169745568 carmen-quimiguing

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CARMEN QUIMIGUING, Suing throughher parents,ANTONIO QUIMIGUING and JACOBA
CABILIN,plaintiffs-appellants, vs.FELIX ICAO, defendant-appellee.
Torcuato L. Galon for plaintiffs-appellants.Godardo Jacintofor defendant-appellee.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appealon points of law froman order of the Court of First Instance of Zamboanga del Norte (Judge Onofre
Sison Abalos, presiding), in its Civil Case No. 1590, dismissing a complaint for support and damages, and
another order denying amendment of the same pleading.
The events in the court of origin can be summarized as follow s:
Appellant, Carmen Quimiguing, assisted by her parents, sued Felix Icao in the court below . In her complaint it
w as averred that the parties w ere neighbors in Dapitan City, and had close and confidentialrelations; that
defendant Icao, although married, succeeded in having carnalintercourse with plaintiff severaltimes by force
and intimidation, and w ithout her consent; that as a result she became pregnant, despite efforts and drugs
supplied by defendant, and plaintiff had to stop studying. Hence, she claimed support at P120.00 per month,
damages and attorney's fees.
Duly summoned, defendant Icao moved to dismiss for lackof cause of action since the complaint did not allege
that the child had been born; and after hearing arguments, the trial judge sustained defendant's motion and
dismissed the complaint.
Thereafter, plaintiff moved to amend the complaint to allege that as a result of the intercourse, plaintiff had later
given birth to a baby girl; but the court, sustaining defendant's objection, ruled that no amendment w as
allow able, since the original complaint averred no cause of action. Wherefore, the plaintiff appealed directly to
this Court.
We find the appealed orders of the court below to be untenable. A conceived child, although as yet unborn, is
given by law a provisionalpersonality of its ow n for allpurposes favorable to it, as explicitly provided in Article
40 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The unborn child, therefore, has a right to support fromits progenitors,
particularly of the defendant-appellee (w hose paternity is deemed admitted for the purpose of the motion to
dismiss), even if the said child is only "en ventre de sa mere;" just as a conceived child, even if as yet unborn,
may receive donations as prescribed by Article 742 of the same Code, and its being ignored by the parent in his
testament may result in preterition of a forced heir that annuls the institution of the testamentary heir, even if
such child should be born after the death of the testator Article 854, Civil Code).
ART. 742. Donations made to conceiv ed and unborn children may be accepted by those persons who would legally
represent them if they were already born.
ART. 854. The preterition or omission of one, some, or all of the compulsory heirs in the direct line, whether liv ing at
the time of the execution of the will or born af ter the death of the testator, shall annul the institution of heir; but the
dev ises and legacies shall be v alid insof ar as they are not inof f icious.
If the omitted compulsory heirs should die bef ore the testator, the institution shall be ef f ectual, without prejudice to
the right of 'representation.
It is thus clear that the low er court's theory that Article 291 of the Civil Code declaring that support is an
obligation of parents and illegitimate children "does not contemplate support to children as yet unborn," violates
Article 40 aforesaid, besides imposing a condition that now here appears in the text of Article 291. It is true that
Article 40 prescribing that "the conceived child shall be considered born for allpurposes that are favorable to it"
adds further "provided it be born later w ith the conditions specified in the follow ing article" (i.e., that the foetus
be alive at the time it is completely delivered fromthe mother's w omb). This proviso, how ever, is not a condition
precedent to the right of the conceived child; for if it w ere, the first part of Article 40 w ould become entirely
useless and ineffective. Manresa, in his Commentaries (5th Ed.) to the corresponding Article 29 of the Spanish
Civil Code, clearly points this out:

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Los derechos atribuidos al nasciturusno son simples expectativas, niaun en el sentido
tecnico que la moderna doctrina da a esta figura juridica sino que constituyen un caso de
los propiamente Ilamados 'derechos en estado de pendenci'; elnacimiento del sujeto en
las condiciones previstas por el art. 30, no determina el nacimiento de aquellos derechos
(que ya existian de antemano), sino que se trata de un hecho que tiene
efectos declarativos. (1 Manresa, Op. cit., page 271)
A second reason for reversing the orders appealed fromis that for a married man to force a w oman not his w ife
to yield to his lust (as averred in the original complaint in this case) constitutes a clear violation of the rights of
his victim that entitles her to claim compensation for the damage caused. Says Article 21 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines:
ART. 21. Any person w ho wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a manner that is
contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter for the
damage.
The rule of Article 21 is supported by Article 2219 of the same Code:
ART 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the follow ing and analogous cases:
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape or other lascivious acts:
xxx xxx xxx
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28 ....
Thus, independently of the right to Support of the child she w as carrying, plaintiff herself had a cause of action
for damages under the terms of the complaint; and the order dismissing it for failure to state a cause of action
w as doubly in error.
WHEREFORE, the orders under appeal are reversed and set aside. Let the case be remanded to the court of
origin for further proceedingsconformable to this decision. Costs against appellee Felix Icao. So ordered.
ANTONIO GELUZ, petitioner, vs.THE HON. COURT OF APPEALS and OSCAR LAZO, respondents.Mariano
H. de Joya for petitioner.A.P. Salvador for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
This petition for certioraribrings up for review question whether the husband of a w oman, who voluntarily
procured her abortion, could recover damages fromphysician w ho caused the same.
The litigation w as commenced in the Court of First Instance of Manila by respondent Oscar Lazo, the of Nita
Villanueva, against petitioner Antonio Geluz, a physician. Convinced of the merits of the complaint upon the
evidence adduced, the trial court rendered judgment favor of plaintiff Lazo and against defendant Geluz,
ordering the latter to pay P3,000.00 as damages, P700.00 attorney's fees and the costs of the suit. On appeal,
Court of Appeals, in a specialdivision of five, sustained the aw ard by a majority vote of three justices as against
tw o, who rendered a separate dissenting opinion.
The facts are set forth in the majority opinion as follow s:
Nita Villanueva came to know the defendant (Antonio Geluz) for the first time in 1948 — through her
aunt Paula Yambot. In 1950 she became pregnant by her present husband before they w ere legally
married. Desiring to concealher pregnancy fromher parent, and acting on the advice of her aunt, she
had herself aborted by the defendant. After her marriage w ith the plaintiff, she again became
pregnant. As she w as then employed in the Commission on Elections and her pregnancy proved to
be inconvenient, she had herself aborted again by the defendant in October 1953. Less than tw o
years later, she again became pregnant. On February 21, 1955, accompanied by her sister
Purificacion and the latter's daughter Lucida, she again repaired to the defendant's clinic on Carriedo
and P. Gomez streets in Manila, w here the three met the defendant and his w ife. Nita w as again
aborted, of a tw o-month old foetus, in consideration of the sum of fifty pesos, Philippine currency. The
plaintiff w as at this time in the province of Cagayan, campaigning for his election to the provincial
board; he did not know of, nor gave his consent, to the abortion.
It is the third and last abortion that constitutes plaintiff's basis in filing this action and aw ard of damages. Upon
application of the defendant Geluz w e granted certiorari.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court predicated the aw ard of damages in the sum of P3,000.06 upon the
provisions of the initial paragraph of Article 2206 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. This w e believe to be error,
for the said article, in fixing a minimum aw ard of P3,000.00 for the death of a person, does not cover the case of
an unborn foetus that is not endow ed with personality. Under the systemof our Civil Code, "la criatura abortiva
no alcanza la categoria de persona naturaly en consscuencia es un ser no nacido a la vida del Derecho"
(Casso-Cervera, "Diccionario de Derecho Privado", Vol. 1, p. 49), being incapable of having rights and
obligations.
Since an action for pecuniary damages on account of personalinjury or death pertains primarily to the one
injured, it is easy to see that if no action for such damages could be instituted on behalf of the unborn child on
account of the injuries it received, no such right of action could derivatively accrue to its parents or heirs. In fact,
even if a cause of action did accrue on behalf of the unborn child, the same w as extinguished by its pre-natal
death, since no transmission to anyone can take place fromon that lacked juridical personality (or juridical
capacity as distinguished fromcapacity to act). It is no answ erto invoke the provisionalpersonality of a
conceived child (conceptus pro nato habetur) under Article 40 of the Civil Code, because that same article
expressly limits such provisionalpersonality by imposing the condition that the child should be subsequently
born alive: "provided it be born later w ith the condition specified in the follow ing article". In the present case,
there is no dispute that the child w as dead when separated fromits mother's w omb.
The prevailing American jurisprudence is to the same effect; and it is generally held that recovery can not had
for the death of an unborn child (Stafford vs. Roadway Transit Co., 70 F. Supp. 555; Dietrich vs. Northampton,
52 Am. Rep. 242; and numerous cases collated in the editorial note, 10 ALR, (2d) 639).
This is not to say that the parents are not entitled to collect any damages at all. But such damages must be
those inflicted directly upon them, as distinguished fromthe injury or violation of the rights of the deceased, his
right to life and physicalintegrity. Because the parents can not expect either help, support or services froman
unborn child, they w ould normally be limited to moral damages for the illegal arrest of the normal development
of the spes hominis that was the foetus, i.e., on account of distress and anguish attendant to its loss, and the
disappointment of their parentalexpectations (Civ. Code Art. 2217), as w ellas to exemplary damages, if the
circumstances should warrant them(Art. 2230). But in the case before us, both the trial court and the Court of
Appeals have not found any basis for an aw ard of moraldamages, evidently because the appellee's
indifference to the previous abortions of his w ife, also caused by the appellant herein, clearly indicates that he
w as unconcerned with the frustration of his parentalhopes and affections. The low er court expressly found, and
the majority opinion of the Court of Appeals did not contradict it, that the appellee w as aware of the second
abortion; and the probabilities are that he w as likew ise aware of the first. Yet despite the suspicious repetition of
the event, he appeared to have taken no steps to investigate or pinpoint the causes thereof, and secure the
punishment of the responsible practitioner. Even after learning of the third abortion, the appellee does not seem
to have taken interest in the administrative and criminal cases against the appellant. His only concern appears
to have been directed at obtaining fromthe doctor a large money payment, since he sued for P50,000.00

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damages and P3,000.00 attorney's fees, an "indemnity" claim that, under the circumstances of record, was
clearly exaggerated.
The dissenting Justices of the Court of Appeals have aptly remarked that:
It seems to us that the normal reaction of a husband w ho righteously feels outraged by the abortion
w hich his w ife has deliberately sought at the hands of a physician w ould be highminded rather than
mercenary; and that his primary concern w ould be to see to it that the medical profession waspurged
of an unw orthymember rather than turn his w ife'sindiscretion to personalprofit, and w ith that idea in
mind to press either the administrative or the criminal cases he had filed, or both, instead of
abandoning them in favor of a civilaction for damages of w hich not only he, but also his w ife, would
be the beneficiaries.
It is unquestionable that the appellant's act in provoking the abortion of appellee's w ife, without medical
necessity to w arrant it, w asa criminal and morally reprehensible act, that can not be too severely condemned;
and the consent of the w oman or that of her husband does not excuse it. But the immorality or illegality of the
act does not justify an aw ard of damage that, under the circumstances on record, have no factualor legal basis.
The decision appealed from is reversed, and the complaint ordered dismissed. Without costs.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished to the Department of Justice and the Board of Medical Examiners for
their information and such investigation and action against the appellee Antonio Geluz as the facts may w arrant.
ANTONIA L. DE JESUS, ET AL., plaintiff-appellant, vs.CESAR SYQUIA, defendant-appellant.
Jose Sotelo for plaintiffs-appellants.Vicente J. Francisco for defendant-appellant.
STREET, J.:
This action w as instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila by Antonia Loanco de Jesus in her ow n
right and by her mother, Pilar Marquez, as next friend and representative of Ismael and Pacita Loanco, infants,
children of the first-named plaintiff, for the purpose of recovering fromthe defendant, Cesar Syquia, the sum of
thirty thousand pesos as damages resulting to the first-named plaintiff frombreach of a marriage promise, to
compel the defendant to recognize Ismael and Pacita as naturalchildren begotten by him w ith Antonia, and to
pay for the maintenance of the three the amount of five hundred pesos per month, together w ith costs. Upon
hearing the cause, after answerof the defendant, the trialcourt erred a decree requiring the defendant to
recognize Ismael Loanco as his natural child and to pay maintenance for him at the rate of fifty pesos per
month, w ith costs, dismissing the action in other respects. Fromthis judgment both parties appealed, the
plaintiffs fromso much of the decision as denied part of the relief sought by them, and the defendant fromthat
feature of the decision w hich required him to recognize Ismael Loanco and to pay for his maintenance.
At the time w ith which weare here concerned, the defendant, Cesar Syquia w asof the age of tw enty-
three years, and an unmarried scion of the prominent family in Manila, being possessed of a considerable
property in his ow n right. His brother-in-law, Vicente Mendoza is the ow ner of a barber shop in Tondo, w here
the defendant w asaccustomed to go for tonsorialattention. In the month of June Antonia Loanco, a likely
unmarried girl of the age of tw entyyears, wastaken on as cashier in this barber shop. Syquia w as not long in
making her acquaintance and amorous relations resulted, as a consequence of which Antonia was gotten with
child and a baby boy w as born on June 17, 1931. The defendant w asa constant visitor at the home of Antonia
in the early months of her pregnancy, and in February, 1931, he w rote and placed in her hands a note directed
to the padre w ho has expected to christen the baby. This note w as as follows:
Saturday, 1:30 p. m.
February14, 1931
Rev. FATHER,
The baby due in June is mine and I should like for my name to be given to it.
CESAR SYQUIA
The occasion for writing this note w as that the defendant was on the eve of his departure on a trip to
China and Japan; and w hile he w asabroad on this visit he w rote severalletters to Antonia show ing a paternal
interest in the situation that had developed w ith her, and cautioning her to keep in good condition in order
that "junior"(meaning the baby to be, "Syquia, Jr.") might be strong, and promising to return to them soon. The
baby arrived at the time expected, and all necessary anticipatorypreparations were made by the defendant. To
this he employed his friend Dr. Crescenciano Talavera to attend at the birth, and made arrangements for the
hospitalization of the mother in Saint Joseph's Hospital of the City of Manila, w here she was cared for during
confinement.
When Antonio w as able to leave the hospital, Syquia took her, w ith her mother and the baby, to a house
at No. 551 Camarines Street, Manila, w here they lived together for about a year in regular family style, all
household expenses, including gas and electric light, being defrayed by Syquia. In course of time, how ever, the
defendant's ardor abated and, w hen Antonia began to show signs of a second pregnancythe defendant
decamped, and he is now married to another w oman. A point that should here be noted is that w hen the time
came for christening the child, the defendant, w ho had charge of the arrangement for this ceremony, caused the
name Ismael Loanco to be given to him, instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., as w as at first planned.
The first question that is presented in the case is w hether the note to the padre, quoted above, in
connection w ith the letters w ritten by the defendant to the mother during pregnancy, proves an acknowledgment
of paternity, w ithin the meaning of subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code. Upon this point w e have no
hesitancy in holding that the acknow ledgment thus shown is sufficient. It is a universalrule of jurisprudence that
a child, upon being conceived, becomes a bearer of legal rights and capable of being dealt w ith as a living
person. The fact that it is yet unborn is no impediment to the acquisition of rights. The problem here presented
of the recognition of unborn child is really not different fromthat presented in the ordinary case of the
recognition of a child already born and bearing a specific name. Only the means and resources of identification
are different. Even a bequest to a living child requires oralevidence to connect the particular individual intended
w ith the name used.
It is contended how ever, in the present case that the w ordsof description used in the w ritings beforeus
are not legally sufficient to indemnify the child now suing as Ismael Loanco. This contention is not, in our
opinion, w ellfounded. The w ords of recognition contained in the note to the padre are not capable of tw o
constructions. They referto a baby then conceived w hich wasexpected to be born in June and w hich would
thereafter be presented for christening. The baby came, and though it w as in the end given the name of Ismael
Loanco instead of Cesar Syquia, Jr., its identity as the child w hich the defendant intended to acknow ledge is
clear. Any doubt that might arise on this point is removed by the letters Exhibit F, G, H, and J. In these letters
the defendant makes repeated reference to junior as the baby w hich Antonia, to w homthe letters w ere
addressed, was then carrying in her w omb, and the w riter urged Antonia to eat w ith good appetite in order
that junior might be vigorous. In the last letter (Exhibit J) w ritten only a few daysbefore the birth of the child, the
defendant urged her to take good care of herself and of junior also.
It seems to us that the only legal question that can here arise as to the sufficiencyof acknowledgment is
w hether the acknowledgment contemplated in subsection 1 of article 135 of the Civil Code must be made in a
single document or may be made in more than one document, of indubitable authenticity, w ritten by the
recognizing father. Upon this point w e are of the opinion that the recognition can be made out by putting
together the admissions of more than one document, supplementing the admission made in one letter by an

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admission or admissions made in another. In the case before us the admission of paternity is contained in the
note to the padreand the other letters suffice to connect that admission w ith the child then being carried by
Antonia L. de Jesus. There is no requirement in the law that the w riting shallbe addressed to one, or any
particular individual. It is merely required that the w riting shallbe indubitable.
The second question that presents itself in this case is w hether the trialcourt erred in holding that Ismael
Loanco had been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a naturalchild, justified by the conduct of the
father himself, and that as a consequence, the defendant in this case should be compelled to acknow ledge the
said Ismael Loanco, under No. 2 of article 135 of the Civil Code. The facts already stated are sufficient, in our
opinion, to justify the conclusion of the trial court on this point, and w e may add here that our conclusion upon
the first branch of the case that the defendant had acknow ledged this child in w ritings above referred to must be
taken in connection w ith the facts found by the court upon the second point. It is undeniable that fromthe birth
of this child the defendant supplied a home for it and the mother, in w hich they lived together w ith the
defendant. This situation continued for about a year, and until Antonia became enciente a second time, w hen
the idea entered the defendant's head of abandoning her. The law fixes no period during w hich a child must be
in the continuous possession of the status of a naturalchild; and the period in this case w as long enough to
evince the father's resolution to concede the status. The circumstance that he abandoned the mother and child
shortly before this action w as started is unimportant. The w ord "continuous" in subsection 2 of article 135 of the
Civil Code does not mean that the concession of statusshallcontinue forever, but only that it shall not be of an
intermittent character while it continues.
What has been said disposes of the principalfeature of the defendant's appeal. With respect to the
appeal of the plaintiffs, we are of the opinion that the trial court w asright in refusing to give damages to the
plaintiff, Antonia Loanco, for supposed breach of promise to marry. Such promise is not satisfactorily proved,
and w e may add that the action for breach of promise to marry has no standing in the civillaw , apart fromthe
right to recover money or property advanced by the plaintiff upon the faith of such promise. This case exhibits
none of the features necessary to maintain such an action. Furthermore, there is no proof upon w hich a
judgment could be based requiring the defendant to recognize the second baby, Pacita Loanco.
Finally, w e see no necessity or propriety in modifying the judgment as to the amount of the maintenance
w hich the trialcourt allow ed to Ismael Loanco. And in this connection w e merely point out that, as conditions
change, the Court of First Instance w illhave jurisdiction to modify the order as to the amount of the pension as
circumstances willrequire.
The judgment appealed fromis in all respects affirmed, without costs. So ordered.
Malcolm, Abad Santos, Hull, Vickers, and butte, JJ., concur.
Separate Opinions
VILLA-REAL, J., dissenting:
The majority opinion is predicated on two grounds: First, that the def endant-appellant Cesar Sy quia has expressly
acknowledged his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco in an indubitable writing of his; and secondly , that said child has enjoy ed
the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural son of said def endant-appellant Cesar Sy quia, justif ied by his acts, as
required by article 135 of the Civ il Code.
The f irst conclusion is drawn f rom Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J.
Exhibit C, which is in the handwriting of any signed by the def endant-appellant Cesar Sy quia, reads as f ollows:
Sabado, 1.30 p. m. — 14 febrero, 1931
Rev . PADRE:
La criatura que v endra el junio es mio y que y o quisiera mi nombre que se de a la criatura.
(Fdo.) CESAR SYQUIA
Exhibit F, G, H, and j, which are letters written by the said def endant-appellant Cesar Sy quia to plaintif f -appellee Antonia
L. de Jesus prior to the birth of the child contain the f ollowing expressions:
SPANISH NA PART NATP<DI MO DIN MAIINTINDIHAN>º
Let it f irst be noted that the law prohibits the inv estigation of paternity (Borres and Barza vs. Municipality of Panay , 42
Phil., 643; Donado vs. Menendez Donado, 55 Phil., 861). The only exceptions to this rule are those established in article 135 of
the Civ il Code quoted abov e, the f irst of which is that the f ather may be compelled to acknowledge his paternity , "When an
indubitable writing of his exists in which he expressly acknowledge his paternity ." The writing that is required by said prov ision
must be complete in itself and by itself , and must contain all the statements that are necessary to constitute a f ull and clear
acknowledgment by a f ather of his paternity of a child, in order that it may serv e as a basis f or compelling him to acknowledge
said child should be af terwards deny his paternity . If several writings put together, each not being complete in itself , should be
necessary in order to obtain a f ull and complete expression of acknowledgment by a f ather of his paternity of a child, the
general prohibition to inv estigate paternity would be v iolated.
By the mere reading of all said letters, the one addressed to a priest and the others to the herein plaintif f -appellee,
Antonia L. de Jesus, the reader cannot ascertain which is the "creature that is coming on June", which the def endant- appellant,
Cesar Sy quia, say s in the said letter addressed to the priest is his, nor who is the "junior" that he recommends to said Antonia
L. de Jesus to take good care of , as there is nothing in any one of said letters f rom which it may be inf erred that Antonia L. de
Jesus was enciente at the time, that the "junior" was the being she was carry ing in her womb, and that it was the "creature that
is coming in June." To connect all these f acts it was necessary to prov e that Cesar Sy quia had had illicit relations with Antonia
L. de Jesus, that as a result of such relations the woman became pregnant, and that she gav e birth to a boy in June 1931. All
this certainly constitutes an inv estigation of the paternity of Cesar Sy quia of said child outside of the documents, which is
prohibited by law.
Either taken alone theref ore, or in connection with Exhibits F, G, H, and J, Exhibit C is insuf f icient to constitute a
"indubitable writing of Cesar Sy quia, in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of the child Ismael Loanco," as required
by number 1 of article 135 of the Civ il Code.
As to the second ground of the decision of the majority , number 2 of article 135 of the Civ il Code prov ides:
ART. 135. The f ather may be compelled to acknowledge his natural child in the f ollowing cases:
x x x x x x x x x
2. When the child has been in the uninterrupted possession of the status of a natural child of the def endant
f ather, justif ied by the conduct of the f ather himself or that of his f amily.
The majority decision bases its connection on the second point on Exhibits C, F, G, H, and J and the f ollowing f acts, as
f ound by the lower court in its decision:
SPANISH
Exhibit, C, F, G, H, and J, are inadmissible in ev idence the purpose of showing that Ismael Loanco has enjoy ed the
continuous possession of the status of a natural child, because being of prior date to the birth of said child they can not be
considered as direct acts of Cesar Sy quia showing possession of the status of natural child, as no human being can enjoy such
possession until he be born with legal capacity f or acquiring civ il rights (Inf antevs. Figueras, 4 Phil., 738; Granados vs. Ley nes,
G.R. No. 31224, promulgated September 9, 1929, not reported).

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It must also be stated that Cesar Sy quia ref used to allow his name to be giv en to the child Ismael when it was baptized,
so that the name of its mother, Loanco, had to be giv en to it.
The f acts which were f ound by the court below to hav e been prov ed by the testimony of the witnesses during the trial, are
not suf f icient to constitute the uninterrupted possession of the status of Ismael Loanco as natural child of said Cesar Sy quia, in
the light of the f ollowing authorities:
In the case of Buenaventura vs. Urbano (5 Phil., 1, 9), this court said:
. . . Conf ining ourselv es to the acts prov ed to hav e been perf ormed by Don Telesf oro, we f ind that he v isited
the mother of the plaintif f ; that he paid money f or her support; that he paid money f or the support of the plaintif f ; that
he hold one witness that the plaintif f was his son; that the plaintif f called him "Papa," and that Don Telesf oro
answered to this designation; that when the plaintif f v isited Don Telesf oro he kissed his hand; that Don Telesf oro
wrote letters to him; that he paid his f ees f or instruction in school, and secured him a position in a commercial
house.
x x x x x x x x x
All these f acts taken together are not suf f icient to show that plaintif f possesses continuously the status of a
natural child. They may hav e a tendency to show that Don Telesf oro was the f ather of the child, but that it is not
suf f icient. It is not suf ficient that the f ather recognize the child as his. By the express terms of article 135 that
recognition must appear either in writing, made by the f ather, or it must appear in acts which show that the son has
possessed continuously the status of a natural child. No recognition by the f ather of the child which comes short of
the requirements of these two paragraphs is suf f icient. It must appear that it was the intention of the f ather to
recognize the child as to giv e him that status, and that the acts perf ormed by him were done with that intention.
Manresa (Codigo Civil, Vol. 1, page 602, 4th ed.) in citing some decisions of the Supreme Court of Spain say s:
SPANISH
It will thus be seen f rom the f oregoing discussion and authorities that the herein def endant-appellant Cesar Sy quia cannot
be compelled to acknowledge the child Ismael Loanco as his natural son because there exists not an indubitable writing of his
in which he expressly acknowledges his paternity of said child, and because the said child has not enjoy ed the uninterrupted
possession of the status of a natural child of the said
def endant-appellant, justif ied by his own conduct or that of his f amily , as required by article 135 of the Civ il Code.
The decision appealed f rom should, theref ore, be rev ersed and the complaint dismissed.
ANGEL T. LIMJOCO, petitioner, vs.INTESTATE ESTATE OF PEDRO O. FRAGRANTE,
deceased, respondent.AngelLimjoco, Jr. and Delfin L. Gonzales for petitioner.
Bienvenido A. Tan for respondent.
HILADO, J.:
Under date of May 21, 1946, the Public Service Commission, through Deputy Commissioner Fidel Ibañez,
rendered its decision in case No. 4572 of Pedro O. Fragante, as applicant for a certificate of public convenience
to install, maintain and operate an ice plant in San Juan, Rizal, w herebysaid commission held that the evidence
therein show ed that the public interest and convenience w illbe promoted in a proper and suitable manner "by
authorizing the operation and maintenance of another ice plant of tw o and one-half (2-½)tons in the
municipality of San Juan; that the original applicant Pedro O. Fragante w as a Filipino Citizen at the time of his
death; and that his intestate estate is financially capable of maintaining the proposed service". The commission,
therefore, overruled the opposition filed in the case and ordered "that under the provisions of section 15 of
Commonw ealth Act No. 146, as amended a certificate of public convenience be issued to the Intestate Estate of
the deceased Pedro Fragante, authorizing said Intestate Estate through its Special or Judicial Administrator,
appointed by the proper court of competent jurisdiction, to maintain and operate an ice plant w ith a daily
productive capacity of two and one-half (2-1/2)tons in the Municipality of San Juan and to sell the ice produced
fromsaid plant in the said Municipality of San Juan and in the Municipality of Mandaluyong, Rizal, and in
Quezon City", subject to the conditions therein set forth in detail (petitioner's brief, pp. 33-34).
Petitioner makes four assignments of error in his brief as follow s:
1. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not in accordance with law.
2. The decision of the Public Service Commission is not reasonably supported by evidence.
3. The Public Service Commission erred in not giving petitioner and the Ice and Cold Storage
Industries of the Philippines, Inc., as existing operators, a reasonable opportunity to meet the
increased demand.
4. The decision of the Public Service Commission is an unw arranted departure fromits announced
policy w ith respect to the establishment and operation of ice plant. (Pp. 1-2, petitioner's brief.)
In his argument petitioner contends that it w as erroron the part of the commission to allow the substitution of
the legal representative of the estate of Pedro O. Fragante for the latter as party applicant in the case then
pending before the commission, and in subsequently granting to said estate the certificate applied for, w hich is
said to be in contravention of law.
If Pedro O. Fragante had not died, there can be no question that he w ould have had the right to prosecute his
application before the commission to its finalconclusion. No one w ould have denied him that right. As declared
by the commission in its decision, he had invested in the ice plant in question P 35,000, and from w hat the
commission said regarding his other properties and business, he w ould certainly have been financially able to
maintain and operate said plant had he not died. His transportation business alone w asnetting him about
P1,440 a month. He w as a Filipino citizen and continued to be such till his demise. The commission declared in
its decision, in view of the evidence before it, that his estate w as financially able to maintain and operate the ice
plant. The aforesaid right of Pedro O. Fragante to prosecute said application to its conclusion w asone w hich by
its nature did not lapse through his death. Hence, it constitutes a part of the assets of his estate, for which a
right w as property despite the possibility that in the end the commission might have denied application, although
under the facts of the case, the commission granted the application in view of the financialability of the estate to
maintain and operate the ice plant. Petitioner, in his memorandum of March 19, 1947, admits (page 3) that the
certificate of public convenience once granted "as a rule, should descend to his estate as an asset". Such
certificate would certainly be property, and the right to acquire such a certificate, by complying w ith the
requisites of the law , belonged to the decedent in his lifetime, and survived to his estate and judicial
administrator after his death.
If Pedro O. Fragrante had in his lifetime secured an option to buy a piece of land and during the life of the option
he died, if the option had been given him in the ordinary course of business and not out of specialconsideration
for his person, there w ould be no doubt that said option and the right to exercise it w ould have survived to his
estate and legal representatives. In such a case there w ould also be the possibility of failure to acquire the
property should he or his estate or legal representative failto comply w ith the conditions of the option. In the
case at bar Pedro O. Fragrante's undoubted right to apply for and acquire the desired certificate of public
convenience — the evidence established that the public needed the ice plant — w as under the law conditioned
only upon the requisite citizenship and economic ability to maintain and operate the service. Of course, such
right to acquire or obtain such certificate of public convenience was subject to failure to secure its objective
through nonfulfillment of the legal conditions, but the situation here is no different fromthe legal standpoint from
that of the option in the illustration just given.
Rule 88, section 2, provides that the executor or administrator may bring or defend actions, among other cases,
for the protection of the property or rights of the deceased w hich survive, and it says that such actions may be
brought or defended "in the right of the deceased".

6
Rule 82, section 1, paragraph (a), mentions among the duties of the executor or administrator, the making of an
inventory of all goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the deceased which shallcome to his possession
or know ledge, or to the possession of any other person forhim.
In his commentaries on the Rules of Court (Volume II, 2nd ed., pages 366, 367) the present chief Justice of this
Court draw s the following conclusion fromthe decisions cited by him:
Therefore, unless otherwise expressly provided by law , any action affecting the property
or rights (emphasis supplied) of a deceased person which may be brought by or against him if he
w ere alive, may likew ise be instituted and prosecuted by or against the administrator, unless the
action is for recoveryof money, debt or interest thereon, or unless, by its very nature, it cannot
survive, because death extinguishes the right . . . .
It is true that a proceeding upon the application for a certificate of public convenience before the Public Service
Commission is not an "action". But the foregoing provisions and citations go to prove that the decedent's rights
w hich by their nature are not extinguished by death go to make up a part and parcelof the assets of his estate
w hich, being placed under the controland management of the executor or administrator, can not be exercised
but by him in representation of the estate for the benefit of the creditors, devisees or legatees, if any, and the
heirs of the decedent. And if the right involved happens to consist in the prosecution of an unfinished
proceeding upon an application for a certificate of public convenience of the deceased before the Public Service
Commission, it is but logical that the legal representative be empow ered and entitled in behalf of the estate to
make the right effective in that proceeding.
Manresa (Vol. III, 6th ed., p. 11) says that No. 10 of article 334 and article 336 of the Civil Code, respectively,
consider as immovable and movable things rights which are not material. The same eminent commentator says
in the cited volume (p. 45) that article 336 of the Civil Code has been deficiently drafted in that it is not
sufficiently expressive of allincorporealrights w hich are also propertyfor juridicalpurposes.
Corpus Juris (Vol. 50, p. 737) states that in the broad sense of the term, property includes, among other things,
"an option", and "the certificate of the railroad commission permitting the operation of a bus line", and on page
748 of the same volume w e read:
How ever, these terms (realproperty, as estate or interest) have also been declared to include every
species of title, inchoate or complete, and embrace rights w hich lie in contract, w hether executoryor
executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
Another important question raised by petitioner is w hether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is a "person" w ithin
the meaning of the Public Service Act.
Words and Phrases, First Series, (Vol. 6, p, 5325), states the follow ing doctrine in the jurisdiction of the State of
Indiana:
As the estate of the decedent is in law regarded as a person, a forgery committed after the death of
the man w hose name purports to be signed to the instrument may be prosecuted as with the intent to
defraud the estate. Billings vs. State, 107 Ind., 54, 55, 6 N. E. 914, 7 N. E. 763, 57 Am. Rep. 77.
The Supreme Court of Indiana in the decision cited above had before it a case of forgery committed after the
death of one Morgan for the purpose of defrauding his estate. The objection w as urged that the information did
not aver that the forgery wascommitted w ith the intent to defraud any person. The Court, per Elliott, J.,
disposed of this objection as follow s:
. . . The reason advanced in support of this proposition is that the law does not regard the estate of a
decedent as a person. This intention (contention) cannot prevail. The estate of the decedent is a
person in legal contemplation. "The w ord "person" saysMr. Abbot, "in its legal signification, is a
generic term, and includes artificialas w ellas naturalpersons," 2 Abb. Dict. 271; Douglas vs. Pacific,
etc. Co., 4 Cal. 304; Planters', etc., Bank vs. Andrew s, 8 Port. (Ala.) 404. It said in another w orkthat
'persons are of tw o kinds: naturaland artificial. A natural person is a human being. Artificialpersons
include (1) a collection or succession of naturalpersons forming a corporation; (2) a collection of
property to w hich the law attributes the capacity of having rights and duties. The latter class of
artificialpersons is recognized only to a limited extent in our law . "Examples are the estate of a
bankrupt or deceased person." 2 Rapalje & L. Law Dict. 954. Our ow n casesinferentially recognize
the correctnessof the definition given by the authors fromw homw e have quoted, for they declare
that it is sufficient, in pleading a claim against a decedent's estate, to designate the defendant as the
estate of the deceased person, naming him. Ginn vs. Collins, 43 Ind. 271. Unless w e accept this
definition as correct, there would be a failure of justice in cases where, as here, the forgeryis
committed after the death of a person w hose name is forged; and this is a result to be avoided if it
can be done consistent with principle. We perceive no difficulty in avoiding such a result; for, to our
minds, it seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificialperson. It
is the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made, and,
although natural persons as heirs, devises, or creditors, have an interest in the property, the artificial
creature is a distinct legal entity. The interest w hich naturalpersons have in it is not complete until
there has been a due administration; and one w ho forgesthe name of the decedent to an instrument
purporting to be a promissory note must be regarded as having intended to defraud the estate of the
decedent, and not the natural persons having diverse interests in it, since ha cannot be presumed to
have know n w hothose persons were, or what wasthe nature of their respective interest. The
fraudulent intent is against the artificialperson, — the estate — and not the naturalpersons w ho have
direct or contingent interest in it. (107 Ind. 54, 55, 6 N.E. 914-915.)
In the instant case there w ould also be a failure of justice unless the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante is considered
a "person", for quashing of the proceedings for no other reason than his death w ould entailprejudicial results to
his investment amounting to P35,000.00 as found by the commission, not counting the expenses and
disbursements w hich the proceeding can be presumed to have occasioned him during his lifetime, let alone
those defrayed by the estate thereafter. In this jurisdiction there are ample precedents to show that the estate of
a deceased person is also considered as having legal personality independent of their heirs. Among the most
recent cases may be mentioned that of "Estate of Mota vs. Concepcion, 56 Phil., 712, 717, w herein the principal
plaintiff w as the estate of the deceased Lazaro Mota, and this Court gave judgment in favor of said estate along
w ith the other plaintiffs in these w ords:
. . . the judgment appealed from must be affirmed so far as it holds that defendants Concepcion and
Whitaker are indebted to he plaintiffs in the amount of P245,804.69 . . . .
Under the regime of the Civil Code and before the enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, the heirs of a
deceased person w ere considered in contemplation of law as the continuation of his personality by virtue of the
provision of article 661 of the first Code that the heirs succeed to all the rights and obligations of the decedent
by the mere fact of his death. It w as so held by this Court in Barrios vs. Dolor, 2 Phil., 44, 46. How ever, afterthe
enactment of the Code of Civil Procedure, article 661 of the Civil Code w as abrogated, as held in Suiliong & Co.
vs. Chio-Taysan, 12 Phil., 13, 22. In that case, as w ellas in many others decided by this Court after the
innovations introduced by the Code of Civil Procedure in the matter of estates of deceased persons, it has been
the constant doctrine that it is the estate or the mass of property, rights and assets left by the decedent, instead
of the heirs directly, that becomes vested and charged w ith his rights and obligations w hich survive after his
demise.
The heirs w ere formerly considered as the continuation of the decedent's personality simply by legal fiction, for
they might not have been flesh and blood — the reason w asone in the nature of a legal exigency derived from
the principle that the heirs succeeded to the rights and obligations of the decedent. Under the present legal
system, such rights and obligations as survive after death have to be exercised and fulfilled only by the estate of
the deceased. And if the same legal fiction w ere not indulged, there w ould be no juridical basis for the estate,

7
represented by the executor or administrator, to exercise those rights and to fulfill those obligations of the
deceased. The reason and purpose for indulging the fiction is identical and the same in both cases. This is w hy
according to the Supreme Court of Indiana in Billings vs. State, supra, citing 2 Rapalje & L. Dictionary, 954,
among the artificial persons recognized by law figures "a collection of property to w hich the law attributes the
capacity of having rights and duties", as for instance, the estate of a bankrupt or deceased person.
Petitioner raises the decisive question of w hether or not the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante can be considered a
"citizen of the Philippines" w ithin the meaning of section 16 of the Public Service Act, as amended, particularly
the proviso thereof expresslyand categorically limiting the pow er of the commission to issue certificates of
public convenience or certificatesof public convenience and necessity "only to citizens of the Philippines or of
the United States or to corporations, copartnerships, associations, or joint-stockcompanies constituted and
organized under the law s of the Philippines", and the further proviso that sixty per centumof the stockor paid-
up capital of such entities must belong entirely to citizens of the Philippines or of the United States.
Within the Philosophy of the present legal system, the underlying reason for the legal fiction by w hich, for
certain purposes, the estate of the deceased person is considered a "person" is the avoidance of injustice or
prejudice resulting fromthe impossibility of exercising such legalrights and fulfilling such legal obligations of the
decedent as survived after his death unless the fiction is indulged. Substantially the same reason is assigned to
support the same rule in the jurisdiction of the State of Indiana, as announced in Billings vs. State, supra, w hen
the Supreme Court of said State said:
. . . It seems reasonable that the estate of a decedent should be regarded as an artificialperson. it is
the creation of law for the purpose of enabling a disposition of the assets to be properly made . . . .
Within the framew orkand principles of the constitution itself, to cite just one example, under the bill of rights it
seems clear that w hile the civil rights guaranteed therein in the majority of cases relate to natural persons, the
term "person" used in section 1 (1) and (2) must be deemed to include artificial or juridical persons, for
otherw ise these latter would be w ithout the constitutionalguarantee against being deprived of property w ithout
due process of law, or the immunity fromunreasonable searches and seizures. We take it that it w as the
intendment of the framers to include artificialor juridical, no less than natural, persons in these constitutional
immunities and in others of similar nature. Among these artificialor juridical persons figure estates of deceased
persons. Hence, w e hold that w ithin the framew orkof the Constitution, the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante should
be considered an artificialor juridical person for the purposes of the settlement and distribution of his estate
w hich, of course, include the exercise during the judicial administration thereof of those rights and the fulfillment
of those obligations of his w hich survived after his death. One of those rights w as the one involved in his
pending application before the Public Service Commission in the instant case, consisting in the prosecution of
said application to its final conclusion. As stated above, an injustice w ould ensue fromthe opposite course.
How about the point of citizenship? If by legal fiction his personality is considered extended so that any debts or
obligations left by, and surviving, him may be paid, and any surviving rights may be exercised for the benefit of
his creditors and heirs, respectively, we find no sound and cogent reason for denying the application of the
same fiction to his citizenship, and for not considering it as likew ise extended for the purposes of the aforesaid
unfinished proceeding before the Public Service Commission. The outcome of said proceeding, if successful,
w ould in the end inure to the benefit of the same creditors and the heirs. Even in that event petitioner could not
allege any prejudice in the legal sense, any more than he could have done if Fragrante had lived longer and
obtained the desired certificate. The fiction of such extension of his citizenship is grounded upon the same
principle, and motivated by the same reason, as the fiction of the extension of personality. The fiction is made
necessary to avoid the injustice of subjecting his estate, creditors and heirs, solely by reason of his death to the
loss of the investment amounting to P35,000, w hich he has already made in the ice plant, not counting the other
expenses occasioned by the instant proceeding, fromthe Public Service Commission of this Court.
We can perceive no valid reason for holding that w ithin the intent of the constitution (Article IV), its provisions on
Philippine citizenship exclude the legal principle of extension above adverted to. If for reasons already stated
our law indulges the fiction of extension of personality, if for such reasonsthe estate of Pedro O. Fragrante
should be considered an artificialor juridical person herein, w e can find no justification for refusing to declare a
like fiction as to the extension of his citizenship for the purposes of this proceeding.
Pedro O. Fragrante w as a Filipino citizen, and as such, if he had lived, in view of the evidence of record, he
w ould have obtained fromthe commission the certificate for which he w asapplying. The situation has suffered
but one change, and that is, his death. His estate w as that of a Filipino citizen. And its economic ability to
appropriately and adequately operate and maintain the service of an ice plant w as the same that it received
fromthe decedent himself. In the absence of a contrary showing, which does not exist here, his heirs may be
assumed to be also Filipino citizens; and if they are not, there is the simple expedient of revoking the certificate
or enjoining them frominheriting it.
Upon the w hole, w e are of the opinion that for the purposes of the prosecution of said case No. 4572 of the
Public Service Commission to its finalconclusion, both the personality and citizenship of Pedro O. Fragrante
must be deemed extended, w ithin the meaning and intent of the Public Service Act, as amended, in harmony
w ith the constitution: it is so adjudged and decreed.
Decision affirmed, w ithout costs. So ordered.
Moran, C.J., Pablo, Bengzon, Briones, Padilla and Tuason, JJ., concur.Paras, J., Ihereby certify that Mr.
Justice Feria voted w ith the majority.
Separate Opinions
PERFECTO, J., dissenting:
Commonwealth Act No. 146 reserv es to Filipino citizens the right to obtain a certif icate of public conv enience to operate an ice
plant in San Juan, Rizal. The limitation is in accordance with section 8 of Article XIV of the Constitution which prov ides
No f ranchise, certif icate, or any other f orm of authorization f or the operation of a public utility shall be granted except
to citizens of the Philippines or to corporations or other entities organized under the laws of the Philippines, sixty per
centum of the capital of which is owned by citizens of the Philippines, nor such f ranchise, certif icate or authorization
be exclusiv e in character or f or a longer period than f if ty years. No f ranchise granted to any indiv idual, f irm or
corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to amendment, alteration, or repeal by Congress
when the public interest so requires.
The main question in this case is whether the estate of Pedro O. Fragrante f ulf ills the citizenship requirement. To our mind, the
question can be restated by asking whether the heirs of Pedro O. Fragrante f ulf ill the citizenship requirement of the law.
The estate is an abstract entity . As such, its legal v alue depends on what it represents. It is a dev ice by which the law giv es a
kind of personality and unity to undetermined tangible persons, the heirs. They inherit and replace the deceased at the v ery
moment of his death. As there are procedural requisites f or their identif ication and determination that need time f or their
compliance, a legal f iction has been dev ised to represent them. That legal f iction is the estate, a liquid condition in process of
solidif ication.
The estate, theref ore, has only a representativ e v alue. What the law calls estate is, a matter of f act, intended to designate the
heirs of the deceased. The question, theref ore, in this case, boils down to the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante.
There is nothing in the record to show conclusiv ely the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante. If they are Filipino citizens, the
action taken by the Public Serv ice Commission should be af f irmed. If they are not, it should be rev ersed.
Petitioner alleges that the estate is just a f ront or dummy f or aliens to go around the citizenship constitutional prov ision. It is
alleged that Gaw Suy , the special administrator of the estate, is an alien.

8
We are of the opinion that the citizenship of the heirs of Fragrante should be determined by the Commission upon ev idence that
the party should be present. It should also determine the dummy question raised by the petitioner.
We are of opinion and so v ote that the decision of the Public Serv ice Commission of May 21, 1946, be set aside and that the
Commission be instructed to receiv e ev idence of the abov e f actual questions and render a new decision accordingly .
DIONISIO DUMLAO, in his own behalfand in his capacity as Administrator of the Testate Estate of the
late Pedro Oria;FAUSTA DUMLAO, AMADO DUMLAO, and BENJAMIN DUMLAO, plaintiffs-
appellants, vs.QUALITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, INC., defendant-appellee.
Castillo & Castillo for appellants.Eugenio T. Estavillo for appellee.
AQUINO, J.:p
On February 28, 1962 the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan in Civil Case No.
T-662 rendered a judgment ordering defendants Vicente Soliven, Pedro Oria, Santiago Laurencio, Marcelino
Sumalbag and Juana Darang to pay solidarity Quality Plastic Products, Inc. the sum of P3,667.03 plus the legal
rate of interest fromNovember, 1958. The low er court directed that in case the defendants failed to pay the said
amount before its decision became final, then Quality Plastic Products, Inc. "is hereby authorized to foreclose
the bond, Exhibit A, in accordance with law, forthe satisfaction of the judgment". (Under that bond the four
sureties bound themselves to answ ersolidarity for the obligations of the principal, Vicente Soliven and certain
real properties of the sureties w ere "given as security for" their undertaking).
Upon defendants' failure to pay the amount of the judgment and after the decision had become final, the low er
court, on motion of Quality Plastic Products, Inc., ordered the "foreclosure" of the surety bond and the sale at
public auction of the land of Pedro Oria w hich he had given as security under the bond. Oria's land, w hich was
covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 28732 and has an area of nine and six-tenths hectares, waslevied
upon and sold by the sheriff at public auction on September 24, 1962. The sale w as confirmed by the low er
court in its order of November 20, 1962.
It turned out that Oria died on April23, 1959 or long before June 13, 1960 w hen the action w as filed. Oria's
death w as not known to Quality Plastic Products, Inc. Nor w ere the representativesof Quality Plastic Products,
Inc. aw are that in the same Tayug court SpecialProceeding No. T-212, Testate Estate of the deceased Pedro
Oria, w as pending.
The summons and copies of the complaint for the five defendants in Civil Case No.
T-662 had been personally served on June 24, 1960 by a deputy sheriff on Soliven, the principal in the bond,
w ho acknowledged such service by signing on the backof the original summons in his ow n behalf and again
signing for his co-defendants.
On March 1, 1963 Dionisio, Fausta, Amado and Benjamin, all surnamed Dumlao and all testamentary heirs in
Oria's duly probated w ill, sued Quality Plastic Products, Inc., also in the Tayug court for the annulment of the
judgment against Oria and the execution against his land. (Dionisio Dumlao also sued in his capacity as
administrator of Oria's testate estate).
The ground for annulment w as lackof jurisdiction over the person of the deceased Oria (Civil Case No. T- 873).
It w as only when Quality Plastic Products, Inc. received the summons in Civil Case No. T-873 that it learned
that Oria w as already dead at the time the prior case, Civil Case No. T-662, w as filed.
Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in its answ eralleged that Oria's heirs w ere aware of the suit against Soliven and
his sureties and that the said heirs w ere estopped to question the court's jurisdiction over Oria.
After hearing the low er court held that it acquired jurisdiction over Soliven and the other defendants in Civil
Case No. T-662 by reason of their voluntary appearance. It reasoned out that Soliven acted in bad faith
because he did not apprise the court that Oria w asdead. It specifically ruled that "it had acquired jurisdiction
over the person" of Oria and that the judgment w as valid as to him. From that decision the plaintiffs appealed.
The four assignments of error of appellants Dumlao may be boiled dow n to the issue as to the validity of the
low er court's judgment against the deceased Pedro Oria w ho, being already in the other w orld, was never
served w ith summons.
There is no difficulty in resolving that issue. Since no jurisdiction w as acquired over Oria, the judgment against
him is a patent nullity (Ang Lam vs. Rosillosa and Santiago, 86 Phil. 447; Asuncion vs. Nieto, 4 Phil. 97;
Gorostiaga vs. Sarte, 68 Phil. 4).
As far as Oria w as concerned, the low ercourt'sjudgment against him in Civil Case No. T-662 is void for lackof
jurisdiction over his person. He w as not, and he could not have been, validly served w ith summons. He had no
more civil personality. His juridical capacity, w hichis the fitness to be the subject of legal relations, w as lost
through death. (Arts. 37 and 42, Civil Code).
The low er court erred in ruling that since Soliven's counselalso appeared as counselfor Oria, there w as a
voluntary appearance which enabled the court to acquire jurisdiction over Oria, as contemplated in section 23,
Rule 14 of the Revised Rules of Court. Soliven's counselcould not have validly appeared for a dead co-
defendant. Estoppel has no application to this case.
But fromthe fact that appellants Dumlao had to sue Quality Plastic Products, Inc. in order to annul the judgment
against Oria, it does not follow that they are entitled to claim attorney's fees against that corporation. The parties
herein agreed in their stipulation of facts that Quality Plastic Products, Inc. w as unaware of Oria's death.
Appellants Dumlao in effect conceded that the appellee acted in good faith in joining Oria as a co-defendant.
WHEREFORE, the low er court's decision is reversed and set aside. Its judgment in Civil Case No. T-662
against Pedro Oria is declared void for lackof jurisdiction. The execution sale of Oria's land covered by OCT
No. 28732 is also void. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MOY YA LIM YAOalias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO LIM and LAU YUEN YEUNG, petitioners-
appellants, vs.THE COMMISSIONER OF IMMIGRATION, respondent-appellee.
Aruego, Mamaril & Associates for petitioners-appellants.Office of the SolicitorGeneralArturo A. Alafriz,
Assistant SolicitorGeneralFrine' C. Zaballero and SolicitorSumilang V. Bernardo for respondent-appellee.
BARREDO, J.:
Appealfrom the follow ing decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila in its Civil Case No. 49705
entitled Moy Ya Lim Yao, etc., et al. vs. The Commissioner of Immigration which, brief as it is, sufficiently
depicts the factualsetting of and the fundamental issues involved in this case thus:
In the instant case, petitioners seekthe issuance of a w rit of injunction against the Commissioner of
Immigration, "restraining the latter and/or his authorized representative fromordering plaintiff Lau
Yuen Yeung to leave the Philippines and causing her arrest and deportation and the confiscation of
her bond, upon her failure to do so."

9
The prayer for preliminary injunction embodied in the complaint, having been denied, the case w as
heard on the merits and the parties submitted their respective evidence.
The facts of the case, as substantially and correctly stated by the Solicitor General are these:
On February 8, 1961, Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as
a non-immigrant. In the interrogation made in connection w ith her application for a temporary
visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she stated that she w as a Chinese residing at Kow loon,
Hongkong, and that she desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great (grand)
uncle Lau Ching Ping for a period of one month (Exhibits "l," "1-a," and "2"). She w as permitted to
come into the Philippines on March 13, 1961, and w as permitted to stay for a period of one month
w hich would expire on April13, 1961. On the date of her arrival, Asher Y, Cheng filed a bond in the
amount of P1,000.00 to undertake, among others that said Lau Yuen Yeung w ould actually depart
fromthe Philippines on or before the expiration of her authorized period of stay in this country or
w ithin the period as in his discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized
representative might properly allow . After repeated extensions, petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung w as
allow ed to stay in the Philippines up to February 13, 1962 (Exhibit "4"). On January 25, 1962, she
contracted marriage w ith Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged Filipino citizen.
Because of the contemplated action of respondent to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and
immediate deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought this action for
injunction w ith preliminary injunction. At the hearing w hich tookplace one and a half years after her
arrival, it w as admitted that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung could not w rite either English or Tagalog.
Except for a few words, she could not speakeither English or Tagalog. She could not name any
Filipino neighbor, w ith a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the names of her
brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law.
Under the facts unfolded above, the Court is of the considered opinion, and so holds, that the instant
petition for injunction cannot be sustained for the same reason as set forth in the Order of this Court,
dated March 19, 1962, the pertinent portions of w hich read:
First, Section 15 of the Revised Naturalization Law provides:
Effect of the naturalization on wife and children. — Any woman who is now or may hereafter be married
to a citizen of the Philippines, and w ho might herself be law fully naturalized shallbe deemed a citizen of
the Philippines.
The above-quoted provision is clear and its import unequivocaland hence it should be held
to mean w hat it plainly and explicitly expressesin unmistakable terms. The clause "w ho
might herself be law fully naturalized" incontestably implies that an alien w oman may be
deemed a citizen of the Philippines by virtue of her marriage to a Filipino citizen only if she
possessesall the qualifications and none of the disqualificationsspecified in the law,
because these are the explicit requisites provided by law for an alien to be naturalized. (Lee
Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Emilio Galang, etc., G. R. No.L-11855). How ever,
fromthe allegation of paragraph 3 of the complaint, to w it:
3. That plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung, Chinese by birth, w ho might herself be law fully naturalized as a
Filipino citizen (not being disqualified to become such by naturalization), is a Filipino citizen by virtue
of her marriage on January 25, 1962 to plaintiff MOY YA LIM YAOalias EDILBERTO AGUINALDO
LIM, under the Naturalization Law s of the Philippines.
it can be deduced beyond debate that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung w hile claiming not to be
disqualified, does not and cannot allege that she possesses allthe qualifications to be
naturalized, naturally because, having been admitted as a temporary visitor only on March
13, 1961, it is obvious at once that she lacks at least, the requisite length of residence in
the Philippines (Revised Naturalization Law , Sec. 2, Case No. 2, Sec. 3, Case No. 3).
Were if the intention of the law that the alien w oman, to be deemed a
citizen of the Philippines by virtue of marriage to a Filipino citizen, need
only be not disqualified under the Naturalization Law , it w ould have
been w orded "and who herself is not disqualified to become a citizen of
the Philippines."
Second, Lau Yuen Yeung, a temporary Chinese w oman visitor, whose authorized stay in
the Philippines, after repeated extensions thereof, wasto expire last February 28, 1962,
having married her co-plaintiff only on January 25, 1962, or just a little over one month
before the expiry date of her stay, it is evident that said marriage w as effected merely for
convenience to defeat or avoid her then impending compulsory departure, not to say
deportation. This cannot be permitted.
Third, as the Solicitor General has w ellstated:
5. That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a
temporary alien visitor on the strength of a deliberate and voluntary
representation that she w illenter and stay only for a period of one
month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go backon her
representation to stay permanently w ithout first departing fromthe
Philippines as she had promised. (Chung Tiao Bing, et al. vs.
Commissioner of Immigration, G. R. No. L-9966, September 29, 1956;
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G. R. No.L-6017, September
16, 1954; Sec. 9, last par., Phil. Immigration Law ).
The aforequoted argument of the Solicitor General is w ellbuttressed not only by the
decided cases of the Supreme Court on the point mentioned above, but also on the very
provisions of Section 9, sub-paragraph (g) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940 w hich
reads:
An alien w ho is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the
Philippines permanently. To obtain permanent admission, a non-
immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some foreign country and
procure fromthe appropriate Philippine Consul the proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the Officers of the Bureau of
Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his
admissibility in accordance with the requirements of this Act. (This
paragraph is added by Republic Act 503). (Sec. 9, subparagraph (g) of
the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940).
And fourth, respondent Commissioner of Immigration is charged w ith the administration of
all law s relating to immigration (Sec. 3, Com. Act No. 613) and in the performance of his
duties in relation to alien immigrants, the law gives the Commissioner of Immigration a w ide
discretion, a quasi-judicialfunction in determining cases presented to him (Pedro Uy So vs.
Commissioner of Immigration CA-G. R. No. 23336-R, Dec. 15, 1960), so that his decision
thereon may not be disturbed unless he acted w ith abuse of discretion or in excess of his
jurisdiction.
It may also be not amiss to state that w ife Lau Yuen Yeung, while she barely and
insufficiently talkin broken Tagalog and English, she admitted that she cannot w rite either
language.

10
The only matter of fact not clearly passed upon by His Honor w hich could have some bearing in the resolution
of this appeal is the allegation in the brief of petitioners-appellants, not denied in the governments brief, that "in
the hearing ..., it w as shown thru the testimony of the plaintiff Lau Yuen Yeung that she does not possess any of
the disqualifications for naturalization." Of course, as an additional somehow relevant factualmatter, it is also
emphasized by said appellants that during the hearing in the low er court, held almost ten months after the
alleged marriage of petitioners, "Lau Yuen Yeung w as already carrying in her w omb for seven months a child by
her husband."
Appellants have assigned six errors allegedly committed by the court a quo, thus:
I
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE CLAUSE "WHO MIGHT
HERSELF BE LAWFULLY NATURALIZED" (OF SECTION 15, REVISED
NATURALIZATION LAW) INCONTESTABLY IMPLIES THAT AN ALIEN WOMAN MAY BE
DEEMED A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES BY VIRTUE OF HER MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN, ONLY IF SHE POSSESSES ALL THE QUALIFICATIONS AND NONE
OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS SPECIFIED IN THE LAW.
II
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT A WOMAN FOREIGNER WHO DOES
NOT POSSESS ANY OF THE DISQUALIFICATIONS FOR CITIZENSHIP AND WHO
MARRIED A FILIPINO CITIZEN IS STILL CONSIDERED AN ALIEN EVEN AFTER SUCH
MARRIAGE AS TO FALL WITHIN THE REQUIREMENT OF SECTION 9, SUB-
PARAGRAPH (9) OF THE PHILIPPINE IMMIGRATION ACT OF 1940.
III
THE COURT ERRED IN CONCLUDING THAT LAUYUEN YEUNG'S MARRIAGE TO A
FILIPINO CITIZEN WAS ONLY FOR CONVENIENCE, MERELY BECAUSE THE SAME
WAS CELEBRATED JUST OVER A MONTH BEFORE THE EXPIRY DATE OF HER
AUTHORIZED STAY.
IV
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO FIND THAT THE COMMISSIONER OF
IMMIGRATION ACTED WITH ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR IN EXCESS OF HIS
JURISDICTION WHEN SAID OFFICER THREATENED TO SEND OUT OF THE
COUNTRY PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG WITH WARNING THAT HER FAILURE TO
DO SO WOULD MEAN CONFISCATION OF HER BOND, ARREST AND IMMEDIATE
DEPORTATION, IN SPITE OF THE FACT THAT LAU YUEN YEUNG IS NOW A FILIPINO
CITIZEN.
V
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS' COMPLAINT
AND IN REFUSING TO PERMANENTLY ENJOIN THE COMMISSIONER FROM
ORDERING PLAINTIFF LAU YUEN YEUNG TO LEAVE THE PHILIPPINES AS A
TEMPORARY VISITOR WHICH SHE IS NOT.
VI
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GRANT PLAINTIFFS-APPELLANTS'
MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION EMBODIED IN THEIR COMPLAINT, IN AN
ORDER DATED MARCH 19, 1962. (PAGES 36-41, RECORD ON APPEAL) .
We need not discuss these assigned errors separately. In effect, the above decision upheld the tw o main
grounds of objection of the Solicitor General to the petition in the court below , viz:
That petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung, having been admitted as a temporary alien visitor on the
strength of a deliberate and voluntary representation that she w illenter and stay only for a
period of one month and thereby secured a visa, cannot go backon her representation to
stay permanently w ithout first departing fromthe Philippines as she had promised. (Chung
Tiao Bing, et al. vs. Commissioner of Immigration, G.R. No.L-9966, September 29, 1956;
Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Commissioners, G.R. No.L-6017, Sept. 16, 1954, Sec. 9, last par.
Phil. Immigration Law );
That the mere marriage of a Filipino citizen to an alien does not automatically confer on the
latter Philippine citizenship. The alien w ife must possess allthe qualifications required by
law to become a Filipino citizen by naturalization and none of the disqualifications. (Lee
Suan Ay, Alberto Tan and Lee Chiao vs. Galang, etc., G. R. No. L-11855, Dec. 25, 1959)
It is obvious fromthe nature of these objection that their proper resolution w ould necessarily coverallthe points
raised in appellants' assignments of error, hence, We w illbase our discussions, more or less, on said
objections.
I
The first objection of the Solicitor General w hich coversthe matters dealt w ith in appellants' second and fourth
assignments of error does not require any lengthy discussion. As a matter of fact, it seem evident that the
Solicitor General's pose that an alien w ho has been admitted into the Philippines as a non-immigrant cannot
remain here permanently unless he voluntarily leaves the country first and goes to a foreign country to secure
thereat fromthe appropriate Philippine consulthe proper visa and thereafter undergo examination by officers of
the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with
the requirements of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940, as amended by Republic Act 503, is premised on
the assumption that petitioner Lau Yuen Yeung is not a Filipino citizen. We note the same line of reasoning in
the appealed decision of the court a quo. Accordingly, it is but safe to assume that w ere the Solicitor General
and His Honor of the view that said petitioner had become ipso facto a Filipina by virtue of her marriage to her
Filipino husband, they w ould have held her as entitled to assume the status of a permanent resident w ithout
having to depart as required of aliens by Section 9 (g) of the law .
In any event, to set this point at rest, We hereby hold that portion of Section 9 (g) of the Immigration Act
providing:
An alien w ho is admitted as a non-immigrant cannot remain in the Philippines permanently.
To obtain permanent admission, a non-immigrant alien must depart voluntarily to some
foreign country and procure fromthe appropriate Philippine consulthe proper visa and
thereafter undergo examination by the officers of the Bureau of Immigration at a Philippine
port of entry for determination of his admissibility in accordance with the requirements of
this Act.
does not apply to aliens w ho after coming into the Philippines as temporary visitors, legitimately become Filipino
citizens or acquire Filipino citizenship. Such change of nationality naturally bestow supon their the right to stay
in the Philippines permanently or not, as they may choose, and if they elect to reside here, the immigration
authorities may neither deport them nor confiscate their bonds. True it is that this Court has vehemently
expressed disapprovalof convenient rusesemployed by alien to convert their status fromtemporary visitors to

11
permanent residents in circumvention of the procedure prescribed by the legalprovision already mentioned,
such as inChiong Tiao Bing vs. Commissioner of Immigration, 99 Phil. 1020, w herein, thru Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, the Court, reiterating the ruling in Ong Se Lun vs. Board of Immigration Commissioners, 95 PMI. 785,
said:
... It is clear that if an alien gains admission to the Islands on the strength of a deliberate
and voluntary representation that he w illenter only for a limited time, and thereby secures
the benefit of a temporary visa, the law w illnot allow him subsequently to go backon his
representation and stay permanently, w ithout first departing fromthe Philippines as he had
promised. No officer can relieve him of the departure requirements of section 9 of the
Immigration Act, under the guise of "change" or "correction", forthe law makes no
distinctions, and no officer is above the law . Any other ruling w ould, as stated in our
previous decision, encourage aliens to enter the Islands on false pretences; every alien so
permitted to enter for a limited time, might then claim a right to permanent admission,
how everflimsy such claimshould be, and thereby compel our government to spend time,
money and effort to examining and verifying w hether or not every such alien really has a
right to take up permanent residence here. In the meanw hile, the alien w ould be able to
prolong his stay and evade his return to the port w hence he came, contrary to w hat he
promised to do w hen he entered. The damages inherent in such ruling are self-evident.
On the other hand, how ever, We cannot see any reason w hyan alien w ho has been here as a temporary visitor
but w ho has in the meanw hile become a Filipino should be required to still leave the Philippines for a foreign
country, only to apply thereat for a re-entry here and undergo the process of showing that he is entitled to come
back, w hen after all, such right has become incontestible as a necessaryconcomitant of his assumption of our
nationality by w hatever legalmeans this has been conferred upon him. Consider for example, precisely the
case of the minor children of an alien w ho is naturalized. It is indubitable that they become ipso facto citizens of
the Philippines. Could it be the law that before they can be allow ed permanent residence, they still have to be
taken abroad so that they may be processed to determine w hether or not they have a right to have permanent
residence here? The difficulties and hardships which sucha requirement entails and its seeming
unreasonableness argue against such a rather absurd construction. Indeed, as early as 1957, in Ly Giok Ha vs.
Galang, 101 Phil. 459, Mr. Justice Concepcion, our present Chief Justice, already ruled thus:
... (P)etitioners allege that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became also a
citizen of the Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion w ere correct, it w ould follow that, in
consequence of her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence the
decision appealed fromw ould have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonw ealth Act
613 provides that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on
w hose behalf the bond deposit is given, the bond shall be cancelled or the sum deposited
shall be returned to the depositor or his legal representative." (At. pp. 462-463)
In other w ords, the applicable statute itself more than implies that the naturalization of an alien visitor as a
Philippine citizen logically produces the effect of conferring upon him ipso facto all the rights of citizenship
including that of being entitled to permanently stay in the Philippines outside the orbit of authority of the
Commissioner of Immigration vis-a-vis aliens, if only because by its very nature and express provisions, the
Immigration Law is a law only for aliens and is inapplicable to citizens of the Philippines. In the sense thus
discussed therefore, appellants' second and fourth assignments of errorare welltaken.
II
Precisely, the second objection, of the Solicitor General sustained by the trial judge is that appellant Lau Yuen
Yeung's marriage to appellant Moya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo w hose Filipino citizenship is not denied
did not have the effect of making her a Filipino, since it has not been show n that she "might herself be law fully
naturalized," it appearing clearly in the record that she does not possess allthe qualifications required of
applicants for naturalization by the Revised Naturalization Law , Commonw ealth Act 473, even if she has proven
that she does not suffer fromany of the disqualifications thereunder. In other w ords, the Solicitor General
implicitly concedes that had it been established in the proceedings below that appellant Lau Yuen Yeung
possessesallthe qualifications required by the law of applicants for naturalization, she would have been
recognized by the respondent as a Filipino citizen in the instant case, w ithout requiring her to submit to the
usualproceedings for naturalization.
To be sure, this position of the Solicitor General is in accord with what used to be the view of this Court
since Lee Suan Ay, et al. v. Emilio Galang, etc., et al., G.R. No. L-11855, promulgated December 23, 1959, 106
Phil., 706,713, 1
for it w as only in Zita Ngo Burca vs. Republic,G.R. NO. L-24252 w hich was promulgated on
January 30, 1967 (19 SCRA 186), that over the pen of Mr. Justice Conrado Sanchez, this Court held that for an
alien w oman w homarries a Filipino to be deemed a Filipina, she has to apply for naturalization in accordance
w ith the procedure prescribed by the Revised Naturalization Law and prove in said naturalization proceeding
not only that she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications provided in the law but also that she
has complied w ith allthe formalities required thereby like any other applicant for naturalization, 2
albeit said
decision is not yet part of our jurisprudence inasmuch as the motion for its reconsideration is still pending
resolution. Appellants are in effect urging Us, how ever, in their first and second assignments of error, not only to
reconsider Burca but to even reexamine Lee Suan Ay w hich, as a matter of fact, is the prevailing rule, having
been reiterated in all subsequent decisions up to Go Im Ty. 3
Actually, the first case in w hich Section 15 of the Naturalization Law , Commonw ealth Act 473, underwent
judicial construction wasin the first Ly Giok Ha case, 4
one almost identical to the one at bar. Ly Giok Ha, a
w oman of Chinese nationality, w as a temporary visitor here w hose authority to stay wasto expire on March 14,
1956. She filed a bond to guaranty her timely departure. On March 8, 1956, eight days before the expiration of
her authority to stay, she married a Filipino by the name of Restituto Lacasta. On March 9, 1956, her husband
notified the Commissioner of Immigration of said marriage and, contending that his w ife had become a Filipina
by reason of said marriage, demanded for the cancellation of her bond, but instead of acceding to such request,
the Commissioner required her to leave, and upon her failure to do so, on March 16, 1956, the Commissioner
confiscated her bond; a suit w as filed for the recoveryof the bond; the low er court sustained her contention that
she had no obligation to leave, because she had become Filipina by marriage, hence her bond should be
returned. The Commissioner appealed to this Court. In the said appeal, Mr. Justice Roberto Concepcion, our
present Chief Justice, spoke for the Court, thus:
The next and most important question for determination is w hether her marriage to a
Filipino justified or, at least, excused the aforesaid failure of Ly GiokHa to depart fromthe
Philippines on or before March 14, 1956. In maintaining the affirmative view , petitioners
alleged that, upon her marriage to a Filipino, Ly Giok Ha became, also, a citizen of the
Philippines. Indeed, if this conclusion w ere correct, it w ould follow that, in consequence of
her marriage, she had been naturalized as such citizen, and, hence, the decision appealed
fromw ould have to be affirmed, for section 40(c) of Commonw ealth Act No. 613 provides
that "in the event of the naturalization as a Philippine citizen ... of the alien on w hose behalf
the bond deposit is given, the bond shallbe cancelled or the sum deposited shall be
returned to the depositor or his legal representative." Thus the issue boils dow n to w hether
an alien female w ho marries a male citizen of the Philippines follow s ipso facto his political
status.
The pertinent part of section 15 of Commonw ealth Act No. 473, upon w hich petitioners rely,
reads:
Any w oman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and w ho might herself be law fully naturalized shallbe
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.

12
Pursuant thereto, marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine citizenship to his
foreign wife, unless she "herself maybe lawfullynaturalized." As correctlyheld in an
opinion of the Secretaryof Justice (Op. No. 52, series of 1950),* this limitation of section 15
excludes, from the benefits of naturalization bymarriage, those disqualified from being
naturalized as citizens of the Philippines under section 4 of said Commonw ealth Act No.
473, namely:
(a) Persons opposed to organized government or affiliated w ith any
association or group of persons w houphold and teach doctrines
opposing all organized governments;
(b) Persons defending or teaching the necessity or propriety of
violence, personalassault, or assassination for the success and
predominance of their ideas;
(c) Polygamists or believers in the practice of polygamy;
(d) Persons convicted of crimes involving moral turpitude;
(e) Persons suffering frommental alienation or incurable contagious
diseases;
(f) Persons w ho, during the period of their residence in the Philippines,
have not mingled socially w ith the Filipinos, or w ho have not evinced a
sincere desire to learn and embrace the customs, traditions, and ideals
of the Filipinos;
(g) Citizens or subjects of nations w ith whomthe ... Philippines are at
w ar, during the period of such w ar;
(h) Citizens or subjects of a foreign country other than the United
States, w hose lawsdoes not grant Filipinos the right to become
naturalized citizens or subjects thereof.
In the case at bar, there is neither proof nor allegation in the pleadings that Ly Giok Ha
does not fall under any of the classes disqualified by law . Moreover, as the parties who
claim that, despite her failure to depart from the Philippines w ithin the period specified in
the bond in question, there has been no breach thereof, petitioners have the burden of
proving her alleged change of political status, fromalien to citizen. Strictly speaking,
petitioners have not made out, therefore a case against the respondents-appellants.
Considering, how ever, that neither in the administrative proceedings, nor in the low er court,
had the parties seemingly felt that there w as an issue on w hetherLy GiokHa may "be
law fully naturalized," and this being a case of first impression in our courts, w e are of the
opinion that, in the interest of equity and justice, the parties herein should be given an
opportunity to introduce evidence, if they have any, on said issue. (At pp. 462-464.) .
As may be seen, although not specifically in so many w ords, no doubt w asleft in the above decision as regards
the follow ing propositions: .
1. That under Section 15 of Commonw ealth Act 473, the Revised Naturalization Law , the marriage of an alien
w oman to a Filipino makes her a Filipina, if she "herself might be law fully naturalized";
2. That this Court declared as correct the opinion of the Secretary of Justice that the limitation of Section 15 of
the Naturalization Law excludes fromthe benefits of naturalization by marriage, only those disqualified from
being naturalized under Section 4 of the law qouted in the decision;
3. That evidence to the effect that she is not disqualified may be presented in the action to recover her bond
confiscated by the Commissioner of Immigration;
4. That upon proof of such fact, she may be recognized as Filipina; and
5. That in referring to the disqualification enumerated in the law , the Court somehow left the impression that no
inquiry need be made as to qualifications, 5
specially considering that the decision cited and footnotes several
opinions of the Secretary of Justice, the immediate superior of the Commissioner of Immigration, the most
important of w hich are the follow ing:
Paragraph (a), section 13 of Act No. 2927, as amended, (now section 15, Commonw ealth
Act No. 473), provided that "any w oman w ho is now or may hereafter be married to a
citizen of the Philippines, and w ho might herself be law fully naturalized shallbe deemed a
citizen of the Philippines." A similar provision in the naturalization law of the United States
has been construed as not requiring the w oman to have the qualifications of residence,
good character, etc., as in the case of naturalization by judicial proceedings, but merely that
she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Kelly v. Ow en [Dist. Col. 1868] 7
Wall 496, 5F, 11, 12; ex parte Tryason [D. C. Wash. 1914] 215 F. 449, 27 Op. Atty. Gen.
507).(Op. No. 168, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose Abad Santos.)
In a previous opinion rendered for your Office, Istated that the clause "w ho might herself
be law fully naturalized", should be construed as not requiring the w oman to have the
qualifications of residence, good character, etc., as in cases of naturalization by judicial
proceedings, but merelythat she is of the race of persons who may be naturalized. (Op.
No. 79, s. 1940)
Inasmuch as the race qualification has been removed by the Revised Naturalization Law , it
results that any w oman w ho married a citizen of the Philippines prior to or after June 17,
1939, and the marriage not having been dissolved, and on the assumption that she
possessesnone of the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of Commonw ealth Act No.
473, follow sthe citizenship of her husband. (Op. No. 176, s. 1940 of Justice Sec. Jose
Abad Santos.)
From the foregoing narration of facts, it w ould seemthat the only material point of inquiry is
as to the citizenship of Arce Machura. If he shall be found to be a citizen of the Philippines,
his w ife, Mrs. Lily James Machura, shall likew ise be deemed a citizen of the Philippines
pursuant to the provision of Section 15, Commonw ealth Act No. 473, w hich reads in part as
follow s:
Any w oman who is now or may hereafter be married to a citizen of the
Philippines, and w ho might herself be law fully naturalized shallbe
deemed a citizen of the Philippines.
The phrase "w ho might herself be law fully naturalized", as contained in the above
provision, means that the w oman w ho is married to a Filipino citizen must not belong to any
of the disqualified classes enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law (Ops., Sec. of
Jus., No. 28, s. 1950; No. 43, s. 1948, No. 95, s. 1941; Nos. 79 and 168, s. 1940). Under
the facts stated in the w ithin papers, Mrs. Machura does not appear to be among the
disqualified classes mentioned in the law .

13
It having been show n that Arce Machura or Arsenio Guevara wasborn as an illegitimate of
a Filipino mother, he should be considered as a citizen of the Philippines in consonance
w ith the w ell-settled rule that an illegitimate child follow sthe citizenship of his only legally
recognized parent, the mother (Op., Sec. of Jus., Nos. 58, 98 & 281, s. 1948; No. 96, s.
1949). Her husband being a Filipino, Mrs. Machura must necessarily be deemed as a
citizen of the Philippines by marriage (Sec. 15, Com. Act No. 473.) (Op. No. 52, s. 1950 of
Justice Sec. Ricardo Nepomuceno.)
The logic and authority of these opinions, compelling as they are, must have so appealed to this Court that five
days later, on May 22, 1957, in Ricardo Cua v. The Board of Commissioners, 101 Phil. 521, Mr. Justice J.B.L.
Reyes, reiterated the same ruling on the basis of the follow ing facts:
Tjioe Wu Suan, an Indonesian, arrived in Manila on November 1, 1952, but it turned out that her passport w as
forged. On December 10, 1953, a w arrant wasissued for her arrest for purpose of deportation. Later, on
December 20, 1953, she married Ricardo Cua, a Filipino, and because of said marriage, the Board of Special
Inquiry considered her a Filipina. Upon a review of the case, however, the Board of Immigration Commissioners
insisted on continuing w ith the deportation proceedings and so, the husband filed prohibition and mandamus
proceedings. The low er court denied the petition. Although this Court affirmed said decision, it held, on the other
hand, that:
Granting the validity of marriage, this Court has ruled in the recent case of LyGiok Ha v.
Galang, supra, p. 459, that the bare fact of a valid marriage to a citizen does not suffice to
confer his citizenship upon the w ife.Section 15 of the Naturalization Law requires that the
alien w oman w homarries a Filipino must show , in addition, that she "might herself be
law fully naturalized" as a Filipino citizen. As construed in the decision cited, this last
condition requiresproof that the woman who married a Filipino isherselfnot disqualified
under section 4 of the Naturalization Law.
No such evidence appearing on record, the claim of assumption of Filipino citizenship by
Tjioe Wu Suan, upon her marriage to petitioner, is untenable. The low er court, therefore,
committed no error in refusing to interfere with the deportation proceedings, w here she can
anyw ayestablish the requisites indispensable for her acquisition of Filipino citizenship, as
w ellas the alleged validity of her Indonesian passport. (Ricardo Cua v.The Board of
Immigration Commissioners, G. R. No.L-9997, May 22, 1957, 101 Phil. 521, 523.)
[Emphasis supplied] .
For emphasis, it is reiterated that in the above tw o cases, this Court expressly gave the parties concerned
opportunity to prove the fact that they w ere not suffering fromany of the disqualifications of the law w ithout the
need of undergoing any judicial naturalization proceeding. It may be stated, therefore, that according to the
above decisions, the law in this country, on the matter of the effect of marriage of an alien w oman to a Filipino is
that she thereby becomes a Filipina, if it can be proven that at the time of such marriage, she does not possess
any of the disqualifications enumerated in Section 4 of the Naturalization Law , without the need of submitting to
any naturalization proceedings under said law .
It is to be admitted that both of the above decisions made no reference to qualifications, that is, as to w hether or
not they need also to be proved, but, in any event, it is a fact that the Secretary of Justice understood themto
mean that such qualifications need not be possessed nor proven. Then Secretary of Justice Jesus Barrera, who
later became a distinguished member of this Court, 6
so ruled in opinions rendered by him subsequent to Ly
Giok Ha, the most illustrative of w hich held: .
At the outset it is important to note that an alien w oman married to a Filipino citizen needs
only to show that she "might herself be law fully naturalized" in order to acquire Philippine
citizenship. Compliance w ith other conditions of the statute, such as those relating to the
qualifications of an applicant for naturalization through judicial proceedings, is not
necessary. (See: Leonard v. Grant, 5 Fed. 11; 27 Ops. Atty. Gen [U.S.] 507; Ops. Sec. of
Justice, No. 776, s. 1940, and No. 111, s. 1953.
This view finds support in the case of LyGiok Ha et al. v. Galang et al., G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957, w here the Supreme Court, construing the abovequoted section
of the Naturalization Law , held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign w ife," unlessshe "herself may be law fully naturalized," and that
"this limitationof Section 15 excludes, from the benefitsof naturalization bymarriage, those
disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the Philippinesunder Section 4 of said
Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other w ords, disqualification for any of the causes
enumerated in Section 4 of the Act is the decisive factor that defeats the right of the foreign
w ife of a Philippine citizen to acquire Philippine citizenship.
xxx xxx xxx
Does petitioner, Lim King Bian, belong to any of these groups The Commissioner of
Immigration does not say so but merely predicates his negative action on the ground that a
w arrant of deportation for "overstaying" is pending against the petitioner.
We do not believe the position is w elltaken. Since the grounds for disqualification for
naturalization are expressly enumerated in the law , a w arrant of deportation not based on a
finding of unfitness to become naturalized for any of those specified causesmay not be
invoked to negate acquisition of Philippine citizenship by a foreign w ife of a Philippine
citizen under Section 15 of the Naturalization Law . (Inclusio uniusest exclusio alterius)(Op.
No. 12, s. 1958 of Justice Undersec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
Regarding the steps that should be taken by an alien w oman married to a Filipino citizen in
order to acquire Philippine citizenship, the procedure followed in the Bureau of Immigration
is as follow s:The alien w oman must file a petition for the cancellation of her alien certificate
of registration alleging, among other things, that she is married to a Filipino citizen and that
she is not disqualified fromacquiring her husband's citizenship pursuant to section 4 of
Commonw ealth Act No. 473, as amended. Upon the filing of said petition, w hich should be
accompanied or supported by the joint affidavit of the petitioner and her Filipino husband to
the effect that the petitioner does not belong to any of the groups disqualified by the cited
section frombecoming naturalized Filipino citizen (please see attached CEB Form 1), the
Bureau of Immigration conducts an investigation and thereafter promulgates its order or
decision granting or denying the petition. (Op. No. 38, s. 19058 of Justice Sec. Jesus G.
Barrera.)
This view finds support in the case of Ly Giok Ha et al., v. Galang et al. (G.R. No. L-10760,
promulgated May 17, 1957), w here the Supreme Court, construing the above-quoted
section in the Revised Naturalization Law , held that "marriage to a male Filipino does not
vest Philippine citizenship to his foreign w ife, unlessshe herself may be law fully
naturalized," and that "this limitation of Section 15 excludes, from the benefits of
naturalizationbymarriage, those disqualified from being naturalized as citizens of the
Philippines under Section 4 of said Commonwealth Act No. 473." In other w ords,
disqualification for any of the causes enumerated in section 4 of the Act is the decisive
factor that defeats the right of an alien w oman married to a Filipino citizen to acquire
Philippine citizenship. (Op. 57, s. 1958 of Justice Sec. Jesus G. Barrera.)
The contention is untenable. The doctrine enunciated in the Ly Giok Ha case is not a new
one. In that case, the Supreme Court held that under paragraph I of Section 15 Of
Commonw ealth Act No. 473, 'marriage to a male Filipino does not vest Philippine
citizenship to his foreign w ife unless she "herself may be law fully naturalized"', and, quoting
severalearlier opinions of the Secretary of Justice, namely: No. 52, s. 1950; No. 168, s.

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