Respond 250  Do you think IGOs create a convergence of state interest? Convergence of state interest goes along the same line as socialization with both influenced by interact with other entities (Greenhill 2010, Tanninchev 2015).  I think of two examples; US/Soviet cessation of the Cold War (Horelick 1989) and the UK/North Ireland Good Friday Agreement (Mageean and O’Brien 1998).   Since the inception of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union faced off across the globe both economically (free market versus communism) and militarily (the Cuban Missle Crisis nearly escalated into nuclear war).  Robert McNamara, for Secretary of Defense under President Johnson agrued “that the more each reacted to the other’s escalation, the more they had chosen “an insane road to follow.” (Department of State n.d.).  Both countries distrusted one another deeply and sought influence around the globe.  SALT I and II (never ratified but agreed upon) sought to limit further escalation and stabilize relations (ibid).  The Good Friday Agreements (Kelly n.d.) brought an end to the period known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland.  Factions on both sides, Westminister and Belfast, finally agreed to end hostilities with consessions made on both sides.  The landmark deal, chaired by Senator George Mitchell at the behest of President Clinton, was the first unification step subsequently follwoed by several other agreements (Landow and Sergie 2020). This question recalled just one country and its effort towards socialization and that is post WWII Germany.  By any reasonable standard, Germany’s post war reconciliation (Rienzi 2015, Johns Hopkins 2015) and reintegration into the global community is the benchmark for other countries to emulate (Evans 2018).  Its turn around post-World War II enabled it to be a world leader today.  Greenhill (2010) determined, “IGOs can change state behavior through a process of socialization calls for a more optimistic assessment of the effects of participation in international institutions”.  In Germany’s case, he is on point though it was considerable internal effort that put the country toward its current status (Rienzi 2015, Johns Hopkins 2015, Evans 2018).  His basic point is laying with dogs will get you fleas.  I believe, overall, this is true.  Greenhill states, “...socialization effects refer to behavioral changes that presumably come about through changes in the actors’ interest” (2010).  However, outliers show the limited effect of OIGs.  Russia, North Korea and China, are all members of numerous IGOs but all still have questionable human rights records (HRW n.d.) (HRW n.d.) (HRW n.d.).  They are certainly not the only countries with questionable records but, I observe, they are the ones most focused on by the international community.  Socialization can occurs but the countries must pursue change, sometimes with help (sanctions) (McMahon 2006), and sometimes with internal forces (Rienzi 2015).        This question certain.

1. Respond 250
Do you think IGOs create a convergence of state interest?
Convergence of state interest goes along the same line as
socialization with both influenced by interact with other entities
(Greenhill 2010, Tanninchev 2015). I think of two examples;
US/Soviet cessation of the Cold War (Horelick 1989) and the
UK/North Ireland Good Friday Agreement (Mageean and
O’Brien 1998).
Since the inception of the Cold War, the US and Soviet Union
faced off across the globe both economically (free market
versus communism) and militarily (the Cuban Missle Crisis
nearly escalated into nuclear war). Robert McNamara, for
Secretary of Defense under President Johnson agrued “that the
more each reacted to the other’s escalation, the more they had
chosen “an insane road to follow.” (Department of State n.d.).
Both countries distrusted one another deeply and sought
influence around the globe. SALT I and II (never ratified but
agreed upon) sought to limit further escalation and stabilize
relations (ibid).
The Good Friday Agreements (Kelly n.d.) brought an end to the
period known as The Troubles in Northern Ireland. Factions on
both sides, Westminister and Belfast, finally agreed to end
hostilities with consessions made on both sides. The landmark
deal, chaired by Senator George Mitchell at the behest of
President Clinton, was the first unification step subsequently
follwoed by several other agreements (Landow and Sergie
2020).

2. This question recalled just one country and its effort towards
socialization and that is post WWII Germany. By any
reasonable standard, Germany’s post war reconciliation (Rienzi
2015, Johns Hopkins 2015) and reintegration into the global
community is the benchmark for other countries to emulate
(Evans 2018). Its turn around post-World War II enabled it to
be a world leader today. Greenhill (2010) determined, “IGOs
can change state behavior through a process of socialization
calls for a more optimistic assessment of the effects of
participation in international institutions”. In Germany’s case,
he is on point though it was considerable internal effort that put
the country toward its current status (Rienzi 2015, Johns
Hopkins 2015, Evans 2018). His basic point is laying with dogs
will get you fleas.
I believe, overall, this is true. Greenhill states, “...socialization
effects refer to behavioral changes that presumably come about
through changes in the actors’ interest” (2010). However,
outliers show the limited effect of OIGs. Russia, North Korea
and China, are all members of numerous IGOs but all still have
questionable human rights records (HRW n.d.) (HRW n.d.)
(HRW n.d.). They are certainly not the only countries with
questionable records but, I observe, they are the ones most
focused on by the international community. Socialization can
occurs but the countries must pursue change, sometimes with
help (sanctions) (McMahon 2006), and sometimes with internal
forces (Rienzi 2015).
This question certainly leads to a rabbit hole of accountability
issues; I will focus chiefly on US involvement with Iraq since
1990. Grant and Keohane (2005, 39) highlight UN Security
Council issue with reigning in Saddam Hussein’s weapons of
mass destruction. Initially, when I read the passage (Grant and
Keohane 2005, 39) I took note of the article date and thought
about all the information eventually making it into the public

3. forum proving this narrative false (Breslow 2016, 9/11
Commission 2004, Bright 2007). Colin Powell provided false
information to the United Nations, learning later that it was
false, and resigned (Breslow 2016). The 9/11 Commission
(2004) found several instances of intelligence failure. Bright
(2007), a British journalist, published a series of articles based
on whistleblower documents, notably one based on an e-mail
received by a staff member at British GCHQ (Government
Communication Headquarters) outlining US plans to pressure
the UN resolution sanctioning the invasion of Iraq.
This list could go on concerning actions leading up to and since
the invasion of Iraq and led to the matter of accountability.
Grant and Keohane (2005) also discuss accountability being an
important measure for how NGOs behave. US accountability
has taken a massive hit over the past twenty years or so but that
has not diminished our standing as a super-power as it would if
the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation were accused of and
proven to have violated international or national law.
We have endured our loss our credibility and rebuffed
international accountability attempts (Peltier and Faizi 2020).
Even recent cases such as the one currently in the International
Criminal Court system concerning US Service members and
officials action in Afghanistan, provide pause. I was aware of
the ICC but hadn’t read anything about it. I was unaware of
sustained US effort towards to ICC (Pace n.d., Gallagher 2018,
Marquand 2009). Grant and Keohane (2005) rightly point out
that states such as the US are “accountable to citizens and to an
array of domestic interests and institutions”, but that is rarely
successful. No administration official suffered any
consequence as a result of ouractions in Iraq. I supposed one
could argue Colin Powell suffered a hit to his impeccable
reputation. Concerning the ICC, would it further our world
standing to allow for proscecution of individual service
members and contractors for alleged doings in Afghanistan?

4. Again, as Grant and Keohane (2005) point out, probably not,
but it might if the world thought we, as the global leader, were
accountable for our successes and failures.
IOs, such as the UN, have levied wide ranging sanctions as a
measure of accountablility (UN 2017). The EU and the US have
also levied wide ranging sanctions (U.S. Department of the
Treasury 2020, CRS 2019, Masters 2019). Use of such
sanctions afford the aforementioned greater influence over
accountbility making it difficult to argue that they could be held
accountable to anyone globally. In 2018, the US and the EU
controlled nearly half of the global GDP ($20.5T US, and
$18.8T, EU, global $84.93T) (World Bank 2018). The US
provides the largest share of dues to the UN, nealry 20 percent
of the budget (Hillard and Shendruk 2019). Given these
financial means, it seems unlikely that the United States could
or would be held accountablity for any action it undertook.
However, recent G-20 events concerning climate change may
have slightly altered the arch of accountability (Woodcock
2019, Vela 2019).
In conclusion, OI enforced accountablility depends on the
influence wielded by the country. It is highly unlikely the US
would ever suffer any serious reprocussion for an action or
series of actions, economically or legally. Tomuschat (2006)
presents an interesting overview from the Trials at Nuremberg
to the ICC. This is NOT to suggest or imply similar trials
should be held of US officials concerning actions in Iraq.
However, I believe leaders lead and should be accountable for
their actions. Fundementally, I believe the ICC has that place
in international accountability.