This document summarizes three court cases from the Philippines related to wills and property rights. The first case examines whether an unsigned holographic will from 1923 can be validated under a new civil code that allows holographic wills. The court rules the will is invalid based on the laws at the time of writing. The second case concerns inheritance rights when a property was sold that partially belonged to minor children. The court upholds the second sale and the children's rights. The third case examines the redemption of properties sold in an auction to satisfy a judgment.

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G.R. No. L-7188 August 9, 1954
In re: Will and Testament of the deceased REVEREND SANCHO ABADIA.
SEVERINA A. VDA. DE ENRIQUEZ, ET AL., petitioners-appellees,
vs.
MIGUEL ABADIA, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
Manuel A. Zosa, Luis B. Ladonga, Mariano A. Zosa and B. G. Advincula for
appellants.
C. de la Victoria for appellees.
MONTEMAYOR, J.:
On September 6, 1923, Father Sancho Abadia, parish priest of Talisay, Cebu,
executed a document purporting to be his Last Will and Testament now marked
Exhibit "A". Resident of the City of Cebu, he died on January 14, 1943, in the
municipality of Aloguinsan, Cebu, where he was an evacuee. He left properties
estimated at P8,000 in value. On October 2, 1946, one Andres Enriquez, one of
the legatees in Exhibit "A", filed a petition for its probate in the Court of First
Instance of Cebu. Some cousins and nephews who would inherit the estate of the
deceased if he left no will, filed opposition.
During the hearing one of the attesting witnesses, the other two being dead,
testified without contradiction that in his presence and in the presence of his co-
witnesses, Father Sancho wrote out in longhand Exhibit "A" in Spanish which the
testator spoke and understood; that he (testator) signed on he left hand margin
of the front page of each of the three folios or sheets of which the document is
composed, and numbered the same with Arabic numerals, and finally signed his
name at the end of his writing at the last page, all this, in the presence of the
three attesting witnesses after telling that it was his last will and that the said
three witnesses signed their names on the last page after the attestation clause in
his presence and in the presence of each other. The oppositors did not submit
any evidence.
The learned trial court found and declared Exhibit "A" to be a holographic will;
that it was in the handwriting of the testator and that although at the time it was
executed and at the time of the testator's death, holographic wills were not
permitted by law still, because at the time of the hearing and when the case was
to be decided the new Civil Code was already in force, which Code permitted the
execution of holographic wills, under a liberal view, and to carry out the
intention of the testator which according to the trial court is the controlling
factor and may override any defect in form, said trial court by order dated
January 24, 1952, admitted to probate Exhibit "A", as the Last Will and
Testament of Father Sancho Abadia. The oppositors are appealing from that
decision; and because only questions of law are involved in the appeal, the case
was certified to us by the Court of Appeals.
The new Civil Code (Republic Act No. 386) under article 810 thereof provides
that a person may execute a holographic will which must be entirely written,
dated and signed by the testator himself and need not be witnessed. It is a fact,
however, that at the time that Exhibit "A" was executed in 1923 and at the time
that Father Abadia died in 1943, holographic wills were not permitted, and the
law at the time imposed certain requirements for the execution of wills, such as

2. numbering correlatively each page (not folio or sheet) in letters and signing on
the left hand margin by the testator and by the three attesting witnesses,
requirements which were not complied with in Exhibit "A" because the back
pages of the first two folios of the will were not signed by any one, not even by
the testator and were not numbered, and as to the three front pages, they were
signed only by the testator.
Interpreting and applying this requirement this Court in the case of In re Estate
of Saguinsin, 41 Phil., 875, 879, referring to the failure of the testator and his
witnesses to sign on the left hand margin of every page, said:
. . . . This defect is radical and totally vitiates the testament. It is not
enough that the signatures guaranteeing authenticity should appear
upon two folios or leaves; three pages having been written on, the
authenticity of all three of them should be guaranteed by the signature
of the alleged testatrix and her witnesses.
And in the case of Aspe vs. Prieto, 46 Phil., 700, referring to the same
requirement, this Court declared:
From an examination of the document in question, it appears that the
left margins of the six pages of the document are signed only by Ventura
Prieto. The noncompliance with section 2 of Act No. 2645 by the
attesting witnesses who omitted to sign with the testator at the left
margin of each of the five pages of the document alleged to be the will of
Ventura Prieto, is a fatal defect that constitutes an obstacle to its
probate.
What is the law to apply to the probate of Exh. "A"? May we apply the provisions
of the new Civil Code which not allows holographic wills, like Exhibit "A" which
provisions were invoked by the appellee-petitioner and applied by the lower
court? But article 795 of this same new Civil Code expressly provides: "The
validity of a will as to its form depends upon the observance of the law in force at
the time it is made." The above provision is but an expression or statement of the
weight of authority to the affect that the validity of a will is to be judged not by
the law enforce at the time of the testator's death or at the time the supposed will
is presented in court for probate or when the petition is decided by the court but
at the time the instrument was executed. One reason in support of the rule is that
although the will operates upon and after the death of the testator, the wishes of
the testator about the disposition of his estate among his heirs and among the
legatees is given solemn expression at the time the will is executed, and in
reality, the legacy or bequest then becomes a completed act. This ruling has been
laid down by this court in the case of In re Will of Riosa, 39 Phil., 23. It is a
wholesome doctrine and should be followed.
Of course, there is the view that the intention of the testator should be the ruling
and controlling factor and that all adequate remedies and interpretations should
be resorted to in order to carry out said intention, and that when statutes passed
after the execution of the will and after the death of the testator lessen the
formalities required by law for the execution of wills, said subsequent statutes
should be applied so as to validate wills defectively executed according to the
law in force at the time of execution. However, we should not forget that from the
day of the death of the testator, if he leaves a will, the title of the legatees and
devisees under it becomes a vested right, protected under the due process clause
of the constitution against a subsequent change in the statute adding new legal
requirements of execution of wills which would invalidate such a will. By parity
of reasoning, when one executes a will which is invalid for failure to observe and
follow the legal requirements at the time of its execution then upon his death he
should be regarded and declared as having died intestate, and his heirs will then
inherit by intestate succession, and no subsequent law with more liberal
requirements or which dispenses with such requirements as to execution should
be allowed to validate a defective will and thereby divest the heirs of their vested
rights in the estate by intestate succession. The general rule is that the
Legislature can not validate void wills (57 Am. Jur., Wills, Sec. 231, pp. 192-193).
In view of the foregoing, the order appealed from is reversed, and Exhibit "A" is
denied probate. With costs.
Paras, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Jugo, Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion and Reyes J.B.L., JJ., concur

3. G.R. No. L-5064 February 27, 1953
BIENVENIDO A. IBARLE, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
ESPERANZA M. PO, defendant-appellant.
Quirico del Mar for appellant.
Daniel P. Tumulak and Conchita F. Miel appellee.
TUASON, J.:
This action commenced in the Court of First Instance of Cebu to annul a deed of
sale conveying to the defendant, in consideration of P1,700, one undivided half of
a parcel of land which previously had been sold, along with the other half, by the
same vendor to the plaintiff's grantors. judgment was against the plaintiff.
The case was submitted for decision upon an agreed statement of facts, the
pertinent parts of which are thus summarized in the appealed decision:
1st. — That Leonard j. Winstanley and Catalina Navarro were husband
and wife, the former having died on June 6, 1946 leaving heir the
surviving spouse and some minor children;
2nd. — hat upon the death of L.J. Winstanley, he left a parcel of land
described under Transfer Certificate of title No. 2391 of the Registry of
Deeds of the Province of Cebu;
3rd. — That the above mentioned property was a conjugal property;
4th. — That on April 15, 1946, the surviving spouse Catalina Navarro
Vda. de Winstanley sold the entire parcel of land to the spouses Maria
Canoy, alleging among other things, that she needed money for the
support of her children;
5th. — That on May 24, 1947, the spouses Maria Canoy and Roberto
Canoy sold the same parcel of land to the plaintiff in this case named
Bienvenido A. Ebarle;
6th. — That the two deeds of sale referred to above were not registered
and have never been registered up to the date;
7th. — That on January 17, 1948 surviving spouse Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley, after her appointment as guardian of her children by this
court (Special proceeding no. 212-R) sold one-half of the land mentioned
above to Esperanza M. Po, defendant in the instant case, which portion
belongs to the children of the above named spouses.
As stated by the trial Judge, the sole question for determination is the validity of
the sale to Esperanza M. Po, the last purchaser. This question in turn depends
upon the validity of the prior ale to Maria Canoy and Roberto Canoy.

4. Article 657 of the old Civil Code provides: "The rights to the succession of a
person are transmitted from the moment of his death." in a slightly different
language, this article is incorporated in the new Civil Code as article 777.
Manresa, commending on article 657 of the Civil Code of Spain, says:
The moment of death is the determining factor when the heirs acquire a
definite right to the inheritance, whether such right be pure or
contingent. It is immaterial whether a short or long period of time lapses
between the death of the predecessor and the entry into possession of
the property of the inheritance because the right is always deemed to be
retroactive from the moment of death. (5 Manresa, 317.)
The above provision and comment make it clear that when Catalina Navarro Vda.
de Winstanley sold the entire parcel to the Canoy spouses, one-half of it already
belonged to the seller's children. No formal or judicial declaration being needed
to confirm the children's title, it follows that the first sale was null and void in so
far as it included the children's share.
On the other hand, the sale to the defendant having been made by authority of
the competent court was undeniably legal and effective. The fact that it has not
been recorded is of no consequence. If registration were necessary, still the non-
registration would not avail the plaintiff because it was due to no other cause
than his own opposition.
The decision will be affirmed subject to the reservation, made in said decision, of
the right of the plaintitff and/or the Canoy spouses to bring such action against
Catalina Navarro Vda. de Winstanley as may be appropriate for such damages as
they may have incurred by reason of the voiding of the sale in their favor.
Paras, C.J., Feria, Pablo, Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, Jugo, Bautista
Angelo and Labrador, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-55076 September 21, 1987
MATILDE S. PALICTE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. JOSE O. RAMOLETE as Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch III, and MARCELO SOTTO, Administrator, respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order of the then Court of First
Instance of Cebu declaring the deed of redemption executed for the petitioner

5. null and void and denying the petitioner's motion that the Registrar of Deeds of
the City of Cebu be directed to transfer the Owner's Duplicate Certificates of Title
to Lot Nos. 1049, 1051, and 1052 from Filemon Sotto to her and to issue a new
Owner's Duplicate Certificate of Title to Lot 2179-C in her name.
On July 5, 1979, a sale at public auction was held pursuant to a writ of execution
issued on February 5, 1979 by the respondent judge and to a court order dated
June 4, 1979 in the case of Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, Administrator, Civil
Case No. R-10027, for the satisfaction of judgment in the amount of P725,270.00.
The following properties belonging to the late Don Filemon Sotto and
administered by respondent Marcelo Sotto were levied upon:
1. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;
2. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642 of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City;
3. Parcel of land on Lot No. 1051,covered by TCT No. 27641 of
the Banilad Friad Lands Estate, Cebu City;
4. Parcel of land on Lot No. 5253 of the Cebu Cadastre, Cebu
City, covered by TCT No. 27639;
5. Parcel of land situated at Mantalongon, Dalaguete, Cebu,
covered by TD No. 010661, with an area of 76-708; (sic)
6. Parcel of land on Lot No. 4839 of the Upon Cadastre, at Barrio
Sa-ac Mactan Island, with an area of Forty Four Thousand Six
Hundred Forty Four (44,644) square meters more or less;
7. Residential House of strong materials, situated on a
Government lot at Lahug, Cebu City;
8. Residential House of strong materials, situated at Central,
Cebu City. " (Rollo, p. 40)
Seven of the above-described properties were awarded to Pilar Teves, who alone
bid for them for the amount of P217,300.00.
The residential house situated on a government lot at Lahug, Cebu City, was
awarded to lone bidder Asuncion Villarante for the amount of P10,000.00.
Within the period for redemption, petitioner Matilde S. Palicte, as one of the heirs
of the late Don Filemon Sotto, redeemed from purchaser Pilar Teves, four (4) lots
for the sum of P60,000.00.
A deed of redemption dated July 29, 1980, executed by Deputy Provincial Sheriff
Felipe V. Belandres and approved by the Clerk of Court, Esperanza Garcia as Ex-
Officio Sheriff, was issued for these lots:
1. A parcel of land or Lot No. 2179-C-PDI-25027 Cebu Cadastre,
Cebu City, bid at P20,000.00;
2. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1052, covered by TCT No. 27642,
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, bid at P15,000.00;
3. A parcel of land or Lot No.1051,covered by TCT No. 27641, of
the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P5,000.00;
4. A parcel of land or Lot No. 1049, covered by TCT No. 27640,
of the Banilad Friar Lands Estate, Cebu City, at P20,000.00.
(Rollo, p. 42)
On July 24, 1980, petitioner Palicte filed a motion with respondent Judge
Ramolete for the transfer to her name of the titles to the four (4) parcels of land
covered by the deed of redemption.
This motion was opposed by the plaintiffs in Civil Case No. R-10027, entitled
"Pilar Teves, et al. vs Marcelo Sotto, administrator" on several grounds, principal
among which, is that movant, Palicte, is not one of those authorized to redeem
under the provisions of the Rules of Court.
A hearing on the said motion, with both parties adducing evidence was held.

6. The lower court held that although Palicte is one of the declared heirs in Spl.
Proc. No. 2706-R, she does not qualify as a successor-in-interest who may
redeem the real properties sold. It ruled that the deed of redemption is null and
void. The motion of Palicte was denied.
Hence, the present petition.
The petitioner raises the following assignment of errors:
A
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT THE JUDGMENT
DEBTOR ENTITLED TO REDEEM UNDER SECTION 29(a), RULE
39 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT REAL PROPERTY SOLD
ON EXECUTION AGAINST THE ESTATE OF THE DECEDENT IS
ONLY THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE ESTATE, OR HIS
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST.
B
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER,
WHO IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, IS NOT THE
JUDGMENT DEBTOR NOR DOES SHE QUALIFY AS A
SUCCESSOR-IN-INTEREST OF THE ADMINISTRATOR OF THE
ESTATE ENTITLED TO RIGHT OF REDEMPTION UNDER
SECTION 29(a), RULE 39 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
C
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT ALTHOUGH
PETITIONER IS A DECLARED HEIR OF THE DECEDENT, HER
RIGHT TO THE ESTATE, LIKE THAT OF REDEMPTION OF
CERTAIN ESTATE PROPERTY, COULD ONLY ARISE AFTER
DISTRIBUTION OF THE ESTATE AS THERE IS STILL JUDGMENT
DEBT CHARGEABLE AGAINST THE ESTATE.
D
RESPONDENT JUDGE ERRED IN RULING THAT PETITIONER'S
REDEMPTION OF FOUR (4) PARCELS OF LAND OF THE ESTATE
OF THE DECEDENT SOLD ON EXECUTION OF JUDGMENT
AGAINST THE ESTATE IS NULL AND VOID AND INEFFECTIVE.
(Rollo, pp. 17-18)
These assigned errors center on whether or not petitioner Palicte may validly
exercise the right of redemption under Sec. 29, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court.
We answer in the affirmative. Sec. 29 of Rule 39 provides:
SEC. 29. Who may redeem real property so sold. — Real property
sold as provided in the last preceding section, or any part
thereof sold separately, may be redeemed in the manner
hereinafter provided, by the following persons:
(a) The judgment debtor, or his successor in interest in the
whole or any part of the property;
(b) A creditor having a lien by attachment, judgment or
mortgage on the property sold, or on some part thereof,
subsequent to the judgment under which the property was sold.
Such redeeming creditor is termed a redemptioner.
Under Subsection (a), property sold subject to redemption may be redeemed by
the judgment debtor or his successor-in-interest in the whole or any part of the
property. Does Matilde Palicte fall within the term "successor-in-interest"?
Magno vs Viola and Sotto (61 Phil. 80, 84-85) states that:
The rule is that the term "successor-in-interest" includes one to
whom the debtor has transferred his statutory right of
redemption (Big Sespe Oil Co. vs Cochran, 276 Fed., 216, 223);
one to whom the debtor has conveyed his interest in the
property for the purpose of redemption (Southern California
Lumber Co. vs. McDowell, 105 Cal, 99; 38 Pac., 627; Simpson vs.
Castle, 52 Cal., 644; Schumacher vs. Langford, 20 Cal. App., 61;
127 Pac., 1057); one who succeeds to the interest of the debtor by
operation of law (XI McKinney's California Jurisprudence, 99);
one or more joint debtors who were joint owners of the

7. property sold (Emerson vs. Yosemite Gold Min. etc. Co., 149 Cal.,
50; 85 Pac., 122); the wife as regards her husband's homestead
by reason of the fact that some portion of her husband' title
passes to her (Hefner vs. Urton, 71 Cal., 479; 12 Pac., 486). This
court has held that a surety can not redeem the property of the
principal sold on execution because the surety, by paying the
debt of the principal, stands in the place of the creditor, not of
the debtor, and consequently is not a successor in interest in the
property. (G. Urruitia & Co. vs. Moreno and Reyes, 28 Phil., 260,
268). (Emphasis supplied).
In the case at bar, petitioner Palicte is the daughter of the late Don Filemon Sotto
whose estate was levied upon on execution to satisfy the money judgment
against it. She is one of the declared heirs in Special Proceeding No. 2706-R. As a
legitimate heir, she qualifies as a successor-in- interest.
Art. 777 of the Civil Code states that:
The rights to the succession are transmitted from the moment
of the death of the decedent.
At the moment of the decedent's death, the heirs start to own the property,
subject to the decedent's liabilities. In fact, they may dispose of the same even
while the property is under administration. (Barretto vs. Tuason, 59 Phil. 845;
Jakosalem vs. Rafols, 73 Phil. 628). If the heirs may dispose of their shares in the
decedent's property even while it is under administration. With more reason
should the heirs be allowed to redeem redeemable properties despite the
presence of an administrator.
The respondents contend that the petitioner must positively prove that the three
other co-heirs, the administrator, and the intestate court had expressly agreed to
the redemption of the disputed parcels of land. We see no need for such prior
approval. While it may have been desirable, it is not indispensable under the
circumstances of this case. What is important is that all of them acquiesced in the
act of redeeming property for the estate. The petitioner contends that the
administrator and the three other heirs agreed to the redemption. There is,
however. no clear proof of such approval. What is beyond dispute from the
records is that they did not disapprove nor reprobate the acts of the petitioner.
There is likewise nothing in the records to indicate that the redemption was not
beneficial to the estate of Don Filemon Sotto.
It may be true that the interest of a specific heir is not yet fixed and determinate
pending the order of distribution but, nonetheless, the heir's interest in the
preservation of the estate and the recovery of its properties is greater than
anybody else's, definitely more than the administrator's who merely holds it for
the creditors, the heirs, and the legatees.
The petitioner cites precedents where persons with inchoate or contingent
interest were allowed to exercise the right of redemption as "successors-in-
interest," e.g. Director of Lands vs. Lagniton (103 Phil. 889, 892) where a son
redeemed the property of his parents sold on execution and Rosete vs. Provincial
Sheriff of Zambales (95 Phil. 560, 564), where a wife by virtue of what the Court
called "inchoate right of dower or contingent interest" redeemed a homestead as
successor-in-interest of her husband.
In fact, the Court was explicit in Lagniton that:
... The right of a son, with respect to the property of a father or
mother, is also an inchoate or contingent interest, because upon
the death of the father or the mother or both, he will have a
right to inherit said conjugal property. If any holder of an
inchoate interest is a successor in interest with right to redeem
a property sold on execution, then the son is such a successor in
interest, as he has an inchoate right to the property of his father.
The lower court, therefore, erred in considering the person of the administrator
as the judgment debtor and as the only "successor-in-interest." The estate of the
deceased is the judgment debtor and the heirs who will eventually acquire that
estate should not be prohibited from doing their share in its preservation.
Although petitioner Palicte validly redeemed the properties, her motion to
transfer the titles of the four (4) parcels of land covered by the Deed of
Redemption from registration in the name of Filemon Sotto to her name cannot
prosper at this time.
Otherwise, to allow such transfer of title would amount to a distribution of the
estate.
As held in the case of Philippine Commercial and Industrial Bank vs. Escolin (56
SCRA 267, 345- 346):

8. Indeed, the law on the matter is specific, categorical and
unequivocal. Section 1 of Rule 90 provides:
SECTION 1. When order for distribution of residue made. —
When the debts, funeral charges, and expenses of
administration, the allowance to the widow, and inheritance tax,
if any, chargeable to the estate in accordance with law, have
been paid, the court, on the application of the executor or
administrator, or of a person interested in the estate, and after
hearing upon notice, shall assign the residue of the estate to the
persons entitled to the same, naming them and the proportions,
or parts, to which each is entitled, and such persons may
demand and recover their respective shares from the executor
or administrator, or any other person having the same in his
possession. If there is a controversy before the court as to who
are the lawful heirs of the deceased person or as to the
distributive shares to which each person is entitled under the
law, the controversy shall be heard and decided as in ordinary
cases.
No distribution shall be allowed until the payment of the
obligations above mentioned has been made or provided for,
unless the distributees, or any of them, give a bond, in a sum to
be fixed by the court, conditioned for the payment of said
obligations within such time as the court directs.
These provisions cannot mean anything less than that in order
that a proceeding for the settlement of the estate of a deceased
may be deemed ready for final closure, (1) there should have
been issued already an order of distribution or assignment of
the estate of the decedent among or to those entitled thereto by
will or by law, but (2) such order shall not be issued until after it
is shown that the "debts, funeral expenses, expenses of
administration, allowances, taxes, etc., chargeable to the estate"
have been paid, which is but logical and proper, (3) besides,
such an order is usually issued upon proper and specific
application for the purpose of the interested party or parties,
and not of the court."
The other heirs are, therefore, given a six months period to join as co-
redemptioners in the redemption made by the petitioner before the motion to
transfer titles to the latter's name may be granted.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court's orders
declaring the deed of redemption null and void and denying the motion to
transfer title over the redeemed properties to Matilda Palicte are REVERSED and
SET ASIDE, subject to the right of the other heirs to join in the redemption as
stated above.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 126950 July 2, 1999
NELSON NUFABLE, SILMOR NUFABLE and AQUILINA NUFABLE, petitioners,
vs. GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE, MARCELO NUFABLE, and the
COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.
GONZAGA-REYES, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Decision
dated November 25, 1995 of the Fifth Division 1 of the Court of Appeals for
allegedly being contrary to law.
The following facts as found by the Court of Appeals are undisputed:

9. Edras Nufable owned at Poblacion, Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, consisting of 948
square meters, more or less. He died on August 9, 1965 and was survived by his
children, namely: Angel Custodio, Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed
Nufable. Upon petition for probate filed by said heirs and after due publication
and hearing, the then Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental (Branch II)
issued an Order dated March 30, 1966 admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the deceased Edras Nufable (Exhs. B, C and C-1).
On June 6, 1966 the same court issued an Order approving the Settlement of
Estate submitted by the heirs of the late ESdras Nufable, portions of which read:
KNOW ALL MEN BY THESE PRESENTS:
We, ANGEL CUSTODIO NUFABLE, GENEROSA NUFABLE, VILFOR NUFABLE and
MARCELO NUFABLE, all of legal ages (sic), Filipinos, and with residence and
postal address at Manjuyod, Negros Oriental, Philippines,
— HEREBY DECLARE AND MAKE MANIFEST —
1. That on August 9, 1965, Rev. Fr. Esdras Nufable died leaving (a) Last Will and
Testament (marked Exh. G) disposing (of) his properties or estate in favor of his
four legitimate children, namely: Angel Custodio Nufable, Generosa Nufable,
Vilfor Nufable and Marcelo Nufable;
2. That on March 30, 1966 the said Last Will and Testament was probated by the
Honorable Court, Court of First Instance of Negros Oriental, and is embodied in
the same order appointing an Administratrix, Generosa Nufable, but to qualify
only if she put up a necessary bond of P1,000.00;
3. That herein legitimate children prefer not to appoint an Administratrix, as
agreed upon (by) all the heirs, because they have no objection as to the manner
of disposition of their share made by the testator, the expenses of the
proceedings and that they have already taken possession of their respective
shares in accordance with the will;
4. That the herein heirs agreed, as they hereby agree to settle the estate in
accordance with the terms and condition of the will in the following manner, to
wit:
a) That the parcel of land situated in Poblacion Manjuyod, Negros Oriental
remains undivided for community ownership but respecting conditions imposed
therein (sic) in the will;
xxx xxx xxx
(Exhs. "E" and "E-1")
Two months earlier, or on March 15, 1966, spouses Angel Custodio and Aquilina
Nufable mortgaged the entire property located at Manjuyod to the Development
Bank of the Philippines [DBP] (Pre-trial Order, dated January 7, 1992, p. 103,
Original Records). Said mortgagors became delinquent for which reason the
mortgaged property was foreclosed by DBP on February 26, 1973 (id.).

10. On January 11, 1980, Nelson Nufable, the son of Angel Custodio Nufable (who
died on August 29, 1978 [TSN, Testimony of Nelson Nufable, Hearing of August
18, 1992, p. 17]), purchased said property from DBP (Exh. "1").
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo, all surnamed Nufable filed with the lower court a
complaint dated July 25, 1985 "To Annul Fraudulent Transactions, to Quiet Title
and To Recover Damages' against Nelson Nufable, and wife, Silmor Nufable and
his mother Aquilina Nufable. Plaintiffs pray:
WHEREFORE, plaintiffs pray this Honorable Court that after trial judgment be
rendered ordering:
(a) That the said Deed of Sale (Annex "C") executed by the Development Bank of
the Philippines in favor of the defendants be declared null and void as far as the
three fourths (3/4) rights which belongs (sic) to the plaintiffs are concerned;
(b) That the said three fourths (3/4) rights over the above parcel in question be
declared as belonging to the plaintiffs at one fourth right to each of them;
(c) To order the defendants to pay jointly and severally to the plaintiffs by way of
actual and moral damages the amount of P10,000.00 and another P5,000.00 as
Attorney's fees, and to pay the costs.
(d) Plus any other amount which this Court may deem just and equitable. (p. 6,
Original Records)
In their Answer, defendants contend:
4. Paragraph 4 is denied, the truth being that the late Angel Nufable was the
exclusive owner of said property, that as such owner he mortgaged the same to
the Development Bank of the Philippines on March 15, 1966, that said mortgage
was foreclosed and the DBP became the successful bidder at the auction sale,
that ownership was consolidated in the name of the DBP, and that defendant
Nelson Nufable bought said property from the DBP thereafter. During this
period, the plaintiffs never questioned the transactions which were public, never
filed any third party claim nor attempted to redeem said property as
redemptioners, and that said Deed of Sale, Annex "B" to the complaint, is
fictitious, not being supported by any consideration; (pp. 20-21, id.)
The Deed of Sale (Annex "B"), referred to by the parties is a notarized Deed of
Sale, dated July 12, 1966 (marked as Exhibit "H") by virtue of which, spouses
Angel and Aquilina Nufable, as vendors, sold 3/4 portion of the subject property
to herein plaintiffs for and in consideration of P1,000.00 (Exh. "5"). 2
On November 29, 1995, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment, the dispositive
portion 3 of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision of the lower court is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. A new judgment is hereby entered declaring plaintiffs-appellants as the
rightful co-owners of the subject property and entitled to possession of 3/4
southern portion thereof; and defendant-appellee Nelson Nufable to 1/4 portion.

11. No award on damages.
No costs.
Defendants-appellees' Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit in
the Resolution of the Court of Appeals 4 dated October 2, 1996.
Hence, the present petition. Petitioners raise the following grounds for the
petition:
1. Honorable Court of Appeals erred in considering as controlling the probate of
the Last Will and Testament of Esdras Nufable, the probate thereof not being an
issue in this case;
2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not considering the fact that the
Development Bank of the Philippines became absolute, exclusive, legal and
rightful owner of the land in question, from whom petitioner Nelson Nufable
acquired the same by purchase and that, therefore, no award can be made in
favor of private respondent unless and until the Development Bank of the
Philippines' title thereto is first declared null and void by the court.
The Court of Appeals, in its decision, stated that the trial court failed to take into
consideration the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable bequeathing the
subject property to all his four children. 5 In the present petition, petitioner
present the issue of whether or not the Last Will and Testament of Esdras
Nufable and its subsequent probate are pertinent and material to the question of
the right of ownership of petitioner Nelson Nufable who purchased the land in
question from, and as acquired property of, the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP, for short). They contend that the probate of the Last Will
Testament and of Esdras Nufable did not determine the ownership of the land in
question as against third parties.1âwphi1.nêt
As a general rule, courts in probate proceedings are limited only to passing upon
the extrinsic validity of the will sought to be probated, the due execution thereof,
the testator's testamentary capacity and the compliance with the requisites or
solemnities prescribes by law. Said court at this stage of the proceedings is not
called to rule on the rule on the intrinsic validity or efficacy of the will. 6 The
question of the intrinsic validity of a will normally comes only after the court has
declared that the will has been duly authenticated.
The records show that upon petition for probate filed by the heirs of the late
Esdras Nufable, an Order dated March 30, 1966 was issued by then Court of First
Instance of Negros Oriental, Branch II, admitting to probate the last will and
testament executed by the decedent. 7 Thereafter, on June 6, 1966, the same
court approved the Settlement of Estate submitted by the heirs of the late Esdras
Nufable wherein they agreed "(T)hat the parcel land situated in Poblacion
Manjuyod, Negros Oriental remains undivided for community ownership but
respecting conditions imposed therein (sic) in the will." 8 In paragraph 3 thereof,
they stated that "they have no objection as to the manner of disposition of their
share made by the testator, the expenses of the proceeding and that they have
already taken possession of their respective shares in accordance with the will."
Verily, it was the heirs of the late Esdras Nufable who agreed among themselves
on the disposition of their shares. The probate court simply approved the
agreement among the heirs which approval was necessary for the validity of any
disposition of the decedent's estate. 9
It should likewise be noted that the late Esdras Nufable died on August 9, 1965.

12. When the entire property located at Manjuyod was mortgaged on March 15,
1966 by his son Angel Custodio with DBP, the other heirs of Esdras — namely:
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo — had already acquired successional rights over
the said property. This is so because of the principle contained in Article 777 of
the Civil Code to the effect that the rights to the succession are transmitted from
the moment of death of the decedent. Accordingly, for the purpose of
transmission of rights, it does not matter whether the Last Will and Testament of
the late Esdras Nufable was admitted on March 30, 1966 or thereafter or that the
Settlement of Estate was approved on June 6, 1966 or months later. It is to be
noted that the probated will of the late Esdras Nufable specifically referred to the
subject property in stating that "the land situated in the Poblacion, Manjuyod,
Negros Oriental, should not be divided because this must remain in common for
them, but it is necessary to allow anyone of them brothers and sisters to
construct a house therein." 10 It was therefor the will of the decedent that the
subject property should undivided, although the restriction should not exceed
twenty (20) years pursuant to Article 870 11 of the Civil Code.
Thus, when Angel Nufable and his spouses mortgaged the subject property to
DBP on March 15, 1966, they had no right to mortgage the entire property.
Angel's right over the subject property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso
share. As co-owner of the subject property, Angel's right to sell, assign or
mortgage is limited to that portion that may be allotted to him upon termination
of the co-ownership. Well-entrenched is the rule that a co-owner can only
alienate his pro indiviso share in the co-owned property. 12
The Court of Appeals did not err in ruling that Angel Custodio Nufable "had no
right to mortgage the subject property in its entirety. His right to encumber said
property was limited only to 1/4 pro indiviso share of the property in question."
13 Article 493 of the Civil Code spells out the rights or co-owners over a co-
owned property. Pursuant to said Article, a co-owner shall have full ownership of
his part and of the fruits and benefits pertaining thereto. He has the right to
alienate, assign or mortgage it, and even substitute another person in its
enjoyment. As a mere part owner, he cannot alienate the shares of the other co-
owners. The prohibition is premised on the elementary rule that "no one can give
what he does not have." 14
Moreover, respondents stipulated that they were not aware of the mortgage by
petitioners of the subject property. 15 This being the case, a co-owner does not
lose his part ownership of a co-owned property when his share is mortgaged by
another co-owner without the former's knowledge and consent 16 as in the case
at bar. It has likewise been ruled that the mortgage of the inherited property is
not binding against co-heirs who never benefitted. 17
Furthermore, the Deed of Sale dated June 17, 1966 marked as Exhibit "H"
executed by spouses Angel and Aquilina Nufable in favor of respondents
Generosa, Vilfor and Marcelo wherein the former sold, ceded and transferred
back to the latter the 3/4 portion of the subject property bolsters respondents'
claim that there was co-ownership. Petitioner Nelson himself claimed that he
was aware of the aforesaid Deed of Sale. 18
Anent the second ground of the petition, petitioners allege that the Development
Bank of the Philippines acquired ownership of the land in question through
foreclosure, purchase and consolidation of ownership. Petitioners argue that if
petitioner Nelson Nufable had not bought said land from the DBP, private
respondents, in order to acquire said property, must sue said bank for the
recovery thereof, and in so doing, must allege grounds for the annulment of
documents evidencing the bank's ownership thereof. Petitioners contend that
since petitioner Nelson Nufable simply bought the whole land from the bank,
they cannot be deprived of the ownership of 3/4 without making any
pronouncement as to the legality or illegality of the bank's ownership of said
land. It is argued that there was no evidence to warrant declaration of nullity of
the bank's acquisition of said land; and that neither was there a finding by the
court that the bank illegally acquired the said property.

13. As adverted to above, when the subject property was mortgaged by Angel
Custodio, he had no right to mortgage the entire property but only with respect
to his 1/4 pro indiviso share as the property was subject to the successional
rights of the other heirs of the late Esdras. Moreover, in case of foreclosure; a sale
would result in the transmission of title to the buyer which is feasible only if the
seller can be in a position to convey ownership of the things sold. 19 And in one
case, 20 it was held that a foreclosure would be ineffective unless the mortgagor
has title to the property to be foreclosed. Therefore, as regards the remaining
3/4 pro indiviso share, the same was held in trust for the party rightfully entitled
thereto, 21 who are the private respondents herein.
Pursuant to Article 1451 of the Civil Code, when land passes by succession to any
person and he causes the legal title to be put in the name of another, a trust is
established by implication of law for the benefit of the true owner. Likewise,
under Article 1456 of the same Code, if property is acquired through mistake or
fraud, the person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property comes. In the
case of Noel vs. Court of Appeals, 22 this Court held that "a buyer of a parcel of
land at a public auction to satisfy a judgment against a widow acquired only one-
half interest on the land corresponding to the share of the widow and the other
half belonging to the heirs of her husband became impressed with a constructive
trust in behalf of said heirs."
Neither does the fact that DBP succeeded in consolidating ownership over the
subject property in its name terminate the existing co-ownership. Registration of
property is not a means of acquiring ownership. 23 When the subject property
was sold to and consolidated in the name of DBP, it being the winning bidder in
the public auction, DBP merely held the 3/4 portion in trust for the private
respondents. When petitioner Nelson purchased the said property, he merely
stepped into the shoes of DBP and acquired whatever rights and obligations
appertain thereto.
This brings us to the issue of whether or not the DBP should have been
impleaded as party-defendant in the case at bar. Petitioners contend that DBP
was never impleaded and that due process requires that DBP be impleaded so
that it can defend its sale to petitioner Nelson Nufable; and that it was the duty of
private respondents, and not of petitioner Nelson, to implead the bank and ask
for the annulment of documents evidencing the bank's ownership of the disputed
land.
In the Rejoinder to the Reply, private respondents that the non-inclusion of DBP
as a "necessary party" was not questioned by petitioners from the time the
Complaint was filed until the case was "finished." It was only after the adverse
decision by the respondent Court of Appeals that petitioners raised the issue.
At the outset, it should be stated petitioners never raised this issue in their
Answers and pursuant to Section 2, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court, defenses and
objections not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the answer are deemed
waived.
Nonetheless, the rule is that indispensable parties, i.e., parties in interest without
whom no final determination can be had of an action, shall be joined either as
plaintiffs or defendants; the inclusion as a party, i.e., persons who are not
indispensable but ought to be parties if complete relief is to be accorded as
between those already parties, the court may, in its discretion, proceed in the
action without making such persons parties, and the judgment rendered therein
shall be without prejudice to the rights of such persons. 25 Proper parties,
therefore, have been described as parties whose presence in necessary in order
to adjudicate the whole controversy, but whose interests are so far separable
that a final decree can be made in their absence without affecting them. 26 Any
claim against a party may be severed and proceeded with separately. 27

14. The pivotal issue to be determined is whether DBP is an indispensable party in
this case.
Private respondents do not question the legality of the foreclosure of the
mortgaged property and the subsequent sale of the same to DBP. The subject
property was already purchased by petitioner Nelson from DBP and latter, by
such sale, transferred its rights and obligations to the former. Clearly,
petitioners' interest in the controversy is distinct and separable from the interest
of DBP and a final determination can be had of the action despite the non-
inclusion of DBP as party-defendant. Hence, DBP, not being an indispensable
party, did not have to be impleaded in this case.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error in the decision appealed from, the
petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, Panganiban and Purisima, JJ., concur.
Romero, J., abroad, on official business leave.
G.R. No. 111682 February 6, 1997
ZENAIDA REYES, petitioner, vs. COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
R E S O L U T I O N
This is a motion for reconsideration of the resolution dated November 29, 1995,
of the Court, denying the petition for review of the decision, dated May 28, 1993,
and the resolution, dated August 30, 1993, of the Court of Appeals 1 in CA-G.R.
CR. No. 08410, affirming the conviction of petitioner Zenaida P. Reyes of
falsification of public document. Petitioner's motion is based on her contention
that because of her counsel's unexplained absences at the trial she was
prevented from presenting evidence in her defense and therefore denied the due
process of law.
The facts are as follows:
In an information filed on April 7, 1986 with the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan

15. and later assigned to Branch 22 thereof as Criminal Case No. 9252-M, petitioner
Zenaida Reyes was accused of falsifying a deed of sale of four (4) parcels of land
"by feigning and signing the name of Pablo Floro, who could not affix his
signature anymore due to age infirmity, on the said document as seller and
causing it to appear that said Pablo Floro [had] participated in the execution of
the said document when in truth and in fact, as said accused well knew, said deed
of sale was not executed and signed by the said Pablo Floro, nor did he ever
appear before any notary public for the purpose of acknowledging the deed
above mentioned." 2
Upon being arraigned, petitioner pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits then
followed. After the prosecution had rested its case, the presentation of the
defense evidence was scheduled on February 6, 1989, which, however, was reset
"for the last time" to March 10, 1989 due to petitioner's illness. 3 The hearing on
March 10, 1989 was, however, cancelled also because of the absence of both the
private prosecutor and defense counsel, Atty. Analuz Cristal-Tenorio. The new
schedule was April 12, 1989. 4 However, Atty. Tenorio was again absent on April
12, 1989. Petitioner was also absent, but her husband appeared and submitted to
the court a medical certificate that she was sick. The hearing on that date was
therefore postponed to May 17, 1989 "[f]or the last time. " 5
On May 11, 1989, Atty. Tenorio moved for the postponement of the hearing from
May 17, 1989 to June 5, 1989, allegedly because she had to leave for Malaybalay,
Bukidnon to assist in the prosecution of her brother-in-law's killers. The trial
court, while noting that the hearing on May 17, 1989 was "intransferrable in
character," nonetheless granted Atty. Tenorio's motion and postponed the
hearing to June 5, 1989 over the objection of the private prosecutor. Petitioner
was warned that if she did not present her evidence on that date, she would be
considered to have waived her right to do so. 6 But the hearing on June 5, 1989
had to be rescheduled again because petitioner's counsel, Atty. Tenorio, was
absent. 7
On July 10, 1989, the new date of hearing, both petitioner and Atty. Tenorio were
absent, so that on motion of private prosecutor, the court declared petitioner to
have waived the right to present her evidence. 8 Four days later (on July 14,
1989), petitioner gave a medical certificate 9 stating that she was suffering from
hypertension and rheumatism which required bed rest for at least 5-7 days. The
court merely noted the medical certificate but maintained its previous order, on
the ground that "the same is not a motion and [as] counsel was also not in Court
during the last hearing, the Order of the Court dated July 10, 1989 to the effect
that the presentation of defense evidence is considered waived, stands. " 10
Petitioner by herself moved for reconsideration, alleging that she failed to appear
in court on July 10, 1989 because she was indisposed and had been unable to
contact Atty. Tenorio. She asked for permission to present her evidence. Her
motion, however, was denied by the court in its order of August 29, 1989 11 in
which it also scheduled the promulgation of judgment on September 29, 1989.
On September 29, 1989, the court rendered its decision 12 finding petitioner
guilty of falsification and sentencing her to 4 months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional, as maximum, and to
pay a fine of P5,000.00.
Petitioner through a new counsel, Atty. Ronolfo S. Pasamba, filed a notice of
appeal. 13 On May 9, 1990, petitioner by herself filed a motion in the Court of
Appeals for extension of 30 days to file her brief as appellant. 14 About the same
time Atty. Pasamba also filed a motion for an extension of 45 days for the same
purpose, but later asked to be relieved as petitioner's counsel on the ground that
despite his request, petitioner did not give him the records of the case and confer
with him but instead acted as her own counsel by filing her own motion for time
to file brief.

16. The Court of Appeals granted Atty. Pasamba's motion and required petitioner to
submit the name and address of her new counsel within ten (10) days from
notice. Petitioner instead filed a motion for new trial in lieu of appellant's brief,
claiming that because of the negligence of her counsel, she had been deprived of
her right to present evidence on her behalf in the trial court.
After the Solicitor General filed his comment, the Court of Appeals in its
resolution dated January 15, 1992 denied petitioner's motion for new trial and
gave her 30 days within which to file her appellant's brief. 15 The appellate court
held:
All that appellant is invoking as ground for new trial is the policy of liberality in
the application of the rules and the alleged negligence of her counsel.
Appellant, who has, in fact, prepared the motion herself, without the assistance
of counsel, is probably a member of the Bar. If she is not, she must have gone
through law school as her handiwork is written in forensic style and is even
better than the pleadings of some licensed advocates who are handling appealed
cases or original special civil actions before this Court.
Under the Rules the grounds for new trial are
(a) That errors of law or irregularities have been committed during the trial
prejudicial to the substantial nights of the accused; and
(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial,
and which if introduced and admitted, would probably change the judgment.
(Rule 121, Section 2)
There is not even a wee bit of a hint about the second ground.
So, in effect, what the accused would want of Us is to bend over backwards and in
a gesture of liberality consider as an error of law or as an irregularity the trial
court's conclusion that she was deemed to have waived her right to present
evidence in her defense. In connection with this course of action she already filed
before the trial court a motion for reconsideration: this was denied, whereupon
the trial court proceeded to rendition of the judgment appealed from by the
accused to this court.
We have meticulously gone over the entire record, and We find that accused
appellant was not at all deprived of her day in court or denied due process. She
was afforded ample opportunity to present evidence in her defense.
Regardless of the nature of the offense charged, a criminal case, even if it
involves only a light offense, the penalty for which might be mere censure, is a
serious matter that deserves equally serious attention by the one accused. The
appellant, it seems never gave to this case while it was still at the lower court the
serious attention that it deserves. For good reason — repeated absences of the
accused and her counsel — the trial court was eventually constrained to consider
the accused to have waived the presentation of evidence in her defense. As
pointed out by the Solicitor General, it is settled in our jurisprudence that
dilatory moves by the accused that tend to defeat the expeditious termination of
a criminal case is tantamount to trifling with the administration of justice that
certainly can not and should not be condoned. (PP vs. Angco, 103 Phil. 33; PP vs.

17. Dichoso, 96 SCRA 957)
Petitioner filed a "very urgent motion" for 90 days from February 22, 1992 to
secure services of counsel to file her appellant's brief. The Court of Appeals gave
petitioner 15 days from February 22, 1992, the last day of the extension
previously granted her. The Court of Appeals stated that it had given petitioner
notice to file brief as early as March 27, 1990, but "petitioner has been trifling
with our judicial processes long enough."
On March 6, 1992, without the assistance of counsel, accused-appellant filed an
appellant's brief. Thereafter the Solicitor General filed the appellee's brief to
which petitioner filed a reply brief. On May 28, 1993, the Court of Appeals
rendered its decision, affirming the trial court's ruling. On August 30, 1993 it
denied reconsideration.
Petitioner filed this case for review on certiorari, claiming that her conviction by
the trial court was void because she was denied due process, since she was
denied the opportunity to present evidence in her behalf. The Solicitor General
filed his comment to which petitioner filed a reply. On November 29, 1995 this
Court denied the petition for lack of merit. Hence this motion for reconsideration.
After due consideration of the motion and its supplement and the separate
comments thereto by the respondents as well as petitioner's replies and private
respondent's consolidated rejoinder, the Court now resolves to grant petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
First. The issue in this case is whether the trial court properly held petitioner to
have waived the right to present evidence because of her failure to proceed
despite several postponements granted to her. To be sure, the postponement of
the trial of a case to allow the presentation of evidence of a party is a matter
which lies in the discretion of the trial court, but it is a discretion which must be
exercised wisely, considering the peculiar circumstances obtaining in each case
and with a view to doing substantial justice. 16 In the case at bar, hearings were
scheduled for die presentation of petitioner's evidence on six different dates, to
wit: (1) February 6, 1989; (2) March 10, 1989; (3) April 12, 1989; (4) May 17,
1989; (5) June 5, 1989; and (6) July 10, 1989. Petitioner was absent thrice, i.e., on
February 6, 1989, April 12, 1989, and July 10, 1989. On the first date, petitioner
could not come because she was sick and her counsel so informed the court. She
was absent also on June 5, 1989 and July 10, 1989 because of illness
(hypertension and rheumatism). Thus, while petitioner's absences were
explained, those of her counsel were not. Atty. Tenorio simply disappeared
without a trace, despite warning to counsel that her failure to present evidence
for her client on June 5, 1989 would be considered a waiver of the latter's right to
present her evidence. But counsel failed to heed the warning. Petitioner had to
soldier on and, by herself, had to plead with the court for a chance to present her
evidence. Contrary to what the appellate court thought in affirming petitioner's
conviction, this was not the case of a woman who treated the criminal
proceedings against her with cavalier disdain. Indeed, we do not think that
petitioner's absences were so many, capricious, or egregious as to indubitably
indicate an attempt to stall the proceedings of the criminal case as was the case
in People v. Angco 17 and People v. Dichoso. 18 Petitioner might have tried to
delay the filing of her appellant's brief, but her effort can be attributed to an
understandable desire to be allowed to present her evidence. Hence, the filing of
a motion for new trial. Even in her present petition before this Court petitioner's
prayer is not that she be exonerated but only that she be given the chance to
prove her innocence by being allowed to present her evidence.
Respondent People and the counsel for the private respondent oppose
petitioner's motion. They point out that, unlike the cases 19 which petitioner
cites in support of her motion, petitioner herself was negligent. They contend
that she could not have been unaware of the absences of her lawyer but despite
that she did nothing to protect her interests. Private respondent argues that "if

18. granted a second chance to present her side, nothing will stop the petitioner
from once again engaging the services of her erstwhile absentee counsel.
Anyway, after another 10 years of litigation, she can easily sound her reliable
refrain: 'I was denied due process! I was ready to present my evidence, but my
lawyer was absent for five consecutive times'. . . ."
Private respondent's contention is exaggerated. Of course there is a limit to
petitioner's credibility should she repeat what had happened here just for delay,
not to mention that she would be taking a big risk of losing her defense. As for
the private respondent's argument that petitioner should have gotten another
lawyer, only with the benefit of hindsight does this course appear to be the only
tenable one to take. Petitioner might have thought that her counsel would be
more sedulous in her behalf. Or perhaps petitioner tried to get another counsel,
but failed and, left with no choice, stuck it out with Atty. Tenorio and simply
hoped for the best rather than be left without a counsel. In any case, the fact that
on May 17, 1989 and June 5, 1989 petitioner was present even when counsel was
absent tends to negate an intention to delay the criminal proceedings.
It was Atty. Tenorio's absences, then, rather than petitioner's, which appear to be
the cause for the defense's failure to present its evidence. Atty. Tenorio's
negligence did not consist in error of procedure or even a lapse in strategy but
something as basic as failing to appear in court despite clear warning that such
failure would amount to waiver of her client's right to present evidence in her
defense.
Keeping in mind that this case involves personal liberty, the negligence of
counsel was certainly so gross that it should not be allowed to prejudice
petitioner's constitutional right to be heard. The judicial conscience certainly
cannot rest easy on a conviction based solely on the evidence of the prosecution
just because the presentation of the defense evidence had been barred by
technicality. Rigid application of rules must yield to the duty of courts to render
justice where justice is due — to secure to every individual all possible legal
means to prove his innocence of a crime with which he or she might be
charged. 20
Only last year, this Court set aside its decision after finding that the right of the
accused to due process had been violated. In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan, 21
this Court set aside its decision affirming petitioner's conviction by the
Sandiganbayan and its resolution denying reconsideration, after being shown
that petitioner's conviction had been brought about by his counsel's gross
ignorance of law and procedure. The Court held:
Petitioner's present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and
centavos. No less than his liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it
simply because his former lawyers pursued a carelessly contrived procedural
strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy, which
thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for
presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher
interests of justice and equity demand that petitioner be not penalized for the
costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the same principles why
this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties
from the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this
case is only to condone rather than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners
whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his innocence to his previous
lawyers. . . .
The Court remanded the case to the Sandiganbayan for reception and
appreciation of petitioner's evidence.
In another case, People v. Del Mundo, 22 in which the accused was convicted of

19. rape in six cases and sentenced to reclusion perpetua on five of them and to
death on the sixth, this Court ordered a new trial after it was shown that
complainant had executed prior to accused's conviction an affidavit of
desistance, while an NBI medico-legal report given after such conviction found
that complainant's "physical virginity preserved." The report belied the contrary
finding of the city health officer on which the trial court relied in convicting the
accused. Although the NBI report did not constitute newly-discovered evidence,
a new trial was nonetheless ordered "on the broader ground of substantial
justice [as] the rule for granting a motion for new trial, among others, should be
liberally construed to assist the parties in obtaining a just and speedy
determination of their rights. . . . Court litigations are primarily for the search for
truth, and a liberal interpretation of the rules by which both parties are given the
fullest opportunity to adduce proofs is the best way to ferret out such truth."
Reconsideration of the resolution in this case is compelled by these precedents.
Indeed, to deny petitioner the opportunity to present her evidence on the merest
chance that she might be innocent would be to disregard the wisdom that it is
better to acquit ten guilty individuals than to convict one innocent person. The
Court is as aware as anyone of the need for the speedy disposition of cases. At the
same time, however, it has ever been mindful of its responsibility as the highest
tribunal of justice to see to it that the paramount interests of justice are not
sacrificed for the sake of speed and efficiency. As Justice Teehankee wrote: 23
The Court has consistently maintained that although a speedy determination of
an action implies a speedy trial, speed is not the chief objective of a trial. Careful
and deliberate consideration for the administration of justice, a genuine respect
for the rights of all parties and the requirements of procedural due process and
an adherence to the Court's standing admonition that the discretion granted
judges in the granting or denial of motions for postponement and the setting
aside of denial orders previously issued "should always be predicated on the
consideration that more than the mere convenience of the courts or of the
parties in the case, the ends of justice and fairness would be served thereby" are
more important than a race to end the trial.
Second. In denying petitioner's plea for a chance to present her evidence, the
Court of Appeals observed that petitioner has more than a layman's
acquaintance with the law, having been able to prepare and file her own motion
for new trial and appellant's brief, to be given the benefit of the doubt. But even
lawyers, who are parties in a case, need the guiding hand of counsel. Skill in
drafting pleadings (which is practically the only "lawyerly" thing petitioner did)
is vastly different from skill needed in the courtroom. Preparing pleadings can be
done at leisure with the luxury of consultation, either of books or of people. Trial
work, however, demands more. It requires the ability to think fast on one's feet
and the psychologist's feel for the witness' mood and motive. As then Chief
Justice Moran said for the Court in People v. Holgado: 24
Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science of the
law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be
convicted not because he is guilty but because he does not know how to establish
his innocence.
It is entirely probable that, forced to be her own lawyer, petitioner nonetheless
felt some inadequacy and experienced some moments of doubt whether she
could go through the ordeal of presenting her evidence by her lonesome, and
that could be the reason why she hesitated from doing so when she found herself
without the assistance of counsel and not because petitioner tried to delay the
proceedings and obstruct the course of justice.
In sum, it is better to allow petitioner another chance to present her evidence
than to let her conviction stand based solely on the evidence of the prosecution.
In accordance with Rule 121, §6, 25 the evidence of the prosecution shall be

20. understood preserved, subject to the right of the prosecution to supplement it
and/or to rebut the evidence which petitioner may present.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration of the resolution of November 29,
1995 is GRANTED and the decision dated May 28, 1993 of the Court of Appeals
and that of the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan, Branch 22 dated September 29,
1989 in Criminal Case No. 9252-M are SET ASIDE and this case is REMANDED to
the Regional Trial Court of Bulacan for a new trial for the purpose of allowing
petitioner to present evidence in her defense with directive to the court
thereafter to decide the case with all deliberate speed.
SO ORDERED.
Regalado, Romero, Puno and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
POSTIGO VS. BORJAL
13 Phil 240
G.R. No. L-15737 February 28, 1962
LEONOR VILLAFLOR VDA. DE VILLANUEVA, plaintiff-appellant,
vs.
DELFIN N. JUICO, in his capacity as Judicial Administrator of the testate
estate of FAUSTA NEPOMUCENO, defendant-appellee.
Amado G. Salazar for plaintiff-appellant.
Sycip, Salazar, Luna and Associates for defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Subject to this direct appeal to us on points of law is the decision of the Court of
First Instance of Rizal, in its Civil Case No. Q-2809, dismissing plaintiff-
appellant's complaint for the recovery of certain properties that were originally
owned by the plaintiff's granduncle, Nicolas Villaflor, and which he granted to his
widow, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno, bequeathing to her "su uso y posesion
mientras viva y no se case en segundas nupcias".
The following facts appear of record: On October 9, 1908, Don Nicolas Villaflor, a
wealthy man of Castillejos, Zambales, executed a will in Spanish in his own
handwriting, devising and bequeathing in favor of his wife, Dona Fausta
Nepomuceno, one-half of all his real and personal properties, giving the other
half to his brother Don Fausto Villaflor.
Clause 6th, containing the institution of heirs, reads as follows: .
SEXTO — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes,
instituyo per mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos
y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que partan todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones
y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente: .

21. SEPTIMO: — Lego para dispues de mi muerte a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno, en prueba de mi amor y carino, los bienes, alhajas y
muebles que a continuacion se expresan; .
OCTAVO: — Que estos legades disfrutaria mi referida esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno su uso y posesion mientras viva y no se case en segundas
nupcias, de la contrario, pasara a ser propiedad estos dichos legados de
mi sobrina nieta Leonor Villaflor.
The 12th clause of the will provided, however, that Clauses 6th and 7th thereof
would be deemed annulled from the moment he bore any child with Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno. Said Clause 12th reads as follows: .
DUODECIMO: — Quedan anulados las parrafos 6.0 y 7.0 de este
testamento que tratan de institucion de herederos y los legados que se
haran despues de mi muerte a favor de mi esposa, en el momento que
podre tener la dicha de contrar con hijo y hijos legitimos o legitimados,
pues estos, conforme a ley seran mis herederos.
Don Nicolas Villaflor died on March 3, 1922, without begetting any child with his
wife Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The latter, already a widow, thereupon instituted
Special Proceeding No. 203 of the Court of First Instance of Zambales, for the
settlement of her husband's estate and in that proceeding, she was appointed
judicial administratrix. In due course of administration, she submitted a project
of partition, now Exhibit "E". In the order of November 24, 1924, now exhibit "C",
the probate court approved the project of partition and declared the proceeding
closed. As the project of partition, Exhibit "E", now shows Doña Fausta
Nepomuceno received by virtue thereof the ownership and possession of a
considerable amount of real and personal estate. By virtue also of the said
project of partition, she received the use and possession of all the real and
personal properties mentioned and referred to in Clause 7th of the will. The
order approving the project of partition (Exh. "C"), however, expressly provided
that approval thereof was "sin perjuicio de lo dispuesto en la clausula 8.o del
testamento de Nicolas Villaflor." .
On May 1, 1956, Doña Fausta Nepomuceno died without having contracted a
second marriage, and without having begotten any child with the deceased
Nicolas Villaflor. Her estate is now being settled in Special Proceeding No. Q-
1563 in the lower court, with the defendant Delfin N. Juico as the duly appointed
and qualified judicial administrator.
The plaintiff Leonor Villaflor Vda. de Villanueva is admitted to be the same
Leonor Villaflor mentioned by Don Nicolas Villaflor in his will as his "sobrina
nieta Leonor Villaflor".
Plaintiff Leonor Villaflor instituted the present action against the administrator
of the estate of the widow Fausta Nepomuceno, on February 8, 1958, contending
that upon the widow's death, said plaintiff became vested with the ownership of
the real and personal properties bequeathed by the late Nicolas Villaflor to
clause 7 of his will, pursuant to its eight (8th) clause. Defendant's position,
adopted by the trial court, is that the title to the properties aforesaid became
absolutely vested in the widow upon her death, on account of the fact that she
never remarried.
We agree with appellant that the plain desire and intent of the testator, as
manifested in clause 8 of his testament, was to invest his widow with only a
usufruct or life tenure in the properties described in the seventh clause, subject
to the further condition (admitted by the appellee) that if the widow remarried,
her rights would thereupon cease, even during her own lifetime. That the widow
was meant to have no more than a life interest in those properties, even if she did
not remarry at all, is evident from the expressions used by the deceased "uso y
posesion mientras viva" (use and possession while alive) in which the first half of
the phrase "uso y posesion" instead of "dominio" or "propiedad") reinforces the
second ("mientras viva"). The testator plainly did not give his widow the full
ownership of these particular properties, but only the right to their possession
and use (or enjoyment) during her lifetime. This is in contrast with the
remainder of the estate in which she was instituted universal heir together with
the testator's brother (clause 6). 1äwphï1.ñët
SEXTO: — En virtud de las facultades que me conceden las leyes,
instituyo por mis unicos y universales herederos de todos mis derechos
y acciones a mi hermano D. Fausto Villaflor y a mi esposa Da. Fausta
Nepomuceno para que parten todos mis bienes que me pertenescan, en
iguales partes, para despues de mi muerte, exceptuando las donaciones
y legados que, abajo mi mas expontanea voluntad, lo hago en la forma
siguiente.
The court below, in holding that the appellant Leonor Villaflor, as reversionary
legatee, could succeed to the properties bequeathed by clause 7 of the testament
only in the event that the widow remarried, has unwarrantedly discarded the
expression "mientras viva," and considered the words "uso y posesion" as

22. equivalent to "dominio" (ownership). In so doing, the trial court violated Article
791 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, as well as section 59 of Rule 123 of the
Rules of Court.
ART. 791. The words of a will are to receive an interpretation which will
give to every expression some effect, rather than one which will render
any of the expressions inoperative; and of two modes of interpreting a
will, that one is to be preferred which will prevent intestacy." .
SEC. 59. Instrument construed so as to give effect to all provisions. — In
the construction of an instrument where there are several provisions or
particulars, such a construction is, if possible, to be adopted as will give
effect to all." .
Speculation as to the motives of the testator in imposing the conditions
contained in clause 7 of his testament should not be allowed to obscure the clear
and unambiguous meaning of his plain words, which are over the primary source
in ascertaining his intent. It is well to note that if the testator had intended to
impose as sole condition the non-remarriage of his widow, the words "uso y
posesion mientras viva" would have been unnecessary, since the widow could
only remarry during her own lifetime.
The Civil Code, in Article 790, p. 1 (Article 675 of the Code of 1889), expressly
enjoins the following: .
ART. 790. The words of a will are to be taken in their ordinary and
grammatical sense, unless a clear intention to use them in another sense
can be gathered, and that other can be ascertained." .
Technical words in a will are to be taken in their technical sense, unless
the context clearly indicates a contrary intention, or unless it
satisfactorily appears that the will was drawn solely by the testator, and
that he was unacquainted with such technical sense. (675a)
In consonance with this rule, this Supreme Court has laid the doctrine in In re
Estate of Calderon, 26 Phil., 233, that the intention and wishes of the testator,
when clearly expressed in his will, constitute the fixed law of interpretation, and
all questions raised at the trial, relative to its execution and fulfillment, must be
settled in accordance therewith, following the plain and literal meaning of the
testator's words, unless it clearly appears that his intention was otherwise. The
same rule is adopted by the Supreme Court of Spain (TS. Sent. 20 Marzo 1918; 28
Mayo 1918; 30 Abril 1913; 16 Enero 1915; 23 Oct. 1925).
La voluntad del testador, clara, precisa y constantemente expresada al
ordenar su ultimo voluntad, es ley unica, imperativa y obligatoria que
han de obedecer y cumplir fieldmente albaceas, legatarios y heredera,
hoy sus sucesores, sin que esa voluntad patente, que no ha menester de
interpretaciones, pues no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse, pues
no ofrece la menor duda, pueda sustituirse por ningun otro criterio de
alguna de los interesados, ni tampoco por el judicial. (Tribunal Supremo
of Spain, Sent. 20 March 1918) .
The American decisions invoked by appellee in his brief inapplicable, because
they involve cases where the only condition imposed on the legatee was that she
should remain a widow. As already shown, the testament of Don Nicolas Villaflor
clearly and unmistakably provided that his widow should have the possession
and use of the legacies while alive and did not remarry. It necessarily follows that
by the express provisions of the 8th clause of his will, the legacies should pass to
the testator's "sobrinanieta", appellant herein, upon the widow's death, even if
the widow never remarried in her lifetime. Consequently, the widow had no right
to retain or dispose of the aforesaid properties, and her estate is accountable to
the reversionary legatee for their return, unless they had been lost due to
fortuitous event, or for their value should rights of innocent third parties have
intervened.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the decision appealed from is reversed, and the
appellant Leonor Villaflor Vda. de VILLANUEVA is declared entitled to the
ownership and fruits of the properties described in clause 7 of the will or
testament, from the date of the death of Doña Fausta Nepomuceno. The records
are ordered remanded to the court of origin for liquidation, accounting and
further proceedings conformably to this decision. Costs against the
Administrator-appellee.
Bengzon, C.J., Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes, Dizon and De
Leon, JJ., concur.
Labrador, J., took no part.

23. Aznar v Garcia 7 scra 95
Facts:
Edward S. Christensen, though born in New York, migrated to California
where he resided and consequently was considered a California Citizen for a
period of nine years to 1913. He came to the Philippines where he became a
domiciliary until the time of his death. However, during the entire period of his
residence in this country, he had always considered himself as a citizen of
California.
In his will, executed on March 5, 1951, he instituted an acknowledged
natural daughter, Maria Lucy Christensen as his only heir but left a legacy of
some money in favor of Helen Christensen Garcia who, in a decision rendered by
the Supreme Court had been declared as an acknowledged natural daughter of
his. Counsel of Helen claims that under Art. 16 (2) of the civil code, California law
should be applied, the matter is returned back to the law of domicile, that
Philippine law is ultimately applicable, that the share of Helen must be increased
in view of successional rights of illegitimate children under Philippine laws. On
the other hand, counsel for daughter Maria , in as much that it is clear under Art,
16 (2) of the Mew Civil Code, the national of the deceased must apply, our courts
must apply internal law of California on the matter. Under California law, there
are no compulsory heirs and consequently a testator should dispose any
property possessed by him in absolute dominion.
Issue:
Whether Philippine Law or California Law should apply.
Held:
The Supreme Court deciding to grant more successional rights to Helen
Christensen Garcia said in effect that there be two rules in California on the
matter.
The conflict rule which should apply to Californian’s outside the
California, and
The internal Law which should apply to California domiciles in
califronia.
The California conflict rule, found on Art. 946 of the California Civil code
States that “if there is no law to the contrary in the place where personal
property is situated, it is deemed to follow the decree of its owner and is
governed by the law of the domicile.”
Christensen being domiciled outside california, the law of his domicile,
the Philippines is ought to be followed.
Wherefore, the decision appealed is reversed and case is remanded to
the lower court with instructions that partition be made as that of the
Philippine law provides.
G.R. Nos. L-11483-11484 February 14, 1958
In the matter of the Testate Estate of the deceased Edward E. Christensen,
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioner.
MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY and ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, petitioners-
appellants,
vs.
MARIA HELEN CHRISTENSEN GARCIA and BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO,
oppositors-appellees.
BERNARDA CAMPOREDONDO, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
ADOLFO CRUZ AZNAR, as Executor of the Deceased EDWARD E.
CHRISTENSEN, defendant-appellant.

24. M. R. Sotelo for appellants.
Leopoldo M. abellera and Amado A. Munda for appellee Maria Heliuen Christensen
Garcia.
Pedro P. Suarez and Oscar Breva for appellee Bernarda Camporedondo.
FELIX, J.:
From the records of the above-entitled cases, it appears that as of 1913,Edward
E. Christensen, an American citizen, was already residing in Davao and on the
following year became the manager of Mindanao Estates located in the
municipality of Padada of the same province. At a certain time, which the lower
court placed at 1917, a group of laborers recruited from Argao, Cebu, arrived to
work in the said plantation. Among the group was a young girl,Bernarda
Camporendondo, who became an assistant to the cook. Thereafter, thegirl and
Edward E. Christensen, who was also unmarried staring living together as
husband and wife and although the records failed to establishthe exact date
when such relationship commenced, the lower court found the same to have
been continous for over 30 years until the death of Christensen occurecd on April
30, 1953. Out of said relations, 2 children, Lucy and Helen Christensen, were
allegedly born.
G. R. NO. L-11484.
Upon the demise of the American, who had left a considerable amount of
properties his will naming Adolfo Cruz Aznar as executor was duly presented for
probate in court and became the subject of Special Proceedings No. 622 of the
Court of First Instance of Davao. Said will contains, among others, the following
provisions:
xxx xxx xxx.
3. I declare . . . that I have but one (1) child, named MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN (now Mrs. Bernard Daney), who was born in the
Philippines about twenty-eight years ago, and who is now residing at No.
665 Rodger Young Village, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A.
4. I further declare that I have no living ascendants, andno
descendantsexcept my above named daughter, MARIA LUCY
CHRISTENSEN DANEY.
xxx xxx xxx.
7. I give, devise and bequeath unto MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN, now
married toEduardo Garcia, about eighteen years of age and who,
notwithstanding the factthat she was baptized Christensen, is not in any
way related to me, nor hasshe been at any time adopted to me, and who,
from all information I have now resides in Egipt, Digos, Davao,
Philippines, the sum of THREEE THOUSAND SIXHUNDRED PESOS
(P3,600) Philippine Currency, the same to be deposited in trustfor said
Maria Lucy Christensen with the Davao Branch of the PhilippineNational
Bank, and paid to her at the rate of One Hundred Pesos (P100),
Philippine Currency per month until the the principal thereof as well as
any interest which may have accrued thereon, is exhausted.
8. I give devise and bequeath unto BERNARDA CAMPORENDONDO, now
residing inPadada, Davao, Philippines, the sum of One Thousand Pesos
(P1,000), Philippine Currency.
xxx xxx xxx.
12. I hereby give, devise and bequeath, unto my well-beloved daughter,
the said MARIA Lucy CHRISTENSEN DANEY (Mrs. Bernard Daney), now
residing as aforesaid at No. 665 Rodger Young Village Los Angeles,
California, U.S.A., all the income from the rest, remainder, and residue of
my property and estate, real, personal and/or mixed, of whatsoever kind
or character, andwheresover situated; of which I may be possessed at
any death and which mayhave come to me from any source whatsoever,
during her lifetime,Provided, honvever, that should the said MARIA
LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY at any time prior to her decease having
living issue, then, and in that event, the life interest herein given shall
terminate, and if so terminated, then I give, devise, and bequeath to my
said daughter, the said MARIA LUCY CHRISTENSEN DANEY, the rest
remainder and residue of my property, with the same force and effectas
if I had originally so given, devised and bequeathedit to her; and
provided, further, that should be said Maria Lucy ChristensenDaney die
without living issue then, and in that event, I give, devise and bequeath
all the rest, remainder and residue of my property, one-half (1/2) to my
well-beloved sister, Mrs. CARRIE LOIUSE C. BORTON, now residing at
No. 2124 Twentieth Street, Bakersfield, California, U.S.A. and one-half
(1/2) to the children of my deceased brother, JOSEPH C.

25. CRISTENSEN, . . .
13. I hereby nominate and appoint Mr Adolfo Cruz Aznar, of Davao City,
Philippines, my executor, and the executor of this, my last will and
testament.
. . . (Exh. A).
Oppositions to the probate of this will were separately filed by Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia and Bernarda Camporendondo, the first contending that
thewill lacked the formalities required by law; that granting that he had,
thedispositions made therein were illegal because although she and Lucy
Christensen were both children had by the deceased with Bernarda
Camporendondo, yet she was given only a meager sum of P3,600 out of an estate
valued at $485,000 while Lucy would get the rest of the properties;and that the
petitioner Adolfo Cruz Aznar was not qualified to be appointed as administrator
of the estate because he had an interest adverse to thatof the estate. It was
therefore prayed by his oppositor that the application for probate be denied and
the will disallowed; that the proceeding be declared intestate and that another
disinterested person be appointed as administrator.
Bernarda Camporedondo, on the other hand, claimed ownership over one-halfof
the entire estate in virtue of her relationship with the deceased, it being alleged
that she and the testator having lived together as husband andwife continuously
for a period of over 30 years, the properties acquired during such cohabitation
should be governed by the rules on co-ownership. This opposition was dismissed
by the probate court on the ground that shehad no right to intervene in said
proceeding, for as such common-law wife she had no successional right that
might be affected by the probate of thewill, and likewise, she could not be
allowed to establish her title and co-ownership over the properties therein for
such questions must be ventilated in a court of general jurisdiction. In view of
this ruling of the Court and in order to attain the purpose sought by her
overruled opposition Bernarda Camporedondo had to institute, as she did
institute Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao (G.R. No. L-
11483) which we will consider and discuss hereinafter.
In the meantime, Adolfo Cruz Aznar was appointed special adminsitrator of the
estate after filing a bond for P5,000 pending the appointment of a regular one,
and letters of special administrition were correspondingly issued to him on May
21, 1953.
The records further show that subsequent to her original opposition. Helen
Christensen Garcia filed a supplemental opposition and motion to declare her an
acknowledged natural child of Edward E. Christensen, alleging that shewas
conceived during the time when her mother Bernarda Camporendondo was
living with the deceased as his common-law wife; that she had been in continous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased; thatahe had in her
favor evidence and/or proof that Edward Christensen was her father; and that
she and Lucy had the same civil status as children of the decedent and Bernarda
Camporedondo. This motion was opposed jointly by the executor and Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney asserting that before, during and after the conception and
birth of Helen Christensen Garcia, her mother was generally known to be
carrying relations with 3 different men; that during the lifetime of the decedent
and even years before his death, Edward Christensen verbally as well as in
writing disavowed relationship with said oppositor; that oppositor appropriated
and used the surname Christensen illegally and without permission from the
deceased. Thus they prayed the Court that the will be allowed; that Maria Helen
Christensen Garcia be declared not in any way related to the deceased; and that
the motion of said oppositor be denied.
After due hearing, the lower court in a decision dated February 28, 1953, found
that oppositor Maria Helen Cristensen had been in continous possession of the
status of a natural child of the deceased Edward Christensen notwithstanding the
fact that she was disowned by him in his will, for such action must have been
brought about by the latter's disaproval of said oppositor's marriage to a man he
did not like. But taking into considerationthat such possession of the status of a
natural child did not itself constitute acknowledgment but may only be availed of
to compel acknowledgment, the lower Court directed Maria Lucy Christensen
Daney toacknowledge the oppositor as a natural child of Edward E. Christensen.
Thewill was, however, allowed the letters testamentary consequently issued
toAdolfo Cruz Aznar, the executor named therein. From the portion of the
decision requiring Lucy Christensen to acknowledge Helen as a natural child of
the testator, the former and the executor interposed an appeal to the Court of
Appeals (CA-G. R. No. 13421-R), but the appellate tribunal elevatedthe same to
Us on the ground that the case involves an estate the value of which far exceeds
P50,000.00 and thus falls within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of this Court
pursuant to Section 17 (5), Republic Act No. 296.
The principal issue in this litigation is whether the lower court erred in finding

26. that the oppositor Maria Helen Christensen Garcia had been in continous
possession of the status of a natural child of the deceased EdwardE. Christensen
and in directing Maria Lucy Christensen Daney, recognizeddaughter and
instituted heirs of the decedent, to acknowledge the former assuch natural child.
Maria Lucy Christensen was born on April 25, 1922, and Maria Helen
Christensen on July 2, 1934, of the same mother, Bernarda Camporedondo,
during the period when the latter was publicly known to have been living as
common-law wife of Edward E. Chrisiensen. From the facts of the case there can
be no question as to Lucy's parentage, but controversy arose when Edward
Christensen, in making his last will and testament, disavowed such paternity to
Helen and gave her only a legacy of P3,600. ln the course of the proceeding for
the probate of the will (Exh, A), Helen introduced documentary and testimonial
evidence to support her claim that she, Lucy,was a natural child of the deceased
and, therefore, entitled to the hereditaryshare corresponding to such
descendant. Several witness testified in herfavor, including the mother Bernarda
Camporendondo, her former teachers andother residents of the community,
tending to prove that she was known in the locality as a child of the testator and
was introduced by the latter to the circle of his friends and acquaintances as his
daughter. Family portraits, greeting cards and letters were likewise presented to
bolster herassertion that she had always been treated by the deceased and by
Lucy herself as a member of the family.
Lucy Christensen and Adolfo Cruz Aznar, as executor, tried to repudiate herclaim
by introducing evidence to prove that on or about the period when shewas
conceived and born, her mother was carrying an affair with another man,Zosimo
Silva, a former laborer in her Paligue plantation. Silva executed an affidavit and
even took the witness stand to testify to this effect. Appellants also strived to
show that the defendant's solicitations for Helen's welfare and the help extended
to her merely sprang out generosity and hammered on the fact that on several
occasions, the deceased disclaimed any relationship with her (Exh. O-Daney, Exh.
Q-Daney, Exh. Z-Daney, Exh. 8-Helen).
Going over the evidence adduced during the trial, it appears indubitable that on
or about the period when Helen was born, Bernarda Camporendondo had
established residence at her plantation at Paligue, Davao, and that although
Edward Christensen stayed in Davao City to manage his merchandising business,
he spent the weekends with the former and their child Lucy in the
Christensenplantation. Even granting that Zosimo Silva at his stage fitted himself
intothe picture, it cannot be denied that Helen's mother and the deceased
weregenerally and publicly known to be living together as husband and wife.
Thismust have been the reason why Christensen from Helen's birth in 1934
providedfor her maintenance; shouldered the expenses for her education to the
extentthat she was even enrolled as an intern in an exclusive college for girls
inManila; tolerated or allowed her carrying the surname "Christensen", and
ineffect gaver her the attention and care that a father would only do to this
offspring. We should take note that nothing appears on record to show
thatChristensen ever entertained any doubt or disputed Helen's paternity.
Hisrepudations of her relationship with him came about only after he
andBernarda Comperodondo parted ways in March, 1950, and apparently after
Helentook sides with her mother. Furthermore, it seems that despite that
decedent's desire that she continue her studies, Helen ignored the same andgot
married to a man for Christensen held no high esteem. We may state at
hisjuncture that while it is true that herein appellants introduced witnesses
todisprove oppositor'r claim, the lower Court that had the opportunity to
observe the conduct of the witnesses while testifying and could better gaugetheir
credibility and impartiality in the case, arrived at the conclusion that Maria Helen
Christensen had established that she had been in continouspossessions of the
status of a natural child of the deceased. Considering the preponderant evidence
on record, We see no reason to reverse said ruling.The testator' lastacts cannot
be made the criterion in determining whether oppositor was his child or not, for
human frailty and parental arrogance maydraw a person to adopt unnatural or
harsh measures against an erring child orone who displeases just so the weight
of his authority could be felt. In theconsideration of a claim that one is a natural
child, the attitude or directacts of the person against whom such action is
directed or that of his family before the controversy arose or during his lifetime if
he predeceases the claimant, and not a single opportunity or an isolated
occasions but as a whole, must be taken into account. The possession of such
status is one of the cases that gives rise to the right, in favor of the child, of
coumpulsaryrecognition. (Art. 283, Civil Code).
The lower Court, however, after making its finding directed Maria Lucy
Christensen Daney, an heir of the decedent, to recognize oppositor as a natural
child of the deceased. This seems improper. The Civil Code for 2 kinds of
acknowledgement of a natural child: voluntary and compulsory. In the first
instance, which may be effected in the record of birth, a will, a statement before a
court of record or in an authentic writing (Art. 278,Civil Code), court
intervention is very nil and not altogether wanting, whereas in the second,
judicial pronouncement is essential, and while it is true that the effect of a
voluntary and a compulsory acknowledgment onthe right of the child so

27. recognized is the same, to maintain the view of thelower Court would eliminate
the distinction between voluntary acts and those brought about by judicial dicta.
And if We consider that in the case, where, the presumed parent dies ahead of
the child and action for compulsory recogniton is brought against the heirs of the
deceased, as in the instant case, the situation would take absurd turn, for the
heirs would be compelled to recognize such child as a natural child of the
deceased without a properprovision of the law, for as it now stands, the Civil
Code only requires a declaration by the court of the child's status as a natural
child of the parent who, if living, would be compelled to recognize his offspring
as such.Therefore, We hold that in cases of compulsory recognition, as in the case
at bar, it would be sufficient that a competent court, after taking into account all
the evidence on record, would declare that under any of the circumstances
specified by Article 283 of the Civil Code, a child has acquired the status of a
natural child of the presumptive parent and as such is entitled to all rights
granted it by law, for such declaration is by itself already a judicial recognition of
the paternity of the parent concerned which is her against whom the action is
directed, are bound to respect.
G.R. No. L-11483
Coming now to Civil Case No. 1076 of the Court of First Instance of Davao,
Bernarda Camporendondo claimed in her complaint 1/2 of the properties of
thedeceased as co-owner thereof in virtue of her relations with the deceased. She
alleged as basis for action that she and the deceased Edward E. Christensen had
lived and cohabitated as husband and wife, continously and openly for a period
for more than 30 years; that within said period, plaintiff and the deceased
acquired real and personal properties through their common effort and industry;
and that in virtue of such relationship, she was a co-owner of said properties. As
the executor refused to account forand deliver the share allegedly belonging to
her despite her repeated demands, she prayed the court that said executor be
ordered to submit an inventory and render an accounting of the entire estate of
the deceased;to divide the same into 2 equal parts and declare that one of them
lawfully belonged to plaintiff; and for such other reliefs as may be deemed just
and equitable in the premises. In his answer, the executor denied the
avermentsof the complaint, contending that the decedent was the sole owner of
the properties left by him as they were acquired through his own efforts;
thatplaintiff had never been a co-owner of any property acquired or possessed
by the late Edward christensen during his lifetime; that the personal relationship
between plaintiff and the deceased was purely clandestinebecause the former
habitually lived in her plantation at Paligue, Davao, from the time she acquired
the same in 1928; that she also maintained relations with 2 other men; and that
the claim of plaintiff would violate the provisions of Article 2253 of the Civil Code
as the vested rights of the compulsory heirs of the deceased would be impaired.
Defendant thus prayed for the dismissal of the complaint and as counterclaim
demanded the sum ofP70.000.00 representing actual, moral and exemplary
damages.
Due hearing was conducted thereon and after the parties ad submitted
theirrespective memoranda, the lower Court on August 25, 1954, rendered
judgmentfinding that the deceased Edward Christensen and Bernarda
Camporendondo,not otherwise suffering from any impediment to contract
marriage, lived together as husband and wife without marital ties continously for
over 30years until the former's death in 1953; that out of such relations 2
childrenwere born; and that the properties in controversy were acquired by
either orboth of them through their work or industry. Relying on Section 144 of
theCivil Code which said court considered to have created another mode
ofacquiring ownership, plaintiff was held to be entitled to one-half of
saidproperties as co-owner thereof in view of her relationship with the
deceasedand ordered the executor to account for and deliver the same by her.
Fromthis decision, defendant Aznar, as Executor of the will, perfected an
appealto the Court of Appeals, but as the property involved in the litigation
exceeds P50,000.00 said tribunal elevated the case to Us for consideration.
It is not controverted that at the time of his death, Edward Christensen was the
owner of certain properties, including shares of stock in the plantation bearing
his name and a general merchandising store in Davao City. It is also undeniable
that the deceased and appellee, both capacitated to enter into the married state,
maintained relations as husband and wife, continuously and publicly for a
considerable number of years which the lower Court declared to be until the
death of Christensen in 1953. While as a general rule appellate courts do not
usually disturb the lower court's findings of fact, unless said finding is not
supported by or totally devoid of or inconsistent with the evidence on record,
such finding must ofnecessity be modified to confrom with the evidence if the
reviewing tribunalwere to arrive at the proper and just solution of the
controversy. In theinstant case, the court a quo overlooked or failed to consider
the testimonies of both Lucy and Helen Christensen to the effect that the
deceased and their mother Bernarda Camporendondo had some sort of quarrel
or misunderstanding and parted ways as of March, 1950, a fact which
appelleewas not able to overcome. Taking into account the circumstances of this
caseas found by the trial court, with the modification that the cohabitation