In August 2018, African Swine Fever (ASF), one of the world’s most feared swine infection made headlines as it hit for the first time ever, the world’s largest pig producer – China. This review paper summarizes the current state of knowledge and very recent updates on ASF.

1. African Swine Fever:
Nature, Impacts and
Threats to the Global
Pig Industry
GARRY D. LASAGA

2. African Swine Fever
• ASF is a contagious, febrile,
hemorrhagic & systemic viral
disease of swine.
• It is regarded as the one of the
most serious constraints of pig
production worldwide.
Penrith, 2009; OIE, 2010; Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Spickler, 2015; Sánchez-
Cordón et al., 2017

3. Overview
 Current Updates
 Organism
 Epidemiology
 Transmission
 Clinical Signs/Necropsy
 Diagnosis
 Prevention and Control
 Economic Impact
Actions to Take

4. Current
Updates

5. Patton (2018)
As of September 7, 2018

6. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
As of September 6, 2018
Nepveux (2018)

7. Impacts of the
outbreak in China
• Culling herds
• Ban on transporting pigs and pork
products
• Price increase (7%) [9/4/2018]
Nepveux, 2018

8. Global impact in 2018
More than 361,000 infected wild
boars and domestic pigs have been
reported to the organization*, with
more than 119,000 deaths in 2018.
World Organization for Animal Health

9. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Nepveux, 2018

10. As of October 19, 2018
• 41 cases of ASF had been reported in
China – more than 100,000 pigs culled
• Challenges:
 China possesses almost half of the world's
pig population
 ASF – hardy virus
 Backyard farms (27%)
 Wild boar population – 33.5 million
 Access to untreated or uncooked food waste
and swill
The Pig Site, 2018

11. As of November 2, 2018
• China has reported almost 50 outbreaks
in 13 provinces since early August.
• China has ordered enhanced
supervision of vehicles transporting live
pigs as reported by the Ministry of
Agriculture and Rural Affairs.
The Pig Site, 2018

12. Potential threat
• One of the most crucial threats
that the virus may produce is its
potential to spread to neighboring
Southeast Asian countries and the
Korean Peninsula, where hog
production is proliferating.
The Pig Site, 2018

13. In the Philippines…
• DA issued memorandum that
prohibits the use of catering food
wastes/left-overs from
international and domestic airports
and seaports for swill feeding of
local swine throughout the country.
Louise Maureen Simeon (The Philippine Star) - September 3, 2018
Tacio, H. D. 2018. Agritrends – September 6, 2018

14. In the Philippines…
• The second memorandum
temporarily bans the importation of
domestic and wild pigs and their
products, including pork, meat, and
semen particularly those originating
from Latvia, Poland, Romania,
Russia, Ukraine and China.
Louise Maureen Simeon (The Philippine Star) - September 3, 2018
Tacio, H. D. 2018. Agritrends – September 6, 2018

15. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011

16. In the Philippines…
• “Historically, the country is free
from ASF,” the agriculture
department pointed.
•“Thus, incursion of the disease in
the Philippines will result to great
economic loss due to direct and
indirect damages to the industry.”
Louise Maureen Simeon (The Philippine Star) - September 3, 2018
Tacio, H. D. 2018. Agritrends – September 6, 2018

17. In the Philippines…
• “The public is enjoined to support
the government’s efforts by
reporting to veterinary authorities
any unusual pig mortalities, pork
smuggling activities or meat items
hand-carried by travelers from
affected countries,” the DA
technical advisory said.
Louise Maureen Simeon (The Philippine Star) - September 3, 2018
Tacio, H. D. 2018. Agritrends – September 6, 2018

18. Species Affected
Domestic pigs
Feral swine
Wild pigs
◦ Eurasian wild boars
◦ Warthogs (reservoir)
◦ Bush pigs (reservoir)
◦ Giant forest hogs
bush pig
warthog
European boar
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; FAO, 2012; Cisek et al., 2016

19. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Warthog act as the reservoirs of the ASFV in Africa without
clinical symptoms.

20. Ornithodoros erraticus (male & female)
Giant forest hog
Source: Beltran-Alcrudo et al., 2017

21. Distribution of ASF virus genotypes (Source: Gallardo et al., 2015).

22. The Organism

23. African Swine Fever Virus
Asfarviridae: Asfivirus
◦ Large, enveloped
DNA virus
◦ Only arbo-DNA virus
More than 20 genotypes
◦ Vary in virulence
◦ High virulence: up to 100% mortality
◦ Low virulence: seroconversion
Infects monocytes and macrophages
Misinzo et al., 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

24. African Swine Fever
Virus
Highly resistant in environment,
especially at lower temperatures
Survival
◦ Several days in feces
◦ Month(s) in contaminated pens
◦ Up to 18 months in blood
◦ Over 140 days in some pork products
◦ Salted dried hams
◦ Years in frozen carcasses
(Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; FAO, 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015

25. Virus Inactivation
Most disinfectants ineffective
Disinfectants on nonporous surfaces
◦ Sodium hypochlorite, citric acid,
some iodine and quaternary
ammonium solutions
Meat/tissue products (unprocessed)
◦ High temp (70oC/150oF) for 30 min
Can be inactivated
◦ pH below 3.9 or above 11.5
◦ Higher pH needed if serum present
Gallardo et al., 2015; Spickler, 2015:

26. History and
Importance

27. History
1921: Discovered in Kenya
◦ Today: endemic
in most of
sub-Saharan
Africa including
the island
of Madagascar
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Gallardo et
al., 2015; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2017

28. History
1957: First occurrence outside
Africa
- Portugal
1960s:
- Portugal and Spain
1970-1980s:
Spread to Europe
◦ The Netherlands,
Italy, France, Belgium
1990s: Disease eradicated
Remains endemic on the Island
of Sardinia
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Penrith, 2009; Gallardo et al.,
2015; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

29. 2929
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2007)
Armenia
Georgia
Russia

30. 3030
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2008)
Azerbaijan
Georgia
Russia

31. 3131
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2009)
Russia

32. 3232
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2010)
Armenia
Russia

33. 3333
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2011)
Armenia
Russia

34. Impact: Russia (2011-
2012)
• Total damages $110 million US
•50% decrease in # of large farms
(compared to 2010)
•Decrease of pigs by 35% between
2010-2012
• Cancellation of licenses of many
producers
Becton (PorkCheckoff)
ASF killed 800,000 pigs (Mason, 2018 Reuters)

35. 3535
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2012)
Russia
Ukraine

36. 3636
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2013)
Russia
Belarus

37. 3737
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (Jan-May 2014)
Russia
Belarus
Lithuania
Poland
Ukraine

38. 3838
Outbreaks reported in Eastern Europe (2007 - May 2014)

39. History: Tick Vector
1963: Virus isolated
from soft tick
◦ Ornithodoros erraticus
1971: Western
Hemisphere
◦ Cuba, the Dominican
Republic, Haiti, Brazil
◦ Eradicated
Penrith, 2009; Gallardo et al., 2015; Cisek
et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

40. History
2007: Republic of Georgia
◦ Spread in Caucasus
Region (Eurasia),
including Russia
Federation
2015:
Eastern Europe
◦ Lithuania, Latvia,
Poland, Romania
◦ Wild boar in Iran
Spickler, 2015
Cisek et al., 2016
Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2017
Cappai et al., 2018

41. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011

42. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Geographic distribution of ASF worldwide as of 2015. In red, countries in which ASF
is currently present from 2010 to date. In grey, countries in which ASF was reported
in the past. In white, countries in which ASF has not been never reported. (Source:
Gallardo et al., 2015).

43. 2018 Outbreaks
• China: First time reported, domestic pigs
• Belgium: Wild boars
• Hungary, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia,
Poland, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Romania
OIE and USDA

44. Economic Impact
Animal health
◦ High morbidity and mortality
◦ Highly contagious
Import and export bans
Movement restrictions
Quarantine and depopulation
◦ Required for eradication
◦ 1971-Cuba: 400,000 pigs
◦ 2018-Romania: over 120,000 pigs
Can become prolonged epidemic
Fortune, 2018; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

45. Epidemiology

46. Geographic Distribution
Endemic
◦ Sub-Saharan Africa
◦ Island of Sardinia (feral swine)
Continued outbreaks
◦ Central and Eastern Europe
◦ Poland, Czech Republic, Hungary,
Romania, Ukraine
◦ Eurasia: Russia, Caucasus
◦ Belgium
Never been reported in United States,
Canada, Mexico, Australia, New Zealand
Penrith, 2009; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

47. Reported Outbreaks
OIE: Jan-Sept 2018
Source: OIE, 2018

48. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
The specific provinces of China where the first ever outbreak of ASF transpired since
August 3, 2018. (Source: Reuters, Maps4News as cited by Patton, 2018)

49. Morbidity and Mortality
Morbidity up to 100%
◦ Previously unexposed herds
Mortality varies with genotype
virulence
◦ Ranges from <5% to 100%
All ages affected
Subacute mortality = 30% to 70%
May be asymptomatic in wild pigs
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Gallardo et al., 2015

50. Transmission

51. Transmission
Direct contact with infected pig
◦ Usually oronasal
◦ All secretions/excretions, blood,
tissues
◦ Environmental contamination with products
Ingestion of contaminated
pork products
◦ Fed to pigs – swill, waste, garbage
◦ Carcasses
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Cisek et al., 2016

52. Transmission
Fomites
◦ Clothing, vehicles, equipment
◦ Environmental contamination
◦ Blood, diarrhea, feces
Vectors
◦ Biological: Bite from soft ticks
Ornithodoros
◦ Mechanical: Other insects
◦ Mosquitoes, biting flies (Stomoxys), lice
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Cisek et al., 2016

53. Transmission
Ornithodoros soft ticks
◦ Transstadial
◦ Transovarial
◦ Sexual transmission
◦ Infected for life
◦ Colonies maintain virus for years
Tick-to-pig transmission
◦ Important in Africa
◦ Maintained between warthogs and tick
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Cisek et al., 2016

54. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Potential transmission routes for ASFV in Europe.
Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

55. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
The three ASF transmission cycle.

56. Warthog burrow
The natural habitat for Ornithodoros moubata ticks,
Murchinson Falls national Park, Uganda.

57. Eggs
Adult
Sylvatic Cycle
Domestic Cycle
Persistent infection
Blood and sera
from warthogs
Blood and sera from
domestic pigs
Ticks from warthog
burrows and pig pens
Trans-Stadial
transmission

58. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Wild boar density in Europe (Source: FAO,
2015).
Half-eaten carcass of wild boar (©State Food and Veterinary
Service, lithuania/A. Marius Masiulis).
Wild boar in Europe

59. History: Virus Introduction
for Outbreaks
Uncooked/undercooked pork products fed to
pigs (imported, illegal)
◦ Portugal , Spain (1960); Italy (1983);
Belgium (1985); Russia (2008); Romania,
China (2018)
Raw pork waste/garbage at airport or
shipping ports
◦ Lisbon (1957), Malta, Sardinia (1978),
Georgia (2007)
Movement of infected wild boars
◦ Russia (2008)
Penrith, 2009; FAO, 2012; Gallardo et al., 2015; Cisek et al.,
2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

60. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Year Country Source
1960 Portugal Imported meat products
1978 Brazil Raw waste from an international
airport
1978 Malta Raw waste from a sea port
1978 Sardinia Raw waste from a sea port
1980 Cuba Importation of live pigs/pig
products
1983 Italy Importation of pig products
Table 1. Primary source of African swine fever outbreaks
in various countries*
*Adapted from Sánchez-Vizcaíno, J. M. 2010. Early detection and contingency plans for African
Swine Fever. Conf. OIE 2010, 139-147.

61. Humans are not
susceptible to
African Swine Fever
THERE IS NO PUBLIC HEALTH OR
FOOD SAFETY CONCERN.
OIE, 2010

62. African Swine
Fever in Animals

63. Clinical Disease
Incubation period
◦ 5-21 days following direct contact
◦ < 5 days after tick bite
Forms of disease
◦ Peracute – sudden death
◦ Acute
◦ Subacute
◦ Chronic
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Gallardo et al., 2015

64. Acute Disease
High fever
Anorexia
Lethargy
Weakness, recumbency
Erythema, cyanosis
Hemorrhages
◦ Skin, snout
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

65. Clinical Signs:
Acute Disease
Diarrhea
Abortion
Respiratory
◦ Dyspnea
◦ Nasal discharge
Death
◦ 7-10 days
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2018
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

66. Clinical Signs:
Subacute Disease
Moderately virulent isolates
Similar signs to acute form,
but less severe
– Thrombocytopenia
– Leukopenia
– Death or recovery within
3-4 weeks
– Abortion
– Fever
– Erythema, cyanosis
– Hemorrhages
may occur
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

67. Clinical Signs:
Chronic Disease
Intermittent, low fever
Anorexia, depression
Emaciation, stunting
Respiratory: coughing
Joint swelling
Diarrhea
Occasional vomiting
Skin lesions
May be fatal
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

68. Post-Mortem Lesions
Numerous hemorrhagic
internal organs
Skin
◦ Discoloration
◦ Hemorrhages
Signs of bloody diarrhea
or internal hemorrhages
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

69. Post-Mortem Lesions
Spleen
◦ Enlarged
◦ Friable
◦ Dark red/
black
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

70. Post-Mortem Lesions:
Most Common
Lymph nodes
◦ Swollen
◦ Hemorrhagic
◦ Gastrohepatic and renal LN
common
◦ Tonsils:
swollen, reddened
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2018
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010; Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

71. Post-Mortem Lesions:
Most Common
Kidneys
◦ Petechiae on cortical and cut surfaces
◦ Perirenal edema possible
Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010

72. Post Mortem Lesions
Other organs
◦ Hemorrhages,
petechiae, ecchymoses
Edema
◦ Lungs, gall bladder
Brain/meninges
◦ Congested, edema
Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

73. Post Mortem Lesions:
Chronic Infection
Focal skin necrosis
Skin ulcers
Consolidated lung
Caseous pneumonia
Fibrinous pericarditis
Pleural adhesions
Lymphadenopathy
Swollen joints
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2018Cisek et al., 2016; Sánchez-Cordón et al., 2018

74. Differential Diagnosis
Classical swine fever
(hog cholera)
Acute PRRS
Porcine dermatitis and
nephropathy syndrome
Erysipelas
Salmonellosis
Eperythrozoonosis
Actinobacillosis
Glasser’s disease
Aujeszky’s disease
(pseudorabies)
Thrombocytopenic
purpura
Warfarin poisoning
Heavy metal toxicity
Spickler, 2015

75. Sampling
Before collecting or sending any samples,
the proper authorities should be contacted
Samples should only be sent under secure
conditions and to authorized laboratories
to prevent the spread of the disease
Spickler, 2015

76. Samples
• Tissue from lymph nodes, spleen and
tonsils collected aseptically and kept
separate and chilled (never frozen).
•Lung, liver, kidney and brain may be kept
in 10% formalin as well.
• Aseptic blood samples, with or without
an anti-coagulant.
Spickler, 2015

77. Actions To Take
Reportable disease
If ASF suspected, IMMEDIATELY
notify animal health authorities
Isolate/quarantine animals until
definitive diagnosis received
(Gallardo et al., 2015; Spickler, 2015; Cisek et al., 2016

78. Treatment
No treatment available
◦ No treatment should be attempted
No vaccine available
Response should be directed by
animal health authorities
Depopulation
Restrictions on pig movements
Spickler, 2015

79. Risk factors
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Scavenging
and tethering
are common
Producer
DIONE et al. (2016) Value chain actors’ practices associated with the spread of ASF disease in smallholder pig systems in
Uganda
Trade and
movement of
sick pigs without
movement
permits
Trader

80. Risk factors
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
DIONE et al. (2016) Value chain actors’ practices associated with the spread of ASF disease in smallholder pig systems in
Uganda
Backyard slaughtering w/
improper disposal of
slaughter waste
Butcher
Poor hygiene at butchery
and lack of inspection
Pork retailer

81. Risk factors
CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
DIONE et al. (2016) Value chain actors’ practices associated with the spread of ASF disease in smallholder pig systems in
Uganda
Lack of application of
biosecurity measures (e.g.,
absence of disinfection of
work equipment)
Poor feeds and feeding
strategies (e.g., use of
contaminated feeds)

82. Prevention

83. Prevention
Prevent direct transmission between
infected and susceptible swine
◦ Isolate ill pigs
◦ Prevent contact with feral or wild hogs; when
possible house pigs indoors
◦ Keep newly acquired pigs separate from the
herd for at least 30 days to assure health
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Spickler, 2015

84. Prevention
Do not feed uncooked
pork products to pigs
◦ Swill, garbage, waste
Disinfection
◦ Vehicles, equipment,
footwear, clothing
Appropriate disposal of
manure and carcasses
Avoid hunting wild hogs
prior to contact with
domestic pigs
Control tick and other
insect vectors
May be difficult in
endemic areas
Prevent indirect
transmission
Prevent vector
transmission
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Spickler, 2015

85. During an outbreak
• Infected and suspected infected farms
must be placed under quarantine
• No movement of pigs or any products of
pig origin should be allowed
• All infected and in-contact pigs must be
humanely slaughtered
• Carcasses, animal products and bedding
must be burnt or buried deeply on site
(Gallardo et al., 2015; Spickler, 2015; Cisek et al., 2016

86. During an outbreak
• Vehicles should be disinfected on
entering and leaving farms
• Personnel should ensure that shoes,
clothes and equipment are disinfected
between farms
• Farms should not be restocked for at
least 40 days following above procedures.
• Sentinel pigs should be used for at least 6
weeks while being monitored clinically
and serologically.
(Gallardo et al., 2015; Spickler, 2015; Cisek et al., 2016

87. CENTER FOR FOOD SECURITY AND PUBLIC HEALTH, IOWA
STATE UNIVERSITY, 2011
Humane killing and proper burial of infected pigs Sentinel pigs contained in a sty with controlled entry
Disinfecting boot bath at entrance to farm

88. Diagnosis
Virus isolation
◦ Blood, tissues
PCR
◦ Clinical
samples,
putrefied
samples, fresh
tissues/blood
◦ Tonsils for FAD
investigation
Serological
◦ ELISA
◦ Immunoblotting
◦ Indirect
fluorescent
antibody (IFA)
◦ Smears, cryostat,
buffy coat
◦ Endemic regions
Spickler, 2015; Cisek et al., 2016

89. Control

90. Control Measures
Quarantine of farm
Authorities notified
Movement
restrictions
Investigation
Rapid diagnosis
Determine source of
virus
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010;
Spickler, 2015

91. Roadblocks & signs limiting access to
outbreak area & protection zone in
Lithuania
Beltran-Alcrudo et al., 2017

92. Fencing of farm premises
Double fencing pig-proof barriers in Sardinia (A) and South
Africa (B).

93. Disinfection
Many disinfectants ineffective
◦ Use an product approved for the virus
◦ Feces and organic debris can increase resistance
of virus
Disinfectants on nonporous surfaces
◦ Sodium hypochlorite, citric acid,
some iodine and quats
Disinfect premises, equipment, vehicles,
footwear
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010;
Spickler, 2015

94. Eradication
Euthanize/depopulation of infected and in-
contact animals
Proper carcass disposal
◦ To avoid further spread
Sanitation/disinfection
Movement controls/quarantines
Avoid contact with wild suids
Penrith and Vosloo, 2009; Sánchez-Vizcaíno, 2010;
Spickler, 2015

95. EU: measures to
control ASF
• Farm biosecurity
• Swill feeding ban
• Identification and registration of pigs
• Animal movement control
• Surveillance
• Stamping out policy
• Zoning and regionalization
• Cleansing and disinfection
EU Commisision on Health & Consumers

96. Stamping out & disposal
Culling in a CO chamber in
Lithuania.
Disposal in Russia Disposal in Lithuania
Beltran-Alcrudo et al., 2017

97. Challenges for
control & eradication
• Suboptimal farm registration animal
identification
• Free ranging pigs
• Poor bio-security (fencing, swill feeding)
• Home slaughtering
• Deficient pig movements control
• Poor epidemiological investigations
(tracing)
• Wild boars
EU Commisision on Health & Consumers

98. Removal & decontamination of ASF-
suspected wild boar in Lithuania
Beltran-Alcrudo et al., 2017

99. Authorities inspect a dead boar during an ASF
outbreak exercise in Germany in June 2018.
Wild boars and human behavior are believed to be
the main causes of spread in Europe
Authorities inspect a dead boar as part of a swine fever
outbreak practice in Germany in June 2018.

100. Conclusion
 Since no vaccine is currently
available, prevention and control
must be based on early detection
and strict sanitary measures.
 It is therefore crucial for control of
diseases like ASF that all
stakeholders understand the
disease and know what they
themselves must do to prevent it.

101. References
Beltran-Alcrudo, D., M. Arias, C. Gallardo, S. A. Kramer, and M.-L. Penrith. 2017.
African Swine Fever: Detection and diagnosis a manual for veterinarians. FAO
Animal Production and Health.
Brown, S. 2018. Seventh case of African Swine Fever in China; Pig transport
banned.
Cappai, S., S. Rolesu, A. Coccollone, A. Laddomada, and F. Loi. 2018. Evaluation of
biological and socio-economic factors related to persistence of African swine fever
in Sardinia. Preventive Veterinary Medicine 152 (2018) 1-11. doi:
10.1016/j.prevetmed.2018.01.004
Chenais, E., S. Boqvist, U. Emanuelson, C. von Brömssen, E. Ouma, T. Aliro, C.
Masembe, K. Ståhl, and S. Sternberg-Lewerin. 2017. Quantitative assessment of
social and economic impact of African swine fever outbreaks in northern Uganda.
Preventive Veterinary Medicine 144:134–148.
Cisek, A. A., I. Dąbrowska, K. P. Gregorczyk, and Z. Wyżewski. 2016. African
swine fever virus: a new old enemy of Europe. Annals of Parasitology, 62(3): 161–
167. doi: 10.17420/ap6203.49

102. References
Cristea, C. 2018. Measures to curtail the impact of African swine fever.
http://www.rri.ro/en_gb/measures_to_curtail_the_impact_of_the_africa
n_swine_fever-2585952 (Accessed 8 September 2018)
Dutch Wildlife Health Centre. 2017. African swine fever in wild boar and
African wild suids.
EFSA AHAW Panel (EFSA Panel on Animal Health and Welfare). 2014.
Scientific opinion on African swine fever. EFSA Journal;12(4):3628, 77
pp. doi: 10.2903/j.efsa.2014.3628
Fasina, F. O., D. D. Lazarus, B. T. Spencer, A. A. Makinde, and A. D. S.
Bastos. 2011. Cost implications of African swine fever in smallholder
farrow-to-finish units: economic benefits of disease prevention through
biosecurity. doi:10.1111/j.1865-1682.2011. 01261.x

103. References
FAO. 2018a. African Swine Fever threatens People’s Republic of China, A
rapid risk assessment of ASF introduction. FAO Animal Health Risk
Analysis – Assessment, Issue No. 5. Rome, FAO
FAO. 2018b. UN FAO convenes emergency meeting of animal health
experts in Asia in response to African Swine Fever threat.
http://www.fao.org/asiapacific/news/detail-events/en/c/1151566/
(Accessed 3 November 2018)
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104. THANK YOU