The Latest Information about African Swine Fever in Europe - Dr. Andres Perez, College Of Veterinary Medicine, University of Minnesota, from the 2017 Allen D. Leman Swine Conference, September 16-19, 2017, St. Paul, Minnesota, USA. More presentations at http://www.swinecast.com/2017-leman-swine-conference-material

1. African swine fever in Russia
and Eastern Europe
an overview of 10-year epidemic
and the latest news from Europe
Presented at Allen D. Leman Swine Conference
18th September 2017

2. z.umn.edu/SwineDiseaseSurveillance
Global
surveillance
program

3. African Swine Fever: Some Important Points
PROBLEMS FOR
ASF CONTROL
No vaccine available
Domestic & Wild
animals affected
Carrier animals
Ticks
Very resistant in
the environment
Clinical signs similar to
other diseases
High variability
23 genotypes in AFRICA
OUT: Only type II TCC-RF
Type I Sardinia
Laboratory diagnosis
needed
Pigs &products
Freezer
No neutralizing
Ab
From: Professor J. M.
Sanchez-Vizcaino

4. ASF: history
• First described in 1921
• Endemic in African countries
• Major outbreaks outside Africa:
Year Country Source of the virus introduction
1960 Portugal Importation of meat products
1978 Brazil Untreated food waste from an international airport
1978 Malta Untreated food waste from a sea port
1978 Sardinia Untreated food waste from a sea port
1980 Cuba Importation of live pigs and pork products
1983 Italy Importation of pork products
adopted from Sanchez-Vizcaino, OIE, 2010

5. Schematic scenario of
the ASF movement
across the Eastern
Europe

6. 2017 as of September, 13th
• Two new countries affected: Czech
Republic and Romania
• Rise of incidence in domestic pigs

7. ASF: Yearly dynamics Russia vs Europe
Russia
Europe

8. ASF: Russia vs Europe
• Cases in wild boars prevail among reported outbreaks in EU
• Specifics of reporting in EU vs RF (1 case = 1 outbreak)
• Wild boar population density in EU (>10 times denser in EU)
• Wild boar hunting is a traditional gaming activity in Europe

9. ASF: main transmission pathways
Source of infection
Number Percent
Trade of infected pigs 1 0.3 %
Direct contact between neighboring farms
(backyards)
5 1.7 %
Contaminated food waste brought by farm personnel 1 0.3 %
Contaminated vehicles 108 38.0 %
Contact with wild boars 4 1.4 %
Feeding contaminated fodders 100 35.0 %
Not defined 65 23.0 %
Results of study in Russia for the period of ASF spread 2007 – 2012:
Adopted from: Belyanin, 2013.
PhD Thesis ‘Dynamics of spread and monitoring of
the ASF epidemic process’

10. ASF: main transmission pathways
• Ornithodoros: present in southern regions only, but no
evidence of its role in Russia and EU
• Feeding pigs by contaminated fodders and waste
• Wild boars and free-range pigs may have an access to
open dumps and illegal burials of dead pigs

11. ASF: main transmission pathways
• Transportation and trade of [infected] pigs and
[contaminated] pork production
– Often, farmers tend to sell their pigs as soon as ASF is detected in the
area [problem of insufficient indemnities]
• Costard, S., Zagmutt, F.J., Porphyre, T., Pfeiffer, D.U., 2015. Small-scale pig farmers’
behavior, silent release of African swine fever virus and consequences for disease
spread. Sci. Rep. 5, 17074. doi:10.1038/srep17074
– This can lead to long-distance spread of the disease

12. ASF in Russia 2017
Omsk region
Irkutsk region
~ 1500 km
900 mi

13. ASF: main transmission pathways
• Domestic pigs vs wild boars
– Direct contacts between wild boars and domestic pigs are possible in
low-biosecurity farms (free-range pigs; mainly in southern areas)
– The virus transmission from domestic pigs to wild boars is far more
plausible than vise versa
• Wild boars contacts with garbage in villages, towns etc
© pictures collected throughout the Web

14. ASF: who infects whom?
• Domestic Pigs vs Wild Boars
• Will mass WB shooting stop the ASF spread?
– Vergne, T., Gogin, A., Pfeiffer, D.U., 2015. Statistical Exploration of Local
Transmission Routes for African Swine Fever in Pigs in the Russian
Federation, 2007-2014. Transbound. Emerg. Dis.
doi:10.1111/tbed.12391
• DP outbreaks do not demonstrate a statistically significant
tendency towards grouping around WB outbreaks
• Interactions between WB and DP populations are possible but
less likely

15. ASF: control and preventive measures
• Russia:
– Infected farm: culling all susceptible pigs
– High risk zone (5 – 20 km around an infected farm): depopulation of all
susceptible pigs
– Surveillance zone (up to 150 km): enhanced surveillance, prohibition
on pigs’ transportation etc.
• EU:
– Infected farm: culling all susceptible pigs
– High risk zone (3 – 5 km around an infected farm): enhanced
surveillance, prohibition on pigs’ transportation etc.
– Surveillance zone (30 km): enhanced surveillance

17. WB increase in Spain
0
50000
100000
150000
200000
250000
1980-81 1985-86 1990-91 1995-96 2000-01 2005-06 2010-11
Increase from 1980-2010  719%
Source: Jose Luis Garrido/FEDENCA
From: Professor J. M. Sanchez-Vizcaino

18. EVALUATING THE RISK OF ASFV
ENTRANCE IN CHINA
2500km aprox.
Increasing commercial and cooperation
relations with African continent
From: Professor J. M.
Sanchez-Vizcaino

19. Thank you for your attention!
FKORENNOY@YANDEX.RU
APEREZ@UMN.EDU