A chief engineer died after being trapped in a watertight door for over 8 minutes during an emergency drill on a passenger ship in New Zealand. The door closed at twice the allowable speed, possibly due to being in remote closing mode instead of local control mode. An investigation found that the crew routinely passed through watertight doors without fully opening them in local control mode. The accident highlighted the importance of following proper procedures for watertight doors, maintaining safe closing speeds, and ensuring warning alarms function properly.
1. Group Assignment LA 1
Case Study of :
Oceanic Discoverer
Prepared by:
1) PANDIARAJ A/L RETENAM
2) ABDUL JABBAR KHAN
3) MD.MIZANUR RAHMAN PARVEZ
2. Contents
1. Ship’s particular
2. What, when and where happen?
3. Location of the watertight door
4. How it happen
5. Why he got trapped
6. Other reasons for the accident
7. Overall view of the watertight door
8. Solas requirement regarding watertight door
9. Lesson learned
4. What, when and where happen?
• A chief engineer was trapped by a watertight door for more than 8
minutes.
• Happened on 19 Feb 2009
• Port of Napier, New Zealand.
6. How it happen?
• The ship was conducting the fire and emergency drill. Therefor they
also has to carry out close and test the hydraulically closed
watertight doors.
• The Master has closed the watertight door by using remote control
system/switch from the bridge.
• After that the Chief Engineer has open the door and got trapped.
• He was trapped at watertight door for more than 8 minutes.
• Until the crew found and removed him.
• Later he was send to hospital.
• Unluckily he died on the way to hospital.
7. Why he got trapped?
• The watertight doors were normally set in the local-control mode,
which meant that they would not automatically close after
someone had walked through. At the time of the accident the doors
were in the remote-close mode, which meant they would
automatically close when the user released the opening handle. The
crew on board the Oceanic Discoverer routinely passed through the
watertight doors without fully opening them when the doors were
in the local-control mode, a practice that was probably followed
when the doors were in the remote-close mode as well.
• The chief engineer could also followed by trying to pass the
watertight door before it is fully opened.
8. Other reasons for the accident.
• The door had been set to close at twice the allowable closing
speed, which would have likely contributed to the accident.
• It is possible that the audible alarm warning that the door was
closing, was not working at the time. A failure of the audible alarm
may have contributed to the accident.
10. Solas requirement Chapter II-1 Regulation
15.7 referred to power-operated sliding
watertight doors
• Provided with controls for opening and closing the door by power from
both sides of the door and also for closing the door by power from the
central operating console on the bridge.
• provided with an audible alarm, distinct from any other alarm in the area,
which will sound whenever the door is closed remotely by power and
which shall sound for at least 5s [seconds] but no more than 10 s before
the door begins to move and shall continue sounding until the door is
completely closed. In the case of remote hand operation it is sufficient for
the audible alarm to sound only when the door is moving.
• Additionally, in passenger areas and areas of high ambient noise the
Administration may require the audible alarm to be supplemented by an
intermittent visual signal at the door.
• shall have an approximately uniform rate of closure under power. The
closure time, from the time the door begins to move to the time it reaches
the completely closed position shall in no case be less than 20s or more
than 40s with the ship in an upright position.
11. Lesson learned
1. Always fully open a watertight door before passing through the doorway
when the door is in the remote-close mode.
2. The faster the door closes, the greater the risk. Under no circumstances
should watertight doors be set to close faster than the maximum
allowable speed.
3. Ship operators should adopt specific procedures for operating
watertight doors in both the local-control and remote-close modes. The
procedures should be compatible with the doors’ purpose and design,
and the frequency with which they are used.
4. Legislation governing the design and use of watertight doors should be
flexible enough to achieve appropriate procedures for the use of any
watertight door in any mode.
5. Poorly maintained watertight doors are dangerous. Shipboard planned
maintenance systems should be designed and followed to ensure that
watertight doors are maintained in accordance with manufacturers’
instructions, and in accordance with good standard marine engineering
practice.
