Operation Search Light , 6 Points of Shiekh Mujeeb and a Faux Pas called Lucknow Pact 1916

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What was the background and consequence of the operation
search light in Bangladesh in 1971?
A H Amin, former Major , Tank Corps at Pakistan Army (1981-1994)
Answered March 7
What was the background and consequence of the operation search light in Bangladesh
in 1971?
• April 2021
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.12581.42724
• Project:
• GEOPOLITICS
• Agha H Amin

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Attached is extract from
book authored by me PAKISTAN ARMY THROUGH EYES OF PAKISTANI GENERALS.
THIS IS INTERVIEW OF BATTALION COMMANDER INVOLVED IN OPERATION
SEARCHLIGHT—-YOU WERE GSO-1 (INTELLIGENCE) 14 DIVISION IN EAST
PAKISTAN IN 1970. WHAT WAS YOUR ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION AT THAT
POINT IN TIME AND DID YOU EVER IMAGINE THAT CIVIL WAR AND SECESSION
WAS IMMINENT? HOW WOULD YOU ASSESS THE REACTION TO YOUR REQUESTS?
On joining 14 Division my analysis was that Sh. Mujib Ur Rehman was a popular leader and
his Six-Point programme was on the lips of almost every East Pakistani. There was hatred
against West Pakistanis both in the army and the civilian population. The hatred grew with
the passage of time. The East Pakistani non-Muslim intellectuals, particularly those who
had economic hold on that wing of the country, fanned the flames of hatred in a very

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systematic manner. The organization headed by Maulana Bhashani and Jamaat-i-Islami
did oppose Sh. Mujib and his party but they were no match to the sway of latter. My
assessment was that the alarming situation could be resolved by politicians and not by
military commanders who were at the helm of affairs at that time.
PLEASE TELL US ABOUT YOUR EXPERIENCES IN EAST PAKISTAN IN THE MONTH
OF MARCH 1971?
During the 1970 elections, Sh. Mujib’s Awami League won all the seats in East Pakistan
leaving of course one or two which was inconsequential. With a pretty less sway, the same
phenomenon was witnessed in West Pakistan, where PPP emerged as the dominant party.
In all fairness, the majority party Awami League, should have formed the government, but a
combination of inauspicious circumstances, created by politicians, forced General Yahya
not to hold the NA session on the scheduled date and postpone it. This was not
acceptable to East Pakistanis who came out on the streets to agitate against the decision.
Most of the East Pakistan establishment, either out of fear for reprisal or wilful
determinations, also supported the agitation and walked out of their offices. The army was
called in to control the situation but it was too late. The East Pakistanis, with the help of
Mukti Bahinis and Indian agents, virtually launched a war against West Pakistanis
irrespective of any differentiation between the army and the civil population, who were
vastly outnumbered. Government officials from West Pakistan callously killed along with
their wives and children. Food supplies to the cantonments were stopped and banks were
ordered not to encash cheques of West Pakistanis. There was complete revolt and anarchy
and all the shots were called by Sh. Mujib and his party. Given the particular nature of the
situation and its political contours, it was not easy for the army to set its targets. Lt. Gen.
Sahibzada Yaqoob, Commander Eastern Command, requested Gen. Yahya to come to
Dacca to handle the situation but he refused to do so. Sheikh Mujib also planned a big rally
on March 6, 1971 where it was feared that he would announce UDI (Unilateral Declaration
of Independence). In the meantime, killing of West Pakistanis continued and atrocities
against them remained unchecked. On March 6, Gen. Tikka Khan arrived in Dacca to take
over the Command from Gen. Yaqoob who had resigned following his differences with
Gen. Yahya, Gen. Tikka, having assessed the situation also suggested a political solution
and requested Gen. Yahya to come to East Pakistan for dialogue with Sheikh Mujib and his
party associates. A number of West Pakistanis leaders were also present in Dacca at that
time, they included Sardar Shaukat Hayat, Mufti Mahmood, Wali Khan, Akbar Bugti and
some others, on March 19, Z.A. Bhutto also arrived with his entourage which; included J.
A. Rahim, Hayat Sherpao, Rafi Raza and Ghulam Mustafa Khar. Gen. Yahya had come four
days earlier on March 15. He held a series of meeting with the leaders of both the wings
but the issues at stake could not be settled. Sheikh Mujib presented a document of
confederation before the President. Obviously this could not be accepted under the
circumstances existing at that time. This led to complete change in the attitude of the army
and it was decided to take military action to control the law and order situation.
IT HAS BEEN ASSERTED IN SOME QUARTERS THAT EVENTS OF 25TH OF MARCH
1971 CONSTITUTED THE POINT OF NO RETURN AS FAR AS SOLVING THE EAST
PAKISTAN CRISIS WAS CONCERNED. HOW FAR IS THIS CORRECT?

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As I have said earlier, the law and order situation had gone completely out of control and
there was no other course available but military action to restore normalcy. We started on
March 25 and the situation was brought under control by the middle of April. After that, the
government and the politicians should have joined hands to install a political setup in the
premises but, unfortunately, this was not done.
WAS SECESSION AND CIVIL WAR INEVITABLE IN 1971 OR WAS IT AVOIDABLE?
It was, no doubt, avoidable provided the democratic process was allowed to take its
course. There were too many vested interests both in the army and among the politicians.
WHAT HAPPENED POST-MARCH 25, 1971?
The military action proposed was highly successful and law and order situation was under
control. The violent elements went underground. The government did try to install civilian
government but the popular leaders of Awami Party were missing.
HOW WOULD YOU COMPARE TIKKA WITH NIAZI AS A COMMANDER IN 1971?
No comparison can be made between the two. Tikka was every inch professional and
dedicated soldier.
IS IT TRUE THAT THERE WAS A DIVIDE BETWEEN THE OFFICERS WHO WERE
PRESENT IN 1970 IN EAST PAKISTAN AND THOSE WHO CAME IN AND AROUND 25
MARCH, 1971?
Yes, to some extent it is true. The new comers did not appreciate the actions of the
officers already posted there. The disagreement was more visible among senior officers.
HOW DID THE MEN TAKE THE CIVIL WAR?
As there was complete anarchy in East Pakistan, the West Pakistanis, including army men
were being humiliated and butchered, the men took the military action as the only answer.
HOW DO YOU RATE THE MUKHTI BAHINIS WHO FOUGHT AGAINST YOU?
Mukhti Bahini were not a properly trained force but their venom against West Pakistanis
was high. They could not stand against regular army and this was one major reason that
they scattered too soon and went either underground or beyond the borders where they
had their hideouts.
PLEASE TELL US SOMETHING ABOUT YOUR SERVICE PROFILE AFTER RETURN
FROM EAST PAKISTAN TILL THE OUTBREAK OF 1971 WAR?
I came back to West Pakistan for giving my evidence in connection with the trial of Sheikh
Mujib Ur Rehman. In November, I took over the command of 44 Punjab (now 4 Sindh)
which was at that time deployed near Rahimyar Khan. I commanded this unit during the
entire duration of the war.

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6 POINTS OF SHIEKH MUJEEB
• January 2020
• DOI:
• 10.13140/RG.2.2.19916.77448
• Project:
• BOOK REVIEWS
• Agha H Amin
https://www.researchgate.net/publication/338750133_6_POINTS_OF_SHIEKH_MUJEEB

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