1. MSC CHITRAMSC CHITRA
Saturday 7th of August 2010 the bulk
cargo vessel MV Khalijia collided with
the container vessel MSC Chitra off
Mumbai India spilling an estimated
800 tonnes of oil and 400 containers
into the sea.
2.
3. More than a week since two shipsMore than a week since two ships
collided off the coast of Mumbai, thecollided off the coast of Mumbai, the
worries still remain.worries still remain.
A hundred of the 250 odd containersA hundred of the 250 odd containers
that had drifted from the vessel MSCthat had drifted from the vessel MSC
Chitra, have gone missing. Two ofChitra, have gone missing. Two of
these containers are carryingthese containers are carrying
hazardous chemical substances.hazardous chemical substances.
Efforts are still on to locate the missingEfforts are still on to locate the missing
containers.containers.
4.
5. The MSC Chitra has been grounded inThe MSC Chitra has been grounded in
the Arabian Sea since then off thethe Arabian Sea since then off the
Mumbai coast. The ship tiltedMumbai coast. The ship tilted
precariously from the impact of theprecariously from the impact of the
collision. While oil poured out into thecollision. While oil poured out into the
sea through a leak, some containerssea through a leak, some containers
too detached from the ship.too detached from the ship.
The oil leak was only plugged afterThe oil leak was only plugged after
hundreds of tonnes of crude oil werehundreds of tonnes of crude oil were
already spilt. Both Mumbai Port andalready spilt. Both Mumbai Port and
Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT)Jawaharlal Nehru Port Trust (JNPT)
were shut for many days.were shut for many days.
6.
7. MV Khalija III had been grounded forMV Khalija III had been grounded for
many days and was entering Mumbaimany days and was entering Mumbai
port for repairs. Her seaworthiness atport for repairs. Her seaworthiness at
the time of the collision was doubted.the time of the collision was doubted.
Initially the Khalija III had MSC ChitraInitially the Khalija III had MSC Chitra
on her stbd side, which meant that sheon her stbd side, which meant that she
was the give way vsl. She the crossedwas the give way vsl. She the crossed
ahead of Chitra and went on her stbdahead of Chitra and went on her stbd
side, since the Master felt that thereside, since the Master felt that there
was more sea room there.was more sea room there.
8.
9. Once on the stbd side of Chitra, theOnce on the stbd side of Chitra, the
Master of the Khalija III realized thatMaster of the Khalija III realized that
there was no sea room on that side.there was no sea room on that side.
Then in a desperate move, he tried toThen in a desperate move, he tried to
bring the ship back on to the port sidebring the ship back on to the port side
of Chitra. But he misjudged the speedof Chitra. But he misjudged the speed
of the other vsl and collided. The courtof the other vsl and collided. The court
held Khalija III to be blamed, but alsoheld Khalija III to be blamed, but also
castigated the Master of the MSCcastigated the Master of the MSC
Chitra for not taking any avoidngChitra for not taking any avoidng
action.action.
10.
11. After a long-drawn litigation to establishAfter a long-drawn litigation to establish
who was responsible for the calamity,who was responsible for the calamity,
Chitra was given a clean chit and wasChitra was given a clean chit and was
free to sail. But the owner had morefree to sail. But the owner had more
problems to face. The vessel wasproblems to face. The vessel was
damaged, and still had over 500damaged, and still had over 500
containers of polluting chemicals. Itcontainers of polluting chemicals. It
was impossible to get it afloatwas impossible to get it afloat.. AfterAfter
that, said insiders, an effort was madethat, said insiders, an effort was made
to sell the ship to breakers at Alang into sell the ship to breakers at Alang in
Gujarat. But the company, or any otherGujarat. But the company, or any other
for that matter, did not want to touch it.for that matter, did not want to touch it.
12. The vessel still held 500 containersThe vessel still held 500 containers
with poisonous fumes, a potentialwith poisonous fumes, a potential
danger for the workers who woulddanger for the workers who would
shred the vessel to pieces. The shipshred the vessel to pieces. The ship
breakers explained that they wouldbreakers explained that they would
have to buy very skilled labourers withhave to buy very skilled labourers with
oxygen masks and other equipment tooxygen masks and other equipment to
protect them against the chemicals.protect them against the chemicals.
That would make the deal exorbitant.That would make the deal exorbitant.
Nobody would buy scrap at that price.Nobody would buy scrap at that price.
13.
14. More than eight months after the head-More than eight months after the head-
on collision between two sea vesselson collision between two sea vessels
off the Mumbai coast, which caused theoff the Mumbai coast, which caused the
damaging oil spill in the Arabian Sea,damaging oil spill in the Arabian Sea,
the curious case of MSC Chitra wasthe curious case of MSC Chitra was
finally put to rest on April 17 when thefinally put to rest on April 17 when the
ship was sent sinking down to the sea.ship was sent sinking down to the sea.
At the time of its submersion, the shipAt the time of its submersion, the ship
had over 500 cargo containers carryinghad over 500 cargo containers carrying
tones of hazardous chemicals, diesel,tones of hazardous chemicals, diesel,
lubricating oil and other fuel.lubricating oil and other fuel.
15.
16.
17. M. V. HEBEI SPIRIT / 7M. V. HEBEI SPIRIT / 7thth
DEC ‘07DEC ‘07
The Hong Kong registered tankerThe Hong Kong registered tanker HebeiHebei
SpiritSpirit (146 848 GT) was struck by the(146 848 GT) was struck by the
crane bargecrane barge Samsung Nº1Samsung Nº1while at anchorwhile at anchor
about five nautical miles off Taean on theabout five nautical miles off Taean on the
west coast of the Republic of Korea. Thewest coast of the Republic of Korea. The
crane barge was being towed by two tugscrane barge was being towed by two tugs
((Samsung Nº5Samsung Nº5 andand Samho T3Samho T3) when the) when the
tow line broke. Weather conditions weretow line broke. Weather conditions were
poor and it was reported that the cranepoor and it was reported that the crane
barge had drifted into the tanker,barge had drifted into the tanker,
puncturing three of its port cargo tanks.puncturing three of its port cargo tanks.
18.
19. TheThe shipship was laden with about 209was laden with about 209
000 tonnes of four different crude000 tonnes of four different crude
oils. Due to inclement weatheroils. Due to inclement weather
conditions, repairs of the puncturedconditions, repairs of the punctured
tanks took four days to complete. Intanks took four days to complete. In
the meantime, the crew of H Spiritthe meantime, the crew of H Spirit
tried to limit the quantity of cargotried to limit the quantity of cargo
spilled through holes in thespilled through holes in the
damaged tanks by making it list anddamaged tanks by making it list and
transferring cargo between tanks.transferring cargo between tanks.
20.
21. As a result of the collision a total ofAs a result of the collision a total of
10 900 tonnes of oil (a mix of Iranian10 900 tonnes of oil (a mix of Iranian
Heavy, Upper Zakum and KuwaitHeavy, Upper Zakum and Kuwait
Export) escaped into the sea.Export) escaped into the sea.
TheThe Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit is owned byis owned by HebeiHebei
SpiritSpirit Shipping Company Limited. It isShipping Company Limited. It is
insured by China Shipowners Mutualinsured by China Shipowners Mutual
Insurance Association (China P&I)Insurance Association (China P&I)
and Assuranceföreningen Skuldand Assuranceföreningen Skuld
(Gjensidig) (Skuld Club) and(Gjensidig) (Skuld Club) and
managed by V-Ships Limited.managed by V-Ships Limited.
22. The crane barge and the twoThe crane barge and the two
tugs are owned and/or operatedtugs are owned and/or operated
by Samsung Corporation and itsby Samsung Corporation and its
subsidiary Samsung Heavysubsidiary Samsung Heavy
Industries (SHI) which belong toIndustries (SHI) which belong to
the Samsung Group, the Republicthe Samsung Group, the Republic
of Korea’s largest industrialof Korea’s largest industrial
conglomerate.conglomerate.
23.
24. Large parts of the Republic ofLarge parts of the Republic of
Korea’s western coast were affectedKorea’s western coast were affected
to varying degrees. The shorelineto varying degrees. The shoreline
composed of rocks, boulders andcomposed of rocks, boulders and
pebbles, as well as sand beaches andpebbles, as well as sand beaches and
port installations in the Taeanport installations in the Taean
peninsula and in the nearby islands,peninsula and in the nearby islands,
was polluted. Over a period ofwas polluted. Over a period of
several weeks, mainland shorelinesseveral weeks, mainland shorelines
and islands further south alsoand islands further south also
became contaminated by emulsifiedbecame contaminated by emulsified
oil and tar balls.oil and tar balls.
25. The Korean Coast Guard tasked aThe Korean Coast Guard tasked a
total of 21 licensed clean-uptotal of 21 licensed clean-up
contractors, supported by localcontractors, supported by local
authorities and fisheries cooperativesauthorities and fisheries cooperatives
to undertake clean-up operations.to undertake clean-up operations.
Onshore clean-up operations wereOnshore clean-up operations were
carried out at numerous locationscarried out at numerous locations
along the western coast of thealong the western coast of the
Republic of Korea. Local villagers,Republic of Korea. Local villagers,
army and navy cadets andarmy and navy cadets and
volunteers from all over the countryvolunteers from all over the country
also participated in the clean-up ops.also participated in the clean-up ops.
26.
27. The Republic of Korea is a Party toThe Republic of Korea is a Party to
the 1992 Civil Liability Conventionthe 1992 Civil Liability Convention
(1992 CLC) and the 1992 Fund(1992 CLC) and the 1992 Fund
Convention but, at the time of theConvention but, at the time of the
spill, had not ratified thespill, had not ratified the
Supplementary Fund Protocol.Supplementary Fund Protocol.
The tonnage of theThe tonnage of the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit (146(146
848 GT) is in excess of 140 000 GT.848 GT) is in excess of 140 000 GT.
The total amount available forThe total amount available for
compensation under the 1992 CLCcompensation under the 1992 CLC
and the 1992 Fund Convention isand the 1992 Fund Convention is
203 million SDR.203 million SDR.
28. Investigation in the Republic ofInvestigation in the Republic of
KoreaKorea
An investigation into the cause of theAn investigation into the cause of the
incident was initiated soon after theincident was initiated soon after the
incident by the Incheon Districtincident by the Incheon District
Maritime Safety Tribunal in theMaritime Safety Tribunal in the
Republic of Korea.Republic of Korea.
In September 2008, in a decisionIn September 2008, in a decision
rendered by the Incheon Tribunal,rendered by the Incheon Tribunal,
both the two tugs and theboth the two tugs and the HebeiHebei
SpiritSpiritwere considered at fault forwere considered at fault for
causing the collision.causing the collision.
29.
30. The Tribunal found that the masterThe Tribunal found that the master
and the duty officer of theand the duty officer of the HebeiHebei
SpiritSpirit were also partly liable for thewere also partly liable for the
collision between the crane bargecollision between the crane barge
and theand the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit. A number of. A number of
defendants, including SHI, thedefendants, including SHI, the
masters of the tugboats and themasters of the tugboats and the
master and duty officer of themaster and duty officer of the HebeiHebei
SpiritSpirit appealed against the decisionappealed against the decision
to the Central Maritime Safetyto the Central Maritime Safety
Tribunal.Tribunal.
31. In December 2008 the CentralIn December 2008 the Central
Maritime Safety Tribunal deliveredMaritime Safety Tribunal delivered
its decision.its decision.
The decision of the Central TribunalThe decision of the Central Tribunal
was similar to that of the Incheonwas similar to that of the Incheon
Tribunal in that the two tugs wereTribunal in that the two tugs were
found mainly responsible and thefound mainly responsible and the
master and the duty officer ofmaster and the duty officer of
thethe Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit were also foundwere also found
partly liable for the collision betweenpartly liable for the collision between
the crane barge and thethe crane barge and the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit..
32. The Master and the duty officer
was held liable on the following
accounts:
- Not tracking the movements of
vessels in the area.
- Not picking up anchor in force 6
winds and increasing.
- Not taking any action whatsoever
to avoid a dangerous situation
33.
34. An investigation into the cause of theAn investigation into the cause of the
incident was also carried out by theincident was also carried out by the
ship’s Flag State administration inship’s Flag State administration in
China. The investigation found thatChina. The investigation found that
the decision by the operator of thethe decision by the operator of the
tugboats and of the crane barge (thetugboats and of the crane barge (the
Marine Spread), to undertake theMarine Spread), to undertake the
towing voyage when adversetowing voyage when adverse
weather had been forecast was theweather had been forecast was the
main contributory factor to thismain contributory factor to this
accident.accident.
35. Moreover, the delay by the MarineMoreover, the delay by the Marine
Spread in notifying the VTIS, andSpread in notifying the VTIS, and
other ships in the vicinity resulted inother ships in the vicinity resulted in
insufficient time being given toinsufficient time being given to
thethe Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit to take allto take all
necessary actions to avoid thenecessary actions to avoid the
collision. The investigation furthercollision. The investigation further
indicated that the actions taken byindicated that the actions taken by
the master and the crew ofthe master and the crew of
thethe Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit after the collisionafter the collision
had fully complied with thehad fully complied with the
provisions as set out in SOPEP.provisions as set out in SOPEP.
36.
37. Criminal proceedingsCriminal proceedings
In June 2008, the Seosan CourtIn June 2008, the Seosan Court
delivered its judgement to the effectdelivered its judgement to the effect
that (i) the master of the tugboatsthat (i) the master of the tugboats
was sentenced to three years andwas sentenced to three years and
one year imprisonment resp. (ii) theone year imprisonment resp. (ii) the
owners of the two tugboats (SHI),owners of the two tugboats (SHI),
were sentenced to a fine of KRW 30were sentenced to a fine of KRW 30
million; (iv) the master of the cranemillion; (iv) the master of the crane
barge was found not guilty; and (v)barge was found not guilty; and (v)
the master and chief officer ofthe master and chief officer of HebeiHebei
SpiritSpirit were found not guilty.were found not guilty.
38. n December 2008, the Criminal Courtn December 2008, the Criminal Court
of Appeal rendered its judgement andof Appeal rendered its judgement and
reduced the sentence against thereduced the sentence against the
masters of the two tugboats. Themasters of the two tugboats. The
judgement overturned the non-guiltyjudgement overturned the non-guilty
judgements for the master of thejudgements for the master of the
crane barge and the master and chiefcrane barge and the master and chief
officer of theofficer of the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit. The owner. The owner
ofof Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit was also given a finewas also given a fine
of KRW 30 million and the master andof KRW 30 million and the master and
chief officer of thechief officer of the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit werewere
arrested.arrested.
39.
40. In April 2009, the Korean SupremeIn April 2009, the Korean Supreme
Court annulled the Court of Appeal’sCourt annulled the Court of Appeal’s
decision to arrest the crew membersdecision to arrest the crew members
of theof the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit and they wereand they were
allowed to leave the Republic ofallowed to leave the Republic of
Korea. The Supreme Court, however,Korea. The Supreme Court, however,
upheld the decision to arrest theupheld the decision to arrest the
masters of one of the towing tugsmasters of one of the towing tugs
and of the crane barge andand of the crane barge and
confirmed the fines imposed by theconfirmed the fines imposed by the
Court of Appeal.Court of Appeal.
41. In June 2009, the master and chiefIn June 2009, the master and chief
officer of theofficer of the Hebei SpiritHebei Spirit werewere
released from arrest and left thereleased from arrest and left the
Republic of Korea.Republic of Korea.
At last they were proclaimed notAt last they were proclaimed not
guilty but in the meantime hadguilty but in the meantime had
already spent over eighteen monthsalready spent over eighteen months
of torture and arrest.of torture and arrest.
44. On Wednesday, 5 October 2011, at 2:20 AMOn Wednesday, 5 October 2011, at 2:20 AM
while sailing in clear weather from Napier towhile sailing in clear weather from Napier to
Tauranga with a speed of 17 knots (20 mph),Tauranga with a speed of 17 knots (20 mph),
MVMV RenaRena ran aground on the Astrolaberan aground on the Astrolabe
Reef.The ship was carrying 1,368 containers,Reef.The ship was carrying 1,368 containers,
eight of which contained hazardous materials,eight of which contained hazardous materials,
as well as 1,700 tonnes of heavy fuel oil andas well as 1,700 tonnes of heavy fuel oil and
200 tonnes of marine diesel oil. Initially the200 tonnes of marine diesel oil. Initially the
ship listed 11 degrees to port, with the frontship listed 11 degrees to port, with the front
stuck on the reef.stuck on the reef.
By 9 October 2011, a 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) oilBy 9 October 2011, a 5 kilometres (3.1 mi) oil
slick threatened the coast.slick threatened the coast.
45.
46. Oil fromOil from RenaRena began washing ashore onbegan washing ashore on
the beach on 10 October 2011. Badthe beach on 10 October 2011. Bad
weather that night had caused the ship toweather that night had caused the ship to
shift onto the reef, and the crew wasshift onto the reef, and the crew was
evacuated. The shifting of the ship causedevacuated. The shifting of the ship caused
further damage, resulting in a further 130further damage, resulting in a further 130
- 350 tonnes of oil leaking.- 350 tonnes of oil leaking.
47.
48. Strong winds and bad weather on theStrong winds and bad weather on the
night of 11 October 2011 caused the shipnight of 11 October 2011 caused the ship
to list over to starboard 19 degrees; thisto list over to starboard 19 degrees; this
resulted in between 30 and 70 containersresulted in between 30 and 70 containers
being washed overboard. None of thebeing washed overboard. None of the
containers contained hazardouscontainers contained hazardous
cargo. Containers subsequently begancargo. Containers subsequently began
washing ashore.washing ashore.
On the afternoon of 12 October 2011 ,On the afternoon of 12 October 2011 ,
aerial footage showed a large crack in theaerial footage showed a large crack in the
hull ofhull of RenaRena, increasing fears that the, increasing fears that the
ship could break in two and sinkship could break in two and sink
49.
50. Also on 14 October 2011, the FilipinoAlso on 14 October 2011, the Filipino
crew of thecrew of the RenaRena left New Zealand "forleft New Zealand "for
their safety" after a racist backlashtheir safety" after a racist backlash
against Filipinos in Tauranga.against Filipinos in Tauranga.
Calm weather on 15 October 2011,Calm weather on 15 October 2011,
allowed salvage experts to board theallowed salvage experts to board the
vessel and begin preparations to pump thevessel and begin preparations to pump the
remaining oil to a barge. Platforms wereremaining oil to a barge. Platforms were
attached to the side of the ship, andattached to the side of the ship, and
pumping began on 16 October 2011. Bypumping began on 16 October 2011. By
17 October only twenty tons of oil had17 October only twenty tons of oil had
been removed.been removed.
51.
52. On 16 October a mine-countermeasuresOn 16 October a mine-countermeasures
team began hunting for containers spilledteam began hunting for containers spilled
from thefrom the RenaRena..
Since October, salvage efforts have beenSince October, salvage efforts have been
focused on removing the ship's cargofocused on removing the ship's cargo
before it completely breaks apart.before it completely breaks apart.
In January 2012, theIn January 2012, the RenaRena completelycompletely
broke in half and the stern end slipped offbroke in half and the stern end slipped off
of the reef and began sinking. A smallof the reef and began sinking. A small
amount of oil and containers escaped theamount of oil and containers escaped the
ship as it broke in half.ship as it broke in half.