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Republicof the Philippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 87193June 23, 1989
JUAN GALLANOSAFRIVALDO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND THELEAGUEOF MUNICIPALITIES, SORSOGON CHAPTER, HEREIN
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, SALVADOR NEEESTUYE, respondents.
J.L. Misa &Associates for petitioner.
Lladoc,Huab & Associates for privaterespondent.
CRUZ, J.:
Petitioner JuanG. Frivaldowas proclaimed governor-electoftheprovinceofSorsogonon January 22,
1988, and assumed office induetime. On October 27, 1988, the LeagueofMunicipalities,
Sorsogon Chapter(hereafter, League), representedby its President,Salvador Estuye, who was also
suing in his personalcapacity, filedwith theCommission on Elections a petitionfor theannulment
of Frivaldo; election and proclamationon the groundthat hewas nota Filipino citizen, having
been naturalized intheUnitedStates on January 20, 1983.In his answer datedMay 22, 1988,
Frivaldo admitted thathewas naturalized intheUnitedStates as alleged but pleadedthespecial
and affirmativedefenses that hehad sought American citizenship only to protect himselfagainst
PresidentMarcos. His naturalization, hesaid,was "merely forced upon himselfas a means of
survivalagainst the unrelenting persecutionby theMartial LawDictator's agents abroad."He
added that hehad returnedto thePhilippines after theEDSArevolutionto helpin the restoration
ofdemocracy. Healso argued that thechallenge tohis title shouldbe dismissed, being in reality a
quo warrantopetition thatshould havebeenfiled withintendays from his proclamation, in
accordance withSection 253ofthe Omnibus ElectionCode.The League, moreover, was nota
proper party becauseitwas not a voter and so could notsue under thesaid section.
Frivaldo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmativedefenses but the respondentCommissionon
Elections decided instead by its OrderofJanuary20,1988, to set thecasefor hearing onthe
merits.His motion for reconsideration was deniedin another Order datedFebruary 21,1988. He
then cameto this Courtin a petition for certiorari andprohibitionto ask that thesaidorders beset
aside ontheground thatthey had been renderedwith graveabuse ofdiscretion. Pending
resolutionofthepetition, weissued a temporary order against thehearing onthemerits
scheduledby theCOMELEC and at the sametimerequiredcomments from therespondents.
In their Comment,theprivaterespondents reiterated their assertionthat Frivaldo was a naturalized
Americancitizen and hadnot reacquired Philippinecitizenship onthedayofthe election on
January18,1988. Hewas therefore not qualified to run for and beelected governor. They also
argued that their petitionin the Commission on Elections was not really for quo warranto under
Section 253 oftheOmnibus ElectionCode. Theultimatepurposewas toprevent Frivaldo from
continuing as governor,his candidacy andelection being null andvoidabinitio becauseofhis
alienage. Eveniftheir petitionwere tobe considered as one for quo warranto, itcould not have
been filedwithin ten days from Frivaldo's proclamation because itwas onlyin September 1988
that they received proofofhis naturalization. Andassuming that the Leagueitselfwas nota
proper party, Estuye himself,who was suing not only for theLeague but also inhis personal
capacity,could nevertheless institutethesuitby himselfalone.
Speaking for the publicrespondent, the SolicitorGeneral supportedthecontention thatFrivaldowas
not a citizen ofthePhilippines andhadnotrepatriated himselfafterhis naturalization as an
Americancitizen. As an alien, hewas disqualified frompublic office inthePhilippines.His election
did not curethis defect because the electorate ofSorsogon could not amend theConstitution, the
Local GovernmentCode, andtheOmnibus Election Code.He alsojoined in theprivate
respondent's argument that Section253 oftheOmnibus Election Codewas not applicable because
what the Leagueand Estuyewereseeking was not only theannulment oftheproclamationand
election ofFrivaldo. Heagreed thatthey werealso asking for the terminationofFrivaldo's
incumbency as governor ofSorsogonon the groundthat hewas nota Filipino.
In his Reply, Frivaldo insisted thathewas a citizen ofthePhilippines because his naturalization as an
Americancitizen was not"impressed with voluntariness."In supporthe cited theNottebohmCase,
[(1955 I.C.J.4; 49A.J.I.L.396(1955)]where a German national's naturalization inLiechtenstein was
not recognized because ithad been obtainedfor reasons ofconvenienceonly. Hesaid hecould
not have repatriated himselfbeforethe1988elections becausetheSpecialCommitteeon
Naturalizationcreated for thepurposeby LOI No. 27C had not yetbeenorganized then. His oath in
his certificateofcandidacythat hewas a natural-borncitizen shouldbe a sufficient actof
repatriation. Additionally, his activeparticipationin the 1987 congressionalelections had divested
him ofAmerican citizenship underthelaws oftheUnited States, thus restoring his Philippine
citizenship. Heended by reiterating his prayerfor therejectionofthe moveto disqualify him for
being time-barred under Section253oftheOmnibus Election Code.
Considering theimportance andurgencyofthe question hereinraised, the Courthas decidedto resolve
it directly insteadofallowing thenormal circuitous routethat willafter all eventuallyendwith this
Court, albeit only after a,long delay. Wecannot permitthis delay. Such delaywill beinimicalto
the publicinterestand thevital principles ofpublic office tobe hereapplied.

2. It is true thattheCommissionon Elections has the primary jurisdiction over this questionas the sole
judge of all contests relating to theelection, returns and qualifications ofthemembers ofthe
Congress and electiveprovincialand cityofficials. However, thedecision on Frivaldo's citizenship
has alreadybeen made by theCOMELEC throughits counsel,theSolicitor General,who
categorically claims that Frivaldo is a foreigner.We assumethis stancewas taken by him after
consultation with thepublicrespondent andwithits approval. It thereforerepresents thedecision
of the COMELEC itselfthat wemay now review.Exercising ourdiscretion tointerpret the Rules of
Court and theConstitution, weshallconsiderthepresentpetition as having been filedin
accordance withArticleIX-ASection7, oftheConstitution, tochallengetheaforementioned
Orders of the COMELEC.
The basicquestion wemustresolveis whetheror notJuan G.Frivaldowas a citizen ofthePhilippines at
the time of his election on January18,1988, as provincialgovernorofSorsogon. All theother
issues raised inthis petition are merely secondary to this basicquestion.
The reason for this inquiry is theprovisionin Article XI, Section9, oftheConstitution thatall public
officials and employees owe theStateand theConstitution "allegianceatall times"and the
specificrequirementin Section42 ofthe LocalGovernment Codethata candidatefor local elective
office must beinter alia a citizen ofthePhilippines anda qualified voter ofthe constituency where
he is running. Section 117 oftheOmnibus Election Codeprovides thata qualified votermust be,
among other qualifications,a citizenofthePhilippines, this being an indispensablerequirement
for suffrage under ArticleV, Section 1,ofthe Constitution.
In the certificateof candidacyhe filedon November 19, 1987, Frivaldo described himselfas a "natural-
born"citizenof the Philippines, omitting mentionofanysubsequentloss ofsuch status.The
evidenceshows,however,that hewas naturalizedas a citizenoftheUnitedStates in 1983 per the
following certification fromtheUnited States DistrictCourt, NorthernDistrict ofCalifornia,as duly
authenticated by Vice ConsulAmado P. Cortez ofthePhilippineConsulateGeneral in San
Francisco,California, U.S.A.
OFFICEOF THE CLERK
UNITED STATES DISTRICTCOURT
NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
September 23, 1988
TO WHOMIT MAY CONCERN:
Our records show thatJUAN GALLANOSAFRIVALDO,bornon October 20, 1915,was naturalized inthis
Court on January 20, 1983,and issued CertificateofNaturalizationNo. 11690178.
Petition No. 280225.
Alien Registration No.A23 079270.
Very truly yours,
WILLIAML. WHITTAKER
Clerk
by:
(Sgd.)
ARACELI V. BAREN
Deputy Clerk
This evidence is not deniedby thepetitioner.In fact, heexpressly admitted itin his answer.
Nevertheless,as earliernoted,he claims it was "forced"on him as a measureofprotectionfrom
the persecutionofthe Marcos government through his agents intheUnited States.
The Court sees no reason not to believethat thepetitioner was oneofthe enemies oftheMarcos
dictatorship. Even so, itcannot agree that as a consequencethereofhe was coercedinto
embracing American citizenship. His feeblesuggestion thathis naturalization was nottheresultof
his own free andvoluntary choiceis totally unacceptableand mustbe rejected outright.
There were many otherFilipinos in the United States similarly situated as Frivaldo,andsomeofthem
subjectto greater risk than he, whodidnot find itnecessary — nor do theyclaim tohave been
coerced — toabandon their cherished status as Filipinos. They didnot takethe oath ofallegiance
to the United States, unlikethepetitioner whosolemnly declared "on oath,that I absolutely and
entirely renounceand abjureallallegianceand fidelity to any foreignprince, potentate, stateor
sovereigntyofwhom orwhich I haveheretoforebeen a subject or citizen,"meaning in his case the
Republicofthe Philippines. ThemartyredNinoy Aquino heads the impressive list ofthose Filipinos
in exile who, unlikethepetitioner,held fastto their Philippine citizenship despitetheperils oftheir
resistanceto theMarcos regime.
The Nottebohm casecitedby thepetitioner invokedtheinternational lawprinciple ofeffective
nationalitywhich is clearlynot applicableto the caseatbar. This principleis expressedin Article5
ofthe Hague Conventionof1930 ontheConflict ofNationality Laws as follows:
Art. 5. Within a third Statea person having more than onenationality shall betreated as ifhe
had only one. Withoutprejudiceto theapplicationofits law inmatters ofpersonalstatus andof
any convention inforce, a third Stateshall,ofthe nationalities which any such personpossesses,
recognize exclusively inits territory either thenationality ofthecountry inwhich heis habitually
and principally resident orthenationality ofthecountry with whichin the circumstances he
appears tobe in fact mostclosely connected.
Nottebohmwas a German bybirth but a resident ofGuatemala for 34years whenhe appliedfor and
acquired naturalization in Liechtensteinonemonth beforetheoutbreak ofWorldWar II. Many
members ofhis family and his business interests were inGermany. In 1943, Guatemala,whichhad
declared war onGermany, arrested Nottebohm andconfiscated allhis properties on the ground
that he was a Germannational. Liechtensteinthereupon filedsuit onhis behalf, as its citizen,
against Guatemala. TheInternationalCourt ofJusticeheld Nottebohm tobe stilla national of
Germany,withwhichhe was more closelyconnectedthan withLiechtenstein.
That caseis notrelevant tothepetition beforeus becauseit dealtwith a conflict betweenthe
nationalitylaws oftwo states as decided bya thirdstate. No thirdstate is involved inthecase at
bar; in fact,even the UnitedStates is not actively claiming Frivaldo as its national. Thesole
question presented tous is whether ornot Frivaldo is a citizen ofthePhilippines under ourown
laws, regardless ofother nationalitylaws. Wecan decidethis question aloneas sovereignofour
own territory,conformably toSection 1 ofthe said Convention providing that"it is for eachState
to determineunderits law who areits nationals."

3. It is also worth noting thatNottebohm was invoking his naturalizationin Liechtensteinwhereas in the
presentcaseFrivaldo is rejecting his naturalization intheUnited States.
Ifhe really wanted todisavowhis American citizenship and reacquire Philippinecitizenship, the
petitionershould havedone so inaccordancewith thelaws ofourcountry. UnderCANo. 63 as
amended by CANo. 473andPD No.725, Philippinecitizenshipmay be reacquired by directactof
Congress, by naturalization, or by repatriation.
While Frivaldodoes not invokeeitherofthefirst twomethods, henevertheless claims he has
reacquired Philippinecitizenship by virtue ofa validrepatriation. He claims thatby actively
participating intheelections in this country, heautomatically forfeited American citizenshipunder
the laws of theUnitedStates. Such laws donot concern us here.The allegedforfeiture is between
him and theUnited States as his adoptedcountry. It should beobvious that evenifhe did losehis
naturalized American citizenship, such forfeituredidnotandcouldnot havetheeffectof
automatically restoring his citizenship in thePhilippines that hehad earlierrenounced.At best,
what might have happened as a resultofthe loss ofhis naturalized citizenship was that hebecame
a stateless individual.
Frivaldo's contentionthathe could nothaverepatriated himselfunderLOI 270 because the Special
Committee provided for therein hadnot yet been constitutedseems to suggest thatthelackof
that body rendered his repatriationunnecessary. Thatis far-fetchedifnot specious Such a
conclusionwould open thefloodgates, as it were. It would allow allFilipinos who have renounced
this country toclaim back theirabandoned citizenshipwithout formally rejecting their
adoptedstateand reaffirming their allegiance tothePhilippines.
It does not appearthat Frivaldo has taken thesecategoricalacts. Hecontends that by simply filing his
certificate of candidacy hehad, without more,already effectivelyrecovered Philippinecitizenship.
But that is hardly theformaldeclaration thelaw envisions — surely, Philippinecitizenship
previously disowned is notthat cheaplyrecovered.Ifthe SpecialCommitteehadnotyet been
convened, whatthat meantsimply was thatthepetitioner had towaituntilthis was done,or seek
naturalizationby legislative orjudicial proceedings.
The argument thatthepetition filedwith theCommissionon Elections should bedismissed for tardiness
is not well-taken. Thehereinprivaterespondents are seeking toprevent Frivaldo from continuing
to dischargehis office ofgovernor because heis disqualified fromdoing soas a foreigner.
Qualifications for publicofficeare continuing requirements andmustbe possessednot only at the
time of appointmentor electionor assumption ofofficebutduring theofficer's entiretenure.
Once any of the requiredqualifications is lost, his titlemay beseasonably challenged. If, say, a
female legislatorwere tomarry a foreigner during her term andby her act or omission acquires his
nationality, wouldshehavea rightto remainin office simply becausethechallenge tohertitle
may no longerbe made withintendays from her proclamation? It has beenestablished, and not
even denied, thattheevidence ofFrivaldo's naturalization was discovered only eightmonths after
his proclamation andhis title was challengedshortly thereafter.
This Court willnot permittheanomaly ofa personsitting as provincial governor inthis country while
owing exclusiveallegiance toanothercountry. Thefactthat hewas elected by thepeopleof
Sorsogon does not excuse this patent violationofthesalutaryrulelimiting publicofficeand
employmentonly to thecitizens ofthis country. Thequalifications prescribed for electiveoffice
cannot beerased by the electorate alone. Thewill ofthepeopleas expressedthroughtheballot
cannot cure the viceofineligibility,especially ifthey mistakenly believed,as inthis case, that the
candidatewas qualified. Obviously, this rule requires strictapplication whenthedeficiency is lack
of citizenship. Ifa personseeks toserveintheRepublic ofthePhilippines,he mustowehis total
loyalty tothis country only,abjuring and renouncing all fealty and fidelity to any other state.
It is true as the petitioner points out thatthestatus ofthenatural-borncitizen is favored by the
Constitution andour laws, whichis all the morereasonwhy itshould betreasured likea pearlof
great price.But onceit is surrendered and renounced, the gift is goneand cannotbe lightly
restored. This countryofours, for allits difficulties andlimitations,is likea jealous andpossessive
mother. Oncerejected, itis not quick to welcomeback with eager arms its prodigalifrepentant
children. Thereturning renegademustshow,by anexpress andunequivocal act, the renewalofhis
loyalty and love.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED andpetitioner JUAN G.FRIVALDO is herebydeclarednot a
citizen ofthePhilippines and therefore DISQUALIFIED fromserving as Governor oftheProvinceof
Sorsogon. Accordingly, heis orderedto vacate his officeand surrender thesame totheduly
elected Vice-Governorofthesaidprovinceonce this decision becomes final and executory. The
temporary restraining order datedMarch 9,1989, is LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan, C.J.,Narvasa,Melencio-Herrera, Paras,Feliciano, Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino,
Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Sarmiento,J., took nopart.
Cortes J.,concurs in theresult.
Separate Opinions
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., concurring:
I concur in thepragmaticapproachtakenby theCourt.I agreethat whenthehigherinterests ofthe
State areinvolved, the publicgood shouldsupersedeany proceduralinfinities which may affecta
petitionfiled withtheCommission onElections. I failto see how theCourt could allowa person
who by his own admissions is indubitably analien tocontinueholding the office ofGovernorof
any province.
It is an establishedrule oflong standing that theperiod fixedby law for the filing ofa protest —
whether quo warranto orelection contest — is mandatory andjurisdictional.1
As a rule, thequowarranto petitionseeking to annul the petitioner's electionand proclamationshould
have been filed withtendays after the proclamation ofelectionresults. 2The purposeofthelaw
in not allowing thefiling ofprotests beyond theperiod fixedby law is tohave a certain and
definite timewithin which petitions against theresults ofan election should befiledand to
provide summary proceedings for thesettlementofsuch disputes.3 The Rules ofCourtallow the
Republicofthe Philippines to file quo warrantoproceedings againstany public officerwho
performs an act which works a forfeiture ofhis office. 4However, wheretheSolicitor General or
the Presidentfeel thatthereare nogood reasons tocommence quo warrantoproceedings, 5the
Court should allowa personlikerespondentEstuye orhis leagueto bring theaction.
I must emphasize,however,that my concurrenceis limited toa clearcaseofanalien holding an elective
public office. And perhaps in a clear caseofdisloyalty to theRepublicofthePhilippines. 6 Where
the disqualification is basedon age,residence,or any ofthemany grounds for ineligibility, 7 I
believethat theten-day period shouldbe appliedstrictly.
The pragmaticapproachis alsoshownby thefact thattheCourt found itinexpedientto wait for the
final decision ofCOMELEC. This step is mostunusual but considering thetotallackofany serious

4. grounds for thepetitioner's claim ofhaving regained his Philippinecitizenship, I amconstrained to
concur in theprocedurepro hacvice.
Republicof the Philippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
FIRSTDIVISION
G.R. No. 113213August 15, 1994
PAUL JOSEPH WRIGHT, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. JUDGEJOSEDELA RAMA, RTC, BRANCH 139,MAKATI, M.M.
and HON. FRANK DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, respondents.
Rodrigo E. Mallari forpetitioner.
Aurora SalvaBautista collaborating forpetitioner.
KAPUNAN, J.:
A paramountprincipleofthelaw ofextraditionprovides thata State may not surrender any individual
for any offense not includedin a treaty ofextradition. This principlearises from the reality of
extradition as a derogation ofsovereignty. Extradition is an intrusioninto the territorial integrity of
the host State and a delimitationofthesovereign power oftheStatewithin its own territory. 1 The
act of extraditing amounts toa "delivery by the State ofa person accused or convictedofa crime,
to another Statewithin whose territorial jurisdiction, actual or constructive,it was committed and
which asks for his surrenderwith a viewto executejustice." 2 As it is anact of"surrender"ofan
individualfoundin a sovereign State toanother Statewhichdemands his surrender 3, an act of
extradition,even witha treaty renderedexecutory uponratificationby appropriateauthorities,
does not imposed an obligation toextraditeon the requestedStateuntilthe latterhas made its
own determination ofthevalidity oftherequesting State's demand, inaccordancewith the
requestedState's own interests.
The principles of internationallaw recognizeno right ofextradition apartfrom thatarising from
treaty. 4 Pursuant to theseprinciples, States enter into treaties ofextradition principally for the
purpose of bringing fugitives ofjusticewithin theambitoftheirlaws, under conventions
recognizing therightofnations to mutually agreeto surrender individuals withintheir jurisdiction
and control, andfor thepurposeofenforcing their respectivemunicipallaws. Since punishmentof
fugitive criminals is dependent mainly on thewillingness ofhostStateto apprehend themand
revert them totheStatewheretheiroffenses werecommitted, 5 jurisdictionover suchfugitives
and subsequentenforcementofpenal laws canbe effectively accomplished only by agreement
betweenStates through treaties ofextradition.
Desiring to makemore effectivecooperationbetween Australia andtheGovernment ofthe Philippines
in the suppressionofcrime,6 thetwocountries entered into a TreatyofExtradition onthe7thof
March 1988. Thesaid treaty was ratified inaccordancewith theprovisions ofSection21,Article VII
of the 1987 Constitution ina Resolutionadoptedby theSenateon September 10, 1990and
becameeffective thirty (30) days after both States notifiedeachotherin writing that the
respective requirements for theentryintoforceoftheTreatyhave been compliedwith. 7
The Treaty adopts a "non-list, double criminality approach"which provides for broadercoverageof
extraditableoffenses betweenthetwocountries and(which) embraces crimes punishable by
imprisonmentfor atleastone(1) year. Additionally, the Treaty allows extradition for crimes
committed priorto the treaty's dateofeffectivity, provided that thesecrimes wereinthestatute
books of the requesting State at the timeoftheircommission.
Under the Treaty, each contracting Stateagrees to extradite.. . "persons
. . . wanted for prosecutionoftheimposition or enforcementofa sentenceintheRequesting State
for an extraditable offense." 8 Arequest for extradition requires, ifthe personis accusedofan
offense, thefurnishing by the requesting Stateofeither a warrant for thearrestor a copy ofthe
warrantof arrest oftheperson, or, where appropriate, a copy ofthe relevantcharge againstthe
person sought to beextradited. 9
In defining theextraditable offenses, theTreaty includes alloffenses "punishable under the Laws of
both Contracting States by imprisonment for a period ofatleast one(1) year, or bya more severe
penalty." 10 Forthepurposeofthedefinition,theTreaty states that:
(a) an offense shall beanextraditableoffensewhetheror notthelaws oftheContracting States place
the offensewithinthesame category ordenominate the offenseby thesame terminology;
(b) the totality ofthe acts oromissions allegedagainst the person whoseextradition is requested shall
be taken intoaccountin determining theconstituentelements oftheoffense. 11
Petitioner, an AustralianCitizen, was sought by Australianauthorities for indictablecrimes in his
country. Extraditionproceedings werefiledbefore the RegionalTrial CourtofMakati, which
rendereda decision ordering thedeportationofpetitioner. Said decision was sustained by the
Court ofAppeals; hence, petitionercameto this Court bywayofreviewon certiorari, to setaside
the order ofdeportation. Petitioner contends thattheprovision oftheTreaty giving retroactive
effect to the extradition treatyamounts to an ex post facto lawwhichviolates Section 21ofArticle
VI ofthe Constitution. Heassails thetrial court's decision ordering his extradition, arguing that the
evidenceadduced inthecourt below failedto showthat heis wantedfor prosecutionin his
country. Capsulized,all the principal issues raised by the petitioner beforethis Courtstrike at the
validity oftheextradition proceedings institutedby thegovernment against him.
The facts, as found bytheCourt ofAppeals, 12 are undisputed:
On March 17, 1993, AssistantSecretary SimeD. HidalgooftheDepartment ofForeign Affairs indorsed
to the DepartmentofJusticeDiplomaticNoteNo. 080/93dated February 19,1993from the
Government ofAustralia to theDepartment ofJusticethrough Attorney GeneralMichaelDuffy.
Said DiplomaticNotewas a formalrequest for the extradition ofPetitioner Paul Joseph Wright
who is wantedfor thefollowing indictable crimes:
1. Wright/Orr Matter — onecountofObtaining Property by Deception contrary toSection 81(1) ofthe
VictorianCrimes Act of1958; and
2. Wright/CrackerMatter— Thirteen (13) counts ofObtaining Properties by Deceptioncontrary to
Section 81(1) oftheVictorian Crimes Act of1958; onecountofattempting to Obtain Property by
Deception contrary toSection 321(m) ofVictorianCrimes Act of1958; and onecountofPerjury
contrary toSection 314ofVictorianCrimes Act of1958, whichcrimes wereallegedly committed in
the following manner:
The one (1) count ofObtaining Property by Deception contrary to Section81(1) ofthe VictorianCrimes
Act of1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's andco-offender,Herbert LanceOrr's,dishonesty in
obtaining $315,250from Mulcahy, Mendelson and RoundSolicitors (MM7R), secured by a
mortgage on theproperty inBangholme,Victoria owned byRuven Nominees Pty.Ltd., a company
controlledby a Rodney and a Mitchell, by falsely representing that alltherelevantlegaldocuments
relating to the mortgagehad been signed by Rodney andJanineMitchell.
The thirteen (13) counts ofObtaining Propertyby Deceptioncontraryto Section81(1) ofthe Victorian
Crimes Act of1958 constitutes in Mr. Wright's andco-offender Mr. John Carson Craker's receiving
a total ofapproximately 11.2in commission (including $367,044 inbonus commission) via Amazon
Bond Pty. Ltd., depending onthevolumeofbusiness written, by submitting two hundredfifteen
(215) life insuranceproposals,and paying premiums thereon (totheacceptanceofthepolicies and
payment ofcommissions) to theAustralianMutualProvident (AMP) Society throughtheOfficeof
MelbourneMutualInsurance, ofwhichrespondent is an insuranceagent, outofwhich life
proposals none arein existenceand approximately 200ofwhich arealleged to havebeenfalse, in
one or more ofthefollowing ways:
( i ) some policy-holders signed up only because theywere toldthepolicies were free (usually for 2
years) andno payments wererequired.
(ii) some policy-holders wereoffered cash inducements ($50or $100) to sign andhadto supplya bank
account nolongerused(at which a directdebitrequest for payment ofpremiums would apply).
These policy-holders were alsotold no payments by themwere required.
(iii) some policy-holders wereintroduced through the"Daily Personnel Agency", andagainweretoldthe
policies werefreefor 2 years as long as an unusedbank account was applied.
(iv) some policy-holders werefound notto exist.
The one countofAttempting toObtain Property by Deceptioncontrary to Section321(m) ofthe
VictorianCrimes Act of1958constitutes inMr. Wright's and Mr. Craker's attempting to cause the

5. payment of $2,870.68commission toa bank accountin the name ofAmazon Bond Pty. Ltd.by
submitting one proposal for Life Insurance totheAMP Society, the policy-holder ofwhichdoes not
exist with the end inview ofpaying thepremiums thereonto insureacceptanceofthepolicy and
commission payments.
The one countof Perjurycontraryto Section 314ofVictorian Crimes Act of1958constitutes inMr.
Wright's andMr. Craker's signing and swearing before a Solicitor holding a current practicing
certificate pursuantto the Legal ProfessionPractice Act(1958), a Statutory Declarationattesting to
the validity of 29 ofthemostrecent Life Insuranceproposals ofAMP Society and containing three
(3) false statements.
Pursuant to Section 5 ofPD No. 1069, inrelation totheExtradition Treaty concluded betweenthe
Republicof the Philippines and Australia onSeptember 10, 1990,extraditionproceedings were
initiatedon April 6, 1993by theState Counsels oftheDepartmentofJusticebeforethe
respondentcourt.
In its Order datedApril13, 1993, the respondentcourt directedthepetitioner to appearbeforeit on
April 30, 1993and to file his answer within ten days. Inthesame order, the respondentJudge
ordered the NBI toservesummons andcausethearrestofthe petitioner.
The respondent courtreceived return ofthe warrant ofarrest and summons signed by NBI Senior Agent
Manuel Almendras with theinformation thatthepetitioner was arrested on April26,1993at
Taguig, Metro Manila and was subsequentlydetainedat theNBI detentioncellwherepetitioner,
to date, continue tobe held.
Thereafter, the petitionerfiled his answer.
In the course of the trial, thepetitioner testified thathewas jobless, married toa Filipina, JudithDavid,
with whom hebegot a child;that hehas no casein Australia; that heis nota fugitivefromjustice
and is not awareoftheoffenses charged against him; thathearrived in thePhilippines on
February 25, 1990 returned toAustralia on March1, 1990,then backto thePhilippines onApril11,
1990, left thePhilippines again onApril24, 1990for Australia and returnedto thePhilippines on
May 24, 1990, againleftfor Australia on May 29,1990passing by Singaporeandthen returned to
the Philippines on June25, 1990and fromthat timeon,has not left the Philippines; and thathis
tourist visa has beenextended but hecouldnot producethesamein courtas itwas misplaced, has
neither produced any certificationthereof, nor any temporaryworking visa.
The trial court, inits decisiondated 14June1993, granting the petitionfor extraditionrequested by the
Government of Australia, concluding thatthedocuments submitted by the AustralianGovernment
meet the requirements ofArticle7 oftheTreaty ofExtraditionand thattheoffenses for which the
petitionerwere sought in his country areextraditableoffenses underArticle2 ofthesaid Treaty.
The trial court, moreover, held thatunder the provisions ofthesameArticle,extraditioncouldbe
granted irrespectiveofwhentheoffense — in relation totheextradition— was committed,
provided that theoffensehappened to beanoffensein therequesting Stateatthetimetheacts
or omissions constituting the samewere committed. 13
Petitioner challenged thedecision ofthe Regional Trial Court before the CourtofAppeals assigning the
following errors:
I. THAT THE HONORABLERESPONDENTJUDGEGRAVELYERRED IN GIVING RETROACTIVEFORCEAND
EFFECT TO THE EXTRADITION TREATYDESPITETHEFACT THAT THEEVIDENCEADDUCED BY THE
RESPONDENT SHOW THATTHEALLEGED OFFENSES FOR WHICH PETITIONER IS SOUGHTTO BE
EXTRADITED TOOK PLACEIN 1988-1989 ATTHETIMETHERE WAS NO EXTRADITION TREATY
BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA.
II. THAT THE ACT OF THE HONORABLERESPONDENTJUDGEIN GIVING RETROACTIVEFORCEAND EFFECT
TO THEEXTRADITION TREATY BETWEEN THE REPUBLIC OF THEPHILIPPINES AND AUSTRALIA
AMOUNTS TO AN "EX POST FACTO LAW"AND VIOLATES SECTION 21, ARTICLEVII OF THE1987
CONSTITUTION.
III. THAT THEHON. RESPONDENTJUDGEGRAVELYERRED IN ORDERING THEEXTRADITION OF
PETITIONER DESPITETHEFACTTHAT THE EVIDENCEADDUCED DO NOTSHOW THATPETITIONER IS
WANTED FOR PROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
IV. THAT THE HON. RESPONDENTJUDGEGRAVELYABUSED HIS DISCRETION,AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION, IN MISINTERPRETING THEEXTENDED STAYOF PETITIONER AS EVIDENCEOF
PETITIONER'S DESIGN TO HIDEAND EVADEPROSECUTION IN AUSTRALIA.
V. THAT THEHON. RESPONDENTJUDGEGRAVELYERRED IN ORDERING THEEXTRADITION OF
PETITIONER WITHOUTSPECIFYING IN HIS ORDER OR DECISION THESPECIFIC CHARGES FOR WHICH
PETITIONER IS TO STAND TRIAL IN AUSTRALIA.
The Court ofAppeals affirmed thetrialcourt's decisionon September14, 1993and deniedpetitioner's
Motion for Reconsideration on December 16, 1993. 14 Reiterating substantially thesame
assignments oferror which heinterposedin theCourtofAppeals,petitioner challenges inthis
petitionthevalidity oftheextradition orderissuedby thetrial courtas affirmedby theCourt of
Appeals under the Treaty.Petitioner vigorously argues thatthetrialcourtorder violates the
Constitutionalprohibition againstex post factolaws. Heavers that for the extradition orderto be
valid, theAustraliangovernment shouldshow thathe"has a criminal casepending beforea
competent court"in thatcountry "which canlegally pass judgementor acquittalor conviction
upon him."
Clearly,a closereading ofthe provisions ofthe Treaty previously cited,whicharerelevantto our
determinationofthe validityofthe extradition order, reveals thatthetrial courtcommittedno
error in ordering thepetitioner's extradition. Conformablywith Article 2, Section 2ofthe said
Treaty, thecrimes for which the petitioner was charged and for which warrants for his arrest were
issuedin Australia wereundeniably offenses intheRequesting Stateat thetimethey werealleged
to have been committed. From its examination ofthecharges againstthepetitioner,thetrialcourt
correctly determined that thecorresponding offenses underour penallaws areArticles 315(2) and
183 ofthe RevisedPenal Codeon swindling/estafa and false testimony/perjury, respectively. 15
The provisions ofArticle 6 ofthe saidTreaty pertaining to thedocuments required for extradition are
sufficientlyclear and requireno interpretation. Thewarrantfor thearrestofan individualor a
copy thereof, a statement ofeach and every offenseand a statement ofthe acts andomissions
which werealleged againsttheperson inrespect ofeach offenseare sufficientto showthata
person is wantedfor prosecution under the said article. Allofthesedocumentaryrequirements
were dully submittedto the trialcourt inits proceedings a quo. Forpurposes ofthecompliance
with the provisions oftheTreaty, the signature andofficialsealofthe Attorney-Generalof
Australia were sufficientto authenticate allthedocuments annexed totheStatement oftheActs
and Omissions, including thestatementitself. 16 In conformity withtheprovisions ofArticle7 of
the Treaty,theappropriatedocuments and annexes weresigned by "anofficer inor ofthe
Requesting State" 17 "sealedwith. . . (a) publicseal ofthe Requesting Stateor ofa Minister of
State, or ofa Department or officerofthe Government oftheRequesting State," 18 and "certified
by a diplomaticor consularofficer oftheRequesting State accredited to theRequested
State." 19 Thelast requirement was accomplishedby thecertification made bythePhilippine
Consular Officer inCanberra,Australia.
The petitioner's contentionthata personsoughtto beextradited shouldhavea "criminal casepending
before a competentcourt intheRequesting Statewhichcan legally pass judgement ofacquittal or
conviction" 20 stretches the meaning ofthe phrase "wantedfor prosecution"beyond the intended
by the treaty provisions because therelevant provisions merely require"a warrant for the arrest
or a copy ofthe warrant for thearrest oftheperson sought tobe extradited." 21 Furthermore, the
'Charge and WarrantofArrest Sheets'attest to the factthat petitioneris not only wanted for
prosecution but has, infact, absconded toevade arrestandcriminal prosecution.Since a chargeor
information under the Treaty is required only whenappropriate, i.e., incases wherean individual
charged beforea competent courtin the Requesting Statethereafter absconds to the Requested
State, a chargeor a copy thereofis not requirediftheoffender has infactalready absconded
before a criminal complaintcould befiled. As theCourtofAppeals correctly noted, limiting the
phrase "wanted for prosecution"to person charged with an information ora criminalcomplaint
renders theTreaty ineffective over individuals who abscondfor thepurposeofevading arrest and
prosecution. 22
This brings us toanother pointraisedby thepetitioner bothin thetrial court and intheCourt of
Appeals. May the extradition ofthe petitionerwho is wanted for prosecutionby thegovernment
ofAustralia begrantedin spiteofthe factthat the offenses for which thepetitioner is sought in his
country wereallegedly committed priorto thedateofeffectivity oftheTreaty.
Petitioner takes theposition thatunder Article18ofthe Treaty its enforcementcannot begiven
retroactive effect. Article 18 states:

6. ENTRY INTO FORCEAND TERMINATION
This Treaty shall enter intoforcethirty(30) days after the date on whichtheContracting States have
notified each other in writing that their respectiverequirements for theentry intoforceofthis
Treaty havebeencomplied with.
Either contracting Statemayterminatethis Treatyby notice inwriting atany timeand it shall cease to
be in force on the one hundredand eightiethday after the dayon whichnoticeis given.
We fail to seehow thepetitioner can infer a prohibition againstretroactiveenforcementfrom this
provision. Thefirst paragraph ofArticle18refers to theTreaty's dateofeffectivity; thesecond
paragraph pertains toits termination.Absolutely nothing in thesaid provisionrelates to, much
less, prohibits retroactiveenforcement oftheTreaty.
On the other hand, Article2(4) oftheTreaty unequivocally provides that:
4. Extradition may begranted pursuant to provisions ofthis Treaty irrespectiveofwhentheoffensein
relation towhich extradition is requestedwas committed, provided that:
(a) it was anoffensein the Requesting State at the timeof theacts or omissions constituting the
offense; and
(b) the acts or omissions allegedwould,ifthey had taken placein the Territory oftheRequestedStateat
the time of themaking oftherequest for extradition, haveconstituted an offenseagainstthe laws
in force in that state.
Thus, the offenses for which petitioner is soughtby his governmentare clearly extraditableunder Article
2 of the Treaty.They wereoffenses in the Requesting Stateat thetime theywerecommitted, and,
irrespectiveof thetimethey were committed,they fall under thepanoply oftheExtradition
Treaty's provisions, specifically, Article2 paragraph4, quotedabove.
Does the Treaty's retroactiveapplication violate the Constitutionalprohibition against ex post facto
laws? Early commentators understood ex post factolaws to include alllaws ofretrospective
application, whether civilor criminal. 23 However, ChiefJusticeSalmon P.Chase,citing Blackstone,
The Federalistand other early U.S. state constitutions in Caldervs. Bull 24 concludedthat the
concept was limited only topenal and criminal statutes. As conceived underour Constitution, ex
post facto laws are 1) statutes that make an actpunishableas a crime whensuchact was not an
offense whencommitted; 2) laws which, while not creating new offenses,aggravate the
seriousness of a crime; 3) statutes which prescribes greater punishmentfor a crimealready
committed; or, 4) laws which alter the rules ofevidenceso as tomake it substantially easier to
convict a defendant. 25 "Applying theconstitutional principle,the(Court) has held thatthe
prohibitionapplies onlyto criminallegislation which affects the substantialrights ofthe
accused." 26 This being so, thereis no absolutely no merit in petitioner's contention thattheruling
of the lower courtsustaining theTreaty's retroactiveapplication with respectto offenses
committed priorto the Treaty's coming intoforceand effect, violates theConstitutional
prohibitionagainst ex post facto laws. As the CourtofAppeals correctly concluded,theTreaty is
neither a piece ofcriminallegislation nora criminalprocedural statute. "It merely provides for the
extradition of persons wanted for prosecution ofan offenseor a crime which offenseor crime was
already committedor consummated at the timethe treaty was ratified." 27
In signing theTreaty, the governmentofthePhilippines has determined that itis withinits interests to
enter intoagreementwith the governmentofAustralia regarding therepatriationofpersons
wanted for criminaloffenses in either country. Thesaid Treaty was concurred and ratified by the
Senate ina Resolutiondated September10,1990. Having beenratifiedin accordance withthe
provision of the1987Constitution, theTreaty took effect thirty days aftertherequirements for
entry into force werecompliedwithby both governments.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversibleerror inthedecisionofrespondentCourt ofAppeals, wehereby
AFFIRMthe sameand DENYtheinstantpetition for lackofmerit.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr.,Bellosilloand Quiason, JJ., concur.
Cruz, J., is on leave.
EN BANC
[G.R. No. 148571. September24,2002]
GOVERNMENTOF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, represented by thePhilippineDepartment of
Justice, petitioner,vs. Hon. GUILLERMOG. PURGANAN, Morales, and Presiding Judge,Regional
Trial Court ofManila, Branch 42; and MARK B. JIMENEZ a.k.a. MARIOBATACAN
CRESPO, respondents.
D E C I S I ON
PANGANIBAN, J.:
In extraditionproceedings,areprospectiveextraditees entitled tonotice andhearing before warrants
for their arrest canbe issued? Equallyimportant,arethey entitled to therightto bail and
provisional liberty whilethe extradition proceedings are pending? In general, theanswer to these
two novel questions is “No.” The explanation ofand the reasons for, as wellas the exceptions to,
this rulearelaid outin this Decision.
The Case
Before us is a Petitionfor CertiorariunderRule65oftheRules ofCourt, seeking tovoidandset aside
the Orders datedMay 23,2001[1] and July3, 2001[2] issuedby theRegional TrialCourt (RTC) of
Manila, Branch42.[3] Thefirst assailed Orderset for hearing petitioner’s applicationfor the
issuanceofa warrant for the arrest ofRespondent Mark B. Jimenez.
The secondchallenged Order,on theother hand, directed theissuanceofa warrant,butat thesame
time grantedbailto Jimenez. The dispositiveportion oftheOrder reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, in the lightofthe foregoing,the[Court]finds probablecauseagainst respondentMark
Jimenez. Accordingly let a Warrant for the arrest oftherespondent beissued. Consequently and
taking intoconsideration Section9, Rule 114oftheRevisedRules ofCriminal Procedure, this Court
fixes the reasonableamount ofbailfor respondent’s temporary liberty atONEMILLION PESOS
(Php 1,000,000.00), thesameto bepaid in cash.
“Furthermorerespondent is directedto immediatelysurrender tothis Court his passport andthe
Bureau ofImmigrationand Deportation is likewisedirected toincludethenameoftherespondent
in its HoldDepartureList.”[4]
Essentially, thePetitionprays for thelifting ofthe bail Order, thecancellation ofthebond, andthe
taking ofJimenez into legal custody.
The Facts
This Petition is really a sequel toGR No. 139465 entitled Secretary ofJustice v. RalphC. Lantion.[5]
Pursuant to theexisting RP-US Extradition Treaty,[6] theUnited States Government, through diplomatic
channels, sentto the PhilippineGovernmentNoteVerbaleNo. 0522 datedJune 16, 1999,
supplemented by NoteNos. 0597, 0720 and 0809 andaccompanied by duly authenticated
documents requesting theextraditionofMark B. Jimenez, alsoknownas MarioBatacan
Crespo. UponreceiptoftheNotes anddocuments, the secretaryofforeign affairs (SFA)
transmittedthem tothesecretary ofjustice (SOJ) for appropriateaction, pursuantto Section5 of
PresidentialDecree(PD) No. 1069, alsoknownas theExtradition Law.
Upon learning ofthe requestfor his extradition, Jimenez sought and was granteda Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO) by theRTC ofManila, Branch25.[7] TheTRO prohibited the Department of
Justice(DOJ) fromfiling with the RTC a petition for his extradition. The validity oftheTRO was,
however, assailedby theSOJ ina Petition before this Court in thesaid GR No.
139465. Initially, theCourt --by a vote of9-6--dismissedthePetition. The SOJ was ordered to
furnish privaterespondent copies oftheextraditionrequest and its supporting papers andto grant
the latter a reasonable periodwithin whichto file a commentandsupporting evidence.[8]
Acting on the Motionfor Reconsiderationfiled by theSOJ, this Court issuedits October 17, 2000
Resolution.[9] By an identicalvote of9-6 --after threejustices changed their votes --it
reconsidered and reversed its earlier Decision. It heldthat private respondentwas bereft ofthe
right to noticeandhearing during the evaluation stageofthe extradition process. This Resolution
has becomefinalandexecutory.
Finding no morelegal obstacle, theGovernmentoftheUnitedStates ofAmerica,representedby the
PhilippineDOJ, filed withtheRTC on May18,2001, theappropriate Petitionfor Extraditionwhich
was docketed as ExtraditionCaseNo. 01192061. The Petition alleged, inter alia,thatJimenez was
the subjectofan arrest warrant issuedby theUnited States DistrictCourt for theSouthernDistrict
ofFlorida on April 15, 1999.The warrant hadbeen issuedin connection withthefollowing charges
in Indictment No. 99-00281CR-SEITZ: (1) conspiracy to defraudtheUnited States and tocommit

7. certainoffenses in violation ofTitle 18US Code Section371; (2) tax evasion, inviolationofTitle26
US Code Section 7201; (3) wire fraud, inviolationofTitle18US CodeSections 1343 and 2; (4) false
statements, in violationofTitle18US CodeSections 1001 and2; and (5) illegal campaign
contributions, inviolationofTitle2 US Code Sections 441b,441fand 437g(d) andTitle 18US Code
Section 2. In order to prevent theflight ofJimenez, the Petitionprayed for the issuanceofan
order for his “immediatearrest” pursuantto Section6 ofPD No. 1069.
Before the RTC couldact on thePetition, RespondentJimenez filed beforeit an “Urgent
Manifestation/Ex-ParteMotion,”[10] which prayed that petitioner’s application for an arrest
warrantbe setfor hearing.
In its assailed May 23, 2001Order, the RTC granted theMotionofJimenez and set thecasefor hearing
on June 5, 2001. In thathearing, petitioner manifested its reservations ontheprocedure adopted
by the trialcourt allowing theaccusedin an extradition case tobe heardprior totheissuance ofa
warrantof arrest.
After the hearing, the courta quo required the parties to submit their respectivememoranda. In his
Memorandum,Jimenez sought an alternativeprayer: thatin casea warrant should issue, hebe
allowedto postbailin the amount of P100,000.
The alternative prayerofJimenez was also setfor hearing onJune 15, 2001. Thereafter, the courtbelow
issuedits questionedJuly 3,2001Order, directing the issuanceofa warrant for his arrestand
fixing bailfor his temporary liberty at onemillion pesos in cash.[11] After hehad surrendered his
passport andposted the requiredcashbond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty via the
challenged Order datedJuly 4, 2001.[12]
Hence, this Petition.[13]
Issues
Petitioner presents thefollowing issues for the considerationofthis Court:
I.
“The publicrespondent actedwithout or in excess ofjurisdiction orwith graveabuse ofdiscretion
amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdictionin adopting a procedureoffirst hearing a potential
extraditee beforeissuing an arrest warrant under Section6 ofPD No. 1069.
II.
“The publicrespondent actedwithout or in excess ofjurisdiction orwith graveabuse ofdiscretion
amounting to lack or excess ofjurisdictionin granting theprayer for bailand inallowing Jimenez to
go on provisionalliberty because:
‘1. An extraditioncourt has no power to authorizebail, in theabsence ofany lawthat provides for such
power.
‘2. Section 13,ArticleIII (right tobailclause) ofthe1987Philippine Constitution andSection 4,Rule114
(Bail) of the Rules ofCourt, as amended, which [were]relied upon, cannot beusedas bases for
allowing bailin extradition proceedings.
‘3. The presumption is againstbailin extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to extradition.
‘4. On the assumption thatbailis availablein extradition proceedings or proceedings leading to
extradition,bailis not a matterofrightbut only ofdiscretionuponclear showing by theapplicant
of the existenceofspecialcircumstances.
‘5. Assuming that bail is a matterofdiscretionin extradition proceedings, the publicrespondent
received no evidenceof‘specialcircumstances’ which may justify release onbail.
‘6. The risk that Jimenez willfleeis high, andno specialcircumstanceexists thatwill engendera well-
founded belief that hewillnot flee.
‘7. The conditions attachedto the grantofbailareineffectual and donotensure compliance by the
Philippines with its obligations under the RP-US ExtraditionTreaty.
‘8. The Court of Appeals Resolutionpromulgated onMay 10, 2001 inthecase entitled ‘EduardoT.
Rodriguez et al.vs. The Hon.PresidingJudge,RTC, Branch 17, Manila,’ CA-G.R.SP No. 64589, relied
upon by the public respondentin granting bail, had been recalled beforetheissuanceofthe
subjectbailorders.’”[14]
In sum, the substantivequestions that this Court willaddress are: (1) whether Jimenez is entitled to
notice and hearing beforea warrant for his arrestcan beissued, and (2) whether heis entitled to
bail andto provisionallibertywhiletheextraditionproceedings arepending. Preliminarily, weshall
take up thealleged prematurityofthe Petitionfor Certiorariarising from petitioner’s failureto file
a Motion for Reconsiderationin theRTC and toseek reliefin the CourtofAppeals (CA), instead of
in this Court.[15] We shall also preliminarily discuss fiveextraditionpostulates that willguideus in
disposing ofthesubstantiveissues.
The Court’sRuling
The Petition is meritorious.
Preliminary Matters
Alleged Prematurity ofPresent Petition
Petitioner submits the following justifications for not filing a Motionfor Reconsiderationin the
Extradition Court: “(1) the issues werefullyconsidered by such courtafter requiring the parties to
submit their respectivememoranda and position papers on the matter andthus, thefiling ofa
reconsiderationmotionwould serveno useful purpose; (2) theassailed orders area patent nullity,
absentfactualandlegal basis therefor; and (3) theneedfor reliefis extremelyurgent,as the
passage ofsufficienttime would giveJimenez ample opportunity to escapeand avoid extradition;
and (4) the issues raised arepurely oflaw.”[16]
For resorting directly tothis Courtinsteadofthe CA, petitionersubmits the following reasons: “(1) even
ifthe petitionis lodgedwith theCourt ofAppeals andsuch appellate courttakes cognizanceofthe
issues and decides them, theparties would stillbring thematter to this HonorableCourt tohave
the issues resolvedonce andfor all [and]to havea binding precedentthat alllower courts ought
to follow; (2) the HonorableCourtofAppeals hadin one case[17] ruledon the issueby disallowing
bail but the courtbelowrefused torecognizethedecisionas a judicial guideand allother courts
might likewiseadoptthesame attitudeofrefusal; and (3) thereare pending issues on bailboth in
the extradition courts and theCourtofAppeals,which, unless guided by the decision thatthis
Honorable Courtwill renderin this case,would resolveto grant bail in favor ofthepotential
extraditees and would givethemopportunity tofleeand thus, cause adverseeffect on theability
ofthe Philippines to comply with its obligations under existing extraditiontreaties.”[18]
As a general rule, a petitionfor certiorari beforea higher courtwillnot prosper unless the inferior court
has beengiven,through a motion for reconsideration,a chanceto correct theerrors imputed to
it. This rule, though,has certainexceptions: (1) whentheissueraised is purely oflaw, (2) when
public interestis involved,or (3) in caseofurgency.[19] As a fourthexception, the Courthas also
ruled that thefiling ofa motionfor reconsideration beforeavailment oftheremedy ofcertiorariis
not a sine qua non,when the questions raisedare the sameas those that havealready been
squarely argued andexhaustively passed upon by the lower court.[20] Asidefrombeing ofthis
nature, theissues inthepresent casealsoinvolve purequestions oflaw that are ofpublic
interest. Hence,a motion for reconsiderationmaybe dispensed with.
Likewise,this Courthas allowed a directinvocation ofits original jurisdictionto issuewrits ofcertiorari
when thereare special andimportant reasons therefor.[21] In Fortich v. Corona[22]westated:
“[T]he Supreme Courthas thefull discretionary power to takecognizanceofthepetition filed directly
[before]it ifcompelling reasons, orthenature andimportanceoftheissues raised, warrant. This
has beenthejudicialpolicy to beobserved andwhich has beenreiteratedin subsequent cases,
namely: Uy vs. Contreras, et. al.,Torres vs. Arranz,Bercerovs. De Guzman, and, Advinculavs.
Legaspi, et. al. As we havefurther stated inCuaresma:
‘x x x. Adirect invocationofthe SupremeCourt’s originaljurisdiction to issuethesewrits should be
allowedonly when there arespecialand importantreasons therefor,clearly and specifically set
out in the petition. This is established policy. x x x.’
“Pursuantto said judicial policy,we resolve totake primary jurisdiction over thepresentpetition inthe
interest ofspeedy justiceand toavoidfuture litigations so as topromptly put an end tothe
presentcontroversy which, as correctlyobserved by petitioners,has sparked nationalinterest
because ofthemagnitudeoftheproblem created by theissuanceoftheassailed
resolution. Moreover, x x x requiring the petitioners to filetheir petitionfirstwith the Courtof
Appeals would only result ina wasteoftime andmoney.
“That the Courthas the power to setasideits own rules inthehigherinterests ofjusticeis well-
entrenchedin our jurisprudence. We reiteratewhatwe saidin Piczon vs. CourtofAppeals:[23]
‘Be it remembered that rules ofprocedurearebut meretools designed tofacilitate theattainmentof
justice. Their strictandrigid application, whichwould result intechnicalities that tend tofrustrate
rather thanpromote substantial justice, mustalways beavoided. Timeand again,this Courthas

8. suspended its own rules andexcepted a particularcasefromtheir operation wheneverthehigher
interests of justice so require. In theinstantpetition, weforego a lengthy disquisitionofthe
proper procedurethatshould havebeentakenby theparties involvedandproceeddirectly to the
merits of thecase.’
In a number of other exceptional cases,[24] weheld as follows:
“This Court has original jurisdiction, concurrentwith thatofRegional Trial Courts andtheCourt of
Appeals, over petitions for certiorari, prohibition,mandamus,quowarrantoand habeas corpus,
and we entertaindirect resortto us in cases wherespecialandimportantreasons orexceptional
and compelling circumstances justify thesame.”
In the interestof justiceand to settleonceand for alltheimportantissueofbail in extradition
proceedings, wedeemit best totake cognizanceofthepresent case. Suchproceedings constitute
a matterof firstimpressionover whichthereis, as yet, nolocal jurisprudenceto guidelower
courts.
FivePostulates ofExtradition
The substantive issues raised in this caserequirean interpretation or construction ofthe treaty and the
law on extradition. Acardinal rulein theinterpretation ofa treatyor a lawis to ascertain and give
effect to its intent.[25] Since PD1069is intended as a guidefor theimplementationofextradition
treaties to which thePhilippines is a signatory,[26] understanding certainpostulates ofextradition
will aid us inproperly deciding theissues raisedhere.
1. Extradition IsaMajor Instrument for the Suppression ofCrime.
First, extraditiontreaties are entered intofor thepurposeofsuppressing crime[27] by facilitating the
arrest andthecustodial transfer[28] ofa fugitive[29] from one state totheother.
With the adventof easierand faster means ofinternational travel, the flightofaffluentcriminals from
one countryto another for thepurposeofcommitting crime andevading prosecution has become
more frequent. Accordingly,governments are adjusting their methods ofdealing with criminals
and crimes that transcendinternationalboundaries.
Today, “a majority ofnations intheworld community havecometolookupon extraditionas the major
effective instrument of international co-operationin the suppression ofcrime.”[30] It is theonly
regular system thathas been devisedto return fugitives to the jurisdictionofa court competent to
try them in accordancewith municipalandinternational law.[31]
“An importantpractical effect x x x oftherecognition oftheprinciple thatcriminals shouldbe restored
to a jurisdictioncompetent totry andpunish themis that the numberofcriminals seeking refuge
abroad willbe reduced. For to theextentthat efficient means ofdetectionand the threatof
punishment playa significant rolein the deterrenceofcrimewithin the territorial limits ofa State,
so the existenceofeffectiveextradition arrangements and theconsequent certainty ofreturnto
the locusdelicticommissi play a corresponding rolein thedeterrenceofflight abroadin order to
escapetheconsequence ofcrime. x x x. From anabsenceofextradition arrangements flight
abroad by the ingenious criminalreceives direct encouragement and thus indirectly does the
commission of crimeitself.”[32]
In Secretary v. Lantion[33] weexplained:
“The Philippines also has a national interest to help insuppressing crimes and oneway to doit is to
facilitate the extradition ofpersons covered by treaties dulyentered[into]by our
government. Moreandmore,crimes arebecoming theconcernofone world. Laws involving
crimes andcrime preventionareundergoing universalization. One manifest purpose ofthis trend
towards globalizationis to deny easyrefugeto a criminalwhoseactivities threatenthepeaceand
progress of civilizedcountries. It is to the great interest ofthePhilippines tobe partofthis
irreversiblemovement inlight ofits vulnerability to crimes,especially transnationalcrimes.”
Indeed, inthis era of globalization, easier and fasterinternationaltravel,and an expanding ring of
internationalcrimes and criminals, wecannot afford to bean isolationist state. Weneedto
cooperatewith otherstates inorder toimprove our chances ofsuppressing crimein our own
country.
2. The Requesting State WillAccord Due Processto the Accused
Second, an extradition treaty presupposes that both parties theretohaveexamined, and that both
accept andtrust, each other’s legal system and judicial process.[34] Morepointedly,our duly
authorized representative’s signature onanextradition treaty signifies our confidenceinthe
capacity andthewillingness oftheother state toprotect the basic rights ofthepersonsoughtto
be extradited.[35] That signature signifies ourfull faith thattheaccusedwill begiven,upon
extradition totherequesting state, allrelevant andbasic rights in thecriminalproceedings that
will takeplace therein;otherwise, thetreatywould not havebeensigned, orwould havebeen
directlyattacked for its unconstitutionality.
3. The ProceedingsAreSui Generis
Third, as pointed out in Secretary ofJustice v. Lantion,[36] extradition proceedings arenotcriminalin
nature. In criminalproceedings, theconstitutionalrights oftheaccused areatfore; in extradition
which is suigeneris --in a class by itself --they are not.
“An extradition[proceeding]is sui generis. It is nota criminalproceeding which willcallinto operation
all the rights ofanaccused as guaranteed bytheBillofRights. To begin with,theprocess of
extradition does not involve the determinationoftheguilt or innocence ofanaccused. His guilt or
innocence will beadjudged in thecourt ofthestatewherehe willbeextradited. Hence,as a rule,
constitutional rights thatare only relevant to determinetheguilt or innocence ofan accused
cannot beinvoked by an extraditeex x x.
x x x x x x x x x
“There areotherdifferences between anextraditionproceeding anda criminalproceeding. An
extradition proceeding is summary innature whilecriminal proceedings involve a full-blown
trial. In contradistinctionto a criminal proceeding, therules ofevidence inanextradition
proceeding allowadmission ofevidenceunderless stringentstandards. In terms ofthequantum
ofevidenceto besatisfied,a criminalcase requires proof beyondreasonable doubt for conviction
while a fugitivemay beorderedextradited ‘uponshowing oftheexistenceofa prima facie
case.’ Finally, unlikein a criminal casewherejudgmentbecomes executoryuponbeing rendered
final, in anextraditionproceeding, ourcourts may adjudgeanindividual extraditable but the
Presidenthas thefinal discretionto extradite him. The United States adheres to a similar practice
whereby theSecretary ofState exercises widediscretionin balancing the equities ofthe caseand
the demands ofthenation’s foreign relations beforemaking theultimatedecisionto extradite.”
Given the foregoing, it is evidentthattheextraditioncourt is not called upon toascertaintheguilt or
the innocenceofthe person soughtto beextradited.[37] Such determination during theextradition
proceedings willonly result in needless duplicationand delay. Extradition is merelya measureof
internationaljudicialassistancethroughwhicha personcharged withor convicted ofa crimeis
restored to a jurisdiction with the best claimto try thatperson. It is not partofthe functionofthe
assisting authorities to enter into questions thataretheprerogative ofthat
jurisdiction.[38] Theultimate purpose ofextradition proceedings in court is onlyto determine
whether the extraditionrequestcomplies withthe Extradition Treaty, andwhether the person
sought is extraditable.[39]
4. Compliance ShallBe in Good Faith.
Fourth, our executive branchofgovernment voluntarily enteredintotheExtradition Treaty, and our
legislativebranch ratified it. Hence, the Treaty carries thepresumptionthatits implementation
will serve the national interest.
Fulfilling our obligations undertheExtraditionTreatypromotes comity[40]with therequesting state. On
the other hand, failureto fulfillourobligations thereunderpaints a badimageofour country
before the worldcommunity. Suchfailure would discourage other states from entering into
treaties with us, particularly anextradition treaty thathinges on reciprocity.[41]
Verily, we arebound by pacta sunt servanda tocomply in good faithwithour obligations under the
Treaty.[42] This principlerequires that wedelivertheaccusedto therequesting country ifthe
conditions precedentto extradition, as set forth intheTreaty, are satisfied. In otherwords, “[t]he
demanding government, when it has doneallthat the treaty and the lawrequireit todo, is
entitled tothedelivery ofthe accused ontheissueofthe proper warrant,and theother
governmentis underobligationto makethesurrender.”[43] Accordingly, the Philippines must be
ready andin a position todeliver theaccused,should itbe found proper.
5. There Isan Underlying Risk ofFlight
Fifth, persons to beextraditedare presumed to beflight risks. This prima faciepresumption finds
reinforcement in theexperience[44] oftheexecutivebranch:nothing short ofconfinement can

9. ensure that theaccusedwill not flee thejurisdictionoftherequested statein order to thwarttheir
extradition totherequesting state.
The present extradition casefurther validates the premisethatpersons sought to beextraditedhave a
propensity to flee. Indeed,extraditionhearings would noteven begin, ifonly the accused were
willing to submit to trialin the requesting country.[45] Prioracts ofherein respondent-- (1) leaving
the requesting staterightbeforetheconclusion ofhis indictment proceedings there; and(2)
remaining intherequested statedespitelearning thattherequesting stateis seeking his return
and that the crimes he is chargedwith arebailable -- eloquently speakofhis aversion tothe
processes in therequesting state, as well as his predispositionto avoid thematall cost. These
circumstances point to an ever-present, underlying highrisk offlight. Hehas demonstrated that
he has thecapacity and thewillto flee. Having fled once, whatis thereto stophim, given
sufficientopportunity, from fleeing a secondtime?
First Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Noticeand Hearing
Before theIssuanceofa Warrant ofArrest?
Petitioner contends that the procedureadopted by the RTC --informing theaccused, a fugitivefrom
justice, thatanExtraditionPetition has beenfiled againsthim, and that petitioner is seeking his
arrest --gives him noticeto escapeand to avoid extradition. Moreover,petitioner pleads that
such proceduremay set a dangerous precedent, in that thosesought tobeextradited -- including
terrorists, mass murderers and war criminals -- may invokeit in future extradition cases.
On the other hand, RespondentJimenez argues thathe shouldnotbe hurriedlyandarbitrarily deprived
of his constitutional right toliberty withoutdueprocess. He furtherasserts thatthereis as yet no
specificlaw or rulesetting forththeprocedure priorto theissuanceofa warrant ofarrest, after
the petition for extraditionhas been filedin court; ergo, the formulation ofthatprocedure is
within thediscretion ofthepresiding judge.
Both parties citeSection 6ofPD 1069in supportoftheirarguments. It states:
“SEC. 6. Issuance of Summons; TemporaryArrest; Hearing,Service ofNotices.-(1) Immediately upon
receiptof the petition, thepresiding judge ofthecourtshall,as soonas practicable, summon the
accused toappearand to answer the petitionon the day andhourfixed in theorder. [H]e
may issue awarrant for the immediate arrest ofthe accused which may be served any where
within the Philippinesifit appearsto the presiding judgethat theimmediate arrest and
temporary detention ofthe accused will best serve the endsofjustice. Uponreceiptofthe
answer,or shouldtheaccused after having receivedthesummons fail toanswerwithin thetime
fixed, the presiding judge shallhearthecase orset another datefor thehearing thereof.
“(2) The order andnoticeas well as a copy ofthewarrantofarrest, ifissued, shall bepromptly served
each upontheaccused andtheattorney having charge ofthecase.” (Emphasis ours)
Does this provisionsanctionRTC JudgePurganan’s actofimmediately setting for hearing theissuance of
a warrant of arrest? Weruleinthenegative.
1. On the Basisof the Extradition Law
It is significant to notethatSection 6 ofPD1069, ourExtraditionLaw, uses theword“immediate”to
qualify thearrestoftheaccused. This qualification wouldbe renderednugatory bysetting for
hearing the issuanceofthe arrestwarrant. Hearing entails sending notices totheopposing
parties,[46] receiving facts and arguments[47] fromthem,[48] and giving themtimeto prepareand
presentsuch facts andarguments. Arrestsubsequentto a hearing canno longer beconsidered
“immediate.” The law couldnothave intendedthewordas a mere superfluity but,on thewhole,
as a means of imparting a senseofurgency andswiftness in thedeterminationofwhether a
warrantof arrest shouldbe issued.
By using the phrase “ifit appears,” thelawfurther conveys thataccuracy is not as important as speed at
such early stage. The trial courtis notexpected tomakean exhaustive determinationto ferret out
the true and actual situation, immediatelyuponthefiling ofthepetition. From theknowledge and
the materialthen availableto it,thecourt is expected merelyto geta goodfirst impression --
a prima facie finding -- sufficientto makea speedy initialdeterminationas regards thearrest and
detention of theaccused.
Attachedto thePetition for Extradition, with a Certificate ofAuthenticationamong others, werethe
following: (1) Annex H, the Affidavit executed on May 26, 1999by Mr. Michael E. Savage --trial
attorneyin the CampaignFinancing Task ForceoftheCriminal Divisionofthe US Department of
Justice; (2) Annexes H to G, evidentiary Appendices ofvarious exhibits that constituted evidenceof
the crimes charged intheIndictment, withExhibits 1to 120 (duly authenticatedexhibits that
constituted evidenceofthecrimes charged in theIndictment); (3) Annex BB, the ExhibitI
“AppendixofWitness [excerpts]Statements Referenced intheAffidavitofAngela Byers” and
enclosed Statements intwovolumes; (4) AnnexGG, the Exhibit J“TableofContents for
SupplementalEvidentiary Appendix”with enclosed Exhibits 121to 132; and(5) AnnexMM, the
Exhibit L “AppendixofWitness [excerpts]Statements Referenced intheAffidavitofBetty Steward”
and enclosedStatements in two volumes.[49]
It is evidentthat respondentjudge could havealready gotten an impression from theserecords
adequatefor himto makeaninitial determination ofwhether theaccusedwas someonewho
should immediately bearrested inorder to“best serve the ends ofjustice.” He could have
determined whether such facts andcircumstances existed as would lead a reasonablydiscreetand
prudent personto believe that theextradition request was prima faciemeritorious. In pointof
fact, he actually concluded fromthese supporting documents that“probablecause”didexist. In
the second questioned Order, hestated:
“In the instantpetition,thedocuments sentby theUS Government in supportof[its]request for
extradition ofhereinrespondent areenough toconvincetheCourt oftheexistenceofprobable
cause toproceedwiththehearing against the extraditee.”[50]
We stress that the prima facieexistence ofprobablecause for hearing the petitionand, a priori, for
issuing an arrest warrant was alreadyevidentfrom thePetitionitselfand its supporting
documents. Hence, after having already determined therefrom that a primafacie finding did exist,
respondentjudge gravelyabusedhis discretionwhen heset the matter for hearing upon motion of
Jimenez.[51]
Moreover, thelawspecifies thatthecourt sets a hearing upon receipt oftheanswer or upon failureof
the accused toanswerafter receiving thesummons. In connection withthematterofimmediate
arrest,however,theword“hearing”is notably absentfrom theprovision. Evidently,hadthe
holding ofa hearing at that stagebeen intended, the lawcould have easily so provided. It also
bears emphasizing at this point thatextraditionproceedings aresummary[52]in nature. Hence, the
silenceoftheLaw andtheTreatyleans tothemore reasonableinterpretation that thereis no
intention topunctuatewith a hearing every littlestepin theentireproceedings.
“It is taken for granted thatthecontracting parties intend something reasonable andsomething not
inconsistent withgenerally recognizedprinciples ofInternational Law, norwithprevious treaty
obligations towards third States. If, therefore, the meaning ofa treaty is ambiguous, the
reasonablemeaning is to bepreferred to the unreasonable, the morereasonable totheless
reasonablex x x .”[53]
Verily, as argued by petitioner, sending to persons sought tobe extradited a noticeoftherequest for
their arrest andsetting it for hearing atsomefuturedatewouldgivethem ampleopportunityto
prepareandexecute an escape. NeithertheTreatynor the Lawcould have intendedthat
consequence, for the very purposeofboth wouldhave been defeatedby theescape ofthe
accused fromtherequested state.
2. On the Basisof the Constitution
Even Section2 ofArticleIII ofour Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not requirea noticeor
a hearing before the issuanceofa warrant ofarrest. It provides:
“Sec. 2. The rightofthepeople tobe secure intheir persons,houses, papers, andeffects against
unreasonablesearches andseizures ofwhatevernatureand for any purpose shall beinviolable,
and no search warrant orwarrantofarrest shall issueexceptuponprobable cause tobe
determined personally by thejudge after examinationunder oath or affirmation ofthe
complainantand thewitnesses hemay produce, and particularly describing theplaceto be
searchedand thepersons orthings to beseized.”
To determine probablecausefor theissuance ofarrest warrants, theConstitutionitselfrequires only
the examination --under oathor affirmation--of complainants andthewitnesses they may
produce. There is norequirement tonotify and hear the accused beforetheissuanceofwarrants
ofarrest.

10. In Ho v. People[54] and inall the cases citedtherein, never was a judgerequiredto go totheextent of
conducting a hearing justfor thepurposeofpersonally determining probablecausefor the
issuanceof a warrant ofarrest. All werequired was thatthe“judgemusthave sufficient
supporting documents upon which to makehis independent judgment,or atthevery least, upon
which to verify thefindings oftheprosecutor as to theexistenceofprobablecause.”[55]
In Webb v. De Leon,[56] the Courtcategorically stated thata judgewas not supposed to conducta
hearing beforeissuing a warrantofarrest:
“Again, we stress that beforeissuing warrants ofarrest, judges merely determinepersonally the
probability, not thecertainty ofguilt ofanaccused. In doing so,judges donotconducta de novo
hearing to determine the existence ofprobable cause. They justpersonally reviewtheinitial
determinationofthe prosecutor finding a probablecauseto seeifitis supported by substantial
evidence.”
At most, in cases of clear insufficiency ofevidence onrecord, judges merely further
examinecomplainants and theirwitnesses.[57] In thepresent case, validating the actofrespondent
judge and instituting thepracticeofhearing theaccusedand his witnesses atthis earlystage
would be discordant withtherationale for the entiresystem. Iftheaccused wereallowed to be
heard and necessarily to presentevidenceduring the primafacie determinationfor theissuanceof
a warrant of arrest, whatwould stop himfrom presenting his entireplethora ofdefenses atthis
stage --if he so desires --in his effortto negatea prima facie finding? Such a procedure could
convert thedetermination ofa prima facie caseinto a full-blown trialofthe entireproceedings
and possibly maketrial ofthe main casesuperfluous. This scenario is also anathema to the
summarynatureofextraditions.
That the caseunder consideration is anextraditionand nota criminal actionis notsufficientto justify
the adoptionofa setofprocedures moreprotectiveoftheaccused. Ifa different procedurewere
calledfor at all, a more restrictive one --not theopposite--wouldbe justifiedin viewof
respondent’s demonstratedpredisposition toflee.
Since this is a matter offirst impression,we deem itwiseto restatetheproper procedure:
Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents,thejudgemuststudythem and
make, as soon as possible, a primafacie finding whether (a) they aresufficient inform and
substance,(b) they show compliancewith the Extradition Treaty and Law, and (c) theperson
sought is extraditable. At his discretion, thejudgemay requirethesubmission offurther
documentation or maypersonally examinetheaffiants and witnesses ofthe petitioner. If, in spite
of this study and examination, no prima facie finding[58] is possible, the petitionmay bedismissed
at the discretion ofthejudge.
On the other hand, ifthepresenceofa prima facie caseis determined,then the magistrate must
immediately issuea warrant for the arrest oftheextraditee,who is at the sametime summoned
to answer thepetition andto appear at scheduled summary hearings. Priorto theissuanceofthe
warrant, thejudge must not inform ornotify thepotential extraditeeofthependency ofthe
petition, lest the latter begiven the opportunity to escapeand frustratetheproceedings. In our
opinion, the foregoing procedurewill“best serve the ends ofjustice”in extradition cases.
Second Substantive Issue:
Is Respondent Entitled to Bail?
Article III,Section 13oftheConstitution, is worded as follows:
“Art. III, Sec. 13. Allpersons, except those charged with offenses punishableby reclusion perpetua when
evidenceof guilt is strong, shall,before conviction, bebailableby sufficient sureties,or bereleased
on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right tobailshallnot beimpairedeven whenthe
privilegeof thewritofhabeas corpus is suspended. Excessivebailshallnotbe required.”
RespondentMarkB. Jimenez maintains that this constitutionalprovision secures theright tobail
ofall persons, including thosesoughtto beextradited. Supposedly, theonlyexceptions arethe
ones charged with offenses punishable withreclusion perpetua, when evidenceofguilt is
strong. He also alleges therelevance tothepresent caseofSection4[59] ofRule 114ofthe Rules of
Court which, insofaras practicable andconsistentwith thesummary natureof extradition
proceedings, shall also apply according to Section9 ofPD 1069.
On the other hand, petitionerclaims thatthereis no provision in thePhilippineConstitutiongranting
the right to bail to a person who is the subjectofan extradition request andarrestwarrant.
Extradition Different from Ordinary Criminal Proceedings
We agree withpetitioner. As suggested by theuseofthe word “conviction,”theconstitutional
provision on bail quoted above, as wellas Section 4 ofRule 114ofthe Rules of Court, applies only
when a personhas been arrested anddetainedfor violation ofPhilippinecriminallaws. It does not
apply to extraditionproceedings,becauseextraditioncourts do not render judgments of
conviction or acquittal.
Moreover, theconstitutionalright to bail “flows fromthepresumptionofinnocence in favor ofevery
accused who should not besubjected totheloss offreedomas thereafter hewould beentitledto
acquittal, unless his guilt beproved beyond reasonabledoubt.”[60] It follows thattheconstitutional
provision on bail willnotapplyto a caselike extradition,wherethepresumptionofinnocence is
not at issue.
The provision in the Constitution stating thatthe“rightto bailshallnotbe impaired evenwhen the
privilegeofthewritof habeas corpus is suspended”does notdetractfrom the rulethatthe
constitutional right tobailis availableonly in criminal proceedings. It mustbe noted that the
suspensionofthe privilegeofthewritofhabeas corpus finds application“only topersons judicially
charged for rebellion or offenses inherentin or directlyconnected withinvasion.”[61] Hence, the
second sentence intheconstitutionalprovision on bail merely emphasizes theright tobailin
criminal proceedings for theaforementionedoffenses. It cannot betaken tomeanthat therightis
availableeven inextraditionproceedings that are not criminalin nature.
That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to beextraditedarebailablein the United States is not an
argumentto grant him onein thepresent case. To stress, extradition proceedings are separate
and distinct fromthetrial for the offenses for whichheis charged. He should apply for bail before
the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not beforetheextraditioncourt.
No ViolationofDueProcess
RespondentJimenez cites the foreigncase Paretti[62] in arguing that, constitutionally,
“[n]o one shall be deprivedofx x x liberty x x x without due process oflaw.”
Contrary tohis contention, his detentionprior to theconclusion oftheextraditionproceedings does not
amount to a violationofhis right to due process. Weiterate thefamiliar doctrine that theessence
ofdue process is theopportunity tobeheard[63] but, at thesame time,point out thatthedoctrine
does not always call for a prioropportunity tobeheard.[64] Where the circumstances --such as
those present inan extradition case -- callfor it, a subsequent opportunity to beheard is
enough.[65] In thepresent case, respondentwill begiven full opportunity to beheard subsequently,
when the extraditioncourt hears thePetitionfor Extradition. Hence, thereis no violation ofhis
right to due process andfundamentalfairness.
Contrary tothecontentionofJimenez, wefindno arbitrariness, either, intheimmediatedeprivation of
his liberty prior to his being heard.Thathis arrest and detention willnotbe arbitrary is sufficiently
ensuredby (1) theDOJ’s filing in courtthePetition withits supporting documents after a
determinationthat the extradition requestmeets the requirements ofthelaw and therelevant
treaty; (2) theextraditionjudge’s independent prima faciedeterminationthat his arrestwill best
serve theends ofjusticebeforetheissuance ofa warrantfor his arrest; and (3) his opportunity,
once he is under the court’s custody, to apply for bail as anexceptionto theno-initial-bail rule.
It is also worth noting thatbeforetheUS governmentrequested the extradition ofrespondent,
proceedings had already beenconducted inthat country. But becausehe left the jurisdictionof
the requesting statebefore thoseproceedings could becompleted, itwas hinderedfrom
continuing with the due processes prescribed underits laws. His invocationofdue process now
has thus become hollow. He alreadyhadthatopportunity intherequesting state; yet, instead of
taking it, heran away.
In this light, would itbe proper and just for the governmentto increase therisk ofviolating its treaty
obligations inorder toaccord RespondentJimenez his personalliberty in thespan oftimethat it
takes to resolvethePetition for Extradition? His supposed immediatedeprivation ofliberty
without thedueprocess that hehad previously shunned pales againstthegovernment’s interest in
fulfilling its Extradition Treaty obligations and in cooperating withtheworld communityin the
suppression ofcrime. Indeed, “[c]onstitutionalliberties donot existin a vacuum; the due process
rights accorded to individuals must becarefully balancedagainst exigentand palpable government
interests.”[66]

11. Too, we cannot allow our country tobe a havenfor fugitives, cowards andweaklings who,instead of
facing the consequences oftheir actions, chooseto runandhide. Hence, it would not begood
policy to increase the risk ofviolating ourtreaty obligations if, through overprotection or
excessively liberaltreatment, persons sought to beextradited areableto evadearrestor escape
from our custody. In the absence ofany provision--in the Constitution,thelaw or thetreaty --
expressly guaranteeing theright tobailin extradition proceedings, adopting thepracticeofnot
granting them bail,as a generalrule, would bea step towards deterring fugitives from coming to
the Philippines to hidefrom orevadetheir prosecutors.
The denialof bailas a matter ofcourse in extradition cases falls intoplace withand gives lifeto Article
14[67] of the Treaty, since this practicewouldencourage theaccused tovoluntarily surrender to
the requesting stateto cutshorttheirdetentionhere. Likewise, their detention pending the
resolutionof extradition proceedings wouldfall into placewith the emphasis oftheExtradition
Law on the summary natureofextraditioncases and the need for their speedy disposition.
Exceptionsto the “No Bail”Rule
The rule, we repeat,is that bail is not a matter ofright inextraditioncases. However,thejudiciaryhas
the constitutional duty tocurbgrave abuseofdiscretion[68] andtyranny, as well as thepower to
promulgate rules to protectand enforce constitutionalrights.[69] Furthermore,we believethat the
right to due process is broad enough toincludethegrant ofbasicfairness to extraditees. Indeed,
the right to dueprocess extends to the “life, liberty or property” of every person. It is “dynamic
and resilient,adaptableto everysituation calling for its application.”[70]
Accordingly andto best serve the ends ofjustice,we believeand sohold that, aftera potential
extraditee has beenarrested or placed under thecustodyofthe law, bail may beapplied for and
granted as an exception, only upona clearandconvincing showing (1) that, oncegrantedbail, the
applicant willnot bea flightrisk or a danger to thecommunity; and (2) thatthereexist special,
humanitarianandcompelling circumstances[71]including,as a matter ofreciprocity,thosecited by
the highest courtin therequesting statewhen itgrants provisionallibertyin extradition cases
therein.
Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, andsince itis derivedessentially from
general principles ofjustice andfairness,theapplicant bears theburden ofproving theabovetwo-
tiered requirementwith clarity, precisionandemphaticforcefulness. The Court realizes that
extradition is basically an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising from thepresidential
power to conduct foreignrelations. In its barestconcept, itpartakes ofthenatureofpolice
assistanceamongststates,whichis not normallya judicialprerogative. Hence,anyintrusion by
the courts into the exercise ofthis powershould becharacterizedby caution, so thatthevital
internationaland bilateralinterests ofour country willnot beunreasonably impeded or
compromised. In short,whilethis Court is ever protective of“thesporting idea offair play,”italso
recognizes thelimits ofits own prerogatives and the need tofulfill internationalobligations.
Along this line, Jimenez contends that therearespecialcircumstances that arecompelling enough for
the Court to granthis request for provisional releaseon bail. Wehave carefullyexaminedthese
circumstances and shall now discuss them.
1. Alleged Disenfranchisement
While his extradition was pending, RespondentJimenez was electedas a member oftheHouseof
Representatives. On thatbasis, heclaims thathis detention willdisenfranchise his Manila district
of 600,000residents. We are not persuaded. In People v. Jalosjos,[72] the Courthas already
debunked thedisenfranchisement argument whenit ruled thus:
“When thevoters of his districtelected theaccused-appellantto Congress,they did sowith full
awareness of thelimitations onhis freedom ofaction. They did sowith the knowledge that he
could achieveonly such legislativeresults which hecouldaccomplishwithin theconfines of
prison. To give a more drasticillustration, ifvoters electa personwith fullknowledgethathe is
suffering from a terminal illness,they do so knowing thatat anytime,he may nolongerservehis
full term in office.
“In the ultimate analysis, the issue beforeus boils down toa questionofconstitutional equalprotection.
“The Constitution guarantees: ‘x x x nor shallany person bedeniedtheequal protection oflaws.’ This
simply means thatall persons similarly situated shallbetreated alike bothin rights enjoyedand
responsibilities imposed. Theorgans ofgovernment may notshow any undue favoritism or
hostility toany person. Neither partialitynor prejudiceshallbedisplayed.
“Does being an electiveofficialresult in a substantialdistinctionthat allows differenttreatment? Is
being a Congressman a substantial differentiationwhichremoves theaccused-appellant as a
prisoner from the sameclass as allpersons validly confinedunder law?
“The performanceoflegitimate and even essential duties by publicofficers has neverbeen an excuse to
free a person validly [from]prison. The duties imposed by the ‘mandate ofthe people’ are
multifarious. The accused-appellant asserts thatthedutyto legislateranks highestin the
hierarchy ofgovernment. The accused-appellant is only one of250 members oftheHouseof
Representatives, not tomentionthe24 members oftheSenate,charged withtheduties of
legislation. Congress continues tofunction wellin thephysical absence ofoneor a few ofits
members. Depending ontheexigencyof Government thathas tobeaddressed,thePresident or
the SupremeCourt canalso bedeemedthehighestfor that particular duty. The importanceofa
function depends on theneed for its exercise. The duty ofa motherto nurseher infant is most
compelling under the lawofnature. Adoctor withuniqueskills has theduty to save the lives of
those with a particular affliction. An electivegovernor has to serveprovincialconstituents. A
police officer must maintain peaceand order. Never has thecall ofa particular duty lifted a
prisoner into a different classification fromthoseothers who arevalidlyrestrainedby law.
“Astrict scrutiny ofclassifications is essential lest[,]wittingly or otherwise,insidious discriminations are
made in favor ofor againstgroups ortypes ofindividuals.
“The Court cannot validate badges ofinequality. The necessities imposedby public welfaremay justify
exerciseofgovernmentauthority toregulateevenifthereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded.
“We, therefore,find that electionto thepositionofCongressman is not a reasonableclassification in
criminal lawenforcement. The functions andduties ofthe office arenotsubstantialdistinctions
which lift him fromtheclass ofprisoners interrupted intheirfreedomand restrictedin liberty of
movement. Lawfularrestandconfinement aregermaneto thepurposes ofthelaw and apply to
all those belonging tothesameclass.”[73]
It must be noted thateven beforeprivaterespondent ranfor andwona congressional seatin Manila, it
was alreadyofpublicknowledgethat theUnitedStates was requesting his extradition. Hence, his
constituents wereor shouldhave been preparedfor theconsequences oftheextraditioncase
against their representative, including his detentionpending the finalresolution ofthe
case. Premises consideredand inline withJalosjos,we areconstrained to ruleagainst his claim
that his election topublicofficeis by itselfa compelling reason togrant him bail.
2. AnticipatedDelay
RespondentJimenez further contends thatbecausetheextraditionproceedings arelengthy, itwould be
unfair to confinehimduring thependency ofthecase. Again weare not convinced. We must
emphasizethat extradition cases aresummary innature. They are resorted to merely to
determinewhether theextradition petitionand its annexes conform to theExtraditionTreaty,not
to determineguilt orinnocence. Neitheris it,as a rule, intendedto address issues relevant tothe
constitutional rights available totheaccused in a criminal action.
We are not overruling thepossibility thatpetitioner may, in bad faith, unduly delay the proceedings.
This is quiteanothermatter that is notatissuehere.Thus, any furtherdiscussion ofthis point
would be merely anticipatoryandacademic.
However, ifthe delayis dueto maneuverings ofrespondent,with allthemorereason wouldthe grant
ofbail not bejustified. Giving premium todelay by considering it as a specialcircumstancefor the
grant ofbailwould betantamountto giving him the power to grant bailto himself. It would also
encourage him tostretchout andunreasonablydelay theextraditionproceedings even more. This
we cannotallow.
3. Not a Flight Risk?
Jimenez further claims that heis not a flight risk. To supportthis claim,he stresses thathelearned of
the extradition requestin June1999; yet, hehas not fled the country. True,he has notactually
fled during thepreliminary stages oftherequest for his extradition. Yet, this fact cannotbe taken
to mean thathe willnotfleeas the process moves forwardto its conclusion, as he hears the
footsteps oftherequesting governmentinching closerand closer. Thathe has notyetfledfrom

12. the Philippines cannot betaken tomeanthat hewillstand his ground and stillbe withinreach of
our governmentifandwhenit matters; thatis, upon theresolutionofthe Petitionfor Extradition.
In any event, itis settled thatbailmay beapplied for and granted by the trial court at anytimeafterthe
applicant has been takeninto custodyandprior tojudgment,even after bailhas been previously
denied. In the presentcase, theextraditioncourt may continue hearing evidenceon the
application for bail, which may begranted in accordancewith the guidelines in this Decision.
BriefRefutation ofDissents
The proposalto remandthis caseto the extradition court, webelieve, is totally unnecessary; infact, itis
a cop-out. The parties --in particular, RespondentJimenez --have been given morethan sufficient
opportunity both by thetrialcourt andthis Courtto discuss fully and exhaustively private
respondent’s claimto bail. As already stated, theRTC setfor hearing not only petitioner’s
application for anarrestwarrant, but also privaterespondent’s prayer for temporary
liberty. Thereafter requiredby theRTC were memoranda on the arrest,then positionpapers on
the application for bail, both ofwhich wereseparately filed bytheparties.
This Court has meticulously poredover thePetition, theComment, theReply, thelengthy Memoranda
and the Position Papers ofboth parties. Additionally, it has patiently heard them inOral
Arguments,a procedurenot normally observed inthegreatmajority ofcases in this
Tribunal. Moreover,after theMemos hadbeen submitted, theparties --particularly thepotential
extraditee --have bombarded this Court withadditionalpleadings --entitled“Manifestations” by
both parties and “Counter-Manifestation”by privaterespondent --in whichthemaintopicwas
Mr. Jimenez’s plea for bail.
A remandwould mean that this long, tedious process would berepeated inits entirety. Thetrialcourt
would again hear factual and evidentiary matters. Be itnoted, however, that, in allhis voluminous
pleadings and verbal propositions, privaterespondenthas not askedfor a remand. Evidently,even
he realizes thatthereis absolutelyno needto rehear factualmatters. Indeed, theinadequacy lies
not in the factualpresentationofMr. Jimenez. Rather,it lies in his legalarguments. Remanding
the casewillnot solvethis utter lack ofpersuasionand strength inhis legal reasoning.
In short, this Court --as shown bythis Decision and thespirited Concurring,SeparateandDissenting
Opinions written by the learnedjustices themselves -- has exhaustively deliberated andcarefully
passed upon all relevant questions in this case. Thus,a remandwill not serve any usefulpurpose;
it will onlyfurther delay these already very delayed proceedings,[74] which ourExtraditionLaw
requires to be summary incharacter. What weneed now is prudentanddeliberatespeed, not
unnecessary and convoluted delay. What is needed is a firm decisionon the merits, not a
circuitous cop-out.
Then, thereis alsothesuggestion thatthis Courtis allegedly “disregarding basic freedoms when a case
is one of extradition.” We believethat this charge is not only baseless,butalsounfair. Sufficeit to
say that, in its lengthand breath, this Decisionhas takenspecialcognizance oftherights to due
process and fundamentalfairness ofpotentialextraditees.
Summation
As we draw to a close,it is nowtimeto summarizeand stress theseten points:
1. The ultimate purpose ofextradition proceedings is to determinewhether therequest expressed in
the petition, supported by its annexes andtheevidence that may beadduced during thehearing
of the petition, complies with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and whether thepersonsoughtis
extraditable. The proceedings areintendedmerely to assist the requesting state in bringing the
accused --or thefugitivewho has illegally escaped --backto its territory,sothat the criminal
process may proceedtherein.
2. By entering into an extradition treaty,thePhilippines is deemed to have reposed its trustin the
reliabilityor soundness of the legalandjudicialsystemofits treaty partner,as wellas in theability
and the willingness ofthelatterto grantbasic rights totheaccusedin the pending criminal case
therein.
3. By naturethen, extradition proceedings are not equivalentto a criminal caseinwhich guiltor
innocence is determined. Consequently, an extradition caseis not one in whichtheconstitutional
rights of the accused are necessarily available. It is moreakin, ifatall,to a court’s requestto
police authorities for thearrest ofthe accused whois atlargeor has escaped detention orjumped
bail. Having onceescapedthejurisdiction oftherequesting state, the reasonableprima facie
presumption is thatthepersonwould escapeagain ifgiven the opportunity.
4. Immediately upon receipt ofthepetitionfor extradition andits supporting documents, thejudgeshall
make a prima faciefinding whether the petitionis sufficient inform and substance,whether it
complies withtheExtraditionTreatyand Law,andwhetherthe person sought is extraditable. The
magistrate has discretionto requirethepetitioner tosubmit further documentation, orto
personally examinetheaffiants or witnesses. Ifconvinced thata prima facie caseexists, thejudge
immediately issues a warrant for the arrest ofthepotential extraditee andsummons himor her to
answer andto appear at scheduledhearings on thepetition.
5. After being taken intocustody, potentialextraditees may apply for bail. Since the applicants havea
history ofabsconding, theyhave the burdenofshowing that (a) thereis noflight risk andno
danger to thecommunity;and(b) there existspecial, humanitarian orcompelling
circumstances. The grounds usedby thehighestcourt intherequesting statefor thegrantofbail
therein maybe considered, under theprincipleofreciprocity as a specialcircumstance. In
extradition cases, bailis nota matter ofright; itis subjectto judicialdiscretionin the context ofthe
peculiar facts ofeach case.
6. Potential extraditees areentitled totherights to due process and to fundamental fairness. Due
process does notalways callfor a prioropportunity tobe heard. Asubsequent opportunity is
sufficientdueto the flightrisk involved. Indeed,availableduring the hearings on the petitionand
the answeris thefull chance tobe heardand to enjoy fundamentalfairness that is compatible with
the summary nature ofextradition.
7. This Court willalways remain a protector ofhumanrights, a bastionofliberty, a bulwark of
democracy andtheconscienceofsociety. But it is alsowell awareofthelimitations ofits
authority and oftheneedfor respect for theprerogatives oftheother co-equaland co-
independent organs ofgovernment.
8. We realizethat extradition is essentially an executive,nota judicial, responsibility arising outofthe
presidentialpower toconduct foreignrelations andto implement treaties. Thus, theExecutive
Department ofgovernment has broaddiscretion in its duty andpower ofimplementation.
9. On the otherhand,courts merely perform oversightfunctions and exercisereviewauthority to
prevent or excisegraveabuseand tyranny.They should notallow contortions,delays and “over-
due process” every littlestepoftheway, lest these summary extraditionproceedings becomenot
only inutilebut alsosources ofinternational embarrassment due toour inability tocomply in good
faith with a treaty partner’s simple requestto return a fugitive. Worse, our country should not be
converted into a dubious havenwherefugitives and escapees can unreasonably delay,mummify,
mock, frustrate,checkmateand defeatthequest for bilateraljustice andinternational
cooperation.
10. At bottom, extraditionproceedingsshould beconductedwith all deliberate speed todetermine
compliance with theExtradition Treaty and Law; and, whilesafeguarding basic individual rights,
to avoid the legalistic contortions, delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
WHEREFORE, the Petitionis GRANTED. The assailed RTC Order datedMay 23, 2001 is hereby
declared NULL andVOID, while the challenged Order datedJuly 3, 2001 is SETASIDE insofar as it
granted bailto RespondentMarkJimenez. The bailbondposted byprivaterespondent
is CANCELLED. The Regional TrialCourt ofManila is directed toconduct the extradition
proceedings before it, withall deliberate speed pursuant to thespiritandtheletterofour
Extradition Treaty withtheUnited States as wellas our ExtraditionLaw. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republicofthe Philippines
SUPREMECOURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 153675 April 19, 2007
GOVERNMENTOF HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVEREGION, representedby the Philippine
Department ofJustice,Petitioner,