The document discusses the challenges facing Abenomics policies in Japan and examines the implications for economic welfare and wealth inequality. It establishes a framework to analyze Abenomics by comparing potential policy outcomes to those of Reaganomics and Thatcherism. Key uncertainties include external factors, asymmetrical risks, and whether policy commitments can be maintained. If implementation succeeds, growth could increase aggregate welfare but also potentially widen wealth gaps without redistributive policies.
Using Video Tools to Develop Student's Writing SkillsAndrew McCarthy
This was one of my presentations given at the recent Teach IT conference in Singapore. November 2011. For more resources see here - http://teachit2011.uwcsea.wikispaces.net/Workshop_03
ECON 301 Week 5 DiscussionsGroup 2 US Trade PolicySummaryFor.docxjack60216
ECON 301 Week 5 Discussions
Group 2 US Trade Policy
Summary
For our group project we have decided to research, analyze, and formulate an argument on the World Trade Organization (WTO) in regards to the US Trade Policy. In our paper we have discussed what WTO stands for and the goal of this organization. We have also addressed the latest form of trade negotiations among the WTO membership – Doha Development Round and the controversial topics of protectionism and free trade. Among the research we have performed, we as a group have come to a conclusion that we support this organization. Although there are incomplete developments that still need to be addressed, we continue to support this organization because of the fact that numerous nations come together in order to reform these conflicts.
Questions:
1. What makes free trade a better option than protectionism for the economic situation in the US?
2. What consequences would the WTO face if they acted unethically given their power?
Group 3 US Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policy refers to the practice of monitoring spending levels and tax rates to try and influence our economy. Before the Great Depression, which started in the late twenties, our government had a hands off approach to the economy or a laissez-faire approach. After the Second World War it was deemed necessary for the government to become involved in our economy. (Heakal, Reem) They decided this would be necessary in order to attempt to influence unemployment, the business cycle and inflation. Of course there are many different ideas on the best approach and way to accomplish this.
The government takes initiative in trying to regulate unemployment, unemployment benefits, and taxation. They do this through the use of what is known as automatic stabilizers, which are programs and policies meant to balance fluctuations in the economy. During a recession, automatic stabilizers are expanded, and during an economic boom, the automatic stabilizers are reduced. An example of this would be unemployment benefits (David Weil). When there is a recession and unemployment is high, the government spends more money on unemployment benefits, whereas when the unemployment is low, the government spends less money on unemployment benefits. According to William J. Carrington, an analyst of the Congressional budget office, some of the fiscal policies used to reduce unemployment include household assistance (reducing employees’ taxes, increased unemployment insurance expenditures, and more refundable tax), business assistance, and financial aid to the states. Carrington also shows that to reduce unemployment, unemployment benefit policies must be modified such as an extension to the duration of benefits, reemployment bonuses, and offering wage insurance. Fiscal Policy can also be used to influence new ideas like those in alternative energies.
The United States government often tries to finds ways to stimulate the economy while looking towards its future. T ...
Using Video Tools to Develop Student's Writing SkillsAndrew McCarthy
This was one of my presentations given at the recent Teach IT conference in Singapore. November 2011. For more resources see here - http://teachit2011.uwcsea.wikispaces.net/Workshop_03
ECON 301 Week 5 DiscussionsGroup 2 US Trade PolicySummaryFor.docxjack60216
ECON 301 Week 5 Discussions
Group 2 US Trade Policy
Summary
For our group project we have decided to research, analyze, and formulate an argument on the World Trade Organization (WTO) in regards to the US Trade Policy. In our paper we have discussed what WTO stands for and the goal of this organization. We have also addressed the latest form of trade negotiations among the WTO membership – Doha Development Round and the controversial topics of protectionism and free trade. Among the research we have performed, we as a group have come to a conclusion that we support this organization. Although there are incomplete developments that still need to be addressed, we continue to support this organization because of the fact that numerous nations come together in order to reform these conflicts.
Questions:
1. What makes free trade a better option than protectionism for the economic situation in the US?
2. What consequences would the WTO face if they acted unethically given their power?
Group 3 US Fiscal Policy
Fiscal Policy refers to the practice of monitoring spending levels and tax rates to try and influence our economy. Before the Great Depression, which started in the late twenties, our government had a hands off approach to the economy or a laissez-faire approach. After the Second World War it was deemed necessary for the government to become involved in our economy. (Heakal, Reem) They decided this would be necessary in order to attempt to influence unemployment, the business cycle and inflation. Of course there are many different ideas on the best approach and way to accomplish this.
The government takes initiative in trying to regulate unemployment, unemployment benefits, and taxation. They do this through the use of what is known as automatic stabilizers, which are programs and policies meant to balance fluctuations in the economy. During a recession, automatic stabilizers are expanded, and during an economic boom, the automatic stabilizers are reduced. An example of this would be unemployment benefits (David Weil). When there is a recession and unemployment is high, the government spends more money on unemployment benefits, whereas when the unemployment is low, the government spends less money on unemployment benefits. According to William J. Carrington, an analyst of the Congressional budget office, some of the fiscal policies used to reduce unemployment include household assistance (reducing employees’ taxes, increased unemployment insurance expenditures, and more refundable tax), business assistance, and financial aid to the states. Carrington also shows that to reduce unemployment, unemployment benefit policies must be modified such as an extension to the duration of benefits, reemployment bonuses, and offering wage insurance. Fiscal Policy can also be used to influence new ideas like those in alternative energies.
The United States government often tries to finds ways to stimulate the economy while looking towards its future. T ...
Goal of this assignmentVoters in all regions around the world exp.docxstarkeykellye
Goal of this assignment:
Voters in all regions around the world expect their government (the public sector) to somehow help economic development in their region.
The problem is-- there is NO simple, guaranteed way to assure
economic development
and expansion.
Sometimes public sector action, such as an increase in certain taxes or regulation,
leads to better services, and helps the economy. And sometimes it doesn’t.
Debate will continue about the best balance between allowing markets (which are sometimes irrational) to dictate economic policy, and using government policy and resources to reduce uncertainty, by incentivizing comparative advantages, innovation, and investment in the region, especially at times of cyclic economic recovery, or recovering from
historic
economic disparities.
Industry is best at maintaining or expanding its own profitability.
But that may
not always turn into
benefit for the entire economy of that region:
i.e. it may not increase employment, investment, or sustainability of that region’s economy.
There is sufficient evidence that public involvement and investment in economic development, when done wisely, strengthens economy-wide outcomes over the long term, including infrastructure, work force education and well-being, environmental protection, fair competition, taxation, regulatory and legal certainty -the foundations of a strong economy.
For this assignment, look at two of the largest methods in government action for economic development and sustainability; A)“Transfers” (government to government), and B)“Subsidies”
(government support for a business or an industry).
Based on a
ll
the items in
Readings # 5
and #6,
please respond to the following questions:
Respond to the following Qs in
no more than two pages
altogether (double spaced, 12 pt)
15 %
of final grade for this course.
1)
Decribe “
Transfers”
(government to government).
Describe
“Subsidy”.
What are the main
differences
?
2)
Explain several
rationales
(pro and con)
for each -at least two each,
e.g. pro and con.
3)
Describe how people have been
confused or mistaken
about difference between these two policies.
Note
:
I Recommend you review
readings in coursepack
Reading #5
and especially
Reading #6
...
ECON 3324 Winter 2017 Written Assignment Due march 16Regio.docxSALU18
ECON 3324 Winter 2017: Written Assignment: Due march 16
Regional Economic Development Techniques:
Beyond False Critiques, Fake News, & Economic Theory
Goal of this assignment:
Voters in all regions around the world expect their government (the public sector) to somehow help economic development in their region.
The problem is-- there is NO simple, guaranteed way to assure economic developmentand expansion. Sometimes public sector action, such as an increase in certain taxes or regulation, leads to better services, and helps the economy. And sometimes it doesn’t. Debate will continue about the best balance between allowing markets (which are sometimes irrational) to dictate economic policy, and using government policy and resources to reduce uncertainty, by incentivizing comparative advantages, innovation, and investment in the region, especially at times of cyclic economic recovery, or recovering from historic economic disparities.
Industry is best at maintaining or expanding its own profitability. But that may not always turn into benefit for the entire economy of that region: i.e. it may not increase employment, investment, or sustainability of that region’s economy. There is sufficient evidence that public involvement and investment in economic development, when done wisely, strengthens economy-wide outcomes over the long term, including infrastructure, work force education and well-being, environmental protection, fair competition, taxation, regulatory and legal certainty -the foundations of a strong economy.
For this assignment, look at two of the largest methods in government action for economic development and sustainability; A)“Transfers” (government to government), and B)“Subsidies”
(government support for a business or an industry).
Based on all the items in Readings # 5 and #6, please respond to the following questions:
Respond to the following Qs in no more than two pages altogether (double spaced, 12 pt)
15 % of final grade for this course.
1) Decribe “Transfers” (government to government). Describe “Subsidy”. What are the main differences?
2) Explain several rationales (pro and con) for each -at least two each, e.g. pro and con.
3) Describe how people have been confused or mistaken about difference between these two policies.
Note: I Recommend you review readings in coursepack Reading #5 and especially Reading #6 .
...
DB2
7 Economic Policy Challenging Incrementalism
Incremental and Nonincremental Policymaking
Traditionally, fiscal and monetary policies were made incrementally; that is, decision makers concentrated their attention on modest changes—increases or decreases—in existing taxing, spending, and deficit levels, as well as the money supply and interest rates. Incrementalism was especially pervasive in annual federal budget making. The president and Congress did not reconsider the value of all existing programs each year, or pay much attention to previously established expenditure levels. Rather last year’s expenditures were considered as a base of spending for each program, attractive consideration of the budget proposals focused on new items or increases over last year’s base.
But crises often force policymakers to abandon incrementalism and reach out in non-incremental directions. In economic policy, the president and Congress and the Fed are pressured to “do something” in the face of a perceived economic crisis, even if there is little consensus on what should be done, or even whether there is anything the federal government can do to resolve the crisis. As we shall see later in this chapter, the recession that began in 2008 caused policymakers to search for new policies and make dramatic changes in spending and deficit levels and to undertake unprecedented measures to prevent the collapse of financial markets and avoid a deep recession.
Fiscal and Monetary Policy
Economic policy is exercised primarily through the federal government’s fiscal policies—decisions about taxing, spending, and deficit levels—and its monetary policies—decisions about the money supply and interest rates.
Fiscal policy is made in the annual preparation of the federal budget by the president and the Office of Management and Budget, and subsequently considered by Congress in its annual appropriations bills and revisions of the tax laws. These decisions determine overall federal spending levels, as well as spending priorities among federal programs. Together with tax policy decisions (see Chapter 8), these spending decisions determine the size of the federal government’s annual deficits or surpluses.
Monetary policy is the principal responsibility of the powerful and independent Federal Reserve Board—“the Fed”—which can expand or contract the money supply through its oversight of the nation’s banking system (see “The Fed at Work” later in this chapter). Congress established the Federal Reserve System and its governing Board in 1913 and Congress could, if it wished, reduce its power or even abolish the Fed altogether. But no serious effort has ever been undertaken to do so.
Economic Theories As Policy Guides
The goals of economic policy are widely shared: growth in economic output and standards of living, full and productive employment of the nation’s work force, and stable prices with low inflation. But a variety of economic theories compete for preeminence as ways of achiev.
Why Macroeconomic Structural and Wage-Price Indicators are Puzzling the Polic...Economic Policy Dialogue
This commentary tries to answer the puzzling questions – why there is a disconnect between inflation and unemployment, unemployment rate and wage rate, monetary policy rate stance and real economy, economic buoyancy and price-wage indicators; and also, why the neutral interest rate and the natural unemployment rate are declining. It points out that the official data do not represent the structural realities of the economy. As the official measurements have been deviating more from the social and economic facts, the economic indicators have tended to become less predictable and applicable.
Deliverable length 1,100 to 1,500 words. Please go in-depth.Tw.docxcargillfilberto
Deliverable length 1,100 to 1,500 words. Please go in-depth.
Two important policy goals of the government and the Fed are to keep unemployment and inflation low, while at the same time making sure that GDP is increasing at an average of 3% per year. It is important to have the right mix of policies and that all the variables be timed perfectly.
Government is fiscal Policy and Federal is Monetary Policy. Monetary Policy is the one that cares if inflation gets out of hand.
Part 1:
Assume that the country is in a period of high unemployment, interest rates are at almost zero,
inflation is about 2% per year
, and GDP growth is less than 2% per year.
Suggest how fiscal and monetary policy can move those numbers to an acceptable level keeping inflation the same.
What is the first action you would take as the president? As the chairman of the Fed? Why?
What would be your subsequent steps?
Make sure you include both the positive and negative effects of your actions, and include the trade-offs or opportunity costs.
Include the following concepts in your discussion:
Demand and supply of money
- (This is a Fed issue)
Interest rates – (This is a Fed issue)
The Phillips curve
Taxation – (This is a Government issue)
Government spending – (This is a Government issue)
Wages – (This is a Fed issue)
Costs of inflation - (This is a Fed issue)
The multiplier and the tax multiplier – (This is a Government issue)
The idea of tax rebates to stimulate the economy – (This is a Government issue)
Part 2:
Assume that the country is in a budget deficit and carrying a very large debt. Discuss the dangers of a high debt to GDP ratio and a growing budget deficit. Would this affect any policy changes you discussed in Part 1?
Describe the concepts and measurement of Gross Domestic Product (GDP), unemployment, and inflation.
Explain what is meant by “business cycles” and “economic growth and describe the factors that contribute to each.
Demonstrate understanding of the relevance and impact of macroeconomics and how it impacts politics, the workplace, and people.
References required
.
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
Swedbank was founded in 1820, as Sweden’s first savings bank was established. Today, our heritage is visible in that we truly are a bank for each and every one and in that we still strive to contribute to a sustainable development of society and our environment. We are strongly committed to society as a whole and keen to help bring about a sustainable form of societal development. Our Swedish operations hold an ISO 14001 environmental certification, and environmental work is an integral part of our business activities.
Similar to Public Lecture Presentation Slide (11.29.2013) Naomi Fink: Abenomics and the Japanese Wealth Gap (19)
A theoretical Framework on Inflation and Retirement:
Improvements in longevity as well as declining fertility rates have led to an aging demographic across developed nations. These tendencies, alongside several decades of low inflation have led to shifts in pension and retirement policies across developed nations. It goes without saying that Retirement security remains a shared concern, one that has heightened as inflation has returned to the global landscape, adding further uncertainty to the financial security of retirees. From a policy perspective, monetary policy is the most blunt tool within the macroeconomic toolkit whereas retirement has increasingly become a household-level savings, investment and decumulation problem. Given the dependency of policy on inflation expectations and that of inflation expectations on household-level decision-making, we present elements of an incipient framework that may be used to integrate household and firm-level decision making into the contemporary macroeconomic policy toolkit.
The Finnish and Swedish accessions to NATO—even though incomplete as of now—have been interpreted in some corners as the beginning of the end for neutrality. Not picking sides in a war of aggression is untenable, they hold, cheering the decisions of some former neutrals to give up their signature foreign policies while berating those who still do not send weapons to Ukraine or sanction Russia. Whatever one’s stance on the policy side is, one point has been lost in the debate: neutrality is not a question of ideology but a fact of conflict dynamics. It just won’t go away. Not even the two World Wars or the 40 years of the Cold War could get rid of the “fence-sitters.”
Neutrality, always and everywhere, is a reaction to conflict(s). The current one over Ukraine is no exception, giving rise to neutral policies in roughly two-thirds of the world. It is a moot question if there should be neutrality or not. Nonaligned behavior of third-party states is a fact of international life and will remain one. There are really only two questions that matter: First, which neutrals will leave the stage, and which ones will be born? Second, will the neutrals play a constructive role in the new global conflict, or will they be relegated to the margins?
This talk will disentangle the neutrality debate by differentiating the legal components from the political and strategic aspects and discuss recent neutrality developments in Europe, Asia, and the Americas.
Dual citizenship was once universally reviled as a moral abomination, then largely marginalized as an anomaly. During the twentieth century, states were able to police the status and manage incidental costs to the extent that full suppression proved impossible. More recent decades have seen wide acceptance of dual citizenship as those costs dissipated for both states and individuals. Powerful nonresident citizen communities have played a crucial role in winning recognition of the status. A handful of states -- Japan notable among them -- have held out against this clear trend and increasingly vocal emigrant and immigrant constituencies and children of bi-national couples. This session will situate Japan's resistance to dual citizenship in a global historical context.
November 28, 2022
The Tokyo Metropolitan Government has given the go-ahead for a major redevelopment of Jingu Gaien, the cluster of sports facilities and green space adjacent to the National Stadium in Sendagaya. The project has recently become a focus of attention in Tokyo, with many people from across the political spectrum speaking out with concerns about the project.
The redevelopment plan is made possible by a loosening of height restrictions in the area that was implemented in conjunction with the Olympics, and former Prime Minister Yoshiro Mori was involved in conceptualization of the plan. The redevelopment will eliminate nearly a thousand trees, two historic stadiums and several public sports facilities, and put in three high rise office buildings.
In this presentation activist Rochelle Kopp will describe the various concerns and issues related to the Jingu Gaien redevelopment project and how she and some other activists and academics are speaking out against the plan and urging that Governor Koike withdraw it and start over with input from the public and experts.
November 17, 2022
8 November 2022 was the last day of voting for the US midterm elections. These elections reflected the mood of American voters and give us some idea of the future course of American policy and of the political and ideological balance of power in the United States. They will also affect the ability of the Biden Administration to pursue its agenda.
Professor Yashiro, one of Japan's leading economists, will look at the results of Abenomics (a term coined to describe Japan's economic policy while Shinzo Abe was premier) and Prime Minister Kishida's plans for what he calls a "New Capitalism."
Observers of Japanese security and foreign policies have largely focused on analyzing Japanese policies in the area of traditional security. However, they would be remiss to disregard the string of new developments that have been occurring in Japan – namely that of “economic security.”
Prompted by rising U.S.-China competition, Japan has been undergoing rapid change in its economic security policies over the last few years. These changes range from organizational transformation to new legislation as well as increasing support for the private sector. This trend is likely to accelerate under the incoming Kishida administration, which has created a new ministerial post for economic security.
How has Japan’s economic security policy evolved in the last few years? What kind of changes will we likely see in Japan’s economic security policies under the Kishida administration? What impact will this “economic security awakening” in Japan have on Japan-U.S. and Japan-China relations? How should Japan cooperate with other key actors, such as the European Union, the Quad countries, the Five Eyes states, and Southeast Asian countries?
This seminar will address these critical questions and more with Akira Igata, who has been advising international organizations, the Japanese government, bureaucracy, and the private sector in economic security issues for many years.
Speaker Biography:
Akira Igata is Executive Director and Visiting Professor at the Center for Rule-making Strategies at Tama University. He is also the Economic Security Advisor for the Inter-Parliamentary Alliance on China and Senior Adjunct Fellow at Pacific Forum, a U.S.-based think tank. He advises Japan’s bureaucracy, politicians, and private sector as well as international organizations on economic security issues.
A half a year ago, the prospect of an LDP presidential election did not inspire flights of the imagination. After all, what could break the hammerlock the top three party factions – the Hosoda, the Aso and the Nikai – had upon the process of selecting the party leader? Who or what could outmaneuver the wily LDP Secretary-General Nikai Toshihiro, whom two prime ministers in a row found themselves powerless to budge from his post at the apex of the party’s secretariat?
Over the summer of 2021, however, several factors became catalysts for changes in the party’s internal power structures. A presidential campaign like any other had unfolded, with the faction leaders and the party’s senior officials left gasping as erstwhile subordinates have run away with the narrative and the initiative. So many assumptions about how the LDP “works” have been challenged that the unprecedented situation of half of the candidates being women has been largely subsumed.
What will we have learned from this election? Michael Cucek will offer his views, along with suggestions of avenues of future research into the contemporary LDP.
Closed Loop, Open Borders: Wealth and Inequality in India
Speaker:
Anthony P. D’Costa, Eminent Scholar in Global Studies and Professor of Economics College of Business, The University of Alabama in Huntsville
Japan and Russia: Contemporary Political, Economic, and Military Relations
Speaker: Yu Koizumi, Project Assistant Professor, University of Tokyo
Presentation: Russian Military Posture in Northern Territory
Japan and Russia: Contemporary Political, Economic, and Military Relations
Speaker: Elena Shadrina, Associate Professor, Waseda University
Presentation: What to Expect for Russia-Japan Relations: Contemplation against a Backdrop of Social and Economic Situation in Russia
Japan and Russia: Contemporary Political, Economic, and Military Relations
Speaker: James D. J. Brown, Associate Professor of Political Science at Temple University, Japan Campus
Presentation: Japan-Russia Joint Economic Projects on the Disputed Islands: What are they good for?
More from Institute of Contemporary Asian Studies (ICAS) at TUJ (20)
Introduction to AI for Nonprofits with Tapp NetworkTechSoup
Dive into the world of AI! Experts Jon Hill and Tareq Monaur will guide you through AI's role in enhancing nonprofit websites and basic marketing strategies, making it easy to understand and apply.
Unit 8 - Information and Communication Technology (Paper I).pdfThiyagu K
This slides describes the basic concepts of ICT, basics of Email, Emerging Technology and Digital Initiatives in Education. This presentations aligns with the UGC Paper I syllabus.
Normal Labour/ Stages of Labour/ Mechanism of LabourWasim Ak
Normal labor is also termed spontaneous labor, defined as the natural physiological process through which the fetus, placenta, and membranes are expelled from the uterus through the birth canal at term (37 to 42 weeks
A Strategic Approach: GenAI in EducationPeter Windle
Artificial Intelligence (AI) technologies such as Generative AI, Image Generators and Large Language Models have had a dramatic impact on teaching, learning and assessment over the past 18 months. The most immediate threat AI posed was to Academic Integrity with Higher Education Institutes (HEIs) focusing their efforts on combating the use of GenAI in assessment. Guidelines were developed for staff and students, policies put in place too. Innovative educators have forged paths in the use of Generative AI for teaching, learning and assessments leading to pockets of transformation springing up across HEIs, often with little or no top-down guidance, support or direction.
This Gasta posits a strategic approach to integrating AI into HEIs to prepare staff, students and the curriculum for an evolving world and workplace. We will highlight the advantages of working with these technologies beyond the realm of teaching, learning and assessment by considering prompt engineering skills, industry impact, curriculum changes, and the need for staff upskilling. In contrast, not engaging strategically with Generative AI poses risks, including falling behind peers, missed opportunities and failing to ensure our graduates remain employable. The rapid evolution of AI technologies necessitates a proactive and strategic approach if we are to remain relevant.
Operation “Blue Star” is the only event in the history of Independent India where the state went into war with its own people. Even after about 40 years it is not clear if it was culmination of states anger over people of the region, a political game of power or start of dictatorial chapter in the democratic setup.
The people of Punjab felt alienated from main stream due to denial of their just demands during a long democratic struggle since independence. As it happen all over the word, it led to militant struggle with great loss of lives of military, police and civilian personnel. Killing of Indira Gandhi and massacre of innocent Sikhs in Delhi and other India cities was also associated with this movement.
June 3, 2024 Anti-Semitism Letter Sent to MIT President Kornbluth and MIT Cor...Levi Shapiro
Letter from the Congress of the United States regarding Anti-Semitism sent June 3rd to MIT President Sally Kornbluth, MIT Corp Chair, Mark Gorenberg
Dear Dr. Kornbluth and Mr. Gorenberg,
The US House of Representatives is deeply concerned by ongoing and pervasive acts of antisemitic
harassment and intimidation at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT). Failing to act decisively to ensure a safe learning environment for all students would be a grave dereliction of your responsibilities as President of MIT and Chair of the MIT Corporation.
This Congress will not stand idly by and allow an environment hostile to Jewish students to persist. The House believes that your institution is in violation of Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, and the inability or
unwillingness to rectify this violation through action requires accountability.
Postsecondary education is a unique opportunity for students to learn and have their ideas and beliefs challenged. However, universities receiving hundreds of millions of federal funds annually have denied
students that opportunity and have been hijacked to become venues for the promotion of terrorism, antisemitic harassment and intimidation, unlawful encampments, and in some cases, assaults and riots.
The House of Representatives will not countenance the use of federal funds to indoctrinate students into hateful, antisemitic, anti-American supporters of terrorism. Investigations into campus antisemitism by the Committee on Education and the Workforce and the Committee on Ways and Means have been expanded into a Congress-wide probe across all relevant jurisdictions to address this national crisis. The undersigned Committees will conduct oversight into the use of federal funds at MIT and its learning environment under authorities granted to each Committee.
• The Committee on Education and the Workforce has been investigating your institution since December 7, 2023. The Committee has broad jurisdiction over postsecondary education, including its compliance with Title VI of the Civil Rights Act, campus safety concerns over disruptions to the learning environment, and the awarding of federal student aid under the Higher Education Act.
• The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is investigating the sources of funding and other support flowing to groups espousing pro-Hamas propaganda and engaged in antisemitic harassment and intimidation of students. The Committee on Oversight and Accountability is the principal oversight committee of the US House of Representatives and has broad authority to investigate “any matter” at “any time” under House Rule X.
• The Committee on Ways and Means has been investigating several universities since November 15, 2023, when the Committee held a hearing entitled From Ivory Towers to Dark Corners: Investigating the Nexus Between Antisemitism, Tax-Exempt Universities, and Terror Financing. The Committee followed the hearing with letters to those institutions on January 10, 202
2. Intro: A framework to
examine Abenomics
In the early days of the Abe Administration, public
(and market) expectations appear to be riding high
What are the chances the public will be
disappointed?
Hint: in order to estimate this, we need to agree about
what we expect from Abe, as well as what we expect
from the rest of the world
What are the implications for the conduct of policy
given these expectations?
2
What are the implications for welfare (aggregate or
relative) if Abe’s policy succeeds or fails?
2
3. What can we expect from
public policy?
We assume that elected policy-makers attempt to maximise
the welfare of their electorate (or at least minimise the loss), if
only to remain in office.
Most OECD governments, even those with purported “free
market” platforms, not only care about aggregate welfare,
but also relative welfare (to some degree) and thus some
form of redistribution (transfers, national insurance, pensions,
tax progressivity, etc). Example: OECD notes that social
transfers allayed much of the shock to market income from
GFC
Devising a redistribution rule that leaves nobody worse-off is a
tough proposition.
3
The attractiveness of Reaganomics/Thatcherism came alongside
the image of the “rising tide” (aggregate growth) that “lifts all
boats”.
Did it? Possibly not, but it mattered more at the time whether we
believed it would.
3
4. Framework for examining
public policy
Setup of the policy problem:
To stay in office, governments will make policy promises to
minimise welfare losses (and thus stay in office)
Circumstances will often lead to temptation to shift policy to
gain a more optimal result, abandoning commitment
If the public perceives that temptation is greater than the
political cost of breaking promises given (a) particular
outcome(s), they shift their expectations such that the
implemented policy may no longer be optimal (enforcement)
Policy with commitment is more likely when the cost of
enforecement outweighs temptation to deviate
4
Incomplete markets mean there exists uncertainty…
4
5. A few sources of uncertainty
Economic cycles
Probabilities associated with welfare gains/losses
associated with economic fluctuations
Externalities
Natural disasters
Geopolitical risk
Economic crises
Overseas investment flows/foreign exchange
Asymmetries
5
“Disorderly” inflation risk is greater than welfare loss
associated with deflation
5
6. Source: http://www.kantei.go.jp/
What does this mean for Abe?
We need to estimate all of these factors if we want to answer
our initial questions on Abenomics!
We can use Reagan/Thatcher policy examples for qualitative
comparison/contrast(since we know outcomes) in doing so.
6
7. What can we expect from
Abenomics?
Expectations: So far, things look good for Abe: early
gauges – market signals (stock market, yen) show
positive expectations
Problem: Some probability for implementation to
diverge from expectations (no commitment), and if
potential divergence is too far, this means loss of
credibility. Is the cost to the Abe administration of
credibility loss (eventual regime change) greater
than the temptation to deviate from reform
promises?
Sources of Uncertainty:
7
Asymmetrical credibility risks (especially for the BOJ)
Externalities: e.g. US monetary policy, Chinese growth,
crises in the rest of the world
7
8. What do these possibilities
mean for the wealth gap?
Although cutting capital taxes are a fairly robust way to
maximise future aggregate consumption growth and thus
aggregate welfare (e.g. Chamley, Atkeson/Chari),
cutting capital taxes too radically can widen welfare
gaps (Conesa/Kitao/Kruger, Marcet/Mila/Ventura)
If implementation succeeds, it is possible that the wealth
gap widens, in the absence of income transfers (either
implicit or explicit)
This is one area in which comparing/contrasting
Abenomics with the policies of Reagan and Thatcher may
be useful
8
If implementation fails, it is possible that Japan continues
to “spread the disutility” – deflation is not only damaging
to debtors, it is regressive without fiscal adjustments
8
9. Japan’s wealth gap: “spreading
the disutility”
High income earners are
getting no richer… but poor
are getting poorer
..Yet deflation is regressive –
high-capital earning retirees
gain more in deflation years
2.7
2.6
3000000
2.5
P90/P50
disposable
income decile
ratio i
2.3
2.2
2.1
2
1.9
1.8
2900000
P50/P10
disposable
income decile
ratio i
2.4
2600000
2800000
Median disposable
income (constant
prices)
2700000
2500000
Mean disposable
income 65+ age
group
2400000
2300000
2009
2006
2003
2000
2200000
1985
1985 1995 2000 2003 2006 2009
1995
1.7
Source: http://www.oecd.org/
9
10. Post Crisis: Wealth gap shows
why OECD fears Japan-like
pattern
Japan is still in the disutilityspreading minority
But transgenerational gap is
growing across OECD
5. Poorer households tended to lose more or gain less
Annual percentage changes in disposable income between 2007 and 2010 1, by income group
5%
Total (↗ )
0%
Top 10%
-5%
-10%
Bottom
10%
Ic
el
M and
e
G xico
re
e
Ire ce
Es land
to
n
S ia
N Hu pa
ew n in
ga
Ze r
al y
an
d
I
Tu taly
U
ni
rk
te
ey
d J
U Ki a p a
ni ng n
te d
d om
St
N Po ates
et rtu
Lu her ga
xe lan l
m ds
b
N our
o g
A u rwa
st y
Sl ral
ov ia
e
Fr nia
an
ce
C
z e B Ko r
ch el ea
gi
R u
e m
D pub
en lic
m
Fi ark
nl
an
Is d
G ra
er e
m l
Ca an
n y
Au ada
Sw stri
ed a
e
Sl
C n
ov
ak Po hile
R lan
ep d
ub
lic
O
EC
D
-3
3
-15%
Notes: See notes to Figure 1. Information on data for Israel: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932315602.
Source: OECD Income Distribution Database (www.oecd.org/social/income-distribution-database.htm)
Source: http://www.oecd.org/
10
12. Commitment, under
Reagan and Thatcher
Reagan/Thatcher ideologies mostly comprised:
Rhetorical/ideological commitment to monetarist
policies, pressure for central bank to fight inflation
(not to monetise debt) and (in Thatcher’s case)
rejection of Keynesian policies
Reagan: Emphasis on capital tax cuts and
elimination of progressivity of inflation, reallocation of
spending to defence
Thatcher: Emphasis on deregulation of industry and
privatisation – “structural” reform
12
12
13. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths….
Actual outcomes for Reagan/Thatcher:
Perceived commitment to their respective policy paths,
independent of popularity of these policies.
Temptation<Enforcement
Reagan: capital tax cuts and reallocation of government
spending
Thatcher: deregulation of labour and numerous government
privatisations
Inflation, high at first in both areas decreased (possibly thanks
to the Volcker Fed’s commitment)
Economic growth (one measure of welfare), anemic at first,
picked up by the end of both administrations (no definitive
causality)
Fiscal, policy, structural consequences:
US government debt/GDP swelled, UK debt/GDP subsided
The “great moderation” in inflation continued
Greater wealth gap at the end of Reagan/Thatcher regimes
13
13
14. Plus lower-probability (now
0%)events, for example…
Stagflation: Volcker Fed fails to maintain credibility,
falls prey to asymmetric inflation expectations, fails
to subdue inflation, unemployment remains high and
real incomes drop within Reagan’s two terms; cost:
welfare loss, risk of regime change (for Reagan,
possibly for Thatcher)
Reagan: Capitalists show scepticism over Reagan’s
corporate tax cuts (perceiving
temptation>enforcement), fearing budgetbalancing hikes in the future (in actuality, Reagan
did hike 11 times). Growth fails to pick up; cost:
perceived welfare loss, risk of regime change
14
14
15. Plus lower-probability (now
0%)events, for example…
Thatcher: budget hike fails to quell investor concerns
over the UK government budget (clashes with BoE seen
as loss of central bank autonomy sabotaging inflationfighting credentials), UK sees flight of capital and forced
austerity is imposed; cost: perceived welfare loss (rise in
rates, drop in transfers), risk of regime change
Thatcher: deregulation of labour loses traction among
voting populace and reform is diluted (optimal, but
time inconsistent policy), companies fail to increase
hiring activity, unemployment remains high; cost: failure
of welfare improvement, regime change
Reagan: Failure to negotiate an increase in the debt
ceiling (raised 18 times under Reagan), compelling
renewed, unpopular tax hikes, forcing reversal of prior
cuts (time inconsistency). cost: perception of default,
regime change
15
15
16. Commitment, for Abe
Monetary: Rhetorical/ideological commitment to
monetarism (Deflation-fighting) without rejection of
Keynesian policies.
The above poses a time-consistency question for the
BOJ’s monetary policy in its willingness to reflate, then in its
ability to subdue eventual inflation
Fiscal: expectations for fiscal easing within the cycle,
expectations for eventual fiscal tightening (consumption
tax hikes, goal to halve the primary balance surplus). No
expectations either for aggressive moves either way
Structural: Expectations for reallocation of government
spending to create labour reallocation incentives; slight
expectations for prouctivity-enhancing capital
reallocation incentives (Japan Post privatisation, TPP,
SEZ’s) but potential for temptation>enforcement here
16
16
17. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths
Potential outcomes for Abe (examples):
“Good” Global markets continue their rally, driving
reflation in asset markets, spilling over to Japan. Yet
global inflation remains low enough for the Fed to
withdraw accommodation amid low inflation
expectations. The BOJ leaves stimulus in place until
2% is in sight, and slowly withdraws in an inflating
market, while reflation allows Abe’s regime to survive
long enough to embark upon structural reform while
inflating away existing debt.
17
17
18. Use potential outcomes to
identify policy paths
“Bad” The rally in global markets proves ephemeral and the
Fed leaves policy accommodation in place for longer than
originally expected. Japan remains mired in deflation, as BOJ’s
“commitment” to reflate the economy is not seen as strong
enough, in a situation of ongoing global stagnation. Without
reflation, Abe is unable to deliver on even the mild structural
reforms the market expects.
“Ugly” Markets lose confidence in the FOMC’s commitment to
keeping inflation under control, and inflation expectations
spiral uncontrollably. The BOJ, tarred by the same brush as the
Fed, fails to enforce its 2% target on the upside, and is left to
hike rates after prices have already zoomed. Failure to boost
productivity in the services sector results in lagging wage
inflation even as wage rigidities contribute to higher
unemployment; meanwhile consumer savings are inflated
away alongside government debt balances.
18
18
19. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples)
“Good/Good” The rally in global markets assists capitalists, who
redeploy profits and create jobs, while inflation enforces the
greater progressivity of income tax brackets even as
consumption tax increases are imposed. Tax receipts rise and
transfers are directed to reinforcing the social safety net,
facilitating implementation of labour reform and further
structural reform; aggregate growth improves the situation of
all and redistribution (via monetary and fiscal policy, transfers)
keeps the wealth gap in check
“Good/Bad” Global markets continue their rally and give rise to
modest inflation, yet the combination of higher income and
corporate tax revenues are insufficient to fund new transfers.
To appeal to capitalists (and reverse progressivity), the
government inflation-adjusts tax brackets. Interest rates rise,
forcing the government to inflate away existing debt balances
but reducing their capacity to establish a social safety net.
Support fails to crystallise either for labour reform, trade
liberalisation or other productivity-boosting measures. The
wealth gap widens without structural reform
19
19
20. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples) II
“Bad”/Good” Reflation persists for a period, but the BOJ reacts
too early or aggressively and its 2% target loses credibility.
However, due to a healthy global market abroad, the
government is able to inflate away a large enough portion of
debt to regain credibility in its efforts to regain primary balance.
The BOJ’s failure to monetise debt moreover reinforces
credibility in the government’s improved fiscal condition; while
Japanese growth under-performs, some productivityenhancing structural reform takes place. Aggressive cuts to
capital taxes do not take place, thus allowing mild reflation to
introduce a greater degree of tax progressivity.
“Bad/Bad” The global market rally falters and Japan falls back
into deflation. Structural reforms fail to be implemented, and
the government remains constrained in its fiscal maneuver;
while the BOJ’s policy is time-consistent with regard to fighting
inflation, it cannot be consistent in fighting deflation and it is
the government’s debt-monetisation pressures that suffer from
lack of credibility. The slow erosion of aggregate and relative
welfare (thanks to lack of adjustment of tax brackets)
continues.
20
20
21. Potential outcomes for the
welfare gap (examples) III
“Ugly”/Bad Inflation surges far above the BOJ’s 2%
target and despite the tax-progressiveness of inflation,
languishing productivity fails to keep wage growth in
line with inflation on aggregate. The ability for firms in
certain sectors to innovate (manufacturing, IT sectors)
and thus reduce costs contrasts starkly with those who
cannot (services, in which 70% of the labour force is
employed) and aggravates the two-speed economy,
widening the wealth gap along sector lines. The
services sector fails to maintain its function of absorbing
capacity spillover from the more productive
manufacturing sector. The government inflates away
debt but its credibility damaged, is unable to spend a
sufficient amount to establish an adequate
redistribution rule.
“Ugly/Ugly” inflation spirals out of control and depositors
dump the yen and capital flight ensues. Those who get
out in time retain a far greater part of lifetime wealth.
21
21
22. Assign probabilities to each
scenario, solve backward…
If we can do this in a manner that reflects public
opinion, we can estimate the distribution of risks (to
the upside and downside) to welfare that will
dictate the credibility of the Abe administration in its
ability to carry out its stated policy goals.
By setting relative wealth as the welfare measure,
we also estimate the risks to the welfare gap – to the
upside and downside, as a function of how the
public is likely to react in each scenario (weighted
by likelihood, of course).
22
22
23. Recovering First
Best
We want the optimal outcome, and if only to
remain in office, so does Abe. How do we get
it?
23
24. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Fiscal policy
The policy: Promising reflationary growth alongside
maintaining fiscal discipline is by nature a tough
proposition. With little room to ease, they are reliant
on the BOJ to offer monetary stimulus (which can be
time-inconsistent). Mentions of potential corporate
tax cuts gain a lukewarm reception. Consumption
tax hikes may reinforce fiscal credibility but are seen
by many (e.g. IMF) as insufficient.
Is it optimal? The risk of jeapordising the BOJ’s
credibility is not optimal. There remains “temptation”
either for the BOJ to give up its 2% target or for the
government to abandon goals to halve the primary
balance deficit by 2015
24
24
25. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Monetary policy
The policy: Stock and foreign exchange markets tell
us they rate the Kuroda BOJ’s 2% inflation target and
stepped up asset purchases, but to some extent, this
rally is driven by cyclical recovery in Japan and
abroad, supported by the Fed’s monetary policy.
Is it optimal? There is asymmetric risk of inflation
surging out of control. So long as everybody
believes the probability of this event is extremely low
this policy could be optimal.
25
25
26. Back to the “Three Arrows”
Structural reform
The policy: Carrying through a partial privatisaton of
Japan Post. Pursuing experimental labour and
capital reform through special economic zones, with
emphasis on specific sectors. Trade liberalisation
(TPP) seen as one avenue to bolster productivity.
Is it optimal? Most likely too early to tell and pathdependent. As the Koizumi administration learned,
reflation makes structural reform more palatable to
voters. For now, substantial risks remain in the timing,
as well as the temptation to deviate from promises
of more aggressive reforms.
26
26
27. Comparison to
Reagan/Thatcher
Platforms:
Monetary: Reagan reinforced inflation-fighting
activities from Volcker’s Fed while Thatcher used
fiscal policy to subvert BoE power to fight inflation.
Fiscal: Reagan voiced commitment to tax cuts;
Thatcher to spending cuts (alongside some income
tax cuts) - overall fiscal tightening.
Structural reform: Reagan’s fiscal reform credentials
overshadowed regulatory; Thatcher’s platform
focused around privatisations and labour
deregulation
27
27
28. Comparison to
Reagan/Thatcher
Commitment: perception of time-consistent policy
kept both in office
Was it optimal?
Monetary: The Fed’s ability to keep inflation in check
has been lauded, but there remains no proof that this
policy was by nature optimal (Primiceri paper)
Fiscal: Laffer curve dynamics (espoused by Reagan
especially in justifying supply-side policies) do not
actually differ so greatly in Japan and the US..
Corporate tax rates are comparable, bases are narrow
Structural: Thatcher’s reforms were credible – some
argue optimal on aggregate; many argue sub-optimal
when examined with respect to relative wealth.
28
28
29. Reagan Thatcher & inflation
cost: Too great to deviate?
Good luck: One massive difference is that the
US/UK were in an enviable position when in regard
to monetary policy – they were in a position to
tame the huge inflation created in the 1970’s by the
Oil shock.
High inflation risk also meant high cost of deviation:
the cost of losing credibility on inflation-fighting was
likely perceived as much greater than the
temptation to re-optimise policy to give rise to
interim growth
Would Fed policy have worked under different
conditions?
29
Primiceri results give rise to scepticism
29
30. Even Volcker’s activism is
questioned in retrospect
“Too loose” policy in 70’s &
80’s vs activist in 90’s
But Primeceri questions Fed
activism effect
Source: Cogley & Sargent (2003)
Source: Primeceri (2005)
30
31. For Abe, structural reform is
contingent upon…
Successful monetary policy – money is neutral long-term,
but reflation is a pre-requisite to structural reform
Credible fiscal policy – nobody expects the world from
Abe, given limited range of maneuver, so refraining from
aggressive fiscal tightening may be as much as we can
hope for. Still, Japanese debt holders perceive risk of
Japanese default, so “temptation” to deviate from
primary balance targets is substantial.
Good luck – “Goldilocks” growth in the US and “just right”
accommodation from the Fed, attenuation of Europe
crisis risks, etc
31
Structural reform will remain, in retrospect the true
measure of Abenomics’ success
31
33. Potential for Structural
Reform in Japan
Via structural reform, we strive to maximise the contributions
of factors of production
Capital: Japan’s capital/output ratio rose in the 1990’s (as
did depreciation costs)
Labour: Labour hours dropped significantly over the 90’s
and have kept decreasing– labour’s share of income also
decreased
Labour “productivity” (output per worker) rose as labour hours
fell faster than output
Total Factor Productivity growth (highly correlated with per
capita output) has been on a downtrend since the
1990’s.
33
Technlological advancement
Efficiency gains in allocation of labour
Efficiency gains in allocation of capital
33
34. Drivers of Japanese Growth
Study by Hayashi & Prescott: TFP contributed
0.43% of the 3.95% decline in value-added
between pre and post lost decade (the periods
of 1983-1991 and 1992-1998).
Similar results from my own model (next slide).
34
34
37. Why it is necessary to take a
closer look at deflation
Price declines are not only due to lack of demand
– some of them are thanks to technology!
37
Source: Naomi Fink, 2013
37
38. Deflation and “investment
specific technology”
An even better fit in simulation using IST!
Base case:
With investment-specific technology:
Detrended real GDP per working age person in Japan
130
base case model
Index (1989=100)
120
38
110
data
100
90
1989
1991
1993
1995
1997
1999
2001
2003
2005
Source: Naomi Fink, 2013
38
39. TFP: No surprise; gap in
sector growth accounting
39
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
39
40. TFP: Results hold upon more
detailed sector examination
40
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
40
41. Empirical Studies: Panel
Regression 1, Regulation &
Subsidies
Endogenous variables:
Exogenous variables (from the JIP database):
A = our own measure of productivity growth
(Solow residual), by industry
TFPDA: TFP growth rates (baseline case,
adjusted for quality of labour only)
TFPDB: TFP growth rates (ex- quality of labour)
TFPDC: TFP growth rates adjusted for capacity
utilization, intermediate inputs)
TFPDD: TFP growth rates adjusted for capacity
utilization, production indices).
REG1 : Regulation index with some relevant
categories subject to regulation
REG2: Regulation index with all relevant
categories subject to regulation
RDY: ratio of knowledge stock to value added
41
RDL: ratio of knowledge stock to vaue added, lag
of 3 years
ITY: ratio of IT capital stock to value added
LK: capital/labour ratio (input measure)
SI: log value of real value added
SUB (included in 2nd round of regressions):
Subsidies, at 5y intervals
TT = Time trend
41
42. Empirical Studies: Panel
Regression 2, Capital
Allocation
Endogenous variables:
A = our own measure of
productivity growth(Solow
residual), by industry
TFPD = JIP labour and capital
quality adjusted measure of TFP
growth
Exogenous variables (from the JIP
database):
QL: Quality of labour index
QK: Quality of capital index
INTAY: Stock of intangibles (ratio to
output)
ECOC: Investment stock of ‘economic
competencies’ (ratio to output) 42
INNY: Stock of innovative property
(ratio to output)
LK: capital/labour ratio (input measure)
SI: log value of real value added
TT = Time trend
42
43. Key results, for policy
guidance
Deregulation correlated positively with most
measures of productivity in highly-regulated
industries (Non-IT, Non-manufacturing) but
negatively in deregulated industries (IT,
Manufacturing). Could this mean an optimum lies
in between?
Subsidies may be necessary for other reasons than
boosting productivity but their ability to boost or
damage productivity looks weak
Allocation of capital matters broadly to productivity
(even in the services sector); the tiny stock of
innovative capital, scaled by output, correlated
positively to total factor productivity
43
43
44. Recommendations:
Excessive focus on improving productivity in the
manufacturing sector – focus on fixing the laggards
Look at how non-IT businesses, above and beyond nonmanufacturing alone, can improve productivity
Innovation capital is important in services, non-IT as well as in
IT/manufacturing. Create incentives for reallocation of capital
toward innovative capital within these lagging sectors
Subsidies might be necessary – while they do not show evidence of
damaging TFP too much, they do not improve it either. Use
subsidies as an interim measure in non-IT sectors.
There may be an optimal level of regulation between the
highly-regulated non-manufacturing/non-IT sectors and their
dereglated counterparts. Focus deregulations on these
sectors, particularly partial regulations that might damage
competitiveness among substitutible goods/services.
44
Could there be a message for postal privatisation here?
44
45. R&D expenditures rise alongside
trade, financial openness
R&D expenditures have
risen with trade/financial
openness across the OECD
Rise in quality of labour
across IT/Non IT but
stagnation of Non-IT quality
of capital
…higher relative wages for
skilled workers in traded
industries
Source: JIP, Naomi Fink, 2013
45
46. References
Amador & Coimbra, 2008. Total Factor Productivity in G7 Countries, IFC Bulletin No 28 (BIS)
Atkeson, A., Chari, V.V. and P.J. Kehoe, 1999. Taxing Capital Income: A Bad Idea. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis
Quarterly Review, Vol. 23, 3-17.
Barro, Robert J. & Gordon, David B., 1983. "Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policy," Journal of Monetary
Economics, Elsevier, vol. 12(1), pages 101-121.
Roberto M. Billi & Klaus Adam, 2004. "Optimal Monetary Policy under Commitment with a Zero Bound on Nominal Interest Rates,"
Computing in Economics and Finance 2004 67, Society for Computational Economics
T. Cogley and T.J. Sargent, (2002). ”Evolving Post-World War II U.S. Inflation Dynamics,” NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2001,
Volume 16, pages 331-388
Juan Carlos Conesa & Sagiri Kitao & Dirk Krueger, 2009. "Taxing Capital? Not a Bad Idea after All!," American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 99(1), pages 25-48, March
Teresa Garcia-Milà & Albert Marcet & Eva Ventura, 1995. "Supply side interventions and redistribution," Economics Working
Papers 115, Department of Economics and Business, Universitat Pompeu Fabra
Fumio Hayashi & Edward C. Prescott, 2002. "The 1990s in Japan: A Lost Decade," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the
Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(1), pages 206-235, January.
Inui, Tomohiko, 2006. “Regulation and Productivity” http://www.eco.nihonu.ac.jp/center/economic/publication/journal/pdf/36/36inui.pdf
46
Growing Income Inequality in OECD Countries: What Drives it and How Can Policy Tackle it ? Forum, Paris, 2 May 2011
G. Primiceri ”Time Varying Structural Vector Autoregressions and Monetary Policy”, The Review of Economic Studies, 72, July
2005, pp. 821-852
RIETI/ESRI/HISTAT JIP data bases: http://www.rieti.go.jp/en/database;
http://www.esri.go.jp/en/archive/bun/abstract/bun170index-e.html
46