber troops, and influence operations used to manipulate public opinion on social media platforms. 2) It provides examples of how these techniques were used in Indonesia during elections to spread propaganda about political candidates, and in issues like West Papua to counter foreign influence. 3) The author concludes that while computational propaganda methods continue to evolve globally and in Indonesia, analysis using open-source intelligence can still effectively detect and expose such operations.

1. HOAX, CYBER TROOPS,
COMPUTATIONAL
PROPAGANDA, AND
INFLUENCE OPERATIONS
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Director PT. Media Kernels Indonesia
(a.k.a Drone Emprit)
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com
PELUNCURAN BUKU
TARUNG DIGITAL
8 APRIL 2021

2. 2
1992 – 1997 Undergraduate, Electrical Engineering, ITB, Indonesia
2003 – 2004 Master, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2004 – 2009 Doctor, Information Science, University of Groningen, NL
2009 – Now Engineer at Weborama (Paris/Amsterdam)
2014 – Now Founder PT. Media Kernels Indonesia, a Drone Emprit Company
2015 – Now Consultant at Perpustakaan Nasional, Inisiator Indonesia OneSearch
2017 – Now Lecturer at the IT Magister Program of the Universitas Islam Indonesia
Ismail Fahmi, Ph.D.
Ismail.fahmi@gmail.com

3. PROPAGANDA DALAM NEGERI

4. DRONE EMPRIT DALAM ”TARUNG DIGITAL”
4

5. FAKE NEWS AND STATE CONTROL
KYOTO UNIV, JAPAN
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6. COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
6
Since 2012 until now, we
have seen bots, algorithms
and other forms of
automation are used by
political actors in countries
around the world to
manipulate public opinion
over major social networking
platforms, such as Twitter,
Facebook, Instagram, and
YouTube.

7. CYBER TROOPS
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CYBER TROOPS: government,
military or political party teams
committed to developing or
manipulating public opinion
over social media.

8. THE PURPOSES OF CYBER TROOPS AND
COMPUTATIONAL PROPAGANDA
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Manipulates public opinion to
promote the interests of
government, opposition, or
trolls.
Interests Interests
TROLLS
Interests

9. ISSUES ON JOKOWI
Unfulfilled Promises
Claiming other’s works Anti Islam and Ulama
PKI
China
Leadership

10. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON JOKOWI

11. ISSUES ON PRABOWO
Hoaxes
Lack of experiences
Religion
Khilafah
Temperamental
Human Rights

12. WHO PLAYED THE ISSUES ON PRABOWO

13. AI UNTUK MENDETEKSI ROBOT DI TWITTER
TiLiK
HUMAN ROBOT
HUMAN ROBOT
HUMAN ROBOT
HUMAN ROBOT

14. PETA PERCAKAPAN “JEJAK KHILAFAH”
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Pro Pemerintah
Pro Oposisi
Pro Khilafah (HTI)
robot
robot

15. PROPAGANDA INTERNASIONAL

16. DI BERBAGAI NEGARA
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17. 17

18. 18

19. 19

20. 20

21. 21

22. 22

23. 23

24. FB PAGES OF “FREE WEST PAPUA CAMPAIGN”
• When we search for “Free West Papua” on Facebook, we found dozens of Facebook Pages related to “Free West Papua Campaign.”
Below is some of the search results. “Free West Papua Campaign” page is the most popular one, followed by more than 390k users.

25. THE LOCATIONS OF FWP CAMPAIGN ADMINS
• The following are 6 Facebook Pages of Free (West) Papua campaigns and movements. From the page
transparency we can see the location of their admins. Most of them have admins in the United Kingdom, and all
of them are from outside of Indonesia.

26. SNA OF TOP 10 FREE (WEST) PAPUA CAMPAIGNS
• This social network only shows Facebook Pages related to the Free (West) Papua campaigns and movements.
From this network we can see the close interaction between the pages based on their users’ comment behavior.
The cluster of users that are
active in multiple FB pages. They
can transmit messages from one
page to another.

27. 11 NOVEMBER 2020: BELLINGCAT
MEMBONGKAR INFLUENCE OPS INDONESIA
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28. CONTOH CUITAN BOT INDONESIA (BAHASA
JERMAN DAN BELANDA)
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29. ANALISIS POSISI MATA BOT INDONESIA:
SAMA PERSIS
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30. PENUTUP

31. KESIMPULAN
• Sejak 2012 hingga sekarang, computational propaganda terus
digunakan di seluruh dunia untuk “memanipulasi opini publik”.
• Di Indonesia, metode propaganda ini juga digunakan baik saat
kontestasi politik (pilpres, pilkada), maupun setelahnya, dan untuk
menghadapi pengaruh asing (misal isu Papua).
• Secanggih apapun metode computational propagandanya, akan tetap
mudah dideteksi oleh pegiat analisis OSINT.
• Meskipun saya sudah membaca laporan-laporan, dan mengikuti event
internasional tentang propaganda komputasi, saya tetap dimudahkan
mendapat gambaran yang sangat lengkap, terstruktur, kaya referensi
tentang propaganda komputasi dari buku ini. Buku ini wajib dibaca
siapapun yang ini paham tentang influence operations and
computational propaganda baik internasional maupun di Indonesia.
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