SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1
Red Hat Deep Dive SessionsRed Hat Deep Dive Sessions
Linux on System zLinux on System z
Shawn Wells (swells@redhat.com)
W/W Lead Architect, Linux on System z
Team Lead, System z SMEs
2
Introduction
 Shawn Wells (swells@redhat.com)
Lead Architect, Linux on System z
Team Lead, System z SMEs
Phone: +1 443 534 0130
3
Agenda
 Scheduled questions to be answered in this session:
 What's the Linux on System z development process?
 What's in RHEL now?  What's on the roadmap?
 Provisioning & Patch Management in RHN
 Security Update
SELinux, Audit, etc
Linux on System z
Development Process
5
Linux on System z Development
Community
 Development with “upstream” communities
 Kernel, glibc, etc
 Collaboration with partners, IBM,
open source contributors
6
Linux on System z Development
Fedora
 Bleeding Edge
 Sets direction for RHEL
technologies
 Community Supported
 Released ~6mo cycles
 Fedora 8,9,10 = RHEL6
Fedora 8; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/8/FeatureList
Fedora 9; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/9/FeatureList
Fedora 10; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/10/FeatureList
7
Linux on System z Development
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
 Stable, mature, commercial product
 Extensive Q&A, performance testing
 Hardware & Software Certifications
 7yr maintenance
 Core ABI compatibility
guarantee
 Major releases 2-3yr cycle
8
Support Cycle
Extended Product Lifecycle
Years 1 - 4 Yr 6,7Yr 5
Production 1
Production 2
Production 3
Security Patches
Bug Fixes
Hardware Enablement
Software Enhancements
X
X
X
Full
X
X
Partial
X
X
None
9
Linux on System z Subscriptions
Product Source & Binaries
Upgrades to New Versions
Stable Application Interfaces
Hardware & Application Certifications
Security, Bug Fixes
Regular H/W & S/W Updates
Web Support. 2 Day SLABASIC
Phone/Web
1-4 Business Hour SLA
STANDARD
24x7 Phone/Web
1 Hour SLAs
PREMIUMS
U
P
P
O
R
T
Red Hat Enterprise Linux
Subscription
 No Upgrade Costs
 No Client Access Fee
 Unlimited Support
Incidents
For System z:
 Priced Per IFL
 Unlimited VMs per IFL
Customers can consolidate
subscriptions to or from other
platforms
10
Linux on System z Support
Support via Red Hat
T
E
C
H
A
C
C
N
T
M
G
R
S
Level 1: Front Line Support
Known Issues, Initial Troubleshooting,
Everyone is minimum RHCE
Level 2: Advanced Support
Reproduce Problems,
Grouped via Skillsets
Level 3: Special Engineering
Custom Patches, Code Re-writes,
Interim Patches, Application Redesign
C
O
N
S
U
L
T
A
N
T
S
11
Linux on System z Support
Support via Red Hat
T
E
C
H
A
C
C
N
T
M
G
R
S
Level 1: Front Line Support
Known Issues, Initial Troubleshooting,
Everyone is minimum RHCE
Level 2: Advanced Support
Reproduce Problems,
Grouped via Skillsets
Level 3: Special Engineering
Custom Patches, Code Re-writes,
Interim Patches, Application Redesign
C
O
N
S
U
L
T
A
N
T
S
Support via IBM
Level 1: First Responders
Basic Support
Level 2: Advanced Support
Reproduce Problems,
Category Specialists
P
A
R
T
N
E
R
T
A
M
What's in RHEL now?
What's on the road map?
13
14
IBM Changes to 2.6.x Kernel
RHEL5RHEL4
15
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Support for z10
 Dynamic CHPID reconfiguration
 Improved “ssh -X” with VPN during installation process
 Better network performance with skb scatter-gather support
 Implementation of SCSI dump infrastructure
16
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Accelerated in­kernel Crypto
 Support for crypto algorithms of z10
 SHA-512, SHA-384, AES-192, AES-256
 Two OSA ports per CHPID; Four port exploitation
 Exploit next OSA adapter generation which offers two ports within one CHPID. The
additional port number 1 can be specified with the qeth sysfs-attribute “portno”
 Support is available only for OSA-Express3 GbE SX and LX on z10, running in LPAR
or z/VM guest (PFT for z/VM APAR VM64277 required!)
17
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Large Page Support
 This adds hugetblfs support on System z, using both hardware large page support if
available, and software large page emulation (with shared hugetblfs pagetables) on
older hardware
 skb scatter-gather support for large incoming messages
 This avoids allocating big chunks of consecutive memory and should increase
networking throughput in some situations for large incoming packets
Full Release Notes At: redhat.com
http://www.redhat.com/docs/en-
US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/5.2/html/Release_Notes/s390x/index.html
18
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Lightweight userspace priority inheritance (PI) support for futexes, useful for 
realtime applications (2.6.18)
 Assists priority inversion handling. Ref: http://lwn.net/Articles/178253/
 High resolution timers (2.6.16)
 Provide fine resolution and accuracy depending on system configuration and
capabilities - used for precise in-kernel timing
 New Pipe implementation (2.6.11)
 30-90% perf improvement in pipe bandwidth
 Circular buffer allow more buffering rather than blocking writers
 "Big Kernel Semaphore": Turns the Big Kernel Lock into a semaphore
 Latency reduction, by breaking up long lock hold times and adds voluntary
preemption
19
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Process Events Connector (2.6.15)
 Reports fork, exec, id change, and exit events for all processes to userspace
 Useful for accounting/auditing (e.g. ELSA), system activity monitoring,
security, and resource management
 kexec & kdump (2.6.13)
 Provide new crash-dumping capability with reserved, memory-resident kernel
 Extended device mapper multipath support
 Address space randomization:
 Address randomization of multiple entities – including stack & mmap() region
(used by shared libraries) (2.6.12; more complete implementation than in
RHEL4)
 Greatly complicates and slows down hacker attacks
 Audit subsytem
 Support for process-context based filtering (2.6.17)
 More filter rule comparators (2.6.17)
20
RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2
 Add nf_conntrack subsystem: (2.6.15)
 Common IPv4/IPv6 generic connection tracking subsystem
 Allows IPv6 to have a stateful firewall capability (not previously possible)
 Increased security
 Enables analysis of whole streams of packets, rather than only checking
the headers of individual packets
 SELinux per-packet access controls
 Replaces old packet controls
 Add Secmark support to core networking
 Allows security subsystems to place security markings on network
packets (2.6.18)
21
RHEL Tomorrow: RHEL 5.3
 Currently in beta
 Interested in being a beta tester?
 NSS
 CPU Affinity
 ETR Support
 Device-multipath support for xDR
 RHT BugZilla: 184770
 IBM LTC 18425-62140
22
RHEL Tomorrow: Fedora
Fedora is Red Hat's bleeding edge, an incubator for new 
technologies and features
Fedora sets our direction for Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and gives you a good
idea of what will be in our next RHEL release (... and in other Linux distros, too)
Fedora 8; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/8/FeatureList
Fedora 9; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/9/FeatureList
Fedora 10; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/10/FeatureList
Fedora 8,9,10 = RHEL6
23
RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade
Currently a beta feature in RHEL 5.3
“In Place” Upgrades:  preupgrade
Will download files needed to upgrade, 
Store them locally on disk
Reboot you into the installer
Not a true in­place upgrade (yet)!
 Benefit
The longest part of an install is when packages are 
downloaded to the local machine
Pre­Upgrade downloads and stores packages locally, 
while the machine is running/in production
Reboot directly into the installer
24
RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade
 Select Target Version
25
RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade
 Determines which packages need upgrading, and downloads them
26
RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade
 Downloads new initrd & kernel images
27
RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade
 User reboots, brought into installer
28
RHEL Tomorrow: gnome-control-center
 gnome­control­center
 It is not YaST (yet)
 It is a unified GUI for package management and system configuration
 Benefit
 Progress towards a YaST-like tool in RHEL (currently we have the
system­config­* GUIs/TUIs)
29
RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit
 PackageKit
 Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc
 Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI
package managers
rpm dpkg ipkg
30
RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit
 PackageKit
 Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc
 Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI
package managers
PackageKit
rpm dpkg ipkg
31
RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit
 PackageKit
 Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc
 Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI
package managers
PackageKit
YaST RHN
rpm dpkg ipkg
Linux Virtualization on
System z
33
CONNECTIVITY PROCESSING DATA
z/VM
JBoss Oracle Custom App
Red Hat
Enterprise Linux
Red Hat
Enterprise Linux
Red Hat
Enterprise Linux
Using RHN Satellite
to Manage s390/s390x & distributed
35
Red Hat Network Satellite
Update
36
Red Hat Network Satellite
Update Manage
37
Red Hat Network Satellite
Update Manage
Provision
38
Red Hat Network Satellite
Update Manage
MonitorProvision
39
Red Hat Network Satellite
40
Red Hat Network Satellite
41
Red Hat Network Satellite
42
RHN Installation Requirements
 Software
 RHEL 4 (31-bit or 64-bit)
 @Base install
 Hardware
 1 to 2 (virtual) IFLs
 2 to 4 GB storage (memory)
 1 GB swap (combination VDISK, disk)
 1 x mod3 for OS install
 Estimated 12 GB disk space for
embedded database
 6 GB per channel (disk)
43
44
45
RHN Satellite Is Now Open Source
http://spacewalk.redhat.com
 Announced at Red Hat Summit 2008
 .... remember the Fedora -> RHEL model?
Security
47
Agenda
 Why do we need SELinux?  What are the principal concepts?
 SELinux Details
 Type Enforcement
 What are the available policies?
 What's a policy actually made of?
 How do I {add, change} a policy?
 What's the associated overhead?
 Usage
 User Perspective
 Admin Perspective
 Scenarios
 Fixing the RHT Corporate VPN “update”
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
Why do we need 
SELinux?
49
Linux Access Control Problems
 Access is based off users' access
Example: Firefox can read SSH keys
Fundamental Problem: Security properties not specific
enough. Kernel can't distinguish applications from users.
# ps -x | grep firefox
shawn 21375 1 35 11:38 ? 00:00:01 firefox-bin
# ls -l id_rsa
-rw------- 1 shawn shawn 1743 2008-08-10 id_rsa
50
Linux Access Control Problems
2) Processes can change security properties
Example: Mail files are readable only by me..... but
Thunderbird could make them world readable
Fundamental Problems:
 Standard access control is discretionary
 Includes concept of “resource ownership”
 Processes can escape security policy
51
Linux Access Control Problems
3) Only two privilege levels: User & root
Example: Apache gets hacked, allowing remote access to
root. Entire system is compromised.
Fundamental Problems:
 Simplistic security policy
 No way to enforce least-privilege
52
SELinux: Building Security Openly
NSA Develops
SELinux
Integrated into
Linux Kernel
Integrated into
Open Source
Project
Enabled By
DEFAULT In RHEL
Customers, NSA, Community, and
Red Hat continue evolution
53
Red Hat Security Certifications
NIAP/Common Criteria: The most evaluated operating system platform
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1 – EAL 2 (Completed: February 2004)
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 EAL 3+/CAPP (Completed: August 2004)
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 EAL 4+/CAPP (Completed: February 2006)
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 EAL4+/CAPP/LSPP/RBAC (Completed: June 2007)
DII-COE
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 (Self-Certification Completed: October 2004)
● Red Hat Enterprise Linux: First Linux platform certified by DISA
DCID 6/3
● Currently PL3/PL4: ask about kickstarts.
● Often a component in PL5 systems
DISA SRRs / STIGs
● Ask about kickstarts.
FIPS 140-2
● Red Hat / NSS Cryptography Libraries certified Level 2
54
Security Standards Work
Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF)
 Enumeration for configuration requirements
 DISA FSO committed to deploying STIG as XCCDF
 Others working with NIST
 Security policy becomes one file
Open Vulnerability & Assessment Language (OVAL)
 Machine-readable versions of security advisories
Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) Compatibility
 Trace a vulnerability through multiple vendors
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
How's it work?
56
Linux Access Control Introduction
Linux access control involves the kernel controling
Processes (running programs), which try to access...
Resources (files, directories, sockets, etc)
For example:
 Apache (process) can read web files
 But not the /etc/shadow file (resource)
Traditional methods do not clearly separate the privileges of
users and applications acting on the users behalf, increasing
the damage that can be caused by application exploits.
So, how should these decisions be made?
57
Security Architecture
Every subject (i.e process) and object (i.e. data files) are
assigned collections of security attributes, called a
security context
1) Security context of subject & object passed to SELinux
2) Kernel/SELinux check, verify access
2a) Grant access. Record allowance in AVC (Access Vector
Cache)
2b) Deny access, log error
58
Security Architecture
Or in picture view...
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
SELinux Details
60
SELinux Contexts
root:object r:sysadm home t:s0:c0
● The above is an SELinux context
● user_t
● role_t
● file_t
● Sensitivity
● category
61
Role Based Access Control (RBAC)
“root” really isn't “root”
i.e:
root_u:WebServerAdmin_r:SysAdmin_t
root_u:OracleDBAdmin_r:SysAdmin_t
62
SELinux Contexts
63
SELinux Policy
● Policies are matrices of statements which tell
SELinux if certain actions are allowed based on the
context of the objects attempting those actions.
● There are three SELinux Policy Types
64
The Three SELinux Policy Types
 Targeted Policy
 Default policy in RHEL5. Supported by HelpDesk.
 Targets specific applications to lock down.
 Allows all other applications to run in the unconfined
domain (unconfined_t)
 Applications running in the unconfined domain run as
if SELinux were disabled
65
The Three SELinux Policy Types
2) Strict Policy
 Denies access to everything by default
 Complete protection for all processes on the system
 Requires that policies be written for all applications,
often requires customization
 Strict is type enforcement with added types for users
(e.g. user_t and user_firefox_t).
 Not enabled by Red Hat as default
66
The Three SELinux Policy Types
3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)
 Focuses on confidentiality (i.e. separation of multiple
classifications of data)
 Ability to manage {processes, users} with varying
levels of access. (i.e. “the need to know”)
 Uses category & sensitivity levels
67
The Three SELinux Policy Types
3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)
(a) Sensitivity Labels
 Mostly used by the government – Top Secret, Secret,
Unclassified, etc
s0 Unclassified
s1 Secret
s2 Top Secret
68
The Three SELinux Policy Types
3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)
(b) Category Labels
 Separation of data types, compartments, projects,
etc
Unclassified Secret Top Secret
Project A
Project B
Alpha
Bravo
Charlie
Delta
s0 s1 s1
c0
c1
c2
c3
c0
c1
69
The Three SELinux Policy Types
3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)
(b) Polyinstantiation & pam_namespace
 The pam_namespace PAM module sets up a private
namespace for a session with polyinstantiated
directories
 A polyinstantiated directory provides a different
instance of itself based on user name, or when using
SELinux, user name, security context or both
70
The Three SELinux Policy Types
3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)
(b) Polyinstantiation & pam_namespace
# id ­Z
staff_u:WebServer_Admin_r:WebServer_Admin_t:s0:c0
# ls ­l /data
secret­file­1
secret­file 2
# id ­Z
staff_u:WebServer_Admin_r:WebServer_Admin_t:s1:c0
# ls ­l /data
secret­file­1
secret­file 2
top­secret­file­1
71
The Three SELinux Policy Types
Multi-Level Security (MLS) & Common Criteria
 The Common Criteria (CC) is an international
security standard against which systems are
evaluated. Many government customers require CC
evaluated systems.
 Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 meets EAL4+ with
RBAC/LSPP/CAPP endorcements
72
What's the Performance Overhead?
73
What's the Performance Overhead?
74
What's the Performance Overhead?
75
What's the Performance Overhead?
● Not official statistics
● Laptop = 2GHz, 2x 1GB RAM
● Workstation = 2.13GHz, 4x 1GB RAM
● Apache = Lots of threads
● MySQL = Lots of disk I/O
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
SELinux Usage
(GUI & console)
77
End-User Perspective
● sealert Notifications
78
End-User Perspective
● sealert Browser
79
System Administrator Perspective
● sealert + EMail Notifications
80
System Administrator Perspective
● system-config-selinux
81
System Administrator Perspective
● sediffx
82
System Administrator Perspective
● apol
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
SELinux Usage
(Hints & Tips)
84
System Administrator Perspective
● semanage
Configure elements of SELinux policy without
modification/recompilation of policy sources
. . . . aka on the fly
Example: Dynamically Allowing Apache to listen on
port 1234
# semanage port ­a ­t httpd_port_t ­p tcp 1234
85
System Administrator Perspective
● semanage (more examples)
Example: Allow shawn to join “webadmin_u” group
# semanage login ­a ­s webadmin_u shawn
Example: Relabel files for access by Apache
# semanage fcontext ­a ­t 
httpd_sys_content_t "/data/webpages(/.*)?"
86
System Administrator Perspective
● semanage (most important example)
You don't need to disable SELinux to fix a single error!
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
The Fix:
# semanage permissive ­a ifconfig_t
87
System Administrator Perspective
● audit2allow
Allows generation of SELinux policy rules from
logs of denied operations
Example: Fix all the errors on the system (completely not a
good idea on a real system)
# cat /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow ­M FixAll
Generating type enforcment file: FixAll.te
Compiling policy: checkmodule ­M ­m ­o FixAll.mod FixAll.te
Building package: semodule_package ­o FixAll.pp ­m FixAll.mod
# semodule ­i FixAll.pp
Name of Presentation
Red Hat
Presenter
Scenarios
89
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
● Red Hat has a Corporate Standard Build (CSB) for
desktop environments
● Red Hat pushes updates to said CSB
● I “tweak” my configuration files
● When RHT pushed a CSB update, it broke my VPN
settings
90
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
/var/log/messages:
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
Now what?
91
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
What I Know:
1)  AVC Event ID 738
2)  syscall=54 (I'd have to google this)
3)  root (or an application on its behalf) was 
running /sbin/ip
4)  context = user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0
92
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
My Options:
1) Create a SELinux Policy Module
# ausearch ­x “/sbin/ip” | audit2allow ­M MyVPNFix
93
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
My Options:
1) Create a SELinux Policy Module
# ausearch ­x “/sbin/ip” | audit2allow ­M MyVPNFix
# semodule ­i MyVPNFix.pp
94
Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate
VPN “update”
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54
success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0
ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0
sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip"
subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null)
My Options:
2) Disable enforcement of ifconfig_t (there is no need 
to turn SELinux completely off!)
# semanage permissive ­a ifconfig_t
What'd I forget?
Open Discussion

More Related Content

What's hot

Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 PlatformEmbedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
SZ Lin
 
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR SolutionsRhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
IPSRAptitudetraining
 
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux DistributionLong-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
SZ Lin
 
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologiesKernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Anne Nicolas
 
SGX Trusted Execution Environment
SGX Trusted Execution EnvironmentSGX Trusted Execution Environment
SGX Trusted Execution Environment
Kernel TLV
 
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
SZ Lin
 
Lac2006 Lee Revell
Lac2006 Lee RevellLac2006 Lee Revell
Lac2006 Lee Revell
rlrevell
 
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
Shawn Wells
 
DPDK In Depth
DPDK In DepthDPDK In Depth
DPDK In Depth
Kernel TLV
 
Kernel Recipes 2016 - New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
Kernel Recipes 2016 -  New hwmon device registration API - Jean DelvareKernel Recipes 2016 -  New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
Kernel Recipes 2016 - New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
Anne Nicolas
 
1unit2ndpart
1unit2ndpart1unit2ndpart
1unit2ndpartprksh89
 
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar LeibovichHow Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
DevOpsDays Tel Aviv
 
Securing the tunnel with Raccoon
Securing the tunnel with RaccoonSecuring the tunnel with Raccoon
Securing the tunnel with Raccoon
Gloria Stoilova
 
Automotive Grade Linux and systemd
Automotive Grade Linux and systemdAutomotive Grade Linux and systemd
Automotive Grade Linux and systemd
Alison Chaiken
 
Distributed Compiler Icecc
Distributed Compiler IceccDistributed Compiler Icecc
Distributed Compiler Icecc
SZ Lin
 
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application DevelopmentIntroduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
Michelle Holley
 
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
Shawn Wells
 
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
Filipe Miranda
 
Tuning systemd for embedded
Tuning systemd for embeddedTuning systemd for embedded
Tuning systemd for embedded
Alison Chaiken
 

What's hot (20)

Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 PlatformEmbedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
Embedded Linux/ Debian with ARM64 Platform
 
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR SolutionsRhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
Rhce syllabus | Red Hat Linux Training: IPSR Solutions
 
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux DistributionLong-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
Long-term Maintenance Model of Embedded Industrial Linux Distribution
 
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologiesKernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
Kernel Recipes 2015: Kernel packet capture technologies
 
SGX Trusted Execution Environment
SGX Trusted Execution EnvironmentSGX Trusted Execution Environment
SGX Trusted Execution Environment
 
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
Building, deploying and testing an industrial linux platform @ Open source su...
 
Lac2006 Lee Revell
Lac2006 Lee RevellLac2006 Lee Revell
Lac2006 Lee Revell
 
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
2008-09-09 IBM Interaction Conference, Red Hat Update for System z
 
DPDK In Depth
DPDK In DepthDPDK In Depth
DPDK In Depth
 
Kernel Recipes 2016 - New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
Kernel Recipes 2016 -  New hwmon device registration API - Jean DelvareKernel Recipes 2016 -  New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
Kernel Recipes 2016 - New hwmon device registration API - Jean Delvare
 
1unit2ndpart
1unit2ndpart1unit2ndpart
1unit2ndpart
 
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar LeibovichHow Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
How Linux Processes Your Network Packet - Elazar Leibovich
 
Securing the tunnel with Raccoon
Securing the tunnel with RaccoonSecuring the tunnel with Raccoon
Securing the tunnel with Raccoon
 
Automotive Grade Linux and systemd
Automotive Grade Linux and systemdAutomotive Grade Linux and systemd
Automotive Grade Linux and systemd
 
Distributed Compiler Icecc
Distributed Compiler IceccDistributed Compiler Icecc
Distributed Compiler Icecc
 
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application DevelopmentIntroduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
Introduction to OpenDaylight & Application Development
 
Libpcap
LibpcapLibpcap
Libpcap
 
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
2008-07-30 IBM Teach the Teacher (IBM T3), Red Hat Update for System z
 
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
Red Hat for IBM System z Update v5
 
Tuning systemd for embedded
Tuning systemd for embeddedTuning systemd for embedded
Tuning systemd for embedded
 

Viewers also liked

Rhel6
Rhel6Rhel6
Ccna new syllabus
Ccna new syllabusCcna new syllabus
Ccna new syllabus
thetechnicalzone
 
Ccnp workbook network bulls
Ccnp workbook network bullsCcnp workbook network bulls
Ccnp workbook network bulls
Swapnil Kapate
 
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
Ramola Dhande
 

Viewers also liked (8)

RHEL6 - Rh135
RHEL6 - Rh135RHEL6 - Rh135
RHEL6 - Rh135
 
RHEL6 - Rh124
RHEL6 - Rh124RHEL6 - Rh124
RHEL6 - Rh124
 
RHEL6 - Rh255
RHEL6 - Rh255RHEL6 - Rh255
RHEL6 - Rh255
 
Rhel6
Rhel6Rhel6
Rhel6
 
Ccna new syllabus
Ccna new syllabusCcna new syllabus
Ccna new syllabus
 
Ccna notes
Ccna notesCcna notes
Ccna notes
 
Ccnp workbook network bulls
Ccnp workbook network bullsCcnp workbook network bulls
Ccnp workbook network bulls
 
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
Red hat enterprise linux 7 (rhel 7)
 

Similar to 2008-11-13 CAVMEN RHEL for System z Deep Dive

2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
Shawn Wells
 
First steps on CentOs7
First steps on CentOs7First steps on CentOs7
First steps on CentOs7
Marc Cortinas Val
 
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
Shawn Wells
 
Pacemaker+DRBD
Pacemaker+DRBDPacemaker+DRBD
Pacemaker+DRBDDan Frincu
 
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
Shawn Wells
 
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow StoryHandling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
DataWorks Summit
 
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
Shawn Wells
 
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
Filipe Miranda
 
Rhel7 vs rhel6
Rhel7 vs rhel6Rhel7 vs rhel6
Rhel7 vs rhel6
Arunvignesh Venkatesh
 
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community) [발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
동현 김
 
OpenShift 4 installation
OpenShift 4 installationOpenShift 4 installation
OpenShift 4 installation
Robert Bohne
 
App container rkt
App container rktApp container rkt
App container rkt
Xiaofeng Guo
 
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, CitrixLCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
The Linux Foundation
 
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
Hajime Tazaki
 
4 implementation
4 implementation4 implementation
4 implementationhanmya
 
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System zSHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
Filipe Miranda
 
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edgeRunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
Stefano Stabellini
 

Similar to 2008-11-13 CAVMEN RHEL for System z Deep Dive (20)

2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
2009-10-07 IBM zExpo 2009, Current & Future Linux on System z
 
First steps on CentOs7
First steps on CentOs7First steps on CentOs7
First steps on CentOs7
 
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
2009-06-18 CAVMEN System z Users Group Update
 
Pacemaker+DRBD
Pacemaker+DRBDPacemaker+DRBD
Pacemaker+DRBD
 
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
2008-06-25 Marist System z Summer Professors Series
 
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow StoryHandling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
Handling Kernel Upgrades at Scale - The Dirty Cow Story
 
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
2009-03-13 Atlanda System z Council Meeting
 
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
Linux Containers and Docker SHARE.ORG Seattle 2015
 
Rhel7 vs rhel6
Rhel7 vs rhel6Rhel7 vs rhel6
Rhel7 vs rhel6
 
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community) [발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
[발표자료] 오픈소스 Pacemaker 활용한 zabbix 이중화 방안(w/ Zabbix Korea Community)
 
test
testtest
test
 
HeartBeat
HeartBeatHeartBeat
HeartBeat
 
OpenShift 4 installation
OpenShift 4 installationOpenShift 4 installation
OpenShift 4 installation
 
Rhce ppt
Rhce pptRhce ppt
Rhce ppt
 
App container rkt
App container rktApp container rkt
App container rkt
 
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, CitrixLCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
LCC17 - Securing Embedded Systems with the Hypervisor - Lars Kurth, Citrix
 
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
LibOS as a regression test framework for Linux networking #netdev1.1
 
4 implementation
4 implementation4 implementation
4 implementation
 
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System zSHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
SHARE.ORG in Boston Aug 2013 RHEL update for IBM System z
 
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edgeRunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
RunX: deploy real-time OSes as containers at the edge
 

More from Shawn Wells

2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
Shawn Wells
 
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
Shawn Wells
 
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
Shawn Wells
 
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f022017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
Shawn Wells
 
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
Shawn Wells
 
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
Shawn Wells
 
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
Shawn Wells
 
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
Shawn Wells
 
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
Shawn Wells
 
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
Shawn Wells
 
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
Shawn Wells
 
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
Shawn Wells
 
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
Shawn Wells
 
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
Shawn Wells
 
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
Shawn Wells
 
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
Shawn Wells
 
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
Shawn Wells
 
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
Shawn Wells
 
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
Shawn Wells
 
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 20142014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
Shawn Wells
 

More from Shawn Wells (20)

2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
2017-10-10 AUSA 2017: Repeatable DCO Platforms
 
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
2017-07-12 GovLoop: New Era of Digital Security
 
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
2017-07-11 GovLoop: Changing the Open Hybrid Cloud Game (Deploying OpenShift ...
 
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f022017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
2017 02-17 rsac 2017 tech-f02
 
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
2017-02-21 AFCEA West Building Continuous Integration & Deployment (CI/CD) Pi...
 
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
2016 -11-18 OpenSCAP Workshop Coursebook
 
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
2016-08-29 AFITC Security Automation
 
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
2016-08-24 FedInsider Webinar with Jennifer Kron - Securing Intelligence in a...
 
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
2016-08-18 Red Hat Partner Security Update
 
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
2015-11-15 - Supercomputing 2015 - Applied Cross Domain
 
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
2015-10-05 Fermilabs DevOps Alone in the Dark
 
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
2015-06-25 Red Hat Summit 2015 - Security Compliance Made Easy
 
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
2015 06-12 DevOpsDC 2015 - Consumer to Collaborator
 
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
2015-01-27 ssa opening remarks
 
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers2014-12-16  defense news - shutdown the hackers
2014-12-16 defense news - shutdown the hackers
 
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
2014-07-31 customer convergence applied scap
 
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
2014-07-30 defense in depth scap workbook
 
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
2014-05-08 IT Craftsmanship to IT Manufacturing
 
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
2014-04-28 cloud security frameworks and enforcement
 
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 20142014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
2014 04-17 Applied SCAP, Red Hat Summit 2014
 

Recently uploaded

First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User EndpointsFirst Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
Globus
 
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
Juraj Vysvader
 
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
Ortus Solutions, Corp
 
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptxStrategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
varshanayak241
 
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessAccelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
WSO2
 
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
Globus
 
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdfA Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
kalichargn70th171
 
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBrokerSOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
SOCRadar
 
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
Paco van Beckhoven
 
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
Shahin Sheidaei
 
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital TransformationWSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
WSO2
 
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
Globus
 
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMSCorporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
Tendenci - The Open Source AMS (Association Management Software)
 
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdfEnhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
Globus
 
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdfCyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
Cyanic lab
 
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New ZealandUsing IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
IES VE
 
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptxHow Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
wottaspaceseo
 
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
Globus
 
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden ExtensionsQuarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
Max Andersen
 
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good PracticesHow to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
Globus
 

Recently uploaded (20)

First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User EndpointsFirst Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
First Steps with Globus Compute Multi-User Endpoints
 
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
In 2015, I used to write extensions for Joomla, WordPress, phpBB3, etc and I ...
 
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
BoxLang: Review our Visionary Licenses of 2024
 
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptxStrategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
Strategies for Successful Data Migration Tools.pptx
 
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with PlatformlessAccelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
Accelerate Enterprise Software Engineering with Platformless
 
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
Globus Compute wth IRI Workflows - GlobusWorld 2024
 
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdfA Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
A Comprehensive Look at Generative AI in Retail App Testing.pdf
 
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBrokerSOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
SOCRadar Research Team: Latest Activities of IntelBroker
 
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
Cracking the code review at SpringIO 2024
 
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
Gamify Your Mind; The Secret Sauce to Delivering Success, Continuously Improv...
 
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital TransformationWSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
WSO2Con2024 - WSO2's IAM Vision: Identity-Led Digital Transformation
 
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
Exploring Innovations in Data Repository Solutions - Insights from the U.S. G...
 
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMSCorporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
Corporate Management | Session 3 of 3 | Tendenci AMS
 
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdfEnhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
Enhancing Research Orchestration Capabilities at ORNL.pdf
 
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdfCyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
Cyaniclab : Software Development Agency Portfolio.pdf
 
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New ZealandUsing IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
Using IESVE for Room Loads Analysis - Australia & New Zealand
 
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptxHow Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
How Recreation Management Software Can Streamline Your Operations.pptx
 
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
Developing Distributed High-performance Computing Capabilities of an Open Sci...
 
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden ExtensionsQuarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
Quarkus Hidden and Forbidden Extensions
 
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good PracticesHow to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
How to Position Your Globus Data Portal for Success Ten Good Practices
 

2008-11-13 CAVMEN RHEL for System z Deep Dive

  • 1. 1 Red Hat Deep Dive SessionsRed Hat Deep Dive Sessions Linux on System zLinux on System z Shawn Wells (swells@redhat.com) W/W Lead Architect, Linux on System z Team Lead, System z SMEs
  • 3. 3 Agenda  Scheduled questions to be answered in this session:  What's the Linux on System z development process?  What's in RHEL now?  What's on the roadmap?  Provisioning & Patch Management in RHN  Security Update SELinux, Audit, etc
  • 4. Linux on System z Development Process
  • 5. 5 Linux on System z Development Community  Development with “upstream” communities  Kernel, glibc, etc  Collaboration with partners, IBM, open source contributors
  • 6. 6 Linux on System z Development Fedora  Bleeding Edge  Sets direction for RHEL technologies  Community Supported  Released ~6mo cycles  Fedora 8,9,10 = RHEL6 Fedora 8; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/8/FeatureList Fedora 9; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/9/FeatureList Fedora 10; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/10/FeatureList
  • 7. 7 Linux on System z Development Red Hat Enterprise Linux  Stable, mature, commercial product  Extensive Q&A, performance testing  Hardware & Software Certifications  7yr maintenance  Core ABI compatibility guarantee  Major releases 2-3yr cycle
  • 8. 8 Support Cycle Extended Product Lifecycle Years 1 - 4 Yr 6,7Yr 5 Production 1 Production 2 Production 3 Security Patches Bug Fixes Hardware Enablement Software Enhancements X X X Full X X Partial X X None
  • 9. 9 Linux on System z Subscriptions Product Source & Binaries Upgrades to New Versions Stable Application Interfaces Hardware & Application Certifications Security, Bug Fixes Regular H/W & S/W Updates Web Support. 2 Day SLABASIC Phone/Web 1-4 Business Hour SLA STANDARD 24x7 Phone/Web 1 Hour SLAs PREMIUMS U P P O R T Red Hat Enterprise Linux Subscription  No Upgrade Costs  No Client Access Fee  Unlimited Support Incidents For System z:  Priced Per IFL  Unlimited VMs per IFL Customers can consolidate subscriptions to or from other platforms
  • 10. 10 Linux on System z Support Support via Red Hat T E C H A C C N T M G R S Level 1: Front Line Support Known Issues, Initial Troubleshooting, Everyone is minimum RHCE Level 2: Advanced Support Reproduce Problems, Grouped via Skillsets Level 3: Special Engineering Custom Patches, Code Re-writes, Interim Patches, Application Redesign C O N S U L T A N T S
  • 11. 11 Linux on System z Support Support via Red Hat T E C H A C C N T M G R S Level 1: Front Line Support Known Issues, Initial Troubleshooting, Everyone is minimum RHCE Level 2: Advanced Support Reproduce Problems, Grouped via Skillsets Level 3: Special Engineering Custom Patches, Code Re-writes, Interim Patches, Application Redesign C O N S U L T A N T S Support via IBM Level 1: First Responders Basic Support Level 2: Advanced Support Reproduce Problems, Category Specialists P A R T N E R T A M
  • 12. What's in RHEL now? What's on the road map?
  • 13. 13
  • 14. 14 IBM Changes to 2.6.x Kernel RHEL5RHEL4
  • 15. 15 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Support for z10  Dynamic CHPID reconfiguration  Improved “ssh -X” with VPN during installation process  Better network performance with skb scatter-gather support  Implementation of SCSI dump infrastructure
  • 16. 16 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Accelerated in­kernel Crypto  Support for crypto algorithms of z10  SHA-512, SHA-384, AES-192, AES-256  Two OSA ports per CHPID; Four port exploitation  Exploit next OSA adapter generation which offers two ports within one CHPID. The additional port number 1 can be specified with the qeth sysfs-attribute “portno”  Support is available only for OSA-Express3 GbE SX and LX on z10, running in LPAR or z/VM guest (PFT for z/VM APAR VM64277 required!)
  • 17. 17 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Large Page Support  This adds hugetblfs support on System z, using both hardware large page support if available, and software large page emulation (with shared hugetblfs pagetables) on older hardware  skb scatter-gather support for large incoming messages  This avoids allocating big chunks of consecutive memory and should increase networking throughput in some situations for large incoming packets Full Release Notes At: redhat.com http://www.redhat.com/docs/en- US/Red_Hat_Enterprise_Linux/5.2/html/Release_Notes/s390x/index.html
  • 18. 18 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Lightweight userspace priority inheritance (PI) support for futexes, useful for  realtime applications (2.6.18)  Assists priority inversion handling. Ref: http://lwn.net/Articles/178253/  High resolution timers (2.6.16)  Provide fine resolution and accuracy depending on system configuration and capabilities - used for precise in-kernel timing  New Pipe implementation (2.6.11)  30-90% perf improvement in pipe bandwidth  Circular buffer allow more buffering rather than blocking writers  "Big Kernel Semaphore": Turns the Big Kernel Lock into a semaphore  Latency reduction, by breaking up long lock hold times and adds voluntary preemption
  • 19. 19 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Process Events Connector (2.6.15)  Reports fork, exec, id change, and exit events for all processes to userspace  Useful for accounting/auditing (e.g. ELSA), system activity monitoring, security, and resource management  kexec & kdump (2.6.13)  Provide new crash-dumping capability with reserved, memory-resident kernel  Extended device mapper multipath support  Address space randomization:  Address randomization of multiple entities – including stack & mmap() region (used by shared libraries) (2.6.12; more complete implementation than in RHEL4)  Greatly complicates and slows down hacker attacks  Audit subsytem  Support for process-context based filtering (2.6.17)  More filter rule comparators (2.6.17)
  • 20. 20 RHEL Now: RHEL 5.2  Add nf_conntrack subsystem: (2.6.15)  Common IPv4/IPv6 generic connection tracking subsystem  Allows IPv6 to have a stateful firewall capability (not previously possible)  Increased security  Enables analysis of whole streams of packets, rather than only checking the headers of individual packets  SELinux per-packet access controls  Replaces old packet controls  Add Secmark support to core networking  Allows security subsystems to place security markings on network packets (2.6.18)
  • 21. 21 RHEL Tomorrow: RHEL 5.3  Currently in beta  Interested in being a beta tester?  NSS  CPU Affinity  ETR Support  Device-multipath support for xDR  RHT BugZilla: 184770  IBM LTC 18425-62140
  • 22. 22 RHEL Tomorrow: Fedora Fedora is Red Hat's bleeding edge, an incubator for new  technologies and features Fedora sets our direction for Red Hat Enterprise Linux, and gives you a good idea of what will be in our next RHEL release (... and in other Linux distros, too) Fedora 8; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/8/FeatureList Fedora 9; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/9/FeatureList Fedora 10; http://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Releases/10/FeatureList Fedora 8,9,10 = RHEL6
  • 23. 23 RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade Currently a beta feature in RHEL 5.3 “In Place” Upgrades:  preupgrade Will download files needed to upgrade,  Store them locally on disk Reboot you into the installer Not a true in­place upgrade (yet)!  Benefit The longest part of an install is when packages are  downloaded to the local machine Pre­Upgrade downloads and stores packages locally,  while the machine is running/in production Reboot directly into the installer
  • 24. 24 RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade  Select Target Version
  • 25. 25 RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade  Determines which packages need upgrading, and downloads them
  • 26. 26 RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade  Downloads new initrd & kernel images
  • 27. 27 RHEL Tomorrow: “In Place” Upgrade  User reboots, brought into installer
  • 28. 28 RHEL Tomorrow: gnome-control-center  gnome­control­center  It is not YaST (yet)  It is a unified GUI for package management and system configuration  Benefit  Progress towards a YaST-like tool in RHEL (currently we have the system­config­* GUIs/TUIs)
  • 29. 29 RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit  PackageKit  Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc  Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI package managers rpm dpkg ipkg
  • 30. 30 RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit  PackageKit  Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc  Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI package managers PackageKit rpm dpkg ipkg
  • 31. 31 RHEL Tomorrow: PackageKit  PackageKit  Abstraction layer for YUM, apt, conary, etc  Provides a common set of abstractions that can be used by GUI/TUI package managers PackageKit YaST RHN rpm dpkg ipkg
  • 33. 33 CONNECTIVITY PROCESSING DATA z/VM JBoss Oracle Custom App Red Hat Enterprise Linux Red Hat Enterprise Linux Red Hat Enterprise Linux
  • 34. Using RHN Satellite to Manage s390/s390x & distributed
  • 35. 35 Red Hat Network Satellite Update
  • 36. 36 Red Hat Network Satellite Update Manage
  • 37. 37 Red Hat Network Satellite Update Manage Provision
  • 38. 38 Red Hat Network Satellite Update Manage MonitorProvision
  • 39. 39 Red Hat Network Satellite
  • 40. 40 Red Hat Network Satellite
  • 41. 41 Red Hat Network Satellite
  • 42. 42 RHN Installation Requirements  Software  RHEL 4 (31-bit or 64-bit)  @Base install  Hardware  1 to 2 (virtual) IFLs  2 to 4 GB storage (memory)  1 GB swap (combination VDISK, disk)  1 x mod3 for OS install  Estimated 12 GB disk space for embedded database  6 GB per channel (disk)
  • 43. 43
  • 44. 44
  • 45. 45 RHN Satellite Is Now Open Source http://spacewalk.redhat.com  Announced at Red Hat Summit 2008  .... remember the Fedora -> RHEL model?
  • 47. 47 Agenda  Why do we need SELinux?  What are the principal concepts?  SELinux Details  Type Enforcement  What are the available policies?  What's a policy actually made of?  How do I {add, change} a policy?  What's the associated overhead?  Usage  User Perspective  Admin Perspective  Scenarios  Fixing the RHT Corporate VPN “update”
  • 49. 49 Linux Access Control Problems  Access is based off users' access Example: Firefox can read SSH keys Fundamental Problem: Security properties not specific enough. Kernel can't distinguish applications from users. # ps -x | grep firefox shawn 21375 1 35 11:38 ? 00:00:01 firefox-bin # ls -l id_rsa -rw------- 1 shawn shawn 1743 2008-08-10 id_rsa
  • 50. 50 Linux Access Control Problems 2) Processes can change security properties Example: Mail files are readable only by me..... but Thunderbird could make them world readable Fundamental Problems:  Standard access control is discretionary  Includes concept of “resource ownership”  Processes can escape security policy
  • 51. 51 Linux Access Control Problems 3) Only two privilege levels: User & root Example: Apache gets hacked, allowing remote access to root. Entire system is compromised. Fundamental Problems:  Simplistic security policy  No way to enforce least-privilege
  • 52. 52 SELinux: Building Security Openly NSA Develops SELinux Integrated into Linux Kernel Integrated into Open Source Project Enabled By DEFAULT In RHEL Customers, NSA, Community, and Red Hat continue evolution
  • 53. 53 Red Hat Security Certifications NIAP/Common Criteria: The most evaluated operating system platform ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 2.1 – EAL 2 (Completed: February 2004) ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 EAL 3+/CAPP (Completed: August 2004) ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 4 EAL 4+/CAPP (Completed: February 2006) ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 EAL4+/CAPP/LSPP/RBAC (Completed: June 2007) DII-COE ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux 3 (Self-Certification Completed: October 2004) ● Red Hat Enterprise Linux: First Linux platform certified by DISA DCID 6/3 ● Currently PL3/PL4: ask about kickstarts. ● Often a component in PL5 systems DISA SRRs / STIGs ● Ask about kickstarts. FIPS 140-2 ● Red Hat / NSS Cryptography Libraries certified Level 2
  • 54. 54 Security Standards Work Extensible Configuration Checklist Description Format (XCCDF)  Enumeration for configuration requirements  DISA FSO committed to deploying STIG as XCCDF  Others working with NIST  Security policy becomes one file Open Vulnerability & Assessment Language (OVAL)  Machine-readable versions of security advisories Common Vulnerability and Exposures (CVE) Compatibility  Trace a vulnerability through multiple vendors
  • 56. 56 Linux Access Control Introduction Linux access control involves the kernel controling Processes (running programs), which try to access... Resources (files, directories, sockets, etc) For example:  Apache (process) can read web files  But not the /etc/shadow file (resource) Traditional methods do not clearly separate the privileges of users and applications acting on the users behalf, increasing the damage that can be caused by application exploits. So, how should these decisions be made?
  • 57. 57 Security Architecture Every subject (i.e process) and object (i.e. data files) are assigned collections of security attributes, called a security context 1) Security context of subject & object passed to SELinux 2) Kernel/SELinux check, verify access 2a) Grant access. Record allowance in AVC (Access Vector Cache) 2b) Deny access, log error
  • 60. 60 SELinux Contexts root:object r:sysadm home t:s0:c0 ● The above is an SELinux context ● user_t ● role_t ● file_t ● Sensitivity ● category
  • 61. 61 Role Based Access Control (RBAC) “root” really isn't “root” i.e: root_u:WebServerAdmin_r:SysAdmin_t root_u:OracleDBAdmin_r:SysAdmin_t
  • 63. 63 SELinux Policy ● Policies are matrices of statements which tell SELinux if certain actions are allowed based on the context of the objects attempting those actions. ● There are three SELinux Policy Types
  • 64. 64 The Three SELinux Policy Types  Targeted Policy  Default policy in RHEL5. Supported by HelpDesk.  Targets specific applications to lock down.  Allows all other applications to run in the unconfined domain (unconfined_t)  Applications running in the unconfined domain run as if SELinux were disabled
  • 65. 65 The Three SELinux Policy Types 2) Strict Policy  Denies access to everything by default  Complete protection for all processes on the system  Requires that policies be written for all applications, often requires customization  Strict is type enforcement with added types for users (e.g. user_t and user_firefox_t).  Not enabled by Red Hat as default
  • 66. 66 The Three SELinux Policy Types 3) Multi-Level Security (MLS)  Focuses on confidentiality (i.e. separation of multiple classifications of data)  Ability to manage {processes, users} with varying levels of access. (i.e. “the need to know”)  Uses category & sensitivity levels
  • 67. 67 The Three SELinux Policy Types 3) Multi-Level Security (MLS) (a) Sensitivity Labels  Mostly used by the government – Top Secret, Secret, Unclassified, etc s0 Unclassified s1 Secret s2 Top Secret
  • 68. 68 The Three SELinux Policy Types 3) Multi-Level Security (MLS) (b) Category Labels  Separation of data types, compartments, projects, etc Unclassified Secret Top Secret Project A Project B Alpha Bravo Charlie Delta s0 s1 s1 c0 c1 c2 c3 c0 c1
  • 69. 69 The Three SELinux Policy Types 3) Multi-Level Security (MLS) (b) Polyinstantiation & pam_namespace  The pam_namespace PAM module sets up a private namespace for a session with polyinstantiated directories  A polyinstantiated directory provides a different instance of itself based on user name, or when using SELinux, user name, security context or both
  • 70. 70 The Three SELinux Policy Types 3) Multi-Level Security (MLS) (b) Polyinstantiation & pam_namespace # id ­Z staff_u:WebServer_Admin_r:WebServer_Admin_t:s0:c0 # ls ­l /data secret­file­1 secret­file 2 # id ­Z staff_u:WebServer_Admin_r:WebServer_Admin_t:s1:c0 # ls ­l /data secret­file­1 secret­file 2 top­secret­file­1
  • 71. 71 The Three SELinux Policy Types Multi-Level Security (MLS) & Common Criteria  The Common Criteria (CC) is an international security standard against which systems are evaluated. Many government customers require CC evaluated systems.  Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5 meets EAL4+ with RBAC/LSPP/CAPP endorcements
  • 75. 75 What's the Performance Overhead? ● Not official statistics ● Laptop = 2GHz, 2x 1GB RAM ● Workstation = 2.13GHz, 4x 1GB RAM ● Apache = Lots of threads ● MySQL = Lots of disk I/O
  • 79. 79 System Administrator Perspective ● sealert + EMail Notifications
  • 84. 84 System Administrator Perspective ● semanage Configure elements of SELinux policy without modification/recompilation of policy sources . . . . aka on the fly Example: Dynamically Allowing Apache to listen on port 1234 # semanage port ­a ­t httpd_port_t ­p tcp 1234
  • 85. 85 System Administrator Perspective ● semanage (more examples) Example: Allow shawn to join “webadmin_u” group # semanage login ­a ­s webadmin_u shawn Example: Relabel files for access by Apache # semanage fcontext ­a ­t  httpd_sys_content_t "/data/webpages(/.*)?"
  • 86. 86 System Administrator Perspective ● semanage (most important example) You don't need to disable SELinux to fix a single error! type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) The Fix: # semanage permissive ­a ifconfig_t
  • 87. 87 System Administrator Perspective ● audit2allow Allows generation of SELinux policy rules from logs of denied operations Example: Fix all the errors on the system (completely not a good idea on a real system) # cat /var/log/audit/audit.log | audit2allow ­M FixAll Generating type enforcment file: FixAll.te Compiling policy: checkmodule ­M ­m ­o FixAll.mod FixAll.te Building package: semodule_package ­o FixAll.pp ­m FixAll.mod # semodule ­i FixAll.pp
  • 89. 89 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” ● Red Hat has a Corporate Standard Build (CSB) for desktop environments ● Red Hat pushes updates to said CSB ● I “tweak” my configuration files ● When RHT pushed a CSB update, it broke my VPN settings
  • 90. 90 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” /var/log/messages: type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) Now what?
  • 91. 91 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) What I Know: 1)  AVC Event ID 738 2)  syscall=54 (I'd have to google this) 3)  root (or an application on its behalf) was  running /sbin/ip 4)  context = user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0
  • 92. 92 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) My Options: 1) Create a SELinux Policy Module # ausearch ­x “/sbin/ip” | audit2allow ­M MyVPNFix
  • 93. 93 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) My Options: 1) Create a SELinux Policy Module # ausearch ­x “/sbin/ip” | audit2allow ­M MyVPNFix # semodule ­i MyVPNFix.pp
  • 94. 94 Scenario: Fixing the RHT corporate VPN “update” type=SYSCALL msg=audit(1204719775.306:738): arch=40000003 syscall=54 success=no exit=­19 a0=4 a1=8933 a2=bfcec1bc a3=bfcec1bc items=0 ppid=3900 pid=5003 auid=501 uid=0 gid=0 euid=0 suid=0 fsuid=0 egid=0 sgid=0 fsgid=0 tty=(none) comm="ip" exe="/sbin/ip" subj=user_u:system_r:ifconfig_t:s0 key=(null) My Options: 2) Disable enforcement of ifconfig_t (there is no need  to turn SELinux completely off!) # semanage permissive ­a ifconfig_t
  • 95. What'd I forget? Open Discussion