V100 Dissertation 2

HIST 398 The United States and Vietnam, 1956-1965
Thomas Charles Beresford
200443725
HIST 398 - Dissertation (V100)
THE UNITED STATES AND VIETNAM,
1956-1965.
Word Length: 10,032
Date Submitted: 27/4/2009
1

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION…………………………………………………….3
CHAPTER ONE
The Eisenhower Years – 1956-61……………………………………...11
CHAPTER TWO
The Kennedy Years – 1961-1963………………………………………18
CHAPTER THREE
The Johnson Years – 1963-1965……………………………………….26
CONCLUSION………………………………………………………..38
BIBLIOGRAPHY……………………………………………………..43
2

INTRODUCTION
By 1975 when the North Vietnamese finally captured the South Vietnamese
capital of Saigon, bringing an end to the major fighting in Vietnam, just over fifty
eight thousand American personnel had lost their lives through acts of terrorism or
front line combat1
. Alongside them were over two hundred and twenty thousand
South Vietnamese killed, and over one million North Vietnamese dead. Returning
soldiers were not given heroes welcomes, instead they faced protestations from the
large number of anti-war protesters that had built up over the course of America’s
involvement in Vietnam. American prestige both domestically and internationally was
seriously tarnished and its involvement in Vietnam came to be known by some as the
“American Tragedy”2
.
The question therefore is how and why did the United States become so
heavily involved with a small, almost backwater, nation in Vietnam? It is in the
course of this study that I hope to shed some light onto the series of events,
discussions and planning that went on in both the United States and on the ground in
Vietnam between the years of 1956 and 1965. To do this I will mostly focus on
documentation and primary source material, such as memorandums, security
estimates, meetings and memoirs.
I have chosen to begin in the year of 1956, because I believe it was in that year
when American involvement in Vietnam started on its downward spiral towards a
major conflict. 1956 had been the year when the temporary divide along the 17th
parallel between North and South Vietnam was planned to be removed and the
1
Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War, reproduced at
http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html.
2
D. Kaiser, American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam War (Belknap Press,
2002).
3

country re-united under an ‘All-Vietnam’ election3
. This election never occurred
mainly due to the intervention of the United States, and it was from this point on that
the Hanoi-sponsored insurgency into the South began with earnest and the US was
dragged deeper into a tangled mess of terrorism, upheaval, political instability and
eventually war.
This study ends in the year of 1965, due to the fact that this is the point where
the United States involvement went beyond the theoretical ‘point of no return’. As it
was in 1965 when the US Administration under President Lyndon Baines Johnson
initiated a series of air strikes against North Vietnam, known as “Rolling Thunder”. It
was also in March of 1965, when the first American combat troops set foot on
Vietnamese soil, as previously to 1965 the American personnel in Vietnam had been
there in an advisory and training capacity. The US Marine battalions that landed in
1965 were therefore the first Americans assigned to Vietnam in a strictly combat role.
Between these two ‘watersheds’ in American foreign policy towards Vietnam,
there were a number of crucial events and decisions made that can give important
insight onto the why and how of America’s folly into a disastrous war. The
assassination of American backed South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem in
1963, and the events in the Gulf of Tonkin in August of 1964 to name but two
examples. It is in the course of this study that I will be looking into such events,
among other elements of American involvement to chart an interpretation of to why
American became so involved in the struggle of South Vietnam against North
Vietnam.
3
D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, in D.
Anderson, ed, Shadow on the White House, Presidents and the Vietnam War, 1945-1975 (Kansas,
1993), p. 48.
4

The Situation by 1956
To begin this study, I believe it is important to give a background to the period
covered, as it is important to cover previous events to give an understanding of the
position the United States found itself in, in the year of 1956.
The region of Southeast Asia had been a substantial thorn in the side for the
United States since the early 1930’s, when the Japanese invasion of Manchuria in
1931 had interfered with America’s dealings with the Chinese in trade, and effectively
cut off the ‘Open door’ policy that America had extended to the Chinese since the
very beginning of the 20th
century.
Problems with Southeast Asia reached a high point in 1941, when it was
through a Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor that the United States became involved in
the Second World War. It was from this point on that the United States became a
major factor in the affairs of Southeast Asia. The war that occurred in the Pacific
against Japan was a war almost exclusively fought by the United States, with only
limited support from its Allies of the British Empire and the Soviet Union. It was also
in Southeast Asia that many saw the first act of the Cold War being carried out. The
first atomic bombs were dropped on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August of 1945, and although they achieved the aim that President Harry S. Truman
had hoped for, the ending of the war with Japan, they also created an atmosphere of
criticism and suspicion both at home and abroad. Historians such as Gor Alperovitz
have even suggested that the use of the Atomic bombs were for political means, a way
of intimidating the Soviet Union to accept American ideals4
.
In addition, the end of the war in the Pacific did not bring about the end of
American involvement and interest in Southeast Asia. The United States maintained
an occupation force within Japan for a number of years after the end of the Second
4
W. Pemberton, Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston, 1989), p. 50.
5

World War, and it would be this force that would later become involved in America’s
next stage of deepening involvement in the affairs of Southeast Asia. It was also only
four years later that grave concern was raised over the future of Southeast Asia
through the victory of Mao Zedong’s Communists in China.
America’s involvement increased dramatically only five years later in June
1950, when the Korean War broke out as the Communist led Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea (DPRK) invaded in southern Republic of Korea in an attempt to
reunify the country under Communist leadership after it had been split in two during
the course of the Second World War. Acting under the driving policy behind US
foreign relations, “containment” first established by George F. Kennan5
, America led
a United Nations combat force into what became a costly and embarrassing conflict in
Korea. It was in Korea that the United States was forced to make one of its longest
retreats in military history, and is not looked upon favourably by many who
experienced the conflict. Korea was also a major source of criticism for the Truman
administration at the time, especially from a Congress that they had failed to consult
about entering into the war.
It was at this same period in time that the situation in Indochina (Vietnam,
Laos and Cambodia) was also taking a turn for the worse. The French had held
Indochina as an imperial colony since the 19th
century. But after the catastrophe it
faced in the Second World War, France struggled to hold onto these colonies in the
late 1940’s. This struggle against a Communist led Nationalist movement within
Vietnam eventually led to the First Indochina War. The war lasted for a period of
around seven years of bloody fighting and false French hopes of victory6
. The United
States had become heavily involved with the conflict in Vietnam around 1950, when
5
X., ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 4 (July, 1947), p. 566
6
F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War (Essex, 2001), p.25.
6

through the Mutual Defence Assistance Act they began to supply economic aid and
military supplies. However, even with the backing and substantial support of the
United States the French were unable to achieve victory against Ho Chi Minh’s
Vietminh army. The terrain had strongly acted against them, and the French army was
not suited to fighting a guerrilla style of warfare. Subsequently the humiliating defeat
at Dien Bien Phu led the French to call a cease-fire and head to the negotiating table,
even though Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles had urged the French to only
negotiate when they had the upper hand7
.
The Geneva Conference was held in July 1954, and the resulting accords
established the crucial split between North and South Vietnam along the 17th
Parallel,
as well as establishing the principle that this division was meant to be temporary
measure8
, resulting in elections to be held in 1956. During the conference the United
States had held a passive involvement, engaging in “holding action” diplomacy9
, and
even went as far as not signing up to the Geneva Accords, although they did publicly
acknowledge the terms10
. The reasoning behind the actions of the United States was
two fold; firstly President Eisenhower had wanted to avoid any criticism that had had
compromised with Communists, and secondly; Eisenhower wanted to have an
element of freedom of action over Vietnam11
.
The Eisenhower administration quickly realized in the course of 1954, that the
Accords presented a very grave problem. The government that had been established in
South Vietnam was a weak regime, under the Emperor Bao Dai, a figure who was
largely unpopular with his own people. On the other hand, the newly formed
Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) in the North was now in a position of
7
Ibid, p. 25.
8
D. Anderson, ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh Diem’, p. 48.
9
F. Logevall, The Origins of the Vietnam War, p. 26.
10
11
7

strength. The DRV now had an international sanction for its existence and a
leadership that had the praise and adulation of its own people through its defeat of the
French imperialists.
As a response to this situation, the Eisenhower administration drew up a
document known as NSC 5429/2. A section of which was to become crucial to the
United State’s future actions in Vietnam:
“The United States must protect its position and restore its prestige in the Far East
by a new initiative in Southeast Asia, where the situation must be stabilized as soon as
possible to prevent further losses to Communism through (1) creeping
expansion and subversion, or (2) over aggression.”12
The document also provided for the establishment of what came to be known
as the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). A haphazard collection of allies
for collective defence over Southeast Asia. The establishment of SEATO was the
initial response by the United States to justify its attempts to intervene with the affairs
of Vietnam13
, and most importantly at the time, to interfere with the proposed
elections in 1956.
In conjunction with the establishment of SEATO, the Eisenhower
administration had begun what historian Frederick Logevall calls “The Diem
Experiment”14
. Ngo Dinh Diem was appointed by Emperor Bao Dai as President of
the Republic of South Vietnam in early 1955, largely because Bao Dai knew of
Diem’s virulent anti-Communism and hoped that it would appeal to the United States,
and encourage them to continue to assist South Vietnam. Diem was not a practical
choice for a number of reasons; he had a reclusive, arrogant nature, and lacked
12
13
W. LaFeber, The American Age (New York, 1989), p. 524.
14
8

popular support outside of his own family15
. However, he was seen as the only real
choice by American officials, mainly because his competition were even worse, “we
are prepared to accept the seemingly ridiculous prospect that this yogi-like mystic
could assume the change he is apparently about to undertake only because the
standard set by his predecessors is so low”16
. Even so, in public, President Eisenhower
hailed Diem as a “tough miracle man” and the supposed “saviour” of South
Vietnam17
. However, Diem was to turn out to be a poor choice by the United States as
a leader for South Vietnam, partly because of his arrogant nature and his handling of
government that became more autocratic and dictatorial as the years progressed.
As 1956 approached, the United States worked consistently to attempt to
subvert the Geneva Accords of 1954. By 1955 Diem, most likely under American
influence and his own anti-Communist feelings, refused to even hold consultations
with the North that had been part of the Geneva agreements. Hanoi in the North was
bitterly disappointed, as they had been hoping to achieve a reunification of Vietnam
not by bullets, but by ballots18
. As 1955 became 1956 it was clear that a confrontation
was brewing on the horizon as the deadline for the All-Vietnam elections approached.
Diem and his American backers were not going to see eye to eye with the Communist
led North, and the opportunity to gain unification of Vietnam through an election
came and went with Diem’s refusal to hold the election as he believe they would not
be “absolutely free”19
.
The stage by 1956 was set for a clash between North and South, and the
United States had already become involved on the side of Ngo Dinh Diem, with its
15
16
G. Hess, Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (New York, 1998), p. 55.
17
18
19
Katsiaficas, G., ed, Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War (New York,
1992), p. 36.
9

anti-communist, “containment” stance. Therefore, the United States was from then on,
committed to assisting in an ever escalating conflict that would drag them deeper and
deeper, resulting in a tragic war.
CHAPTER ONE
THE EISENHOWER YEARS, 1956-1961
President Dwight D. Eisenhower was elected in November 1952 and came to
office in early 1953, with his entrance into the Presidency he took over overseeing the
end of the largely disastrous conflict in Korea that had begun in June 1950. From that
point on, Eisenhower placed a greater emphasis on Southeast Asia than his
10

predecessors had done so. This importance was embodied in his ‘domino’ theory that
he publicly voiced in a press conference on April 7th
1954, “Finally, you have broader
considerations that might follow what you would call the "falling domino" principle.
You have a row of dominoes set up, you knock over the first one, and what will
happen to the last one is the certainty that it will go over very quickly. So you could
have a beginning of a disintegration that would have the most profound influences”20
.
It was this principle that Eisenhower directly applied to situations occurring in
Southeast Asia, however he gave a greater importance to the struggle of Laos21
than
he did that of Vietnam. This fact is clear in Eisenhower’s memoirs ‘Waging Peace’
which directly cover his time in office from 1956 to 1961. The absence of attention to
issues in Vietnam is clear, and at the same time Eisenhower gives more of his time
towards the Laos situation, stating that he and his administration were determined to
preserve the independence of Laos22
. Coupled with this focus more towards Laos in
Southeast Asia, was the fact that Eisenhower was often distracted with events
elsewhere in the international turmoil that was the Cold War, such as the launching of
the Russian satellite Sputnik 1 in October of 1957 and problems with China. Because
of this, Eisenhower is accused by historians as providing no direction to policymakers
on the worsening problems in Vietnam23
.
Despite Eisenhower’s apparent lack of interest in the situation brewing in
Vietnam, it is clear that America’s growing involvement in the small Southeast Asian
country began strongly under the Eisenhower administration. The obvious starting
point for this growing influence and direction of South Vietnam was during 1956, the
year when the All-Vietnam elections were scheduled to be held, as put forward by the
20
Public Papers of the President, 73 – The President’s News Conference of April 7th
, 1954, reproduced
at http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10202&st=&st1=
21
D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61 (London, 1966), p. 607.
22
Ibid, p. 607.
23
11

Geneva Accords of 1954. The decision was made by South Vietnamese President Ngo
Dinh Diem not to participate in the proposed elections that would have led to
reunification of Vietnam under a single government. It is highly likely that Diem had
his own personal reasons for this decision, mainly that he would have feared losing
his position of power to a North Vietnamese government. However, Diem was not
alone in his decision, as the Eisenhower administration backed Diem’s decision
wholeheartedly for their own purposes24
, as it was widely believed in Washington that
the All-Vietnam elections would lead to a Communist takeover of the entire country.
This takeover would then invoke the falling of the dominoes (Cambodia, Laos, Korea,
Thailand etc.) that Eisenhower strongly believed in. This event in 1956 was the first
time that the United States became involved in the political workings of Vietnam, and
it would simply be the start of many more such occasions, leading to almost complete
American control over the actions of the South Vietnamese government.
It was also in 1956, due to Diem’s refusal to hold elections that the insurgency
into South Vietnam really began. In December of 1956, a Communist leader residing
in the South, Le Duan, published a lengthy report entitled, ‘The Path to Revolution in
the South’. The report called upon all those North Vietnamese cadres that still
remained in the Southern half of Vietnam to prepare for a long-term political struggle,
as well as making the suggestion that Hanoi in the North should prepare itself for
overt military action in future25
. Initially Hanoi had reservations about supporting the
newly proposed insurgency in South Vietnam, but as years passed with little change
in the South Vietnamese position towards the North and no real prospect of
unification through elections, Hanoi gradually shifted more towards support for
subversion through the insurgency. By 1959, Hanoi recognized the fact that Diem’s
24
F. Logevall, Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and Escalation in Vietnam (California,
1999), p. 1.
25
12

oppressive regime in the South had created an atmosphere that was ripe for a
revolution26
. Thus by the spring of 1959, Hanoi decided to put its full support behind a
Southern insurgency, authorizing the start of armed struggle and took steps towards
actively supporting it, including; establishing a task force to establish infiltration
routes such as the now infamous Ho Chi Minh Trail, as well as sending a number of
Vietminh veterans back into the Southern half of Vietnam. By December of 1960,
Hanoi had directed the establishment of the ‘National Front for the Liberation of
South Vietnam’ (NLF)27
, and it was from this point on that the insurgency really
began to make a strong impact upon the situation in South Vietnam.
Within the United States, the growing problems in Vietnam did not go
unnoticed by members of the Eisenhower administration. Numerous officials and
departments believed in the importance of the survival of Vietnam as a free and
independent state, such as the Joint Chiefs of Staff under Admiral Arthur Radford,
and the incumbent Ambassador in Saigon, Elbridge Durbrow. This recognition is
evident in a number of documents published throughout Eisenhower’s time in office.
For example as early as June 1956, the Joint Chiefs of Staff presented to the National
Security Council an outline plan for United States military participation in the event
of Vietminh aggression in Vietnam28
. This plan implied a substantial amount of
assistance towards the Government of Vietnam (GVN) against Northern overt
invasion, including the suggestion of the necessity to use atomic weapons29
. Also as
early as 1957 the US officials on the ground in Vietnam were not blind to the fact that
the situation was in need of increasing American assistance. In a memorandum sent
from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (MAAG),
26
Ibid, p. 37.
27
Ibid, p. 37.
28
Paper presented to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 7 June 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States
1955-1957, Vietnam: Volume I (hereafter FRUS 1955-57, Vol. I), Doc. 333.
29
Ibid, p. 708.
13

Lieutenant General Samuel Williams to Ambassador Durbrow in October, it states
that the country needed ‘pacifying’ and a reorientation of the entire populace towards
American democratic ideals30
.
As the months went by from 1957 into 1958 terrorist activity and instances of
armed insurrections were on the rise, largely as retaliation against Diem’s increasingly
repressive regime31
. Both Vietnamese and American officials had a shared feeling that
a crisis was mounting in Vietnam. In 1959, even President Eisenhower himself lent
more than a passing remark to the situation in Vietnam, stating in April that, “the loss
of Vietnam would…have grave consequences for us and for freedom”32
By the final years of the Eisenhower administration in 1959 and 1960, the
problems in Vietnam had only gotten worse. A National Intelligence estimate
published in May of 1959 stated that, “the prospect of reunification…remains remote”
and that political stability in South Vietnam relied heavily upon Diem33
, a harrowing
prospect considering the concerns over Diem’s own difficult situation and autocratic
tendencies. A year later in March 1960, Ambassador Durbrow sought to bring
attention to South Vietnam’s worsening security situation to the Department of State.
In his despatch, he stated that there had been an intensification of Viet Cong activities
and a rise in kidnappings and assassinations. Coupled with this, Durbrow refers to a
lack of appropriate anti-guerrilla training for the South Vietnamese army and the
amount of torture, extortion and corruption that is occurring with local officials34
.
Durbrow also presents the evaluations of the MAAG in Vietnam, stating that the
30
Memorandum from the Chief of the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam (Williams) to
the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow), 9 October 1957, FRUS 1955-57, Vol. I, Doc. 398.
31
32
The Importance to the United States of the Security and Progress of Vietnam, Address 4th
April
1959, reproduced at http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/eisen.htm
33
National Intelligence Estimate, 26 May 1959, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960.
Vietnam: Volume I (hereafter FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I), Doc. 76.
34
Despatch from the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State, 7 March 1960,
FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, Doc. 112.
14

Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN) is failing in its campaign against the Viet
Cong due to “security leaks, inadequate planning, lack of aggressive leadership” as
well as communication failures and the failure of supporting units35
. Durbrow also
makes the stark and foreboding statement that, “the GVN is unable to cope with the
internal security situation”36
.
The Durbrow despatch of March 7th
1960, is also important for one other
reason that will become more apparent in later years, especially during the Johnson
administration; as it mentions the recent appointment of a new military commander,
Colonel Nguyen Khanh37
, a name that will in the later 1960’s become a symbol for all
that is wrong in South Vietnam.
It was only in the waning months of Eisenhower’s presidency, that US
officials began to take the situation in Vietnam more seriously, evident by the drawing
up of a plan for counterinsurgency in Vietnam by the Military Assistance Advisory
Group, giving the reason that the communist inspired and directed insurgency requires
the development of such a plan38
. However, it seems more like an occasion of too
little too late, as the insurgency in South Vietnam had gained a strong foothold by
1960, and had already caused a number of serious incidents such as the Tay Ninh
incident in January 195939
.
By the end of Eisenhower’s time in the White House, the situation in Vietnam
had continued to degrade alongside its neighbour Laos, despite Eisenhower’s deeper
interest. There was no concrete US policy towards Vietnam, the men on the ground,
Durbrow and Williams were bickering with one another over what Vietnam really
35
Ibid, p. 305.
36
Ibid, p. 306.
37
Ibid, p. 316.
38
Outline Plan Prepared by the Military Assistance Advisory Group in Vietnam, 27 October 1960,
FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, p. 614.
39
Despatch from the Ambassador in Vietnam (Durbrow) to the Department of State, 7 March 1960,
FRUS 1958-60, Vol. I, Doc. 112.
15

needed; political reform or military support. This lead to Williams accusing Durbrow
of being “insulting, misinformed and unfriendly” towards President Diem in an
attempt to get him removed from office40
. An overbearing and autocratic dictator in
Diem was ruling over a disaffected population, creating even more favourable basis
for the Viet Cong insurgency, while Hanoi in the North remained stable and in
complete control of its own people. A report published by General Lansdale in
January 1961, stated that South Vietnam was in a “critical condition” and that the
Vietcong “have started to steal the country and expect to be done by 1961”41
.
Overall, under the Eisenhower administration the situation in Vietnam had
been allowed to grow worse, and the United States was being dragged down with it,
the seven hundred military personnel sent to Vietnam by Eisenhower having little
positive effect42
. In the words of historian, David Anderson, Eisenhower left a record
of non-solution and ever-narrowing options in Vietnam for newly elected President
John F. Kennedy43
.
Eisenhower did however make one important statement that was to become
resoundingly true in later years, especially as the aforementioned Nguyen Khanh
came to power; “The difficulties facing the free world…can be handled with
confidence and success if those who love freedom will work together in the
knowledge that individual self-interest must never prevail over the welfare of the total
free community”44
All in all, President John F. Kennedy faced a difficult and confusing situation
to deal with right from the beginning in Vietnam, as Eisenhower had failed to truly
get to grasp with what was occurring.
40
41
Ibid, p. 57.
42
JFK in History: Vietnam, reproduced at
http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/JFK+in+History/Vietnam.htm
43
44
D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61, p. 629.
16

CHAPTER TWO
THE KENNEDY YEARS, 1961-1963
Although the Presidency of John F. Kennedy is well remembered more for his
actions in the Cuban missile crisis that occurred in the early 1960’s, Kennedy was
also heavily involved in the situation in Vietnam, much more so than his predecessor
had been. Kennedy had a unique fascination in Special Forces and
counterinsurgency45
, tactics that he was to push quite firmly for within South
Vietnam. Coupled with this interest was the fact that Kennedy had read General
45
L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford, 2000), p. 287.
17

Lansdale’s report on Vietnam only recently before his entrance into office, and had a
“keen interest”46
. Kennedy was also further pushed into confronting the problems of
Southeast Asia as a whole by the failures of his predecessor, Eisenhower, who himself
admitted that he had left, Laos in particular, in a state of strife and confusion47
. It is
therefore no surprise that Kennedy took a deeper and more direct interest into the
problems of Vietnam.
It was not long after Kennedy’s inauguration into office that he began to make
decisions that were to change the face of US involvement in Vietnam for years to
come, mainly concerning the men he brought into office along with him in 1961. Not
only was his Vice President, Lyndon B. Johnson, an important choice in itself, but it
was also Kennedy’s choice of staff that was to have a long term impact. Kennedy
appointed Robert McNamara as his Secretary of Defence, Dean Rusk as Secretary of
State and McGeorge Bundy as National Security Advisor. These three men
throughout both Kennedy’s and Johnson’s administrations become increasingly more
important in the decision making on Vietnam, eventually becoming known as the
“Inner War Cabinet” or the “Awesome Foursome” alongside Lyndon Johnson48
.
Appointments such as these showed that Kennedy’s approach to Vietnam was going
to be a stark contrast to that of Eisenhower before him.
Within Vietnam itself, the situation was still on a downward spiral, and
throughout the course of Kennedy’s administration, policy makers and officials were
deeply involved in a number of discussions, reports and planning in an attempt to
reverse the course of South Vietnam. South Vietnamese President Ngo Dinh Diem
still held tenuous power in the country, and was a grave concern for many US
46
Summary Record of a Meeting, The White House, 28 January 1961,Foreign Relations of the United
States 1961-1963, Volume I: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I), Doc. 3.
47
D. Eisenhower, Waging Peace 1956-61, p. 612.
48
F. Logevall, Choosing War, p. 387.
18

officials in both Washington and on the ground in Saigon. It was not lost on those US
officials involved that Diem was in a precarious position, with little popularity and a
weakened amount of respect among his own people49
, but there was little in the way
of alternatives in the early 1960’s and so the United States continued to support his
regime. Also in early 1961, there was a determined drive by the Kennedy
administration to push for a basic counterinsurgency plan within South Vietnam as
reports kept coming in from the field about the various military, political and
economic situations within the country, such as agricultural economist, Wolf
Ladejinsky’s letter in February, which concluded that “everything must be brought
into play to ensure the survival of Vietnam”50
. However, the push for a plan that
would ultimately assist the struggle of South Vietnam was resisted by the Government
due to Diem himself, mostly because of his own personal insecurity at sharing power
with other individuals51
. Although the counterinsurgency plan (CIP) was eventually
accepted by Diem, this was just one example of how Diem was more of a hindrance
than help to the cause of South Vietnam, and subsequently the efforts of the United
States to assist.
Throughout the duration off Kennedy’s first year, the United States
implemented a number of actions within Vietnam or with the purpose of assisting
efforts in Vietnam. These actions included counter-guerrilla operations under
direction of the Military Advisory and Assistance Group as well as the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA)52
. In addition, and more importantly, Kennedy himself
directed the establishment of a Presidential Task Force in April 1961, with the sole
49
Notes on a Meeting between the Secretary of State and the Assistant Secretary of State for Far
Eastern Affairs (Parsons), 28 January 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 5.
50
Editorial Note, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 14.
51
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 1 March 1961, FRUS 1961-63,
Vol. I, Doc. 16, Footnote 4.
52
Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow) to the
President, 3 April 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 24.
19

purpose to counter the Communist influence and pressures on South Vietnam as well
as strengthen US actions within the country, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defence,
Roswell Gilpatric53
. The task force’s main contribution was to draft up programs of
action for the United States against Communism in Vietnam. Another contribution by
Kennedy in May 1961, was to instruct Secretary McNamara to divert one hundred
million dollars towards encouraging military reorientation towards guerrilla war54
. In
June of 1961, Vice President Lyndon Johnson made a fact-finding trip to Vietnam,
and reported back to Washington after five days of investigation. His principal
conclusions were similar to those that had been voiced by US officials previously,
such as; the lack of alternatives to Diem’s government, the need for sustained US aid
to Vietnam and that military force must be “firm and powerful”55
. Johnson’s final
conclusion however was rather foreboding in nature, stating that there is no visible
solution to Vietnam’s instability and warned that even US military involvement may
be required56
. A rather ironic statement, as it would be the directive of Johnson as
President that led to US military involvement in Vietnam.
As 1961 entered its final months, the situation in Vietnam took more turns for
the worse, even after the months of presidential directives, plans and numerous
reports attempting to improve matters in the country. In September, there came in
reports of increased Viet Cong activity, now utilising battalion sized units, arming
themselves with modern weaponry and, for the first time since the first Indochina
War, wearing “khaki uniforms into battle”57
. These new developments in the
insurgency led President Diem to believe that open warfare was now beginning in
53
Program for the Presidential Task Force on Vietnam, 22 April 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 32.
54
L. Freedman, Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam, p. 289.
55
Report by the Vice President, Undated, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 60.
56
Report by the Vice President, Undated, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 60.
57
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 5 September 1961, FRUS 1961-
63, Vol. I, Doc. 127.
20

Vietnam58
, and to coincide with this fear, Hanoi received full public backing from
both the Soviet Union and China in its objective to take power in South Vietnam59
. It
seemed that full blown overt invasion from the North was just around the corner.
The reaction of the United States to the increasingly problematic situation in
Vietnam was to send General Maxwell Taylor to Southeast Asia from October
through to November 1961. One of the crucial conclusions that Taylor was to come to
at the end of his mission to Southeast Asia was that it would be the actions of the
United Sates that would be “decisive to the end result”60
, clearly stating that the fate
of Vietnam now seemed to no longer rest with the Vietnamese, but with the United
States government. However, conversely Taylor did reach the conclusion that overt
invasion, as had been predicted by Diem, was not likely to occur due to the threat of
SEATO intervention61
. Taylor also offered recommendation on dealing with what he
calls “the famous problem” of Diem as an administrator, including ideas of removing
him from office, but ultimately concludes that engineering a coup against Diem would
be far too dangerous62
. Coinciding with recommendations of the Taylor report, the
United States along with South Vietnam decided to throw off the limitations of the
1954 Geneva Accords in November of 1961, citing the violations made by North
Vietnam as probable cause to do so63
.
As 1961 turned to 1962, the United States was still in an uncertain and messy
situation with Vietnam, causing the administration to implement a number of
58
Memorandum from the President’s Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow)
to the President, 15 September 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 131.
59
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 18 September 1961, FRUS
1961-63, Vol. I, Doc. 133.
60
Paper prepared by the President’s Military Representative (Taylor), 3 November 1961, FRUS 1961-
63, Vol. I, Doc. 210, Attachment 1.
61
Paper Prepared by the Members of the Taylor Mission, 3 November 1961, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. I,
Doc. 210, Attachment 2.
62
Ibid, Doc. 210.
63
Memorandum from Robert H. Johnson of the National Security Council Staff to the President’s
Deputy Special Assistant for National Security Affairs (Rostow), 16 November 1961, FRUS 1961-63,
Vol. I, Doc. 260.
21

reorganization efforts, including Kennedy’s establishment of the Special Group
(Counterinsurgency) to be chaired by Maxwell Taylor in January64
, and Command
structure reorganization in Vietnam itself from January through to February.
However, as reported by the Joint Chiefs of Staff in a ‘Talking Paper’ the problem of
Diem still persisted, stating that he had “not followed through on the agreed GVN
measures as fully as hoped or desired”65
. This problem was further emphasized by the
Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff, Robert Johnson, who posed the
question, “how much more failure of performance do we tolerate from Diem?”66
.
Throughout the Kennedy administration, Diem was the major problem in
Vietnam, which is not surprising as he had been brought into office through
appointment and had a very weak political base. His unpopularity among the South
Vietnamese was evident by the assassination attempt against him on February 27th
1962. He was not only unpopular with his own people, but also with members of the
US Government, “we cannot with the war with the Diem-Nhu methods” commented
Ambassador Durbrow’s political counsellor, Joseph Mendenhall67
. By 1963, Diem
created more problems and frustrations for the US aid efforts, as he became more
autocratic and more paranoid about political opponents, rather than fighting the Viet
Cong. Diem furthered his unpopularity amongst the population with a series of
affronts towards the influential Buddhist population, treating them with increasingly
harsh measures68
. President Kennedy was caught unawares when the domestic crisis
erupted in South Vietnam, occurring at a time when Ambassador Durbrow had taken
64
65
Talking Paper prepared by Colonel Robert M. Levy, J-3, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 4 January 1962,
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume II: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol.
II), Doc. 6.
66
Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Johnson) to the Director
(Rostow), 11 January 1962, FRUS 1961-63, Vol. II, Doc. 12.
67
H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, in
H. Ford, CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes: 1962-1968 (Central Intelligence Agency,
1998), p. 2.
68
Ibid, p. 2.
22

a vacation. Kennedy thus decided to replace Durbrow with Henry Cabot Lodge, a
man who had no record of sympathy for Diem unlike Durbrow had69
.
A crucial point in the Diem situation came on the 24th
of August 1963, when a
cable sent to Ambassador Lodge by members of the State Department signalled that
he should advise members of the Vietnamese military that the US will not continue to
support Diem if he did not respond promptly to the Buddhist crisis70
. This directive
was by other US officials, including Vice President Johnson, seen as giving a “green
light” to a coup against Diem71
. However, for some members of Kennedy’s
administration this was not a bad thing, such as George Carver, Vietnam specialist in
Saigon, who stated that the risks of not attempting to overthrow Diem “are even
greater than those involved in trying it”72
. On the other hand, Director of the CIA,
John McCone, opposed this thinking believing that the removal of Diem would result
in a succession of coups and political disorder73
, a statement which would later be
proved entirely accurate.
Eventually a coup did occur against Diem resulting in his death, on November
1st
1963, executed by generals of the Army of the Republic of Vietnam, led by Duong
Van Minh, also known as “Big Minh”. President Kennedy was reported to have
reacted with shock and dismay at the news of Diem’s death, not because he had
supported Diem’s regime, more because he had always insisted that Diem never
suffer more than exile from Vietnam74
. In Vietnam itself the coup was initially greeted
with rejoice and enthusiasm, because they finally felt themselves free of the Diem
69
Ibid, p. 3.
70
Ibid, p. 4.
71
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 24 August 1963, Foreign
Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume III: Vietnam January-August 1963 (hereafter FRUS
1961-63, Vol. III), Doc. 281.
72
H. Ford, ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big” in Vietnam’, p.
5.
73
Ibid, p. 6.
74
M. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (De Capo, 1990), p. 301.
23

regime that had become increasingly repressive over its nine year term. However, this
rejoicing quickly faded as the regime that replaced Diem, under a military junta led by
Big Minh proved to be totally incapable of handling the position it had forcefully
taken over. Subsequently the security situation in Vietnam worsened dramatically,
with the Viet Cong taking full advantage of the political confusion by expanding the
range, intensity and frequency of their armed attacks. Commander of the Military
Advisory Command Vietnam (MACV), General Paul Harkins, stated VC activity had
“shot up 300-400% of what they were before”75
. The death of Diem also made it
harder for the US to withdraw from Vietnam, as policy was so clearly geared to
creating a new government better able to prosecute the war76
.
US-Vietnam relations were thrown into even greater turmoil less than three
weeks after the assassination of President Diem77
, when President Kennedy was
assassinated on November 22nd
in Dallas, Texas. His assassination meant an untried
President entered the White House with a lack of foreign policy experience who
ultimately escalated Vietnam into the full blown conflict it became, and has led a
number of historians down ‘What If?’ roads concerning the path JFK may have taken
in Vietnam78
.
Overall the period under the Kennedy administration did more to aggravate
the problems in Vietnam than they did help. The numerous reports, plans and
statements created in attempt to rescue the situation rarely held water. This fact was
mainly due to the uncooperative and paranoid nature of the US backed President Ngo
Dinh Diem. Although Kennedy had greatly increased the number of US military
75
Memorandum of Discussion at the Special Meeting on Vietnam, Honolulu, 20 November 1963,
Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume IV: Vietnam August-December 1963
(hereafter FRUS 1961-63, Vol. IV), Doc. 321.
76
77
78
24

advisors in Vietnam (to around 16,000) and increased the amount of aid to the
country79
, it did little to turn the tables on the Viet Cong, who continued to grow and
become bolder in their insurgency. When crisis struck the country in November of
1963, Kennedy had been unprepared to respond to it, as for a long period of his
administration he had viewed Vietnam as simply a test bed for ill-prepared theories of
counterinsurgency80
.
As Kennedy was tragically removed from office at the end of 1963, the
situation in Vietnam was worse than ever before, with an unstable and divided
government harassed by an ever confident Viet Cong adversary. Newly appointed
President, Lyndon B. Johnson was faced with a major foreign policy failure to avert81
,
and a serious dilemma in aiding a broken and imperilled South Vietnam.
79
80
81
8.
25

CHAPTER THREE
THE JOHNSON YEARS, 1963-1965
The developing situation in Vietnam may not have been a central focus for
either Eisenhower or Kennedy, with their attentions directed elsewhere, Vietnam was
often treated more as a side issue. When crisis really did hit home in Vietnam during
the November of 1963 making it an undeniable central concern to the United States,
President Kennedy had had little chance to react. However, from the moment Lyndon
B. Johnson was sworn into office as Kennedy’s replacement, it was clear that
Vietnam was going to take centre stage, not only in US foreign policy, but as a central
concern for the entirety of the Johnson administration.
As stated in his own memoirs, when Johnson took office as a result of the
tragic death of President Kennedy, he stated he would devote every hour of every day
during the remainder of JFK’s unfulfilled term to achieving the goals he had set. In
1963 and beyond, this meant seeing things through in Vietnam82
. Even with this
intention to follow the ‘Kennedy way’ as President, Johnson took a very different
82
L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969 (London, 1972), p. 42.
26

stance on policy in Vietnam to his predecessor. He often had the tendency to
personalize all issues that related to the war occurring in Vietnam, and viewed any
attacks on US policy towards the country as personal attacks on himself83
. Johnson
also believed that what the US was doing in Southeast Asia was simply an extension
of what America had done for Europe in the Second World War84
.
Johnson also had an extensive experience of the situation in Vietnam before he
entered into office, due to his previous position as Vice President. Plus the fact that
President Kennedy had, as we have previously seen, sent Johnson on a fact-finding
mission into Vietnam. He had witnessed the situation grow and escalate into
something more than a simple aid program, and had always been on the sidelines
when some new and controversial event occurred in the country. In addition, Johnson
had witnessed the results of the Kennedy-Senator James Fulbright discussion in May
1961, which had pointed to the idea that the US may have to spill blood to keep its
word in Vietnam85
. It was therefore clear that if something dramatic was to happen
with US involvement in Vietnam it was going to occur under the guidance of
President Johnson.
It is also important to note that Johnson made very few changes to the core of
his administration from what Kennedy had appointed. The important and influential
figures of Robert McNamara, Dean Rusk and McGeorge Bundy all retained their
positions in the administration, and continued to exercise the greatest of control over
the situation in Vietnam alongside Johnson. In operating the administration however,
Johnson took a different approach to his predecessor. Whereas Kennedy had sought
the views of a wide spectrum of foreign policy advisors, Johnson on the other hand
had a tendency to only listen to those who agreed with what he thought. In the words
83
84
L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p. 48.
85
27

of National Security Council staffer Chester L. Cooper, Johnson “seemed to have a
blind mind-set which made him pay attention to people who said that (a) he was right,
(b) there was a way out, and (c) there were no other alternatives to what he wanted to
do”86
. This approach immediately locked out a number of individuals in the State
Department who had previously had more influence over Vietnam under Kennedy.
In the closing months of 1963, Johnson’s initial involvement with policy over
Vietnam was a simple case of reinforcement of present policy. Sticking to his belief in
the policy laid down by Kennedy, he stated on the 27th
November 1963 in a speech
entitled ‘Let Us Continue’, that the United States, “will keep our commitments from
South Vietnam to West Berlin”87
. In addition to this public declaration, Johnson made
a more official commitment to continuing the support of South Vietnam one day
earlier, by passing National Security Action Memorandum 273. NSAM 273 stated
that, “it remains the central objective of the United States in South Vietnam to assist
the people and Government of that country to win their contest against the externally
directed and supported Communist conspiracy”88
. At the same time that Johnson was
re-establishing US commitment towards Vietnam, he was receiving numerous reports
from a number of high ranking officials about growing concerns over the current
situation. Director of the CIA, John McCone declared that “there is no organized
government in South Vietnam at this time”89
referring to the incompetent and divided
military junta that had overthrown President Diem. Defence Secretary McNamara
returned from a visit to Saigon in December 1963 to report that the situation was
86
9.
87
Let Us Continue Speech, November 27th
1963, reproduced at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbjletuscontinue.html
88
National Security Action Memorandum 273: South Vietnam, reproduced at
http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/Johnson/archives.hom/NSAMs/nsam273.asp
89
10.
28

“very disturbing” and that unless current trends were reversed quickly, developments
would be highly in favour of the Communists90
.
The absence of optimism towards the situation in Vietnam continued into
early 1964 both domestically and from Saigon itself. Senator Mike Mansfield, the
Senate Majority leader at the time, stated in January that the US was “close to the
point of no return in Vietnam”91
and in the same month, Secretary McNamara stated
that “the security situation is very serious” and that the US should “go on bending
every effort to win”92
. It was not long after these warnings and bleak outlooks were
reported to President Johnson, that the situation in Vietnam did take yet another turn
for the worse, although at the time it occurred it may not have been viewed to be as
disastrous as it became.
On the 29th
January 1964, another successful coup was staged in South
Vietnam93
, less than three months after the previous one that had removed Diem from
office. The coup itself was led by General Nguyen Khanh, the military commander
appointed by Diem during the Eisenhower administration. Khanh’s reasoning behind
the coup was that he believed the old government was contemplating neutralization of
South Vietnam, which would have brought a favourable situation for takeover by the
Communist North. Initially the coup was greeted with a feeling of enthusiasm and
optimism by US officials, such as Michael Forrsetal of the National Security Council,
who reported to the President at the end of January that Khanh “may prove to be
stronger than the present set-up”94
. Ambassador Henry Cabot Lodge added to this
90
Ibid, p. 10.
91
Memorandum from Senator Mike Mansfield to the President, 6 January 1964, Foreign Relations of
the United States 1964-1968, Volume I: Vietnam (hereafter FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I), Doc. 2.
92
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the President, 7 January 1964, FRUS
1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 8, Tab B.
93
Memorandum from the Deputy Director of the Bureau of Intelligence and Research (Denney) to the
Acting Secretary of State, 29 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 20.
94
Memorandum from Michael V. Forrsetal of the National Security Council Staff to the President, 30
January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 22
29

optimistic appraisal by stating that “Khanh is cool, clear-headed, realistic planner; has
good record; is tough, ruthless, farsighted”95
. President Johnson himself also gave a
feeling of optimism towards Khanh, stating in a meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff
in March that the United States should make him “our boy”96
.
As 1964 progressed from March through to May, the major activity of the
Johnson administration was to send a number of missions to South Vietnam, to attain
an updated appraisal of the situation under the new leadership of General Khanh. The
first mission in early March through to April was led by Defence Secretary
McNamara and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Maxwell Taylor, the purpose of
this mission was to “appraise the current strength of the SVN government”97
. This
first mission ultimately concluded an optimistic appraisal of the new situation, stating
that if the Khanh government could remain in power, in addition to US aid, then the
situation in South Vietnam “can be significantly improved”98
. The second mission
sent to South Vietnam in the early months of 1964 was headed by another of
Johnson’s ‘awesome foursome’ Secretary of State Dean Rusk, in which Rusk sought
to obtain a greater understanding of the country and to reaffirm the United States
support for the fight against the Viet Cong insurgency99
.
Around the same time that Rusk was travelling to South Vietnam, there was
also evidence of tentative early planning for pressures against North Vietnam, on the
basis of, as Assistant Secretary William Bundy called, “tit-for-tat actions”100
. Many
95
Memorandum from the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Green) to the
Secretary of State, 30 January 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 23.
96
Memorandum of a Conversation between the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the President, 4 March 1964,
FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 70.
97
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the Members of the McNamara-Taylor
Mission to Vietnam, 5 March 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 74.
98
Memorandum from the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) to the President, 16 March 1964, FRUS
1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 84.
99
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 9 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68,
Vol. I, Doc. 111.
100
Letter from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Bundy) to the Ambassador in
Vietnam (Lodge), 4 April 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 108.
30

military planners had come to assume that punishing the North would result in them
ceasing their activities in the South101
. This is one of the earliest indications of the idea
for attacks against the North and going beyond simple counterinsurgency that had
been advocated by President Kennedy previously. However, the concept of giving any
substantial US military aid was still, at this time, out of the question, “we do not
intend to provide military support nor undertake the military objective of ‘rolling
back’ Communist control in North Vietnam”102
The third US directed mission to visit South Vietnam in May 1964 was yet
again headed by McNamara and Maxwell Taylor. The reasoning for this mission was
due to President Johnson’s impatience with the lack of visible progress in the war in
Vietnam, and so he required a second look at the situation103
.
Shortly after these fact-finding missions into South Vietnam, the appraisal of
the situation became increasingly bleak in nature. Dean Rusk began suggesting
sending US troop divisions into Southeast Asia, Director McCone expressed the need
to go in hard, while Secretary McNamara stated that “the situation is still going to
hell. We are continuing to lose. Nothing we are now doing will win.”104
The turn
towards military escalation seemed to be well under way by the end of May 1964, and
as further evidence of this new course of action, Secretary Rusk presented a
memorandum entitled, “Legal Basis for Sending American Forces to Vietnam”105
.
Secretary McNamara cancelled previous plans made under Kennedy to withdraw US
101
11.
102
Talking Paper prepared for the Secretary of Defence (McNamara) by the Secretary of State’s Special
Assistant for Vietnam (Sullivan), 7 May 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 145.
103
Editorial Note, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 146.
104
Summary Record of the National Security Council Executive Committee Meeting, 24 May 1964,
FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 172.
105
Memorandum from the Secretary of State to the President, 29 June 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I,
Doc. 226.
31

military personnel from Vietnam106
and in addition President Johnson replaced
Ambassador Lodge with the more military minded General Maxwell Taylor in July
1964107
. The concept of negotiated settlements and a withdrawal from Vietnam
seemed a very distant memory by this time.
US-Vietnamese relations took yet another drastic turn for the worse in August
1964, with events in the Gulf of Tonkin. On August 2nd
the US destroyer Maddox
reported that it had been attacked by three North Vietnamese patrol craft, and reported
2 days later that another attack appeared imminent108
. This event was greeted with
outrage by a number of US officials as well as General Khanh who pushed strongly
for US retaliation. Secretary Rusk stated that the “unprovoked attack on the high seas
is an act of war for all practical purposes”109
and President Johnson strongly agreed
that a retaliatory attack was needed in response. However, support for this idea was
not unanimous, as Director McCone stated his belief that the attacks on the Maddox
were simply a response “out of pride and on the basis of defence considerations”110
due to recent gunboat raids that had been carried out by the South Vietnamese.
Despite these objections, the result of the Gulf of Tonkin events was retaliatory
bombing strikes against North Vietnamese targets by US forces. In addition Congress
passed a Joint Resolution that authorized the future use of appropriate force in
response to unprovoked attacks111
. The first major step towards US military
involvement in Vietnam had been taken.
106
17.
107
Letter from the President to the Ambassador to Vietnam (Taylor), 2 July 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol.
I, Doc. 228.
108
Editorial Notes, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 255 and Doc. 272.
109
Summary Notes of the 538th
Meeting of the National Security Council, 4 August 1964, FRUS 1964-
68, Vol. I, Doc. 278.
110
20.
111
Draft Joint Resolution on Southeast Asia, 4 August 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 278,
Attachment.
32

Map showing the course of events on August 2nd
1964
33

Artist’s interpretation of the Gulf of Tonkin Incident.
Following the events in the Gulf of Tonkin, the situation domestically in South
Vietnam began to take a further downward turn as General Khanh began to show his
ineptitude at being a politician. He began to become paranoid towards his opposition
similar to how Diem had once been, and once again clashed with the influential
Buddhist elements in his attempts to form a more presidential form of government.
Attempts which seriously stalled the working of government and subsequently stalled
the war against the Viet Cong112
. Ambassador Taylor stated in a memorandum to the
State Department that the situation had tarnished Khanh’s reputation and that
circumstances now lent themselves dangerously to another coup113
. A Special
National Intelligence Estimate published in September of 1964 provided the bleak
conclusion that “the odds are against the emergence of a stable government” in South
Vietnam114
.
112
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 31 August 1964, FRUS 1964-
68, Vol. I, Doc. 333.
113
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 2 September 1964, FRUS 1964-
68, Vol. I, Doc. 336.
114
Special National Intelligence Estimate, 8 September 1964, FRUS 1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 341.
34

Although a High National Council (HNC) was eventually established in South
Vietnam, and progress had been made to bring about a stable government through the
HNC, it was not to last. A Military Council headed once again by General Khanh took
the decision on the 19th
December 1964 to dissolve the HNC; an action which
Ambassador Taylor believed would look to be yet another military coup in the
international sphere115
. US officials were keenly distraught over the actions by
General Khanh, as their hopes for a workable and stable government were dashed.
Taylor began to lash out at Khanh and his compatriots, stating that they had “lost the
confidence” of the US government and that there would be little chance of
improvement over Khanh’s former “sorry performance”116
. Khanh became
increasingly difficult towards the US, proclaiming that Vietnam was not a vassal of
the United States and proclaiming Ambassador Taylor as a ‘persona non grata’
(unwelcome person)117
.
As 1964 became 1965, South Vietnam descended into a mess of political
turmoil, continuously spurred on by the actions of General Khanh who was
attempting to maintain his position of power, with little regard to the real pressing
matter of war against the Viet Cong. President Johnson in his memoirs, characterized
this period by stating that the South Vietnamese often seemed to have a strong
impulse toward political suicide, and described how General Khanh seemed to be in
and out of Government constantly118
.
At the same time, US officials were continuing to debate over whether to
expand US involvement in Vietnam. The Joint Chiefs of Staff were still concerned
115
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 20 December 1964, FRUS
1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 451.
116
Telegram from the Embassy in Vietnam to the Department of State, 20 December 1964, FRUS
1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 453.
117
Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Vietnam, 24 December 1964, FRUS
1964-68, Vol. I, Doc. 464, Footnote 3.
118
L. Johnson, The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969, p 64.
35

over the “domino theory” of President Eisenhower, and Ambassador Taylor
proclaimed the US was “playing a losing game in South Vietnam” and that
“immediate and automatic reprisals” were needed to change course119
. The debate
reached a dramatic conclusion when the Viet Cong launched an attack on US
installations at Pleiku on February 7th
1965, killing eight Americans and wounding
many others120
. This attack was followed a few days later by a second attack on a US
base at Qui Nhon. In response to these attacks, President Johnson made what he called
his third major decision on Vietnam121
, the initiation of bombing operations against
North Vietnam, under the name of ‘Rolling Thunder’. A month after the initiation of
Rolling Thunder, the President authorized the landing of the first troops into Vietnam.
Two Marine battalions numbering around 3,500 men were landed at Danang as a
defence force for the airbase there122
. American involvement had reached a
completely new level of escalation, which the Johnson administration could not easily
turn back on.
Thus by early 1965 the war in Vietnam had more or less changed from being a
war between South and North, to a war between the North and the United States. The
South Vietnamese government was still in a shambles, and the power hungry
disruptive figure of General Khanh was only eventually exiled by February 1965. The
arrival of US combat troops on Vietnamese soil signalled the end of any hopes for
diplomacy and negotiated settlement, the United States was now in the situation it had
vowed to avoid for over a decade.
119
23.
120
Ibid, p. 23.
121
122
Editorial Note, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964-1968, Volume II: Vietnam January-June
1965, Doc. 188.
36

CONCLUSION
In September of 1963, President Kennedy declared in an interview that
Vietnam was “their war. They are the ones that have to win it or lose it. We can help
them, we can give them equipment, we can send our men out there as advisers, but
they have to win it, the people of Vietnam, against the Communists.”123
. But by the
spring of 1965, Walter Lippmann the influential and award-winning American
journalist commented on the situation in Vietnam, “it used to be a war of the South
Vietnamese assisted by the Americans. It is now becoming an American war very
inefficiently assisted by the South Vietnamese”124
. In the space of two years the
eventuality that President Kennedy and numerous members of the US government
had protested against ever happening had become a shocking reality.
The reasoning behind this drastic change in policy can be accounted to a
number of factors, from bad luck, poor planning, surprising turns of events, through to
the actions of certain individuals. Escalating American involvement in Vietnam to
123
124
37

some historians, such as Frederick Logevall, is viewed as being a choice that was
taken mainly by Johnson and his advisors, apparent in the fact that the title of one of
his recent books is Choosing War. I would however argue that there was little room
for choice in the situation that developed over the nine year period that I have covered
in this study, due to a number of factors outside the control of those who actually had
to make the decisions.
Initial US involvement in Vietnam had come from a simple execution of
foreign policy that they had utilised in a number of countries since the end of the
Second World War, that of ‘containment’. The Soviet Union had come out of the
Second World War as a new threat to world security, a view that was not simply
exclusive to the United States. Other nations such as the United Kingdom, France and
various democratic nations worried about the influence and spread of Communism
throughout Europe and globally. The fall of China to Communism and the conflicts
occurring in both Laos and Vietnam simply made Southeast Asia the focus of this
fear, a fear that the United States hoped to stand against, as they had done in Iran a
number of years earlier.
In addition to this committed effort to resist what was widely viewed as a
hostile ideology, the United States saw their commitment to Southeast Asia and
Vietnam in particular as an extension of the assistance they had lent to Europe during
the course of the Second World War. As President Kennedy stated in the same
interview in September 1963, “The United States made this effort to defend Europe.
Now Europe is quite secure. We also have to participate – we may not like it – in the
defence of Asia.”125
It should therefore be seen as no real surprise that the United
States became involved in the way that they did with Vietnam in the earlier
125
38

Eisenhower years. Also I would argue that this involvement was always intended to
serve as a program of aid and advice towards the South Vietnamese, nothing more so.
The course that American involvement subsequently followed after the
justifiable initial involvement of American aid was not a course that had been plotted
out by American officials from the beginning. It is impossible to believe that anyone
in the US Government in the late 1950’s and early 1960’s could have desired the
course of events that would follow in Vietnam. Many of the decisions that were later
made concerning American involvement were hastily made reactions or responses to
unexpected turns in the road, perpetrated more often than not by South Vietnam,
rather than the United States itself.
The regime of Ngo Dinh Diem, which had been a United States influenced and
backed government, had initially held the nation of South Vietnam relatively intact,
despite Diem’s numerous personal flaws and weak political base. Many US officials,
as has been revealed in the course of this study, believed Diem to be a liability and
even went as far as considering the options for his removal. However, it is also
important to note that many other members of Kennedy’s administration vocally
stated their belief that the removal of Diem would be a dangerous idea, including
Lyndon Johnson and John McCone. An even more important factor to note is the
numerous problems and crises that followed the actual removal of Diem in November
1963.
The coup was carried about by untried and politically inexperienced
individuals, none of which had any explicit backing from the United States, even if
the Kennedy administration did give “tacit approval”126
for the coup itself. The
appearance of “Big Minh” and his incapable military junta was not something that
126
39

members of the Kennedy administration or the subsequent Johnson administration had
hoped for, a fact that is evident in the numerous reports of how unstable and divided
the government had become.
The subsequent government that came into power under General Nguyen
Khanh was even less of a desirable occurrence to the US government at the time, and
proved to be one of the more fatal events out of US control. General Khanh came to
be a highly disruptive, unresponsive character, who consistently hampered US efforts
to reverse the downward trend of the situation in South Vietnam. Most notably his
actions to dissolve the High National Council signalled the end of the last chance
South Vietnam had of establishing a stable and workable government.
However, the United States cannot be devoid of blame for the way the
situation developed into conflict. President Johnson had vowed that he would not be
the President to lose Vietnam127
, and the fact that numerous individuals in the US
Government stressed the need to go all out and win in Vietnam meant that the
possibility of entering into full scale conflict was always there, especially in the early
to mid 1960’s. There can also be staunch criticism for how the idea of bombing the
North was carried out, especially as the concept was proved to be ill advised on a
number of occasion’s months previous to ‘Rolling Thunder’. War games held in 1964
(SIGMA I and SIGMA II) had proved beyond much doubt that the bombing of North
Vietnam would not help in achieving success in South Vietnam128
. However, this
advice was largely ignored by senior decision makers who embarked on the bombing
course regardless.
Blame can also be placed upon the United States for largely disregarding the
option of negotiation, it was only in the later stages of 1964 and early 1965 that the
127
128
21.
40

Johnson administration even entertained the idea of approaching the United Nations
with the problems in Vietnam.
However, it is important to note that a lot of the reasoning behind the way the
US acted towards the Vietnam situation can be explained due to the heavy investment
that the United States placed in the security of Southeast Asia. Eisenhower and
subsequent administrations adhered strongly to his concept of the “domino theory”,
and thus the very idea of losing Vietnam to Communism especially after China had
already fallen was completely inconceivable to almost every member of the various
administrations. In addition, as US involvement became deeper the prestige of
America itself in the international sphere was put on the line, similar to how it had
been in Korea. As historian Frederick Logevall has stated, US “prestige, reputation
and credibility…were on the line in Vietnam”129
. Therefore if there was any viable
option for the US Government besides withdrawing and sacrificing their credibility at
the time, they would take it. The attacks that occurred in 1964 and 1965 were an
affront to American prestige and failure to respond would have created an image of
the US as a ‘paper tiger’. It is also important to note that the US at this time was
confident in its abilities to execute a successful conflict in Vietnam.
It was thus a combination of a number of mixed together factors, not all of
which were the fault of the US that led to war. Factors such as; unfortunate and
unforeseen circumstances, uncooperative and disruptive individuals, a strong and
unwavering commitment to defend against the ‘evils’ of Communism and the fact that
US prestige abroad as a whole was in jeopardy, largely led to the eventual decision to
“Go Big”130
in Vietnam.
129
130
1.
41

BIBLIOGRAPHY
PRIMARY SOURCES
Eisenhower, D., Waging Peace 1956-61 (London, 1966).
Eisenhower, D., The Importance to the United States of the Security and Progress of
Vietnam, Address 4th
April 1959, reproduced at
http://www.mtholyoke.edu/acad/intrel/eisen.htm
Johnson, L. B., The Vantage Point, Perspectives of the Presidency 1963-1969
(London, 1972).
Johnson, L. B., Let Us Continue Speech, November 27th
1963, reproduced at
http://www.americanrhetoric.com/speeches/lbjletuscontinue.html
Taylor, M., Swords and Plowshares (De Capo, 1990).
The American Presidency Project, Public Papers of the President, 73 – The
President’s News Conference of April 7th
, 1954, reproduced at
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=10202&st=&st1=
The Dwight David Eisenhower Presidential Library,
http://www.eisenhower.archives.gov/
The John Fitzgerald Kennedy Presidential Library, Historical Resources, JFK in
History: Vietnam,
The Lyndon Baines Johnson Presidential Library, http://www.lbjlib.utexas.edu/
The National Archives, Statistical information about casualties of the Vietnam War,
reproduced at http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/casualty-statistics.html
42

U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957.
Vietnam: Volume I, reproduced at
http://digital.library.wisc.edu/1711.dl/FRUS.FRUS195557v01
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1958-1960.
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U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1961-1963, Volume
III: Vietnam January-August 1963 (Washington, 1991).
IV: Vietnam August-December 1963 (Washington, 1991).
I: Vietnam, 1961, reproduced at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i_1961/index.html
II: Vietnam, reproduced at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii_1961-63/index.html
U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1964, Volume I:
Vietnam, reproduced at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_i/index.html
II: Vietnam January-June 1965, reproduced at
http://www.state.gov/www/about_state/history/vol_ii/index.html
X., ‘The Sources of Soviet Conduct’, Foreign Affairs, 4 (July, 1947), pp. 566-582.
SECONDARY SOURCES
Anderson, D., ‘Dwight D. Eisenhower and Wholehearted Support of Ngo Dinh
Diem’, in Anderson, D., ed, Shadow on the White House, Presidents and the Vietnam
War, 1945-1975 (Kansas, 1993).
Ford, H., ‘1963-1965: CIA Judgments on President Johnson’s Decision To “Go Big”
in Vietnam’, in Ford, H., CIA and the Vietnam Policymakers: Three Episodes: 1962-
1968 (Central Intelligence Agency, 1998), reproduced at
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-
publications/books-and-monographs/cia-and-the-vietnam-policymakers-three-
episodes-1962-1968/epis2.html
Freedman, L., Kennedy’s Wars: Berlin, Cuba, Laos and Vietnam (Oxford, 2000).
Hess, G., Vietnam and the United States: Origins and Legacy of War (New York,
1998).
43

Kaiser, D., American Tragedy: Kennedy, Johnson and the Origins of the Vietnam
War (Belknap Press, 2002).
Katsiaficas, G., ed, Vietnam Documents: American and Vietnamese Views of the War
(New York, 1992).
LaFeber, W., The American Age (New York, 1989).
Logevall, F., Choosing War: The Lost Chance for Peace and Escalation in Vietnam
(California, 1999).
Logevall, F., The Origins of the Vietnam War (Essex, 2001).
Pemberton, W., Harry S. Truman: Fair Dealer and Cold Warrior (Boston, 1989).
44

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