1965 war and pakistan army's doctrinal failure

1. 1965 War and Pakistan Army's Doctrinal Failure
Being part of Analysis Chapter of Pakistan Army
till 1965 by Major Agha.H.Amin (Retired)
https://www.amazon.com/History-Pakistan-Army-
Three-
Analysed/dp/1546566376/ref=sr_1_3?s=books&ie=
UTF8&qid=1505565010&sr=1-
3&keywords=agha+h+amin

7. INABILITY TO DEVELOP A DOCTRINE OF
DECISIVE WARFARE
It would not be wrong to say that one of the principal reasons for
poor performance of both Indian and Pakistan Armies in 1965 was
"failure or inability to develop a dynamic doctrine of decisive

8. warfare".Both the armies were not national armies but essentially
mercenary armies created for the aim of internal security.They
were not designed as instruments of decisive warfare but forces
which were designed for use in small wars or for limited roles
while the resources of the British Army came into action and
decisive results were achieved by diplomacy coalition warfare etc.
Doctrine may essentially be described as a conceptual frame
work combining and integrating the dynamics of combat so that
an army can fight decisively.Doctrine visualises harmonious
combination of essentially five functions i.e. "Manoeuvre"
"Fire support" "Intelligence" "Command and Control by means of
a practical and dynamic organisation" and lastly "logistic support".
Once all these five are combined in a well conceived and
harmonious manner we arrive at a decisive doctrine of
wafrare.Once there is a clear cut doctrine uniformly understood at
all levels and in all formations in the army,all actions
taken at various levels of command including
decision making,movement,execution of orders and all battle drills
are carried out in the minimum possible time and the result is swift
execution of plans.
This is not an exactly simple process.Each country has its own
unique circumstances.The British Indian Army was designed
to fight against primitive enemies against whom no military
talent was required as far as higher military leadership was
concerned.Pripnitive and backward countries could be
defeated by simple frontal advance and a few pitched battles
in which none of these countries could stand the bayonet
charge of a brigade or division of a couple of native regiments
with a hard core of a few British regiments.

9. We have already seen that after the Second Sikh War the
role of the Indian Army was reduced to internal security.The
Second and Third Afghan Wars were militarily insignificant
affairs in terms of complexity of military operations and
number of casualties sustained.
Only skills in minor operations were required in most of
the operations of the British Indian Army.There was simply
no operational level of war in most battles of British
Indian Army till world war two.
Wherever it functioned it was as a small part of the larger
Eighth Army or in Burma where the Japanese
were fighting in conditions of overwhelming
logistic numerical andmaterial odds.
Hence there was no credible doctrine
inherited by both armies to fight a war in
the Punjabi countryside which was entirely
different from the NWFP or North Africa or
Burma.The British way of war depended
more on diplomacy maritime strategy and
coalition warfare.The Americans developed a
comfortable doctrine based on material
superiority which did not require them to do
anything creative or militarily brilliant
therefore the last brilliant commanders that
they produced were in the US Civil war!

10. The Germans developed Blitzkrieg because their peculiar
geographical position forced them to develop a doctrine aimed at
achieving swift decisions in an extremely short time span.ln
Pakistan no such doctrine was framed.The foundation of the army
rested on internal security and preserving the status quo.
There was simply no doctrine which combined the above
named five functions. "Manoeuvre" was not important
because no decisive war was to be fought. "Fire support" was
not important because the army was infantry dominated and
the gunners were a despicable lot. "Command and Control"
was not important and only one corps
commander was expected to control and co-ordinate five
divisions with more than 200 miles frontage since a war was
never to be fought and it was not politically advisable to have
too many corps commanders.
The stress and friction of war was not understood because
Ayub hardly had any worthwhile military record. Specialised
Staff work was not important because even the British did not
have a full time general staff .
What the Pakistani military leaders failed to realise was
the fact that Indian Army was never designed to
conduct "Decisive Warfare" ! "Intelligence" was a
misunderstood term and was thought to be something
designed primarily to keep track of political dissidents and
internal enemies! "Logistic Support" was also not
appreciated because fighting a war and specially a protracted
one was never the intention of the ruling elite.
The men at the helm of affairs failed to develop a fresh
doctrine of decisive warfare because of three reasons.

11. Firstly they were intellectually weak and possessed limited
vision,being products of a class which was educationally backward
and primarily designed not to produce first rate military leaders
but politically reliable mercenary company commanders and
company second in commands!
Secondly they were not among the best officers of Indian Army
as far as war performance was concerned and therefore did
not fully grasp the dynamic inter relationship between "Doctrine
Organisation and Conduct of War" .(Weaker and primitive states
find it difficult to conduct decisive warfare).Thirdly the Pakistani
military leadership as far as Ayub was concerned was more
preoccupied with politics than with the business of war.
Ayub was essentially a paper tiger,outwardly impressive,tall
,manly in appearance but timid at heart,who mistakenlythought
that mere acquisition of US equipment was sufficient insurance
against war and that he could win all the glory without fighting an
actual war-ft was not his intention to fight a war since the Kashmir
issue was only a good political slogan which served as cheap opium
for the Pakistanimasses.
Thus since there was no intention to use the military
option for settling the dispute with India no doctrine of
decisive war was developed by Ayub and Musa in any
case was little more than a figurehead and drill
square soldier who did not have the capacity to do
anything intellectually worthwbile.
The so called "New Tactical Concept" was not a
doctrine but essentially one set of actions covering

12. defence and it was not this concept which envisaged
not having "any obstacle in front or flanks of the
striking force" 17 but the BRB , 25 Cavalry and above
all poor Indian leadership which saved Lahore and
Sialkot in 1965!
This was the case of Pakistan Army which had a better
opportunity to develop a dynamic military doctrine since at least
theoretically there was a man having total power at the top who
was a soldier and supposed to understand the dynamics of war
better than civilian leadership of India etc.
The Indian Army's story was different.Here was a case of an
army which was run down as a relic of colonial past .
" Gandhian nonsense" of Ahimsa and peaceful protest further
introduced a more pacific snirit in the Indian nationalpsyche.The
army's salary was reduced and it was reduced to 300,000 all ranks '`.
Luckily for the Indians the Himalayan debacle forced their
pacifist leadership to rehash their thinking.After 1962 an effort was
made to reorganise the Indian Army but the new raisings and
headquarters were to Pakistan's good luck stillsuffering from
teething problems in 1965!
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