Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army failed in 1965 war - Analysis of 1965 War

17
CHAPTER FOURTEEN ANALYSIS -
1965 WAR
Havelock said that ; "In philosophy,it is
not the attainment of the goal that
matters,it is the things that are met with
by the way".So it is with war.The most
important thing for the student of
military history or the art of war is not
whether a country lost or won the war
but how it was fought,how units
performed in action,how decisions were
made in face of the stress and strain of
battle,the difference between practice
and precept in short all matters
pertaining to strategy tactics leadership
equipment etc.In other words to simply
analyse the war to answer the questions
like "Whence"? "Whither" ? "Why"? and
"How"?
In this analysis of war we have to go
beyond probabilities and examine
various facets of a particular situation
and arrive at conclusions that will assist
us in face of a similar crisis situation in
future.War is the final audit of an army
in which unit efficiency as well as higher

18
and lower leadership is gauged and no
book on an army is complete without
analysing in detail the qualitative
efficiency of an army in actual
War.Unfortunately most books written
on both Pakistan and Indian Armies by
foreigners and therefore meekly
accepted by the subcontinentals who
suffer from a subtle inferiority
complex;as the final authority; do not
discuss the qualitative efficiency of both
the Pakistan and Indian Armies in any
actual war; both as British Indian Army
and as two different armies after 1947!
Instead these books beat round the
bush discussing vague and largely
irrelevant issues which their authors
have decided to highlight,merely
because they have decided to write a
book and want to write their book
without going into the subtleties of
actual wars fought by the Indo Pak
armies.
In the following paragraphs an attempt
has been made to analyse the conduct
of 1965 war and to answer certain
questions about the qualitative
efficiency of the Pakistan Army in a
detached manner separating myth from

19
reality and fact from fiction.This analysis
is important because a considerable
part of Pakistani military history has
been deliberately or inadvertently
distorted based on nationalistic
parochial personal and inter arm
prejudices and jealousies.
THE BRITISH COLONIAL LEGACY
We have already discussed in detail the
impact of the British military tradition on
the Judo Pak armies in our earlier
chapters dealing with the armies of the
English East India Company and the pre
1947 British Indian Army.This was not
something confined to Judo Pak
subcontinent alone but an all Asia
trend.From the late eighteenth century
the "European Way of Warfare" was
generally borrowed and follow as the
gospel truth by many East European and
Afro-Asian armies.The trend of
"importing the European way of war"
started around 1600 when the Ottoman
Turks came into contact with the
European powers in Eastern Europe and
Russia.
Till 1500 the Europeans who had as a
matter of fact military failed in the
Crusades against Asia enjoyed no

20
significant military advantage over
Asia.Till the invention of gunpowder the
cavalry remained the dominant arm in
battle and the infantry was relegated to
a secondary role.The ascendancy of
European methods of warfare starts with
the advent of Gustavus Adolphus(1496-
1560) of Sweden who introduced a
renaissance in the art of warfare by
"harnessing modern technology to a
practical military philosophy" . (1)
Gustavus principal contribution was the
introduction of a relatively superior
conceptual framework of integrating
military organisation with weapons and
tactics.He created an infantry organised
in brigades of two to four regiments
each of which had eight battalions of
four companies etc.He introduced
similar reforms in cavalry and artillery
integrating artillery with infantry and
cavalry in battle and restructured
infantry formations in such a way that
their firepower was enhanced.One of his
most important reforms was
employment of cavalry as a "shock
weapon".
Gustavus's methods were copied by the
French and the British.Gustavus 's

21
tactics were improved by Turrene of
France and Cromwell and Marlborough
of England and were further improved
by Napoleon who was able to benefit
from the analytical studies of great
military thinkers like Gribeauval Maurice
de Saxe Bourcet Joseph Du Teil and
Guibert.Formal military schools were
organised in France where the art of war
was studied while similar institutions
were founded in Prussian and Sweden.
By 1600 Russia was the first country
outside mainland Europe to realise that
there was something conceptually and
organisationally superior in the West
European way of warfare which enabled
them to defeat numerically superior but
more primitively organised armies.lt
may be noted that as late as 1592 the
Russians were no match to the Muslim
Tartars of the Golden Horde who sacked
Moscow in 1571 and managed to
penetrate into suburbs of Moscow as
late as 1592.1t may seem unbelievable
to many but as late as 1660s the
Crimean Muslim Tartars were one of
Russia's most feared enemies.(2)
A similar pattern of imitation was
followed in the Ottoman Turk Army from

22
approximately 1750 to 1914 when the
Ottomans discovered that medieval
tactics of cavalry assault were of little
utility against relatively numerically
superior or equal strength European
armies with superior organisation'.(3)
It was adoption of superior West
European military tactics which enabled
the Russians to defeat the Ottomans
during the period 1699-1878.A similar
effort was made in the Egyptian Army of
Mohammad Ali during the period I803-
30. (4)
The Chinese started organising their
army on European lines from
approximately 1850 onwards following
disastrous military performance in the
Opium War of 1840-42.The Japanese
learnt a similar lesson from the
humbling of China by the Europeans in
the Opium Wars and invited a French
Military Mission in 1867 to organise and
train their army in modern military
methods. (5)
We have seen that a similar trend was
followed in India when the European
companies appeared on the Indian
scene as major participants in the
struggle for political supremacy in the

23
period 1740-1800 in the situation
created because of the vacuum which
developed as a result of the decline of
the Mughal Empire.
The Indian native states discovered that
smaller armies with a European nucleus
and larger number of Indians trained in
the European way of war could defeat
numerically much larger armies of the
Indian rulers.
Thus all Indian states imitated the
European companies and imported
military advisors from France Italy
Germany Ireland etc to train their
armies on European lines.
By 1849 however the English East India
Company had defeated all native states
employing as we have earlier discussed
a largely native army led by British
officers and based on a smaller
European core element.From 1757 to
1947 for a period of approximately 190
years India saw an army of Indian
mercenaries led by British officers which
dominated India.
This army was primarily an internal
security army which was theoretically
supposed to defend India against a

24
possible Russian invasion from the
northwest.Later as w-e saw the outbreak
of first world war forced the British to
employ the Indian Army as a desperate
remedy against the German invasion of
France.After the first world war the
Indian Army was once again relegated to
its major role of internal security.This
was followed by the Second World War
which forced the British to once again re
equip and modernise the Indian Army in
order to fight the second world war.This
was followed by the partition when the
British Indian Army was divided on
religious lines and was bifurcated into
two blocks of a tree whose sapling was
planted by Clive in 1757.
Any discussion or analysis of the
performance of Pakistani or Indian
Armies based on the assumption that
these armies came into existence in
August 1947 is meaningless and
incomplete.The organisational tactical
and social development of both the
armies had a 190 year old connection
with British rule in India and influenced
their conduct in 1948 1965 1971 wars
and even today in many aspects.We will
therefore first of all analyse the conduct
of Pakistan Army in 1965 with particular

25
reference to the influence of the "British
military Legacy".An attempt was made
by sycophants in the period 1958-69 to
prove that the Pakistan Army was
largely the creation of Ayub Khan!
There are two types of men in history;ie
those who follow the status quo and
those who are originators or executors
of dynamic ideas which change the
course of history ! Both Indian and
Pakistan Armies were dominated by men
of the former category.In India primacy
of civilian leadership did not allow the
growth of dynamism in the army while in
Pakistan concentration on improving
personal fortunes and in perpetuating
military dictatorship ,kept the military
usurpers attention fixed on non military
things!
In other words no major change or
reform was undertaken in both the
armies as far as doctrine staff
procedures and military organisation
were concerned .The armies which
fought the 1965 war were led by men
who were the products of the British
Colonial heritage. We will examine the
influence of British military colonial

26
legacy on Pakistan Army's conduct in
1965 war in the following paragraphs.
British Indian Military Tradition:--
Britains power was never based on its
army but on its naval power and
superior diplomacy which enabled it to
defeat its various European mainland
rivals by coalition warfare.
Thus after Marlborough British Army's
role in land warfare on European
mainland decreased and during the
Napoleonic wars Britain's main
contribution consisted in naval warfare
or in providing finances for sustaining
the various coalitions against France
than in actual war against France.Thus
Napoleon was destroyed in Russia and in
the campaigns of 1813 and 1814 in
which the British Army had no role.
Even Waterloo was a coalition affair in
which the Prussians played as major a
role as the British.In short the
foundation of British supremacy or
British power was not military
excellence but other factors like naval
power,superior diplomacy and an overall
superior political system.

27
In this sense the British legacy which the
Indo Pak armies inherited was certainly
not the finest in the world.But the
difference did not end here.The British
Indian Army which was the father of the
post 1947 Indo Pak Armies was an even
more outdated organisation than the
regular British Army.
This was so because the regular British
Army was designed to fight Britain's
European enemies and thus got more
attention in terms of finances equipment
and was more vigorously reformed by a
concerned parliament.
The British Indian Army which was
primarily an internal security army was
far more backward than the regular
British Army because it was not
designed to face any European foe till
1914 except the Russians whose military
potential or effectiveness was regarded
as far more inferior than Britains West
European rivals like Germany and France
and which in any case performed very
poorly in the Crimean War of 1854-56
and was later defeated by an Asiatic
power in the Russo Japanese War.
In terms of equipment the Indian Army
as we have already seen was

28
deliberately kept one generation behind
the regular British Army whether it was
infantry weapons or artillery (which was
taboo for Indians except few mountain
batteries in which Indians could serve as
common soldiers).
The Indian Army was trained as late as
1900 to fight primarily as battalions or
brigades against frontier tribesmen. We
have already discussed that the First
World War forced the British to slightly
modernise the Indian Army and the
massive Indian contribution to the
British war effort forced the British to
grant the Indians the privilege of
Regular commission in the army.
The Indians selected for officer rank
were from the most loyal classes with
proven record of loyalty to the British
Empire.Even Indianisation (introduction
of Indian Army Officers) was resisted by
the British Indian Army officers and as
late as 1939 twenty years after
Indianisation had started there were just
333 regular Indian officers in the Indian
Army as against 3,031 British officers.
(6)
We have already seen that after 1918 it
was felt that the Indian Army would not

29
be required to fight in a European war
and this led to massive reduction in the
size and resource allocation of the
Indian Army.
Thus the Indian Army was so outdated in
1938 that General Auchinleck observed
in 1938 that “in terms of modernisation
and equipment it was behind even the
Iraqi Egyptian and Afghan Armies” !
(7)
There was another serious
misconception in many minds and has
been carried forward till today that the
Indian Army was the finest army in the
world and played a major part in many
British victories.
There is no doubt that the Indian Army
played a significant role in British
Empires wars.However it must be
remembered,as we have just discussed,
that Britains wars right from the time of
Marlborough were coalition wars and
British Army's role in these successively
became lesser and lesserin this context
the Indian Army's share in the relatively
limited contribution made by the British
Army in both the world wars was even
more limited.In any case the Indian
Army was Indian only as far as the rank

30
and file was concerned and its principal
strength was its British officer
cadre.Even beyond battalion level each
Indian Brigade was stiffened by one pure
British battalion and the Indian Army
always functioned as part of a larger
team and mostly in circumstances
where the British enjoyed a comfortable
numerical material and logistic
superiority over their adversaries.
The Indian Army at its best was used
only as a defensive force in France in
1914.The British final success in both
world wars had a deeper connection
with US aid and Russian blood than with
the Indian Army.In any case the principal
force multiplier of the Indian Army was
the British officer and the vast resources
of the British Empire rather than the
Chakwal Jhelum men who were merely
cannonfodder.
In this regard there was absolutely no
comparison between the quality of
performance of the pre 1947 Indian
Army and the post 1947 Indo Pak
armies.In Pakistan specially it was
mistakenly assumed that the British
Indian Army did well because their

31
soldiers i.e. the Punjabi Muslims were
more martial than the Hindus !
These naïve commentators failed to see
the essential fact i.e. that it was the
British officer who was able to organise
and lead Indians of all nationalities and
religions equally well in battle .The
cardinal factor in the whole equation
was not the martial race,as has been
mistakenly asserted by many Pakistani
officers, but the white officer who
inspired the espirit de corps and the
relatively superior organisation skill that
created the Indian Army.
Legacy of inter arm compartmentation
and rivalry:-
One of the most negative legacies which
inhibited the performance of both the
armies in 1965 and even in 1971 was a
purely British inculcated and British
inherited legacy of inter arm and even
inter regimental rivalry within the same
arm.
While German successes in the WW II
had a deep link with emphasis on
fighting as a division with intimate
coopertion between all arms,many
British military failures had a deep link

32
with inter arm rivalry which severely
retarded their ability to fight as
combined arms teams.Thus at Gazala in
1942 the 2nd Highland Infantry was
overrun by German tanks "whilst a
superior British tank force looked on".
(8)
Lack of leadership tradition:--
We have briefly discussed the fact that
the West European way of warfare was
imported by many Asian and East
European countries like Russia.
There was a major difference between
the other countries who imported the
European way of warfare and the British
Indian Army.While the entire officer
corps in the Ottoman
,Russian,Japanese,Egyptian and Chinese
Armies consisted of their own
people,there was no leadership tradition
in the British Indian Army as far as
Indians were concerned.
The English East India Company was
very careful in not allowing native
Indians from becoming officers in their

33
native Presidency Armies, since Yusuf
Khans rebellion in mid 18th
century ,
and did not allow even Anglo-Indians to
become officers after 1805 barring few
exceptions like Colonel Skinner etc.
The objective of the company was
simple i.e. not letting a leadership
tradition grow in the natives and also
not to let the natives master the
European methods of warfare.The US
War of Independence convinced the
British Government that it was
dangerous to let any colonial subjects
from mastering the art of warfare by
getting the officers commission.This
policy played rich dividends when the
native soldiers of the Bengal Army failed
to handle units larger than platoons and
companies and were easily defeated by
the British despite their relative
numerical superiority at least in the
initial stages of the rebellion.The Sepoy
Rebellion reinforced the British
determination not to allow Indian to
become commissioned officers and till
1919 there were no Indian officers in the
Indian Army.
This meant that there was no leadership
tradition in the Indians who became

34
officers.The Indians selected to become
officers from 1917 onwards were from
classes with proven loyalty and men
meant to be groomed for lower level
command ranks only.
After the formation of Indian Military
Academy a large proportion of cadets
were from the ranks which never
attracted the best available young men
in India. (9)
Many of these were sons of rankers or
VCOs who had spent their whole lives in
serving the juniormost British officers
and had inherited from their family a
narrow approach of a life spent in
playing sycophant par excellence with
the juniormost British officer who was
senior to the seniormost Indian VCO in
rank and authority.In future analysis this
will be referred to as the Ranker/VCO
approach which was found in plenty in
the 1965 Indo Pak Armies!Colmar Von
der Goltz spoke of the "aristocracy of
education" which constituted the corps
of German officersIn India bulk of the
real aristocracy had been eliminated
when the British emerged victorious.
The new aristocracy which they created
was an aristocracy of toadies The

35
German aristocracy which constituted
the bulk of the German officer corps was
basically an impoverished
aristocracy„butrich in tradition of
contributed many generations of officers
to the Prussian/German Army.
In Indo Pak armies bulk of the men who
reached the officer rank were neither an
aristocracy of education nor possessed a
long tradition of leadership by virtue of
having ancestors in the officer ranks!
The Germans on the contrary did not
encourage NCO to become officers and
Von Seeckt the founder of the
Reichswehr which was the iron frame of
the Wehrmacht deliberately increased
educational qualifications to discourage
ex NCOs from getting officer rank.
Thus in 1928 just 117 out of 4000
officers were ex NCOs In the Indian and
Pakistani Armies a much larger
proportion of rankers or rankers sons
were in the officer rank. Contemporary
evidence suggests that the British
preferred these over directly
commissioned Indian officers with good
college or university education since the
ex rankers or rankers sons who were
educated at the military schools of

36
Ajmer Jullundhur and Serai Alamgir
(schools for rankers sons education)
were more pliable and easier to handle
material ! (10)
It is not difficult to understand that the
small number of Indians who joined the
army as commissioned officers were
viewed as a necessary evil arising as a
result of a civilian governments policy to
accept Indians in the commissioned
ranks.
These men were not held in much high
esteem by their British superiors and
viewed the army as just one career
where they could improve their personal
lot and as an avenue of social
advancement.What leadership tradition
could be expected from such
mercenaries.
The real hero of the British Indian Army
was the British officer who was from the
first thirty cadets in the Sandhurst
entrance examination, and was fighting
for his King Emperor!
His Indian counterpart was just a
mercenary for whom serving the British
was just a job!

37
Conservative Military Doctrine:--
The British Army being an extremely
snobbish and class conscious army was
the bastion of conservatism.There was
no threat to Britain in the period till
1933 and military reform or radical
change was never serious agenda in the
British Army.Thus the British Army that
fought the WW Two was an out of date
machine which performed extremely
poorly in France and North Africa till
overwhelming material
superiority,thanks to US aid finally
enabled it to turn the tables at Alamein.
Thus progressive and dynamic military
thinkers like Fuller were sidelined from
the British Army before the war in an
atmosphere where Polo and social
contacts were more important than
strict professionalism.Thus the British
approach towards warfare was
extremely conservative and outdated .
If this was the case in the regular British
Army which was supposed to defend
Britain in a war against European
adversaries it is not difficult to imagine
the rudimentary and primitive approach
that dominated the British Indian Army
which was designed to imperial policing

38
jobs in countries like Iraq and Persia
after the end of First World War.
Lack of Permanent General Staff:--
The British Army lacked a permanent
General Staff unlike the German
Army.This was a serious drawback and
played a major role in relatively poor
performance of the British Army in the
two world wars.Organisationally the
British Army was not as efficient in
carrying out military operations as the
German Army.Cardwell the revolutionary
British Secretary of State and the father
of reform in the British Army was in
favour of having a permanent General
Staff like the German Army but was
frustrated in his attempts to do so by
the conservative elements in the British
Army led by Duke of Cambridge" . (11)
Just because the British did not have a
permanent General Staff,the post 1947
officers of both the Indian and Pakistani
Armies saw no need to have one.Thus
Staff work and procedures stayed as
poor and rudimentary in both the armies
as in the pre 1947 Indian Army or the
British Army.There was an ocean of

39
qualitative difference in between the
British and German Staff institutions of
instruction.The British Staff College at
Cambrai in words of Montgomery's
biographer Nigel Hamilton was an
institution preoccupied with "hunting
and socialising". (12)
The same was the case with US
institutions like Fort Leavenworth where
in words of General Bradley to rose to
great heights in the US Army the system
of education was
"predictable....unrealistic and did not
encourage unconventional tactics" .
(13)
In addition while the German General
Staff course lasted for three years that
at Staff College Quetta lasted for two
years and was later reduced to six
months from 1940.Most of the senior
officers who held important command
and staff assignments in the 1965 war
were graduates of this six months crash
course in which entry was by
nomination.ln 1965 as we shall discuss
many opportunities were primarily lost
because of poor staff work.
In words of a British Army officer ; "The
British Army lacked an institution which

40
deliberately cultivated and carefully
fostered a self-conscious intellectual
existence like the German general
Staff.For the German Army this
institution became the focus for
professional debate and a vehicle for
operational innovation.The officer corps
to which it gave rise received a thorough
grounding in military history and an
induction into the critical methods of
historical study.These formidable
intellectual foundations conferred on the
minds of staff trained German officers a
powerful and sensitive analytic
approach to the problems of managing
violence".(14)
General Von Mellenthin who served as a
general staff officer in North Africa noted
a major different in the quality of
thinking of the British about their staff
officers and the measure of trust that
was placed in British Army in the staff
officers; "The officers of the German
General Staff were not mere clerks or
mouthpieces of their commanders (as
was the case with British and their
corrupted off shoot i.e. the Sub
Continental Indian and Pakistani Armies)
,but were trained to accept
responsibility for grave decisions and

41
were respected accordingly.In contrast
the British fighting commanders tend
look down on the staff,and the British
show a curious reluctance to appoint
capable staff officers to operational
commands. (15)
Orders Oriented British Legacy:--
Another legacy common to both the
Indo Pak armies was an orders oriented
approach.This was the opposite of the
German approach of Auftragtstaktik
under which commanders at all levels
were trained to function without waiting
for orders in case a tactical or
operational situation warranted it and
valuable tactical or operational
opportunities were being lost in case
one waited for orders from higher
headquarters.The famous British staff
officer Dorman Smith observed that ; "
Essentially in a professional army the
commander is left to carry out an order
without wet nursing.In the British
system,on the contrary a subordinate
will do nothing until he will have the
next above breathing down his neck.The
result is that everyone is doing the
proper job of of the next below instead
of his own battle job.This is the main

42
cause of stagnation in the British tactical
mind" . (16)
The Indo Pak armies suffered from
another subtle drawback in this case.On
one hand the British were conservative
in attitude towards orders and secondly
Indians till the second world war were
mostly very junior officers barring few
exceptions who commanded companies
or battalions or one who commanded a
brigade.
The Indian was fighting the White Man's
war and took no interest in exercising
his initiative always pursuing a safe
course of waiting for orders.The same
bunch of people who fought the second
world war constituted the Indian and
Pakistani armies who fought the 1965
war from Lieutenant Colonel onwards.
These men as subalterns and captains
or majors were not trained to take
mission oriented decisions,nor were
they motivated to risk their career by
exercising any initiative since they were
fighting the white man's war !
A large number of them like Musa Tikka
etc were ex rankers who were even

43
more limited and conservative in their
typical "ranker approach".
Thus when these men became
brigadiers and major generals they
expected the same from their juniorsJt
was the case of a habit getting instilled
and internalised as an essential part of
ones personality.Thus many
opportunities were lost since all
commanders from squadron/company
till divisional level preferred to wait for
orders rather than do anything on their
own initiative.
Gul Hassan's memoirs is full of examples
of approach of senior Pakistani officers
using the weight of their rank and
intimidating their juniors by use of court
of inquiries and warnings!
Anyone who is keen to know about the
"Conspiracy against originality boldness
and initiative" should read Gul Hassans
memoirs which though otherwise not
wholly accurate provide an excellent
image of the attitudes of senior officers
of that time as regards cultivation or
rather discouragement of initiative!

44
INABILITY TO DEVELOP A DOCTRINE
OF DECISIVE WARFARE
It would not be wrong to say that one of
the principal reasons for poor
performance of both Indian and Pakistan
Armies in 1965 was "failure or inability
to develop a dynamic doctrine of
decisive warfare".Both the armies were
not national armies but essentially
mercenary armies created for the aim of
internal security.
They were not designed as instruments
of decisive warfare but forces which
were designed for use in small wars or
for limited roles while the resources of
the British Army came into action and
decisive results were achieved by
diplomacy coalition warfare etc.Doctrine
may essentially be described as a
conceptual frame work combining and
integrating the dynamics of combat so
that an army can fight decisively.
Doctrine visualises harmonious
combination of essentially five functions
i.e. "Manoeuvre" "Fire support"
"Intelligence" "Command and Control by
means of a practical and dynamic
organisation" and lastly "logistic
support".Once all these five are

45
combined in a well conceived and
harmonious manner we arrive at a
decisive doctrine of wafrare.Once there
is a clear cut doctrine uniformly
understood at all levels and in all
formations in the army,all actions taken
at various levels of command including
decision making,movement,execution of
orders and all battle drills are carried out
in the minimum possible time and the
result is swift execution of plans.
This is not an exactly simple
process.Each country has its own unique
circumstances.The British Indian Army
was designed to fight against primitive
enemies against whom no military talent
was required as far as higher military
leadership was concerned.
Primitive and backward countries could
be defeated by simple frontal advance
and a few pitched battles in which none
of these countries could stand the
bayonet charge of a brigade or division
of a couple of native regiments with a
hard core of a few British regiments.We
have already seen that after the Second
Sikh War the role of the Indian Army was
reduced to internal security.

46
The Second and Third Afghan Wars were
militarily insignificant affairs in terms of
complexity of military operations and
number of casualties sustained.Only
skills in minor operations were required
in most of the operations of the British
Indian Army.
There was simply no operational level of
war in most battles of British Indian
Army till world war two.Wherever it
functioned it was as a small part of the
larger 8th
Army or in Burma where the
Japanese were fighting in conditions of
overwhelming logistic numerical and
material odds.Hence there was no
credible doctrine inherited by both
armies to fight a war in the Punjabi
countryside which was entirely different
from the NWFP or North Africa or Burma.
The British way of war depended more
on diplomacy maritime strategy and
coalition warfare.The Americans
developed a comfortable doctrine based
on material superiority which did not
require them to do anything creative or
militarily brilliant therefore the last
brilliant commanders that they
produced were in the US Civil war!

47
The Germans developed Blitzkrieg
because their peculiar geographical
position forced them to develop a
doctrine aimed at achieving swift
decisions in an extremely short time
span.ln Pakistan no such doctrine was
framed.The foundation of the army
rested on internal security and
preserving the status quo.There was
simply no doctrine which combined the
above named five functions.
"Manoeuvre" was not important because
no decisive war was to be fought. "Fire
support" was not important because the
army was infantry dominated and the
gunners were a despicable lot.
"Command and Control" was not
important and only one corps
commander was expected to control
and co-ordinate five divisions with more
than 200 miles frontage since a war was
never to be fought and it was not
politically advisable to have too many
corps commanders.
The stress and friction of war was not
understood because Ayub hardly had
any worthwhile military record.
Specialised Staff work was not important
because even the British did not have a
full time general staff .What the

48
Pakistani military leaders failed to
realise was the fact that Indian Army
was never designed to conduct
"Decisive Warfare" ! "Intelligence" was a
misunderstood term and was thought to
be something designed primarily to
keep track of political dissidents and
internal enemies!
"Logistic Support" was also not
appreciated because fighting a war and
specially a protracted one was never the
intention of the ruling elite.The men at
the helm of affairs failed to develop a
fresh doctrine of decisive warfare
because of three reasons.
Firstly they were intellectually weak and
possessed limited vision,being products
of a class which was educationally
backward and primarily designed not to
produce first rate military leaders but
politically reliable mercenary company
commanders and company second in
commands!
Secondly they were not among the best
officers of Indian Army as far as war
performance was concerned and
therefore did not fully grasp the
dynamic inter relationship between
"Doctrine Organisation and Conduct of

49
War" .(Weaker and primitive states find
it difficult to conduct decisive
warfare).Thirdly the Pakistani military
leadership as far as Ayub was concerned
was more preoccupied with politics than
with the business of war.
Ayub was essentially a paper
tiger,outwardly impressive,tall ,manly in
appearance but timid at heart,who
mistakenly thought that mere
acquisition of US equipment was
sufficient insurance against war and that
he could win all the glory without
fighting an actual war-ft was not his
intention to fight a war since the
Kashmir issue was only a good political
slogan which served as cheap opium for
the Pakistani masses.
Thus since there was no intention to use
the military option for settling the
dispute with India no doctrine of
decisive war was developed by Ayub
and Musa in any case was little more
than a figurehead and drill square
soldier who did not have the capacity to
do anything intellectually worthwhile.
The so called "New Tactical Concept"
was not a doctrine but essentially one
set of actions covering defence and it

50
was not this concept which envisaged
not having "any obstacle in front or
flanks of the striking force" (17) but the
BRB , 25 Cavalry and above all poor
Indian leadership which saved Lahore
and Sialkot in 1965!
This was the case of Pakistan Army
which had a better opportunity to
develop a dynamic military doctrine
since at least theoretically there was a
man having total power at the top who
was a soldier and supposed to
understand the dynamics of war better
than civilian leadership of India etc.The
Indian Army's story was different.Here
was a case of an army which was run
down as a “relic of colonial past ." (18)
Gandhian nonsense of Ahimsa and
peaceful protest further introduced a
more pacific spirit in the Indian national
psyche.The army's salary was reduced
and it was reduced to 300,000 all
ranks”. (19)
Luckily for the Indians the Himalayan
debacle forced their pacifist leadership
to rehash their thinking.After 1962 an
effort was made to reorganise the Indian
Army but the new raisings and
headquarters were to Pakistan's good

51
luck still suffering from teething
problems in 1965!
LACK OF RESOLUTION TO
ENERGETICALLY CONDUCT THE WAR
IN AYUB
Lack of resolution in Ayub was a serious
drawback as far as Pakistan was
concerned.Subconsciously Ayub was the
last man who wanted war despite all the
propaganda of Kashmir dispute.
It is possible that this hesitation had
some link with Ayub's poor or
insignificant war record in WW Two.On
various occasions Ayub avoided military
action. In the 1947-48 period when
many officers in Pakistan were
volunteering for participating in the
Kashmir war Ayub did not show any
inclination to participate in the Kashmir
war,acting on the old colonial British
principle "Never Volunteer" ! In 1950-51
he restrained Liaquat who was thinking
of war with India. (20)
It was this unwillingness to fight a war
which motivated Ayub to propose joint
defence of the subcontinent to Nehru in
1959. (21)

52
In 1962 Ayub's attitude exhibited
extreme timidity (22) when the Chinese
asked Pakistan to take advantage of the
India-China War and settle the Kashmir
dispute by exercising the military option.
Seven years in power however
somewhat emboldened Ayub's spirits
and by 1965 he felt confident enough
that the Hindu who Ayub mistakenly
thought as more timid than the Pakistani
would not dare to start a conventional
war even if Pakistan pinched the Hindu
damsel at will ,sometimes in the Rann
and sometimes in Kashmir!
Even in 1965 Ayub was not interested in
a war which he wanted to avoid at all
cost.This was a case of the desire to
gain the glory of martyrdom in battle
without actually getting killed in action!
It was Ayub's misfortune that he was
surrounded by more resolute advisors
like Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad who did not
have any of Ayub's timidity.
Musa Ayub's handpicked Chief was the
last one to wish for a war in which he
would be forced to exercise his intellect
in the actual conduct of modern war
involving tanks etc,about whose
employment Musa had very rudimentary

53
ideas.War or limited war i.e. a war in
which fighting remained confined to
Kashmir was seen by Ayub as a political
opportunity to enhance his prestige
which had suffered because of
allegations of rigging in the 1965
elections.
Thus Operation Gibraltar which
visualised a Guerrilla War leading to
Kashmir was seen by Ayub as a golden
means of winning Kashmir without war
and getting all the glory reserved for the
victor of a war without ever starting an
all out war!
He did not have the long term vision to
understand that India would retaliate
militarily against the infiltrators sent into
Kashmir by Pakistan.
He thus set fire to the fuse which
triggered a series of actions and
counteractions which ultimately led to
an all out war.
Ayub was militarily naive enough to
think that India would not start an all out
war if Pakistan went for what Ayub
himself called "India'a jugular vein" i.e.
Akhnur.

54
When he realised that an all out war was
likely if Pakistan captured Akhnur,he
made an attempt to halt the Pakistani
advance by ordering change of
command of the force moving towards
Akhnur.By then it was too late and
Ayub's half measures and half hearted
conduct of military operations in Grand
Slam harmed the Pakistani military
cause in two ways.

55
Firstly it provoked India to launch an all
out war which Ayub did not have the
resolution to fight and which Musa did
not have the military genius to
conductiSecondly as a result of this
indecision Pakistan failed to capture
Akhnur whose loss would have led to a
serious operational imbalance in the
Indian dispositions in Kashmir and would
have weakened India's resolve to attack
Lahore and opposite Chawinda without
first redressing the serious imbalance
opposite Kashmir.
Thus Pakistani military/political
leadership failed in both aims;ie to sever
the jugular and to prevent an all out war
;and primarily because of irresolution on
part of their own higher leadership
rather than enemy resistance.
Thus Ayub and his team were not
propelled by a burning desire to defeat
the enemy by decisive conduct of
operations but by an essentially
defensive attitude.Thus they viewed
Pakistani thrusts inside India not as
actions taken to strike a decisive blow
on the enemy but merely as measures
to reduce Indian pressure on Lahore.

56
The GHQ simply did not have a forward
command and control set up designed
to vigorously prosecute the war but
essentially a distant headquarter
modelled on colonial principles from
where orders were issued for defence of
India.The war on the Pakistani side was
thus conducted disinterestedly because
the higher leadership was simply
irresolute and was not prepared or
interested in fighting the war which
came as a rude shock to them once the
Indians attacked Lahore.
Pakistani military writers like Shaukat
Riza's claim that the Pakistan Army
never wanted a war in 1965 but war
broke out in 1965 largely because of
those accursed Machiavellian schemers
i.e. Bhutto and Aziz Ahmad;does not
speak very highly about the standard of
resolution of Ayub or Musa.
What is the aim of an army if it never
wanted to fight a war to settle a just
cause or to recover a territory which was
at least as official propaganda went
some sort of a Pakistani Alsace or
Lorraine.it is an open secret that till this
day the Pakistan Army claims that it was
the Foreign Office who got them

57
involved in 1965.So what did the army's
leadership want ;to rule their own
people,in uninterrupted peace,creating
large business empires which made sons
of VCOs and assistant political agents
from Kohat business magnates as they
were doing since 1958!
Perhaps the only positive impact of the
1965 war was the realisation in the
otherwise politically naive and docile
Pakistani masses that their leaders were
essentially making a fool out of them
and Kashmir was just a cheap slogan to
galvanise the masses!Kashmir was
never regarded as an issue by Ayub but
was forced upon him by the hawks like
Bhutto and Aziz aided by military advice
of Akhtar Malik& is an irony of Pakistani
military history that these civilian hawks
possessed much greater resolution than
the two soldiers leading the country's
government and the army!
Once a man lacks resolution his conduct
is vacillating and indecisive and all
decisions that he makes are
compromises and half measures.This
essentially was the tragedy of the
Pakistan Army in 1965.

58
A time when it was still possible to settle
the so called Kashmir dispute by
exercising the military option& is best to
quote Clausewitz who gave guidelines
about the philosophy of war at least
seventy five to ninety years before Ayub
and Musa were born,but whose ideas
perhaps were not digested by both of
them.
Clausewitz said; "No war is
commenced,or,at least no war should be
commenced,if people acted
wisely,without first seeking a reply to
the question,What is to be attained by
and in the same?The first is the final
object;the other is the immediate
aim.By this chief consideration the
whole course of the war is
prescribed,the extent of the means and
the measure of energy are
determined;its influence manifests itself
down to the smallest organ of action" .
(23)
The Pakistani leadership and the
sycophants who courted them later laid
the entire blame for starting the war on
one who had nothing to do with
soldiering and one who was not in any
case the right authority for asking the

59
question whether the Indians would
start an all out war even if their jugular
was severed!It was an irony that a
soldier and not a naive civilian was
leading the country at this stage.One
who was far more naïve than even
Shaastri the civilian who knew much
less about soldiering but understood
grand strategy in a crystal clear manner.
The Indians however dumb their
execution of war at least started it with
clear a cut and definite rationale and did
achieve their aim of putting an end to
military adventurism in Kashmir.The
Pakistani leadership was confused and
as a result conducted the war which
most inexplicably came as a surprise to
them in a most indecisive and vacillating
manner!
FAILURE OF THE PAKISTANI GHQ TO
EFFECTIVELY SUPERVISE
EXECUTION OF PLANS OR TO
CREATE ALTERNATIVE
ORGANISATIONAL OR COMMAND
ARRANGEMENTS TO SUPERVISE THE
CONDUCT OF WAR
Another serious command failing was
failure of the Pakistani GHQ to
effectively supervise execution of

60
plans.Here it was not Ayub alone who
was responsible for this command
failure but all including Musa ,Sher
Bahadur the CGS and Gul Hassan the
DMO.The job of an army headquarters is
not just to formulate plans and issue
general orders but to effectively
supervise the execution of plans.No
such arrangement existed either in
shape of a forward command
headquarter which would have enabled
the GHQ to have closer liaison with the
fighting formations or in shape of
intermediate headquarters.We have
already discussed in brief that Ayub did
not have "operational experience" and
was devoid of "tactical flair" and
"organisational understanding" . (24)
The Corps Headquarter was viewed by
these men not as an intermediate
headquarter between the GHQ and the
divisions fighting the war aimed at
effective command control and co-
ordination of two or three divisions
fighting one battle in a particular area
where the lay of ground terrain and
operational situation required intimate
co-ordination and effective inter
divisional Cooperation but a ceremonial
headquarter under command of a

61
loyal ,regardless of intellectual or
operational ability man who was to
supervise the peacetime function of
divisions like a drill square sergeant
major.For this role they found a man
who lacked imagination operational
insight and whose major qualification
was reliability . (25)
This man commanded the corps without
ever having thought how his corps with
five divisions with one river dividing his
command and with divergent and
different roles fight their battles in
war.Kashmir with 400 miles of difficult
terrain was left to be commanded by
one divisional headquarters though we
have seen that as early as 1948 the
Indians keeping in view the terrain
requirements had subdivided the area
into two divisional commands.Raising
another divisional headquarter was not
that much of an expensive issue so as to
require US aid !
Similarly it was taken for granted that
one corps headquarter with a not very
intellectually gifted commander was
enough to control four divisions;two in
defence in two different areas with a
major river in between and two divisions

62
which were supposed to carry the war
into enemy territory,one of which was
an armoured division!
To say that by 1965 it was already too
late ,to raise another divisional
headquarter ,after the plan to launch
Gibraltar was made ,does not hold any
substance.The Indians as late as 1st
September 1965 brought in a new
divisional headquarter to command and
control the operations in Chhamb-
Akhnur area.Pakistan had the 8th
Division Headquarter which had been
stripped of all its brigades and was
doing nothing at Kharian.
This headquarter could have been
tasked to take care of Grand Slam.It
required imagination and common sense
and it is not just enough to blame Mr
Shoaib the Finance Minister for not
having another divisional headquarter !
(26)
About the offensive Gul the DMO says
that "the co-ordination of this whole
operation was of critical importance but
there was no corps headquarter for the
purpose.Therefore GHQ took over the
control of this sector (sitting 200 miles
in the north!!!!) ,a highly unsatisfactory

63
arrangement (with the benefit of
hindsight of 27 years) ,but there was no
alternative had hoped (hope is good
breakfast but a bad supper ) that very
close liaison between Major Generals
Hamid and Nasir ,Commanders of 11
Infantry and 1st
Armoured Division
respectively would resolve quite a
number of issues of friction" . (27)
Gul as one who was DMO since January
1961 had a large share of responsibility
in this rudimentary command
arrarigement.
Shaukat Riza who had better access to
war diaries and official records by virtue
of having direct support of the GHQ
states that "Major General Hamid (1 1
Division) was verbally informed that he
should 'look after' 1st
Armoured Division.
At the same time GHQ passed orders
directly to 1st
Armoured Division". (28)
The Indians showed relatively better
understanding of military organisation
by finally creating a corps headquarter
to command their main offensive thrust
in Sialkot.
But even this measure had little
influence on the battle since the corps

64
headquarter was raised only in May
1965 and had not trained in peace as a
corps.Its third infantry division the 14
Division was also newly raised.
In practical terms the Indian I Corps also
never functioned as a corps.As per
Harbaksh Singh "the guiding hand of the
corps commander was conspicuously
absent-in fact he appeared to have
hardly played a part in the battle" .
Gurcharan Singh states that "there was
an apparent weakness of command
because the corps commander had no
tangible influence on the battle" .(29)
Both sides failed to grasp the
importance of intermediate military
headquarters although the Indian
organisational arrangements however
late were relatively better.
The failure on the Pakistani side was
more acute because twice golden
opportunities were lost because of
absence of effective divisional and corps
headquarters at Akhnur and in Khem
Karan.The Indian failure had more to do
with poor execution at brigade and
divisional level rather than with poor
organisational arrangements.

65
LACK OF AGGRESSIVENESS AND
HESITATION /AVOIDANCE OF
LEADING FROM THE FRONT AT
REGIMENTAL BRIGADE AND
DIVISIONAL LEVEL
Lack of aggressiveness and
hesitation/avoidance from leading from
the front at regiment brigade and
divisional level was another serious
failing on both sides.
This also had a subtle link with the
British colonial legacy but cannot be
classified as a part of the British colonial
legacy.In the British system of command
brigade and divisional commanders
commanded from their headquarters
which naturally led to slow decision
making because of the time gap and
distortion factor in transmission of
information from lower to higher
echelons of command will quote a
British writer to describe this essentially
British inherited failing; "As a stubborn
and tenacious fighter I doubt whether
the English soldier has any equal;yet as
an attacker and an exploiter in all
probability he has many: because he is
not a quick thinker.. ...his sense of
responsibility is artificial has been

66
drilled into him by misfortune and
sergeant majors.He will follow to hell
without question,not because he fears
to lead....but because he has never been
encouraged or taught to do so" . (30)
It is unfair to blame the British for all
Indo Pak military failings.Thus I have not
included this failing under the heading
of British legacy.But there is no escaping
the fate that both the armies were
nothing more than sons of John
Company?
It was necessary to radically alter the
operational and radical thinking after
independence,but unfortunately it was
not done in both the arrnies.
This essentially British inherited failing
had a deep connection with the staff
systern.ln the British system the staff
was not trained to take independent
decisions in line with the initial orders
passed by a commander in a situation
where the higher commander was away
with some frontline unit or not present in
his headquarters and a situation
demanded immediate decision failing
which operational or tactical
opportunities were being lost or a

67
situation involving tactical or operational
imbalance was being created.
This was not so with the British whose
staff officers were trained to function
more as clerks or mouthpieces of their
commanders. Both the Indo Pak armies
inherited the same legacy and made no
effort to change anything !
Decision making was thus always slow
in British Army as compared to the
German Army where the teaching was
that ; "Personal influence by the
commanding officer on his troops is of
the greatest importance.He must be
located near the fighting troops a
divisional commander's place is with his
troops..... During encounters with the
enemy seeing for oneself is best" . (31)
Even in case of corps headquarters the
German Command instructions of 1936
laid down the following guidelines : "The
selection of a location for a corps
headquarters is determined above all by
the need to keep in close and constant
touch with both the divisions and the
rear.A corps commander is not to rely on
technical means of communication
alone". (32)

68
Thus decision making was greatly
improved by this procedure although
general officer casualties were much
higher in the German Army in the
second world war than any other army
in the war. (33)
The problem with both subcontinental
armies was that they were not the
armies of British Empire which thanks to
immense resources could recover from
phenomenal disasters like France-1940
Gazala-1942 etc. radical reorientation
was required after 1947,with emphasis
on a system in which commanders led
from the front making conduct of war
more decisive by virtue of faster
decision making;and at least in Pakistan
lip service was paid (I would say in
theory only as far as senior officers were
concerned) to the fundamental Islamic
concept of martyrdomi I But this did not
happen.
The brown Englishmen were happier
sitting in the rear controlling the battle
by telephone or wireless.Similarly the
brigade commanders and the senior
lieutenant colonels used to the
mercenary way of warfare saw no

69
reason for unnecessary risk by leading
from the front !
We have already said that the
leadership tradition was not strong in
both the armies having been subjected
to colonial rule for 100 to 200 years and
there was a need for senior officers to
stay forward and spur the junior
commanders.This was not done.There
were men like Tarapur and Sahibzad
Gul,but these were the exception rather
than the rule!
This was a common to both the armies
and was a subcontinent failing and not
just confined to Pakistan Army.Harbaksh
complained about it when he said; "A
peculiar smugness and inertia appeared
to dominate the higher level of
command A firm grip of the situation
combined with resolute direction at the
top at corps level would have tipped the
scales in our favour.A determined
leadership at lower lower levels could
have done the rest to score a striking
success .Both these vital ingredients
were unfortunately missing".(34)
This led to slow decision making as
Amjad Choudhry noted,when the
Pakistani GHQ seemed stunned from the

70
news of Indian main attack opposite
Chawinda and took 48 hours to decide
their next move.
Similarly the Indian failure opposite
Chawinda had a deeper relationship with
inertia and indecision of their 1
Armoured Brigade Headquarter and 1
Armoured Division Headquarter rather
than Pakistani 25 Cavalry's
counteractions,which however
commendable could not have stopped
the Indians from reaching the MRL Canal
on 8th September,had their higher
commanders led from the front and had
resolutely pushed on.
The same is true for the failure of 5
Armoured Brigade whose commander
preferred calling 6 Lancers back from
VaItolna every night rather than leading
from the front.Both the countries were
lucky in having equally incompetent
higher military commanders on both
sides!
EMPLOYMENT OF ARMOUR
The poor employment of armour by both
sides was another British legacy which

71
was not remedied after the
independence.Employment of armour
required quick decision making ability
efficient staff work and boldness at all
levels which was not inculcated in the
pre 1947 Indian Army.
lt was largely a matter of doctrine.The
tank was viewed by the Germans who
used it in the most decisive manner in
WW II as a weapon which would enable
them to achieve a breakthrough and
enable them to achieve victory in face of
numerical inferiority.
The British viewed it as just another
weapon that was available to assist
infantry.The Indian Army got tanks for
the first time in Burma in a scenario
where the battle was largely infantry
dominated and the Japanese did not
have any credible anti tank ability in
terms of anti tank guns or tanks.It was
here that some Indians (Gul Hassan not
being one of them,still being in the
infantry and doing service in the safety
of a headquarter as aide de camp)
commanded tank troop and squadrons.
They could have learnt little since the
Japanese had almost nothing worthwhile

72
to oppose the Sherman tanks with which
Indian tank regiments were equipped.
When the final British offensive was
launched opposite Meiktila-Mandalay are
the Japanese had just one tank regiment
of obsolete tanks to oppose the most
modern 300 Sherman and Grant Tanks
of the British Indian Army ! (35)
Even conceptually the Japanese quality
of employment of armour was extremely
inferior since they used tanks in penny
packets to support and not in a
concentrated manner.' (36)
In war lessons are learnt once the
enemy also possesses the capability to
oppose the other party in terms of
similar equipment.This was not the case
in Burma and the two tank brigades of
14th Army which fought in Burma
operated in essentially a support role.
ln North Africa the British did not trust
the Indians with tanks and Indian
cavalry was equipped with armoured
cars which were swept aside or
scattered in the first phase of any
German attack!Thus in North Africa also
the tank corps officers who later served

73
in tank corps of both armies could have
learnt little.
In analysing employment of armour in
1965 many critics have failed to
understand that armour alone is not the
cure for all operational maladies.The
Germans were able to employ their
armour successfully because of a large
number of circumstances particular to
the German Army.
Firstly they had a first state staff
system through which they succeeded in
eliminating many causes of friction
which an armoured formation
experiences in the preparatory stage of
an operation.These include transport
control, passage of obstacIes,marrying
up and liaison with supporting arms etc.
Secondly the Germans were able to
employ armour effectively because they
adopted a uniform doctrine which was
understood in the entire army regardless
of arm or service.A doctrine in which the
division was the basic formation of
manoeuvre.
The British inhibited by inter arm rivalry
were rigidly divided like the Hindu caste
system and their battles were fought as

74
a Highlander regiment or the 7th
Hussars etc.A similar disease was
inherited by the Indian and Pakistani
Armies.
The Indian armour's inexplicable
withdrawal from Jassoran and Sodreke
which we have already discussed in the
previous chapter was one of the worst
examples of this inter arm rivalry.
All tank regiments had some
idiosyncracies,some special regimental
trait and a distinct class composition.
The pre 1947 Indian Army was an
infantry dominated army organised in
infantry divisions.
There was no Indian armoured division
in the second world war , in actual
operations , although there was one in
Iraq, and Indian armour operated as
part of motorised brigade or tank
brigades.
Thus the British Indian Army while
having a far better perception of how an
infantry division operates was never
employed as part of an armoured
division.

75
After partition the Pakistani armoured
division was seen by the infantry officers
who dominated the army in the light of
their second world war
experience,where the British
employment of armour was far more
cautious than the Germans.
They viewed armour as an infantry
support arm and one which required no
special to the sub continent handling
doctrine.The armour officers also were
equally unimaginative being
thinking,for which he was neither
ideally prepared in terms of education or
training or by force of tradition of long
service in the officer rank of an army
which was a truly national army !The
same was true for both the countries
with minor exceptions .
The Indians were relatively better
educated but their growth was inhibited
because of the mercenary tradition
which had become deeply ingrained in
the military psyche of both the
countries.

76
What did we have in Pakistan.An army
consisting of an officer lot (a large
number of whom were rankers) who was
amongst the least educated lot in India
but were selected by virtue of a quota
system because their home province
contributed large number of common
soldiers to the Indian Army.
Tanks were suddenly acquired by Indian
Army thanks to US concern about the
Japanese threat to China.
The tank experience in Burma was not
worthwhile since the opposite side did
not have the ability to offer any serious
opposition to Indian Army's tanks,which
as we have discussed were far superior
to anything that the Japanese
possessed.
Once the country became independent
in 1947 no serious thinking was done to
develop a doctrine.Officers were posted
to armoured formations not on basis of
ability but on regimental favouritism or
personal rapport etc.
The question whether these officers
were from armour or infantry was not
important.There was no significant
difference in the professional intellectual

77
military ability of an armour or infantry
officer from Chakwal Jhelum or
Peshawar.
In this regard Gul's criticism that armour
as an arm suffered because infantry
officers were posted to command
armour formations is just not valid.Was
an infantry officer commanding the
Indian 1st Armoured Division which
performed as miserably as Pakistani 1st
Armoured Division as far as divisional
level command was concerned?
Was an armour officer commanding the
6 Armoured Division whose performance
as a formation was far superior to the
Indian 1st
Armoured Division
commanded by a thoroughbred armour
officer!
Lee Meade and Macarthur all from
Engineers successfully commanded
essentially infantry dominated armies
with distinction.Rommel who had never
commanded a tank troop and was a
thoroughbred infantry officer suddenly
requested Hitler the command of an
armoured division 1940 and emerged as
one of WW II's finest armour
commanders!

78
A more correct criticism could be was
that regardless of arm merit wise
undeserving officers whether from
armour or infantry were posted to
command armour formations.A reason
why armour officers were not posted to
command the armoured division was the
mistaken assumption which Ayub and
Musa both being intellectually not very
competent may have had;ie armour
required no special bandling.
Another reason may have been the
desire to have politically more reliable
men to command the tank division or
simply sheer ignorance.In this regard
infantry also suffered since many able
officers from infantry also were sidelined
or retired,while men like General
Bakhtiar Rana and Musa were promoted!
Fazal I Mnqueem has stated that a large
number of able officers were retired by
Ayub simply because they showed
"Independence of outlook" while "some
left in sheer disgust" (they cannot be
blamed for this-seeing men like
Musa,Rana etc being masters of their
destiny!!!!).Muqueem stated that
between 1955 and November 1971,40
generals were retired out of whom only

79
four had reached their superannuating
age and states that similar was the case
with other senior ranks. (39)
It was not armour alone,as Gul's account
portrays, but the whole army which
suffered in terms of efficiency since all
who were perceived as able and
therefore politically a potential threat in
the kingdom ruled by men who were
intellectually drill sergeant majors and
incapable of grasping the higher
dimensions of soldiering were retired or
simply sidelined.
We don't have to go far to prove
that.Both Abrar and Akhtar the two
great generals of the Army in terms of
actual performance in the field were
sidelinecl.
Abrar was dumped at staff college
Quetta and later retired without being
promoted to the rank of corps
commander, because of two major
disqualifications;largely because he had
done well in the war and secondly
though to a much lesser extent,because
he was not from the area north of river
Chenab,and did not fit in the quota!

80
Akhtar Malik was packed off to CENTO in
Turkey because he had done well in
war,was taller than Yahya Khan and
despite having the quota qualification
was disqualified because his war
achievements were better than Yahya's .
(40)
Akhtar's less talented brother was
however retained in the mainstream
since he was too junior and did not pose
a potential threat to Yahya !
Tikka being the least capable but one
who was perceived as a yes man was
promoted.There was no serious Indian
threat opposite Sialkot and the real
brunt was borne by Abrar,but somehow
Tikka's achievements were projected as
much larger than those of Abrar after
the war.
Thus outside military circles the name
"Abrar" is Greek for the popular mind.
It has been mistakenly asserted that
Pakistani armour commanders
performed poorly because they had little
experience of handling armour in the
second world war.

81
The Germans who used armour with
maximum perfection had little command
experience of armour in the first world
war.
The British who employed armour for
the first time in the history of warfare
handled armour extremely poorly
despite longer command/handling
experience in actual war,numerical
preponderance and despite possessing
technically superior tanks!
Guderian Rommel and Manstein had
nothing to do with tanks in the first
world war but handled armour much
better than the British.
The simple reason for this was superior
organisation and superior doctrine
combined with a superior general staff
system and a political leadership which
was panting to start an all out war and
avenge the trauma of defeat of 1918!
The Israelis who defeated the Arabs
despite no numerical or material
superiority had little experience of
handling armour in the second world
war.

82
The whole premise that Pakistani
Armour did not so well simply because
they had little command experience in
WWII is fallacious.
On the contrary it was not lack of
suitable war experience but the
influence of a conservative British
doctrine and the quality of experience in
Burma where the Japanese had nothing
worthwhile with which to oppose Indian
Armour that instilled essentially
unrealistic ideas in the Indo-Pak mind
about employment of armour.In North
Africa as we have already discussed the
Indian cavalry only handled armoured
cars and in case the major armour
fighting was done by all British tank
regiments.
The major reason for poor performance
and under employment of armour lies in
the standard of training and intellectual
development of the army in the period
1947-65.There were five major areas of
this failing.
These included "FIRSTLY" a highly
reactionary high command of men" of
limited intellect who thought that mere
possession of the latest tank in the
world was sufficient guarantee for

83
success and that no special training or
doctrine was necessary for employment
of tanks in the bolo Pak operational
scenario.
They thought that the old British War
Office Publications and US Field Manuals
coupled with courses at Fort Knox were
enough for training of armour.
" SECOND" the inability at the higher
command level to pierce what has been
termed as the "veil of operational art"
which included failure to understand war
as a whole,shallow and superficial
knowledge of military history, and
inability to understand the dynamics of
operational strategy in application.This
included understanding of the fact that
battle plans when subjected to the
friction and uncertainty of war require
modification which has been classified
by John Keegan as "transforming paper
plans into. battlefield practice,against
the tactical pressures of time which the
strategist does not know".The talent to
understand operational strategy or the
ability to modify plans in actual combat
was recognised as the most important
quality of a commander in the German
Army and great stress was laid on

84
teaching it in the German General Staff
College.
"THIRDLY" a failure to develop a battle
doctrine based on the combined arms
Cooperation in which armour infantry
artillery and engineers trained together.
The maximum that was done in this
connection was the New Concept off
Defence but no "New Concept of
Offense"because that may have been
too complicated for the VCO type
officers or that was something that they
felt could be learnt simply by doing a
course at Fort Knox or by reading the
Rommel Papers!
The most glaring example of this failure
was the lack of understanding of the
corps battle in which the armoured
division was to closely cooperate with
the infantry division.
A Corps Headquarter was created which
included the armoured division but in
reality it was thought that war would be
fought by divisions and the corps
headquarter remained merely a
headquarter with a lieutenant general
who wrote the annual confidential
reports of the divisional commanders!

85
After the war when the serious failing of
not having a corps headquarter
controlling the armour operation was
realised the army conveniently blamed
the finance ministry without admitting
that the most powerful man in the
country was a soldier who at least
theoretically should have known that a
corps headquarter was crucial for close
integration of infantry with armour
formation.
"FOURTH" was the tendency to
disregard the importance of training
manoeuvres which Gul noted developed
in the period following the disbandment
of the Training Advisory Staff.
According to Gul "A dangerous trend
was creeping in our army.We were
attaching more importance to exercise
without troops" . (41)
Training manoeuvres are the most
important method to judge/assess
suitability of higher
commanders,viability of various military
plans and feasibility of a combat
doctrine and battle procedures.
The training advisory staff was disliked
because Shaukat states that they tested

86
divisions and brigades by conducting
test exercises and gave verdict on the
success or failure of these
exercises,which confirmed or rejected
formation commanders in their
appointments.This Shaukat states was
"Gross Violation of prerogative of
command" . (42)
This was the typical Indo Pak approach
which viewed elevation to a certain rank
as complete immunity from being
assessed;whereas even Clausewitz
recognised mediocrity in higher ranks !
(43)
Thus when the Training Advisory Staff
consisting of British officers was "packed
up" to many including Shaukat's great
satisfaction nothing comparable with a
similar charter of duties created to
assess suitability of higher commanders.
After all a man selected by Ayub or Musa
was taken for granted to be a very fine
officer!Major General Nasir who was
condemned by Shaukat with the benefit
of hindsight as "by no means the best
choice" (44) managed to command the
1st Armoured Division for three long
years before the war.

87
Shaukat does not explain anywhere in
any three of his books why ,the
immediate superior of Nasir i.e.
Commander 1 Corps who also had his
headquarters in Kharian where 1st
Armoured division was located and was
according to Shaukat a man with
"considerable experience of fighting"
(experience helps provided a man has
the capacity to absorb that experience
and later make use of it!!!) and one "not
given to fancy dialectics" (45) failed to
discover the command qualities of Major
General Nasir or the fighting potential of
the 1st
Armoured Division as a
formation!
After all Shaukat himself stated that
Headquarter 1 Corps was a "purely
training and operational command" and
one which was unburdened by what
Shaukat called "Petty administrative
problems" ! (46)
These are unanswered questions and
will remain unanswered because
Shaukat was only doing the job of
whitewashing task given to him by the
GHQ in an age when senility had already
taken control of his intellectual
abilities,whatever they were.

88
Laying the major blame for poor
performance of the Pakistan Army on a
wide range of people including the
Foreign Ministry,Finance Ministry,Mr Aziz
Ahmad,the civilians in the Ministry of
Defence,the British Training Advisory
Staff and absolving Ayub and Musa of all
blame!
The "FIFTH" and the most glaring and
visible was failure of armour officers to
develop a special to armour doctrine
dealing in detail with "Operations of an
armoured diyision/brigade",the "detailed
dynamics of development of situation" ,
"Mission oriented philosophy with stress
on speed of decision making" and
"detailed operating procedures dealing
with traffic control,obstaele
crossing.terrain recce,employment of
recce elements,replenishment ,night
leaguer" etc.
Both sides underemployed armour and
failed to concentrate armour in a short
time and space span at the decisive
point to achieve a decisive
breakthrough,despite having the
resources in number of tanks/available
units to do so.We will firstly deal with
the Pakistani thrust in Khem Karan.The

89
battle was conducted by the armoured
division commander on a piecemeal
basis.He gave certain orders to 5
Armoured Brigade and waited for two
days while 5 Armoured Brigade absurdly
wasted its strength advancing everyday
till Valtoha and coming back.
During this time two recce regiments
(15 Lancers and 12 Cavalry)were doing
nothing in terms of recce in force on the
flanks to discover crossing sites across
Nikasu Nala or towards the Rohi Nullah.
The role of recce regiment was either
not understood by the GOC or in the
heat of the battle he simply forgot the
fact that he had two recce regiments
one of which (12 Cavalry) was doing
nothing and the other (15 Lancers) was
dished out to 5 Armoured Brigade who
used it in a piecemeal manner.
Two other tank brigades (3 and 4
Armoured Brigade) with a total of three
tank regiments also did nothing during
this time.also did nothing during this
time and the 4th Armoured Brigade was
brought forward only on 9th and 10th
September when the Indians were firmly
in position and their higher commanders

90
had regained greater resolution
following the morale breakdown on 7th
and 8th September.On 8TH
and 9th
September 6 Lancers had advanced to
Valtoha and returned.
The 4th Armoured Brigade was available
for action by first light 9th
September.Ideally it should have been
used to reinforce the 6 Lancers attack
towards Valtoha where it was known
that the terrain was less boggy,since 6
Lancers had successfully advanced till
Valtoha on 8th September.
The divisional headquarter showed no
urgency in using 4 Armoured Brigade
which should have got rolling by first
light 9th September towards
Valtoha.The brigade was ordered to
develop the battle from the west while
one brigade was developing the
situation from the east!
What was more criminal was the manner
in which 4TH
Armoured Brigade was
employed on 9th September.
Commander 4 Armoured Brigade issued
his orders which could have been
delivered on the night of 8/9 September
at 1000 hours in the morning of 9TH

91
September as if 4 Armoured Brigade
was a tank army and not a tank brigade!
Shaukat instead of explaining why the
orders were delivered in such a leisurely
manner praised them saying that; "the
orders were quite detailed and Brigadier
Lumb had taken pains to relate theory
(there was no theory) to the reality of
battle" . (47)
4 Armoured Brigade started the battle
in a leisurely manner ,commencing its
advance towards Bura Karimpur to
outflank the Indians from the west at
1600 hours and returned to leaguer at
night without having achieved any
success and discovered that the area on
its axis of advance was boggy (48)
On 10th September the next day when
the Indians had already been alerted by
4 Armoured Brigades advance towards
their western flank on the preceding day
the Brigade was again hurled on its
mission to outflank the Indians from the
west and ran into a trap that was ready
by the evening of 9th September and
whose disastrous details have been
discussed in the previous chapter.

92
It may be noted that 1' Armoured
Division had a total of seven tank
regiments(4 Cavalry,5 Horse,6
Lancers,12 Cavalry,15 Lancers,l9
Lancers and 24 Cavalry) available for
operations.The Indians initially had just
one regiment on the first day i.e. 7th
September.
On 7th September because of poor
staffwork and traffic control the division
was able to concentrate only one
regiment.
On 8th September once two regiments
were concentrated across the
bridgehead the Indians also brought in
one and a quarter regiment.Despite no
major numerical superiority 6 Lancers
advance proceeded very well but
Brigadier Bashir who was from armoured
corps behaved extremely timidly
withdrawing 6 Lancers back to Khem
Karan for leaguer!
Thus when the regiment advanced
eastwards again the additional Indian
armour which had reached the battle
area was in defensive positions and
firmly poised to meet the Pakistani
advance.6 Lancers again reached
Valtoha on 91 September but was again

93
recalled back to Khem Karan by Lord
Bashir for leaguer!
By 9TH
September the Indian tank
strength stood at three regiments while
Pakistani strength was raised to four
regiments out of which only three were
employed in an extremely disjointed
manner 5 Horse on the left,24 Cavalry in
the centre and 6 Lancers on the right
while the remaining four regiments (4
Cavalry,I2 Cavalry,15 Lancers and 19
Lancers ) were told to do nothing!
Thus armour was employed to advance
in three different directions without
being employed as a concentrated
punch at any one point.
Thus 5 Horse which went westwards
fought against terrain having
commenced its leisurely advance at
1600 hours,met no enemy and returned
to leaguer after having eight tanks
bogged down.
On 10TH
September again only two and
quarter tank regiments(4
Cavalry,squadron of 15 Lancers and 24
Cavalry) while the Indians had three
tank regiments in the area!

94
When the operation was finally called off
on night of 10TH
September only three
tank regiments had been employed in
operations against an actual enemy and
all three in three different/divergent
directions while four regiments (5
Horse,12 Cavalry,15 Lancers and 19
Lancers) took no part in the armoured

95
division's operations till 10th
September
in the final tally two tank regiments (5
Horse and 19 Lancers) were not
employed at all and two (12 Cavalry and
15 Lancers) were employed only after
the armoured division had been
withdrawn from the sector in operations
from 11th
September onwards!
What explanation do we have except to
go one hundred and sixty seven years
backward—"It seems incredible,and yet
it has happened a hundred times,that
troops have been divided and separated
merely through a mysterious feeling of
conventional manner,without any clear
perception of the reason" .(49)
The Pakistani GHQ gave seven tank
regiments to a man who was not able to
use even two tank regiments in
concentration while his two armoured
brigade commanders also did not
display much energy in the conduct of
operations.
The case of 5 Armoured Brigade was
pathetic.Even Cloughley a foreigner and
a very mild critic could not help
expressing his horror at the
phenomenally incompetent conduct of
Brigadier Bashir and stated that Bashir

96
"should have been replaced when the
timid decision to Leaguer at Khem Karan
on 8 September was reported to GHQ".
(50)
Cloughley failed to understand the
fundamental fact that in Pakistan Army
war performance was no criteria for
promotion!
It was led by a man who became a Field
Marshal in peace! Many years later it
was to be again led by a man who had
absented himself from his field
command under the pretext of martial
law duty ! The Indians being no different
from Pakistanis racially and as far as
mediocrity in timidity in higher ranks
was concerned proved equally inept.
Their 1st
Armoured Division Commander
on 8th
September had four and a
quarter tank regiments against one
Pakistani tank regiment.Only three out
of the total of ten Indian tank squadrons
came in contact with the Pakistani tank
regiment.Had the Indian commander
possessed any resolution nothing could
have prevented them from reaching the
MRL!

97
25 Cavalry could have been simply
outflanked using the three uncommitted
squadrons of 16 Light Cavalry and Poona
Horse or the three totally free squadrons
of 41 Horse!
The Indian armoured brigade
commander lost his composure of
mind,which suddenly changed the
nature of thing in his eyes, and suddenly
panicked,thinking that his flanks were
not secure,ordered both of his leading
regiments to stop advancing and was
too mentally numb was to make use of
his third regiment in reserve!

98
25 Cavalry at this crucial stage was
totally committed and in contact ) (51)
with Indians all three squadrons abreast!
But as the Indian armoured corps
historian rightly stated; " but that
commanding officer (Commanding

99
Officer of 25 Cavalry) displayed a more
robust and resilient mind than either the
Indian Brigade or Divisional Commander
(a quality ignored by the pedantic
Pakistani selection boards who did not
let Nisar go beyond Brigadier's rank !!
Hesitation in launching bold outflanking
moves and employing tanks in positional
warfare was a common failing on both
sides.
At Chawinda the mind of the Indian
brigade and divisional commanders was
fixed at the area between Badiana and
Degh Nala,an area of less than 10 miles
width,while on 8th
9th
or 10th
September
the Indians could have easily outflanked
the Pakistani position in Gadgor-Phillora
by crossing the Degh Nala in Zafarwal
area and recrossing it opposite Pasrur
area ;without wasting time manpower
and tanks in the highly constricted and
well cultivated area west of Degh Nala.
We have seen that the Pakistani High
Command equally as slow and
inefficient in decision making was
stunned after the Indians had attacked
opposite Chawinda on 8th
September.

100
The Indian 1 Armoured Brigade
Commander instead of swiftly modifying
his plans and outflanking 25 Cavalry on
8th
or 9th
September instead sunk into
inertia and indecision and did nothing at
all on 9th
and 10th
September.
After 10th
September instead of
changing their obvious line of advance
and going against the thickest place in
the hedge the Indians could have
regained initiative by taking the battle
east of Degh Nala and bypass the
Chawinda arealnstead tanks were used
as battering rams in launching senseless
attacks on Chawinda during the period
11-18 September 1965.
The Pakistanis also proved equally inept
and launching any bold outflanking
move and failed to concentrate the
maximum available tank strength
opposite Valtoha from where a
breakthrough deep into the Indian rear
was possible.Like Indians their first
priority was safety and their thinking
was defensive even while launching an
offensive.
The only dynamic armour attack was
launched by the 10 Division when 23
Cavalry and 22 Brigade crossed the

101
Maqboolpur Syphon and struck a daring
blow in Dograi-Bhaini-Bhasin area on 8th
and 9th September.
Unfortunately the armour available was
too limited and the 10 Division was
unable to significantly dislocate the
Indians.
The "Armoured Brigade
Headquarters" on both sides had no
concept of brigade battle and preferred
tasking the armoured regiments and the
security of their headquarters.In Khem
Karan 5 Armoured Brigade issued orders
to both its regiments and decided to no
more waiting for 24 Cavalry or 6 Lancers
to do something.
Their concept of command was to issue
orders and let the battle develop without
making any effort to prod and spur
those under command.
The rank of Brigadier for many Indians
and Pakistanis many of whom were ex
rankers or rankers son was something
like that of viceroy who was not required
to go forward and do the work of seeing
for himself.Frankly the average Indian
and Pakistani officer with no leadership

102
tradition or any clear-cut doctrine
needed leading from the front.
The brigade commanders on both sides
no inclination to lead from the front and
preferred issuing orders which had no
tactical bearing like returning to leaguer
etc.The Indian 1st
Armoured Brigade
exhibited extreme hesitation from
conducting a brigade level manoeuvre
on 8th September when both his
regiments were held up and he
possessed a third regiment to employ in
a brigade level manoeuvre.The role of a
higher commander is not to get blinded
by the fog of war but to have what the
French call "Coup d Oeil" to see through
it !
He has to reduce the "inertia" of his
subordinates by spurring them and
moving them by force of his will and
light the spark in his subordinates by
"the light of his spirit ,the spark of
purpose".And as Clausewitz said "In so
far only as he is equal to it he stands
above the masses and continues to be
their master;whenever that influence
ceases ,and his own spirit is no longer
strong enough to revive the spirit of all
others ,the masses drawing him down

103
with them sink into the lower region of
animal nature ,which shrinks from
danger,but knows not shame.These are
the weights which the courage and
intelligent faculties of the military
commander have to overcome if he is to
make his name illustrious" . (52)
There is no better definition of the
armoured brigade commanders than
this given by Clausewitz before 1832 !
They failed to be the masters of the
operational situation because they
passed the buck to their subordinate
regimental commanding officers
,dampening their spirits instead of
lightening them,standing miles behind
them rather than above them or with
them,and instead of spurring their
subordinates into "incessant advance
towards the aim" preferred "standing
still and doing nothing " ! (53)
Compare this with an example from
second world war; "He arrived in his
armoured car,specially equipped with
radio gear. "What's going on " ? he
asked. " Held up by artillery fire",we
replied. "Show me.Where is the fire
coming from?" Standing in his armoured
car,he studied the opposite bank with

104
his binoculars.He was calm and
steady ,giving no sign of uncertainty and
nervousness .Within minutes he made
his decision. "Stay put," he told us. "This
is a job for the infantry".Another
example—"Keep going,don't look left or
right,only forward.I'll cover your flanks if
necessary_The enemy is confused;we
must take advantage of it" .So ran
Rommels unorthodox orders ! (54)
The Indo Pak man joined the army for
promotion and not for glory or from
leading from the front.This point of view
may sound odd but long years of
mercenary soldiering and fighting the
Britishers wars inculcated a strange
attitude in the Indian officers.
They had to obey orders and they did
that without deviation,but they had little
interest in the final outcome since they
were fighting the White man's war!
Doing something out of the ordinary or
beyond minimum acceptable effort was
viewed by them as
unnecessary.Initiative in any case was
not a much preferred quality that the
British wanted to inculcate in the
Indians.

105
That is why they deliberate kept a fifty
percent quota for rankers in Indian
Military Academy Dera Dun.These
rankers were a virus deliberately
planted by the Britishers to destroy
initiative , independent thought and an
open mind in the newly created Indian
officer corps .
They had served as common soldiers in
units with mostly British officers and
were slavish , more obsequeous ,more
inclined to indulge in sycophancy and
apple polishing , more conservative and
orders oriented in their thinking.In
addition they had a relatively poor
educational background.
In the post 1947 Indian Army they were
sidelined and few went beyond major
generalln Pakistan Army they were
preferred for selection to the army's
highest ranks by Ayub Musa Yahya and
even Bhutto as late as 1972 and even
by Zia as late as 1980 ;primarily
because they were more servile pliable
and intellectually naïve!
Thus most commanders preferred
passing orders rather than making any
mission oriented modification in them
and their prime concern was security

106
rather than speed. There was nothing
like the German regulation which stated;
"Division Commanders need to be close
to the front so that the situation can be
observed and orders quickly issued.The
higher commanders need to observe the
situation personally" . (55)
And what did we have; "Bashir would
not go to Valtoha,so Sahibzad must
come back to Khem Karan " ! The
Brigade commanders thought that they
had reached a rank where their only role
was to pass orders .
The regiment was the principal unit
while brigade and division were merely
administrative arrangements and this
attitude was carried on in the war also.
The Indians had seen the tank brigades
in Burma fighting as tank regiments
dished out to infantry divisions and
leading a leisurely advance against an
enemy who did not have the weaponry
to destroy Sherman tanks!
In North Africa the Indian cavalry units
had no major offensive role and the
Indian motorise brigade were expected
only to act as screens than to do
anything like manoeuvre or attack role

107
for which they were not equipped.After
partition no emphasis was laid on
brigade and divisional level exercises
and in Pakistan the New Concept was
essentially defence with a limited impact
counterattack aimed at stabilising the
situation rather than any deep thrust or
offensive war of manoeuvre aimed at
destroying the enemy's offensive
capability.
Infantry commanders who dominated
the army were not the most imaginative
even by infantry standards and
preferred concentrating on exercising
regiments and battalions rather than
brigade or divisions!
Gul Hassan who was the Director
Military Operations admitted the fact
that armour brigade commanders had
not been trained to command divisions
in actual manoeuvres in peace.Gul thus
said; " It seems (commenting on Khem
Koran operations) that the two
Headquarters (11 Division and It
Armoured Division) were paralysed by
the very dimension of their
undertaking .Had they physically
handled their commands on
manoeuvres in more normal times,they

108
would have been either found out,and
should have been sacked,or the
enormity of the task that confronted
them later in the war would not have
benumbed them”. (56)
Operation Grand Slam was a classic
case of failure to employ armour
correctly and achieve a breakthrough.

112
STRATEGIC LEVEL OF PLANNING-
COMPARATIVE

113
On the strategic level both sides formed
good plans keeping in view the fact that
none of the two opponents enjoyed
overwhelming superiority in the final
reckoning.
The real test of generalship however is
not in performing good strategic plans
but in their actual on ground execution!
There was plenty of mediocrity on both
sides as far as execution of plans
beyond battalion level was concerned!It
has however been wrongly asserted by
some in Pakistan that the "plans on the
strategic level were poor".The "Strategic
Plan" decides "When" "Where " and with
what "Forces" the battle is to be
delivered . (57)
One of the principal objects of strategy
is to "always be strong,first generally
then at the decisive point" .(58)
In this regard both sides initially
succeeded in implementing plans which
led to initial situations where both sides
concentrated their armour at the
decisive point and achieved local
superiority at the decisive point.

114
Thus the Indian strategic plan provided
the 1st
Armoured Division Commander
with five tank regiments against one on
8th and 9th September but the Indian
GOC failed to produce the desired
resultsit was not strategy that failed but
"implementation of plans on ground" or
simply "Operativ" or "Operational
Strategy" as defined in the terminology
of the German General StaffClausewitz
said that "Only great tactical (Operativ
lies between Strategic and Tactical as far
as literal English translation is
concerned) (59) results can great
strategical ones" (60) and the most
superior strategist will come to grief if
plans are executed dumbly!
It was a case of a situation where as one
Israeli general said; "you can lead a
horse to the waterhole but cannot make
it drink it"!
Similar was the case with Pakistani
strategy which gave Major General Nasir
Ahmad seven tank regiments against
one but the GOC and his staff failed to
successfully even carry out the pre
battle exercise of carrying out
movement inside own territory as a
result of which the attack failed initially

115
due to inability to achieve decisive
superiority because of poor traffic
control!
Finally once the Pakistanis were able to
concentrate superior strength inside
enemy territory ,but again failed to
apply it correctly in battle,while also
wasting two days in pigheadedly
following an antiquated leaguer drill.
But Nasir we remember was only the tip
of the iceberg.Those who selected him
and allowed hint to command the
armoured division for three long years
before the war were bigger culprits
;because they failed to discover Nasir's
actual worth.Those in the GHQ who
vacillated and gave contradictory orders
and counter orders to Nasir;to send one
or both of his armoured brigades to
Lahore Sector; just when the armoured
division was about to attack;were
equally culpable!
Nasir's staff who could not foresee the
difficulties in induction of the armoured
division and problems like route
marking,bridging traffic control were
equally culpable!

116
Today only Nasir is blamed and many in
his staff in the headquarters and
brigades responsible for poor staff work
later reached the rank of three star
general !
The Indian failure had a deeper link with
inability of the brigade and divisional
commander to be decisive,but was
superior to the Pakistani plan in the
sense that terrain friction was much less
at all stages of the battle.
But this aspect had another dimension
too.Some writers have levelled the
criticism that the Pakistani armoured
division was launched in an area
unsuitable for armour operations.
This criticism is not justified. "Natural
harards" as Liddell Hart said are
"Inherently less dangerous and less
uncertain than fighting hazards.All
conditions are calculable,all obstacles
more insurmountable,than those of
human resistance.By reasoned
calculation and preparation they can be
overcome almost to timetable". (61)
We have seen that the major reason for
failure of Pakistani armour in Khem
Karan was not "terrain" which became

117
important only on 10th September but
inability to concentrate their optimum
tank strength on 7th 8th and 9th
September which enabled the Indians to
take adequate defensive measures and
even make the terrain factor more
formidable by flooding/innundations.
If terrain is taken as the yardstick then
many great feats of world military
history like Wolfe's attack on
Quebec,Napoleons crossing of the
Alps,the German attack through
Ardennes and Macarthur's landing at
Inchon were childish blunders!
The criticism based on terrain is largely
pednatic.Macarthurs brilliant plan for
landing at Inchon which turned the
tables in the Korean war was similarly
opposed while in the planning stage by
naval experts on hydrographic and
geographic characteristics of Inchon
harbour.
Macarthurs own Chief of Staff Major
General Almond described Inchon as
"the worst possible place we could bring
in an amphibious assault" .(62)
The terrain problems at Inchon were
formidable.The water channel from

118
where the amphibious force had to
approach for the landing could be
conveniently mined or simply blocked by
a sunken or disabled vessel Terrain did
not a favour a landing but the
advantages of strategic surprise were
far greater than terrain odds.
The terrain factor was taken into
account and chances of failure because
of terrain friction minimised by
meticulous planning and staff work .
It was here that the Pakistani GHQ and
the staff of Armoured Division
failed.They failed to over emphasise or
even visualise the fact that two
obstacles i.e. Rohi Nala on the west and
Nikasu Nala on the east imposed an
eight to nine miles bottleneck through
which the Pakistani armour had to get
through so as to regain the freedom to
manoeuvre where its numerical
superiority in tanks could be effectively
translated into practice.
Nothing in the instruction passed on to
1st Armoured Division indicates that the
Pakistani GHQ was even aware of basic
problems like closeness of two obstacles
inside Pakistani territory i.e. Rohi Nala

119
and BRB which could produce traffic
jams and roadblocks or the fact that
Nikasu Nala and Rohi Nala initially
restricted freedom of manoeuvre of
Pakistani armour in the first phase of the
battles.
lgnorance of these were the two
governing factors was the basic reason
for failure of the armoured division
thrust.lt was not the question of which
brigade;Light or Heavy , first as Gul
claimed.Lord Bashir General Nasir etc
came much later .
The GHQ failed to highlight the
importance of speed and further
undermined the efficiency of the 1st
Armoured division by contradictory
orders and counter orders.
The staff of the 1st Armoured Division
Headquarter and the three brigades
failed in planning and controlling simple
movement of brigades inside Pakistani
territory,which resulted in
congestion,delays and the ultimate
failure of the Armoured Division to
concentrate maximum tank strength in
the bridgehead on 7th and 8th
September,which if achieved could have
led to a breakthrough on the 7th 8th or

Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army failed in 1965 war - Analysis of 1965 War

Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army failed in 1965 war - Analysis of 1965 War

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Why Indian Army and Pakistan Army failed in 1965 war - Analysis of 1965 War