History of african philosophy

History of African Philosophy
This article traces the history of systematic African philosophy from the early 1920s to
date. In Plato’s Theaetetus, Socrates suggests that philosophy begins with wonder.
Aristotle agreed. However, recent research shows that wonder may have different subsets.
If that is the case, which specific subset of wonder inspired the beginning of the systematic
African philosophy? In the history of Western philosophy, there is the one
called thaumazein interpreted as awe and the other called miraculum interpreted as
curiosity. History shows that these two subsets manifest in the African place as well, even
during the pre-systematic era. However, there is now an idea appearing in recent African
philosophy literature called onuma interpreted as frustration which is regarded as the
subset of wonder that jump started the systematic African philosophy. In the 1920s, a host
of Africans who went to study in the West were just returning. They had experienced
terrible racism and discrimination while in the West. They were referred to as
descendants of slaves; as people from the slave colony, as sub-humans, and so on. On
return to their native lands, they met the same maltreatment by the colonial officials.
‘Frustrated’ by colonialism and racialism as well as the legacies of slavery, they were jolted
onto the path of philosophy—African philosophy—by what can be called onuma.
These ugly episodes of slavery, colonialism and racialism not only shaped the world’s
perception of Africa; they also instigated a form of intellectual revolt from the African
intelligentsias. The frustration with the colonial order eventually led to angry questions
and reactions out of which African philosophy emerged, first in the form of nationalisms
and then in the form ideological theorizations. But the frustration was borne out of
colonial caricature of Africa as culturally naïve, intellectually docile and rationally inept.
This caricature was created by European scholars such as Kant, Hegel and, much later,
Levy-Bruhl to name just a few. It was the reaction to this caricature that led some African
scholars returning from the West into the type of philosophizing one may describe as
systematic beginning with the identity of the African people, their place in history, and
their contributions to civilization. To dethrone the colonially-built episteme became a
ready attraction for African scholars’ vexed frustrations. Thus began the history of
systematic African philosophy with the likes of Aime Cisaire, Leopold Senghor, Kwame
Nkrumah, Julius Nyerere, William Abraham, John Mbiti and expatriates such as Placid
Tempels, Janheinz Jahn and George James, to name a few.

Table of Contents
1. Introduction
2. Criteria of African Philosophy
3. Methods of African Philosophy
a. The Communitarian Method
b. The Complementarity Method
c. The Conversational Method
4. Schools of African Philosophy
. Ethnophilosophy School
a. Nationalist/Ideological School
b. Philosophic Sagacity
c. Hermeneutical School
d. Literary School
e. Professional School
f. Conversational School
5. The Movements in African Philosophy
. Excavationism
a. Afro-Constructionism/Afro-Deconstructionism
b. Critical Reconstructionism/Afro-Eclecticism
c. Conversationalism
6. Periods of African Philosophy
. Early Period
a. Middle Period
b. Later Period
c. New Era
7. Conclusion
8. References and Further Reading

1. Introduction
African philosophy as a systematic study has a very short history. This history is also a
very dense one, since actors sought to do in a few decades what would have been better
done in many centuries. As a result, they also did in later years what ought to have been
done earlier and vice versa, thus making the early and the middle epochs overlap
considerably. The reason for this overtime endeavor is not far-fetched. Soon after
colonialism, actors realized that Africa had been sucked into the global matrix
unprepared. During colonial times, the identity of the African was European, his thought
system, standard and even his perception of reality were structured by the colonial
shadow which stood towering behind him. It was easy for the African to position himself
within these Western cultural appurtenances even though they had no real-time
connection with his being.
The vanity of this presupposition and the emptiness of colonial assurances manifested
soon after the towering colonial shadow vanished. Now, in the global matrix, it became
shameful for the African to continue to identify himself within the European colonialist
milieu. For one, he had just rejected colonialism and for another, the deposed European
colonialist made it clear that the identity of the African was no longer covered and insured
by the European medium. So, actors realized suddenly that they had been disillusioned
and had suffered severe self-deceit under colonial temper. The question which trailed
every African was, “Who are you?” Of course, the answers from European perspective
were savage, primitive, less than human, etc. It was the urgent, sudden need to contradict
these European positions that led some post-colonial Africans in search of African
identity. So, to discover or rediscover African identity in order to initiate a non-colonial
or original history for Africa in the global matrix and start a course of viable economic,
political and social progress that is entirely African became one of the focal points of
African philosophy.
Placid Tempels, the European missionary, elected to help and in his controversial
book, Bantu Philosophy, sought to create Africa’s own philosophy as proof that Africa has
its own peculiar identity and thought system. However, it was George James, another
concerned European who attempted a much more ambitious project in his work, Stolen
Legacy. In this work, there were strong suggestions not only that Africa has philosophy
but that the so-called Western philosophy, the very bastion of European identity, was
stolen from Africa. This claim was intended to make the proud European colonialists feel
indebted to the humiliated Africans, but it was unsuccessful. That Greek philosophy had
roots in Egypt does not imply, as some Europeans claim, that Egyptians were dark nor
that dark complexioned Africans had philosophy. The use of the term “Africans” in this
work is in keeping with George James’ demarcation which precludes the light
complexioned people of North Africa and refers to the dark complexioned people of
southern Sahara.
After these two Europeans, Africans began to attain maturation. Aime Cesaire, John
Mbiti, Odera Oruka, Julius Nyerere, Leopold Senghor, Nnamdi Azikiwe, Kwame
Nkrumah, Obafemi Awolowo, Alexis Kegame, Uzodinma Nwala, Emmanuel Edeh,
Innocent Onyewuenyi, and Henry Olela, to name just a few, opened the doors of ideas. A
few of the works produced sought to prove and establish the philosophical basis of

African, unique identity in the history of humankind, while others sought to chart a course
of Africa’s true identity through unique political and economic ideologies. It can be stated
that much of these endeavors fall under the early period.
For its concerns, the middle period of African philosophy is characterized by the great
debate. Those who seek to clarify and justify the position held in the early epoch and those
who seek to criticize and deny the viability of such position entangled themselves in a
great debate. Some of the actors on this front include, C. S. Momoh, Robin Horton, Henri
Maurier, Lacinay Keita, Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, Kwame Gyekye, Richard Wright,
Barry Halen, Joseph Omoregbe, C. B. Okolo, Theophilus Okere, Paulin Hountondji,
Gordon Hunnings, Odera Oruka and Sophie Oluwole to name a few.
The preceding epoch eventually gave way to the later period which has as its focus the
construction of an African episteme. Two camps rivaled each other namely; the Critical
Reconstructionists who are the evolved Universalists/Deconstructionists and the
Eclectics who are the evolved Traditionalists/Excavators. The former seek to build an
African episteme untainted by ethnophilosophy; whereas, the latter seek to do the same
by a delicate fusion of relevant ideals of the two camps. In the end, Critical
Reconstructionism ran into a brick wall when it became clear that whatever it produced
cannot truly be called African philosophy if it is all Western without African marks. The
mere claim that it would be African philosophy simply because it was produced by
Africans (Hountondji 1996 and Oruka 1975) would collapse like a house of cards under
any argument. For this great failure, the influence of Critical Reconstructionism in the
later period whittled down and it was latter absorbed by its rival—Eclecticism.
The works of the Eclectics heralded the emergence of the New Era in African philosophy.
The focus becomes the Conversational philosophizing, in which the production of
philosophically rigorous and original African episteme better than what the Eclectics
produced occupied the center stage.
The sum of what historians of African philosophy have done can be presented in the
following two broad categorizations to wit; Pre-systematic Era and the Systematic era.
The former refers to Africa’s philosophical culture, thoughts of the anonymous African
thinkers and may include the problems of Egyptian legacy. The latter refers to the periods
marking the return of Africa’s first eleven, Western-tutored philosophers from the 1920’s
to date. This latter category could further be delineated into four periods:
1.
a. Early period 1920s - 1960s
b. Middle period 1960s - 1980s
c. Later period 1980s - 1990s
d. New (Contemporary) Era since 1990s
Note, of course, that this does not commit us to saying that, before the early period, people
in Africa never philosophized—they did. But one fact that must not be denied is that they
did not document their thoughts and, as such, scholars cannot attest to their systematicity

or sources. In other words, what this periodization shows is that African philosophy as a
system first began in the late 1920s.
Because there are credible objections among African philosophers with regards to the
inclusion of it in the historical chart of African philosophy, the Egyptian question will be
ignored for now. The main objection is that even if the philosophers of stolen legacy were
able to prove a connection between Greece and Egypt, they could not prove in concrete
terms that Egyptians were dark complexioned Africans or that dark complexioned
Africans were Egyptians. It is understandable the frustration and desperation that
motivated such ambitious effort in the ugly colonial era which was captured above, but
any reasonable person, judging by the responses of time and events in the last few decades
knows it was high time Africans abandoned that unproven legacy and let go of that, now
helpless propaganda. If however, some would want to retain it as part of African
philosophy, it would carefully fall within the pre-literate or the pre-systematic era.
In this essay, discussion will focus on the history of systematic or literate African
philosophy touching prominently on the criteria, schools, movements and periods in
African philosophy. As much as the philosophers of a given era may disagree, they are
inevitably united by the problem of their epoch. That is to say, it is orthodoxy that each
epoch is defined by a common focus or problem. Therefore, the approach of the study of
the history of philosophy can be done either through personality periscope or through the
periods, but whichever approach one chooses, he unavoidably runs into the person who
had chosen the other. This is a sign of unity of focus. Thus philosophers are those who
seek to solve the problem of their time. In this presentation, the study of the history of
African philosophy will be approached principally through the periods, schools,
movements and the personalities will be discussed within these purviews.
2. Criteria of African Philosophy
To start with, more than three decades debate on the status of philosophy ended with the
affirmation that African philosophy exists. But what is it that makes a philosophy African?
Answers to this question polarized actors into two main groups, namely the
Traditionalists and Universalists. Whereas the Traditionalists aver that the studies of the
philosophical elements in world-view of the people constitute African philosophy, the
Universalists insist that it has to be a body of analytic and critical reflections of individual
African philosophers. Further probing of the question was done during the debate by the
end of which the question of what makes a philosophy “African” produced two contrasting
criteria. First, as a racial criterion; a philosophy would be African if it is produced by
Africans. This is the view held by people like Paulin Hountondji, Odera Oruka (in part),
and early Peter Bodunrin, derived from the two constituting terms—“African” and
“philosophy”. African philosophy following this criterion is the philosophy done by
Africans. This has been criticized as pejorative, incorrect and exclusivist. Second, as a
tradition criterion; a philosophy is “African” if it designates a non-racial-bound
philosophy tradition where the predicate “African” is treated as a solidarity term of no
racial import and where the approach derives inspiration from African cultural
background or system of thought. It does not matter whether the issues addressed are
African or that the philosophy is done by an African insofar as it has universal

applicability and emerged from the purview of African system of thought. African
philosophy would then be that rigorous discourse of African issues or any issues
whatsoever from the critical eye of African system of thought. Actors like Odera Oruka (in
part), Meinrad Hebga, C. S. Momoh, Udo Etuk, Joseph Omoregbe, the later Peter
Bodunrin, Jonathan Chimakonam can be grouped here. This criterion has also been
criticized as courting uncritical elements of the past when it makes reference to the
controversial idea of African logic tradition. Further discussion on this is well beyond the
scope of this essay. What is however common in the two criteria is that African philosophy
is a critical discourse on issues that may or may not affect Africa by African philosophers—
the purview of this discourse remains unsettled.
3. Methods of African Philosophy
a. The Communitarian Method
This method speaks to the idea of mutuality, the type found in the classic expression of
ubuntu: “a person is a person through other person” or that which is credited to John
Mbiti, “ I am because we are, since we are, therefore I am”. Those who employ this method
wish to demonstrate the idea of mutual interdependence of variables. You find this most
prominent in the works of researchers working in ubuntu and communalism. Some of the
thinkers who employ this method include; Ifeanyi Menkiti, Mogobe Ramose, Kwame
Gyekye, Thaddeus Metz, Fainos Mangena, Leonhard Praeg, Bernard Matolino, Michael
Eze, and so forth.
b. The Complementarity Method
This method was propounded by Innocent Asouzu and it harps on the idea of missing
link. No variable is useless. The system of reality is like a network in which each variable
has an important role to play i.e. it complements and is in return complemented because
no variable is self sufficient. Other scholars whose works have followed this method
include Mesembe Edet, Ada Agada, Jonathan Chimakonam and a host of others.
c. The Conversational Method
This is a formal procedure for assessing the relationships of opposed variables in which
thoughts are shuffled through disjunctive and conjunctive modes to constantly recreate
fresh thesis and anti-thesis each time at a higher level of discourse without the expectation
of the synthesis. It is an encounter between philosophers of rival schools of thought and
between different philosophical traditions or cultures in which one party called nwa-nsa
(the defender or proponent) holds up a position and another party called nwa-nju (the
doubter or opponent) doubts or questions the accuracy of the position. On the whole, this
method points to the idea of relationships among interdependent, interrelated and
interconnected realities existing in a network whose peculiar truth conditions can more
accurately and broadly be determined within specific contexts. This method was first
proposed by Jonathan Chimakonam and endorsed by the The Conversational School of
Philosophy. Other thinkers that now employ this method include, Victor Nweke,
Mesembe Edet, Fayemi Ademola Kazeem, Ada Agada, Pius Mosima, and a host of others.

4. Schools of African Philosophy
a. Ethnophilosophy School
This is the foremost school in systematic African philosophy which equated African
philosophy with culture-bound systems of thought. For this, their enterprise was
scornfully described as substandard hence the term “ethnophilosophy.” Thoughts of the
members of the Excavationism movement like Tempels Placid and Alexis Kagame
properly belong here and their high point was in the early period of African philosophy.
b. Nationalist/Ideological School
The concern of this school was nationalist philosophical jingoism to combat colonialism
and to create political philosophy and ideology for Africa from the indigenous traditional
system as a project of decolonization. Thoughts of members of the Excavationism
movement like Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Sedar Senghor and Julius Nyerere in the early
period can be brought under this school.
c. Philosophic Sagacity
There is also the philosophic sagacity school whose main focus is to show that standard
philosophical discourse existed and still exists in traditional Africa and can only be
discovered through sage conversations. The chief proponent of this school was the
brilliant Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka who took time to emphasize that Marcel
Gruaile’s similar programme is less sophisticated than his. Other adherents of this school
include Gail Presbey, Anke Graness and the Cameroonian philosopher Pius Mosima. But
since philosophical sagacity thrives on the method of oral interview of presumed sages
whose authenticity cannot be independently verified, what is produced distances itself
from the sages and becomes the fruits of the interviewing philosopher. So the sage
connection and the tradition became defeated. Their enterprise falls within the movement
of Critical Reconstructionism of the later period.
d. Hermeneutical School
Another prominent school is the hermeneutical school. Its focus is that the best approach
to studying African philosophy is through interpretations of oral traditions and emerging
philosophical texts. Theophilus Okere, Okonda Okolo, Tsenay Serequeberhan and
Ademola Fayemi Kazeem are some of the major proponents and members of this school.
The confusion however is that they reject ethnophilosophy whereas the oral tradition and
most of the texts available for interpretation are ethnophilosophical in nature. The works
of Okere and Okolo feasted on ethno-philosophy. This school exemplifies the movement
called Afro-constructionism of the middle period.
e. Literary School
The literary school’s main concern is to make a philosophical presentation of African
cultural values through literary/fictional ways. Proponents like Chinua Achebe, Cheik
Anta Diop, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wole Soyinka to name a few have been outstanding. Yet
critics have found it convenient to identify their discourse with ethnophilosophy from
literary angle thereby denigrating it as sub-standard. Their enterprise remarks the
movement of Afro-constructionism of the middle period.

f. Professional School
Perhaps the most controversial is the one variously described as professional, universalist
or modernist school. It contends that all the other schools are engaged in one form of
ethnophilosophy or the other, that standard African philosophy is critical, individual
discourse and that what qualifies as African philosophy must have universal merit and
thrive on the method of critical analysis and individual discursive enterprise. It is not
about talking, it is about doing. Some staunch unrepentant members of this school
include Kwasi Wiredu, Paulin Hountondji, Peter Bodunrin to name a few. They
demolished all that has been built in African philosophy and built nothing as an
alternative episteme. This school champions the movement of Afro-deconstructionism
and the abortive Critical Reconstructionism of the middle and later periods respectively.
Perhaps, one of the deeper criticisms that can be leveled against the position of the
professional school comes from C. S. Momoh’s scornful description of the school as
African logical neo-positivism. They agitate that (1) there is nothing as yet in African
traditional philosophy that qualifies as philosophy and (2) that critical analysis should be
the focus of African philosophy; so what then is there to be critically analyzed?
Professional school adherents are said to forget in their overt copying of European
philosophy that analysis is a recent development in European philosophy which attained
saturation in the 19th
century after over 2000 years of historical evolution thereby
requiring some downsizing. Would they also grant that philosophy in Europe before
19th
century was not philosophy? The aim of this essay is not to offer criticisms of the
schools but to present historical journey of philosophy in the African tradition. It is in
opposition to and the need to fill the lacuna in the enterprise of the professional school
that the new school which can be called conversational school has recently emerged in
African philosophy.
g. Conversational School
This emerging school thrives on fulfilling the yearning of the professional/modernist
school to have a robust individual discourse as well as fulfilling the conviction of the
traditionalists that a thorough-going African philosophy has to be erected on the
foundation of African thought systems. They make the most of the criterion which
presents African philosophy as a critical tradition that prioritizes engagements between
philosophers and cultures and projects individual discourses from the thought system of
Africa. Those whose writings fit into this school include Pantaleon Iroegbu, Innocent
Asouzu, Bruce Janz, Jennifer Vest, Jonathan Chimakonam and Ada Agada to name a few.
Their projects promote partly the movements of Afro-eclecticism and fully the
conversationalism of the later and the new periods respectively.
5. The Movements in African Philosophy
There are four main movements that can be identified in the history of African
philosophy, they include: Excavationism, Afro-constructionism/Afro-deconstructionism,
Critical Reconstructionism/Afro-Eclecticism and Conversationalism.
a. Excavationism
The Excavators are all those who sought to erect the edifice of African philosophy by
systematizing the African cultural world-views. Some of them aimed at retrieving and
reconstructing presumably lost African identity from the raw materials of African culture,
while others sought to develop compatible political ideologies for Africa from the native

political systems of African peoples. Members of this movement have all been grouped
under the school known as ethnophilosophy, and they thrived in the early period of
African philosophy. Their concern was to build and demonstrate unique African identify
in various forms. A few of them include Placid Tempels, Julius Nyerere, John Mbiti, Alexis
Kagame, Leopold Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah and Aime Cesaire.
b. Afro-Constructionism/Afro-Deconstructionism
The Afro-deconstructionists sometimes called the Modernists or the Universalists are
those who sought to demote such edifice erected by the Excavators on the ground that
their raw materials are substandard cultural paraphernalia. They are opposed to the idea
of unique African identity or culture-bound philosophy and preferred a philosophy that
will integrate African identity with the identity of all other races. They never built this
philosophy. Some members of this movement include Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu,
Peter Bodunrin, Macien Towa, Fabien Ebousi Boulaga, Richard Wright and Henri
Maurier. Their opponents are the Afro-constructionists, sometimes called the
Traditionalists or Particularists who sought to add rigor and promote the works of the
Excavators as true African philosophy. Some prominent actors in this movement include
Innocent Onyewuenyi, Henry Olela, Lansana Keita, C. S. Momoh, Joseph Omoregbe,
Janheinz Jahn, George James, Sophie Oluwole and, in some ways, Kwame Gyekye.
Members of this twin-movement have variously been grouped under ethnophilosophy,
philosophic sagacity, professional, hermeneutical and literary schools and they thrived in
the middle period of African philosophy. This is also known as the period of the Great
Debate.
c. Critical Reconstructionism/Afro-Eclecticism
A few Afro-deconstructionists of the middle period evolved into Critical
Reconstructionists hoping to reconstruct from the scratch the edifice of authentic African
philosophy that would be critical, individualistic and universal. They hold that the edifice
of ethnophilosophy, which they had demolished in the middle period, contained no
critical rigor. Some of the members of this movement include, Kwasi Wiredu, Olusegun
Oladipo, V. Y. Mudimbe, D. A. Masolo, Odera Oruka and, in some ways, Barry Hallen and
J. O. Sodipo. Their opponents are the Afro-Eclectics who evolved from Afro-
constructionism of the middle period. Unable to sustain their advocacy and the structure
of ethnophilosophy they had constructed, they stepped down a little bit to say, “Maybe we
can combine meaningfully, some of the non-conflicting concerns of the Traditionalists
and the Modernists.” They say (1) that African traditional philosophy is not rigorous
enough as claimed by the Modernists is a fact (2) that the deconstructionist program of
the Modernists did not offer and is incapable of offering an alternative episteme is also a
fact (3) maybe the rigor of the Modernists can be applied on the usable and relevant
elements produced by the Traditionalists to produce the much elusive, authentic African
philosophy. African philosophy for this movement therefore becomes a product of
synthesis resulting from the application of tools of critical reasoning on the relevant
traditions of African life-world. A. F. Uduigwomen, Kwame Gyekye, Ifeanyi Menkiti and
Kwame Appiah are some of the members of this movement. This movement played a vital
reconciliatory role, the importance of which was not fully realized in African philosophy.
Most importantly, they found a way out and laid the foundation for the emergence of
Conversationalism. Members of this twin-movement thrived in the later period of African
philosophy.

d. Conversationalism
The Conversationalists are those who seek to create an enduring corpus in African
philosophy by engaging elements of tradition and individual thinkers in critical
conversations. They emphasize originality, creativity, innovation, peer-criticism and
cross-pollination of ideas in prescribing and evaluating their ideas. They hold that new
episteme in African philosophy can only be created by individual African philosophers
who make use of the “usable past” and the depth of individual originality in finding
solutions to contemporary demands. They do not lay emphasis on analysis alone but also
on critical rigor and what is now called arumaristics—a creative reshuffling of thesis and
anti-thesis that spins out new concepts and thoughts. Members of this movement thrive
in this contemporary period and their school can be called the conversational school.
Some of the philosophers that have demonstrated this trait include Pantaleon Iroegbu,
Innocent Asouzu, Bruce Janz, Jonathan Chimakonam, Ada Agada, Jennifer Lisa Vest, and
so forth.
6. Periods of African Philosophy
a. Early Period
The early period of African philosophy is an era of the movement called
cultural/ideological excavation aimed at retrieving and reconstructing African identity.
The schools that emerged and thrived in this period were ethnophilosophy and
ideological/nationalist schools. The Sub-Saharan Africans, Hegel wrote, had no high
cultures and had made no contributions to world history and civilization (1975: 190).
Lucien Levy Bruhl also added that they are pre-logical and two-third of human (1947: 17).
The summary of these two positions, which represent the colonial mindset, is that
Africans have no dignified identity like their European counterpart. This could be
deciphered in the British colonial system which sought to erode the native thought system
in the constitution of social systems in their colonies and also in the French policy of
assimilation. Assimilation is a concept credited to the French philosopher Chris Talbot
(1837) which rests on the idea of expanding French culture to the colonies outside of
France in the 19th
and 20th
centuries. According to Betts (2005: 8), the natives of these
colonies were considered French citizens as long as the French culture and customs were
adopted to replace the indigenous system. The purpose of the theory of assimilation, for
Michael Lambert, therefore, was to turn African natives into French men by educating
them in the French language and culture (1993: 239-262).
During colonial times, the British, for example, educated their colonies in the British
language and culture, strictly undermining the native languages and cultures. The
products of this new social system were then given the impression that they were British,
though second class, the king was their king, and the empire was also theirs. Suddenly,
however, colonialism ended and they found, to their chagrin, that they were treated as
slave countries in the new post-colonial order. Their native identity had been destroyed
and their fake British identity had also been taken from them; what was left was
amorphous and corrupt. It was in the heat of this confusion and frustration that the
African philosophers sought to retrieve and recreate the original African identity lost in
the event of colonization. Ruch and Anyanwu, therefore, ask, “What is this debate about

African identity concerned with and what led to it? In other words, why should Africans
search for their identity?” Their response to the questions is as follows:
The simple answer to these questions is this: Africans of the first half of this (20th
century)
century have begun to search for their identity, because they had, rightly or wrongly, the
feeling that they had lost it or that they were being deprived of it. The three main factors
which led to this feeling were: slavery, colonialism and racialism. (1981: 184-85)
Racialism, as Ruch and Anyanwu believed, may have sparked it off and slavery may have
dealt the heaviest blow, but it was colonialism that entrenched it. Ironically, it was the
same colonialism at its stylistic conclusion that opened the eyes of the African by stirring
the hornet’s nest. An African can never be a British or French even with the colonially
imposed language and culture. With this shock, the post colonial African philosophers of
the early period set out in search of Africa’s lost identity.
James in 1954 published his monumental work Stolen Legacy. In it, he attempted to prove
that the Egyptians were the true authors of Western philosophy; that Pythagoras,
Socrates, Plato and Aristotle plagiarized the Egyptians; that the authorship of the
individual doctrines of Greek philosophers is a mere speculation perpetuated chiefly by
Aristotle and executed by his school; and that the African continent gave the world its
civilization, knowledge, arts and sciences, religion and philosophy, a fact that is destined
to produce a change in the mentality both of the European and African peoples. In G. M.
James’ words:
In this way, the Greeks stole the legacy of the African continent and called it their own.
And as has already been pointed out, the result of this dishonesty had been the creation
of an enormous world opinion; that the African continent has made no contribution to
civilization, because her people are backward and low in intelligence and culture…This
erroneous opinion about the Black people has seriously injured them through the
centuries up to modern times in which it appears to have reached a climax in the history
of human relations. (1954: 54)
These rugged intellectual positions supported by evidential and well thought-out proofs
quickly heralded a shift in the intellectual culture of the world. But there was one problem
George James could not fix; he could not prove that the people of North Africa (Egyptians)
who were the true authors of ancient art, sciences, religion and philosophy were dark
complexioned Africans, as can be seen in his hopeful but inconsistent conclusions:
This is going to mean a tremendous change in world opinion, and attitude, for all people
and races who accept the new philosophy of Africa redemption, i.e. the truth that the
Greeks were not the authors of Greek philosophy; but the people of North Africa; would
change their opinion from one of disrespect to one of respect for the black people
throughout the world and treat them accordingly. (1954: 153)
It is inconsistent how the achievements of North Africans (Egyptians) can redeem the
black Africans. This is also the problem with Henri Olela’s article “The African
Foundations of Greek Philosophy”.

In Onyewuenyi’s The African Origin of Greek Philosophy however, an ambitious attempt
emerges to fill this lacuna in the argument of new philosophy of African redemption. In
the first part of chapter two, he reduced the Greek philosophy to Egyptian philosophy,
and in the second part, he attempted to further reduce the Egyptians of the time to dark
complexioned Africans. There are, however, two holes he could not fill. First, Egypt is the
world’s oldest standing country who also told their own story by themselves in different
forms. At no point did they or other historians describe them as dark complexioned
people. Second, if the Egyptians were at a time wholly dark complexioned, why are they
now wholly light complexioned? For the failure of this group of scholars to prove that dark
complexioned Africans were the authors of Egyptian philosophy, one must abandon the
Egyptian legacy.
There are however other scholars of the early period who tried in more reliable ways to
assert African identity by establishing native African philosophical heritage. One of such
is Tempels who authored Bantu Philosophy (1949). He proved that rationality was an
important feature of the traditional African culture. By systematizing Bantu philosophical
ideas he confronted the racist orientation of the West which depicted Africa as a continent
of semi-humans. In fact, Tempels showed the latent similarities in the spiritual
inclinations of the Europeans and their African counterpart. In the opening passage of his
work he observed that the European who has taken to atheism quickly returns to a
Christian viewpoint when suffering or pain threatens his survival. In much the same way,
he says the civilized or Christian Bantu returns to the ways of his ancestors when
confronted by suffering and death. So, spiritual orientation or thinking is not found only
in Africa.
In his attempt to explain the Bantu understanding of being, Tempels admits that this
might not be the same with the understanding of the European. Instead, he argues that
the Bantu construction is as much rational as that of the European. In his words:
So the criteriology of the Bantu rests upon external evidence, upon the authority and
dominating life force of the ancestors. It rests at the same time upon the internal evidence
of experience of nature and of living phenomena, observed from their point of view. No
doubt, anyone can show the error of their reasoning; but it must none the less be admitted
that their notions are based on reason, that their criteriology and their wisdom belong to
rational knowledge. (1949/2006: 51)
Tempels obviously believes that the Bantu, like the rest of the African tribes, posses
rationality which undergird their philosophical enterprise. The error in their reasoning is
only obvious in the light of European logic. The Bantu categories only differ from those of
the Europeans, which is why a first-time European on-looker would misinterpret them to
be irrational or spiritual. This effort clearly makes a case for Africa’s true identity, which,
for him, could be found in African religion within which African philosophy (ontology) is
subsumed. In his words, “being is force, force is being”. And the same could be said of
Alexis Kagame’s work The Bantu-Rwandan Philosophy(1956), which offers similar proofs
and arguments thus further strengthening the claims of Tempels, especially from an
African’s perspective. The major criticism against their industry remains the association
of their thoughts with ethnophilosophy, where ethnophilosophy is seen pejoratively. A
much more studded criticism is offered recently by Innocent Asouzu in his

workIbuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology (2007). His criticism was not directed at
the validity of the thoughts they expressed or whether Africa could boast of a rational
enterprise such as philosophy but at the logical foundation of their thoughts. Asouzu
seems to quarrel with Tempels for allowing his native Aristotelian orientation to influence
his construction of African philosophy and lambasts Kagame for following suit instead of
correcting Tempels’ mistake. The principle of bivalence as evidenced in the Western
thought system was at the background of their construction.
Another important philosopher in this period is John Mbiti. His work African Religions
and Philosophy (1969) avidly educated those who doubted Africans’ possession of their
own identities before the arrival of the European by excavating and demonstrating the
rationality in the religious and philosophical enterprises in African cultures. He boldly
declared: “We shall use the singular, ‘philosophy’ to refer to the philosophical
understanding of African peoples concerning different issues of life” (1969: 2). His
presentation of time in African thought shows off the pattern of excavation in his African
philosophy. Although his studies focus primarily on the Kikamba and Gikuyu tribes of
Africa, he observes that there are similarities in many African cultures just as Tempels did
earlier. He subsumes African philosophy in African religion on the assumption that
African peoples do not know how to exist without religion. This idea is also shared by
William Abraham in his book The Mind of Africa as well as Tempels’ Bantu Philosophy.
African philosophy, from Mbiti’s treatment, could be likened to Tempels’ vital force, of
which African religion is its outer cloak. The obvious focus of this book is on African views
about God, political thought, afterlife, culture or world-view and creation, the
philosophical aspects lie within these religious over-coats. Thus, Mbiti establishes that
the true, and lost, identity of the African could be found within his religion. Another
important observation Mbiti made was that this identity is communal and not
individualistic. Hence, he states, “I am because we are and since we are therefore I am”
(1969: 108). Therefore, the African has to re-enter his religion to find his philosophy and
the community to find his identity.
This is a view shared by William Abraham in his The Mind of Africa (1962). He shares
Tempels’ and Mbiti’s views that the dark complexioned African tribes have many
similarities in their culture, though his studies focus on the culture and political thought
of the Akan of present day Ghana. Another important aspect of Abraham’s work is that he
subsumed African philosophical thought in African culture taking, as Barry Hallen
described, “an essentialist interpretation of African culture” (2002: 15). Thus for
Abraham, like Tempels and Mbiti, the lost African identity could be found in the seabed
of African indigenous culture in which religion features prominently.
On the other hand, there were those who sought to retrieve and establish once again
Africa’s lost identity through economic and political ways. Some names discussed here
include Kwame Nkrumah, Leopold Senghor and Julius Nyerere. These actors felt that the
African could never be truly decolonized unless he found his own system of living and
social organization. One cannot be African living like the European. The question that
guided their study therefore became, “What system of economic and social engineering
will suit us and project our true identity?” Nkrumah advocates African socialism, which,
according to Barry Hallen, is an original, social, political and philosophical theory of
African origin and orientation. This system is forged from the traditional, communal
structure of African society, a view strongly projected by Mbiti. Nkrumah says that a
return to African cultural system with its astute moral values, communal ownership of

land and a humanitarian social and political engineering holds the key to Africa
rediscovering her lost identity. Systematizing this process, will yield what he calls the
African brand of socialism. In most of his books, he projects the idea that Africa’s lost
identity is to be found in African native culture within which is African philosophical
thought and identity shaped by communal orientation. Some of his works include, Neo-
colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (1965), I Speak of Freedom: A Statement of African
Ideology (1961), Africa Must Unite (1970), and Consciencism (1954).
Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal charted a course similar to that of Nkrumah. In his
works Negritude et Humanisme (1964) and Negritude and the Germans (1967), Senghor traced
Africa’s philosophy of social engineering down to African culture, which he said is
communal and laden with brotherly emotion. This is different from the European system,
which he says is individualistic, having been marshaled purely by reason. He opposed the
French colonial principle of assimilation aimed at turning Africans into Frenchmen by
eroding and replacing African culture with French culture. African culture and languages
are the bastions of African identity, and it is in this culture that he found the pedestal for
constructing a political ideology that would project African lost identity. Senghor is in
agreement with Nkrumah, Mbiti, Abraham and Tempels in many ways, especially with
regards to the basis for Africa’s true identity.
Julius Nyerere of Tanzania is another philosopher of note in the early period of African
philosophy. In his books Uhuru na Ujamaa: Freedom and Socialism (1964) and Ujamaa: The
Basis of African Socialism (1968), he sought to retrieve and establish African true identity
through economic and political ways. For him, Africans cannot regain their identity
unless they are first free and freedom (Uhuru) transcends independence. Cultural
imperialism has to be overcome. And what is the best way to achieve this if not by
developing a socio-political and economic ideology from the petals of African native
culture, and traditional values of togetherness and brotherliness? Hence, Nyerere
proposes Ujamaa, meaning familyhood—the “being-with” philosophy or the “we” instead
of the “I—spirit” (Okoro 2004: 96). In the words of Barry Hallen, “Nyerere argued that
there was a form of life and system of values indigenous to the culture of pre-colonial
Africa, Tanzania in particular, that was distinctive if not unique and that had survived the
onslaughts of colonialism sufficiently intact to be regenerated as the basis for an African
polity” (2002: 74). Thus for Nyerere, the basis of African identity is the African culture,
which is communal rather than individualistic. Nyerere was in agreement with other
actors of this period on the path to full recovery of Africa’s lost identity. Other
philosophers of this era not treated here include Nnamdi Azikiwe, Obafemi Awolowo,
Amilcar Cabral, and the two foreigners, Janheinz Jahn and Marcel Griaule.
b. Middle Period
The middle period of African philosophy is also an era of the twin-movement called Afro-
constructionism and afro-deconstructionism, otherwise called the Great Debate, when
two rival schools—Traditionalists and Universalists clashed. While the Traditionalists
sought to construct an African identity based on excavated African cultural elements, the
Universalists sought to demolish such architectonic structure by associating it with
ethnophilosophy. The schools that thrived in this era include Philosophic Sagacity,
Professional/Modernist/Universalist, hermeneutical and Literary schools.

An important factor of the early period is that the thoughts on the basis for Africa’s true
identity generated arguments that fostered the emergence of the Middle Period of African
philosophy. These arguments result from questions that could be summarized as follows:
(1) Is it proper to take for granted the sweeping assertion that all of Africa’s cultures share
a few basic elements in common? It was this assumption that had necessitated the favorite
phrase in the early period, “African philosophy,” rather than “African philosophies”. (2)
Does Africa or African culture contain a philosophy in the strict sense of the term? (3) Can
African philosophy emerge from the womb of African religion, world-view and culture?
Answers and objections to answers soon took the shape of a debate, characterizing the
middle period as the era of the Great Debate in African philosophy.
This debate was between members of Africa’s new crop of intellectual radicals. On one
hand, are the demoters and, on the other, are the promoters of African philosophy
established by the league of early period intellectuals. The former sought to criticize this
new philosophy of redemption, gave it a derogatory tag “ethnophilosophy” and
consequently denigrated the African Identity that was founded on it as savage and
primitive identity. At the other end, the promoters sought to clarify and defend this
philosophy and justify the African identity that was rooted in it as true and original.
For clarity, the assessment of the debate era will begin from the middle instead of the
beginning. In 1978 Odera Oruka a Kenyan philosopher presented a paper at the William
Amo Symposium held in Accra, Ghana on the topic “Four Trends in Current African
Philosophy” in which he identified or grouped voices on African philosophy into four
schools, namely ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity, nationalistic-ideological school
and professional philosophy. In 1990 he wrote another work, Sage Philosophy: Indigenous
Thinker and the Modern Debate on African Philosophy in which he further added two schools
to bring the number to six schools in African philosophy. Those two additions are the
hermeneutic and the artistic/literary schools.
Those who uphold philosophy in African culture are the ethnophilosophers and these
include the actors treated as members of the early period of African philosophy and their
followers or supporters in the Middle Period. These would include C. S. Momoh, Joseph
Omoregbe, Lansana Keita, Olusegun Oladipo, Gordon Hunnings, Kwame Gyekye, M. A.
Makinde, Emmanuel Edeh, Uzodinma Nwala, K. C. Anyanwu and later E. A. Ruch, to
name a few. The philosophic sagacity school, to which Oruka belongs, also accommodates
C. S. Momoh, C. B. Nze, J. I. Omoregbe, C. B. Okolo and T. F. Mason. The nationalist-
ideological school consists of those who sought to develop indigenous socio-political and
economic ideologies for Africa. Prominent members include Julius Nyerere, Leopold
Senghor, Kwame Nkrumah, Amilcar Cabral, Nnamdi Azikiwe and Obafemi Awolowo. The
professional philosophy school insists that African philosophy must be done with
professional philosophical methods such as analysis, critical reflection and logical
coherence as it is in Western philosophy. Members of this school include: Henri Maurier,
Richard Wright, Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, early E. A. Ruch, R. Horton, and later C.
B. Okolo. The hermeneutic school recommends linguistic analysis as a method of doing
African philosophy. A few of its members include Theophilus Okere, Okonda Okolo,
Tsenay Serequeberhan, Godwin Sogolo and partly J. Sodipo and B. Hallen. The
Artistic/Literary school philosophically discusses the core of African norms, and includes
Chinua Achebe, Okot P’Bitek, Ngugi wa Thiong’o, Wole Soyinka, Elechi Amadi and F. C.
Ogbalu.

Also, in 1989, C. S. Momoh in his The Substance of African Philosophy outlined five schools,
namely African logical neo-positivism, the colonial/missionary school of thought, the
Egyptological school, the ideological school and the purist school. The article was titled
“Nature, Issues and Substance of African Philosophy” and was reproduced in Jim
Unah’s Metaphysics, Phenomenology and African Philosophy (1996).
In comparing Momoh’s delineations with Oruka’s, it can be said that the purist school
encompasses Oruka’s ethnophilosophy, artistic/literary school and philosophic sagacity;
The African logical neo-positivism encompasses professional philosophy and the
hermeneutical schools; and the ideological and colonial/missionary schools correspond
to Oruka’s nationalistic-ideological school. The Egyptological school, therefore, remains
outstanding. Momoh sees it as a school which sees African philosophy as synonymous
with Egyptian philosophy or at least, as originating from it. Also, Egyptian philosophy as
a product of African philosophy is also expressed in the writings of George James, I. C.
Onyewuenyi and Henry Olela.
Welding all these divisions together are the perspectives of Peter Bodunrin and Kwasi
Wiredu. In the introduction to his 1985 edited volume Philosophy in Africa: Trends and
Perspectives, Bodunrin created two broad schools for all the subdivisions in both Oruka
and Momoh, namely the Traditionalist and Modernist schools. While the former includes
Africa’s rich culture and past, the latter excludes them from the mainstream of African
philosophy. Kwasi Wiredu also made this type of division, specifically Traditional and
Modernist, in his paper “On Defining African Philosophy” in C. S. Momoh’s (1989) edited
volume. Also, A. F. Uduigwomen created two broad schools, namely the Universalists and
the Particularists, in his “Philosophy and the Place of African Philosophy” (1995). These
can be equated to Bodunrin’s Modernist and Traditionalist schools respectively. The
significance of his contribution to the Great Debate rests on the new school he evolved
from the compromise of the Universalist and the Particularist schools (1995/2009: 2-7).
As Uduigwomen defines it, the Eclectic school accommodates discourses pertaining to
African experiences, culture and world-view as parts of African philosophy. Those
discourses must be critical, argumentative and rational. In other words, the so-called
ethnophilosophy can comply with the analytic and argumentative standards that people
like Bodunrin, Hountondji, and Wiredu insist upon. Many later African philosophers
revived Uduigwomen’s Eclectic school as a much more decisive approach to African
philosophy (Kanu 2013: 275-87). It is the era dominated by Eclecticism and meta-
philosophy that is tagged the ‘Later period’ in the history of African philosophy. For
perspicuity therefore, the debate from these two broad schools shall be addressed as the
perspectives of the Traditionalist or Particularist and the Modernist or Universalist.
The reader must now have understood the perspectives on which the individual
philosophers of the middle period debated. Hence, when Richard Wright published his
critical essay “Investigating African Philosophy” and Henri Maurier published his “Do we
have an African Philosophy?” denying the existence of African philosophy at least, as yet,
the reader understands why Lansana Keita’s “The African Philosophical Tradition”, C. S.
Momoh’s African Philosophy … does it exist?” or J. I. Omoregbe’s “African Philosophy:
Yesterday and Today” are offered as critical responses. When Wright arrived at the
conclusion that the problems surrounding the study of African philosophy are so great
that others are effectively prevented from any worthwhile work until their resolution,
Henri Maurier responded to the question, “Do we have an African Philosophy?” with “No!

Not Yet!” (1984: 25). One would understand why Lansana Keita took it up to provide
concrete evidence that Africa had and still has a philosophical tradition. In his words:
It is the purpose of this paper to present evidence that a sufficiently firm literate
philosophical tradition has existed in Africa since ancient times, and that this tradition is
of sufficient intellectual sophistication to warrant serious analysis…it is rather…an
attempt to offer a defensible idea of African philosophy. (1984: 58)
Keita went on in that paper to excavate intellectual resources to prove his case, but it was
J. I. Omoregbe who tackled the demoters on every front. Of particular interest are his
critical commentaries on the position of Kwasi Wiredu and others who share Wiredu’s
opinion that what is called African philosophy is not philosophy but community thought
at best. Omoregbe alludes that the logic and method of African philosophy need not be
the same as those of Western philosophy, which the demoters cling to. In his words:
It is not necessary to employ Aristotelian or the Russellian logic in this reflective activity
before one can be deemed to be philosophizing. It is not necessary to carry out this
reflective activity in the same way that the Western thinkers did. Ability to reason logically
and coherently is an integral part of man’s rationality. The power of logical thinking is
identical with the power of rationality. It is therefore false to say that people cannot think
logically or reason coherently unless they employ Aristotle’s or Russell’s form of logic or
even the Western-type argumentation. (1998: 4-5)
Omoregbe was addressing the position of most members of the Modernist school who
believed that African philosophy must follow the pattern of Western philosophy if it were
to exist. As he cautions:
Some people, trained in Western philosophy and its method, assert that there is no
philosophy and no philosophizing outside the Western type of philosophy or the Western
method of philosophizing (which they call “scientific” or “technical”. (1998: 5)
Philosophers like E. A. Ruch in some of his earlier writings,, Peter Bodunrin, C. B. Okolo,
and Robin Horton were direct recipients of Omoregbe’s sledge hammer. Robin Horton’s
“African Traditional Thought and Western Science” is a two part essay that sought in the
long run to expose the rational ineptitude in African thought. On the question of logic in
African philosophy, Robin Horton’s “Traditional Thought and the emerging African
Philosophy Department: A Comment on the Current Debate” first stirred the hornet’s nest
and was ably challenged by Godorn Hunnings’ “Logic, Language and Culture”, as well as
by Omoregbe’s “African Philosophy: Yesterday and Today”. Earlier, Meinrad Hebga’s
“Logic in Africa” had made insightful ground clearing on the matter. Recently, C.S.
Momoh’s “The Logic Question in African Philosophy” and Udo Etuk’s “The Possibility of
an African Logic” as well as Jonathan C. Okeke’s “Why can’t there be an African Logic”
made impressions. However, this logic question is gathering new momentum in African
philosophical discourse.

On the philosophical angle, Kwasi Wiredu’s “How not to Compare African Traditional
Thought with Western Thought” responded to the lopsided earlier effort of Robin Horton
but ended up making its own criticisms of the status of African philosophy which, for
Wiredu, is yet to attain maturation. In his words, “[M]any traditional African institutions
and cultural practices, such as the ones just mentioned, are based on superstition. By
‘superstition’ I mean a rationally unsupported belief in entities of any sort (1976: 4-8 and
1995: 194).” In his Philosophy and an African Culture, Wiredu was more pungent. He
caricatured much of the discourse on African philosophy as community thought or folk
thought unqualified to be called philosophy. For him, there had to be a practiced
distinction between “African philosophy as folk thought preserved in oral traditions and
African philosophy as critical, individual reflection, using modern logical and conceptual
techniques” (1980: 14). Olusegun Oladipo supports this in his Philosophy and the African
Experience. As he puts it:
But this kind of attitude is mistaken. In Africa we are engaged in the task of the
improvement of “the condition of men”. There can be no successful execution of this task
without a reasonable knowledge of, and control over, nature. But essential to the quest
for knowledge of, and control over, nature are “logical, mathematical and analytical
procedures” which are products of modern intellectual practices. The glorification of the
“unanalytical cast of mind” which a conception of African philosophy as African folk
thought encourages would not avail us the opportunity of taking advantage of the
theoretical and practical benefits offered by these intellectual procedures. It thus can only
succeed in making the task of improving the condition of man in Africa a daunting
one.(1996: 15)
Oladipo also shares similar thoughts in his The Idea of African Philosophy. African
philosophy for some of the Modernists is practiced in a debased sense. This position is
considered opinionated by the Traditionalists. Later E. A. Ruch and K. C. Anyanwu in
their African Philosophy: An Introduction to the Main Philosophical Trends in Contemporary
Africa attempt to excavate the philosophical elements in folklore and myth. C. S. Momoh’s
“The Mythological Question in African Philosophy” and K. C. Anyanwu’s “Philosophical
Significance of Myth and Symbol in Dogon World-View” further reinforced the position
of the Traditionalists.(cf. Momoh 1989 and Anyanwu 1989)
However, it took Paulin Hountondji in his African Philosophy: Myth and Reality to drive a
long nail in the coffin. African philosophy, for him, must be done in the same frame as
Western philosophy, including its principles, methodologies, methods and all. K. C.
Anyanwu again admitted that Western philosophy is one of the challenges facing African
philosophy but that only calls for systematization of African philosophy not its
decimation. He made these arguments in his paper “The Problem of Method in African
philosophy”.
Other arguments set Greek standards for authentic African philosophy as can be found in
Odera Oruka’s “The Fundamental Principles in the Question of ‘African Philosophy’ (I)”
and Hountondji’s “African Wisdom and Modern Philosophy.” They readily met with
Lansana Keita’s “African Philosophical Systems: A Rational Reconstruction”, J.
Kinyongo’s “Philosophy in Africa: An Existence” and even P. K. Roy’s “African Theory of
Knowledge”. For every step the Modernists took, the Traditionalists replied with two, a
response that lingered till the early 1990’s when a certain phase of disillusionment began
to set in to quell the debate. Actors on both fronts had only then begun to reach a new

consciousness, realizing that a new step had to be taken beyond the debate. Even Kwasi
Wiredu who had earlier justified the debate by his insistence that “without argument and
clarification, there is strictly no philosophy” (1980: 47) had to admit that it was time to
do something else. For him, African philosophers had to go beyond talking about African
philosophy and get down to actually doing it.
It was with this sort of new orientation which emerged from the disillusionment of the
protracted debate that the later period of African philosophy was born in the 1980’s. As it
is said in the Igbo proverb, “The music makers almost unanimously were changing the
rhythm and the dancers had to change their dance steps.” One of the high points of the
disillusionment was the emergence of the Eclectic school in the next period called ‘the
Later Period’ of African philosophy.
c. Later Period
This period of African philosophy heralds the emergence of the movements which can be
called Critical Reconstructionism and Afro-Eclecticism. For the Deconstructionists of the
middle period, the focus shifted from deconstruction to reconstruction of African
episteme in a universally integrated way; whereas, for the eclectics, finding a reconcilable
middle path between traditional African philosophy and the modern African philosophy
should be paramount. Thus they advocate a shift from entrenched ethnophilosophy and
universal hue to the reconstruction of African episteme if somewhat different from the
imposed Westernism and the uncritical ethnophilosophy. So, both the Critical
Reconstructionists and the Eclectics advocate one form of reconstruction or the other.
The former desire a new episteme untainted by ethnophilosophy while the later sue for
reconciled central and relevant ideals.
Not knowing how to proceed to this sort of task was a telling problem on all advocates of
critical reconstruction in African philosophy such as V. Y. Mudimbe, Ebousi Boulaga,
Olusegun Oladipo, Franz Crahey and Marcien Towa to name a few. At the dawn of the
era, these African legionnaires pointed out, in different terms, that reconstructing African
episteme was imperative. But more urgent was the need to first analyse the haggard
philosophical structure patched into existence with the cement of perverse dialogues. It
appeared inexorable to these thinkers and others of the time that none of these can be
successful outside the shadow of Westernism. For whatever one writes which is effectively
free from ethnophilosophy is either contained in Western discourse or in the very least
proceeds from its logic. If it is already contained in Western narrative or proceeds from
its logic, what then makes it African? This became a something of a dead-end for this
illustrious group, which struggled against evolutions in their positions.
Intuitively, almost every analyst knows that discussing what has been discussed in
Western philosophy or taking a lead from Western philosophy does not absolutely negate
or vitiate what is produced as African philosophy. But how is this to be effectively
justified? This appears to be the Achilles heel of the Critical Reconstructionists of the later
period in African philosophy. The massive failure of these Critical Reconstructionists to
go beyond the lines of recommendation and actually engage in reconstructing delayed

their emergence as a school of thought in African philosophy. The diversionary matrix
which occurred at this point ensured that the later period, which began with the two rival
camps of Critical Reconstructionists and Eclectics, ended with only the Eclectics left
standing. Thus dying in its embryo, Critical Reconstructionism became absorbed in
Eclecticism.
The campaign for Afro-reconstructionism had first emerged in the late 1980‘s in the
writings of Peter Bodunrin, Kwasi Wiredu, V. Y. Mudimbe and Olusegun Oladipo, even
though principals like Marcien Towa and Franz Crahey had hinted at it much earlier. The
insights of the latter two never rang bells beyond the ear-shot of identity reconstruction,
which was the echo of their time. Wiredu’s cry for conceptual decolonization and
Hountondji’s call for the abandonment of the ship of ethnophilosophy were in the spirit
of Afro-reconstructionism of the episteme. None of the Afro-reconstructionists except for
Wiredu was able to truly chart a course for reconstruction. His was linguistic even though
the significance of his campaign was never truly appreciated. His 1998 work “Toward
Decolonizing African Philosophy and Religion,” was a clearer recapitulation of his works of
preceding years.
Beyond this modest line, no other reconstructionist crusader of the time actually went
beyond deconstruction and problem identification. Almost spontaneously, Afro-
reconstructionism evolved into Afro-eclecticism in the early 1990’s when the emerging
Critical Reconstructionism ran into a brick wall of inactivity. The argument seems to say,
“If it is not philosophically permissible to employ alternative logic different from the one
in the West or methods, perhaps we can make do with the merger of the approaches we
have identified in African philosophy following the deconstructions.” These approaches
are the various schools of thought from ethnophilosophy, philosophic sagacity,
ideological school, universal, literary to hermeneutic schools which were deconstructed
into two broad approaches namely: The traditionalist school and the modernist school
also called the particularist and the universalist schools.
Eclectics, therefore, are those who think that the effective integration or complementation
of the African native system and the Western system could produce a viable synthesis that
is first African and then modern. Andrew Uduigwomen, the Nigerian philosopher could
be regarded as the founder of this school in African philosophy. In his 1995
work “Philosophy and the Place of African Philosophy,” he gave official birth to the Afro-
eclecticism. Identifying the Traditionalist and Modernist schools as the Particularist and
Universalist schools, he created the eclectic school by carefully unifying their goals from
the ruins of the deconstructed past.
Uduigwomen states that the eclectic school holds that an intellectual romance between
the Universalist conception and the Particularist conception will give rise to an authentic
African philosophy. The Universalist approach will provide the necessary analytic and
conceptual framework for the Particularist school. Since, according to Uduigwomen, this
framework cannot thrive in a vacuum, the Particularist approach will in turn supply the
raw materials or indigenous data needed by the Universalist approach. From the
submission of Uduigwomen above, one easily detects that Eclecticism for him entails
employing Western methods in analyzing African cultural paraphernalia.

However, Afro-Eclecticism is not without problems. The first problem though, is that he
did not supply the yardstick for determining what is to be admitted and what must be left
out of the corpus of African tradition. Everything cannot meet the standard of genuine
philosophy, nor should the philosophical selection be arbitrary. Hountondji, a chronic
critic of traditional efforts once called Tempels’ Bantu philosophy a sham. For him, it was
not African or Bantu philosophy but Tempels’ philosophy with African paraphernalia.
This could be extended to the vision of Afro-eclecticism. On the contrary, it could be
argued that if Hountondji agrees that the synthesis contains as little as African
paraphernalia, then it is something new and in this respect can claim the tag of African
philosophy. However, it leaves to be proven how philosophical that little African
paraphernalia is.
Other notable eclectics include Batholomew Abanuka, Udobata Onunwa, C. C. Ekwealor
and much later Chris Ijiomah. Abanuka posits in his 1994 work that a veritable way to
doing authentic African philosophy would be to recognize the unity of individual things
and, by extension, theories in ontology, epistemology or ethics. There is a basic identity
among these because they are connected and can be unified. Following C. S. Momoh
(1985: 12), Abanuka went on in A History of African Philosophy to argue that synthesis
should be the ultimate approach to doing African Philosophy. This position is shared by
Onunwa on a micro level. He says that realities in African world-view are inter-connected
and inter-dependent (1991: 66-71). Ekwealor and Ijiomah also believe in synthesis, noting
that these realities are broadly dualistic, being physical and spiritual (cf. Ekwalor 1990:
30 and Ijiomah 2005: 76 and 84). So, it would be an anomaly to think of African
philosophy as chiefly an exercise in analysis rather than synthesis. The ultimate
methodological approach to doing African philosophy, therefore, has to reflect unity of
methods above all else.
Eclecticism survived in the New Era of African philosophy in conversational forms.
Godfrey Ozumba and Jonathan Chimakonam on Njikoka philosophy, E. G. Ekwuru and
later Innocent Egwutuorah on Afrizealotism and even Innocent Asouzu on Ibuanyidanda
ontology are all various forms of eclectic thinking. However, these theories are grouped
in the New Era specifically for the time of their emergence and the conversational
structure they have.
The purest development of eclectic thinking in the later period could be found in
Pantaleon Iroegbu’s Uwa Ontology. He posits uwa (worlds) as an abstract generic concept
with fifteen connotations and six zones. Everything is uwa, in uwa and can be known
through uwa. For him, while the fifteen connotations are the different senses and aspects
which uwa concept carries in Igbo-African thought, the six zones are the spatio-temporal
locations of the worlds in terms of their inhabitants. He adds that these six zones are
dualistic and comprise of the earthly and the spiritual. They are also dynamic and
mutually related. Thus, Iroegbu suggests that the approach to doing authentic African
philosophy could consist in the conglomeration of uwa. This demonstrates a veritable
Eclectic method in African philosophy.
However, one of the major hindrances of Eclecticism of the later period is that it leads
straight to applied philosophy. Following this approach in this period almost makes it
impossible for second readers to do original and abstract philosophizing for its own sake.

Eclectic theories and methods confine one to their internal dynamics believing that for a
work to be regarded as authentic African philosophy, it must follow the rules of
Eclecticism. The wider implication is that while creativity might blossom, innovation and
originality are stifled. Because of pertinent problems such as these, further evolutions in
African philosophy became inevitable. The Kenyan philosopher Odera Oruka had
magnified the thoughts concerning individual rather than group philosophizing, thoughts
that had been variously expressed earlier by Peter Bodunrin, Paulin Hountondji and
Kwasi Wiredu, who further admonished African philosophers to stop talking and start
doing African philosophy. And V. Y. Mudimbe, in his The Invention of Africa…, suggested
the development of an African conversational philosophy, and the reinvention of Africa
by its philosophers, to undermine the Africa that Europe invented. The content of Lewis
Gordon’s essay “African Philosophy’s search for Identity: Existential consideration of a
recent effort” suggests a craving for a new line of development for African philosophy—a
new approach which is to be critical, engaging and universal while still being African. This,
in particular, is the spirit of the conversational African philosophy beginning to grip
African philosophers in late 1990’s when Gordon wrote his paper. Influences from these
thoughts by the turn of the millennium year crystallized into a new mode of thinking,
which then metamorphosed into conversational philosophy. The New Era in African
philosophy was thus heralded. The focus of this New Era and the orientation became the
conversational philosophy.
d. New Era
This period of African philosophy began in the late 1990’s and took shape by the turn of
the millennium years. The orientation of this period is conversational philosophy, so,
conversationalism is the movement that thrives in this period. The University of Calabar
has emerged as the international headquarters of this new movement hosting various
workshops, colloquia and conferences in African philosophy under the auspices of a
radical forum called The Conversational/Calabar School of Philosophy. In the Calabar
School of Philosophy, some prominent theories have emerged, namely ibuanyidanda
(complementary reflection) (Innocent Asouzu), harmonious monism (Chris Ijiomah),
Njikoka philosophy (Godfrey Ozumba and Jonathan Chimakonam) and conversational
philosophy (Jonathan Chimakonam). All these theories speak to the method of
conversational philosophy. Conversational philosophy is defined by the active
engagement between individual African philosophers in the creation of critical narratives
either by engaging the elements of tradition or straight-forwardly by producing new
thoughts or by engaging other individual thinkers. It thrives on incessant questioning
geared toward the production of new concepts, opening up new vistas and sustaining the
conversation.
Some of the African philosophers whose works follow this trajectory ironically have
emerged in the Western world, notably in America. The American philosopher Jennifer
Lisa Vest is one of them. Another one is Bruce Janz. These two, to name a few, suggest
that the highest purification of African philosophy is to be realized in the conversational-
styled philosophizing. However, it was the Nigerian philosopher Innocent Asouzu who
went beyond the earlier botched attempt of Leopold Senghor and transcended the
foundations of Pantaleon Iroegbu to erect a new model of African philosophy that is
conversational. The New Era, therefore, is the beginning of conversational philosophy.

Iroegbu in his Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy inaugurated the reconstructive and
conversational approach in African philosophy. He engaged previous writers in a critical
conversation out of which he produced his own thought, (Uwa ontology) bearing the stain
of African tradition and thought systems but remarkably different in approach and
method of ethnophilosophy. Franz Fanon has highlighted the importance of sourcing
African philosophical paraphernalia from African indigenous culture. This is
corroborated in a way by Lucius Outlaw in his African Philosophy: Deconstructive and
Reconstructive Challenges. In it, Outlaw advocates the deconstruction of the European-
invented Africa to be replaced by a reconstruction to be done by conscientious Africans
free from the grip of colonial mentality (1996: 11). Whereas the Wiredu’s crusade sought
to deconstruct the invented Africa, actors in the New Era of African philosophy seek to
reconstruct through conversational approach.
Iroegbu inaugurated this drive but it was Asouzu who has made the most of it. His theory
of Ibuanyidanda ontology or complementary reflection maintains that “to be” simply
means to be in a mutual, complementary relationship (2007: 251-55). Every being,
therefore, is a variable with capacity to join a mutual interaction. In this capacity every
being alone is seen as a missing link and serving a missing link of reality in the network
of realities. One immediately suspects the apparent contradiction that might arise from
the fusion of two opposed variables when considered logically. But the logic of this theory
is not the two-valued classical logic but the three-valued system of logic developed in
Africa (cf. Chimakonam 2012, 2013 and 2014a). In this, the two standard values are sub-
contraries rather than contradictories thereby facilitating effective complementation of
variables. The possibility of the two standard values merging to form the third value in
the complementary mode is what makes Ezumezu logic a powerful tool of thought.
A good number of African philosophers are tuning their works into the pattern of
conversational philosophy. In the southern Africa, Mogobe Ramose, Michael Eze, Fainos
Mangena, Thaddeus Metz and Leonhard Praeg are doing this when they engage with the
idea of ubuntu ethics and ontology. Like all these thinkers, the champions of the new
conversational orientation are building the new edifice by reconstructing the
deconstructed domain of thought in the later period of African philosophy. The central
approach is conversation. By engaging other African philosophers or tradition in critical
and positive discourses, they hope to reconstruct the deconstructed edifice of African
philosophy. Hence, the New Era of African philosophy is safe from the retrogressive,
perverse dialogues which characterized the early and middle periods.
Also, with the critical deconstruction that occurred in the later part of the middle period
and the attendant eclecticism that emerged in the later period, the stage was set for the
formidable reconstructions and conversational encounters that marked the arrival of the
New Era of African philosophy.
7. Conclusion
The development of African philosophy through the periods yields two vital conceptions
for African philosophy, namely that African philosophy is a critical engagement of
tradition and individual thinkers on one hand, and on the other hand it is also a critical
construction of futurity. When individual African philosophers engage tradition critically

in order to ascertain its logical coherency and universal validity, they are doing African
philosophy. And when they employ the tools of logic in doing this, they are doing African
philosophy. On the second conception, when African philosophers engage in critical
conversations with one another and in construction of new thoughts in matters that
concern Africa but which are nonetheless universal and projected from African native
thought systems, they are doing African philosophy. So, the authentic African philosophy
is not just a future project, it can also continue from the past.
On the whole, this essay discussed the journey of African philosophy from the beginning
and focused on the criteria, schools and movements in African philosophical tradition.
The historical account of the periods in African philosophy began with the early period
through to the middle, the later and finally the new periods of African philosophy have
also been covered taking particular interest in the robust, individual contributions. There
are still some questions which trail the development of African philosophy, many of which
include, “Must African philosophy be tailored to the pattern of Western philosophy, even
in less definitive issues? If African philosophy is found to be different in approach from
Western philosophy, — so what? Are logical issues likely to play any major roles in the
structure and future of African philosophy? What is the future direction of African
philosophy? Is the problem of the language of African philosophy pregnant? Would
conversations in contemporary African philosophy totally eschew perverse dialogue?
What shall be the rules of engagement in African philosophy?” These questions are likely
to shape the next lines of thought in African philosophy.

8. References and Further Reading
 Abanuka, Batholomew. A History of African Philosophy. Enugu: Snaap Press, 2011.
 An epochal discussion of African philosophy.
 Abraham, William. The Mind of Africa. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1962.
 A philosophical discussion of culture, African thought and colonial times.
 Achebe, Chinua. Morning yet on Creation Day. London: Heinemann, 1975.
 A philosophical treatment of African tradition and colonial burden.
 Anyanwu, K. C. “Philosophical Significance of Myth and Symbol in Dogon World-view”. C. S. Momoh
ed. The Substance of African Philosophy. Auchi: APP Publications, 1989
 A discussion of the philosophical elements in an African culture.
 Aristotle. Metaphysica, Translated into English under the editorship of W. D. Ross, M.A., Hon. LL.D (Edin.)
Oxford. Vol. VIII, Second Edition, OXFORD at the Clarendon Press 1926. Online Edition. 982b.
 A translation of Aristotle’s treatise on metaphysics.
 Asouzu I. Innocent. Ibuanyidanda: New Complementary Ontology Beyond World-Immanentism, Ethnocentric
Reduction and Impositions. Litverlag, Münster, Zurich, New Brunswick, London, 2007
 An African perspective treatment of metaphysics or the theory of complementarity of beings.
 Babalola, Yai. “Theory and Practice in African Philosophy: The Poverty of Speculative Philosophy. A Review
of the Work of P. Hountondji, M. Towa, et al.” Second Order, 2. 2. 1977
 A Critical review of Hountondji and Towa.
 Betts, Raymond. Assimilation and Association in French Colonial Territory 1890 to 1915. (First ed. 1961),
Reprinted. Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 2005
 A discourse on French colonial policies.
 Bodunrin, Peter. “The Question of African Philosophy”. Richard Wright (ed) African Philosophy: An
Introduction 3rd
ed. Lanham: UPA, 1984.
 A discourse on the nature and universal conception of African philosophy.
 Cesaire Aimer. Return to My Native Land. London: Penguin Books, 1969
 A presentation of colonial impact on the mind of the colonized.
 Chimakonam, O. Jonathan. “Ezumezu: A Variant of Three-valued Logic—Insights and Controversies”. Paper
presented at the Annual Conference of the Philosophical Society of Southern Africa. Free State University,
Bloemfontein, South Africa. Jan. 20-22, 2014.
 An articulation of the structure of Ezumezu/African logic tradition.
 Chimakonam, O. Jonathan.“Principles of Indigenous African Logic: Toward Africa’s Development and
Restoration of African Identity” Paper presented at the 19th
Annual Conference of International Society for
African Philosophy and Studies [ISAPS], ‘50 Years of OAU/AU: Revisiting the Questions of African Unity,
Identity and Development’. Department of Philosophy, Nnamdi Azikiwe University, Awka. 27th
– 29th
May,
2013
 A presentation of the principles of Ezumezu/African logic tradition.
 Chimakonam, O. Jonathan.“Integrative Humanism: Extensions and Clarifications”. Integrative Humanism
Journal. 3.1, 2013.
 Further discussions on the theory of integrative humanism.
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 A discourse on race and cultural imperialism.
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 An Igbo-African discourse on the nature being.
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 A philosophical presentation of Igbo life-world.
 Etuk, Udo. “The Possibility of African logic”. The Third Way in African Philosophy, Olusegun Oladipo (ed).
Ibadan: Hope Publications, 2002
 A discussion of the nature and possibility of African logic.
 Franz, Fanon. The Wretched of the Earth. London: The Chaucer Press, 1965.
 A critical discourse on race and colonialism.

 Graiule, Marcel. Conversations with Ogotemmêli, London: Oxford University Press for the International
African Institute, 1965.
 An interlocutory presentation of African philosophy.
 Gyekye, Kwame. An Essay in African Philosophical Thought: The Akan Conceptual Scheme. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 1987.
 A discussion of philosophy from an African cultural view point.
 Hallen, Barry. A Short History of African Philosophy. Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2002.
 A presentation of the history of African philosophy from thematic and personality
perspectives.
 Hallen, B. and J. O. Sodipo. Knowledge, Belief and Witchcraft: Analytic Experiments in
African Philosophy. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press, 1997.
 An analytic discourse of the universal nature of themes and terms in African philosophy.
 Hebga, Meinrad. “Logic in Africa”. Philosophy Today, Vol.11 No.4/4 (1958).
 An extrapolation on the structure of African logical tradition.
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1975
 Hegel’s discussion of his philosophy of world history.
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 Horton, Robin.
"Traditional Thought and the Emerging African Philosophy Department: A Comment on the Current Debate”
in Second Order: An African Journal of Philosophy vol. III No. 1, 1977.
 A logical critique of the idea of African philosophy.
 Hountondji, Paulin. African Philosophy: Myth and Reality. Second Revised ed. Bloomington, Indiana:
University Press, 1996.
 A critique of ethnophilosophy and an affirmation of African philosophy as a universal
discourse.
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No.1. (1975).
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tradition.
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Society. 1. 1. (August, 2006): pp.29-35.
 An extrapolation on a possible African logic tradition.
 Iroegbu, Pantaleon. Metaphysics: The Kpim of Philosophy. Owerri: International Universities Press, 1995.
 A conversational presentation of theory of being in African philosophy.
 Jacques, Tomaz. “Philosophy in Black: African Philosophy as a Negritude”. Discursos
 Postcoloniales Entorno Africa. CIEA7, No. 17, 7th
Congress of African Studies.
 A critique of the rigor of African philosophy as a discipline.
 James, George . Stolen Legacy: Greek Philosophy is Stolen Egyptian Philosophy. New York: Philosophical
Library, 1954.
 A philosophical discourse on race, culture, imperialism and colonial deceit.
 Jahn, Janheinz. Muntu: An Outline of Neo-African Culture. New York: Grove Press, 1961.
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Scholarship”. The African Studies Review. Vol. 32. No. 3, December, 1989.
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 Lambert, Michael. “From Citizenship to Négritude: Making a Difference in Elite Ideologies of Colonized
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CLR James Journal, Winter 1997, pp. 98-117.
 A survey of the identity crisis of African philosophical tradition.
 Leo Apostel. African Philosophy. Belgium: Scientific Publishers, 1981.
 An Afrocentrist presentation of African philosophy.
 Levy-Bruhl, Lucien. Primitive Mentality. Paris: University of France Press, 1947.
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 A discourse on the practise and relevance of philosophy in Africa.
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Introduction. 3rd ed. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 1984.
 A critique of Ethnophilosophy as authentic African philosophy.
 Mbiti, John. African Religions and Philosophy. London: Heinemann,1969.
 A discourse on African philosophical culture.
 Momoh, Campbell. “Canons of African Philosophy”. Paper presented at the 6th
Congress of the Nigerian
Philosophical Association. University of Ife, July 31- August 3, 1985.
 A presentation of the major schools of thought in African philosophy.
 Momoh, Campbell .ed. The Substance of African Philosophy. Auchi: APP Publications, 1989.
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 A defense of the thesis of a possible African logic tradition.
 Mudimbe, V. Y. The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy and the Order of Knowledge (African Systems of
Thought). Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988.
 A discourse on culture, race, Eurocentrism and modern Africa as an invention of Western
scholarship.
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Curry and Portsmouth, N. H: Heinemann, 1986.
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Leopatra mutazu
Email leomutazu@gmail.com
GREAT ZIMBABWE UNIVERSITY

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