In depth presentation about American Lawyers at the Tokyo War Crimes Trial right after World War II. Presentation by Masako Nakagawa

1. American Defense Attorneys
at the Tokyo War Crimes Trials
Masako Nakagawa
Villanova University

2. Who Requested?
 It is believed that Ota (Saburō), a diplomat requested to Judge Northcroft, then
acting president of tribunal.
 January 9, 1946: Nakamura Toyoichi met with Keenan, chief prosecutor. Keenan
already had such a plan in mind.
 January 25-26: In Washington, British prosecution team approved non-
Japanese counsels. (British Laws made it difficult for barristers to work for
Japanese defenders.)
 February 14: Japanese government appealed to MacArthur.
 February 21: MacArthur Asked Judge Advocate-General’s Dept. of Washington
for 15 to 20 American lawyers.
 March 19: MacArthur told Northcroft, then acting president of tribunal that he
had asked to # 25.
[Prichard, Röling, Higurashi, Sugawara, Brackman, Kojima]
Everyone

3. Why They Need American Colleagues?
 Basically Tokyo War Crimes Trial followed Anglo-
American Legal system but Japanese lawyers were
accustomed to Continental/German system, in which
a judge played a leading role (In Nurenberg German
lawyers often did not know how to behave in Anglo-
American style procedure.)
 Japanese lawyers were not used to the speed of
proceedings at trial and the presentation style
(Japanese lawyers had a tendency for a lengthy
formal speech.)
 They avoided meeting their witnesses before trials
because in principle witnesses were summoned by
the court; confusion over the use of “objection.”
In Japan before Meiji
Restoration of 1868 there
were no lawyers. In 1872
the daigonnin (spokesman)
system was introduced. In
1880 the spokesman was
licensed and started
working in criminal cases.
In 1892 modern legal
system with attorneys was
established.

4. Language Issues
 Few Japanese spoke English that the court found tolerable. With
presiding Judges from 11 allied nations, English, Japanese, French,
Russian were used.
 A language and clerical staff of 104 and 154 Japanese and special
preparation not withstanding, simultaneous translation proved
impossible. Counsel then posed only short, simple questions to
witnesses. Later the court approved written presentations prepared
in advanced. (Due to the intensity of task Interpreters changed every
30 minutes.)
 Daily stenographic records in English were available on the same day
and its book bound records were available in the following morning
for English speakers. Japanese stenographic records took 3 to 4
weeks before distribution .

5. Tokyo: A Ruined City
 Tokyo was in total ruin and Japanese lawyers faced many hurdles including
food shortage, unreliable postal services and public transportation(even
dangerous).
 Lacking office essentials such as pencils, pen, paper, no proper working
space. At first many Japanese lawyers received no payment.
 [Dr. Uzawa Somei, chief of defense counsel broadcasted a nationwide radio
appeal for funds but the outcome was very disappointing.]
 Each of American attorneys was provided with own office, a highly legal
secretary and expense accounts. They received substantial salary from US
government.

6. Arrival of American Lawyers
 The first group of American attorneys was
formed on April 1, 1946. On May 24, GHQ
directed that those Americans would
report to Department of Justice.
 When the trial opened on May 3, 1946, the
American defense team was led by Captain
Beverly Coleman, a US Navy officer and a
lawyer.
 On June 3 Captain Coleman and six
associates decided to resign because they
felt that the trial had not been conducted
with fairness.
 By late May a majority of American lawyers
had arrived in Tokyo.
 A minority of American lawyers proved to
be unsuitable and resigned.
 Initially Japanese defendants
thought that American lawyers were
no more than an intermediary
between the court and Japanese
attorneys.
 Some of them were suspicious of
their motive. At first Hashimoto
and Tōjō refused to have American
counsel.

7. American & Japanese Lawyers
 American attorneys had
practiced law or were
prosecutors in the US. Some of
them had been in military
during the war and others were
recruited in the US.
 Overall, American lawyers
fought vigorously and
dominated court scene.
 They earned respect from the
defendants and Japanese
counterparts.
 American and Japanese attorneys
did not always have an amicable
working relationship.
 Americans considered their work to
be individual defense while
Japanese focused on defending
Japan as a nation.
 In February 1947, the difference
surfaced in public when four
American lawyers did not support
the opening argument by the
defense.

8. NAME CLIENT DOB EDUCATION
Benjamin Bruce
Blakeney
Umezu Yoshijirō
Tōgō Shigenori
Oklahoma, 1908 Oklahoma U. & Harvard U.
George Francis Blewett Tōjō Hideki Pennsylvania, 1898 Columbia U., Fordham &
Temple Law School
John G. Brannon Nagano Osami Kansas, 1915 Kansas U.
Alfred W. Brooks Koiso Kuniaki/Ōkawa Shūmei Cairo, Missouri, 1906 Missouri U.
Charles B. Caudle Shiratori Toshio
Roger F. Cole Mutō Akira Pogo, Michigan,1903 Alma College & Detroit Law
School
Owen Cunningham Ōshima Hiroshi Des Moine, Iowa, 1900 Ohio State U. & Drake U.
James N. Freeman Satō Kenryō Dobson, North Carolina,
1902
North Carolina
George A Furness Shigemitsu Mamoru Elizabeth, New Jersey, 1896 Harvard U.
E. Richard Harris Hashimoto Kingorō Brooklyn, NY, 1907 City College of New York &
St. Lawrence
Joseph C. Howard Kimura Heitarō Goliad, Texas, 1899
Samuel Joseph Kleiman Hiranuma Kiichirō
Samuel G. Lazarus Hata Shunroku New York, 1913 New York

9. NAME CLIENT DOB EDUCATION
Michael Levin Suzuki Teiichi Russia, 1887 George Washington &
Wisconsin
William Logan, Jr Kido Kōichi Glasgow, Scotland, 1901 Rutgers & New York
Floyd J. Mattice Matsui Iwane; Itagaki Seishirō Middleburg, New York,
1882
Michigan
William J. McCormack Minami Jirō
Edward P. McDermott Shimada Shigetarō
Lawrence J. McManus Araki Sadao New York, 1905 Manhattan & Fordham
Samuel Allen Roberts Oka Takazumi New York? 1904 New York Law School
Roger S. Ruthick Kaya Okinori
David F. Smith Hirota Kōki Washington, D.C., 1903 Georgetown
Franklin E. N. Warren Doihara Kenji Tulsa, Oklahoma, 1905 Oklahoma
G. Carrington William Hoshino Naoki Virginia, 1903 John Hopkins & Virginia
George Yamaoka Tōgō Shigenori Seattle WA, 1903 Washington & Georgetown

10. Benjamin Bruce Blakeney
 Born in Shawnee, Oklahoma in 1908. Graduated from Oklahoma and Harvard. During
the war he trained in Japanese and became fluent in the language. Counsel of Tōgō and
Umezu.
 On May 14, 1947 he argued that aggressive war could not be defined as a crime under
international law and is the act of a nation, not of individuals. Therefore killing in war
cannot be considered murder. He then touched upon the very sensitive issue of the
atomic bombing of Hiroshima by saying "If the killing of Admiral Kidd by the bombing
of Pearl Harbor is murder, we know the name of the very man who[se] hands loosed
the atomic bomb on Hiroshima."
 On March 3, 1947 he once more argued that according to the Hague Treaty the atomic
bombing was a war crime. (His argument was not included in the trial records.)
 In August 1947 cross examining Fu Yi, Emperor of Machuria, Blakney produced Fu Yi’s
letter to Minami Jirö, then Minister of Army.
 In 1949 he began work as a lecturer of law at Tokyo University. He opened his law
office in Hibiya, Tokyo. He was killed in a plane crash March 4, 1963.
B. B. B.
Click the picture

11. David F. Smith and “Undue Interference”
 Born in Washington, D.C. in 1903. Studied law at Georgetown University. Hirota Kōki’s
Counsel.
 March 5, 1947 Okamoto Shōichi, a Japanese lawyer was taking testimony from a Japanese
journalist concerning prewar cabinets. Webb, the president of IMTFE interjected that
questioning should be limited to Wakatsuki, Hirota and Yoneuchi Cabinets.
 Smith, Hirota’s counsel, objected, “I wanted to take an exception to the undue interference
of the tribunal with the ordinary examination of the witness.” Webb found the term undue
interference disrespectful to the tribunal and told Smith to withdraw that and apologize or
he would leave the court as counsel. Smith declined and Webb called a recess.
 During the recess Japanese defense team held a meeting. Many lawyers felt that unfair
restrictions were imposed on defense cases. They decided to ask court for a recess and
discuss their future course of action.
 When court reconvened, Webb announced that Smith was barred from court until his
withdraw his remark. Smith packed up his stuff and left court.

12. Smith & A Crisis at Court
 Uzawa, Chief Counsel came forward and asked for a recess. He explained that although
it was difficult for Japanese counsel to speak of such thing, there seems to have more
restrictions placed upon the defense case than the prosecution in presenting evidence.
Webb sensed that he was losing control of the trial to the point of collapsing and
responded that Smith had insulted the tribunal and he wanted to know if Japanese
counsel desire the court to be insulted. Webb looked relieved when Uzawa answered
that the defense held the deepest respect. The crisis was thus averted.
 Since then Smith observed the trial from the press section while Uzawa and Brooks were
working hard to reinstate Smith. A delegation of American attorneys (Brooks,
Yamaoka, Logan, Warren, and Lazarus) visited Webb and explained that in the US
Smith’s language would not have been considered offensive. In July Smith went to see
Webb.
 On September 5, 1947 Smith made an apology at court but Webb told him to come
back on Monday because only eight judges were present. Smith did not come back.
Although the defense team tried to stop him from leaving Japan, Smith went home.

13. Cunningham, Furness & Logan
 Owen Cunningham (Ōshima Hiroshi’s counsel) Led the defense in the
Tripartite Pact phase; He flew to Germany and obtained the deposition
from Joachim von Ribbentrop. Cunningham criticized the tribunal at
American Bar Association meeting in Seattle in October 1948. Webb
barred him from court.
 George A. Furness (Shigemitsu Mamoru’s counsel) He flew to the US and
UK and collected the affidavits from diplomats (former Ambassadors,
Kregee & Davis and Butler former foreign vice-minister) for his client
Shigemitsu.
 William Logan, Jr. (Kido Kōichi’s counsel) Led the defense in the Soviet
Phase. His Summation of 3/10/1948 argued that it was Allied not Japan
that brought war to the Pacific because the blockage in 1940-1941
threatened Japan’s existence.

14. Appeals after Sentencing of 11/12/1948
 In Spring 1948: American lawyers started working on
appeal.
 6/15/1948: Uzawa led the Japanese defense team’s
efforts for appeal.
 ******************************************************
*
 11/19: Appeal to MacArthur
 11/20: MacAuthurs’ Meeting with members of the
Allied Control Commission for Japan. Six of those
representatives made no recommendations for
clemency.
 11/21: Representing the defense team, Blakeney sent
a memo to MacArthur.
 11/24: The verdict and sentences of the tribunal
were confirmed by MacArthur.
• 11/18/1948: Brannon, Blakeney,
Logan, Smith, Warren, Furness &
Yamanaka filed an appeal with the
Supreme Court of the US, arguing
that the ruling could not be upheld
because General Douglas MacArthur
had acted unconstitutionally in
constituting the tribunal.
• 12/6: Supreme court decided to
have a hearing.
• 12/20: By 6 to 1, the appeal was
denied. The court has no jurisdiction
over IMTFE.

15. Supreme Duty
 During the Manchuria phase Webb reminded Lazarus an American lawyer should show his
allegiance to his home country and its allied. To this Lazarus responded that American lawyers
put aside personal preference or sentiment and do their very best to defend their clients
because they believe doing so to be their supreme duty. (Tokyo Saiban, Vol. 1, p. 797)
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 12 of American lawyers were granted unique honor of being admitted to practice at the Bar of Japan.
Several remained and did well in their profession.
 After the tribunal Japanese adopted Anglo-American Legal System.
 Overall, Americans assigned to the Defense made a huge difference (Pritchard xlii).
 At the opening of his summation of 3/2/1948 Uzawa expressed the Japanese defense team’s
gratitude to American colleagues:
 “We are also most grateful to this Tribunal, the Supreme Commander and the other authorities
in having made available to the accused and to us the invaluable assistance of our learned
American colleagues. Mr. President and Members of the Tribunal, the expression of such
sentiments may be most unusual but the record of this unprecedented trial would be amiss
without their inclusion.” (Pritchard 42,077)

16. Selected Bibliography
 Akazawa Shirö. Tokyo saiban. Tokyo: Iwanami shoten, 1989.
 Asahi shinbun hōtei kishadan. Tokyo saiban, vol. 1. Tokyo: Tokyo
saiban kankōkai, 1962.
 Bess, Michael. Choice Under Fire: Moral Dimensions of World War II.
New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 2006
 Brackman, Arnold C. The Other Nuremberg: The Untold Story of the
Tokyo War Crimes Trials. New York: William Morrow & Company,
Inc., 1987.
 Crowe, David M. War Crimes, Genocide, and Justice: A Global History.
New York: Palgrare Macmillian, 2004.
 Fuji Nobuo. Watashi no mita Tokyo saiban, 2 vols. Tokyo: Kōdansha,
1988
 Goodman, Grant K. America’s Japan: The First Year, 1945-1946. New
York: Fordham University Press, 2005.
 Higurashi Yoshinobu. Tokyo saiban no kokusai kankei. Tokyo:
Bokutakusha, 2002.
 Hosoya C, N. Andō, Y Ōnuma & R. Minear, ed. The Tokyo War Crime:
An International Symposium Kodansh, 1986.
 Ishikawa Masatoshi. Uzawa Sōmei: sono shōgai to tatakai. Tokyo:
Gihōsha, 1997.
 Kojima Noboru. Tokyo saiban, 2 Vols. Tokyo: Chūō kōronsha,
1971.
 Mainichi shinbun seijibu, ed. Shinbun shiryō ni miru Tokyo
saiban, BCkyū saiban, 2 Vols. Tokyo:Gendai shiryö shuppan,
2002.
 Nagano Konisuke, ed. Hösö hyakunen. Tokyo: Hösö köronsha,
1969
 Piccigallo, Philip R. The Japanese on Trial: Allied War Crimes
Operations in the East, 1945-1951.
 Pritchard, R. John. “An Overview of the Historical Importance of
the Tokyo War Trial.” In Nissan Occasional Paper Series, No. 5,
1987.
 Röling, B.V.A. The Tokyo Trial and Beyond: Reflections of a
Peacemonger. Cambridge, MA: Polity Press, 1993.
 Shimanouchi Tatsuoki. Tokyo saiban. Tokyo: Nihon hyöronsha,
1984.
 Sugawara Yutaka. Tokyo saiban no shötai. Tokyo: Tosho
kankökai, 1961.
 Takigawa Seijirö. Tokyo saiban o sabaku, 2 Vols. Tokyo:
Töwasha, 1953.
 Ushimura Kei. Bunmei no sabaki o koete: tainichi senpan saiban
dokukai no kokoromi. Tokyo: Chūö köronsha, 2006.