2. Major Advisor By
Dr. K.B. Umesh K. Sravanthi
Prof. & Head Dept. Agricultural Economics. PALB 2004
Ph.D. II year
2
3. Flow of presentation
Natural resources: List, Quick facts
Natural resource management: Ownership regimes,
approaches.
Collective Action: Types, Structure, conduct,
performance, Benefits and Barriers of Collective Action.
Classification of collective action problems.
Solution Mechanisms for Collective Action Problems.
Institutional features that promote long-lasting
cooperation.
Factors to be considered for analyzing the performance of
collective action - Case study
Examples of collective actions (Joint Forest Management
in India ) - Case study
3
4. Natural resources ?
“stocks of materials that exist in the natural
environment that are both scarce and economically
useful in production or consumption, either in their
raw state or after a minimal amount of processing”.
Source: world trade report 2010
4
6. Natural Resources and Quick facts
Forest
Covers 21% of the total geographical area of India.
lost 367 square KM. of forest cover in the past two years.
Soil
only 10% of the earth's surface.
India is losing 5,334 million tonnes of soil every year due to soil erosion
Water
only 0.0007% of earth's water is suitable for drinking. The rest is salt water,
water trapped in glaciers, or polluted.
Groundwater accounting for over 65% of irrigation water and 85% of
drinking water supplies in India.
it is estimated that 60% of groundwater sources will be in a critical state of
degradation within the next twenty years.
http://www.globalwaterforum.org/2012/07/30/indias-groundwater-crisis/comment-page-1/
http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/agriculture/india-losing-5334-million-tonnes-of-soil-
annually-due-to-erosion-govt/article915245.ece
SOURCES: Kumar Sambhav (2012)
6
7. Natural resource management
Refers to the management of natural resources such as
land, water, soil, plants and animals, with a particular
focus on how management affects the quality of life for
both present and future generations.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Natural_resources 7
8. Ownership regimes
Natural resource management approaches categorized
according to the kind and right of stakeholders.
State property – forest.
Private property - Private land.
Common property - community forests & water resources.
Non-property (open access) – Ocean.
Hybrid – native vegetation management, Australia.
8
10. Collective Action: Definition
Any action taken by a group of people whose goal is to
enhance the group’s status and condition, which is
enacted by a representative of the group.
The action taken by a group (either directly or on its
behalf through an organization) in pursuit of members’
perceived shared interests
- Marshall (1998)
Source:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Collective_action#In_political_science_and_econ
omics 10
12. Fig. 1 Structure, conduct and performance of
collective action - Bain (1959)
Determining variables Structure of entities Collective action Outcomes
Structure Conduct Performance
(Source: Meinzen-Dick et al. (2004))
12
13. Benefits and Barriers of Collective Action
Benefits
Public goods provision
Sharing knowledge
Possibility of tackling local issues efficiently
Barriers
Free riding
Higher transaction costs
13
14. Free Rider Problem
Individual may be able to obtain the benefits of a good
without contributing to the cost.
Free-rider is a person who receives the benefit of a good
but avoids paying for it.
Public goods:
non-rivalries.
non excludable.
14
15. Table 1: Transaction costs in collective action.
Transaction costs Examples
Search costs incurred in
identifying possibilities for
mutual gains
Identification of funding sources
Identification of relevant stakeholders
Cost of gathering information
Bargaining costs associated with
negotiating an agreement
Time spent at meetings
Effort expended in verbal and written
communications
Monitoring and enforcement
costs involved in making sure all
parties keep to the agreement
Employment of external monitor
Time and effort spent monitoring others
informally
(Source: Singleton and Taylor, 1992) 15
16. Collective action problem
All the difficulties that arise in pursuit of members perceived
share of interest.
Classification of collective action problems
1) Harmony
2) Mere Distribution Problems
3) Pure Conflict
4) Defection Problems (Dilemmas)
5) Co-ordination Problems
6) Disagreement Problems
7) Instability Problems
16
Source: https://www.coll.mpg.de/pdf_dat/2003_02online.pdf
17. Basis for classification
1. Number of Nash equilibria in pure strategies (none,
one, two or more)
2. Pareto-optimality of the equilibria (optimal, sub-
optimal)
3. Conflict over the valuation of the outcomes (no,
irrelevant, partial, pure)
4. Equal payoffs in Pareto-optimal outcomes or
equilibria (yes/yes, yes/no, no)
Source: Holzinger (2003)
17
19. Solution Mechanisms for Collective Action
Problems
Problems of co-ordination:
Resolved by a variety of non-cooperative mechanisms
that work at the individual level and are based on
rational expectations.
Problems involving conflict:
Disagreement, distribution, defection, and instability,
can best be solved by collective and coercive
mechanisms.
19
20. Table 2: List of Solution Mechanisms for Collective Action
Problems
Group of Mechanism Solution Mechanisms
Individual solutions
– based on motivations
Altruism
Equity and fairness norms
Pacta sunt servanda norms
Individual solutions
– based on rational expectations
Mixed strategies
Focal points
Social conventions
Correlated strategies
Sequential play
Infinite and finite repetition
Collective solutions
– decision-making mechanisms
Co-ordinative communication
Bargaining
Voting
Coercive solutions
– enforcement mechanisms
Enforceable contracts
Hierarchically set and enforced rules
Monitoring
Sanctioning
Source: Holzinger (2003) 20
21. Institutional features that promote
long-lasting cooperation
1. clear and detailed rules
2. Congruence
3. Monitoring.
4. credible sanctions for deviators
5. forum to resolve conflicts.
21
22. Factors to be considered for analyzing the
performance of collective action
factors have been grouped into four basic categories
by Agrawal:
1. Resource system characteristics
type of goods, type of knowledge
2. Group characteristics
size and homogeneity
3. Institutional arrangements
rules and Institutional thickness
4. External environment
financial and non-financial support
http://www.springer.com/978-94-007-7456-8 22
23. Case study on
Water Community: An Empirical Analysis of
Cooperation on Irrigation in South India
by
Pranab Bardhan
23
24. Research Objectives
This paper concentrates on a quantitative analysis of
the (physical, institutional and socio-economic)
determinants of cooperation in irrigation communities
on the basis of a large survey conducted in Tamil
Nadu.
24
25. Study Area and Sampling Framework
Data was collected from 48 villages spread over 6
districts in Tamil Nadu.
a selected unit (called ‘ayacut’) of irrigation system in
each village (either a tank or a branch of canal with
roughly about 50 hectares size of command area).
Half of the irrigation units belonged to canal systems,
and the other half to more traditional tank systems.
25
26. All the canal systems are under the general
administration of the government. Within tank
systems, half belonged to ‘isolated or chain tank’
systems, and the other half to ‘system tanks’.
Within each system the villages were randomly
chosen.
Within each village a stratified sample of 10 farmers
were chosen.
26
27. Table 3: Dependent and Independent Variables
Variable
Name Mean
Standard
deviation Min Max Description of Variable
DISTFDCH 1.31 0.92 0 2
Index of Quality of Maintenance of
Distributaries and Field Channels
H2OCOOP 0.67 0.48 0 1
No Conflict over Water Within Village in the last
5 Years
VIOLH2O 0.52 0.5 0 1
Water Allocation Rules Frequently Violated by at
least One Group
NUMUSERS 52.67 54.29 11 279
No. Of Beneficiary Households Using this
Irrigation Source
NUM_ACRE 0.36 0.02 0.06 1.07
No. Of Beneficiary Households per acre of
Ayacut Area
GINI 0.41 0.11 0 1
Gini Coefficient of Landholding of Beneficiary
Households in Ayacut
CASTE75 0.69 0.47 0 1
At least 75% of Sampled Farmers are Members
of the Same Caste Group
AVGACCES 3.65 1.2 2 7 Number of Months there is Access to Irrigation
TOPOGRPH 0.46 0.5 0 1
No equal Access to Water Because of
Topographical Nature of the Ayacut
LINED 1.96 0.82 1 3 If System is Partially or Fully Lined
CANAL 0.5 0.51 0 1 If Ayacut is in a Canal System
Source: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
27
28. Dependent and Independent Variables cont….
Variable
Name Mean
Standard
deviation Min Max Description of Variable
PWDDECID 0.25 0.44 0 1 If PWD Takes All Decisions on Water Allocation
TAILEND 0.75 0.44 0 1
If Village is Situated at Tailend of the Irrigation
System
PRIORAPP 0.44 0.5 0 1 No Conflict with Other Villages over Water
LINKAGE 2.46 0.74 1 3 Index of Connection with Urban Areas
MARKET 2.39 0.7 1 3
Measure of Extent to which Farmers are
Market Oriented
OTHIRRIG 0.26 0.18 0 0.66
Estimated Fraction of Total Irrigated Land Held
by Sampled Farmers Outside the Ayacut
TRADLORG 0.56 0.5 0 1
Where Irrigation Organization Has Been There
for 20 or More Years
GUARD 0.38 0.49 0 1 There Exists at least One Guard in the Ayacut
SHRPROP 0.19 0.39 0 1 Cost-sharing Proportional to Landholding
LEGALRGT 0.33 0.48 0 1
When Formal Water Rights Exist, as opposed
to Customary Rights
Source: http://emlab.berkeley.edu/users/webfac/bardhan/papers/BardhanWater.pdf
28
33. conclusion
cooperative behavior in an irrigation community is by and
large significantly related
(negatively)
inequality of landholding,
urban or market connections.
(positively)
duration of access to water,
monitoring by guards,
to social homogeneity,
small group size,
proportional cost-sharing rule,
collective adversarial relation with other villages over water.
33
34. Examples of collective actions
The management of
Forest resources - Joint forest management.
Grazing pastures - Community Pasture Program (Canada)
Irrigation systems - Participatory ground water management.
35. Joint Forest Management in India
The process of institutionalizing people’s participation
in forest protection and regeneration is termed as Joint
Forest Management.
The programme in the present form can be traced to the
Arabari experiment initiated by foresters in West Bengal.
Small village groups have started to protect and reclaim
degraded forestlands through collective action.
27 State Governments have adopted resolutions for
implementing the JFM programme.
There are different nomenclatures for the JFM
committees in different States.
35
36. Nomenclatures for the JFM
committees in different States
State Nomenclature
Andhra Pradesh Vana Samarakshana Samithis (VSS)
West Bengal &
Maharashtra
Forest Protection Committess
Haryana Hill Resource Management Societies
Karnataka & Tamil Nadu Village Forest Committee
Rajasthan Village Forest Protection and
Management Committees
Orissa Van Samrakshan Samiti
36
37. Official ground for JFM
Prepared by the National Forest Policy of 1988.
Followed in 1990 by a circular from MoEF providing
guidelines for involvement of Village Communities and
Voluntary agencies in regeneration of degraded forests.
The National Forest Policy of 1988 and the JFM
resolution of 1990 combined with state level resolutions
acknowledged the need to give greater rights and
authority to community groups.
The State Governments register the JFM or village
committees under the Societies Registration Act, 1860 to
provide them with legal back up.
37
38. Table 2: Extent of Area under Joint Forest Management
Programme in India
States
No. of JFM Area under No. of Families involved
Total no of
families
Committee JFM (in ha) SC ST General
involved in
JFM
Andhra Pradesh 7606 16,79,084 2,44,655 4,14,650 - 6,59,305
Arunachal
Pradesh 13 5,810 - 766 - 766
Assam 245 6,970 3,179 - 1,495 4,674
Bihar 296 5,04,602 - - - Na
Chhatisgarh 6,412 33,91,305 76,920 2,33,585 1,61,017 4,71,522
Goa 26 13,000 36 - 300 336
Gujarat 1,237 1,38,015 1,124 1,01,890 3,495 1,06,509
Haryana 471 65,852 1,612 0 7,950 9,562
Himachal
Pradesh 914 1,11,247 9,973 159 35,098 45,230
Jammu &
Kashmir 1,895 79,546 - - - NaJharkhand 1,379 4,30,463 - - - Na
Karnataka 2,620 1,85,000 15,800 9,600 44,200 69,60038
40. Case study
Economic Impact of Forest Management
Institutions of Collective Action on Groundwater
Recharge in Karnataka, India
By
Vikram S Patil
40
41. Research Objectives
To analyze the economic impact of JFPM on
groundwater recharge.
To Analyze the incremental net returns of the farmers
due to JFPM over non-JFPM area.
To analyze the equity in income distribution among
different categories of the farmers in JFPM area.
(JFPM: Joint Forest Planning and Management)
41
43. Sampling Framework
Population of farmers possessing irrigation wells
JFPM + Watershed village (23 farmers).
JFPM village (42 farmers).
Watershed village (24 farmers).
Control village (15 farmers).
43
44. Results and Discussion
Table 1: Estimated contribution due to JFPM
development program, 2007-08.
Sl.
No.
Particulars Rs. Per acre
1 Contribution of JFPM program:
A. net returns in only JFPM minus net returns in control
area
= 20044 – 6702
=13342
B. Net returns in JFPM + watershed minus net returns in
watershed
=13068 -13045
= 23
2 Contribution of JFPM + Watershed:
Net returns in (JFPM + watershed) minus Net returns in
control area
=13068- 6702
=6366
3 Contribution of Watershed:
A. Net returns in watershed minus Net returns
in control area
= 13045- 6702
= 6343
B. Net returns in JFPM + watershed minus net returns in only
JFPM
=13068 – 20044
= -6976
Source: Vikram S Patil 44
45. Table 2: Incremental net returns, per acre
2007 -08.
Type of farm JFPM over Non-JFPM area = Rs. 16355.09 – Rs.
10605.25 = Rs. 5749.84
For sample farmers in
JFPM + watershed over
watershed (Chitradurga)
For sample farmers in
JFPM over control area
(Davanagere)
Small and marginal
farmers
1996 23959
Medium farmers 2118 8944
Large farmers -548 2243
Overall 23 13342
Note: Incremental net return in JFPM over Non- JFPM = net return per acre from all
sources in JFPM minus that in non-JFPM area
Source: Vikram S Patil 45
46. Table 3: Gini coefficient for income distribution for
different classes of farmers in all the four study
areas, 2007-08.
Type of farm
JFPM+
watershed
Only
watershedOnly JFPM
Control
area
Small and
marginal farmers 0.72 0.65 0.64 0.66
Medium farmers 0.66 0.67 0.63 0.66
Large farmers 0.73 0.88 0.73 0.77
Overall 0.72 0.69 0.63 0.76
Source: Vikram S Patil 46
47. Table 4: ANOVA for net returns per acre from all the
sources across different categories of sample farmers in
Chitradurga and Davanagere districts, 2007-08.
Sl. No Particulars Mean F statistic
1
a. only JFPM 88764
40.608**b. JFPM + watershed 32149
2
a. only JFPM 88764
46.904**b. only watershed area 30059
3
a. only JFPM 88764
52.766**b. Control area 11798
4
a. JFPM + watershed 32149
0.232b. only watershed area 30059
5
a. JFPM + watershed 32149
21.248**b. Control area 11798
6
a. only watershed area 30059
26.576**b. Control area 11798
Note: ***, ** and * indicate significance at 1, 5 and 10% respectively
Vikram S Patil 47
48. Conclusion
Net returns realized by the farmers in JFPM areas is
higher compare to non-JFPM area.
The collective action of the farmers in the JFPM and
watershed programs is largely responsible for
statistically and economically significant net returns.
The collective action paves the way for improved,
equitable and efficient access to groundwater and
natural resources for small and marginal farmers in
Karnataka through JFPM and watershed
developmental programs.
48
49. References
Williamson, O., (2000) The new institutional economics: taking
stock, looking ahead. Journal of Economic Literature XXXVIII,
595– 613.
Bardhan, p. (2000) ‘Irrigation and cooperation: An empirical
analysis of 48 irrigation communities in south India’, Economic
Development and cultural change, vol 48, no 4, pp845-865.
Davies B, Blackstock K, Brown K, Shannon P (2004) Challenges
in creating local agrienvironmental cooperation action amongst
farmers and other stakeholders. The Macaulay Institute,
Aberdeen
Agrawal A (2001) Common property institutions and sustainable
governance of resources. World Devel 29(10):1649–1672
Meinzen-Dick R, Di Gregorio M, McCarthy N (2004) Methods
for studying collective action in rural development. Agric Syst
82(3):197–214
49
