This document discusses African swine fever virus (ASFV), a large DNA virus that causes a hemorrhagic disease in pigs. The speaker outlines the current global situation of ASFV, noting its spread through parts of Europe, Russia, China, and Africa. Controlling ASFV is challenging due to its resistance, complex genotypes, wildlife reservoirs, potential carrier animals, and lack of vaccines. The United States should be concerned about ASFV spreading given transportation links and wild pig populations. Increased biosecurity is advised on US farms to prevent introduction of the virus.
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ASF Threat to US Pork Industry
1. Chris Oura
Professor of Veterinary Virology
School of Veterinary Medicine
Faculty of Medical Sciences
The University of the West Indies
Trinidad and Tobago
chris.oura@sta.uwi.edu
Allen D. Leman Swine Conference, 17th Sept 2018
University of the
West Indies
African Swine fever – a real and present global threat
Should the USA be worried?
2. Today’s Presentation
• The virus and the disease
• Current global situation
• Why are we struggling to control it?
• Prospects for a vaccine?
• Future risks for the USA
• What next?
3. Main global exporters of pork - 2017:
1.Germany: US$4.8 billion (15.8% of total exported pork)
2.United States: $4.6 billion (15.2%)
3.Spain: $4.1 billion (13.5%)
4.Denmark: $2.7 billion (9.1%)
5.Canada: $2.5 billion (8.4%)
6.Netherlands: $2.2 billion (7.2%)
7.Brazil: $1.5 billion (4.9%)
8.Belgium: $1.4 billion (4.8%)
9.Poland: $1.1 billion (3.5%)
10.France: $932.9 million (3.1%)
11.Mexico: $527.6 million (1.7%)
12.Ireland: $502.6 million (1.7%)
13.Austria: $433.5 million (1.4%)
14.Hong Kong: $427.2 million (1.4%)
15.Chile: $396.5 million (1.3%)
First of all – why the fuss?
China produces over
half of the worlds pork
5. Lis /57
Zim 1/92
MOZ 1/03
MOZ 2/02
MOZ 1/05
Georgia /2007
Mad 1/98
Lus1/93
MOZ 1/02
Bot 1/99
RSA 2/96
RSA 1/95
RSA 1/99
RSA 1/98
Spec 245
Ten /60
Moz 1/94
RSA 1/96
Nam 1/95
Uga 1/95
Uga 3/95
Moz 1/01
Kab /62
MFUE 6/1
Sum 14/11
TAN 1/01
TAN 1/03
NYA 1/2
100
50
57
72
98
88
76
57
68
64
67
I
XXVII
II
III
XIX
XX
IV
VII
XXII
V
VI
XXI
XVIII
VIII
XI
XII
XIII
XV
XVI
XIV
IX
African Swine Fever virus
lots of different (geno)types
9. Recognising African swine fever
Clinical signs: Loss of appetite,
recumbancy (won’t get up), fever,
vomiting, diarrhoea (bloody),
joint swelling, skin haemorrhages
Postmortem signs:
Haemorrhages in many organs
including lymph nodes and
under the skin eg ears Enlarged,
haemorrhagic, friable spleen
22. The amount of live pigs sold by
these six provinces reached
174,175,000, occupying 25.3
percent of the nationally sold live
pigs in 2017.
23. And last Thursday / Saturday………
5 wild boar found to be infected so far…………..
24. How is the virus being transmitted?
In Africa
Ticks not confined
to Africa
25. How is the virus being transmitted?
Transmission
associated with blood
26. Key Risk factors – why is
control proving so challenging?
Contact between Wild Boar
and backyard / feral pigs
Human behavior – poor practices
• Lack of knowledge / information
• Money constraints
• Lack of compensation
Virus entering the Catering cycle
Cured, smoked, raw hams
Surviving swine
becoming carriers?
Long distance movement
of wild boar – hunting?
Ticks?
Lack of Biosecurity
Wild / domestic pigs eat anything!
Movement of humans / migrant
workers with pork products
27. Key Risk factors – why is control proving so challenging?
1. Role of Wild Boar – is ASFV now endemic in wild boar?
Contact between wild and domestic pigs
Modelled wild boar population density in Europe (source: FAO/ASFORCE, May 2015)
28. Densities of domestic pigs in the low biosecurity sector in Europe.
Data: various statistical data 2008- 2011, FAO/EMPRES.
Key Risk factors – why is control proving so challenging?
2. Role of low biosecurity (backyard and feral pigs)
No movement controls in low biosecurity sectors
29. • Different forms of the virus are circulating: high – low virulence
• Carrier status in recovered pigs / wild boar
Key Risk factors – why is control proving so challenging?
3. Role for recovered ‘carrier’ pigs (domestic and wild)?
30. Source: Empress Watch, 2013.
Key Risk factors – why is control proving so challenging?
4. Role of humans
• Disposal of dead pigs – rivers
• Selling pigs in the face of an
outbreak
• Movement of sick pigs to market
• Swill feeding
• Vehicle contamination
• Vets, farm workers and hunters
• Poor levels of biosecurity
• Carcase disposal - flies
Low levels of compensation
Farmers / hunters - Lack of
information
31. Ornithodorus tick distributions
Key Risk factors – why is control proving so challenging?
5. Role of ticks – are they present and contributing
?
32. African swine fever – main challenges we face
Very resistant virus
Complex – multiple genotypes
Present in domestic and wild swine
Signs and symptoms confused with other diseases
Reservoirs of infection (vectors / wildlife)
Carrier animals present?
Lack of effective vaccines
Rapid uncontrolled spread in developing countries
33. Why NO vaccine for ASFV?
• Large complex virus with many proteins (60-185 encoded)
• Inactivated / passaged virus does not protect
• Vaccine candidate antigens (viral proteins) do not protect
• Vaccine trials require high containment facilities - expensive
• Largely African problem (in past) - lack of commercial market.
• Few groups involved in research – USA example
34. The six million dollar question: Should you worry
about African Swine Fever in the USA?
• Spreading around the world (EU / Russia / China /Africa)
• High levels of mortality in pigs (domestic and wild)
• Evidence that the virus may be attenuating in the field
• Very tough and resistant virus – in processed meat
• Many people coming from infected regions of the world
(sandwich effect)
• Vaccine still not in sight
35. Risk factors to assess - USA
• Wild boar and feral pig populations in the USA
• Backyard / outdoor / wild pigs - biosecurity
• Ornithodorus ticks – contact with pigs
• Levels of biosecurity on domestic pig farms
• Border security – illegal / legal imports of pigs and
pig products (and possibly feed) from abroad
• Rapid accurate laboratory diagnosis essential
Virus is only a short flight / boat ride away!
36. Advise to pig farmers in the USA
Biosecurity, Biosecurity, Biosecurity
• Review and increase existing levels of Biosecurity on the farm
• Ensure pigs (and wild boar / feral pigs) are not fed catering waste,
kitchen scraps or pork products,
• Do not allow pig-meat products onto farms, eg in workers’ lunches.
• Ensure that visitors have not had recent contact with affected regions.
• Anybody returning from an affected country should avoid contact with
domestic pigs, whether commercial holdings or smallholdings, areas
with feral pigs or wild boar, until they are confident they have no
contaminated clothing, footwear or equipment.
• Familiarise yourself with the clinical signs of ASF and report any
suspicious illnesses to your vet immediately.
37. Thanks very much!
Any Questions?
EU Reference Laboratory for
ASFV, Madrid, Spain
Carmina, Marisa and Jose
Manuel
University of
the West Indies
Editor's Notes
Survivability outside the host is heavily related to temperature.
The infectious half-life in urine and feces can range from 3 to 15 days and 4 to 8 days at 37°C and 4°C, respectively
Can survive in carcasses for up to 6 months
Persists for several weeks or months in frozen, fresh, or uncooked pork, as well as in salted dried / cured pork products.
and survives in contaminated feed………..
African swine fever virus causes a haemorrhagic fever with high mortality in domestic pigs. These images show examples of haemorrages seen under the skin of the ear, in lymph nodes and the tongue and a greatly enlarged spleen characteristic of ASFV infection.
The natural hosts of ASFV – warthogs, bushpigs and soft ticks remain persistently infected and show no signs of disease, acting as a reservior for infection.
ASFV in endemic in many African countries and in Sardinia and was introduced to the Caucasus region in 2007 where it is still spreading. It was first identified in Georgia and has now spread into many parts of Russia.