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![G.R. No. 115044 January 27, 1995
HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila,
petitioners,
vs.
HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila
and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents.
G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995
TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners,
vs.
HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION,
respondents.
PADILLA, J.:
These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple issues. if these issues have
apparently become complicated, it is not by reason of their nature becaus e of the events and
dramatis personae involved.
The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01
September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of
or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the
questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of
Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of
Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044:
a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to
issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated
Development Corporation (ADC).
b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should
not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March
1994.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-150913045816-lva1-app6892/75/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-6-2048.jpg)
![The police power has been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State.
It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is
the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this
Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus:
The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self-
protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It
may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which
enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely
attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the
purposes ofthe law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security
for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the
individual.
In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as
follows:
WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law
enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills
are still prevalent in many areas of the country;
WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to
eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of
the social and economic development program under the new society;
WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting
by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling
there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from
local government to the National Government.
It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals
and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and
erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a
vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social
and economic development.
In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court
stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz:
In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit
gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some
forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider
sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries,
cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has
consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review,
much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the
merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political
departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and
practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be
resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the
function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied)
Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line between right and privilege in American
constitutional law has no relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there is to
economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the
law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so,
under what conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking authority to determine,
talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is
paramount.
ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771. Clearly, however, this Court
cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was
later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative
motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438
[1971] per Black, J.) There is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's
allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as
already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD
No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable.
It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can
subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications
of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the
national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations
abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and
imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court.
On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order
No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-150913045816-lva1-app6892/75/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-11-2048.jpg)
![WHEREAS, making absolute the protective cloak of
confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits,
exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the
vested rights of depositors would better encourage the
inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking
institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the
Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a
position to properly channel the same to loans and
investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing
to the economic development of the country;
Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign
currency deposits is "to assure the development and speedy growth of the
Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the
Philippines" (3rd Whereas).
The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the
purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows:
WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of
an offshore banking system, such as political stability, a
growing economy and adequate communication facilities,
among others, exist in the Philippines;
WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to
have as wide access as possible to the sources of capital
funds for economic development;
WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the
Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the
country by increasing our links with foreign lenders,
facilitating the flow of desired investments into the
Philippines, creating employment opportunities and
expertise in international finance, and contributing to the
national development effort.
WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and
human resources, and other positive factors provide the
Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another
financial center in Asia;
On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by
PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows:
WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking
system in the Philippines has been authorized under a
separate decree;
WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as
depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act
(RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial
competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange
transactions and participate in the grant of foreign
currency loans to resident corporations and firms;
WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency
lending authority of the said depository banks under RA
6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as
would be applicable to transaction of the proposed
offshore banking units;
It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking
System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw
deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD
No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are
induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them.
Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is
not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given
incentives and protection by said laws because such depositorstays only for
a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the
bank only for a short time.
Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He
deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for
safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-150913045816-lva1-app6892/75/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-24-2048.jpg)
![b) the Resolution of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July
1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for
a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56).
Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the
Office of the President.
On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied.
Hence, this petition.
II
Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a
mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and
executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle
"Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President")
authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the
pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991
(Rollo, pp. 5-6).
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides:
All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders,
administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with
any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified
accordingly.
The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No.
18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to
be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]).
If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through
implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine American Management
Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194
[1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal.
An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict
must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a
subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible
inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and
Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be
absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8
[1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand
together (Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]).
We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative
Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact
be read together.
The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision
from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as
giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision.
There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to
order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of
Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such
intention.
The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear
legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of
execution, such authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of
elective officials in administrative cases.
The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a
consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found,its object and the consequences that
would follow from construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533
[1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as
mandatory.
The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the
Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to
the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the
public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-150913045816-lva1-app6892/75/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-30-2048.jpg)
![place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year
immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January
13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by
Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In
support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA
621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner
maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be
had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree.
The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides:
Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the
subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of
confidence.
(b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the
official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a
regular local election.
[Emphasis added]
It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with
reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with
the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The
evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once
during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely
designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that
is, during the second year of his termof office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation
of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the
novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public
officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is
set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within
the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then
no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local
Government Code.
In the interpretation of a statute,the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature
intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain
thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under
which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified,
destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless,
inoperative or nugatory. 6
It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in
harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local
Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the
Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local
government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local
government structure instituted through a systemof decentralization with effective mechanism
of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ."
Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot
countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition:
We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to
constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors.
That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit
that vivifieth". . . 8
The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute,
as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent.
Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government
unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall
election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to
the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned.
The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a
longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore,
be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular
local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official
sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate.
Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under
Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay
office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May
1997. 9](https://image.slidesharecdn.com/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-150913045816-lva1-app6892/75/235621759-chapter-v-statson-cases-35-2048.jpg)
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- 1. Get Homework/Assignment Done Homeworkping.com Homework Help https://www.homeworkping.com/ ResearchPaper help https://www.homeworkping.com/ Online Tutoring https://www.homeworkping.com/ click here for freelancing tutoring sites G.R. No. 90501 August 5, 1991 ARIS (PHIL.) INC., petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, LABOR ARBITER FELIPE GARDUQUE III, LEODEGARIO DE GUZMAN, LILIA PEREZ, ROBERTO BESTAMONTE, AIDA OPENA, REYNALDO TORIADO, APOLINARIO GAGAHINA, RUFINO DE CASTRO, FLORDELIZA RAYOS DEL SOL, STEVE SANCHO, ESTER CAIRO, MARIETA MAGALAD, and MARY B. NADALA, respondents. Cesar C. Cruz & Partners for petitioner. Zosimo Morillo for respondent Rayos del Sol. Banzuela, Flores, Miralles, Raneses, Sy & Associates for private respondents. DAVIDE, JR., J.:p Petitioner assails the constitutionality of the amendment introduced by Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715 to Article 223 of the Labor Code of the Philippines (PD No. 442, as amended) allowing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee and of Section 2 of the NLRC InterimRules on Appeals under R.A. No. 6715 implementing the same. It also questions the validity of the Transitory Provision (Section 17) of the said Interim Rules. The challenged portion of Section 12 of Republic Act No. 6715, which took effect on 21 March 1989, reads as follows: SEC 12. Article 223 of the same code is amended to read as follows: ART. 223. Appeal. xxx xxx xxx
- 2. In any event,the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, in so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, shall immediately be executory, even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation or, at the option of the employer, merely reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement provided therein. This is a new paragraph ingrafted into the Article. Sections 2 and 17 of the "NLRC Interim Rules On Appeals Under R.A. No. 6715, Amending the Labor Code", which the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) promulgated on 8 August 1989, provide as follows: Section 2. Order of Reinstatement and Effect of Bond. — In so far as the reinstatement aspect is concerned, the decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee shall immediately be executory even pending appeal. The employee shall either be admitted back to work under the same terms and conditions prevailing prior to his dismissal or separation, or, at the option of the employer, merely be reinstated in the payroll. The posting of a bond by the employer shall not stay the execution for reinstatement. xxx xxx xxx Section 17. Transitory provision. — Appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these Interim Rules must conform to the requirements as herein set forth or as may be directed by the Commission. The antecedent facts and proceedings which gave rise to this petition are not disputed: On 11 April 1988, private respondents, who were employees of petitioner, aggrieved by management's failure to attend to their complaints concerning their working surroundings which had become detrimental and hazardous, requested for a grievance conference. As none was arranged, and believing that their appeal would be fruitless, they grouped together after the end of their work that day with other employees and marched directly to the management's office to protest its long silence and inaction on their complaints. On 12 April 1988, the management issued a memorandum to each of the private respondents, who were identified by the petitioner's supervisors as the most active participants in the rally requiring them to explain why they should not be terminated from the service for their conduct. Despite their explanation, private respondents were dismissed for violation of company rules and regulations, more specifically of the provisions on security and public order and on inciting or participating in illegal strikes or concerted actions. Private respondents lost no time in filing a complaint for illegal dismissal against petitioner and Mr. Gavino Bayan with the regional office of the NLRC at the National Capital Region, Manila, which was docketed therein as NLRC-NCR-00-0401630-88. After due trial, Labor Arbiter Felipe Garduque III handed down on 22 June 1989 a decision' the dispositive portion of which reads: ACCORDINGLY, respondent Aris (Phils.), Inc. is hereby ordered to reinstate within ten (10) days from receipt hereof, herein complainants Leodegario de Guzman, Rufino de Castro, Lilia M. Perez, Marieta Magalad, Flordeliza Rayos del Sol, Reynaldo Toriado, Roberto Besmonte, Apolinario Gagahina, Aidam (sic) Opena, Steve C. Sancho Ester Cairo, and Mary B. Nadala to their former respective positions or any substantial equivalent positions if already filled up, without loss of seniority right and privileges but with limited backwages of six (6) months except complainant Leodegario de Guzman. All other claims and prayers are hereby denied for lack of merit. SO ORDERED. On 19 July 1989, complainants (herein private respondents) filed a Motion For Issuance of a Writ of Execution 2 pursuant to the above-quoted Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715. On 21 July 1989, petitioner filed its Appeal. 3 On 26 July 1989, the complainants, except Flor Rayos del Sol, filed a Partial Appeal. 4
- 3. On 10 August1989, complainant Flor Rayos del Sol filed a Partial Appeal. 5 On 29 August 1989, petitioner filed an Opposition 6 to the motion for execution alleging that Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715 on execution pending appeal cannot be applied retroactively to cases pending at the time of its effectivity because it does not expressly provide that it shall be given retroactive effect 7 and to give retroactive effect to Section 12 thereof to pending cases would not only result in the imposition of an additional obligation on petitioner but would also dilute its right to appeal since it would be burdened with the consequences of reinstatement without the benefit of a final judgment. In their Reply 8 filed on 1 September 1989, complainants argued that R.A. No. 6715 is not sought to be given retroactive effect in this case since the decision to be executed pursuant to it was rendered after the effectivity of the Act. The said law took effect on 21 March 1989, while the decision was rendered on 22 June 1989. Petitioner submitted a Rejoinder to the Reply on 5 September 1989. 9 On 5 October 1989, the Labor Arbiter issued an Order granting the motion for execution and the issuance of a partial writ of execution 10 as far as reinstatement of herein complainants is concerned in consonance with the provision of Section 2 of the rules particularly the last sentence thereof. In this Order, the Labor Arbiter also made reference to Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules in this wise: Since Section 17 of the said rules made mention of appeals filed on or after March 21, 1989, but prior to the effectivity of these interim rules which must conform with the requirements as therein set forth (Section 9) or as may be directed by the Commission, it obviously treats of decisions of Labor Arbiters before March 21,1989. With more reason these interim rules be made to apply to the instant case since the decision hereof (sic) was rendered thereafter. 11 Unable to accept the above Order, petitioner filed the instant petition on 26 October 1989 12 raising the issues adverted to in the introductory portion of this decision under the following assignment of errors: A. THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC, IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS PENDING APPEAL AND IN PROVIDING FOR SECTION 2 OF THE INTERIM RULES, RESPECTIVELY, ACTED WITHOUT AND IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION SINCE THE BASIS FOR SAID ORDER AND INTERIM RULE, i.e., SECTION 12 OF R.A. 6715 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS IT BEING OPPRESSIVE AND UNREASONABLE. B. GRANTING ARGUENDO THAT THE PROVISION IN(SIC) REINSTATEMENT PENDING APPEAL IS VALID, NONETHELESS, THE LABOR ARBITER A QUO AND THE NLRC STILL ACTED IN EXCESS AND WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN RETROACTIVELY APPLYING SAID PROVISION TO PENDING LABOR CASES. In Our resolution of 7 March 1989, We required the respondents to comment on the petition. Respondent NLRC, through the Office of the Solicitor General, filed its Comment on 20 November 1989. 13 Meeting squarely the issues raised by petitioner, it submits that the provision concerning the mandatory and automatic reinstatement of an employee whose dismissal is found unjustified by the labor arbiter is a valid exercise of the police power of the state and the contested provision "is then a police legislation." As regards the retroactive application thereof, it maintains that being merely procedural in nature, it can apply to cases pending at the time of its effectivity on the theory that no one can claim a vested right in a rule of procedure. Moreover, such a law is compatible with the constitutional provision on protection to labor. On 11 December 1989, private respondents filed a Manifestation 14 informing the Court that they are adopting the Comment filed by the Solicitor General and stressing that petitioner failed to comply with the requisites for a valid petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. On 20 December 1989, petitioner filed a Rejoinder 15 to the Comment of the Solicitor General. In the resolution of 11 January 1990, 16 We considered the Comments as respondents' Answers, gave due course to the petition, and directed that the case be calendared for deliberation.
- 4. In urging Usto declare as unconstitutional that portion of Section 223 of the Labor Code introduced by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, as well as the implementing provis ion covered by Section 2 of the NLRC Interim Rules, allowing immediate execution, even pending appeal, of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of a labor arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, petitioner submits that said portion violates the due process clause of the Constitution in that it is oppressive and unreasonable. It argues that a reinstatement pending appeal negates the right of the employer to self-protection for it has been ruled that an employer cannot be compelled to continue in employment an employee guilty of acts inimical to the interest of the employer; the right of an employer to dismiss is consistent with the legal truism that the law, in protecting the rights of the laborer, authorizes neither the oppression nor the destruction of the employer. For, social justice should be implemented not through mistaken sympathy for or misplaced antipathy against any group, but even-handedly and fairly. 17 To clinch its case, petitioner tries to demonstrate the oppressiveness of reinstatement pending appeal by portraying the following consequences: (a) the employer would be compelled to hire additional employees or adjust the duties of other employees simply to have someone watch over the reinstated employee to prevent the commission of further acts prejudicial to the employer, (b) reinstatement of an undeserving, if not undesirable, employee may demoralize the rank and file, and (c) it may encourage and embolden not only the reinstated employees but also other employees to commit similar, if not graver infractions. These rationalizations and portrayals are misplaced and are purely conjectural which, unfortunately, proceed from a misunderstanding of the nature and scope of the relief of execution pending appeal. Execution pending appeal is interlinked with the right to appeal. One cannot be divorced from the other. The latter may be availed of by the losing party or a party who is not satisfied with a judgment, while the former may be applied for by the prevailing party during the pendency of the appeal. The right to appeal, however, is not a constitutional, natural or inherent right. It is a statutory privilege of statutory origin 18 and, therefore, available only if granted or provided by statute. The law may then validly provide limitations or qualifications thereto or relief to the prevailing party in the event an appeal is interposed by the losing party. Execution pending appeal is one such relief long recognized in this jurisdiction. The Revised Rules of Court allows execution pending appeal and the grant thereof is left to the discretion of the court upon good reasons to be stated in a special order. 19 Before its amendment by Section 12 of R.A. No. 6715, Article 223 of the Labor Code already allowed execution of decisions of the NLRC pending their appeal to the Secretary of Labor and Employment. In authorizing execution pending appeal of the reinstatement aspect of a decision of the Labor Arbiter reinstating a dismissed or separated employee, the law itself has laid down a compassionate policy which, once more, vivifies and enhances the provisions of the 1987 Constitution on labor and the working-man. These provisions are the quintessence of the aspirations of the workingman for recognition of his role in the social and economic life of the nation, for the protection of his rights, and the promotion of his welfare. Thus, in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights of the Constitution, 20 which principally directs Congress to give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities, and remove cultural inequities by equitably diffusing wealth and political power for the common good, the State is mandated to afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all; to guarantee the rights of all workers to self-organization, collective bargaining and negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with law, security of tenure, human conditions of work, and a living wage, to participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by law; and to promote the principle of shared responsibility between workers and employers and the preferential use of voluntary modes in settling disputes. Incidentally, a study of the Constitutions of various nations readily reveals that it is only our Constitution which devotes a separate article on Social Justice and Human Rights. Thus, by no less than its fundamental law, the Philippines has laid down the strong foundations ofa truly just and humane society.This Article addresses itselfto specified areas of concern labor, agrarian and natural resources reform, urban land reformand housing, health, working women, and people's organizations and reaches out to the underprivileged sector of society, for which reason the President of the Constitutional Commission of 1986, former Associate Justice of this Court Cecilia Muñoz-Palma, aptly describes this Article as the "heart of the new Charter." 21 These duties and responsibilities of the State are imposed not so much to express sympathy for the workingman as to forcefully and meaningfully underscore labor as a primary social and economic force, which the Constitution also expressly affirms With equal intensity. 22 Labor is an indispensable partner for the nation's progress and stability.
- 5. If in ordinarycivil actions execution of judgment pending appeal is authorized for reasons the determination of which is merely left to the discretion of the judge, We find no plausible reason to withhold it in cases of decisions reinstating dismissed or separated employees. In such cases, the poor employees had been deprived of their only source of livelihood, their only means of support for their family their very lifeblood. To Us, this special circumstance is far better than any other which a judge, in his sound discretion, may determine. In short, with respect to decisions reinstating employees, the law itself has determined a sufficiently overwhelming reason for its execution pending appeal. The validity of the questioned law is not only supported and sustained by the foregoing considerations. As contended by the Solicitor General, it is a valid exercise of the police power of the State. Certainly, if the right of an employer to freely discharge his employees is subject to regulation by the State, basically in the exercise of its permanent police power on the theory that the preservation of the lives of the citizens is a basic duty of the State, that is more vital than the preservation of corporate profits. 23 Then, by and pursuant to the same power, the State may authorize an immediate implementation, pending appeal, of a decision reinstating a dismissed or separated employee since that saving act is designed to stop, although temporarily since the appeal may be decided in favor of the appellant, a continuing threat or danger to the survival or even the life of the dismissed or separated employee and its family. The charge then that the challenged law as well as the implementing rule are unconstitutional is absolutely baseless. Laws are presumed constitutional. 24 To justify nullification of a law, there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative implication; a law shall not be declared invalid unless the conflict with the constitution is clear beyond reasonable doubt. 25 In Parades, et al. vs. Executive Secretary 26 We stated: 2. For one thing, it is in accordance with the settled doctrine that between two possible constructions, one avoiding a finding of unconstitutionality and the other yielding such a result, the former is to be preferred. That which will save, not that which will destroy, commends itself for acceptance. After all, the basic presumption all these years is one of validity. The onerous task of proving otherwise is on the party seeking to nullify a statute. It must be proved by clear and convincing evidence that there is an infringement of a constitutional provision, save in those cases where the challenged act is void on its face. Absent such a showing, there can be no finding of unconstitutionality. A doubt, even if well-founded, does not suffice. Justice Malcolm's aphorism is apropos: To doubt is to sustain. 27 The reason for this: ... can be traced to the doctrine of separation of powers which enjoins on each department a proper respect for the acts of the other departments. ... The theory is that, as the joint act of the legislative and executive authorities, a law is supposed to have been carefully studied and determined to be constitution before it was finally enacted. Hence, as long as there is some other basis that can be used by the courts for its decision, the constitutionality of the challenged law will not be touched upon and the case will be decided on other available grounds. 28 The issue concerning Section 17 of the NLRC Interim Rules does not deserve a measure of attention. The reference to it in the Order of the Labor Arbiter of 5 October 1989 was unnecessary since the procedure of the appeal proper is not involved in this case. Moreover, the questioned interim rules of the NLRC, promulgated on 8 August 1989, can validly be given retroactive effect. They are procedural or remedial in character, promulgated pursuant to the authority vested upon it under Article 218(a) of the Labor Code of the Philippines, as amended. Settled is the rule that procedural laws may be given retroactive effect. 29 There are no vested rights in rules of procedure. 30 A remedial statute may be made applicable to cases pending at the time of its enactment. 31 WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. Costs against petitioner. SO ORDERED.
- 6. G.R. No. 115044January 27, 1995 HON. ALFREDO S. LIM, in his capacity as Mayor of Manila, and the City of Manila, petitioners, vs. HON. FELIPE G. PACQUING, as Judge, branch 40, Regional Trial Court of Manila and ASSOCIATED CORPORATION, respondents. G.R. No. 117263 January 27, 1995 TEOFISTO GUINGONA, JR. and DOMINADOR R. CEPEDA, petitioners, vs. HON. VETINO REYES and ASSOCIATED DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, respondents. PADILLA, J.: These two (2) cases which are inter-related actually involve simple issues. if these issues have apparently become complicated, it is not by reason of their nature becaus e of the events and dramatis personae involved. The petition in G.R. No. 115044 was dismissed by the First Division of this Court on 01 September 1994 based on a finding that there was "no abuse of discretion, much less lack of or excess of jurisdiction, on the part of respondent judge [Pacquing]", in issuing the questioned orders. Judge Pacquing had earlier issued in Civil Case No. 88-45660, RTC of Manila, Branch 40, the following orders which were assailed by the Mayor of the City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, in said G.R. No. 115044: a. order dated 28 March 1994 directing Manila mayor Alfredo S. Lim to issue the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in favor of Associated Development Corporation (ADC). b. order dated 11 April 1994 directing mayor Lim to explain why he should not be cited for contempt for non-compliance with the order dated 28 March 1994.
- 7. c. order dated20 April 1994 reiterating the previous order directing Mayor Lim to immediately issue the permit/license to Associated Development Corporation (ADC). The order dated 28 march 1994 was in turn issued upon motion by ADC for execution of a final judgment rendered on 9 September 1988 which ordered the Manila Mayor to immediately issue to ADC the permit/license to operate the jai-alai in Manila, under Manila Ordinance No. 7065. On 13 September 1994, petitioner Guingona (as executive secretary) issued a directive to then chairman of the Games and Amusements Board (GAB) Francisco R. Sumulong, jr. to hold in abeyance the grant of authority, or if any had been issued,to withdraw such grant of authority, to Associated Development Corporation to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila, until the following legal questions are properly resolved: 1. Whether P.D. 771 which revoked all existing Jai-Alai franchisers issued by local governments as of 20 August 1975 is unconstitutional. 2. Assuming that the City of Manila had the power on 7 September 1971 to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation, whether the franchise granted is valied considering that the franchise has no duration, and appears to be granted in perpetuity. 3. Whether the City of Manila had the power to issue a Jai-Alai franchise to Associated Development Corporation on 7 September 1971 in view of executive Order No. 392 dated 1 January 1951 which transferred from local governments to the Games and Amusements Board the power to regulate Jai-Alai. 1 On 15 September 1994, respondent Associated Development Corporation (ADC) filed a petition for prohibition, mandamus, injunction and damages with prayer for temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction in the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner Guingona and then GAB chairman Sumulong, docketed as Civil Case No. 94-71656, seeking to prevent GAB from withdrawing the provisional authority that had earlier been granted to ADC. On the same day, the RTC of Manila, Branch 4, through presiding Judge Vetino Reyes, issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the GAB from withdrawing ADC's provisional authority. This temporary restraining order was converted into a writ of preliminary injunction upon ADC's posting of a bond in the amount of P2,000,000.00. 2 Subsequently, also in G.R. No. 115044, the Republic of the Philippines, through the Games and Amusements Board, filed a "Motion for Intervention; for Leave to File a Motion for reconsideration in Intervention; and to Refer the case to the Court En Banc" and later a "Motion for Leave to File Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention and to Admit Attached Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration-in-Intervention". In an En Banc Resolution dated 20 September 1994, this Court referred G.R. No. 115044 to the Court En Banc and required the respondents therein to comment on the aforementioned motions. Meanwhile, Judge Reyes on 19 October 1994 issued another order, this time, granting ADC a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against Guingona and GAB to compel themto issue in favor of ADC the authority to operate jai-alai. Guingona, as executive secretary, and Dominador Cepeda, Jr. as the new GAB chairman, then filed the petition in G.R. No. 117263 assailing the abovementioned orders of respondent Judge Vetino Reyes. On 25 October 1994, in G.R. No. 117263, this Court granted petitioner's motion for leave to file supplemental petition and to admit attached supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court further required respondents to file their comment on the petition and supplemental petition with urgent prayer for restraining order. The Court likewise set the case and all incidents thereof for hearing on 10 November 1994. At the hearing on 10 November 1994, the issues to be resolved were formulated by the Court as follows: 1. whether or not intervention by the Republic of the Philippines at this stage of the proceedings is proper; 2. assuming such intervention is proper, whether or not the Associated Development Corporation has a valid and subsisting franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai; 3. whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned temporary restraining order (later writ of preliminary injunction); and
- 8. 4. whether ornot there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the aforementioned writ of preliminary mandatory injunction. On the issue of the propriety of the intervention by the Republic of the Philippines, a question was raised during the hearing on 10 November 1994 as to whether intervention in G.R. No. 115044 was the proper remedy for the national government to take in questioning the existence of a valid ADC franchise to operate the jai-alai or whether a separate action for quo warranto under Section 2, Rule 66 of the Rules of Court was the proper remedy. We need not belabor this issue since counsel for respondent ADC agreed to the suggestion that this Court once and for all settle all substantive issues raised by the parties in these cases. Moreover, this Court can consider the petition filed in G.R. No. 117263 as one for quo warranto which is within the original jurisdiction of the Court under section 5(1), Article VIII of the Constitution. 3 On the propriety of intervention by the Republic, however, it will be recalled that this Court in Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals (93 SCRA 238) allowed intervention even beyond the period prescribed in Section 2 Rule 12 of the Rules of Court. The Court ruled in said case that a denial of the motions for intervention would "lead the Court to commit an act of injustice to the movants, to their successor-in-interest and to all purchasers for value and in good faith and thereby open the door to fraud, falsehood and misrepresentation, should intervenors' claimbe proven to be true." In the present case, the resulting injustice and injury, should the national government's allegations be proven correct, are manifest, since the latter has squarely questioned the very existence of a valid franchise to maintain and operate the jai-alai (which is a gambling operation) in favor of ADC. As will be more extensively discussed later, the national government contends that Manila Ordinance No. 7065 which purported to grant to ADC a franchise to conduct jai-alai operations is void and ultra vires since Republic Act No. 954, approved on 20 June 1953, or very much earlier than said Ordinance No. 7065, the latter approved 7 September 1971, in Section 4 thereof, requires a legislative franchise, not a municipal franchise, for the operation of jai-alai. Additionally, the national government argues that even assuming, arguendo, that the abovementioned ordinance is valid, ADC's franchise was nonetheless effectively revoked by Presidential decree No. 771, issued on 20 August 1975, Sec. 3 of which expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits to operate all forms of gambling facilities (including the jai-alai) issued by local governments. On the other hand, ADC's position is that Ordinance No. 7065 was validly enacted by the City of Manila pursuant to its delegated powers under it charter, Republic Act No. 409. ADC also squarely assails the constitutionality of PD No. 771 as violative of the equal protection and non-impairment clauses of the Constitution. In this connection, counsel for ADC contends that this Court should really rule on the validity of PD No. 771 to be able to determine whether ADC continues to possess a valid franchise. It will undoubtedly be a grave injustice to both parties in this case if this Court were to shirk from ruling on the issue of constitutionality of PD No. 771. Such issue has, in our view, become the very lis mota in resolving the present controversy, in view of ADC's insistence that it was granted a valid and legal franchise by Ordinance No. 7065 to operate the jai-alai. The time-honored doctrine is that all laws (PD No. 771 included) are presumed valid and constitutional until or unless otherwise ruled by this Court. Not only this; Article XVIII Section 3 of the Constitution states: Sec. 3. All existing laws, decrees, executive orders, proclamations, letters of instructions and other executive issuances not inconsistent with this Constitution shall remain operative until amended, repealed or revoked. There is nothing on record to show or even suggest that PD No. 771 has been repealed, altered or amended by any subsequent law or presidential issuance (when the executive still exercised legislative powers). Neither can it be tenably stated that the issue of the continued existence of ADC's franchise by reason of the unconstitutionality of PD No. 771 was settled in G.R. No. 115044, for the decision of the Court's First Division in said case, aside from not being final, cannot have the effect of nullifying PD No. 771 as unconstitutional, since only the Court En Banc has that power under Article VIII, Section 4(2) of the Constitution. 4 And on the question of whether or not the government is estopped from contesting ADC's possession of a valid franchise, the well-settled rule is that the State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors, if any, of its officials or agents (Republic v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 209 SCRA 90) Consequently, in the light of the foregoing expostulation, we conclude that the republic (in contra distinction to the City of Manila) may be allowed to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. The Republic is intervening in G.R. No. 115044 in the exercise, not of its business or proprietary
- 9. functions, but inthe exercise of its governmental functions to protect public morals and promote the general welfare. II Anent the question of whether ADC has a valid franchise to operate the Jai-Alai de Manila, a statement of the pertinent laws is in order. 1. The Charter of the City of Manila was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949. Section 18 thereof provides: Sec. 18. Legislative Powers. — The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers: xxx xxx xxx (jj) To tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting by the public on boxing, sipa, bowling, billiards, pools, horse and dog races, cockpits, jai- alai, roller or ice-skating on any sporting or athletic contests, as well as grant exclusive rights to establishments for this purpose, notwithstanding any existing law to the contrary. 2. On 1 January 1951, Executive Order No. 392 was issued transferring the authority to regulate jai-alais from local government to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB). 3. On 20 June 1953, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 954, entitled "An Act to Prohibit With Horse Races and Basque Pelota Games (Jai-Alai), And To Prescribe Penalties For Its Violation". The provisions of Republic Act No. 954 relating to jai-alai are as follows: Sec. 4. No person, or group of persons other than the operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games (Jai- alai), shall offer, to take or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event. (emphasis supplied). Sec. 5. No person, operator or maintainer of a fronton with legislative franchise to conduct basque pelota games shall offer, take, or arrange bets on any basque pelota game or event, or maintain or use a totalizator or other device, method or system to bet or gamble on any basque pelota game or event outside the place,enclosure, or fronton where the basque pelota game is held. (emphasis supplied). 4. On 07 September 1971, however, the Municipal Board of Manila nonetheless passed Ordinance No. 7065 entitled "An Ordinance Authorizing the Mayor To Allow And Permit The Associated Development Corporation To Establish, Maintain And Operate A Jai-Alai In The City Of Manila, Under Certain Terms And Conditions And For Other Purposes." 5. On 20 August 1975, Presidential Decree No. 771 was issued by then President Marcos. The decree, entitled "Revoking All Powers and Authority of Local Government(s) To Grant Franchise, License or Permit And Regulate Wagers Or Betting By The Public On Horse And Dog Races, Jai-Alai Or Basque Pelota, And Other Forms Of Gambling", in Section 3 thereof, expressly revoked all existing franchises and permits issued by local governments. 6. On 16 October 1975, Presidential Decree No. 810, entitled "An Act granting The Philippine Jai-Alai And Amusement Corporation A Franchise To Operate, Construct And Maintain A Fronton For Basque Pelota And Similar Games of Skill In THE Greater Manila Area," was promulgated. 7 On 08 May 1987, then President Aquino, by virtue of Article XVIII, Section 6, of the Constitution, which allowed the incumbent legislative powers until the first Congress was convened, issued Executive Order No. 169 expressly repealing PD 810 and revoking and cancelling the franchise granted to the Philippine Jai-Alai and Amusement Corporation. Petitioners in G.R. No. 117263 argue that Republic Act No. 954 effectively removed the power of the Municipal Board of Manila to grant franchises for gambling operations. It is argued that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 is used to refer to franchises issued by Congress. On the other hand, ADC contends that Republic Act N. 409 (Manila Chapter) gives legislative powers to the Municipal Board to grant franchises, and since Republic Act No. 954 does not specifically qualify the word "legislative" as referring exclusively to Congress, then Rep. Act No. 954 did not remove the power of the Municipal Board under Section 18(jj) of Republic Act No. 409 and consequently it was within the power of the City of Manila to allow ADC to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. On this point, the government counter-argues that the term "legislative powers" is used in Rep. Act No. 409 merely to distinguish the powers under Section 18 of the law fromthe other
- 10. powers of theMunicipal Board, but that the term "legislative franchise" in Rep. Act No. 954 refers to a franchise granted solely by Congress. Further, the government argues that Executive Order No. 392 dated 01 January 1951 transferred even the power to regulate Jai-Alai from the local governments to the Games and Amusements Board (GAB), a national government agency. It is worthy of note that neither of the authorities relied upon by ADC to support its alleged possession of a valid franchise, namely the Charter of the City of Manila (Rep. Act No. 409) and Manila Ordinance No. 7065 uses the word "franchise". Rep. Act No. 409 empowers the Municipal Board of Manila to "tax, license, permit and regulate wagers or betting" and to "grant exclusive rights to establishments", while Ordinance No. 7065 authorized the Manila City Mayor to "allow and permit" ADC to operate jai-alai facilities in the City of Manila. It is clear from the foregoing that Congress did not delegate to the City of Manila the power "to franchise" wagers or betting, including the jai-alai, but retained for itself such power "to franchise". What Congress delegated to the City of Manila in Rep. Act No. 409, with respect to wagers or betting, was the power to "license, permit, or regulate" which therefore means that a license or permit issued by the City of Manila to operate a wager or betting activity, such as the jai-alai where bets are accepted, would not amount to something meaningful UNLESS the holder of the permit or license was also FRANCHISED by the national government to so operate. Moreover, even this power to license, permit, or regulate wagers or betting on jai-alai was removed from local governments, including the City of Manila, and transferred to the GAB on 1 January 1951 by Executive Order No. 392. The net result is that the authority to grant franchises for the operation of jai-alai frontons is in Congress, while the regulatory function is vested in the GAB. In relation, therefore, to the facts of this case, since ADC has no franchise from Congress to operate the jai-alai, it may not so operate even if its has a license or permit from the City Mayor to operate the jai-alai in the City of Manila. It cannot be overlooked, in this connection, that the Revised Penal Code punishes gambling and betting under Articles 195 to 199 thereof. Gambling is thus generally prohibited by law, unless another law is enacted by Congress expressly exempting or excluding certain forms of gambling from the reach of criminal law. Among these form the reach of criminal law. Among these forms of gambling allowed by special law are the horse races authorized by Republic Acts Nos. 309 and 983 and gambling casinos authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1869. While jai-alai as a sport is not illegal per se, the accepting of bets or wagers on the results of jai-alai games is undoubtedly gambling and, therefore, a criminal offense punishable under Articles 195-199 of the Revised Penal Code, unless it is shown that a later or special law had been passed allowing it. ADC has not shown any such special law. Republic Act No. 409 (the Revised Charter of the City of Manila) which was enacted by Congress on 18 June 1949 gave the Municipal Board certain delegated legislative powers under Section 18. A perusal of the powers enumerated under Section 18 shows that these powers are basically regulatory in nature. 5 The regulatory nature of these powers finds support not only in the plain words of the enumerations under Section 28 but also in this Court's ruling in People v. Vera (65 Phil. 56). In Vera, this Court declared that a law which gives the Provincial Board the discretion to determine whether or not a law of general application (such as, the Probation law-Act No. 4221) would or would not be operative within the province, is unconstitutional for being an undue delegation of legislative power. From the ruling in Vera, it would be logical to conclude that, if ADC's arguments were to prevail, this Court would likewise declare Section 18(jj) of the Revised Charter of Manila unconstitutional for the power it would delegate to the Municipal Board of Manila would give the latter the absolute and unlimited discretion to render the penal code provisions on gambling inapplicable or inoperative to persons or entities issued permits to operate gambling establishments in the City of Manila. We need not go to this extent, however, since the rule is that laws must be presumed valid, constitutional and in harmony with other laws. Thus, the relevant provisions of Rep. Acts Nos. 409 and 954 and Ordinance No. 7065 should be taken together and it should then be clear that the legislative powers of the Municipal Board should be understood to be regulatory in nature and that Republic Act No. 954 should be understood to refer to congressional franchises, as a necessity for the operation of jai-alai. We need not, however, again belabor this issue further since the task at hand which will ultimately, and with finality, decide the issues in this case is to determine whether PD No. 771 validly revoked ADC's franchise to operate the jai-alai, assuming (without conceding) that it indeed possessed such franchise under Ordinance No. 7065. ADC argues that PD No. 771 is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection and non-impairment provisions of the Constitution. On the other hand, the government contends that PD No. 771 is a valid exercise of the inherent police power of the State.
- 11. The police powerhas been described as the least limitable of the inherent powers of the State. It is based on the ancient doctrine — salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the people is the supreme law.) In the early case of Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro (39 Phil. 660), this Court through Mr. Justice George A. Malcolm stated thus: The police power of the State . . . is a power co-extensive with self- protection, and is not inaptly termed the "law of overruling necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of society. Carried onward by the current of legislation, the judiciary rarely attempts to dam the onrushing power of legislative discretion, provided the purposes ofthe law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual. In the matter of PD No. 771, the purpose of the law is clearly stated in the "whereas clause" as follows: WHEREAS, it has been reported that in spite of the current drive of our law enforcement agencies against vices and illegal gambling, these social ills are still prevalent in many areas of the country; WHEREAS, there is need to consolidate all the efforts of the government to eradicate and minimize vices and other forms of social ills in pursuance of the social and economic development program under the new society; WHEREAS, in order to effectively control and regulate wagers or betting by the public on horse and dog races, jai-alai and other forms of gambling there is a necessity to transfer the issuance of permit and/or franchise from local government to the National Government. It cannot be argued that the control and regulation of gambling do not promote public morals and welfare. Gambling is essentially antagonistic and self-reliance. It breeds indolence and erodes the value of good, honest and hard work. It is, as very aptly stated by PD No. 771, a vice and a social ill which government must minimize (if not eradicate) in pursuit of social and economic development. In Magtajas v. Pryce Properties Corporation (20 July 1994, G.R. No. 111097), this Court stated thru Mr. Justice Isagani A. Cruz: In the exercise of its own discretion, the legislative power may prohibit gambling altogether or allow it without limitation or it may prohibit some forms of gambling and allow others for whatever reasons it may consider sufficient. Thus, it has prohibited jueteng and monte but permits lotteries, cockfighting and horse-racing. In making such choices, Congress has consulted its own wisdom, which this Court has no authority to review, much less reverse. Well has it been said that courts do not sit to resolve the merits of conflicting theories. That is the prerogative of the political departments. It is settled that questions regarding wisdom, morality and practicability of statutes are not addressed to the judiciary but may be resolved only by the executive and legislative departments, to which the function belongs in our scheme of government. (Emphasis supplied) Talks regarding the supposed vanishing line between right and privilege in American constitutional law has no relevance in the context of these cases since the reference there is to economic regulations. On the other hand, jai-alai is not a mere economic activity which the law seeks to regulate. It is essentially gambling and whether it should be permitted and, if so, under what conditions are questions primarily for the lawmaking authority to determine, talking into account national and local interests. Here, it is the police power of the State that is paramount. ADC questions the motive for the issuance of PD Nos. 771. Clearly, however, this Court cannot look into allegations that PD No. 771 was enacted to benefit a select group which was later given authority to operate the jai-alai under PD No. 810. The examination of legislative motivation is generally prohibited. (Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217, 29 L. Ed. 2d 438 [1971] per Black, J.) There is, the first place, absolute lack of evidence to support ADC's allegation of improper motivation in the issuance of PD No. 771. In the second place, as already averred, this Court cannot go behind the expressed and proclaimed purposes of PD No. 771, which are reasonable and even laudable. It should also be remembered that PD No. 771 provides that the national government can subsequently grant franchises "upon proper application and verification of the qualifications of the applicant." ADC has not alleged that it filed an application for a franchise with the national government subsequent to the enactment of PD No. 771; thus, the allegations abovementioned (of preference to a select group) are based on conjectures, speculations and imagined biases which do not warrant the consideration of this Court. On the other hand, it is noteworthy that while then president Aquino issued Executive Order No. 169 revoking PD No. 810 (which granted a franchise to a Marcos-crony to operate the jai-
- 12. alai), she didnot scrap or repeal PD No. 771 which had revoked all franchises to operate jai- alais issued by local governments, thereby re-affirming the government policy that franchises to operate jai-alais are for the national government (not local governments) to consider and approve. On the alleged violation of the non-impairment and equal protection clauses of the Constitution, it should be remembered that a franchise is not in the strict sense a simple contract but rather it is more importantly, a mere privilege specially in matters which are within the government's power to regulate and even prohibit through the exercise of the police power. Thus, a gambling franchise is always subject to the exercise of police power for the public welfare. In RCPI v. NTC (150 SCRA 450), we held that: A franchise started out as a "royal privilege or (a) branch of the King's prerogative, subsisting in the hands of a subject." This definition was given by Finch, adopted by Blackstone, and accepted by every authority since . . . Today, a franchise being merely a privilege emanating from the sovereign power of the state and owing its existence to a grant, is subject to regulation by the state itself by virtue of its police power through its administrative agencies. There is a stronger reason for holding ADC's permit to be a mere privilege because jai-alai, when played for bets, is pure and simple gambling. To analogize a gambling franchise for the operation of a public utility, such as public transportation company, is to trivialize the great historic origin of this branch of royal privilege. As earlier noted, ADC has not alleged ever applying for a franchise under the provisions of PD No. 771. and yet, the purpose of PD No. 771 is quite clear from its provisions, i.e., to give to the national government the exclusive power to grant gambling franchises. Thus, all franchises then existing were revoked but were made subject to reissuance by the national government upon compliance by the applicant with government-set qualifications and requirements. There was no violation by PD No. 771 of the equal protection clause since the decree revoked all franchises issued by local governments without qualification or exception. ADC cannot allege violation of the equal protection clause simply because it was the only one affected by the decree, for as correctly pointed out by the government, ADC was not singled out when all jai-alai franchises were revoked. Besides, it is too late in the day for ADC to seek redress for alleged violation of its constitutional rights for it could have raised these issues as early as 1975, almost twenty 920) years ago. Finally, we do not agree that Section 3 of PD No. 771 and the requirement of a legislative franchise in Republic Act No. 954 are "riders" to the two 92) laws and are violative of the rule that laws should embrace one subject which shall be expressed in the title, as argued by ADC. In Cordero v. Cabatuando (6 SCRA 418), this Court ruled that the requirement under the constitution that all laws should embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title is sufficiently met if the title is comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishing of the objective. III On the issue of whether or not there was grave abuse of discretion committed by respondent Judge Reyes in issuing the temporary restraining order (later converted to a writ of preliminary injunction) and the writ of preliminary mandatory injunction, we hold and rule there was. Section 3, Rule 58 of the rules of Court provides for the grounds for the issuance of a preliminary injunction. While ADC could allege these grounds, respondent judge should have taken judicial notice of Republic Act No. 954 and PD 771, under Section 1 rule 129 of the Rules of court. These laws negate the existence of any legal right on the part of ADC to the reliefs it sought so as to justify the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. since PD No. 771 and Republic Act No. 954 are presumed valid and constitutional until ruled otherwise by the Supreme Court after due hearing, ADC was not entitled to the writs issued and consequently there was grave abuse of discretion in issuing them. WHEREFORE, for the foregoing reasons, judgment is hereby rendered: 1. allowing the Republic of the Philippines to intervene in G.R. No. 115044. 2. declaring Presidential Decree No. 771 valid and constitutional. 3. declaring that respondent Associated Development corporation (ADC) does not possess the required congressional franchise to operate and conduct the jai-alai under Republic Act No. 954 and Presidential Decree No. 771.
- 13. 4. setting asidethe writs of preliminary injunction and preliminary mandatory injunction issued by respondent Judge Vetino Reyes in civil Case No. 94-71656. SO ORDERED. JOVENCIO LIM and TERESITA LIM, petitioners, vs. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF QUEZON CITY, BRANCH 217, THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY, AND WILSON CHAM, respondents. D E C I S I O N CORONA, J.: The constitutionality of PD 818, a decree which amended Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code by increasing the penalties for estafa committed by means of bouncing checks, is being challenged in this petition for certiorari, for being violative of the due process clause, the right to bail and the provision against cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment enshrined under the Constitution. The antecedents of this case, as gathered fromthe parties’ pleadings and documentary proofs, follow. In December 1991, petitioner spouses issued to private respondent two postdated checks, namely, Metrobank check no. 464728 dated January 15, 1992 in the amount of P365,750 and Metrobank check no. 464743 dated January 22, 1992 in the amount of P429,000. Check no. 464728 was dishonored upon presentment for having been drawn against insufficient funds while check no. 464743 was not presented for payment upon request of petitioners who promised to replace the dishonored check. When petitioners reneged on their promise to cover the amount of check no. 464728, the private respondent filed a complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charging petitioner spouses with the crime of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by PD 818. On February 16, 2001, the City Prosecutor issued a resolution finding probable cause against petitioners and recommending the filing of an information for estafa with no bail recommended. On the same day, an information for the crime of estafa was filed with Branch 217 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioners. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. Q-01-101574. Thereafter, the trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of herein petitioners, thus:
- 14. It appearing onthe face of the information and from supporting affidavit of the complaining witness and its annexesthat probable cause exists, that the crime charged was committed and accused is probably guilty thereof, let a warrant for the arrest of the accused be issued. No Bail Recommended. SO ORDERED. On July 18, 2001, petitioners filed an “Urgent Motion to Quash Information and Warrant of Arrest” which was denied by the trial court. Likewise, petitioners’ motion for bail filed on July 24, 2001 was denied by the trial court on the same day. Petitioner Jovencio Lim was arrested by virtue of the warrant of arrest issued by the trial court and was detained at the Quezon City Jail. However, petitioner Teresita Lim remained at large. On August 22, 2001, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of the lower court and the Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City, arguing that PD 818 violates the constitutional provisions on due process, bail and imposition of cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment. In a resolution dated February 26, 2002, this Court granted the petition of Jovencio Lim to post bail pursuant to Department of Justice Circular No. 74 dated November 6, 2001 which amended the 2000 Bail Bond Guide involving estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d), and qualified theft. Said Circular specifically provides as follows: xxx xxx xxx 3) Where the amount of fraud is P32,000.00 or over in which the imposable penalty is reclusion temporal to reclusion perpetua, bail shall be based on reclusion temporal maximum, pursuant to Par. 2 (a) of the 2000 Bail Bond Guide, multiplied by P2,000.00, plus an additional of P2,000.00 for every P10,000.00 in excess of P22,000.00; Provided, however, that the total amount of bail shall not exceed P60,000.00. In view of the aforementioned resolution, the matter concerning bail shall no longer be discussed. Thus, this decision will focus on whether or not PD 818 violates Sections 1 and 19 of Article III of the Constitution, which respectively provide: Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. x x x Section 19 (1) Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or inhuman punishment inflicted. x x x. We shall deal first with the issue of whether PD 818 was enacted in contravention of Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. In this regard, the impugned provision of PD 818 reads as follows: SECTION 1. Any person who shall defraud another by means of false pretenses or fraudulent acts as defined in paragraph 2(d) of Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 4885, shall be punished by: 1st . The penalty of reclusion temporal if the amount of the fraud is over 12,000 pesos but does not exceed 22,000 pesos, and if such amount exceeds the later sum, the penalty provided in this paragraph shall be imposed in its maximum period, adding one year for each additional 10,000 pesos but the total penalty which may be imposed shall in no case exceed thirty years. In such cases, and in connection with the accessory penalties which may be imposed under the Revised Penal Code, the penalty shall be termed reclusion perpetua; 2nd . The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period, if the amount of the fraud is over 6,000 pesos but does not exceed 12,000 pesos. 3rd . The penalty of prision mayor in its medium period, if such amount is over 200 pesos but does not exceed 6,000 pesos; and 4th. By prision mayor in its minimum period, if such amount does not exceed 200 pesos. Petitioners contend that, inasmuch as the amount of the subject check is P365,750, they can be penalized with reclusion perpetua or 30 years of imprisonment. This penalty, according to petitioners, is too severe and disproportionate to the crime they committed and infringes on the express mandate of Article III, Section 19 of the Constitution which prohibits the infliction of cruel, degrading and inhuman punishment. Settled is the rule that a punishment authorized by statute is not cruel, degrading or disproportionate to the nature of the offense unless it is flagrantly and plainly oppressive and wholly disproportionate to the nature of the offense as to shock the moral sense of the community. It takes more than merely being harsh, excessive, out of proportion or severe for
- 15. a penalty tobe obnoxious to the Constitution. Based on this principle, the Court has consistently overruled contentions of the defense that the penalty of fine or imprisonment authorized by the statute involved is cruel and degrading. In People vs. Tongko, this Court held that the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment is generally aimed at the form or character of the punishment rather than its severity in respect of its duration or amount, and applies to punishments which never existed in America or which public sentiment regards as cruel or obsolete. This refers, for instance, to those inflicted at the whipping post or in the pillory, to burning at the stake, breaking on the wheel, disemboweling and the like. The fact that the penalty is severe provides insufficient basis to declare a law unconstitutional and does not, by that circumstance alone, make it cruel and inhuman. Petitioners also argue that while PD 818 increased the imposable penalties for estafa committed under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, it did not increase the amounts corresponding to the said new penalties. Thus, the original amounts provided for in the Revised Penal Code have remained the same notwithstanding that they have become negligible and insignificant compared to the present value of the peso. This argument is without merit. The primary purpose of PD 818 is emphatically and categorically stated in the following: WHEREAS, reports received of late indicate an upsurge of estafa (swindling) casescommitted by means of bouncing checks; WHEREAS, if not checked at once, these criminal acts would erode the people’s confidence in the use of negotiable instruments as a medium of commercial transaction and consequently result in the retardation of trade and commerce and the undermining of the banking system of the country; WHEREAS, it is vitally necessary to arrest and curb the rise in this kind of estafa cases by increasing the existing penalties provided therefor. Clearly, the increase in the penalty, far from being cruel and degrading, was motivated by a laudable purpose,namely, to effectuate the repression of an evil that undermines the country’s commercial and economic growth, and to serve as a necessary precaution to deter people from issuing bouncing checks. The fact that PD 818 did not increase the amounts corresponding to the new penalties only proves that the amount is immaterial and inconsequential. What the law sought to avert was the proliferation of estafa cases committed by means of bouncing checks. Taking into account the salutary purpose for which said law was decreed, we conclude that PD 818 does not violate Section 19 of Article III of the Constitution. Moreover, when a law is questioned before the Court, the presumption is in favor of its constitutionality. To justify its nullification, there must be a clear and unmistakable breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. The burden of proving the invalidity of a law rests on those who challenge it. In this case, petitioners failed to present clear and convincing proof to defeat the presumption of constitutionality of PD 818. With respect to the issue of whether PD 818 infringes on Section 1 of Article III of the Constitution, petitioners claim that PD 818 is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution as it was not published in the Official Gazette. This claim is incorrect and must be rejected. Publication, being an indispensable part of due process, is imperative to the validity of laws, presidential decrees and executive orders. PD 818 was published in the Official Gazette on December 1, 1975. With the foregoing considerations in mind, this Court upholds the constitutionality of PD 818. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. SO ORDERED.
- 16. .R. No. 94723August 21, 1997 KAREN E. SALVACION, minor, thru Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., father and Natural Guardian, and Spouses FEDERICO N. SALVACION, JR., and EVELINA E. SALVACION, petitioners, vs. CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, CHINA BANKING CORPORATION and GREG BARTELLI y NORTHCOTT, respondents. TORRES, JR., J.: In our predisposition to discover the "original intent" of a statute, courts become the unfeeling pillars of the status quo. Ligle do we realize that statutes or even constitutions are bundles of compromises thrown our way by their framers. Unless we exercise vigilance, the statute may already be out of tune and irrelevant to our day. The petition is for declaratory relief. It prays for the following reliefs: a.) Immediately upon the filing of this petition, an Order be issued restraining the respondents from applying and enforcing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; b.) After hearing, judgment be rendered: 1.) Declaring the respective rights and duties of petitioners and respondents; 2.) Adjudging Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 as contrary to the provisions of the Constitution, hence void; because its provision that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever i.) has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in
- 17. violation of substantivedue process guaranteed by the Constitution; ii.) has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; iii.) has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank. The antecedent facts: On February 4, 1989, Greg Bartelli y Northcott, an American tourist, coaxed and lured petitioner Karen Salvacion, then 12 years old to go with him to his apartment. Therein, Greg Bartelli detained Karen Salvacion for four days, or up to February 7, 1989 and was able to rape the child once on February 4, and three times each day on February 5, 6, and 7, 1989. On February 7, 1989, after policemen and people living nearby, rescued Karen, Greg Bartelli was arrested and detained at the Makati Municipal Jail. The policemen recovered from Bartelli the following items: 1.) Dollar Check No. 368, Control No. 021000678-1166111303, US 3,903.20; 2.) COCOBANK Bank Book No. 104-108758-8 (Peso Acct.); 3.) Dollar Account — China Banking Corp., US$/A#54105028-2; 4.) ID-122-30-8877; 5.) Philippine Money (P234.00) cash; 6.) Door Keys 6 pieces; 7.) Stuffed Doll (Teddy Bear) used in seducing the complainant. On February 16, 1989, Makati Investigating Fiscal Edwin G. Condaya filed against Greg Bartelli, Criminal Case No. 801 for Serious Illegal Detention and Criminal Cases Nos. 802, 803, 804, and 805 for four (4) counts of Rape. On the same day, petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court of Makati Civil Case No. 89-3214 for damages with preliminary attachment against Greg Bartelli. On February 24, 1989, the day there was a scheduled hearing for Bartelli's petition for bail the latter escaped from jail. On February 28, 1989, the court granted the fiscal's Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for the Issuance of Warrant of Arrest and Hold Departure Order. Pending the arrest of the accused Greg Bartelli y Northcott, the criminal cases were archived in an Order dated February 28, 1989. Meanwhile, in Civil Case No. 89-3214, the Judge issued an Order dated February 22, 1989 granting the application of herein petitioners, for the issuance of the writ of preliminary attachment. After petitioners gave Bond No. JCL (4) 1981 by FGU Insurance Corporation in the amount of P100,000.00, a Writ of Preliminary Attachment was issued by the trial court on February 28, 1989. On March 1, 1989, the Deputy Sheriff of Makati served a Notice of Garnishment on China Banking Corporation. In a letter dated March 13, 1989 to the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation invoked Republic Act No. 1405 as its answer to the notice of garnishment served on it. On March 15, 1989, Deputy Sheriff of Makati Armando de Guzman sent his reply to China Banking Corporation saying that the garnishment did not violate the secrecy of bank deposits since the disclosure is merely incidental to a garnishment properly and legally made by virtue of a court order which has placed the subject deposits in custodia legis. In answer to this letter of the Deputy Sheriff of Makati, China Banking Corporation, in a letter dated March 20, 1989, invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 to the effect that the dollar deposits or defendant Greg Bartelli are exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body, whatsoever. This prompted the counsel for petitioners to make an inquiry with the Central Bank in a letter dated April 25, 1989 on whether Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 has any exception or whether said section has been repealed or amended since said section has rendered nugatory the substantive right of the plaintiff to have the claimsought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted to the plaintiff under Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court. The Central Bank responded as follows: May 26, 1989 Ms. Erlinda S. Carolino 12 Pres. Osmena Avenue South Admiral Village Paranaque, Metro Manila Dear Ms. Carolino: This is in reply to your letter dated April 25, 1989 regarding your inquiry on Section 113, CB Circular No. 960 (1983).
- 18. The cited provisionis absolute in application. It does not admit of any exception, nor has the same been repealed nor amended. The purpose of the law is to encourage dollar accounts within the country's banking system which would help in the development of the economy. There is no intention to render futile the basic rights of a person as was suggested in your subject letter. The law may be harsh as some perceive it, but it is still the law. Compliance is, therefore, enjoined. Very truly yours, (SGD) AGAPITO S. FAJARDO Director 1 Meanwhile, on April 10, 1989, the trial court granted petitioners' motion for leave to serve summons by publication in the Civil Case No. 89-3214 entitled "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott." Summons with the complaint was a published in the Manila Times once a week for three consecutive weeks. Greg Bartelli failed to file his answer to the complaint and was declared in default on August 7, 1989. After hearing the case ex-parte, the court rendered judgment in favor of petitioners on March 29, 1990, the dispositive portion of which reads: WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant, ordering the latter: 1. To pay plaintiff Karen E. Salvacion the amount of P500,000.00 as moral damages; 2. To pay her parents, plaintiffs spouses Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., and Evelina E. Salvacion the amount of P150,000.00 each or a total of P300,000.00 for both of them; 3. To pay plaintiffs exemplary damages of P100,000.00; and 4. To pay attorney's fees in an amount equivalent to 25% of the total amount of damages herein awarded; 5. To pay litigation expenses of P10,000.00; plus 6. Costs of the suit. SO ORDERED. The heinous acts of respondent Greg Bartelli which gave rise to the award were related in graphic detail by the trial court in its decision as follows: The defendant in this case was originally detained in the municipal jail of Makati but was able to escape therefrom on February 24, 1989 as per report of the Jail Warden of Makati to the Presiding Judge, Honorable Manuel M. Cosico of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 136, where he was charged with four counts of Rape and Serious Illegal Detention (Crim. Cases Nos. 802 to 805). Accordingly, upon motion of plaintiffs, through counsel, summons was served upon defendant by publication in the Manila Times, a newspaper of general circulation as attested by the Advertising Manager of the Metro Media Times, Inc., the publisher of the said newspaper. Defendant, however, failed to file his answer to the complaint despite the lapse of the period of sixty (60) days from the last publication; hence, upon motion of the plaintiffs, through counsel, defendant was declared in default and plaintiffs were authorized to present their evidence ex parte. In support of the complaint, plaintiffs presented as witnesses the minor Karen E. Salvacion, her father, Federico N. Salvacion, Jr., a certain Joseph Aguilar and a certain Liberato Madulio, who gave the following testimony: Karen took her first year high school in St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City but has recently transferred to Arellano University for her second year. In the afternoon of February 4, 1989, Karen was at the Plaza Fair Makati Cinema Square, with her friend Edna Tangile whiling away her free time. At about 3:30 p.m. while she was finishing her snack on a concrete bench in front of Plaza Fair, an American approached her. She was then alone because Edna Tangile had already left, and she was about to go home. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 2 to 5) The American asked her name and introduced himself as Greg Bartelli. He sat beside her when he talked to her. He said he was a Math teacher and told her that he has a sister who is a nurse in New York. His sister allegedly has
- 19. a daughter whois about Karen's age and who was with him in his house along Kalayaan Avenue. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 4-5) The American asked Karen what was her favorite subject and she told him it's Pilipino. He then invited her to go with him to his house where she could teach Pilipino to his niece. He even gave her a stuffed toy to persuade her to teach his niece. (Id., pp. 5-6) They walked from Plaza Fair along Pasong Tamo, turning right to reach the defendant's house along Kalayaan Avenue. (Id., p. 6) When they reached the apartment house, Karen noticed that defendant's alleged niece was not outside the house but defendant told her maybe his niece was inside. When Karen did not see the alleged niece inside the house, defendant told her maybe his niece was upstairs, and invited Karen to go upstairs. (Id., p. 7) Upon entering the bedroom defendant suddenly locked the door. Karen became nervous because his niece was not there. Defendant got a piece of cotton cord and tied Karen's hands with it, and then he undressed her. Karen cried for help but defendant strangled her. He took a packing tape and he covered her mouth with it and he circled it around her head. (Id., p. 7) Then, defendant suddenly pushed Karen towards the bed which was just near the door. He tied her feet and hands spread apart to the bed posts. He knelt in front of her and inserted his finger in her sex organ. She felt severe pain. She tried to shout but no sound could come out because there were tapes on her mouth. When defendant withdrew his finger it was full of blood and Karen felt more pain after the withdrawal of the finger. (Id., p. 8) He then got a Johnson's Baby Oil and he applied it to his sexorgan as well as to her sex organ. After that he forced his sex organ into her but he was not able to do so. While he was doing it, Karen found it difficult to breathe and she perspired a lot while feeling severe pain. She merely presumed that he was able to insert his sexorgan a little, because she could not see. Karen could not recall how long the defendant was in that position. (Id. pp. 8-9) After that, he stood up and went to the bathroom to wash. He also told Karen to take a shower and he untied her hands. Karen could only hear the sound of the water while the defendant, she presumed, was in the bathroom washing his sex organ. When she took a shower more blood came out from her. In the meantime, defendant changed the mattress because it was full of blood. After the shower, Karen was allowed by defendant to sleep. She fell asleep because she got tired crying. The incident happened at about 4:00 p.m. Karen had no way of determining the exact time because defendant removed her watch. Defendant did not care to give her food before she went to sleep. Karen woke up at about 8:00 o'clock the following morning. (Id., pp. 9-10) The following day, February 5, 1989, a Sunday, after a breakfast of biscuit and coke at about 8:30 to 9:00 a.m. defendant raped Karen while she was still bleeding. For lunch, they also took biscuit and coke. She was raped for the second time at about 12:00 to 2:00 p.m. In the evening, they had rice for dinner which defendant had stored downstairs; it was he who cooked the rice that is why it looks like "lugaw". For the third time, Karen was raped again during the night. During those three times defendant succeeded in inserting his sex organ but she could not say whether the organ was inserted wholly. Karen did not see any firearm or any bladed weapon. The defendant did not tie her hands and feet nor put a tape on her mouth anymore but she did not cry for help for fear that she might be killed; besides, all the windows and doors were closed. And even if she shouted for help, nobody would hear her. She was so afraid that if somebody would hear her and would be able to call the police, it was still possible that as she was still inside the house, defendant might kill her. Besides, the defendant did not leave that Sunday, ruling out her chance to call for help. At nighttime he slept with her again. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 12-14) On February 6, 1989, Monday, Karen was raped three times, once in the morning for thirty minutes after a breakfast of biscuits; again in the afternoon; and again in the evening. At first, Karen did not know that there was a window because everything was covered by a carpet, until defendant opened the window for around fifteen minutes or less to let some air in, and she found that the window was covered by styrofoam and plywood. After that, he again closed the window with a hammer and he put the styrofoam, plywood, and carpet back. (Id., pp. 14-15)
- 20. That Monday evening,Karen had a chance to call for help, although defendant left but kept the door closed. She went to the bathroomand saw a small window covered by styrofoam and she also spotted a small hole. She stepped on the bowl and she cried for help through the hole. She cried: "Maawa no po kayo so akin. Tulungan n'yo akong makalabas dito. Kinidnap ako!" Somebody heard her. It was a woman, probably a neighbor, but she got angry and said she was "istorbo". Karen pleaded for help and the woman told her to sleep and she will call the police. She finally fell asleep but no policeman came. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 15-16) She woke up at 6:00 o'clock the following morning, and she saw defendant in bed, this time sleeping. She waited for him to wake up. When he woke up, he again got some food but he always kept the door locked. As usual, she was merely fed with biscuit and coke. On that day, February 7, 1989, she was again raped three times. The first at about 6:30 to 7:00 a.m., the second at about 8:30 — 9:00, and the third was after lunch at 12:00 noon. After he had raped her for the second time he left but only for a short while. Upon his return, he caught her shouting for help but he did not understand what she was shouting about. After she was raped the third time, he left the house. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, pp. 16-17) She again went to the bathroomand shouted for help. After shouting for about five minutes, she heard many voices. The voices were asking for her name and she gave her name as Karen Salvacion. After a while, she heard a voice of a woman saying they will just call the police. They were also telling her to change her clothes. She went from the bathroom to the roombut she did not change her clothes being afraid that should the neighbors call for the police and the defendant see her in different clothes, he might kill her. At that time she was wearing a T-shirt of the American because the latter washed her dress. (Id., p. 16) Afterwards, defendant arrived and he opened the door. He asked her if she had asked for help because there were many policemen outside and she denied it. He told her to change her clothes, and she did change to the one she was wearing on Saturday. He instructed her to tell the police that she left home and willingly; then he went downstairs but he locked the door. She could hear people conversing but she could not understand what they were saying. (Id., p. 19) When she heard the voices of many people who were conversing downstairs, she knocked repeatedly at the door as hard as she could. She heard somebody going upstairs and when the door was opened, she saw a policeman. The policeman asked her name and the reason why she was there. She told him she was kidnapped. Downstairs, he saw about five policemen in uniform and the defendant was talking to them. "Nakikipag- areglo po sa mga pulis," Karen added. "The policeman told him to just explain at the precinct. (Id., p. 20) They went out of the house and she saw some of her neighbors in front of the house. They rode the car of a certain person she called Kuya Boy together with defendant, the policeman, and two of her neighbors whomshe called Kuya Bong Lacson and one Ate Nita. They were brought to Sub- Station I and there she was investigated by a policeman. At about 2:00 a.m., her father arrived, followed by her mother together with some of their neighbors. Then they were brought to the second floor of the police headquarters. (Id., p. 21) At the headquarters, she was asked several questions by the investigator. The written statement she gave to the police was marked as Exhibit A. Then they proceeded to the National Bureau of Investigation together with the investigator and her parents. At the NBI, a doctor, a medico-legal officer, examined her private parts. It was already 3:00 in the early morning of the following day when they reached the NBI. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 22) The findings of the medico-legal officer has been marked as Exhibit B. She was studying at the St. Mary's Academy in Pasay City at the time of the incident but she subsequently transferred to Apolinario Mabini, Arellano University, situated along Taft Avenue, because she was ashamed to be the subject of conversation in the school. She first applied for transfer to Jose Abad Santos, Arellano University along Taft Avenue near the Light Rail Transit Station but she was denied admission after she told the school the true reason for her transfer. The reason for their denial was that they might be implicated in the case. (TSN, Aug. 15, 1989, p. 46) xxx xxx xxx After the incident, Karen has changed a lot. She does not play with her brother and sister anymore, and she is always in a state of shock; she has been absent-minded and is ashamed even to go out of the house. (TSN, Sept. 12, 1989, p. 10) She appears to be restless or sad, (Id., p. 11) The father prays for P500,000.00 moral damages for Karen for this shocking
- 21. experience which probably,she would always recall until she reaches old age, and he is not sure if she could ever recover fromthis experience. (TSN, Sept. 24, 1989, pp. 10-11) Pursuant to an Order granting leave to publish notice of decision, said notice was published in the Manila Bulletin once a week for three consecutive weeks. After the lapse of fifteen (15) days from the date of the last publication of the notice of judgment and the decision of the trial court had become final, petitioners tried to execute on Bartelli's dollar deposit with China Banking Corporation. Likewise, the bank invoked Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960. Thus, petitioners decided to seek relief from this Court. The issues raised and the arguments articulated by the parties boil down to two: May this Court entertain the instant petition despite the fact that original jurisdiction in petitions for declaratory relief rests with the lower court? Should Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and Section 8 of R.A. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, otherwise known as the Foreign Currency Deposit Act be made applicable to a foreign transient? Petitioners aver as heretofore stated that Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 providing that "Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever." should be adjudged as unconstitutional on the grounds that: 1.) it has taken away the right of petitioners to have the bank deposit of defendant Greg Bartelli y Northcott garnished to satisfy the judgment rendered in petitioners' favor in violation of substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution; 2.) it has given foreign currency depositors an undue favor or a class privilege in violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution; 3.) it has provided a safe haven for criminals like the herein respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott since criminals could escape civil liability for their wrongful acts by merely converting their money to a foreign currency and depositing it in a foreign currency deposit account with an authorized bank; and 4.) The Monetary Board, in issuing Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 has exceeded its delegated quasi- legislative power when it took away: a.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the claim sought to be enforced by the civil action secured by way of the writ of preliminary attachment as granted by Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court; b.) the plaintiffs substantive right to have the judgment credit satisfied by way of the writ of execution out of the bank deposit of the judgment debtor as granted to the judgment creditor by Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court, which is beyond its power to do so. On the other hand, respondent Central Bank, in its Comment alleges that the Monetary Board in issuing Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 did not exceed its power or authority because the subject Section is copied verbatim from a portion of R.A. No. 6426 as amended by P.D. 1246. Hence, it was not the Monetary Board that grants exemption from attachment or garnishment to foreign currency deposits, but the law (R.A. 6426 as amended) itself; that it does not violate the substantive due process guaranteed by the Constitution because a.) it was based on a law; b.) the law seems to be reasonable; c.) it is enforced according to regular methods of procedure; and d.) it applies to all members of a class. Expanding, the Central Bank said; that one reason for exempting the foreign currency deposits from attachment, garnishment or any other order or process of any court, is to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines; that another reason is to encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions thereby placing s uch institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; that the subject section is being enforced according to the regular methods of procedure; and that it applies to all foreign currency deposits made by any person and therefore does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Respondent Central Bank further avers that the questioned provision is needed to promote the public interest and the general welfare; that the State cannot just stand idly by while a considerable segment of the society suffers fromeconomic distress; that the State had to take some measures to encourage economic development; and that in so doing persons and property may be subjected to some kinds of restraints or burdens to secure the general welfare or public interest. Respondent Central Bank also alleges that Rule 39 and Rule 57 of the Revised Rules of Court provide that some properties are exempted fromexecution/attachment especially provided by law and R.A. No. 6426 as amended is such a law, in that it specifically provides, among others, that foreign currency deposits shall be exempted from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. For its part, respondent China Banking Corporation, aside from giving reasons similar to that of respondent Central Bank, also stated that respondent China Bank is not unmindful of the inhuman sufferings experienced by the minor Karen E. Salvacion from the beastly hands of Greg Bartelli; that it is only too willing to release the dollar deposit of Bartelli which may perhaps partly mitigate the sufferings petitioner has undergone; but it is restrained fromdoing so in view of R.A. No. 6426 and Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960; and that despite the harsh effect of these laws on petitioners, CBC has no other alternative but to follow the same.
- 22. This Court findsthe petition to be partly meritorious. Petitioner deserves to receive the damages awarded to her by the court. But this petition for declaratory relief can only be entertained and treated as a petition for mandamus to require respondents to honor and comply with the writ of execution in Civil Case No. 89-3214. This Court has no original and exclusive jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief. 2 However, exceptions to this rule have been recognized. Thus, where the petition has far- reaching implications and raises questions that should be resolved, it may be treated as one for mandamus.3 Here is a child, a 12-year old girl, who in her belief that all Americans are good and in her gesture of kindness by teaching his alleged niece the Filipino language as requested by the American, trustingly went with said stranger to his apartment, and there she was raped by said American tourist Greg Bartelli. Not once, but ten times. She was detained therein for four (4) days. This American tourist was able to escape from the jail and avoid punishment. On the other hand, the child, having received a favorable judgment in the Civil Case for damages in the amount of more than P1,000,000.00, which amount could alleviate the humiliation, anxiety, and besmirched reputation she had suffered and may continue to suffer for a long, long time; and knowing that this person who had wronged her has the money, could not, however get the award of damages because of this unreasonable law. This questioned law, therefore makes futile the favorable judgment and award of damages that she and her parents fully deserve. As stated by the trial court in its decision, Indeed, after hearing the testimony of Karen, the Court believes that it was undoubtedly a shocking and traumatic experience she had undergone which could haunt her mind for a long, long time, the mere recall of which could make her feel so humiliated, as in fact she had been actually humiliated once when she was refused admission at the Abad Santos High School, Arellano University, where she sought to transfer from another school, simply because the school authorities of the said High School learned about what happened to her and allegedly feared that they might be implicated in the case. xxx xxx xxx The reason for imposing exemplary or corrective damages is due to the wanton and bestial manner defendant had committed the acts of rape during a period of serious illegal detention of his hapless victim, the minor Karen Salvacion whose only fault was in her being so naive and credulous to believe easily that defendant, an American national, could not have such a bestial desire on her nor capable of committing such a heinous crime. Being only 12 years old when that unfortunate incident happened, she has never heard of an old Filipino adage that in every forest there is a snake, . . . . 4 If Karen's sad fate had happened to anybody's own kin, it would be difficult for himto fathom how the incentive for foreign currency deposit could be more important than his child's rights to said award of damages; in this case, the victim's claim for damages fromthis alien who had the gall to wrong a child of tender years of a country where he is a mere visitor. This further illustrates the flaw in the questioned provisions. It is worth mentioning that R.A. No. 6426 was enacted in 1983 or at a time when the country's economy was in a shambles; when foreign investments were minimal and presumably, this was the reason why said statute was enacted. But the realities of the present times show that the country has recovered economically; and even if not, the questioned law still denies those entitled to due process of law for being unreasonable and oppressive. The intention of the questioned law may be good when enacted. The law failed to anticipate the iniquitous effects producing outright injustice and inequality such as the case before us. It has thus been said that — But I also know, 5 that laws and institutions must go hand in hand with the progress of the human mind. As that becomes more developed, more enlightened, as new discoveries are made, new truths are disclosed and manners and opinions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also, and keep pace with the times. . . We might as well require a man to wear still the coat which fitted him when a boy, as civilized society to remain ever under the regimen of their barbarous ancestors. In his Comment, the Solicitor General correctly opined, thus: The present petition has far-reaching implications on the right of a national to obtain redress for a wrong committed by an alien who takes refuge under a law and regulation promulgated for a purpose which does not contemplate the application thereof envisaged by the alien. More specifically, the petition raises the question whether the protection against attachment,
- 23. garnishment or othercourtprocess accorded to foreign currency deposits by PD No. 1246 and CB Circular No. 960 applies when the deposit does not come from a lender or investor but from a mere transient or tourist who is not expected to maintain the deposit in the bank for long. The resolution of this question is important for the protection of nationals who are victimized in the forum by foreigners who are merely passing through. xxx xxx xxx . . . Respondents China Banking Corporation and Central Bank of the Philippines refused to honor the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214 on the strength of the following provision of Central Bank Circular No. 960: Sec. 113. Exemption from attachment. — Foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. Central Bank Circular No. 960 was issued pursuant to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 6426: Sec. 7. Rules and Regulations.The Monetary Board of the Central Bank shall promulgate such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act which shall take effect after the publication of such rules and regulations in the Official Gazette and in a newspaper of national circulation for at least once a week for three consecutive weeks. In case the Central Bank promulgates new rules and regulations decreasing the rights of depositors, the rules and regulations at the time the deposit was made shall govern. The aforecited Section 113 was copied from Section 8 of Republic Act NO. 6426, as amended by P.D. 1246, thus: Sec. 8. Secrecy of Foreign Currency Deposits. — All foreign currency deposits authorized under this Act, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, as well as foreign currency deposits authorized under Presidential Decree No. 1034, are hereby declared as and considered of an absolutely confidential nature and, except upon the written permission of the depositor, in no instance shall such foreign currency deposits be examined, inquired or looked into by any person, government official, bureau or office whether judicial or administrative or legislative or any other entity whether public or private: Provided, however, that said foreign currency deposits shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever. The purpose of PD 1246 in according protection against attachment, garnishment and other court process to foreign currency deposits is stated in its whereases, viz.: WHEREAS, under Republic Act No. 6426, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1035, certain Philippine banking institutions and branches of foreign banks are authorized to accept deposits in foreign currency; WHEREAS, under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1034 authorizing the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines, offshore banking units are also authorized to receive foreign currency deposits in certain cases; WHEREAS, in order to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit System and the Offshore Banking System in the Philippines, certain incentives were provided for under the two Systems such as confidentiality of deposits subject to certain exceptions and tax exemptions on the interest income of depositors who are nonresidents and are not engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;
- 24. WHEREAS, making absolutethe protective cloak of confidentiality over such foreign currency deposits, exempting such deposits from tax, and guaranteeing the vested rights of depositors would better encourage the inflow of foreign currency deposits into the banking institutions authorized to accept such deposits in the Philippines thereby placing such institutions more in a position to properly channel the same to loans and investments in the Philippines, thus directly contributing to the economic development of the country; Thus, one of the principal purposes of the protection accorded to foreign currency deposits is "to assure the development and speedy growth of the Foreign Currency Deposit system and the Offshore Banking in the Philippines" (3rd Whereas). The Offshore Banking System was established by PD No. 1034. In turn, the purposes of PD No. 1034 are as follows: WHEREAS, conditions conducive to the establishment of an offshore banking system, such as political stability, a growing economy and adequate communication facilities, among others, exist in the Philippines; WHEREAS, it is in the interest of developing countries to have as wide access as possible to the sources of capital funds for economic development; WHEREAS, an offshore banking system based in the Philippines will be advantageous and beneficial to the country by increasing our links with foreign lenders, facilitating the flow of desired investments into the Philippines, creating employment opportunities and expertise in international finance, and contributing to the national development effort. WHEREAS, the geographical location, physical and human resources, and other positive factors provide the Philippines with the clear potential to develop as another financial center in Asia; On the other hand, the Foreign Currency Deposit system was created by PD. No. 1035. Its purposes are as follows: WHEREAS, the establishment of an offshore banking system in the Philippines has been authorized under a separate decree; WHEREAS, a number of local commercial banks, as depository bank under the Foreign Currency Deposit Act (RA No. 6426), have the resources and managerial competence to more actively engage in foreign exchange transactions and participate in the grant of foreign currency loans to resident corporations and firms; WHEREAS, it is timely to expand the foreign currency lending authority of the said depository banks under RA 6426 and apply to their transactions the same taxes as would be applicable to transaction of the proposed offshore banking units; It is evident from the above [Whereas clauses] that the Offshore Banking System and the Foreign Currency Deposit System were designed to draw deposits from foreign lenders and investors (Vide second Whereas of PD No. 1034; third Whereas of PD No. 1035). It is these deposits that are induced by the two laws and given protection and incentives by them. Obviously, the foreign currency deposit made by a transient or a tourist is not the kind of deposit encouraged by PD Nos. 1034 and 1035 and given incentives and protection by said laws because such depositorstays only for a few days in the country and, therefore, will maintain his deposit in the bank only for a short time. Respondent Greg Bartelli, as stated, is just a tourist or a transient. He deposited his dollars with respondent China Banking Corporation only for safekeeping during his temporary stay in the Philippines.
- 25. For the reasonsstated above, the Solicitor General thus submits that the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli is not entitled to the protection of Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246 against attachment, garnishment or other court processes. 6 In fine, the application of the law depends on the extent of its justice. Eventually, if we rule that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank Circular No. 960 which exempts from attachment, garnishment, or any other order or process of any court, legislative body, government agency or any administrative body whatsoever, is applicable to a foreign transient, injustice would result especially to a citizen aggrieved by a foreign guest like accused Greg Bartelli. This would negate Article 10 of the New Civil Code which provides that "in case of doubt in the interpretation or application of laws, it is presumed that the lawmaking body intended right and justice to prevail. "Ninguno non deue enriquecerse tortizeramente con dano de otro." Simply stated, when the statute is silent or ambiguous, this is one of those fundamental solutions that would respond to the vehement urge of conscience. (Padilla vs. Padilla, 74 Phil. 377). It would be unthinkable, that the questioned Section 113 of Central Bank No. 960 would be used as a device by accused Greg Bartelli for wrongdoing, and in so doing, acquitting the guilty at the expense of the innocent. Call it what it may — but is there no conflict of legal policy here? Dollar against Peso? Upholding the final and executory judgment of the lower court against the Central Bank Circular protecting the foreign depositor? Shielding or protecting the dollar deposit of a transient alien depositor against injustice to a national and victim of a crime? This situation calls for fairness against legal tyranny. We definitely cannot have both ways and rest in the belief that we have served the ends of justice. IN VIEW WHEREOF, the provisions of Section 113 of CB Circular No. 960 and PD No. 1246, insofar as it amends Section 8 of R.A. No. 6426 are hereby held to be INAPPLICABLE to this case because of its peculiar circumstances. Respondents are hereby REQUIRED to COMPLY with the writ of execution issued in Civil Case No. 89-3214, "Karen Salvacion, et al. vs. Greg Bartelli y Northcott, by Branch CXLIV, RTC Makati and to RELEASE to petitioners the dollar deposit of respondent Greg Bartelli y Northcott in such amount as would satisfy the judgment. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 72873 May 28, 1987 CARLOS ALONZO and CASIMIRA ALONZO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and TECLA PADUA, respondents. Perpetuo L.B. Alonzo for petitioners. Luis R. Reyes for private respondent. CRUZ, J.: The question is sometimes asked, in serious inquiry or in curious conjecture, whether we are a court of law or a court of justice. Do we apply the law even if it is unjust or do we administer justice even against the law? Thus queried, we do not equivocate. The answer is that we do neither because we are a court both of law and of justice. We apply the law with justice for that is our mission and purpose in the scheme of our Republic. This case is an illustration. Five brothers and sisters inherited in equal pro indiviso shares a parcel of land registered in 'the name of their deceased parents under OCT No. 10977 of the Registry of Deeds of Tarlac. 1 On March 15, 1963, one of them, Celestino Padua, transferred his undivided share of the herein petitioners for the sum of P550.00 by way of absolute sale. 2 One year later, on April 22, 1964, Eustaquia Padua, his sister, sold her own share to the same vendees, in an instrument denominated "Con Pacto de Retro Sale," for the sum of P 440.00. 3 By virtue of such agreements, the petitioners occupied, after the said sales, an area corresponding to two-fifths of the said lot, representing the portions sold to them. The vendees subsequently enclosed the same with a fence. In 1975, with their consent, their son Eduardo Alonzo and his wife built a semi-concrete house on a part of the enclosed area. 4 On February 25, 1976, Mariano Padua, one of the five coheirs, sought to redeemthe area sold to the spouses Alonzo, but his complaint was dismissed when it appeared that he was an American citizen . 5 On May 27, 1977, however, Tecla Padua, another co-heir, filed her own complaint invoking the same right of redemption claimed by her brother. 6
- 26. The trial court* also dismiss this complaint, now on the ground that the right had lapsed, not having been exercised within thirty days from notice of the sales in 1963 and 1964. Although there was no written notice, it was held that actual knowledge of the sales by the co-heirs satisfied the requirement of the law. 7 In truth, such actual notice as acquired by the co-heirs cannot be plausibly denied. The other co-heirs, including Tecla Padua, lived on the same lot, which consisted of only 604 square meters, including the portions sold to the petitioners . 8 Eustaquia herself, who had sold her portion, was staying in the same house with her sister Tecla, who later claimed redemption petition. 9 Moreover, the petitioners and the private respondents were close friends and neighbors whose children went to school together. 10 It is highly improbable that the other co-heirs were unaware of the sales and that they thought, as they alleged, that the area occupied by the petitioners had merely been mortgaged by Celestino and Eustaquia. In the circumstances just narrated, it was impossible for Tecla not to know that the area occupied by the petitioners had been purchased by themfromthe other. co- heirs. Especially significant was the erection thereon of the permanent semi-concrete structure by the petitioners' son, which was done without objection on her part or of any of the other co-heirs. The only real question in this case, therefore, is the correct interpretation and application of the pertinent law as invoked, interestingly enough, by both the petitioners and the private respondents. This is Article 1088 of the Civil Code, providing as follows: Art. 1088. Should any of the heirs sell his hereditary rights to a stranger before the partition, any or all of the co-heirs may be subrogated to the rights of the purchaser by reimbursing him for the price of the sale, provided they do so within the period of one month fromthe time they were notified in writing of the sale by the vendor. In reversing the trial court, the respondent court ** declared that the notice required by the said article was written notice and that actual notice would not suffice as a substitute. Citing the same case of De Conejero v. Court of Appeals 11 applied by the trial court, the respondent court held that that decision, interpreting a like rule in Article 1623, stressed the need for written notice although no particular form was required. Thus, according to Justice J.B.L. Reyes, who was the ponente of the Court, furnishing the co- heirs with a copy of the deed of sale of the property subject to redemption would satisfy the requirement for written notice. "So long, therefore, as the latter (i.e., the redemptioner) is informed in writing of the sale and the particulars thereof," he declared, "the thirty days for redemption start running. " In the earlier decision of Butte v. UY, 12 " the Court, speaking through the same learned jurist, emphasized that the written notice should be given by the vendor and not the vendees, conformably to a similar requirement under Article 1623, reading as follows: Art. 1623. The right of legal pre-emption or redemption shall not be exercised except within thirty days from the notice in writing by the prospective vendor, or by the vendors, as the case may be. The deed of sale shall not be recorded in the Registry of Property, unless accompanied by an affidavit of the vendor that he has given written notice thereof to all possible redemptioners. The right of redemption of co-owners excludes that of the adjoining owners. As "it is thus apparent that the Philippine legislature in Article 1623 deliberately selected a particular method of giving notice, and that notice must be deemed exclusive," the Court held that notice given by the vendees and not the vendor would not toll the running of the 30-day period. The petition before us appears to be an illustration of the Holmes dictum that "hard cases make bad laws" as the petitioners obviously cannot argue against the fact that there was really no written notice given by the vendors to their co-heirs. Strictly applied and interpreted, Article 1088 can lead to only one conclusion, to wit, that in view of such deficiency, the 30 day period for redemption had not begun to run, much less expired in 1977. But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results; and likewise, we may add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the in tent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice. Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because of its peculiar circumstances. In such a situation, we are not bound, because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do
- 27. instead is finda balance between the word and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed. As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it is worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of a law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes again, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond them." 13 While we admittedly may not legislate, we nevertheless have the power to interpret the law in such a way as to reflect the will of the legislature. While we may not read into the law a purpose that is not there, we nevertheless have the right to read out of it the reason for its enactment. In doing so, we defer not to "the letter that killeth" but to "the spirit that vivifieth," to give effect to the law maker's will. The spirit, rather than the letter of a statute determines its construction, hence, a statute must be read according to its spirit or intent. For what is within the spirit is within the letter but although it is not within the letter thereof, and that which is within the letter but not within the spirit is not within the statute. Stated differently, a thing which is within the intent of the lawmaker is as much within the statute as if within the letter; and a thing which is within the letter of the statute is not within the statute unless within the intent of the lawmakers. 14 In requiring written notice, Article 1088 seeks to ensure that the redemptioner is properly notified of the sale and to indicate the date of such notice as the starting time of the 30-day period of redemption. Considering the shortness of the period, it is really necessary, as a general rule, to pinpoint the precise date it is supposed to begin, to obviate any problemof alleged delays, sometimes consisting of only a day or two. The instant case presents no such problem because the right of redemption was invoked not days but years after the sales were made in 1963 and 1964. The complaint was filed by Tecla Padua in 1977, thirteen years after the first sale and fourteen years after the second sale. The delay invoked by the petitioners extends to more than a decade, assuming of course that there was a valid notice that tolled the running of the period of redemption. Was there a valid notice? Granting that the law requires the notice to be written, would such notice be necessary in this case? Assuming there was a valid notice although it was not in writing. would there be any question that the 30-day period for redemption had expired long before the complaint was filed in 1977? In the face of the established facts, we cannot accept the private respondents' pretense that they were unaware of the sales made by their brother and sister in 1963 and 1964. By requiring written proof of such notice, we would be closing our eyes to the obvious truth in favor of their palpably false claim of ignorance, thus exalting the letter of the law over its purpose. The purpose is clear enough: to make sure that the redemptioners are duly notified. We are satisfied that in this case the other brothers and sisters were actually informed, although not in writing, of the sales made in 1963 and 1964, and that such notice was sufficient. Now, when did the 30-day period of redemption begin? While we do not here declare that this period started fromthe dates of such sales in 1963 and 1964, we do say that sometime between those years and 1976, when the first complaint for redemption was filed, the other co-heirs were actually informed of the sale and that thereafter the 30-day period started running and ultimately expired. This could have happened any time during the interval of thirteen years, when none of the co-heirs made a move to redeem the properties sold. By 1977, in other words, when Tecla Padua filed her complaint, the right of redemption had already been extinguished because the period for its exercise had already expired. The following doctrine is also worth noting: While the general rule is, that to charge a party with laches in the assertion of an alleged right it is essential that he should have knowledge of the facts upon which he bases his claim, yet if the circumstances were such as should have induced inquiry, and the means of ascertaining the truth were readily available upon inquiry, but the party neglects to make it, he will be chargeable with laches, the same as if he had known the facts. 15 It was the perfectly natural thing for the co-heirs to wonder why the spouses Alonzo, who were not among them, should enclose a portion of the inherited lot and build thereon a house of strong materials. This definitely was not the act of a temporary possessor or a mere mortgagee. This certainly looked like an act of ownership. Yet, given this unseemly situation, none of the co-heirs saw fit to object or at least inquire, to ascertain the facts, which were readily available. It took all of thirteen years before one of them chose to claim the right of redemption, but then it was already too late. We realize that in arriving at our conclusion today, we are deviating from the strict letter of the law, which the respondent court understandably applied pursuant to existing
- 28. jurisprudence. The saidcourt acted properly as it had no competence to reverse the doctrines laid down by this Court in the above-cited cases. In fact, and this should be clearly stressed, we ourselves are not abandoning the De Conejero and Buttle doctrines. What we are doing simply is adopting an exception to the general rule, in view of the peculiar circumstances of this case. The co-heirs in this case were undeniably informed of the sales although no notice in writing was given them. And there is no doubt either that the 30-day period began and ended during the 14 years between the sales in question and the filing of the complaint for redemption in 1977, without the co-heirs exercising their right of redemption. These are the justifications for this exception. More than twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render every one his due." 16 That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the law in every case brought to it for decision. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrants, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention of the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice. So we have done in this case. WHEREFORE, the petition is granted. The decision of the respondent court is REVERSED and that of the trial court is reinstated,without any pronouncement as to costs.It is so ordered. G.R. No. 112099 February 21, 1995 ACHILLES C. BERCES, SR., petitioner, vs. HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, JR., CHIEF PRESIDENTIAL LEGAL COUNSEL ANTONIO CARPIO and MAYOR NAOMI C. CORRAL OF TIWI, ALBAY, respondents. QUIASON, J.: This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court with prayer for mandatory preliminary injunction, assailing the Orders of the Office of the President as having been issued with grave abuses of discretion. Said Orders directed the stay of execution of the decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan suspending the Mayor of Tiwi, Albay from office. I Petitioner filed two administrative cases against respondent Naomi C. Corral, the incumbent Mayor of Tiwi, Albay with the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay, to wit: (1) Administrative Case No. 02-92 for abuse of authority and/or oppression for non-payment of accrued leave benefits due the petitioner amounting to P36,779.02. (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 for dishonesty and abuse of authority for installing a water pipeline which is being operated, maintained and paid for by the municipality to service respondent's private residence and medical clinic. On July 1, 1993, the Sangguniang Panlalawigan disposed the two Administrative cases in the following manner: (1) Administrative Case No. 02-92
- 29. ACCORDINGLY, respondent MayorNaomi C. Corral of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby ordered to pay Achilles Costo Berces, Sr. the sum of THIRTY-SIX THOUSAND AND SEVEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-NINE PESOS and TWO CENTAVOS (P36,779.02) per Voucher No. 352, plus legal interest due thereon from the time it was approved in audit up to final payment, it being legally due the Complainant representing the money value of his leave credits accruing for services rendered in the municipality from 1988 to 1992 as a duly elected Municipal Councilor. IN ADDITION, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL is hereby ordered SUSPENDED from office as Municipal Mayor of Tiwi, Albay, for a period of two (2) months, effective upon receipt hereof for her blatant abuse of authority coupled with oppression as a public example to deter others similarly inclined fromusing public office as a tool for personal vengeance, vindictiveness and oppression at the expense of the Taxpayer (Rollo, p. 14). (2) Administrative Case No. 05-92 WHEREFORE, premises considered, respondent Mayor NAOMI C. CORRAL of Tiwi, Albay, is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of SUSPENSION from office as Municipal Mayor thereof for a period of THREE (3) MONTHS beginning after her service of the first penalty of suspension ordered in Administrative Case No. 02-92. She is likewise ordered to reimburse the Municipality of Tiwi One-half of the amount the latter have paid for electric and water bills from July to December 1992, inclusive (Rollo, p. 16). Consequently, respondent Mayor appealed to the Office of the President questioning the decision and at the same time prayed for the stay of execution thereof in accordance with Section 67(b) of the Local Government Code, which provides: Administrative Appeals. — Decision in administrative cases may, within thirty (30) days from receipt thereof, be appealed to the following: xxx xxx xxx (b) The Office of the President, in the case of decisions of the sangguniang panlalawigan and the sangguniang panglungsod of highly urbanized cities and independent component cities. Acting on the prayer to stay execution during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President issued an Order on July 28, 1993, the pertinent portions of which read as follows: xxx xxx xxx The stay of the execution is governed by Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 dated 12 February 1987, quoted below: Sec. 68. Execution Pending Appeal. — An appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory. The respondent shall be considered as having been placed under preventive suspension during the pendency of an appeal in the events he wins such appeal. In the event the appeal results in an exoneration, he shall be paid his salary and such other emoluments during the pendency of the appeal (R.A. No. 7160). Sec. 6 Except as otherwise provided by special laws, the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed from is stayed upon filing of the appeal within the period prescribed herein. However, in all cases, at any time during the pendency of the appeal, the Office of the President may direct or stay the execution of the decision/resolution/order appealed fromupon such terms and conditions as it may deem just and reasonable (Adm. Order No. 18). xxx xxx xxx After due consideration, and in the light of the Petition for Review filed before this Office, we find that a stay of execution pending appeal would be just and reasonable to prevent undue prejudice to public interest. WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Office hereby orders the suspension/stay of execution of: a) the Decision of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case No. 02-92 dated 1 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of two (2) months, and
- 30. b) the Resolutionof the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Albay in Administrative Case. No. 05-92 dated 5 July 1993 suspending Mayor Naomi C. Corral from office for a period of three (3) months (Rollo, pp. 55-56). Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration questioning the aforesaid Order of the Office of the President. On September 13, 1990, the Motion for Reconsideration was denied. Hence, this petition. II Petitioner claims that the governing law in the instant case is R.A. No. 7160, which contains a mandatory provision that an appeal "shall not prevent a decision from becoming final and executory." He argues that administrative Order No. 18 dated February 12, 1987, (entitle "Prescribing the Rules and Regulations Governing Appeals to Office the President") authorizing the President to stay the execution of the appealed decision at any time during the pendency of the appeal, was repealed by R.A. No. 7160, which took effect on January 1, 1991 (Rollo, pp. 5-6). The petition is devoid of merit. Petitioner invokes the repealing clause of Section 530 (f), R.A. No. 7160, which provides: All general and special laws, acts, city charters, decrees, executive orders, administrative regulations, part or parts thereof, which are incosistent with any of the provisions of this Code, are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The aforementioned clause is not an express repeal of Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 because it failed to identify or designate the laws or executive orders that are intended to be repealed (cf. I Sutherland, Statutory Construction 467 [1943]). If there is any repeal of Administrative Order No. 18 by R.A. No. 7160, it is through implication though such kind of repeal is not favored (The Philippine American Management Co., Inc. v. The Philippine American Management Employees Association, 49 SCRA 194 [1973]). There is even a presumption against implied repeal. An implied repeal predicates the intended repeal upon the condition that a substantial conflict must be found between the new and prior laws. In the absence of an express repeal, a subsequent law cannot be construed as repealing a prior law unless an irreconcible inconsistency and repugnancy exists in the terms of the new and old laws (Iloilo Palay and Corn Planters Association, Inc. v. Feliciano, 13 SCRA 377 [1965]). The two laws must be absolutely incompatible (Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector of Customs, 46 Phil. 8 [1924]). There must be such a repugnancy between the laws that they cannot be made to stand together (Crawford, Construction of Statutes 631 [1940]). We find that the provisions of Section 68 of R.A. No. 7160 and Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18 are not irreconcillably inconsistent and repugnant and the two laws must in fact be read together. The first sentence of Section 68 merely provides that an "appeal shall not prevent a decision from becoming final or executory." As worded, there is room to construe said provision as giving discretion to the reviewing officials to stay the execution of the appealed decision. There is nothing to infer therefrom that the reviewing officials are deprived of the authority to order a stay of the appealed order. If the intention of Congress was to repeal Section 6 of Administrative Order No. 18, it could have used more direct language expressive of such intention. The execution of decisions pending appeal is procedural and in the absence of a clear legislative intent to remove from the reviewing officials the authority to order a stay of execution, such authority can provided in the rules and regulations governing the appeals of elective officials in administrative cases. The term "shall" may be read either as mandatory or directory depending upon a consideration of the entire provisions in which it is found,its object and the consequences that would follow from construing it one way or the other (cf. De Mesa v. Mencias, 18 SCRA 533 [1966]). In the case at bench, there is no basis to justify the construction of the word as mandatory. The Office of the President made a finding that the execution of the decision of the Sagguniang Panlalawigan suspending respondent Mayor from office might be prejudicial to the public interest. Thus, in order not to disrupt the rendition of service by the mayor to the public, a stay of the execution of the decision is in order.
- 31. WHEREFORE, the petitionis DISMISSED. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 103982 December 11, 1992 ANTONIO A. MECANO, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondent. CAMPOS, JR., J.: Antonio A. Mecano, through a petition for certiorari, seeks to nullify the decision of the Commission on Audit (COA, for brevity) embodied in its 7th Indorsement, dated January 16, 1992, denying his claim for reimbursement under Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code (RAC), as amended, in the total amount of P40,831.00. Petitioner is a Director II of the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI). He was hospitalized for cholecystitis from March 26, 1990 to April 7, 1990, on account of which he incurred medical and hospitalization expenses, the total amount of which he is claiming from the COA. On May 11, 1990, in a memorandum to the NBI Director, Alfredo S. Lim (Director Lim, for brevity), he requested reimbursement for his expenses on the ground that he is entitled to the benefits under Section 699 1 of the RAC, the pertinent provisions of which read: Sec. 699. Allowances in case of injury, death, or sickness incurred in performance of duty. — When a person in the service of the national government of a province, city, municipality or municipal district is so injured in the performance of duty as thereby to receive some actual physical hurt or wound, the proper Head of Department may direct that absence during any period of disability thereby occasioned shall be on full pay, though not more than six months, and in such case he may in his discretion also authorize the payment of the medical attendance, necessary transportation, subsistence and hospital fees of the injured person. Absence in the case contemplated shall be charged first against vacation leave, if any there be. xxx xxx xxx
- 32. In case ofsickness caused by or connected directly with the performance of some act in the line of duty, the Department head may in his discretion authorize the payment of the necessary hospital fees. Director Lim then forwarded petitioner's claim, in a 1st Indorsement dated June 22, 1990, to the Secretary of Justice, along with the comment, bearing the same date, of Gerarda Galang, Chief, LED of the NBI, "recommending favorable action thereof". Finding petitioner's illness to be service-connected, the Committee on Physical Examination of the Department of Justice favorably recommended the payment of petitioner's claim. However, then Undersecretary of Justice Silvestre H. Bello III, in a 4th Indorsement dated November 21, 1990, returned petitioner's claim to Director Lim, having considered the statements of the Chairman of the COA in its 5th Indorsement dated 19 September 1990, to the effect that the RAC being relied upon was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987. Petitioner then re-submitted his claim to Director Lim, with a copy of Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 2 dated April 26, 1991 of then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon (Secretary Drilon, for brevity) stating that "the issuance of the Administrative Code did not operate to repeal or abregate in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code, including the particular Section 699 of the latter". On May 10, 1991, Director Lim, under a 5th Indorsement transmitted anew Mecano's claim to then Undersecretary Bello for favorable consideration. Under a 6th Indorsement, dated July 2, 1991, Secretary Drilon forwarded petitioner's claim to the COA Chairman, recommending payment of the same. COA Chairman Eufemio C. Domingo, in his 7th Indorsement of January 16, 1992, however, denied petitioner's claim on the ground that Section 699 of the RAC had been repealed by the Administrative Code of 1987, solely for the reason that the same section was not restated nor re-enacted in the Administrative Code of 1987. He commented, however, that the claim may be filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, considering that the illness of Director Mecano occurred after the effectivity of the Administrative Code of 1987. Eventually, petitioner's claim was returned by Undersecretary of Justice Eduardo Montenegro to Director Lim under a 9th Indorsement dated February 7, 1992, with the advice that petitioner "elevate the matter to the Supreme Court if he so desires". On the sole issue of whether or not the Administrative Code of 1987 repealed or abrogated Section 699 of the RAC, this petition was brought for the consideration of this Court. Petitioner anchors his claim on Section 699 of the RAC, as amended, and on the aforementioned Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of Secretary Drilon. He further maintains that in the event that a claim is filed with the Employees' Compensation Commission, as suggested by respondent, he would still not be barred from filing a claim under the subject section. Thus, the resolution of whether or not there was a repeal of the Revised Administrative Code of 1917 would decide the fate of petitioner's claim for reimbursement. The COA, on the other hand, strongly maintains that the enactment of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Exec. Order No. 292) operated to revoke or supplant in its entirety the Revised Administrative Code of 1917. The COA claims that from the "whereas" clauses of the new Administrative Code, it can be gleaned that it was the intent of the legislature to repeal the old Code. Moreover, the COA questions the applicability of the aforesaid opinion of the Secretary of Justice in deciding the matter. Lastly, the COA contends that employment-related sickness, injury or death is adequately covered by the Employees' Compensation Program under P.D. 626, such that to allow simultaneous recovery of benefits under both laws on account of the same contingency would be unfair and unjust to the Government. The question of whether a particular law has been repealed or not by a subsequent law is a matter of legislative intent. The lawmakers may expressly repeal a law by incorporating therein a repealing provision which expressly and specifically cites the particular law or laws, and portions thereof, that are intended to be repealed. 3 A declaration in a statute, usually in its repealing clause, that a particular and specific law, identified by its number or title, is repealed is an express repeal; all others are implied repeals. 4 In the case of the two Administrative Codes in question, the ascertainment of whether or not it was the intent of the legislature to supplant the old Code with the new Code partly depends on the scrutiny of the repealing clause of the new Code. This provision is found in Section 27, Book VII (Final Provisions) of the Administrative Code of 1987 which reads: Sec. 27. Repealing Clause. — All laws, decrees, orders, rules and regulations, or portions thereof, inconsistent with this Code are hereby repealed or modified accordingly. The question that should be asked is: What is the nature of this repealing clause? It is certainly not an express repealing clause because it fails to identify or designate the act or acts that are intended to be repealed. 5 Rather, it is an example of a general repealing provision, as stated in Opinion No. 73, S. 1991. It is a clause which predicates the intended repeal under the condition that substantial conflict must be found in existing and prior acts. The failure to add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
- 33. irreconcilable inconcistency andrepugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.6 This latter situation falls under the category of an implied repeal. Repeal by implication proceeds on the premise that where a statute of later date clearly reveals an intention on the part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject, that intention must be given effect. 7 Hence, before there can be a repeal, there must be a clear showing on the part of the lawmaker that the intent in enacting the new law was to abrogate the old one. The intention to repeal must be clear and manifest; 8 otherwise, at least, as a general rule, the later act is to be construed as a continuation of, and not a substitute for, the first act and will continue so far as the two acts are the same from the time of the first enactment.9 There are two categories of repeal by implication. The first is where provisions in the two acts on the same subject matter are in an irreconcilable conflict, the later act to the extent of the conflict constitutes an implied repeal of the earlier one. The second is if the later act covers the whole subject of the earlier one and is clearly intended as a substitute, it will operate to repeal the earlier law. 10 Implied repeal by irreconcilable inconsistency takes place when the two statutes cover the same subject matter; they are so clearly inconsistent and incompatible with each other that they cannot be reconciled or harmonized; and both cannot be given effect, that is, that one law cannot be enforced without nullifying the other. 11 Comparing the two Codes, it is apparent that the new Code does not cover nor attempt to cover the entire subject matter of the old Code. There are several matters treated in the old Code which are not found in the new Code, such as the provisions on notaries public, the leave law, the public bonding law, military reservations, claims for sickness benefits under Section 699, and still others. Moreover, the COA failed to demonstrate that the provisions of the two Codes on the matter of the subject claim are in an irreconcilable conflict. In fact, there can be no such conflict because the provision on sickness benefits of the nature being claimed by petitioner has not been restated in the Administrative Code of 1987. However, the COA would have Us consider that the fact that Section 699 was not restated in the Administrative Code of 1987 meant that the same section had been repealed. It further maintained that to allow the particular provisions not restated in the new Code to continue in force argues against the Code itself. The COA anchored this argument on the whereas clause of the 1987 Code, which states: WHEREAS, the effectiveness of the Government will be enhanced by a new Administrative Code which incorporate in a unified document the major structural, functional and procedural principles and rules of governance; and xxx xxx xxx It argues, in effect, that what is contemplated is only one Code — the Administrative Code of 1987. This contention is untenable. The fact that a later enactment may relate to the same subject matter as that of an earlier statute is not of itself sufficient to cause an implied repeal of the prior act, since the new statute may merely be cumulative or a continuation of the old one. 12 What is necessary is a manifest indication of legislative purpose to repeal. 13 We come now to the second category of repeal — the enactment of a statute revising or codifying the former laws on the whole subject matter. This is only possible if the revised statute or code was intended to cover the whole subject to be a complete and perfect systemin itself. It is the rule that a subsequent statute is deemed to repeal a prior law if the former revises the whole subject matter of the former statute. 14 When both intent and scope clearly evidence the idea of a repeal, then all parts and provisions of the prior act that are omitted from the revised act are deemed repealed. 15 Furthermore, before there can be an implied repeal under this category, it must be the clear intent of the legislature that the later act be the substitute to the prior act. 16 According to Opinion No. 73, S. 1991 of the Secretary of Justice, what appears clear is the intent to cover only those aspects of government that pertain to administration, organization and procedure, understandably because ofthe many changes that transpired in the government structure since the enactment of the RAC decades of years ago. The COA challenges the weight that this opinion carries in the determination of this controversy inasmuch as the body which had been entrusted with the implementation of this particular provision has already rendered its decision. The COA relied on the rule in administrative law enunciated in the case of Sison vs. Pangramuyen 17 that in the absence of palpable error or grave abuse of discretion, the Court would be loathe to substitute its own judgment for that of the administrative agency entrusted with the enforcement and implementation of the law. This will not hold water. This principle is subject to limitations. Administrative decisions may be reviewed by the courts upon a showing that the decision is vitiated by fraud, imposition or mistake. 18 It has been held that Opinions of the Secretary and Undersecretary of Justice are material in the construction of statutes in pari materia.19
- 34. Lastly, it isa well-settled rule of statutory construction that repeals of statutes by implication are not favored. 20 The presumption is against inconsistency and repugnancy for the legislature is presumed to know the existing laws on the subject and not to have enacted inconsistent or conflicting statutes.21 This Court, in a case, explains the principle in detail as follows: "Repeals by implication are not favored, and will not be decreed unless it is manifest that the legislature so intended. As laws are presumed to be passed with deliberation with full knowledge of all existing ones on the subject, it is but reasonable to conclude that in passing a statute it was not intended to interfere with or abrogate any former law relating to some matter, unless the repugnancy between the two is not only irreconcilable, but also clear and convincing, and flowing necessarily from the language used, unless the later act fully embraces the subject matter of the earlier, or unless the reason for the earlier act is beyond peradventure renewed. Hence, every effort must be used to make all acts stand and if, by any reasonable construction, they can be reconciled, the later act will not operate as a repeal of the earlier. 22 Regarding respondent's contention that recovery under this subject section shall bar the recovery of benefits under the Employees' Compensation Program, the same cannot be upheld. The second sentence of Article 173, Chapter II, Title II (dealing on Employees' Compensation and State Insurance Fund), Book IV of the Labor Code, as amended by P.D. 1921, expressly provides that "the payment of compensation under this Title shall not bar the recovery of benefits as provided for in Section 699 of the Revised Administrative Code . . . whose benefits are administered by the system(meaning SSS or GSIS) or by other agencies of the government." WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court resolves to GRANT the petition; respondent is hereby ordered to give due course to petitioner's claim for benefits. No costs. SO ORDERED. G.R. No. 123169 November 4, 1996 DANILO E. PARAS, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. R E S O L U T I O N FRANCISCO, J.: Petitioner Danilo E. Paras is the incumbent Punong Barangay of Pula, Cabanatuan City who won during the last regular barangay election in 1994. A petition for his recall as Punong Barangay was filed by the registered voters of the barangay. Acting on the petition for recall, public respondent Commission on Elections (COMELEC) resolved to approve the petition, scheduled the petition signing on October 14, 1995, and set the recall election on November 13, 1995. 1 At least 29.30% of the registered voters signed the petition, well above the 25% requirement provided by law. The COMELEC, however, deferred the recall election in view of petitioner's opposition. On December 6, 1995, the COMELEC set anew the recall election, this time on December 16, 1995. To prevent the holding of the recall election, petitioner filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cabanatuan City a petition for injunction, docketed as SP Civil Action No. 2254-AF, with the trial court issuing a temporary restraining order. After conducting a summary hearing, the trial court lifted the restraining order, dismissed the petition and required petitioner and his counsel to explain why they should not be cited for contempt for misrepresenting that the barangay recall election was without COMELEC approval.2 In a resolution dated January 5, 1996, the COMELEC, for the third time, re-scheduled the recall election an January 13, 1996; hence, the instant petition for certiorari with urgent prayer for injunction. On January 12, 1996, the Court issued a temporary restraining order and required the Office of the Solicitor General, in behalf of public respondent, to comment on the petition. In view of the Office of the Solicitor General's manifestation maintaining an opinion adverse to that of the COMELEC, the latter through its law department filed the required comment. Petitioner thereafter filed a reply. 3 Petitioner's argument is simple and to the point. Citing Section 74 (b) of Republic Act No. 7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code, which states that "no recall shall take
- 35. place within one(1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election", petitioner insists that the scheduled January 13, 1996 recall election is now barred as the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) election was set by Republic Act No. 7808 on the first Monday of May 1996, and every three years thereafter. In support thereof, petitioner cites Associated Labor Union v. Letrondo-Montejo, 237 SCRA 621, where the Court considered the SK election as a regular local election. Petitioner maintains that as the SK election is a regular local election, hence no recall election can be had for barely four months separate the SK election from the recall election. We do not agree. The subject provision of the Local Government Code provides: Sec. 74. Limitations on Recall. — (a) Any elective local official may be the subject of a recall election only once during his term of office for loss of confidence. (b) No recall shall take place within one (1) year from the date of the official's assumption to office or one (1) year immediately preceding a regular local election. [Emphasis added] It is a rule in statutory construction that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with the other parts, and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment. 4 The evident intent of Section 74 is to subject an elective local official to recall election once during his term of office. Paragraph (b) construed together with paragraph (a) merely designates the period when such elective local official may be subject of a recall election, that is, during the second year of his termof office. Thus, subscribing to petitioner's interpretation of the phrase regular local election to include the SK election will unduly circumscribe the novel provision of the Local Government Code on recall, a mode of removal of public officers by initiation of the people before the end of his term. And if the SK election which is set by R.A No. 7808 to be held every three years from May 1996 were to be deemed within the purview of the phrase "regular local election", as erroneously insisted by petitioner, then no recall election can be conducted rendering inutile the recall provision of the Local Government Code. In the interpretation of a statute,the Court should start with the assumption that the legislature intended to enact an effective law, and the legislature is not presumed to have done a vain thing in the enactment of a statute. 5 An interpretation should, if possible, be avoided under which a statute or provision being construed is defeated, or as otherwise expressed, nullified, destroyed, emasculated, repealed, explained away, or rendered insignificant, meaningless, inoperative or nugatory. 6 It is likewise a basic precept in statutory construction that a statute should be interpreted in harmony with the Constitution. 7 Thus, the interpretation of Section 74 of the Local Government Code, specifically paragraph (b) thereof, should not be in conflict with the Constitutional mandate of Section 3 of Article X of the Constitution to "enact a local government code which shall provide for a more responsive and accountable local government structure instituted through a systemof decentralization with effective mechanism of recall, initiative, and referendum . . . ." Moreover, petitioner's too literal interpretation of the law leads to absurdity which we cannot countenance. Thus, in a case, the Court made the following admonition: We admonish against a too-literal reading of the law as this is apt to constrict rather than fulfill its purpose and defeat the intention of its authors. That intention is usually found not in "the letter that killeth but in the spirit that vivifieth". . . 8 The spirit, rather than the letter of a law determines its construction; hence, a statute, as in this case, must be read according to its spirit and intent. Finally, recall election is potentially disruptive of the normal working of the local government unit necessitating additional expenses, hence the prohibition against the conduct of recall election one year immediately preceding the regular local election. The proscription is due to the proximity of the next regular election for the office of the local elective official concerned. The electorate could choose the official's replacement in the said election who certainly has a longer tenure in office than a successor elected through a recall election. It would, therefore, be more in keeping with the intent of the recall provision of the Code to construe regular local election as one referring to an election where the office held by the local elective official sought to be recalled will be contested and be filled by the electorate. Nevertheless, recall at this time is no longer possible because of the limitation stated under Section 74 (b) of the Code considering that the next regular election involving the barangay office concerned is barely seven (7) months away, the same having been scheduled on May 1997. 9
- 36. ACCORDINGLY, the petitionis hereby dismissed for having become moot and academic. The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on January 12, 1996, enjoining the recall election should be as it is hereby made permanent. SO ORDERED. .R. Nos. L-28502-03 April 18, 1989 COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, petitioner, vs. ESSO STANDARD EASTERN, INC. and THE COURT OF TAX APPEALS, respondents. NARVASA, J.: In two (2) cases appealed to it 1 by the private respondent, hereafter simply referred to as ESSO, the Court of Tax Appeals rendered judgment 2 sustaining the decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue excepted to, save "the refund-claim .. in the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest which it ordered refunded to ESSO Reversal of this decision is sought by the Commissioner by a petition for review on certiorari filed with this Court. He ascribes to the Tax Court one sole error: "of applying the tax credit for overpayment of the 1959 income tax of .. ESSO, granted by the petitioner (Commissioner), to .. (ESSO's) basic 1960 deficiency income tax liability x x and imposing the 1-1/2% monthly interests 3 only on the remaining balance thereof in the sum of P146,961.00" 4 (instead of the full amount of the 1960 deficiency liability in the amount of P367,994.00). Reversal of the same judgment of the Court of Tax Appeals is also sought by ESSO in its own appeal (docketed as G.R. Nos. L28508-09); but in the brief filed by it in this case, it indicates that it will not press its appeal in the event that "the instant petition for review be denied and that judgment be rendered affirming the decision of the Court of Tax Appeals." The facts are simple enough and are quite quickly recounted. ESSO overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. It was accordingly granted a tax credit in this amount by the Comissioner on August 5,1964. However, ESSOs payment of its income tax for 1960 was found to be short by P367,994.00. So, on July 10, 1964, the Commissioner wrote to ESSO demanding payment of the deficiency tax, together with interest thereon for the period from April 18,1961 to April 18,1964. On August 10, 1964, ESSO paid under protest the amount alleged to be due, including the interest as reckoned by the Commissioner. It protested the computation of interest, contending it was more than that properly due. It claimed that it should not have been required to pay interest on the total amount of the deficiency tax, P367,994.00, but only on the amount of P146,961.00—representing the difference between
- 37. said deficiency, P367,994.00,and ESSOs earlier overpayment of P221,033.00 (for which it had been granted a taxcredit). ESSO thus asked for a refund. The Internal Revenue Commissioner denied the claim for refund. ESSO appealed to the Court of Tax Appeals. As aforestated. that Court ordered payment to ESSO of its "refund-claim x x in the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest. Hence, this appeal by the Commissioner. The CTA justified its award of the refund as follows: ... In the letter of August 5, 1964, .. (the Commissioner) admitted that .. ESSO had overpaid its 1959 income tax by P221,033.00. Accordingly .. (the Commissioner) granted to .. ESSO a tax credit of P221,033.00. In short, the said sum of P221,033.00 of ESSO's money was in the Government's hands at the latest on July 15, 1960 when it ESSO paid in full its second installment of income tax for 1959. On July 10, 1964 .. (the Commissioner) claimed that for 1960, .. ESSO underpaid its income tax by P367,994.00. However, instead of deducting from P367,994.00 the tax credit of P221,033.00 which .. (the Commissioner) had already admitted was due .. ESSO .. (the Commissioner) still insists in collecting the interest on the full amount of P367,994.00 for the period April 18, 1961 to April 18,1964 when the Government had already in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 of .. ESSOs money even before the latter's income tax for 1960 was due and payable. If the imposition of interest does not amount to a penalty but merely a just compensation to the State for the delay in paying the tax, and for the concomitant use by the taxpayer of funds that rightfully should be in the Government's hand (Castro v. Collector, G.R. No. L-1274, Dec. 28, 1962), the collection of the interest on the full amount of P367,994.00 without deducting first the tax credit of P221,033.00, which has long been in the hands of the Government, becomes erroneous, illegal and arbitrary. .. (ESSO) could hardly be charged of delinquency in paying P221,033.00 out of the deficiency income tax of P367,994.00, for which the State should be compensated by the payment of interest, because the said amount of P221,033.00 was already in the coffers of the Government. Neither could .. ESSO be charged for the concomitant use of funds that rightfully belong to the Government because as early as July 15, 1960, it was the Government that was using .. ESSOs funds of P221,033.00. In the circumstances, we find it unfair and unjust for .. (the Commissioner) to exact the interest on the said sum of P221,033.00 which, after all, was paid to and received by the Government even before the incidence of the deficiency income tax of P367,994.00. (Itogon-Suyoc Mines, Inc. v. Commissioner, C.T.A. Case No. 1327, Sept. 30,1965). On the contrary, the Government should be the first to blaze the trail and set the example of fairness and honest dealing in the administration of tax laws. Accordingly, we hold that the tax credit of P221,033.00 for 1959 should first be deducted from the basic deficiency tax of P367,994.00 for 1960 and the resulting difference of P146,961.00 would be subject to the 18% interest prescribed by Section 51 (d) of the Revenue Code. According to the prayer of ..(ESSO) .. (the Commissioner) is hereby ordered to refund to .. (ESSO) the amount of P39,787.94 as overpaid interest in the settlement of its 1960 income tax liability. However, as the collection of the tax was not attended with arbitrariness because .. (ESSO) itself followed x x (the Commissioner's) manner of computing the tax in paying the sum of P213,189.93 on August 10, 1964, the prayer of .. (ESSO) that it be granted the legal rate of interest on its overpayment of P39,787.94 from August 10, 1964 to the time it is actually refunded is denied. (See Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan Estate, Inc., G.R. No. 1,12752, Jan. 30, 1965). The Commissioner's position is that income taxes are determined and paid on an annual basis, and that such determination and payment of annual taxes are separate and independent transactions; and that a taxcredit could not be so considered until it has been finally approved and the taxpayer duly notified thereof. Since in this case, he argues, the tax credit of P221,033.00 was approved only on August 5, 1964, it could not be availed of in reduction of ESSOs earlier tax deficiency for the year 1960; as of that year, 1960, there was as yet no tax credit to speak of, which would reduce the deficiency tax liability for 1960. In support of his position, the Commissioner invokes the provisions of Section 51 of the Tax Code pertinently reading as follows: (c) Definition of deficiency. As used in this Chapter in respect of tax imposed by this Title, the term 'deficiency' means: (1) The amount by which the tax imposed by this Title exceeds the amount shown as the tax by the taxpayer upon his return; but the amount so shown on the return shall first be increased by the amounts previously assessed (or collected without assessment) as a deficiency, and decreased by the amount previously abated credited, returned, or otherwise in respect of such tax; .. xxx xxx xxx
- 38. (d) Interest ondeficiency. — Interest upon the amount determined as deficiency shall be assessed at the same time as the deficiency and shall be paid upon notice and demand from the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; and shall be collected as a part of the tax, at the rate of six per centum per annum from the date prescribed for the payment of the tax (or, if the tax is paid in installments, from the date prescribed for the payment of the first installment) to the date the deficiency is assessed; Provided, That the amount that may be collected as interest on deficiency shall in no case exceed the amount corresponding to a period of three years, the present provision regarding prescription to the contrary notwithstanding. The fact is that, as respondent Court of Tax Appeals has stressed, as early as July 15, 1960, the Government already had in its hands the sum of P221,033.00 representing excess payment. Having been paid and received by mistake, as petitioner Commissioner subsequently acknowledged, that sum unquestionably belonged to ESSO, and the Government had the obligation to return it to ESSO That acknowledgment of the erroneous payment came some four (4) years afterwards in nowise negates or detracts fromits actuality. The obligation to return money mistakenly paid arises from the moment that payment is made, and not from the time that the payee admits the obligation to reimburse. The obligation of the payee to reimburse an amount paid to him results from the mistake, not from the payee's confession of the mistake or recognition of the obligation to reimburse. In other words, since the amount of P221,033.00 belonging to ESSO was already in the hands of the Government as of July, 1960, although the latter had no right whatever to the amount and indeed was bound to return it to ESSO, it was neither legally nor logically possible for ESSO thereafter to be considered a debtor of the Government in that amount of P221,033.00; and whatever other obligation ESSO might subsequently incur in favor of the Government would have to be reduced by that sum, in respect of which no interest could be charged. To interpret the words of the statute in such a manner as to subvert these truisms simply can not and should not be countenanced."Nothing is better settled than that courts are not to give words a meaning which would lead to absurd or unreasonable consequences. That is a principle that goes back to In re Allen (2 Phil. 630) decided on October 29, 1903, where it was held that a literal interpretation is to be rejected if it would be unjust or lead to absurd results." 6 "Statutes should receive a sensible construction, such as will give effect to the legislative intention and so as to avoid an unjust or absurd conclusion." 7 WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED, and the Decision of the Court of Tax Appeals dated October 28, 1967 subject of the petition is AFFIRMED, without pronouncement as to costs. G.R. No. 112170 April 10, 1996 CESARIO URSUA, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS AND PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents. BELLOSILLO, J.:p This is a petition for review of the decision of the Court of Appeals which affirmed the conviction of petitioner by the Regional Trial Court of Davao City for violation of Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142, as amended by R.A. No. 6085, otherwise known as "An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases". 1 Petitioner Cesario Ursua was a Community Environment and Natural Resources Officer assigned in Kidapawan, Cotabato. On 9 May 1989 the Provincial Governor of Cotabato requested the Office of the Ombudsman in Manila to conduct an investigation on a complaint for bribery, dishonesty, abuse of authority and giving of unwarranted benefits by petitioner and other officials of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources. The complaint was initiated by the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of Cotabato through a resolution advising the Governor to report the involvement of petitioner and others in the illegal cutting of mahogany trees and hauling of illegally-cut logs in the area. 2 On 1 August 1989 Atty. Francis Palmones, counsel for petitioner, wrote the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City requesting that he be furnished copy of the complaint against petitioner. Atty. Palmones then asked his client Ursua to take his letter-request to the Office of the Ombudsman because his law firm's messenger, Oscar Perez, had to attend to some personal matters. Before proceeding to the Office of the Ombudsman petitioner talked to Oscar Perez and told him that he was reluctant to personally ask for the document since he was one of the respondents before the Ombudsman. However, Perez advised himnot to worry as he could just sign his (Perez) name if ever he would be required to acknowledge receipt of the complaint. 3 When petitioner arrived at the Office of the Ombudsman in Davao City he was instructed by the security officer to register in the visitors' logbook. Instead of writing down his name petitioner wrote the name "Oscar Perez" after which he was told to proceed to the Administrative Division for the copy of the complaint he needed. He handed the letter of Atty. Palmones to the Chief of the Administrative Division, Ms. Loida Kahulugan, who then gave
- 39. him a copyof the complaint, receipt of which he acknowledged by writing the name "Oscar Perez." 4 Before petitioner could leave the premises he was greeted by an acquaintance, Josefa Amparo, who also worked in the same office. They conversed for a while then he left. When Loida learned that the person who introduced himself as "Oscar Perez" was actually petitioner Cesario Ursua, a customer of Josefa Amparo in her gasoline station, Loida reported the matter to the Deputy Ombudsman who recommended that petitioner be accordingly charged. On 18 December 1990, after the prosecution had completed the presentation of its evidence, petitioner without leave of court filed a demurrer to evidence alleging that the failure of the prosecution to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the local civil registry was fatal to its cause. Petitioner argued that no document from the local civil registry was presented to show the registered name of accused which according to him was a condition sine qua non for the validity of his conviction. The trial court rejected his contentions and found him guilty of violating Sec. 1 of C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085. He was sentenced to suffer a prison term of one (1) year and one (1) day of prision correccional minimum as minimum, to four (4) years of prision correccional medium as maximum, with all the accessory penalties provided for by law, and to pay a fine of P4,000.00 plus costs. Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals. On 31 May 1993 the Court of Appeals affirmed the conviction of petitioner but modified the penalty by imposing an indeterminate term of one (1) year as minimum to three (3) years as maximum and a fine of P5,000.00. Petitioner now comes to us for review of his conviction as he reasserts his innocence. He contends that he has not violated C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 as he never used any alias name; neither is "Oscar Perez" his alias. An alias, according to him, is a term which connotes the habitual use of another name by which a person is also known. He claims that he has never been known as "Oscar Perez" and that he only used such name on one occasion and it was with the express consent of Oscar Perez himself. It is his position that an essential requirement for a conviction under C.A. No. 142 as amended by R.A. No. 6085 has not been complied with when the prosecution failed to prove that his supposed alias was different from his registered name in the Registry of Births. He further argues that the Court of Appeals erred in not considering the defense theory that he was charged under the wrong law. 5 Time and again we have decreed that statutes are to be construed in the light of the purposes to be achieved and the evils sought to be remedied. Thus in construing a statute the reason for its enactment should be kept in mind and the statute should be construed with reference to the intended scope and purpose. 6 The court may consider the spirit and reason of the statute, where a literal meaning would lead to absurdity, contradiction, injustice, or would defeat the clear purpose of the lawmakers. 7 For a clear understanding of the purpose of C.A. No. 142 as amended, which was allegedly violated by petitioner, and the surrounding circumstances under which the law was enacted, the pertinent provisions thereof, its amendments and related statutes are herein cited. C.A. No. 142, which was approved on 7 November 1936, and before its amendment by R.A. No. 6085, is entitled An Act to Regulate the Use of Aliases. It provides as follows: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonymfor literary purposes, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was christened or by which he has been known since his childhood, or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias or aliases shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name. Separate proceedings shall be had for each alias, and each new petition shall set forth the original name and the alias or aliases for the use of which judicial authority has been, obtained, specifying the proceedings and the date on which such authority was granted. Judicial authorities for the use of aliases shall be recorded in the proper civil register . . . . The above law was subsequently amended by R.A. No. 6085, approved on 4 August 1969. As amended, C.A. No. 142 now reads: Sec. 1. Except as a pseudonym solely for literary, cinema, television, radio or other entertainment purposes and in athletic events where the use of pseudonym is a normally accepted practice, no person shall use any name different from the one with which he was registered at birth in the office of the local civil registry or with which he was baptized for the first time, or in case of all alien, with which he was registered in the bureau of immigration upon entry; or such substitute name as may have been authorized by a competent court: Provided, That persons whose births have not been
- 40. registered in anylocal civil registry and who have not been baptized, have one year from the approval of this act within which to register their names in the civil registry of their residence. The name shall comprise the patronymic name and one or two surnames. Sec. 2. Any person desiring to use an alias shall apply for authority therefor in proceedings like those legally provided to obtain judicial authority for a change of name and no person shall be allowed to secure such judicial authority for more than one alias. The petition for an alias shall set forth the person's baptismal and family name and the name recorded in the civil registry, if different, his immigrant's name, if an alien, and his pseudonym, if he has such names other than his original or real name, specifying the reason or reasons for the desired alias. The judicial authority for the use of alias, the Christian name and the alien immigrant's name shall be recorded in the proper local civil registry, and no person shall use any name or names other than his original or real name unless the same is or are duly recorded in the proper local civil registry. The objective and purpose of C.A. No. 142 have their origin and basis in Act No. 3883, An Act to Regulate the Use in Business Transactions of Names other than True Names, Prescribing the Duties of the Director of the Bureau of Commerce and Industry in its Enforcement, Providing Penalties for Violations thereof, and for other purposes, which was approved on 14 November 1931 and amended by Act No. 4147, approved on 28 November 1934. 8 The pertinent provisions of Act No. 3883 as amended follow — Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person to use or sign, on any written or printed receipt including receipt for tax or business or any written or printed contract not verified by a notary public or on any written or printed evidence of any agreement or business transactions, any name used in connection with his business other than his true name, or keep conspicuously exhibited in plain view in or at the place where his business is conducted, if he is engaged in a business, any sign announcing a firm name or business name or style without first registering such other name, or such firm name, or business name or style in the Bureau of Commerce together with his true name and that of any other person having a joint or common interest with himin such contract, agreement, business transaction, or business . . . . For a bit of history, the enactment of C.A. No. 142 as amended was made primarily to curb the common practice among the Chinese of adopting scores of different names and aliases which created tremendous confusion in the field of trade. Such a practice almost bordered on the crime of using fictitious names which for obvious reasons could not be successfully maintained against the Chinese who, rightly or wrongly, claimed they possessed a thousand and one names. C.A. No. 142 thus penalized the act of using an alias name, unless such alias was duly authorized by proper judicial proceedings and recorded in the civil register. 9 In Yu Kheng Chiau v. Republic 10 the Court had occasion to explain the meaning, concept and ill effects of the use of an alias within the purview of C.A. No. 142 when we ruled — There can hardly be any doubt that petitioner's use of alias "Kheng Chiau Young" in addition to his real name "Yu Cheng Chiau" would add to more confusion. That he is known in his business, as manager of the Robert Reid, Inc., by the former name, is not sufficient reason to allow him its use. After all, petitioner admitted that he is known to his associates by both names. In fact, the Anselmo Trinidad, Inc., of which he is a customer, knows him by his real name. Neither would the fact that he had encountered certain difficulties in his transactions with government offices which required him to explain why he bore two names, justify the grant of his petition, for petitioner could easily avoid said difficulties by simply using and sticking only to his real name "Yu Kheng Chiau." The fact that petitioner intends to reside permanently in the Philippines, as shown by his having filed a petition for naturalization in Branch V of the above-mentioned court, argues the more against the grant of his petition, because if naturalized as a Filipino citizen, there would then be no necessity for his further using said alias, as it would be contrary to the usual Filipino way and practice of using only one name in ordinary as well as business transactions. And, as the lower court correctly observed, if he believes (after he is naturalized) that it would be better for him to write his name following the Occidental method, "he can easily file a petition for change of name, so that in lieu of the name "Yu Kheng Chian," he can, abandoning the same, ask for authority to adopt the name Kheng Chiau Young." All things considered, we are of the opinion and so hold, that petitioner has not shown satisfactory proper and reasonable grounds under the aforequoted provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 142 and the Rules of Court, to warrant the grant of his petition for the use of an alias name.
- 41. Clearly therefore analias is a name or names used by a person or intended to be used by him publicly and habitually usually in business transactions in addition to his real name by which he is registered at birth or baptized the first time or substitute name authorized by a competent authority. A man's name is simply the sound or sounds by which he is commonly designated by his fellows and by which they distinguish him but sometimes a man is known by several different names and these are known as aliases. 11 Hence, the use of a fictitious name or a different name belonging to another person in a single instance without any sign or indication that the user intends to be known by this name in addition to his real name fromthat day forth does not fall within the prohibition contained in C.A. No. 142 as amended. This is so in the case at bench. It is not disputed that petitioner introduced himself in the Office of the Ombudsman as "Oscar Perez," which was the name of the messenger of his lawyer who should have brought the letter to that office in the first place instead of petitioner. He did so while merely serving the request of his lawyer to obtain a copy of the complaint in which petitioner was a respondent. There is no question then that "Oscar Perez" is not an alias name of petitioner. There is no evidence showing that he had used or was intending to use that name as his second name in addition to his real name. The use of the name "Oscar Perez" was made by petitioner in an isolated transaction where he was not even legally required to expose his real identity. For, even if he had identified himself properly at the Office of the Ombudsman, petitioner would still be able to get a copy of the complaint as a matter of right, and the Office of the Ombudsman could not refuse him because the complaint was part of public records hence open to inspection and examination by anyone under the proper circumstances. While the act of petitioner may be covered by other provisions of law, such does not constitute an offense within the concept of C.A. No. 142 as amended under which he is prosecuted. The confusion and fraud in business transactions which the anti-alias law and its related statutes seek to prevent are not present here as the circumstances are peculiar and distinct from those contemplated by the legislature in enacting C.A. No. 142 as amended. There exists a valid presumption that undesirable consequences were never intended by a legislative measure and that a construction of which the statute is fairly susceptible is favored, which will avoid all objectionable, mischievous, indefensible, wrongful, evil and injurious consequences. 12 Moreover, as C.A. No. 142 is a penal statute, it should be construed strictly against the State and in favor of the accused. 13 The reason for this principle is the tenderness of the law for the rights of individuals and the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the discretion of the court limited. 14 Indeed, our mind cannot rest easy on the proposition that petitioner should be convicted on a law that does not clearly penalize the act done by him. WHEREFORE, the questioned decision of the Court of Appeals affirming that of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and petitioner CESARIO URSUA is ACQUITTED of the crime charged. SO ORDERED.