1. Oyeshile - African Philosophy And Africa S Political Crisis The Ontological And Ethical Imperatives And The Contributions Of Anthony O. Echekwube

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African Philosophy and Africa’s Political Crisis:
The Ontological and Ethical Imperatives and the
Contributions of Anthony O. Echekwube1
Olatunji A. Oyeshile
University of Ibadan Nigeria
alabi14@yahoo.com
ABSTRACT
This paper examines the role of African philosophy in the political challenges faced in
African societies. It examines specifically the importance of ontological and ethical
approaches to curbing the political crises in African states. The ontological approach
has to do with the human person and what defines his relationship with others. For
instance, in the African communal universe, the individual, though autonomous in
certain senses, owes his social existence largely to the community. The ethical
approach presupposes that we must invoke ethical considerations in our interpersonal
relationship. This implies that Africa cannot showcase virtue or lay claim to operating
on some unique ethical ideals to the rest of the world unless it resolves its political
crisis. The paper also highlights the importance of the contribution of a foremost
Nigerian philosopher, Anthony Onyebuchi Echekwube, to political order in Africa.
Particularly his focus on traditional values, respect for persons, communal living and
the oneness of humanity for the betterment of the African (human) society.
KEYWORDS: Africa, political crises, political order, African philosophy, community,
ethical imperative.
INTRODUCTION
After about six decades of political independence, more than seventy-
five per cent (75%) of African countries are still wallowing in abject
1 Editor’s note: an earlier draft of this paper was first presented by the author as a
lecture delivered in the retirement ceremony organized by the Department of
Philosophy, Ambrose Alli University, Nigeria, on February 19, 2018, for one of her
most senior professors, Rev. Fr. Prof Anthony O. Echekuebe to mark his retirement
for active service. It is published here in honour of Professor Anthony O.
Echekwube who died months after on December 16, 2018. He is greatly missed and
his contribution to the Department is always valued. We also thank Prof Olatunji A.
Oyeshile for preparing this piece in honour of him.

2 Ewanlen Vol. 2, No. 1, 2018
poverty and crisis of development of various forms. One had thought
that by now, the continent would be on its march to sustainable
development. However, what we experience in many of the African
states, including Nigeria, indicates that we as Africans are still far from
the development signpost, irrespective of the contextualization and
interpretation of the term ‘development’.
At the inception of African philosophy, the major task of
African philosophers was to deconstruct the negative Eurocentric gaze
on Africa so as to claim our humanity and identity. Various scholarly
works also addressed the political dimension of the denigration of the
African people. Walter Rodney’s classic, How Europe Underdeveloped
Africa (1972), as well as Frantz Fannon’s works on the African
revolution, especially The Wretched of the Earth (1961), were steps in
asserting Africa’s political identity. Several years later, it is no longer
‘how Europe underdeveloped Africa’, but ‘how Africans are under-
developing Africa’. Yet, as Africans, we quest for political development
which is sine qua non to other forms of development.
The challenge of African philosophy is on the political
emancipation of the African continent mainly from the black leaders
and their political collaborators outside Africa. This is attested to by
large chunk of literature emanating from Africa in the last three
decades. Even recent philosophical conferences held in major Nigerian
universities and seminaries devote much of their attention to this
political malaise as some of the major themes and papers reflect. The
question then is how philosophy and indeed African philosophy has
contributed to understanding this problematic and how, using some
philosophical parameters, we can proffer solution to this predicament
of state, power and leadership in Africa. It is my fervent belief that an
adequate solution to this problem will be a good foundation to
predicate other developments in the African continent.
In this paper, therefore, I examine the role of African
philosophy in the socio-political development of Africa, particularly
how African philosophy, through the theories of African philosophers,
have come to terms with political crisis in Africa, especially the post-
colonial crisis that resulted from political independence and the
inability of African states to manage political independence for
sustainable development in Africa. The main import of this paper is to
see how African philosophers can help to resolve political crisis in
Africa.

Oyeshile, African Philosophy and African Political Crisis 3
In achieving our aim in this paper, I examine African
philosophy and the challenges that gave rise to it - especially the
political ones. I also examine some political theories of African
statesmen and philosophers that were saddled with the task of
governance immediately political independence was granted in many
African states. The examination of these political thinkers will help to
capture the dreams they each had for African states. The next section
shall be concerned with political crisis in contemporary Africa. This
attempt is with a view to capturing the multidimensional problems of
African states ranging from ethnicity, leadership deficit, lack of respect
for human person and communal values, and also the problem of self-
aggrandizement and vulgar materialism. After an analysis of
contemporary political crisis in Africa, I shall present, in an abridged
form, the contributions of Anthony Onyebuchi Echekwube to political
order in Africa. Echekube’s intervention is also multidimensional as it
borders on traditional values, respect for persons, communal living and
the oneness of humanity.
My intervention in this discourse on political crisis in Africa has
to do with what I regard as ontological and ethical imperatives as the
basis of political order. The ontological approach has to do with the
human person and what defines his relationship with others. For
instance, in the African communal universe, the individual, though
autonomous in certain senses, owes his social existence largely to the
community. Mbitit captures this poignantly when he states that in
Africa, “I am because we are, and since we are, therefore I am” (Mbiti,
1981: 108). It is sad that this dictum is no longer respected in
contemporary Africa as the ‘Self’ has been elevated above the
community. My ethical imperative stems from the fact that as rational
beings, we are also moral beings. And being moral presupposes that we
must invoke ethical considerations in our interpersonal relationship.
Immanuel Kant captures this when he states that no man should be
used as a mere means to the satisfaction of the ends of others. Political
relationship in Africa today is largely based on using others merely as
ends and more often than not, crisis of all sorts becomes the order of
the day. Although, my intervention is anchored mainly on the
ontological and ethical, I also add other variables such as the political
and legal frameworks as well as elements of tolerance and compromise
that are germane in the attainment of political order in the normative
sense in Africa. I conclude that Africa cannot showcase virtue to the
rest of the world unless it resolves its political crisis. The political order

constitutes the bedrock of other developments. Therefore, taking into
critical reckoning the ontological and ethical frameworks will lead to
political order and sustainable development in Africa.
AFRICAN PHILOSOPHY AND THE
CHALLENGES THAT GAVE RISE TO IT
There are several factors responsible for the emergence of African
philosophy such as the challenge of development, identity, socio-
economic emancipation, self-definition among others. All these factors
are however ancillary to the colonial factor. The colonial factor which
was largely responsible has had a vital role to play in the emergence of
African philosophy itself. Its importance stems from the fact that the
Eurocentric gaze on Africa questioned both the humanity and
rationality of Africans. Hence, the various responses by African
philosophers and non-African philosophers, such as Placid Tempels to
reclaim the humanity and rationality of Africans in the face of
European denigration. A closer look at the colonial background will
reveal succinctly that past and present pre-occupations of African
philosophers are directed at proving the European gaze on Africa
wrong or incorrect.
The African continent had a long encounter with Europe,
starting off from slave trade, to missionary activities and then
colonialism. It was during the period of colonization that the
Europeans formally took total control over the governance of the
Africans. The African continent was divided among European powers
such as the British, Spanish, Portuguese and French. The Berlin
conference of 1885 saw to the partitioning or balkanization or still the
division of the African continent formally among European powers
mentioned above.
Armed with the ideology of oppression, suppression,
assimilation and association, the Europeans treated the colonized
‘others’ as less than human and thus denied them of their humanity and
rationality. These philosophies of oppression find so much expression
and justification in the works of David Hume, Immanuel Kant,
Friedrich Hegel, Max Muller and even Karl Marx, a philosopher known
to have developed the historical and dialectical materialism to free the
oppressed people across the world.
According to Oladipo:

An integral aspect of the colonial enterprise, then, was to set up
European culture as a standard against which all other cultures and
forms of identity should be measured (Oladipo, 2006:10)
It is not surprising then that various African scholars resolved
to fight what Oladipo describes as “the invention of Africa by the
colonialists” (Oladipo, 2006:10). A major attempt to fight the
colonialists can be found in the attempt by early African intellectuals to
provide several accounts, even if incoherent, of African beliefs, values
and cultural practices which showed that the Africans had a culture and
that they were not barbaric.
Further demonstration of Eurocentric attitude of the European
is very conspicuous in the position of Lucien Levy – Bruhl and
Friedrich Hegel. Levy-Bruhl, for instance, sees the African mind as pre-
logical and a mind that does not follow the canons of European logic
(Cazeneuve, 1972: 6 -20). Hegel, on his part, excludes the African
continent from the movement of the Absolute spirit. He believes that
the Absolute spirit is the European mind that is on its way to
perfection. In this vein, Hegel justified the subjugation of the African
continent by the Europeans. The Europeans scholars tended to
undermine the validity of other cultures. This reason constituted the
motif force for the propagation of all sorts of beliefs and ideologies as
African philosophy. These attempts are glaring in the works of Fr.
Placid Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy (1959), John Mbiti’s African Religions
and Philosophy (1969), Bolaji Idowu’s Olodumare: God in Yoruba Belief
(1962) among others (Oyeshile, 1997: 41). There was also the political
response through the works of Kwame Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere,
Leopold Sedar Senghor and Jomo Kenyatta.
The response to colonial denigration is just one aspect to the
colonial background to contemporary African Philosophy. The second
aspect to the colonial background has to do with the challenge of
development resulting from political freedom or the so-called ‘political
independence’ from colonial powers. Given this factor, many African
philosophers were concerned whether African Philosophy could
respond effectively towards meeting the challenge of development
bequeathed to new African leaders at Independence. It was not so easy
a task to fashion out a role for philosophy as many of the early western
trained African philosophers denied the existence of African
philosophy, while some others asserted its existence. The major

philosophers who believed that there wasn’t African philosophy yet at
this time include Paulin Houtondji, Kwasi Wiredu, Odera Oruka and
Peter Bodunrin. These philosophers are said to belong to the
modernist, Universalist or Analytic school of African philosophy.
However, many of them later asserted that African philosophy existed
and could be sift from the so called ‘ethno-philosophy’.
On the other hand, there was another school of thought that
affirmed the existence of African philosophy and believed that
traditional world views regarding politics, morality, science, social and
religious organizations depicted African’s sense of rich philosophy and
that appealing to these framework could help us to repair the damages
inflicted on the African Psyche. Philosophers in this group include
Alex Kagame, Joseph Omoregbe, K.C. Anyanwu C.S. Momoh and
Sophie Oluwole. It is interesting to note that this group known as
traditionalists, particularists and the modernists and Universalists have
reconciled their different positions and have been concerned with ways
in which African philosophy could be at the service of Africans.
AFRICAN POLITICAL THEORIES
The post-independence period in Africa witnessed a lot of ideological
postulations by the African statesmen, most of whom doubled as
political thinkers. The most prominent ideology they proffered for
post-independence Africa was African socialism which in itself differs
from one African political thinker to the other. The emergence of
African socialism was a product of deliberation by African leaders on
the issue of ideological model to adopt after liberation from European
colonialism that had capitalism as its ideological and economic model.
In 1962, African leaders met in Dakar, Senegal at the invitation of the
Senegalese leader, Leopold Sedar Senghor. So, it can be said that
African socialism was originally formulated in Senegal, even though
most of the thinkers did not agree on its definite framework. One can
therefore say that African socialism is not the product of a political
thinker but the product of conglomeration of thinkers operating in
different environmental circumstances and backgrounds.
Furthermore, African socialism embodies the attempt to
recapture the African past, which was communalistic, and merge it will
present African realities. These include post slavery and post-colonial
African realities. Prominent among those political thinkers that have

formulated one conception of African socialism or the other include
Senghor, Nkrumah, Nyerere and Sekou Toure. W. Friedland and Carl
Rosberg Jnr., for instance, identified three main themes or challenges
that necessitated African socialism. These are:
(1) The problem of continental identity;
(2) The crisis of economic development and
(3) The dilemmas of class control and class formation (Friedland
and Rosberg, 1964: 3-4).
The Problem of Continental Identity: The desire to give an identity to the
African continent was a reaction against European denigration of the
other races. It should be noted that Africans had been abused and
bastardized especially ideologically. For instance, Lucien Levy Bruhl
had written that Africans are pre-logical in thinking. African leaders
saw the need to abandon foreign ideologies such as capitalism and
Marxist socialism. Hence, there was the need to formulate African
socialism that will employ African past in solving present African
predicaments.
Problem of Economic Development: African socialism was an attempt to
justify the involvement of public sector in the economic mainstream of
African countries. This new economic sector is more socialistic and
abhors capitalist economic orientation.
Dilemma of Class Control and Class formation: The problem of how the
African leaders will control their people, especially the bourgeoisie class
that emerged after colonialism forms a major basis of African
socialism. African socialism is seen as a tool to prevent the attempt of
the further emergence and institutionalization of new African
bourgeoisie class. African socialism tends to discourage class formation
as this was contrary to pristine African communal values.
It should be noted, according to Friendland and Roseberg, that
the African socialists wanted to differentiate the socialism of Africa
from other kinds of socialism. It was the contention of these African
leaders that they could forge common identity through their unique
brand of socialism. Hence, one can see African socialism as “both a
reaction against Europe and a search for a unifying doctrine. Part of
the search for identity consists of discovering ostensible roots of
African socialism in indigenous society” (Friedland and Rosberg,
1964:4-5).

FEATURES OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM
The following are some of the features of African socialism.
1. Hard work on communal basis.
2. Rejection of individualism. Man, to the African socialists, was
alienated in both the capitalist and communist set up.
3. Rejection of materialism. The will of the people was
emphasized by African socialism rather than the absolute
pursuit of materialism.
4. Common conception of people holding things in trust of the
community
5. Neutrality: African socialism was neither situated in Eastern
Europe nor in Western Europe philosophy.
The formulation and application of African socialism were met with
conceptual and practical difficulties.
Conceptual Difficulties: These difficulties could be seen in terms of (1) the
need for the clarification of the concept – African socialism. There
wasn’t any kind of consensus among African socialists as to what is
African socialism (2) There was also the conceptual difficulty with
regard to African personality that forms the ontological basis of
African socialism (3) The conceptual problem of class stratification was
also obvious. For instance, some African socialists argued that there
were classes in Africa, while others said there were no classes in Africa.
There seems to be no class war in Africa as such because inspite of the
inequalities that exist within the people, the people still embrace the
‘one another brother’s keeper’ philosophy. In other words, we cannot
define class war rigidly in Africa.’
Practical Difficulties: In the course of implementation of African
socialism, a lot of practical problems are experienced as there seem to
be some inconsistencies in the theorizing of the African socialists.
1. The colonial structure really hampered the implementation of
some of the ideas of the African socialist leaders
2. The African leaders did not really understand the in and out of
the system they were operating coupled with the problem of
illiteracy among their followers. It was therefore important to
raise the consciousness of the people.

3. Most of the African countries (former colonies) were
dependent on European capitalist economy.
4. The question of ethnic differences also hampered the
mobilization of the people as these people often assessed the
viability or otherwise of political programmes on the basis of
ethnic advantages.
5. The problem of military coups in states of Africa did not allow
for the smooth implementation of these socialist ideals.
NYERERE’S UJAMAA AS THE BASIS OF AFRICAN SOCIALISM
Julius Nyerere was the former president of Tanzania. He was both an
exponent of Pan-Africanism and African socialism. According to
Nyerere, one of the fundamental reasons why European socialism
cannot fit into African culture is that European socialism was born out
of class struggle and class stratification. In Africa, there was never and
there is still no class conflict in the technical sense of the phrase
(Okadigbo, 1985:41). He puts it thus: “Indeed I doubt if the equivalent
for the word ‘class’ exists in any indigenous African language and the
idea of ‘class’ or ‘caste’ was non-existent in African society’ (Nyerere,
1967: 238-247).
According to Nyerere, the foundation, and the objective of
African socialism is the extended family. The true or real African
socialist does not look on one class of men as his brethren and another
as his natural enemies. The true African socialist regards all men as his
brethren, that is, as members of his ever extending family. It is on this
basis then that Ujamaa or familyhood describes African socialism.
African socialism is opposed to capitalism, which seeks to build a
happy society on the basis of exploitation of man by man, and it is
equally opposed to doctrinaire socialism, which seeks to build a happy
society on a philosophy of inevitable conflict between man and man.
According to Nyerere, African socialism will make it possible
for adequate distribution of resources. It is also the case that African
socialism does not allow for parasitic living. The desire to acquire
material things in order to dominate for prestige and so forth is
unsocialistic and is a vote of no confidence in the society. Nyerere is
trying to make us realize the virtues in the traditional African set up. In
traditional Africa, there was social security. The jobless were non-
existents, the widows, aged and the young ones were catered for. There

is nothing like acquisitive socialism but what we had was distributive
socialism.
Going by the recommendation of Nyerere, socialism must be
an individual conviction. This means that you must be convinced of
the efficiency of socialism before adopting the principle. The kind of
socialism Nyerere postulates is the type in which there is a ceiling to
which an individual can acquire wealth. To him, communal African set-
up did not allow for exploitation. There is no such thing as socialism
without work. The society that fails to give individuals work needs to
be medically examined. Also, a society which gives work to individuals
and fails to ensure fair sharing of wealth needs to be put right. In the
same vein, any individual who refuses to work needs to be put right. It
is the opinion of Nyerere that the colonial situation has largely been
responsible for some of the major ills within African society.
Nyerere says that we must recapture the African past because
capitalism is alien to African. Infact, we must do everything to
recapture the old African attitude of mind. For instance, in old Africa,
an individual is not to preserve land, he must use the land for
cultivation. But in contemporary Africa we have absentee landlords
who exploit others. The present Africa must go back to old Africa land
tenure system where land ownership is based on use.
Also in traditional Africa, age was respected. The elders were
respected because of both their age and the services they have rendered
to their community in their youth. If there is poverty or wealth, it must
be shared together. This was the practice in traditional African setting.
Individuals should not demand more than what the society can afford.
According to Nyerere, European socialism grew out of two
revelations namely (i) the agrarian revolution and (2) the industrial
revolution. The agrarian revolution gave us two classes, the landed class
and the landless class. The industrial revolution gave us the bourgeoisie
class and the proletariat class. The protagonists of European socialism
have sanctified these revolutions into philosophy. To them class war
and civil war are now seen as something good not evil. European
socialism is linked with capitalism, whereas African socialism emerged
from tribal socialism. Nyerere does not believe that we have to get to
capitalism before we get to socialism. Tribal socialism did not emerge
from capitalism. Therefore, European socialism has given unnecessary
emphasis to capitalism, thereby saying that exploitation of man by man
is inevitable. On the other hand, Nyerere says that there are no classes
in African language, no class war, hatred, antagonism and so forth.

African socialism does not grow out of class struggle. Rather it
grows from extended African family system. That is why Ujamaa
(familyhood) is the basis of African socialism. The new African
socialism will grow beyond tribes. This is because socialism will grow
beyond tribes. That is, socialism must embrace the whole of mankind
and therefore make for universal brotherhood.
SEKOU TOURE’S POLITICAL THOUGHT
The colonial experience in the Anglophone colonies was different from
that of the Francophone countries. Nationalist struggle started early in
Anglophone colonies than in Francophone colonies. The reasons for
this include education, policy of assimilation of the French colonial
territories and so forth. Whereas in Anglophone colonies there was the
policy of indirect rule. In 1958 only Guinea voted ‘no’ to the
referendum for continued stay under the French. The French withdrew
all their supports to Guinea in order to destroy the economic basis
(political economy) of Guinea. Toure was a major leader of Guinea
who provided the theoretical framework for Guinea.
Sekou Toure had a monistic view of reality. This means that
reality is one. Toure condemned both individualism and pluralism. The
unitary state and original party were the expressions of one essential
reality. He believes that there should be a single party in Guinea and
through this, he believes that unity can be preserved. Toure places
emphasis on organization. There must be an efficient organizational
structure. This was expressed in the constitution of Guinea Democratic
Party (GDP), the only political party in Guinea. Toure distinguished
between antagonistic and non-antagonistic conflicts. He believes that
antagonistic conflicts are illegitimate and should be avoided. An
example of such antagonistic conflict is internal conflict. On the other
hand non-antagonistic conflicts are legitimate and desirable because
they lead to progress and development in society.
Toure has a materialist conception of reality but this is a
conception of reality that accommodates religion. Ideas to him do not
make revolution. It takes consciousness for there to be a revolution.
Ideas have to be turned into action. The arguments here constitute the
basis of Toure’s philosophy of history. According to Toure, before
European subjugation of Africa, African societies were classless and
there was economic independence. Colonialism destabilized Africa

because there wasn’t any effective organization. He states further that
the period was that of total depersonalization and devaluation of
African values. At this period also the educated Africans were the most
corrupt. This stage was followed by the stage of reorganization where
African political parties started fighting for independence and freedom.
To engender African Unity Toure believes that Africans should go
beyond their boundaries and become one under the banner of Pan-
Africanism.
In the colonial period, Africa was exploited in both their
material and human resources. Their value systems were destabilized
and all Africans became alienated in their own countries. And whether
we like it or not, all Africans especially the educated ones carry the
marks and scars of colonialism. Therefore, we need to be cured of
these marks of alien European values. A major way forward in the task
to reclaim our identity and values is to destroy all colonial structures
and replace them with institutions that will be relevant to our situation.
According to Toure, there is no specific programme of action except
that we in Africa work towards the establishment of a mass party that
belongs to all and not a class party. He believes that it will be a mistake
to interpret African situation in a purely capitalist or socialist way. That
African socialism has to emerge from within our own cultural
conception. Part of the reason for this is that we in Africa have no
capital to go capitalist which is individualistic and also that Marxist
socialism is alien to Africa. Furthermore, Marxism is atheistic while
Africans are religious. And due to the incursion of colonialism, we only
have one class in Africa- the class of the dispossessed.
Toure believes that there is a distinct African person who is
neither of Eastern European nor Western European persuasion. Toure
leans more to Eastern Europe than Western Europe. He despises
capitalism and borrows certain ideas from Marxism. However, the kind
of socialism he advocates is communal African socialism not the
orthodox Marxism. According to Toure, communism is a form of
capitalism in which the state and not the individuals monopolizes all
the resources. Both capitalism and communism according to him, lead
to the suppression of human thought and freedom.
Inspite of the above, Toure’s political thought shares the
following with Marx:
1. Collective action towards work, economy and so forth.
2. Democratic centralism, that is, a centralized administration
3. Marxism is most opposed to Western capitalism

Toure believes that Africa will grow along the line of democratic
evolution and that man is meaningless outside the society. It is the
society that makes man what he is by providing the culture through
which he develops himself.
LEOPOLD SEDAR SENGHOR’S NEGRITUDE
Leopold Sedar Senghor is, perhaps, one of the greatest African
philosophers. His philosophical works cut across political philosophy,
literary criticism and metaphysics with special regard to ontology.
Senghor was trained as a philosopher in France. He was a member of
the French communist party and later became the president of Senegal.
In fact, Senghor was the major facilitator of the conference on African
socialism that took place in Dakar in 1962. He has been rightly
described as the philosopher – king of Senegal. Although, the concept
of Negritude was introduced in the early nineteen forties by Aime
Cesaire, it was popularized and sustained by the poet-philosopher,
Sedar Senghor who gave it a cultural orientation with regards to
African personality (Ogunmodede, 2009:69).
There are different ways in which we can approach Negritude,
emphasis shall be paid mainly to how it has been used to develop
African socialism with the concomitant African personality based on an
African ontology. In Negritude, Senghor attempted to bring out the
African mind, his human dignity and the responsibility to accept the
inevitable task of self-discovery within the framework of history, his
culture and his patrimony. Senghor is of the view that in order to
disprove the contention of the European that Africa had no inventions,
no creative works, no writings, no sculptures, no art and no music, we
have to show that our patrimony is full of originality and that we as
Africans are capable of revolution that will disengage us from
borrowed and assimilated culture so as to asset our own right to exist
in Negritude; which is a complex reality that accounts for our state of
being and will unravel our cultural values, our social patrimonies and
the spirit of Negro African culture (Ogunmodede, 2009:69).
Negritude can be seen as the literary and ideological movement
of the French West African colonies as well as a reaction to colonialism
in these colonies. It can also be seen as a type of Pan-Africanism in
Francophone West Africa similar to the one in Anglophone West

Africa. Negritude is also an expression of cultural nationalism
projecting the consciousness of the black people.
According to Senghor, all colonized people form a community
of blood and concrete reality of their past. Each has its own distinctive
nature and personality. This personality expresses itself in a particular
way because each race has its own history. The present disposition of
African or any other continent tells its history. Africa has its own
history in Negritude. It was racial imperialism that influenced
European colonialism and it needed a racial philosophy. Negritude is a
reply or response to European racial philosophy. Negritude does not
attempt to show that it is superior to other races but that each race has
its own unique personality. What makes one race what it is, is not just
the physical make up but also the psychological or mental factor.
According to Senghor, Africans are beings of emotion, while
the Europeans are given to reason. Europeans capture reality by
abstraction, while the Africans capture reality by intuitive
understanding. The Africans, according to him, do not make a neat
distinction between the subject and object because both are involved in
dialectical struggle. Because of this the object becomes an extension of
the subject.
NEGRITUDE AND SOCIALISM
According to Senghor, Africans cannot be said to be Marxist insofar as
Marxism is presented as atheistic metaphysics, a total and totalitarian
view of the world. He believes that Marx’s theory of class struggle was
oversimplified, and that in overstating the role of the determinism of
things, Marx underestimates man’s freedom and the organizing power
of capitalist states (Okadigbo, 1985:42). Senghor is of the view that
Karl Marx was inattentive to the role of co-operatives, as emphasized
by the Utopian socialists (Saint Simon, Fourier, Owen, Blanc and
Proudhon) and that arising from the infancy of colonialist strategy at
his time, Marx’s theory of colonization was addressed to European
colonization of Untied States of America and had no direct relevance
to the African situation.
The issue that bears pointing out from the above is that since
the theoretical foundation of Marxism is predicated on non-African
ground, then it is necessary that Marxism be re-examined from an
African point of reference.

According to Senghor:
We are not communists for a practical reason. The anxiety for human
dignity, the need for freedom-man’s freedom of collectives – which
animate Marx’s thought and provide its revolutionary ferment- this
anxiety and this need are unknown to communism, whose major
deviation is Stalinism. The ‘dictatorship of the proletariat’, which has
to be only temporary becomes the dictatorship of the party and state
by perpetuating itself (Senghor cited by Okadigbo, 1985:42).
However, Senghor also examined the paradox arising from the
construction of socialism in some communist countries. For instance,
in the Soviet Union there is increasing resemblance with capitalist
construction as high salaries, refrigerators, television sets, a scientific
bourgeoisie and even the American way of life have become realities is
these so-called communist states. All these peculiarities point to the
necessity for a new African approach in socialism. Senghor therefore
calls for a middle course to socialism which he tagged ‘democratic
socialism’ which among other things goes so far as to integrate spiritual
values. Again Okadigbo quotes him thus:
A third revolution is taking place, as a reaction against capitalist and
communistic materialism- one that will integrate moral, if not
religious, values with the political and economic contributions of the
two great revolutions. In this revolution, the coloured peoples,
including African Negro, must play their part; they must bring their
contribution to the construction of the new planetary civilization
(Senghor cited by Okadigbo, 1985:43).
It should be noted that Senghor’s Negritude provides the philosophical
framework for his socialism. In fact, there is hardly anything that can
be said about Senghor without referring to Negritude. A lot of scholars
have disagreed with the theoretical basis of Negritude. Some see it as
another form of racism super imposing the quality of blackness over
other races. However, one must be sympathetic to Senghor’s project
because he was reacting to the overt racist tendency of the European
colonizers. Hence, one can say that his over-reaction was prompted by
colonialism.

KWAME NKRUMAH’S CONSCIENCISM
Kwame Nkrumah, philosopher and former President of Ghana, was
born in Gold coast, now Ghana in 1909. He attended missionary
schools and the Government College of Achimota where he studied
under Kwegyir Aggrey, a distinguished Pan-Africanist. In 1943, he
graduated at the University of Pennsylvania, receiving a Master of Arts
in philosophy. Some of his works include: Towards Colonial Freedom
(1946), What I mean by Positive Action (1950), Ghana-an Autobiography
(1957), I speak freedom (1961), Consciencism – The Philosophy and Ideology for
Decolonization and Development with particular Reference to the African.
Revolution (1964).
According to Okadigbo (1985: iii), Nkrumah means many
things to different people. To some he was the militant freedom
fighter, the hero, the African dictator, the mythical promoter of Afro-
American solidarity, the communist spokesman in black Africa, the
political and philosophical theorist among others.
Among his numerous books, Consciencism (1964) was the
most popular. It is taken as the epitome of Nkrumah’s pilgrimage and
ideals, written by a political leader and theoretical mentor of
progressive Africa. It should be noted that Consciencism represents the
early philosophical and political temperaments of Nkrumah from
which we can distil his ideas about African’s political liberation and
development.
Nkrumah’s Theory of Social Organization: Nkrumah is of the
view that classes and capitalist exploitation were not present in
traditional African society. Therefore, consciencism will prevent and
eradicate such classes and capitalist exploitation brought about by
colonialism. Nkrumah disagrees with Marx on the ground that
socialism does not emerge from capitalism but from communalism.
That is, to move from capitalism to socialism you need a revolution,
whereas from communalism to socialism you just need transformation.
To Nkrumah, when you say that everything is made of matter, then it
means that everybody is equal. This projects a kind of humanism.
However, Marx’s use of matter is different from this sense.
Nkrumah believes that we should liquidate colonialism and
imperialism and there must of necessity be a conscious effort to
achieve political independence first. Hence his statement. “Seek ye first
the political kingdom and every other thing shall be added unto it”.
This mission can only be achieved through positive action which is a

kind of non-violent political resistance. In order to achieve this
mission, there must be first a mass party. This mass party will embrace
everybody. When this party is formed, the positive action will begin
through boycotts and strikes.
Nkrumah is of the opinion that neo-colonialism is more
harmful than colonialism and therefore neo-colonialism must be dealt
with through positive action and positive action must go with an
ideology which is Consciencism. It should be noted that early
Nkrumah was concerned with colonialism, while the latter Nkrumah
was concerned with neo-colonialism. In the early period, Nkrumah was
a Gandhist. He embraced non-violence as a means of liberation, while
in the later period he realized that class struggle has gone beyond
national boundaries and has become an international phenomenon
through neo-colonialism. He therefore supported the idea of warfare
and violence in seeking liberation.
On African struggle, Nkrumah at the early stages was
advocating for African Unity (United States of Africa). Later he became
disenchanted with the organization of African unity. This is because he
believes that there were some African leaders who were representing
imperialists’ interest. He therefore advocates that African unity should
be from the masses (from below) and not from the leaders (from the
top). The reason for this change of strategy was that Nkrumah had
become convinced that the peoples’ will is not always expressed by
their governments and that autonomous popular organizations are by
far their most faithful representatives.
AWOLOWO’S POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY
The political thoughts of Chief Obafemi Awolowo (1909 -1987) have
been very pre-eminent in the making of the Nigerian Nation. Even
though Awolowo has been forced at times to describe Nigeria as ‘a
mere geographical expression’ due to certain difficulties and problems
concerning the evolution of the Nigerian state especially immediately
after political independence, he nevertheless worked assiduously to
develop political ideas and models which could be used to achieve a
viable Nigerian state. He also contributed actively in practical terms as
a politician to develop his people.
Many have described him in various manners that could show
the great importance of Awolowo. For instance, Joseph Omoregbe, a

foremost African philosopher described him as “an eminent thinker
with deep prophetic insight’. General Ibrahim Babangida former
Nigeria’s Military President described him as ‘the main issue of
Nigerian politics’. (Omoregbe cited in Uduigwomen, 2000). Many
academic theses have been written on him as both a statesman and
philosopher, the most prominent work on him being that of Francis
Ishola Ogunmodede, titled, Chief Obafemi Awolowo’s political philosophy: A
critical Interpretation (1986).
According to Ogunmodede (1991:89), the main political work
of Awolowo is, The People’s Republic which was published in 1968.
Awolowo states the mission of the book thus:
My theme throughout this book is that man may enjoy the fruits of
his labour and live a full and happy life including the enjoyment of
fundamental rights. This can be achieved for Nigerians if the
Nigerian state has a suitable constitution, good governments, and
social objectives which are socialist-oriented. In other words, a full
and happy life can be attained by every Nigerian citizen, if we
embrace and work for federalism, democracy, and socialism as I have
defined and elaborated them; and we have at the same time, a
leadership that possesses mental magnitude (Awolowo cited by
Ogunmodede, 1991:89).
On the end or goal of the state, Awolowo expresses the view that the
aim and objectives of the state must be of such quality and character as
will evoke an abiding sense of patriotism and loyalty from citizens of
the state, and must be such as will, in their execution, benefit all the
citizen substantially, and without exception. Awolowo’s thought here
came during the Nigerian political crisis which eventually led to the
civil war. According to him, one of the main causes of the civil war,
apart from the lack of direction and purpose of the Nigerian state, was
because many of the ethnic groups constituting the Nigerians state
were alienated and frustrated in their bid to share or control power at
the centre and felt very strongly that the Nigerian state as represented
at the Federal level was not interested in their development.
Another major end of the state is its socio-economic task and it
is in this sense that the term Welfarism has been used to describe
Awolowo’s socio-economic objectives of the state. Furthermore, since
nature provides every state with necessary and sufficient natural
resources, then the state has the utmost task to explore and utilize

these resources for the upkeep of the citizens (Ogunmodede, 1991:97).
Accordingly, in his book, Thoughts on Nigerian Constitution (1966)
Awolowo enumerates the basic socio-economic imperatives that
should be achieved by the state. These are:
1. There must be full employment
2. Every citizen other than self-employed persons, should be
guaranteed a national minimum wage compatible with decent
living or economic well-being.
3. Every Nigerian citizen must be educated at public expense to
the limit of his ability to enable him to be in fittest possible
state to produce the utmost that he is capable of.
4. Preventive and curative health services must be provided at the
public expense to all citizens to enable them to enjoy good
physical, mental and spiritual health.
5. Agriculture must be modernized, and mechanized
6. Rapid industrialization
7. New roads must be constructed to modern standards to
achieve the target of at least one mile of road to two square
miles of territory. At the same time, existing roads, bridges,
railways and waterways should be constructed to the same
standards.
8. There should be comprehensive and compulsory insurance for
all Nigerian citizens.
9. The government should make plans for the achievement,
within a reasonable period of time, of the above objectives and
should institute measures for the control and regulation of the
forces of supply and demand.
According to Ogunmodede, the realization of the socio-economic
objectives would bring prosperity but for this to come to pass, socio-
economic services must be well administered and distributed according
to the principle of justice and equality. Furthermore, one can see that
while the welfare policy of Awolowo’s state has the economic
prosperity of the citizens as its goal in the first instance, it goes beyond
economism or materialism because it adopts a welfarism that combines
together the spiritual and material elements in the state (Ogunmodede,
1991: 98).
How does Awolowo hope to achieve the successful
implementation of these socio-economic objectives or imperatives for
the benefit of all? Awolowo recommends (1) the introduction of

socialism and the rejection of capitalism and (2) He urges that
normative social objectives should be abundantly justiceable and
entrenched in the constitution. According to Ogunmodede, although
the call for socialism by other African leaders is not new, Awolowo’s
contribution to socialism lies mainly in the doctrine of justiceability of
objectives. This is a distinct contribution to legal and political
philosophy in Nigeria. (Ogunmodede, 1991: 98).
On Democracy and Democratic Socialism: According to
Awolowo, it is only democracy that can provide the natural habitat for
federalism and welfarism which he so much believes in. To him
therefore, there can be no alternative to democratic way of life if the
aim of government is the physical, mental and spiritual welfare of the
people. In fact, the inconveniencies of democracy are preferred to the
inarticulate and fearful material comfort of a dictatorship.
AFRICA AND THE CRISIS OF DEMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE
Although the African continent is inundated with different facets of
crisis, that of Democratic governance is very acute and fundamental.
Fundamental in the sense that it holds the central key to the resolution
of other crises. Before adumbrating further, let us take a cursory look
at the African crisis of development. Several works are being done
within and outside Africa about the latter’s state of underdevelopment.
In this direction African scholars have identified various factors
responsible for the present state of underdevelopment of Africa.
However, the level of underdevelopment of Africa still defies rational
explanation given the abundant human and material resources with
which Africa is endowed (Oyeshile, 2004: 291-303). One can present a
compendium of woes for a continent whose showcase to the other
parts of the world is fratricidal civil wars, ethnic conflicts, political
instability, corruption, famine, child labour, child prostitution,
economic stagnation and constant fall in life expectancy. Although, as
we have noted somewhere else, these problems are not peculiar to
Africa as there are so many crisis situations in other parts of the world,
for instance in Iraq, between the Israelites and Palestinians, in former
Yugoslavia, in Northern Ireland to mention some few. But the problem
with Africa is that these problems do not abate in any meaningful
sense, especially with the increasing efforts to resolve them (Oyeshile,
2007: 230-40).

The panoramic view of the developmental crisis in Africa and
its perpetuation imposes on us the urgent task of identifying the central
elements responsible for the crisis. Many have suggested that we are in
the present state of developmental inertia and doldrums because we
have failed often to get right the fundamental issue of governance and
by extension, democratic governance. We shall underscore this point
by reference to some scholars.
According to Olusegun Oladipo, leadership in Africa has been
inundated with self-seeking tendency and inability to use power,
political power to be precise, for the benefit of the people within the
African continent. Therefore:
Given this situation, it should be no surprise that democracy has not
been able to realize its transformational potential in most African
countries. A leadership that is self-centred, lacks the commitment to
African emancipation in all its ramifications, and is indifferent to the
outcome of its policies, cannot provide the kind of enabling
environment for the release of people’s energies and the mobilization
of efforts for innovative and creative development (Oladipo, 2006:
48).
Adumbrating further on the connect between the self-seeking
tendency of African leaders and their inability to use political power for
the good of the people, Kelechi Kalu identifies the dearth of public
leadership which also has little or no foundation in core values that can
engender sustainable development. He also takes example from Nigeria
and opines thus:
The central problem in Nigeria has been the lack of public leadership
nurtured by the core values of an indigenous elite across the national
landscape-political, civil society, cultural, religious, educational and in
many instances family. The absence of public leadership is directly
related to the absence of national dialogue on what Nigerian identity
should be about and how the different nationalities that were brought
together by colonialism should live together productively (Kalu, 2005:
1-36).
From Kalu’s lamentation on Africa, we can decipher the problem of
public leadership, lack of core values needed for development, and the
inability of African leaders to cement the cracks in the relationships of
ethnic nationalities brought together through colonialism. One can

then begin to identify the multiplicity of factors accounting for the
crisis of democratic governance in Africa. The factors can be linked
separately or collectively with the phenomenon of colonialism, which
still manifests in different ways in Africa, the occasional exploitative
tendency of multinationals and the challenge of globalization which
have all had effects negatively or positively, on democratic governance
in Africa. It is little wonder then that most African leaders capitalize on
this combination of factors not only to exploit and misrule their people
but also to perpetuatuate themselves in power through electoral
manipulation and dictatorial regimes as witnessed very recently in
countries like Ivory coast, Zimbabwe, Egypt, Libiya, Tunisia, Uganda,
Burundi, Togo and Democratic Republic of Congo to mention a few.
The usual excuses for this scenario are legion. Sometimes
leaders in Africa as opposed to African leaders resort to fatalism for
failure of policy and governance. C. Ukaegbu making allusion to
Nigerian again notes that:
When one examines more closely the development policies of
Nigerian governments, there is the evidence that Nigerian leaders,
both past and present, exhibit a fatalistic orientation, have a highly
dependent mentality, and lack a sense of personal and group self-
efficacy. Consequently, their collective leadership style continues to
stall the country’s development (Ukaegbu, 2007: 161-182).
Ukaegbu goes on to define fatalism within the context of the paper. He
writes:
I define ‘fatalism’ as the tendency of Nigerian leaders to feel hopeless
and act helpless when confronted with problems of critical national
importance. They tow the line of least difficulty and least challenge,
seek and implement short-term and palliative solutions, and depend
on, and outsource complex national problems to international
outsiders without first exploring all domestic possibilities (Ibid., 161-
162).
One can then start to see the merit of Ukaegbu’s position given
the fact that it is uncharitable to lay solutions to one’s internal
problems, especially our political problem, exclusively at the doorstep
of the outsider.
In all the situations of mis-governance, the problem of social
injustice points up. It cannot be over-emphasized that the spate of

injustice at the level of governance is adequately reflected in scenario
where winners of elections are deprived of their mandate by incumbent
governments and are often forced to enter into a power-sharing
arrangement known as “Government of National Unity”, a unity that is
not believed in by the incumbent government in the first instance. This
situation played out in Kenya, Zimbabwe and in Cote d’Ivorie few
years ago. What this means is that people’s votes do not simply count.
Consequently, you have injustice at the level of government and also
travesty of justice on the electorate. Africa cannot experience any
sustainable development in this way.
In January 2011, the Tunisians and Egyptians rose against their
sit-tight governments, passing a rejection vote on over-perpetuation of
bad leadership. The bottom line is that there can never be peace and
other variables of social order in a situation of injustice manifested
through unpopular leadership and the strangulation of people’s
freedom in determining the course of their life.
One cannot overlook and underestimate the role of major
actors in the international community concerning the political stability
or otherwise of the African countries. For instance, the double
standard of the United States of America concerning the situation of
Egypt. The latter under Hosni Mubarak was the main ally of USA in
the Middle East. The USA had tolerated the dictatorial regime of
Mubarak since 1981 when he formed government after the
assassination of President Anwar Sadat. Even, the United States saw
nothing wrong in Mubarak’s son succeeding his father before the
uprising of 24th
January, 2011. So, the big powers that control the
international relations are also accomplices in terms of social injustice.
One can also argue that inspite of the external factors
responsible for African crisis of development especially its governance
variant, there are so many internal factors or contradictions in Africa’s
path to development which must first be resolved before Africa can
advance progressively in the 21st
century. This is aptly stated by
Oyeshile, when he writes:
Any keen observer of Africa’s crisis of underdevelopment will be
quick to note, but reluctant to assert, that lack of internal criticism of
policies, actions and visions of leaders in Africa, coupled with
uncritical acceptance of certain values either domestic or international
have made development and the attainment of social order daunting
tasks in Africa. Of course, the theorization of the causes of our state

of underdevelopment often leaves out the practical role we ought to
play in changing our situation for better (Oyeshile, 2008: 265-280).
It is the obvious, while in responding to the challenge posed by
Oyeshile above, some scholars have suggested the need to look inward
for an enduring solution to Africa’s crisis of development and
governance. One such attempt is put forward by Oladipo when he
strongly advocates for a return to socialist orientation. According to
him:
Given the geographical dynamics of Africa’s place in the world today,
it is obvious that the ideas required for the achievement of an African
renaissance would have to be those of co-operation, self-reliance and
justice. These are the ideals the African socialists struggled to achieve
and preserve, but which peripheral capitalist development has been
undermining (Oladipo, 2008: 1-29).
One can then infer the following from Oladipo’s position: (i) That
capitalist orientation in Africa has not helped much in the attainment
of the desired society. (ii) That socialism especially as advocated by
founding fathers of African socialism such as Kwame Nkrumah, Jomo
Kenyatta, Julius Nyerere and Sekou Toure can provided the needed
foundation for evolving a development oriented society. This line of
thinking is anchored on the fact that a socialist form of life advances
common welfare and gives freedom with responsibility to the
community of which the individual is an inextricable part.
We want to conclude this section by noting some salient points
on governance and democracy. According to J. Obi Oguejiofor, good
governance is synonymous with good leadership and governance
involves the ability to dispose available means to achieve
predetermined goals (Oguejiogor, 2004: xiii-xxvi). The import of
Oguejiofor’s claim is that governance is a major means of managing the
resources of the people, with political authority, to achieve what the
people desire which in summation culminates into the good life for the
people. In governance, the human factor is the most central and it is
conspicuous in the leadership.
One can hardly controvert the view that abstract political
concepts can only translate into reality through leadership which is not
only in short supply in Africa, and in cases where the few are supplied
at all, they are confronted with several other problems that make

performance something of a miracle and not carefully planned human
action. One is then not surprised when Theophilus Okere affirms that
the major explanation of the failure of governance in Africa has to do
with “the misunderstanding of the purpose governance, where leaders
have no idea of public interest or the sacrosanctity of that interest”
(Okere, 2004: 3-11).
What bears pointing out is that the democratic political space in
Africa has only emphasized individual rights, liberties to the detriment
of the duty to the community and society. In other words, the pursuit
of individual autonomy, liberty, right, authenticity to the extreme has
made the attainment of the common good a mirage in Africa. In fact,
the sense of community needed to entrench the democratic culture has
become illusory.
CONTRIBUTIONS OF ANTHONY ECHEKWUBE
TO AFRICAN POLITICAL THEORY
In preceding pages, we considered the views of African political
thinkers like Nyerere, Sekou Toure, Nkrumah, Awolowo, among
others, on the enigmatic question of how ought we to rejig African
polities in order for them to be veritable promoters of the Aristotelian
ideal of Eudemonia – ‘the good life’. Without rehashing our evaluation
of these philosophies, we may easily infer that the dreams and
aspirations of these thinkers are yet to be realized today. A possible
reason for this reality might be the ignorance of pro-activity in the
oeuvres of these otherwise ingenious thinkers. In the present section, we
present an analysis of Echekwube’s unique intervention on African
governance discourse. In a 1989 essay titled “Philosophy for Integral
Development in the Third Republic”, Echekwube had lamented that:
Nigeria has experienced a long period of instability since her
independence in 1960. It is most disturbing that after ruling ourselves
for more than twenty-seven years, we are still groping in the dark for a
system which would most suit the economic, political and social
development of our beloved nation, Nigeria. In the urgent desire to
gain stability in the country, a lot has been sacrificed by a few
responsible Nigerians to no avail, because the number of sincere and
dedicated citizens falls below ten percent (10%) of the entire Nigerian
population. Over ninety per cent of the citizenry indulge in grave
immorality, different shades of corruption, violence, abuse of power,

tribalism, armed robbery, examination malpractice and very many other
acts of indecency (Echekwube, 1989: 62).
The pessimistic odour that suffuses in the passage above is a
peculiar one: it is the common starting premise by every pathologist of
‘the African condition’. To be sure, Echekwube, like other African
political philosophers, had a teleological disposition in his study, or
pathological analysis, as to how African polities ought to be organized
– the development of these states; for why else will supposedly rational
human beings submit their attendant liberties to the suzerainty of (a)
ruler(s) if not because they expect their dreams/aspirations – in short,
welfare – will be better promoted and sustained, thereby? If, then, this
a priori expectation is dashed, the individual may begin to ask, and
rightly so, why he or she ought to continue to maintain fidelity to such
a errant sovereign. The point at which such skeptical thoughts, as the
preceding one, begin to pervade the minds of many, if not all, the
‘political animals’ in any given polity is the point why diverse existential
crises that may ultimately lead to the demise of such a polity will begin
to rear their ugly heads.
For Echekwube, hence, there is an urgent need to unveil ‘a
philosophy for effective governance in Africa’ in order to combat the
already pregnant disastrous fall outs from this anomie (Echekwube,
2004: 457). Echeckwube’s thesis, stated in brief, is founded on Divine
Command moral theory, as well as its ontological foundations; first, in
the overlordship of primordial entities who are the custodians of
morality and, secondly, is rooted in the ‘chain of being’ metaphor
according to which all beings (animate, inanimate, human and non-
human animals, and so on) derive their reality/essences from one
another and all ‘isolationist’ inclinations are essentially frowned
upon/banished.
In getting to this climax, we need to bear in mind that
Echekwube begun his analysis with a diagnosis of the causes of the
African political condition earlier described. For him, “the problem of
governance in Africa originated from the abandonment of our
traditional ways of doing things” (Echekwube, 2004: 460). This
abandonment, explains Echekwube, derives from the colonial
experience of these states and the deliberate foisting of an alien political
philosophy and praxis, whose epistemological, ontological and
historical contents, do not square with theirs. The radical disjuncture
ensuing from this scenario, Echekwube posits, is the bane of the
present chaotic reality in these states. The ‘present reality’ of endemic

political (and its attendant economic, social, cultural, moral, and so on)
debacle – in leadership/governance and developmental spheres – being
referred to by Echekwube, we need to note, is the further bane of the
apparent deification of material aggrandizement and other
“individualistic and egoistic tendencies of our rulers and their subjects”
(Echekwube, 2004: 461).
Peter Palmer Ekeh, a few decades before Echekwube, had also
theorized in this direction when he (Ekeh that is) asserts that
colonialism (un)wittingly fostered two dialectically opposed public
spheres – when the ideal ought to be one – on African states: the
‘Civic’ and ‘Primordial’ public spheres (Ekeh, 1975: 91). Whilst the one
is amoral (civic), the other (primordial) is not. The obvious implication
Ekeh, as with Echekwube, drew from this is the catalogue of woes that
attend such a situation – as we perceive in our African polities, and as
earlier intimated. For any polity to be able to maintain control over its
territory and thenceforth provide the conditions necessary, and
sufficient, for Eudemonia (or development, in all its ramifications) to its
populace, a sound moral philosophy is sine qua non. The inverse of this
proposition, like we have it in Africa today, is that life will be
meaningless and unbearable.
Now, and according to Anthony Echekwube, before
colonialism brought the amoral civic public sphere in its wake to
Africa, the primordial ones maintained a harmonious and blissful polity
since they were founded on moral principles – a divine command
theory of sorts. In primordial African polities, according to
Echekwube:
Every member of society is educated to live responsibly and in
harmony with others in order not to incur the anger of the elders, the
representatives of the ancestors and begin to head towards being
ostracized, a taboo in the African tradition. There is also in the
African mode of governance provision for a pattern (hierarchy) of
gods or deities… These gods (or deities/divinities) are known and
believed to punish instantly all violators of cultural norms and custom
(Echekwube, 2004: 462. Emphasis mine).
While a critic may be quick to point that parallel institutional
frameworks exist in civic publics to ensure social order, it is our
submission that their adversarial jurisprudence and the toleration of
ideas like ‘Plea Bargaining’, retribution, and so on, often leave them

open for wealthy folks to exploit these loopholes to manipulate the
system. Of course, and as well documented, such gaps barely exist in
the primordial system. Because of the foregoing, African politicians, in
the pre-colonial era, as well as the people they superintended over,
never behaved egoistically and individualistically but altruistically and
communally. Owing to this facticity, political order was highly
obtainable and strong in these societies.
The obvious inference one can glean from the scenario just
painted is that it behooves the contemporary African political
philosopher to engage in serious ethnographical cum critical surveys or
investigations of these extant ideals and ontologies with a view to
extrapolating the values latent in them for the re-engineering of the
political and governance structures in these states – and, ultimately,
facilitating their speedy recovery from the throes of underdevelopment.
As we conclude this section, let us further note that the
preceding theorizing of Echekwube – in particular, on the
imperativeness of re-inventing ancient traditional African moral and
political values to the end of guaranteeing their governance and
developmental aspirations/ideals – is further anchored on a pragmatic
ontological framework that regards every human being as – as in the
words of Innocent Asouzu – “missing links” of the same reality – in all
its spheres (see Asouzu, 2011). This ‘complementarist’ ontology, as
equally espoused and defended by Echekwube, is founded in many
traditional African philosophies’ views that all beings are metaphysically
linked together in such a manner that one cannot be without the
anterior being-ness of other ‘beings’. These beings, as in many traditional
African ontologies, include the Supreme Being, the Divinities,
ancestors, human beings, non-human animals, and inanimates. As in
the Tempelsian view of traditional African ontologies, a vital force
permeates all these seemingly disparate ‘beings’ in such a way that each
ontological system reduce to a sort of ‘ontological monism’.
At the realm of politics and social ordering, therefore, such a
mind-set, as broached in the previous paragraph, even if not real, may
as well be interpreted to mean a heuristic device and, hence, can be
used to persuade the most hard-boiled skeptic of the necessity of this
Echekwubean political philosophy. The easy moral to draw, then, is
that with such orientations, the diverse behaviours and attitudes which,
as earlier adumbrated, are the bane of African governance and
developmental challenges will be conclusively shown to be wrong and
thus need be eschewed by all and sundry (Echekwube, 2004: 477).

The foregoing is an abridged version of the contributions of Anthony
Echekwube to political order in Africa. Echekwube’s intervention is
multidimensional as his intervention borders on traditional African
values such as respect for persons, communal living and the oneness of
humanity. In his inaugural lecture titled, A Metaphysical Analysis of the
Concept of Reincarnation: Towards a Global Harmony and Peace (2000) he
demonstrates how African philosophy can engender human harmony
which is sine qua non to any political order that is very much sought for
in Africa.
THE ONTOLOGICAL AND ETHICAL IMPERATIVES
IN OVERCOMING AFRICAN POLITICAL CRISIS
In this section, we outline our interventionist strategy at resolving
ethnic conflicts in Africa. Let us note that it is not the case that the
ontological and political aspects have not been considered by various
theorists in the area of politics, however, they have not considered the
synergy or interconnectedness of the aspects in the resolution of
political conflicts in Africa. This gap is what I intend to fill by
examining the ontological and ethical imperatives not from purely
western perspective, but also from African cultural background.
Conflict, it should be noted, starts from the human mind and then
manifests in the physical. Before an act of violence is committed,
conceptualization must have been done. That is why it is often claimed
that ‘wars starts from the mind of men’, to also end it the human mind
must also be given a prime of place.
Our ontological approach to the resolution of political crisis is
primarily based on the notion of inter-subjectivity. This notion is
popularized by the existentialist philosophers who were saddled with
the task of consensus in the face of two extremes viz objectivity
(absolutism) and subjectivity. The African situation fits correctly into
the existentialist framework for two related reasons. The first is that the
individual and ethnic groups are self-centered, perhaps in the pursuit of
a natural inclination to the law of self-preservation and a spurious
authenticity. This factor is similar to the existentialist project of
individuality and subjectivity in which the cogito, self, I, pour-soi or Dasein
is given a prime of place in the world. The second reason is that
individual and ethnic groups in Africa pursue their goals to the
exclusion of the general welfare of others (Oyeshile, 2005).

The second factor is at variance with the ontological tenet of
inter-subjectivity in the sense that there is an in-built regulator of
human freedom which characterizes inter-subjectivity. In other words,
when we pursue the concept of individual freedom to its logical
conclusion, it would be discerned that it allows for the freedom of
others in spite of impression to the contrary. This is found for
example, in Sartre’s statement that “when I choose for myself, I also
choose for others” and in Heidegger’s claim that: “Dasein is not only a
being-in-the-world, he is also a being-with-others” (Unah, 1996: 60).
Our ontological affirmation on resolution of political crisis is
also rooted in traditional African values. The Yoruba emphasize the
concept of Omoluabi (a morally upright person). This concept is both
ontological and moral. It is believed that this concept is the basis of
(good) character (iwa) that sustains any community and plurality of
communities. The social and political values of traditional Yoruba
society are tailored towards the common good. These values include
isalejo (hospitality), iran ara enilowo (mutal aid/caring for others),
ifowosowopo (cooperation), ifokantan (mutual trust) and aduroti/atilehin
(solidarity). All these are values that are germane in the sustenance of
relationships in multi-ethnic states in Africa. The Yoruba believe that a
person’s destiny can be affected positively or negatively by his
character. The import of this is that though the individual destiny
(Ori/personality God) is personal, yet it needs the existence of others
through character which is the basis for peaceful co-habitation to be
successful.
Omoyajowo (1975) and Mbiti (1981) underscore the
ontological and ethical basis of relationship which have far-reaching
implications for ethnic relationships in Africa. According to
Omoyajowo, “to the African, the concept of man is meaningful only
when seen as man in relation. A family is more than the western
conception of just wife and children” (Omoyajowo, 1975: 41). And
according to Mbiti “it is only in terms of other people does the
individual becomes conscious of his own being, his own duties, his
privileges and responsibilities towards himself and towards other
people” (Mbiti, 1981: 108).
Our ontological approach will further be appreciated when we
pose the question: “How do individual and minority ethnic groups
especially, survive in a multi-cultural society?” (Jamieson, 2004: 374).
This question is important for many reasons, especially the growing
complexity of modern societies in which only few people still live in a

world that comprises only their own kind and their own set of cultural
values and customs (Jamieson, 2004: 373). In other words, with
increasing contact of various cultures and ethnic groups in particular
nation-states, with diverse set of values, there are bound to be
numerous antagonistic tendencies which often result in conflict. In this
process too, not only will marginalized ethnic groups want to leave a
nation-state in which it is been oppressed, it will also seek its own self-
determination by bringing into prominence the issue of self-identity.
We should note then that the notion of community
presupposes that we don’t simply gloss-over those negative factors in
our intergroup relations, but we also manage to resolve them such that
they do not continue to lead to destructive frictions. As Kiros notes:
“Human beings engaged in war are forgetful of the uncountable human
bonds, brotherhood and sisterhood, love and solidarity” (Kiros, 1987:
60). It is because of the need to sustain human solidarity in Africa that
we now draw some insights from the works of some existentialist
philosophers.
Martin Heidegger (1889-1976) a German existentialist, through
his seminal work Being and Time (Sein und Zeit) 1927, provides a
veritable framework through which the Dasein, literally ‘Being-there’,
which also encompasses the individuality of being, could achieve its
project of authenticity by coping with certain facticities of life,
especially the being of others. Heidegger, although reemphasizes over
and over again why the Dasein should be authentic nevertheless allows
for the consideration of others in interpersonal relation which is also a
basis for multi-ethnic harmony.
According to Jim Unah, a leading authority on Heidegger, “the
Dasein is not only a being-in-the-world, he is also a being-with-others”
(Unah, 1996: 60). The import of this is that not only is man constituted
by his projects and his relations with the things which he makes use of,
he is also related to others because, in the first instance, others are also
being-in-the-world just in the same manner like himself. The
implication of this for us, given our present ethnic predicament, is that,
whether as an individual or a group saddled with particular projects and
peculiar means of achieving them, we are related to others who are also
beings-in-the-world. Heidegger underscores this point when he notes
that when a man appears on the scene of existence, he is immediately
not aware only of objects, but of other human beings as well. In other
words, our existence is necessarily tied to the existence of others.
Therefore in terms of survival, the individual must pursue his goals and

projects such as will make possible the survival goal of others. One’s
existence also depends on recognition by others.
The interdependency of the Dasein with others is poignantly
expressed thus:
The awareness of the being of others is part of the awareness of our
own being, and implied in it as the teacher implies the pupil, and the
taxi-car implies both the driver and the passenger. We discover
ourselves as existing with other people and our being as being with
others (Unah, 1996: 60).
As Daseins, both at the individual and ethnic group levels, survival is
only possible if and only if we recognize the importance of others not
as mere objects standing in the way of achieving our goal of survival,
but as ends in themselves who are not only important but also
inevitable and inescapable in the realization of our goal of survival and
freedom.
Buber’s work I and Thou (1937) (Ich und Du (1923), which is
the most popular of his works, provides another veritable basis for
addressing conflicts that emanate from interpersonal and inter-ethnic
relations. Living between 1878 and 1965, he applied his philosophical
disquisition to bringing about understanding between Jews and Arabs
and subsequently advocated a bi-national state (Rader, 1980: 348). As
far as he was concerned there could be an alternative position to
individualism and collectivism, and this he attempts to establish in the I
and Thou through the elements of the inter-human.
The underlying assumption of the I and Thou of Buber is that
one is a proper human being as one sees himself in relation with other
human beings. Although most existentialist theories will aver that one
consciousness tries to capture the consciousness of the other and make
him an object, this kind of approach cannot rule out the reality of the
inter-human (Buber, 1980: 351). The reason for this can be put thus:
“The essential thing is not that one makes the other his object, but the
fact that he is not fully able to do so” (Buber, 1980: 351).
It is therefore only in partnership that my being can be
perceived as an existing whole. This line of thinking is co-terminous
with that of Heidegger’s Dasein, Sartre’s Pour-soi and Merleau-Ponty’s
phenomenal field.
In order to establish his thesis of the inter-human, Buber
recognizes two major forms of relationship in society. These are the “I

Thou’ relation and the “I – it” relation. The latter “I – it” relation is
unholy and depersonalizing as it treats other individuals apart from the
I, as mere objects or means to be used in achieving one’s life goal. It is
an instrumentalist relationship. The I – Thou relationship, on the other
hand, is a relationship that is mutually affirming. It upholds reciprocity
and respect for the others as against the I – it relationship, which aims
at degredation, manipulation and exploitation (Rader, 1980: 365). The I
– Thou relationship upholds the belief that a person is fully a person in
relation to other persons. In this light you are not a real person so far
as you regard others as mere things or as mere objects or implements.
Buber notes that the real meeting between person and person comes
about only when each regards the other as an end.
Buber’s position is instructive here because it appropriately
describes the nature of the relationship among ethnic groups in Africa
– between the Hutus and Tutsi, the Ijaws, Itsekiri and Urhobo, Hausa
and Igbo, Yoruba and Igbo, to mention a few instances in Africa.
Granted then that we must embrace the I – thou relationship, what are
the necessary ingredients for the attainment of this? According to
Buber, at the sphere of the inter-human, the actual happenings between
men must be wholly mutual or must be tending to grow towards
mutual relations. This is because “the participation of both partners is
in principle indispensable” (Buber, 1980: 351). This then reveals to us
that the sphere of the inter-human is one in which a person is
confronted by the other and its unfolding is referred to as the dialogical
(Buber, 1980: 351).
There is thus a connection between Buber and Kant on
interpersonal relationship. For Kant had expressed one of the essential
principles in relationship that one’s fellow must never at any time be
thought of and treated merely as a means but rather as an independent
end. According to Buber, the Kantian view is expressed as an ‘ought’
which is sustained by idea of human dignity.
We can thus see in Buber the need for us, irrespective of our
ethnic affiliation, to break away from our narrow individualism to
interpersonal fellowship. The elements of the inter-human spell out
fundamental basis of the I and Thou relationship. It does stress that the
completeness or wholeness of man is not in the sole virtue of relation
to himself but it embodies the virtue of his relation to others. We see
then such elements as mutuality, everyone as an end, interpersonal
fellowship and dialogue – genuine dialogue – as those elements lacking
or in short supply in inter-ethnic relations in most African states.

Let us note that in a situation of exploitation of some ethnic
groups by others, marginalized groups have consistently agitated for
national self-determination as recently witnessed in some African
states. The attendant marginalization by the dominating group is often
accompanied by large-scale corruption, injustice and wanton poverty
and disease among the people. However, when the I – Thou
relationship is used as the basis for co-existence among ethnic groups it
would then be easy to address the problem of justice, equality, peace,
security and development. The African Union (AU) and other African
sub-regional bodies should actually see that all Africans are Africans
qua Africans and should accept themselves not as means to satisfy their
own ends, but as end in themselves.
The ethical imperative, as could be inferred from the foregoing
analysis, implies that we should be moral in our dealing with others.
Other ethnic groups should not be treated as just means to the
satisfaction of our own ends but as kingdom of ends in themselves.
Kant for instance puts forward the thesis of categorical imperative,
with the injunction that we should act on the maxim through which we
can at the same time will that it should become a universal law. It is on
this basis that Kant urges us to treat others as ends and never as means
to further our own interest (Azenabor, 2008: 58).
The Yoruba worldview, just like many other worldview, is
replete with injunctions that stress the need for ethical considerations
of others. For instance the concepts of ajobi (consanguinity) and ajogbe
(co-residentship) emphasize what we share together both as blood
relations and non-blood relations. The bottom line is that in Yoruba
communal universe, the need for interdependence and co-existence
guide social and political behavior.
The ontological and ethical imperatives must be complemented
by political and legal imperatives. When we talk about political
imperative in the resolution of ethnic conflict in Africa, it has to be
accompanied by legal provisions. In many multi-ethnic state the
disequilibrium in the access to power and the inability by political
leaders to use political power to promote overall interest of constituent
ethnic groups have always brought about ethnic conflict. This also has
much to do with leadership deficit. Hence, to resolve ethnic conflict,
which has made political order elusive in Africa, political power must
be deployed appropriately to serve the interest of the people not ethnic
group(s) that constitutes the power oligarchy.

On leadership, for instance, Kalu focusing attention on Nigeria, the
most populous country in Africa notes:
The central problem in Nigeria has been the lack of public leadership
nurtured by the core values of an indigenous elite across the national
landscape – political, civil society, cultural, religious, educational and
in many instances, family. The absence of public leadership is directly
related to the absence of national dialogue on what Nigerian identity
should be about and how different nationalities that were brought
together by colonialism should live together productively (Kalu, 2005:
3).
The above position by Kalu and others shows that conflict resolution
in contemporary period has a critical political dimension. This is
because contemporary society in its increasing complex form has to
confront the problem of leadership, the problem of elite civil society,
cultural, religious and educational structures. This tendency then calls
for an astute political and legal structure to confront these issues. There
is then the need to institutionalize democratic values on the political
front. For instance, participation and sharing of power by ethnic
groups in African countries, which is a major source of conflict, should
not just end at the theoretical constitutional level, they must be seen to
obtain in the actual operation of the government. This is significant,
according to Kalu, because:
While democracy as a mechanism of governance is not
mutually exclusive with such ideologies as liberalism, authoritarianism
and/or other ideological variants, most agitations in Nigeria are about
participatory rights within the context of liberal constitutionalism that
guarantees citizenship as the dominant identity, political and economic
freedoms of action. And as long as those rights are not constitutionally
guaranteed and protected, the type of regime in power will not assuage
the memories and sources of agitations (Kalu, 2005: 31-32).
We can now see that conflict resolution within the political
framework requires a legal framework, through constitutional
entrenchment of certain rights. As a matter of fact, the legal framework
in the context of conflict resolution lies mainly in the rule of law.It is
through the rule of law that people’s rights are protected and offenders
are sanctioned with full backing of the government, civil society and
the citizens. The foregoing, then, prompts up the kind of rights citizens
are entitled to. There are three principal types of rights that a person

may be said to have namely; civil rights, legal rights and human rights
(Bodunrin, 1987:187).
According to Bodunrin (1987: 187) civil rights are privileges
and entitlements that accrue to an individual by virtue of being a citizen
of a state. Legal rights on the other hand are context dependent and are
also guaranteed by constitutional provisions of the state. They affect
both citizens and foreigners alike. While both civil rights and legal
rights derive from both constitutional provisions, human rights have a
broader dimension. This stems from the fact that human rights are
“rights which persons have simply by virtue of their membership of the
human race” (Bodunrin, 1987: 187). This means provided that one is a
human being one could not be denied of such right whenever one lives.
Various government institutions and states have attempted to couch
these rights in one form or the other. These include the United Nations
Organization’s declaration of Human Rights and The African Bill of
Rights. For instance in 1981, an African charter on human and people’s
right was adopted and various states have constitutional provisions for
rights of people. Specifically Chapter IV section 34-36 of the 1999 Nigerian
Federal Constitution makes an adequate provision for fundamental
human rights. We should note that the enhancement of these forms of
rights (civil, legal and human) also demands from various individuals
certain duties which may be in form of obligations such as payment of
taxes, obeying the law, being loyal and respecting the right of others.
It is pathetic to note that in spite of the usefulness of the
political and legal frameworks in the resolution of conflicts and the
entrenchment of various rights and laws in the constitutions in many
African states, conflicts (violent ones for that matter) are still part of
Africa’s daily reality. The reasons are not far-fetched. In many African
states there are flagrant injustice pertaining to people’s right especially
in the authoritative allocation of national resources, lopsidedness in
power sharing, unlawful incarceration, arrest and extra judicial killings.
Among other reasons are miscarriages of justice especially in our
courts. In Nigeria for instance, there are allegations and counter-
allegations of judicial bribery, which have sometimes led to dismissal or
untimely retirement of judges.
In addition, policies are imposed on the citizens without due input and
impulse of the citizens. It is our contention that if we are to have a
conflict manageable Africa in which there will be sustainable
development, the constitutional provisions should not only be seen to

be made but should be strictly adhered to by governments who in one
way or the other control and determine the life plan of their citizens.
Furthermore, a sense of tolerance and compromise is needed in
Africa’s volatile political space to resolve ethnic conflicts. But what
kind of tolerance and compromise is needed in Africa? Certainly we do
not mean tolerance and compromise in a debased sense in which there
is passive complicity for all kinds of evil such as would undermine the
developmental needs of the people. We are not talking about a sense of
tolerance that encourages and justifies corruption. Rather, it is a sense
of tolerance and compromise that encourages, among the various
ethnic nationalities, a sense of ‘give and take’, a sense of dialogue, a
sense of critical evaluation of ideas and policies and a sense of
community.
CONCLUSION
Our modest attempt in this paper is to propose the synergy of the
ontological and ethical imperatives to resolve politics crisis in Africa so
as to pave way for sustainable development. We want to add that when
ethnic conflicts are resolved, it gives room for peace and where there is
peace, there would be development. Although, we can talk about
negative peace (absence of physical violence) and positive peace
(reconciliation and restoration through creative transformation of
conflicts) (Albert & Oloyede, 2010: 2), it is positive peace that is most
urgently needed in Africa. According to Albert and Oloyede, while
negative peace is adversarial, based on force and involving a winner-
takes-all, the positive non-adversarial conflict management strategies
are premised on the readiness of parties involved to work together to
find lasting solutions to their difference through negotiations,
mediation and arbitration (Albert and Oloyede, 2010: 3).
Furthermore, people of the world should work towards
security, peace and development as a collective project. In doing this,
efforts should be made towards the achievement of inclusive and
integrative humanism based on cross-cultural understanding.
Furthermore, ethnocentric and racist tendencies should be abolished,
whether within or across cultures. The so-called super-altern nations
must respect the humanity of the sub-altern nations. It is the positive
attitude towards the ‘other’ that can help resolve our political crisis not
only in Africa but across the continents of the world.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
I thank the Head, Professors, Lecturers and Students of the
Department of Philosophy, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, for this
rare honour to deliver this lecture in honour of Rev. Fr. (Professor)
A.O. Echekwube. I also thank ’Tayo Oladebo, my research assistant,
for his contributions to getting this paper ready for presentation.
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