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A.M. No. MTJ-96-1088 July 19, 1996
RODOLFO G. NAVARRO, complainant,
vs.
JUDGE HERNANDO C. DOMAGTOY, respondent.
ROMERO, J.:p
The complainant in this administrative case is the Municipal Mayor of Dapa, Surigao del Norte, Rodolfo G. Navarro. He has submitted evidence in
relation to tw o specific acts committed by respondent Municipal Circuit Trial Court Judge Hernando Domagtoy, w hich, he contends, exhibits gross
misconduct as w ellas inefficiency in office and ignorance of the law .
First, on September 27, 1994, respondent judge solemnized the w edding betw een Gaspar A. Tagadan and Arlyn F. Borga, despite the know ledge that
the groom is merely separated fromhis first w ife.
Second, it is alleged that he performed a marriage ceremony betw een Floriano Dador Sumaylo and Gemma G. del Rosario outside his court's
jurisdiction on October 27, 1994. Respondent judge holds office and has jurisdiction in the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sta. Monica-Burgos, Surigao
del Norte. The w edding wassolemnized at the respondent judge's residence in the municipality of Dapa, w hich does not fallw ithin his jurisdictionalarea
of the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, located some 40 to 45 kilometers aw ay fromthe municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte.
In his letter-comment to the office of the Court Administrator, respondent judge avers that the office and name of the Municipal Mayor of Dapa have
been used by someone else, w ho, as the mayor's "lackey," is overly concerned with his actuations both as judge and as a private person. The same
person had earlier filed Administrative Matter No 94-980-MTC, w hich wasdismissed for lackof merit on September 15, 1994, and Administrative Matter
No. OCA-IPI-95-16, "Antonio Adapon v. Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy," w hich is stillpending.
In relation to the charges against him, respondent judge seeks exculpation fromhis act of having solemnized the marriage betw een Gaspar Tagadan, a
married man separated fromhis w ife, and Arlyn F. Borga by stating that he merely relied on the Affidavit issued by the Municipal Trial Judge of Basey,
Samar, confirming the fact that Mr. Tagadan and his first w ife have not seen each other for almost seven years. 1
With respect to the second charge, he
maintains that in solemnizing the marriage betw een Sumaylo and del Rosario, he did not violate Article 7, paragraph 1 of the Family Code w hich states
that: "Marriage may be solemnized by: (1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary w ithin the court's jurisdiction;" and that article 8 thereof applies to the
case in question.
The complaint w as not referred, as is usual, for investigation, since the pleadings submitted w ere considered sufficient for a resolution of the case. 2
Since the countercharges of sinister motives and fraud on the part of complainant have not been sufficiently proven, they willnot be dw elt upon. The
acts complained of and respondent judge's answer thereto willsuffice and can be objectively assessed by themselves to prove the latter's malfeasance.
The certified true copy of the marriage contract betw een Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga states that Tagadan's civilstatus is "separated." Despite this
declaration, the w edding ceremony wassolemnized by respondent judge. He presented in evidence a joint affidavit by Maurecio A. Labado, Sr. and
Eugenio Bullecer, subscribed and sworn to before Judge Demosthenes C. Duquilla, Municipal Trial Judge of Basey, Samar. 3
The affidavit w as not
issued by the latter judge, as claimed by respondent judge, but merely acknow ledged beforehim. In their affidavit, the affiants stated that they knew
Gaspar Tagadan to have been civilly married to Ida D. Peñaranda in September 1983; that after thirteen years of cohabitation and having borne five
children, Ida Peñaranda left the conjugal dw elling in Valencia, Bukidnon and that she has not returned nor been heard of for almost seven years, thereby
giving rise to the presumption that she is already dead.
In effect, Judge Domagtoy maintains that the aforementioned joint affidavit is sufficient proof of Ida Peñaranda's presumptive death, and ample reason
for him to proceed w ith the marriage ceremony. We do not agree.
Article 41 of the Family Code expressly provides:
A marriage contracted by any person during the subsistence of a previous marriage shall be null and void, unless before the
celebration of the subsequent marriage, the prior spouse had been absent for four consecutive yearsand the spouse present had a
w ell-founded belief that the absent spouse w asalready dead. In case of disappearance where there is danger of death under the
circumstances set forth in the provisions of Articles 391 of the Civil Code, an absence of only tw o years shallbe sufficient.

2. For the purpose of contracting the subsequent marriage under the preceding paragraph, the spouse presentmust institutea
summaryproceeding as provided in this Code for the declaration of presumptive death of the absentee, without prejudice to the
effect of reappearance of the absent spouse. (Emphasis added.)
There is nothing ambiguous or difficult to comprehend in this provision. In fact, the law is clear and simple. Even if the spouse present has a w ell-
founded belief that the absent spouse w asalready dead, a summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death is necessaryin order to
contract a subsequent marriage, a mandatory requirement w hich has been precisely incorporated into the Family Code to discourage subsequent
marriages w here it is not proven that the previous marriage has been dissolved or a missing spouse is factually or presumptiv ely dead, in accordance
w ith pertinent provisions of law.
In the case at bar, Gaspar Tagadan did not institute a summary proceeding for the declaration of his first wife'spresumptive death. Absent this judicial
declaration, he remains married to Ida Peñaranda. Whether w ittingly or unw ittingly, it w as manifest erroron the part of respondent judge to have
accepted the joint affidavit submitted by the groom. Such neglect or ignorance of the law has resulted in a bigamous, and therefore void, marriage.
Under Article 35 of the Family Code, " The follow ing marriage shall be void fromthe beginning: (4) Those bigamous . . . marriages not falling under
Article 41."
The second issue involves the solemnization of a marriage ceremony outside the court's jurisdiction, covered by Articles 7 and 8 of the Family Code,
thus:
Art. 7. Marriage may be solemnized by :
(1) Any incumbent member of the judiciary within the court's jurisdiction;
xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied.)
Art. 8. The marriage shall be solemnized publicly in the chambers the judge or in open court, in the church, chapelor temple, or in
the office of the consul-general, consulor vice-consul, as the case may be, and not elsew here, except in cases of marriages
contracted on the point of death or in remote places in accordance with Article 29 of this Code, or where both parties request the
solemnizing officerin writing in which case the marriage maybe solemnized at a house or place designated bythem in a sworn
statement to that effect.
Respondent judge points to Article 8 and its exceptions as the justification for his having solemnized the marriage betw een Floriano Sumaylo and
Gemma del Rosario outside of his court's jurisdiction. As the aforequoted provision states, a marriage can be held outside of the judge's chambers or
courtroomonly in the follow ing instances: (1) at the point of death, (2) in remote places in accordance with Article 29 or (3) upon request of both parties
in w riting in a sw orn statement to this effect. There is no pretense that either Sumaylo or del Rosario w as at the point of death or in the remote place.
Moreover, the w ritten request presented addressed to the respondent judge w as made by only one party, Gemma del Rosario. 4
More importantly, the elementary principle underlying this provision is the authority of the solemnizing judge. Under Article 3, one of the formal requisites
of marriage is the "authority of the solemnizing officer." Under Article 7, marriage may be solemnized by, among others, "any incumbent member of the
judiciary within the court's jurisdiction."Article 8, w hich is a directory provision, refersonly to the venue of the marriage ceremony and does not alter or
qualify the authority of the solemnizing officer as provided in the preceding provision. Non-compliance herew ith will not invalidate the marriage.
A priest w ho is commissioned and allow ed by his local ordinary to marry the faithful, is authorized to do so only w ithin the area of the diocese or place
allow ed by his Bishop. An appellate court Justice or a Justice of this Court has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines to solemnize marriages, regardless
of the venue, as long as the requisites of the law are complied w ith. How ever, judges who are appointed to specific jurisdictions, may officiate in
w eddings only within said areas and not beyond. Where a judge solemnizes a marriage outside his court's jurisdiction, there is a resultant irregularity in
the formalrequisite laid dow n in Article 3, w hich while it may not affect the validity of the marriage, may subject the officiating officialto administrative
liability. 5
Inasmuch as respondent judge's jurisdiction covers the municipalities of Sta. Monica and Burgos, he w as not clothed w ith authority to solemnize a
marriage in the municipality of Dapa, Surigao del Norte. By citing Article 8 and the exceptions therein as grounds for the exercise of his misplaced
authority, respondent judge again demonstrated a lackof understanding of the basic principles of civillaw .
Accordingly, the Court finds respondent to have acted in gross ignorance of the law . The legal principles applicable in the cases brought to our attention
are elementary and uncomplicated, prompting us to conclude that respondent's failure to apply them is due to a lack of comprehension of the law .
The judiciary should be composed of persons who, if not experts, are at least, proficient in the law they are sw orn to apply, more than the ordinary
laymen. They should be skilled and competent in understanding and applying the law . It is imperative that they be conversant with basic legalprinciples
like the ones involved in instant case. 6
It is not too much to expect them to know and apply the law intelligently. 7
Otherw ise, the systemof justice rests
on a shaky foundation indeed, compounded by the errors committed by those not learned in the law . While magistrates may at times make mistakes in
judgment, for w hich they are not penalized, the respondent judge exhibited ignorance of elementary provisions of law , in an area w hich has greatly
prejudiced the status of married persons.
The marriage betw een Gaspar Tagadan and Arlyn Borga is considered bigamous and void, there being a subsisting marriage betw een Gaspar Tagadan
and Ida Peñaranda.
The Office of the Court Administrator recommends, in its Memorandum to the Court, a six-month suspension and a stern w arning that a repetition of the
same or similar acts w illbe dealt w ith more severely. Considering that one of the marriages in question resulted in a bigamous union and therefore void,
and the other lacked the necessary authority of respondent judge, the Court adopts said recommendation. Respondent is advised to be more
circumspect in applying the law and to cultivate a deeper understanding of the law .
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, respondent Judge Hernando C. Domagtoy is hereby SUSPENDED for a period of six (6) months and given a STERN
WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts w illbe dealt w ith more severely.
Regalado, Puno, Mendoza and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-11598 January 27, 1959
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appelee,
vs.
FEDERIC BUSTAMANTE, defendant-appellant.
Assistant Solicitor General Antonio A. Torres and Atty. Eduardo C. Abaya for appellee.
Ramon S. Milo for appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

3. Charged and convicted of the crime of bigamy in the Court of First Instance of Pangasinan, Federico Bustamante appealed to this Court on points of
law .
The records disclose that defendant-appellant Bustamante w asunited in w edlockto one Maria Perez on August 9, 1954, before the Justice of the Peace
of Binalonan, Pangasinan (Exh. "A", pp. 9-11, t.s.n.). A little over a year later, or on September 16, 1955, he contracted a second marriage w ith Demetria
Tibayan, solemnized before Vice-Mayor Francisco B. Nato of Mapandan, Pangasinan, w ho w as then acting as Mayor of the said Municipality (Exh. "B"),
w hile the first marriage w as stillsubsisting. Defendant dw elt with Demetria and her parents for about a month, after w hich a time he returned to Calasiao,
Pangasinan to live w ith the first w ife, Maria Perez. In the course of her search for him, Demetria discovered fromthe Binalonan municipal authorities the
previous marriage of defendant Bustamante. Hence, this accusation.
Defendant did not testify in his behalf during the trial. the main problem poised in this appeal concerns the authority of Francisco Nato to solemnize the
second marriage.
It appears that Enrique Aquino and Francisco Nato w ere the duly elected mayor and vice-mayor, respectively, of the municipality of Mapandan,
Pangasinan in the elections of 1951. On September 16, 1955, Aquino w ent on leave of absence for one month. In view of this, the vice-mayor was
designed by the mayor to take over the rein of municipal government during his absence; and Nato w as acting in this capacity w hen he performed the
second marriage of Bustamante w ith Demetria Tibayan.
Appellant, relying upon article 56 of the Civil Code of the Philippines —
Art. 56. Marriage may be solemnized by:
(1) The Chief Justice and Associate Justices of the Supreme Court;
(2) The Presiding Justice and the Justice of the Court of Appeals;
(3) Judges of the Courts of First Instance;
(4) Mayors of cities and municipalities;
(5) Municipal judges and justices of the Peace;
(6) Priests, rabbis, ministers of the gospelof any denominations, church, religion or sect, duly registered, as provided in article 92; and
(7) Ship captains, airplanes chiefs, military commanders, and consuls and vice-consuls in specialcases provided in provided in articles 74 and
75.
contends that there could not have been a second marriage to speakof, as Nato w as merely acting as mayor w hen he celebrated the same, hence,
w ithout authority of law to do so. He lays stress on the distinction made by this court in the case Salaysayvs. Hon. Fred Ruiz Castro, et al.*
52 Off. Gaz.,
No. 2, 809, betw een "Acting Mayor" and "Vice-Mayor acting as Mayor", urging that w hile the former may solemnize marriages, the latter could not.
We find this connection untenable. When the issue involves the assumption of pow ers and duties of the office of the mayor by the vice-mayor, w hen
proper, it is immaterial w hether it because the latter is the Acting Mayor or merely acting as Mayor, for in both instances, he discharges allthe duties and
w ields the pow erappurtenant to said office (Laxamana vs. Baltazar,1
48 Off. Gaz., No. 9, 3869; Sec. 2195, Revised Administrative Code). The case
of Salaysayvs. Castro (supra) cited by the appellant, w hich revolves upon the interpretation of section 27 of the Revised Election Code, is entirely
distinct fromthe one at bar. This instance does not involve a question of title to the office, but the performance of the functions thereunto appertaining by
one w ho is admitted to be temporarily vested w ith it. As correctly observed by the low ercourt, that case even concedes and recognizesthe powersand
duties of the Mayor to devolve upon the Vice-Mayor whenever the latter is in an acting capacity. The w ord "acting" as held in the case of Austria vs.
Amante,2
45 Off. Gaz., 2809, w hen preceding the title of an office connotes merely the temporary character or nature of the same.
The information charges that the appellant contracted the second marriage before the Justice of the Peace of Mapandan, Pangasinan, w hile the
marriage certificate, Exh. "B", and the testimonies of w itnessesindicate clearly that it w as performed by Francisco Nato. Appellant assigns as error the
admission by the low er court of the said evidence, notw ithstanding counsel'sobjection. This is not reversible error. The w rong averment, if at all, w as
unsubstantialand immaterial that need not even be alleged, for it matters not w ho solemnized the marriage, it being sufficient that the information
charging bigamy alleges that a second marriage w as contracted while the first stillremained undissolved. The information filed in this case w hich
properly states the time and place of the second w edding, wassufficient to apprise the defendant of the crime imputed. Neither proceduralprejudice nor
error w ascommitted by the low er court in finding appellant guilty.
Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code attaches the penalty of prision mayor to the crime of bigamy. Pursuant to the Indeterminate Sentence Law , the
court must impose an indeterminate penalty, the maximum term of w hich shallbe that w hich, in view of the attending circumstances, could be properly
imposed under the Code (in this case the medium period of prision mayor, there being no aggravating nor mitigating circumstances), and the minimum
w hich shallbe w ithin the range of the penalty next low er to that prescribed for the offense (or prision correccionalmedium) (People vs. Gonzales, 73
Phil., 549).
The penalty imposed by the low er court (imprisonment for not less than tw o (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional and not
more than eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor), being in accordance with law, is affirmed. Costs against appellant.
So ordered.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion and Endencia, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-9005 June 20, 1958
ARSENIO DE LORIA and RICARDA DE LORIA, petitioners,
vs.
FELIPE APELAN FELIX, respondent.
Guido Advincula and Nicanor Lapuz for petitioners.
Nicodemus L. Dasig for respondent.
BENGZON, J.:
Review of a decision of the Court of Appeals, involving the centralissue of the validity of the marriage in articulo mortis between Matea de la Cruz and
Felipe Apelan Felix.

4. It appears that long before, and during the War of the Pacific, these tw o persons lived together as w ife and husband at Cabrera Street, Pasay City. They
acquired properties but had no children. In the early part of the liberation of Manila and surrounding territory, Matea be came seriously ill. Know ing her
criticalcondition, tw o young ladies of legal age dedicated to the service of God, named Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra1
visited and persuaded her
to go to confession. They fetched Father Gerardo Bautista, Catholic parish priest of Pasay. The latter, upon learning that the penitent had been living
w ith Felipe Apelan Felix w ithout benefit of marriage, asked both parties to ratify their union according to the rites of his Church. Both agreed. Whereupon
the priest heard the confession of the bed-ridden old w oman, gave her Holy Communion, administered the Sacrament of Extreme Unction and then
solemnized her marriage w ith Felipe Apelan Felix in articulo mortis,2
Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra acting as sponsorsor witnesses. It w asthen
January 29 or 30, 1945.
After a few months, Matea recovered fromher sickness; but death w as not to be denied, and in January 1946, she w as interred in Pasay, the same Fr.
Bautista performing the burial ceremonies.
On May 12, 1952, Arsenio de Loria and Ricarda de Loria filed this complaint to compel defendant to an accounting and to deliver the properties left by
the deceased. They are grandchildren of Adriana de la Cruz, sister of Matea, and claim to be the only surviving forced heirs of the latter. Felipe Apelan
Felix resisted the action, setting up his rights as w idower. They obtained favorable judgment in the court of first instance, but on appeal the Court of
Appeals reversed and dismissed the complaint.
Their request for review here wasgiven due course principally to consider the legal question-w hich they amply discussed in their petition and printed
brief — w hether the events which tookplace in January 1945 constituted, in the eyes of the law , a valid and binding marriage.
According to the Court of Appeals:
There is no doubt at all in the mind of this Court, that Fr. Gerardo Bautista, solemnized the marriage in articulo mortis of Defendant Apelan
Felix and Matea de la Cruz, on January 29 and 30, 1945, under the circumstances set forth in the reverend's testimony in court. Fr. Bautista, a
respectable old priest of Pasay City then, had no reason to side one or the other. . . . Notw ithstanding this positive evidence on the celebration
or performance of the marriage in question, Plaintiffs-Appellees contend that the same w as not in articulo mortis, because Matea de la Cruz
w as not then on the point of death. Fr. Bautista clearly testified, how ever, that her condition at the time w as bad; she was bed-ridden; and
according to his observation, she might die at any moment (Exhibit 1), so apprehensive w ashe about her condition that he decided in
administering to her the sacrament of extreme unction, after hearing her confession. . . . .The greatest objection of the Appellees and the trial
court against the validity of the marriage under consideration, is the admitted fact that it w as not registered.
The applicable legal provisions are contained in the Marriage Law of 1929 (Act No. 3613) as amended by Commonw ealth Act No. 114 (Nov. 1936)
specially sections 1, 3, 20 and 21.
There is no question about the officiating priest's authority to solemnize marriage. There is also no question that the parties had legal capacity to
contract marriage, and that both declared before Fr. Bautista and Carmen Ordiales and Judith Vizcarra that "they tookeach other as husband and w ife."
The appellants' contention of invalidity rests on these propositions:
(a) There w as no "marriage contract" signed by the w edded couple the w itnessesand the priest, as required by section 3 of the Marriage Law ; and
(b) The priest filed no affidavit, nor recorded the marriage w ith the local civilregistry.
The factualbasis of the first proposition — no signing — may seriously be doubted. The Court of Appeals made no finding thereon. Indeed if anything,
its decision impliedly held such marriage contract to have been executed, since it said "the marriage in articulo mortis w as a fact", and the only question
at issue w as whether "the failure of Fr. Bautista to send copies of the certificate of marriage in question to the LocalCivil Registrar and to register the
said marriage in the Record of Marriages of the Pasay Catholic Church . . . renders the said marriage invalid." And such w asthe only iss ue tendered in
the court of first instance. (See p. 14, 34, Record on Appeal.)
How ever, we may as w ellface this secondissue: Does the failure to sign the "marriage certificate or contract" constitute a cause for nullity?
Marriage contract is the "instrument in triplicate" mentioned in sec. 3 of the Marriage Law which provides:
Sec. 3. Mutual Consent. — No particular formfor the ceremony of marriage is required, but the parties w ith legalcapacity to contract marriage
must declare, in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of tw o witnessesof legalage, that they take each other as husband
and w ife. Thisdeclaration shallbe set forth in an instrument in triplicate, signed by signature or mark by the contracting parties and said tw o
w itnessesand attested by the person solemnizing the marriage. . . . (Emphasis ours).
In the first place, the Marriage Law itself, in sections 28, 29 and 30 enumerates the causes for annulment of marriage. Failure to sign the marriage
contract is not one of them.
In the second place, bearing in mind that the "essentialrequisites for marriage are the legal capacity of the contracting parties and their consent"
(section 1), the latter being manifested by the declaration of "the parties" "in the presence of the person solemnizing the marriage and of tw o witnesses
of legal age that they take each other as husband and w ife" — w hich in this case actually occurred.3
We thinkthe signing of the marriage contract or
certificate was required by the statute simply for the purpose of evidencing the act.4
No statutory provision or court ruling has been cited making it
an essential requisite — not the formal requirement of evidentiary value, w hich we believe it is. The fact of marriage is one thing; the proof by w hich it
may be established is quite another.
Certificate and Record. — Statutes relating to the solemnization of marriage usually provide for the issuance of a certificate of marriage and
for the registration or recording of marriage . . . Generally speaking, the registration or recording of a marriage is not essentialto its validity,
the statute being addressed to the officials issuing the license, certifying the marriage, and making the proper return and registration or
recording. (Sec. 27 American Jurisprudence "Marriage" p. 197-198.)
Formal Requisites. — . . . The generalrule, how ever, is that statutes w hich direct that a license must be issued and procured, that only certain
persons shallperformthe ceremony, that a certain number of w itnesses shallbe present, that a certificate of the marriage shall be signed,
returned, and recorded, and that persons violating the conditions shall be guilty of a criminal offense, are addressed to persons in authority to
secure publicity and to require a record to be made of the marriage contract. Such statutes do not void common-law marriages unless they do
so expressly, even where such marriage are entered into without obtaining a license and are not recorded. It is the purpose of these
statutes to discourage deception and seduction, prevent illicit intercourse under the guise of matrimony, and relieve fromdoubt the s tatus of
parties w ho live together as man and w ife, byproviding competent evidence of the marriage. . . . (Section 15 American Jurisprudence
"Marriage" pp. 188-189.) Emphasis Ours. (See also Corpus Juris Secundum "Marriage" Sec. 33.)
And our law says, "no marriage shall be declared invalid because of the absence of one or severalformalrequirements of this Act . . . ." (Section 27.)
In the third place, the law , imposing on the priest the duty to furnish to the parties copies of such marriage certificate (section 16) and punishing him for
its omission (section 41) implies his obligation to see that such "certificate"is executed accordingly. Hence, it w ould not be fair to visit upon the w edded
couple in the form of annulment, Father Bautista's omission, if any, w hich apparently had been caused by the prevailing disorder during the liberation of
Manila and its environs.

5. Identical remarks apply to the priest's failure to make and file the affidavit required by sections 20 and 21. It w as the priest's obligation; non-compliance
w ith it, should bring no serious consequencesto the married pair, specially w here as in this case, it w as caused by the emergency.
The mere fact that the parish priest w ho married the plaintiff's naturalfather and mother, w hile the latter w as in articulo mortis, failed to send a
copy of the marriage certificate to the municipal secretary, does not invalidate said marriage, since it does not appear that in the celebration
thereof all requisites for its validity w ere not present, the forwarding of a copy of the marriage certif icate not being one of the requisites. (Jones
vs. Hortiguela, 64 Phil. 179.) See also Madridejo vs. De Leon, 55 Phil. 1.
The law permits in articulo mortis marriages, without marriage license; but it requires the priest to make the affidavit and file it. Such affidavit contains the
data usually required for the issuance of a marriage license. The first practicallysubstitutes the latter. Now then, if a marriage celebrated w ithout the
license is not voidable (under Act 3613),5
this marriage should not also be voidable for lack of such affidavit.
In line w ith the policy to encourage the legalization of the union of men and w omen w ho have lived publicly in a state of concubinage6
, (section 22), we
must hold this marriage to be valid.
The w idower, needless to add, has better rights to the estate of the deceased than the plaintiffs w ho are the grandchildren of her sister Adriana. "In the
absence of brothers or sisters and of nephews, children of the former, . . . the surviving spouse . . . shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased.
(Art 952, Civil Code.)
Wherefore, the Court of Appeals' decision is affirmed, w ith costs. So ordered.
Paras, C. J., Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Endencia, and Felix, JJ.,concur.
G.R. No. 132529. February 2, 2001
SUSAN NICDAO CARIÑO, petitioner,
vs.
SUSAN YEE CARIÑO, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
The issue for resolution in the case at bar hinges on the validity of the tw o marriages contracted by the deceased SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, w hose
“death benefits” is now the subject of the controversy between the two Susans whomhe married. 1âwphi1.nêt
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorariseeking to set aside the decision 1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263, w hich
affirmed in toto the decision 2
of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 87, in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632.
During the lifetime of the late SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, he contracted two marriages, the first wason June 20, 1969, w ith petitioner Susan Nicdao
Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Nicdao), w ith w homhe had tw o offsprings, namely, Sahlee and Sandee Cariño; and the second w ason
November 10, 1992, w ith respondent Susan Yee Cariño (hereafter referred to as Susan Yee), w ith whomhe had no children in their almost ten year
cohabitation starting w aybackin 1982.
In 1988, SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño became ill and bedridden due to diabetes complicated by pulmonary tuberculosis. He passed aw ayon November 23,
1992, under the care of Susan Yee, w ho spent for his medicaland burial expenses. Both petitioner and respondent filed claims for monetary benefits
and financialassistance pertaining to the deceased fromvarious government agencies. Petitioner Susan Nicdao w as able to collect a total of
P146,000.00 from “MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig,” 3
w hile respondent Susan Yee received a totalof P21,000.00 from“GSIS
Life, Burial (GSIS) and burial (SSS).” 4
On December 14, 1993, respondent Susan Yee filed the instant case for collection of sum of money against petitioner Susan Nicdao praying, inter alia,
that petitioner be ordered to return to her at least one-half of the one hundred forty-six thousand pesos(P146,000.00) collectively denominated as “death
benefits” w hich she (petitioner) received from“MBAI, PCCUI, Commutation, NAPOLCOM, [and] Pag-ibig.” Despite service of summons, petitioner failed
to file her answ er, prompting the trial court to declare her in default.
Respondent Susan Yee admitted that her marriage to the deceased took place during the subsistence of, and without first obtaining a judicial declaration
of nullity of, the marriage betw een petitioner and the deceased. She, how ever, claimed that she had no know ledge of the previous marriage and that she
became aw are of it only at the funeralof the deceased, w here she met petitioner w ho introduced herself as the w ife of the deceased. To bolster her
action for collection of sum of money, respondent contended that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is void ab initio because the same w as
solemnized w ithout the required marriage license. In support thereof, respondent presented: 1) the marriage certificate of the deceased and the
petitioner w hich bears no marriage license number; 5
and 2) a certification dated March 9, 1994, from the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
Manila, w hich reads –
This is to certifythat this Office has no record of marriage license of the spouses SANTIAGOCARINO (sic) and SUSAN NICDAO, who are married in
this municipalityon June 20, 1969. Hence, we cannot issue as requested a true copyor transcription of Marriage License number from the recordsof
this archives.
This certification is issued upon the request of Mrs. Susan Yee Cariño for whatever legal purpose it may serve. 6
On August 28, 1995, the trial court ruled in favor of respondent, Susan Yee, holding as follow s:
WHEREFORE, the defendant is herebyordered to pay the plaintiff the sum of P73,000.00, half of the amount which was paid to her in the form of death
benefits arising from the death of SPO4 Santiago S. Cariño, plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, and costs of sui t.
IT IS SO ORDERED. 7

6. On appeal by petitioner to the Court of Appeals, the latter affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition, contending that:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDINGS OF THE LOWER COURT THAT VDA. DE
CONSUEGRA VS. GSIS IS APPLICABLE TO THE CASE ATBAR.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN APPLYING EQUITY IN THE INSTANT CASE INSTEAD OF THE CLEAR
AND UNEQUIVOCAL MANDATE OF THE FAMILY CODE.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THE CASE OF VDA. DE CONSUEGRA VS GSIS TO HAVE
BEEN MODIFIED, AMENDED AND EVEN ABANDONED BY THE ENACTMENT OF THE FAMILY CODE. 8
Under Article 40 of the Family Code, the absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final
judgment declaring such previous marriage void. Meaning, w here the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of
contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law , for said projected marriage to be free fromlegal infirmity, is a finaljudgment declaring
the previous marriage void. 9
How ever, for purposes other than remarriage, no judicial action is necessaryto declare a marriage an absolute nullity. For
other purposes, such as but not limited to the determination of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even after the death of the parties thereto, and even in a suit
not directly instituted to question the validity of said marriage, so long as it is essentialto the determination of the case. 10
In such instances, evidence
must be adduced, testimonial or documentary, to prove the existence of grounds rendering such a previous marriage an absolute nullity. These need not
be limited solely to an earlier final judgment of a court declaring such previous marriage void. 11
It is clear therefore that the Court is clothed w ith sufficient authority to pass upon the validity of the tw o marriages in this case, as the same is essentialto
the determination of w ho is rightfully entitled to the subject “death benefits” of the deceased.
Under the Civil Code, w hich was the law in force when the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased w as solemnized in 1969, a valid
marriage license is a requisite of marriage, 12
and the absence thereof, subject to certain exceptions, 13
rendersthe marriage void ab initio. 14
In the case at bar, there is no question that the marriage of petitioner and the deceased does not fallw ithin the marriages exempt fromthe license
requirement. A marriage license, therefore, w as indispensable to the validity of their marriage. This notw ithstanding, the recordsrevealthat the marriage
contract of petitioner and the deceased bears no marriage license number and, as certified by the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their
office has no record of such marriage license. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, 15
the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-
issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the localcivil registrar enjoys
probative value, he being the officer charged under the law to keep a record of all data relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficientlyovercome. It then became the burden of
petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she w as declared in default before the trial
court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings before the Court of Appeals and
this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain frompursuing an argument that w illput her case in jeopardy. Hence, the
presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage betw een petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized w ithout the necessary
marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt fromthe marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly void ab initio.
It does not follow fromthe foregoing disquisition, how ever, that since the marriage of petitioner and the deceased is declared void ab initio, the “death
benefits” under scrutiny would now be aw arded to respondent Susan Yee. To reiterate, under Article 40 of the Family Code, for purposes of remarriage,
there must first be a prior judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage,
otherw ise, the second marriage w ould also be void.
Accordingly, the declaration in the instant case of nullity of the previous marriage of the deceased and petitioner Susan Nicdao does not validate the
second marriage of the deceased w ith respondent Susan Yee. The fact remains that their marriage w as solemnized without first obtaining a judicial
decree declaring the marriage of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased void. Hence, the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is,
likew ise, void ab initio.
One of the effectsof the declaration of nullity of marriage is the separation of the property of the spouses according to the applicable property
regime. 16
Considering that the tw o marriages are void ab initio, the applicable property regime w ould not be absolute community or conjugal partnership
of property, but rather, be governed by the provisions of Articles 147 and 148 of the Family Code on “Property Regime of Unions Without Marriage.”
Under Article 148 of the Family Code, w hich refersto the property regime of bigamous marriages, adulterous relationships, relationships in a state of
concubine, relationships w here both man and w oman are married to other persons, multiple alliances of the same married man, 17
-
“... [O]nlythe properties acquired byboth of the parties through their actual joint contribution of money, property, or industryshall be owned bythem in
common in proportion to their respective contributions...”
In this property regime, the properties acquired by the parties through their actual joint contribution shallbelong to the co-ow nership. Wages and
salaries earned by each party belong to him or her exclusively. Then too, contributions in the formof care of the home, children and household, or
spiritual or moral inspiration, are excluded in this regime. 18
Considering that the marriage of respondent Susan Yee and the deceased is a bigamous marriage, having been solemnized during the subsistence of a
previous marriage then presumed to be valid (betw een petitioner and the deceased), the application of Article 148 is therefore in order.
The disputed P146,000.00 fromMBAI [AFP Mutual Benefit Association, Inc.], NAPOLCOM, Commutation, Pag-ibig, and PCCUI, are clearly
renumerations, incentives and benefits fromgovernmental agencies earned by the deceased as a police officer. Unless respondent Susan Yee presents
proof to the contrary, it could not be said that she contributed money, property or industry in the acquisition of these monetary benefits. Hence, they are
not ow ned in common by respondent and the deceased, but belong to the deceased alone and respondent has no right w hatsoever to claim the same.
By intestate succession, the said “death benefits” of the deceased shallpass to his legal heirs. And, respondent, not being the legal w ife of the deceased
is not one of them.
As to the property regime of petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, Article 147 of the Family Code governs. This article applies to unions of parties
w ho are legally capacitated and not barred by any impediment to contract marriage, but w hose marriage is nonetheless void for other reasons, like the
absence of a marriage license. Article 147 of the Family Code reads -
Art. 147. When a man and a woman who are capacitated to marryeach other, live exclusivelywith each other as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or under a void marriage, their wages and salariesshall be owned bythem in equal shares and the propertyacquired byboth of them through
their work or industryshall be governed bythe rules on co-ownership.

7. In the absence of proof to the contrary, properties acquired while theylived together shall be presumed to have been obtained bytheir joint efforts, work
or industry, and shall be owned bythem in equal shares. For purposes of this Article, a partywho did not participate in the acquisition bythe other party
of any propertyshall be deemed to have contributed jointlyin the acquisition thereof if the former’s effortsconsisted in the care and maintenance of the
familyand of the household.
x x x
When onlyone of the parties to a void marriage is in good faith, the share of the party in bad faith in the co-ownership shallbe forfeited in favor of their
common children. In case of default of or waiver byany or all of the common children or their descendants, each vacant share shall belong to the
respective surviving descendants. In the absence of descendants, such share shall belong to the innocent party. In all cases, the forfeiture shalltake
place upon termination of the cohabitation.
In contrast to Article 148, under the foregoing article, w ages and salaries earned by either party during the cohabitation shall be ow ned by the parties in
equal shares and w illbe divided equally betw een them, even if only one party earned the w ages and the other did not contribute thereto. 19
Conformably,
even if the disputed “death benefits” were earned by the deceased alone as a government employee, Article 147 creates a co-ow nership in respect
thereto, entitling the petitioner to share one-half thereof. As there is no allegation of bad faith in the present case, both parties of the first marriage are
presumed to be in good faith. Thus, one-half of the subject “death benefits” under scrutiny shallgo to the petitioner as her share in the property regime,
and the other half pertaining to the deceased shallpass by, intestate succession, to his legal heirs, namely, his children w ith Susan Nicdao.
In affirming the decision of the trial court, the Court of Appeals relied on the case of Vda. de Consuegra v. Government Service Insurance
System, 20
w here the Court aw arded one-half of the retirement benefits of the deceased to the first w ife and the other half, to the second w ife, holding
that:
“... [S]ince the defendant’s first marriage has not been dissolved or declared void the conjugal partnership established bythat marriage has not ceased.
Nor has the first wife lost or relinquished her status as putative heir of her husband under the new Civil Code, entitled to share in his estate upon his
death should she survive him. Consequently, whether as conjugal partner in a still subsisting marriage or as such putative heir she has an interest in the
husband’s share in the propertyhere in dispute....”And with respect to the right of the second wife, this Court observed that although the second
marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was stillsubsisting, stillthere is need for judicialdeclaration of
such nullity. And inasmuch as the conjugal partnershipformed bythe second marriage was dissolved before judicialdeclaration of its nullity, “[t]he only
just and equitable solution in this case would be to recognize the right of the second wife to her share of one-half in the property acquired byher and her
husband, and consider the other half as pertaining to the conjugal partnership of the first marriage.” 21
It should be stressed, however, that the aforecited decision is premised on the rule w hich requires a prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity of
marriage. This is the reason w hyin the said case, the Court determined the rights of the parties in accordance with their existing property regime.
In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, 22
however, the Court, construing Article 40 of the Family Code, clarified that a prior and separate declaration of nullity of
a marriage is an all important condition precedent only for purposes of remarriage. That is, if a party w ho is previously married w ishes to contract a
second marriage, he or she has to obtain first a judicial decree declaring the first marriage void, before he or she could contract said second marriage,
otherw ise the second marriage w ould be void. The same rule applies even if the first marriage is patently void because the parties are not free to
determine for themselves the validity or invalidity or their marriage. How ever, forpurposesother than to remarry, like for filing a case for collection of
sum of money anchored on a marriage claimed to be valid, no prior and separate judicial declaration of nullity is necessary. Allthat a party has to do is
to present evidence, testimonial or documentary, that w ould prove that the marriage fromw hich his or her rights flow is in fact valid. Thereupon, the
court, if material to the determination of the issues before it, w illrule on the status of the marriage involved and proceed to determine the rights of the
parties in accordance with the applicable law s and jurisprudence. Thus, in Niñal v. Bayadog, 23
the Court explained:
[T]he court may pass upon the validityof marriage even in a suit not directlyinstituted to question the same so long as it is essentialto the determination
of the case. This is without prejudice to anyissue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullityis
necessaryeven if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause “on the basis of a final judgment declaring such previousmarriage void”in Article 40
of the FamilyCode connoted that such final judgment need not be obtained onlyfor purpose of remarriage.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 51263 w hich affirmed the decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City ordering petitioner to pay respondent the sum of P73,000.00 plus attorney’s fees in the amount of P5,000.00, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The complaint in Civil Case No. Q-93-18632, is hereby DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J. (Chairman), Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
Puno J., on officialleave.
G.R. No. 145226 February 06, 2004
LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1
dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, w hich
affirmed the judgment2
dated August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No. 8688. The trial court found
herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months of prision
correccional as minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3
of the appellate
court, dated September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follow s:
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete w ere boardmates at the house of Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period
of four (4) years (from1974-1978).

8. After schoolyear 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact w ith each other.
In 1984, Lucio Morigo w as surprised to receive a card fromLucia Barrete fromSingapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters,
they became sw eethearts.
In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to w orkthere. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they
w ere married on August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.
On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her w orkin Canada leaving appellant Lucio behind.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed w ith the Ontario Court (GeneralDivision) a petition for divorce against appellant w hich wasgranted by the
court on January 17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.
On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha Lumbago4
at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.
On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed
as Civil Case No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of accused’s marriage w ith Lucia, on the ground that
no marriage ceremony actually took place.
On October 19, 1993, appellant w as charged with Bigamy in an Information5
filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], w ith the Regional
Trial Court of Bohol.6
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civilcase for judicial nullification of his marriage w ith Lucia posed a
prejudicial question in the bigamy case. His motion w as granted, but subsequentlydenied upon motion for reconsideration by the prosecution. When
arraigned in the bigamy case, w hich wasdocketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial thereafter ensued.
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed dow n its judgment in Criminal Case No. 8688, as follow s:
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Bigamy and sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7) Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6)
Years and One (1) Day of Prision Mayor as maximum.
SO ORDERED.7
In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first marriage to Lucia w as nulland void ab initio. Follow ing Domingo v.
Court of Appeals,8
the trial court ruled that w ant of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of bigamy. The parties to a marriage should
not be allow ed to assume that their marriage is void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their marriage
before they can be allow ed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v. Gmur,9
w hich held that the court of a country in w hich neither of the
spouses is domiciled and in w hich one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the
matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anyw here. Debunking Lucio’s defense of good
faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that following People v. Bitdu,10
everyone is presumed to know the law , and the fact that
one does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him fromthe consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal w ith the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 20700.
Meanw hile, on October 23, 1997, or w hile CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 w as pending before the appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil
Case No. 6020 declaring the marriage betw een Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took place. No appeal w as taken from
this decision, w hich then became finaland executory.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follow s:
WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.11
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in
Civil Case No. 6020 could not acquit Lucio. The reason is that w hat is sought to be punished by Article 34912
of the Revised Penal Code is the act of
contracting a second marriage before the first marriage had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage w as void fromthe
beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the
Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513
of the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under Article 1714
of the Civil
Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectualby a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15
allow s mistake upon a
difficult question of law (such as the effect of a foreign divorce decree)to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of merit.16
How ever, the denialw as by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate
court’s original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The
dissent observed that as the first marriage w as validly declared void ab initio, then there w asno first marriage to speak of. Since the date of the nullity
retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein petitioner w as, in the eyes of the law , never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the follow ing issuesfor our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE
REVISED PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE. COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF
APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE
SECOND MARRIAGE.
B.

9. WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS
APPLICABLE TO THE CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE
FAVORING THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be w hether or not petitioner committed bigamy and if so, w hether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he
contracted the second marriage openly and publicly, w hich a person intent upon bigamy w ould not be doing. The petitioner further argues that his lack of
criminal intent is material to a conviction or acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under the Revised Penal
Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent are allow ed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between
the intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is
tantamount to an intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor
General relies upon our ruling in Marbella-Bobisv. Bobis,18
which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted provided allthe elements concur,
stressing that under Article 4019
of the Family Code, a judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the petitioner
w as aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know the law . The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he w as in
good faith because he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration
of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before w e delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, w e must first determine w hetherallthe elements of bigamy are present
in this case. In Marbella-Bobisv. Bobis,20
we laid dow n the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared
presumptively dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage w ould have been valid had it not been for the existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, w e note that during the pendency of CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed dow n
the follow ing decision in Civil Case No. 6020, to w it:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio
Morigo and Lucia Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the LocalCivil Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the
cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there w as no actualmarriage ceremony performed betw een Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, w hat transpired
w as a mere signing of the marriage contract by the tw o, without the presence of a solemnizing of ficer. The trialcourt thus held that the marriage is
void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322
and 423
of the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it, "This
simply means that there w as no marriage to begin w ith; and that such declaration of nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other w ords, for
all intents and purposes, reckoned fromthe date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab initio to the date of the celebration of the first
marriage, the accused was,under the eyes of the law , never married."24
The records show that no appeal w as taken fromthe decision of the trial court in
Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner w as
never married to Lucia Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speakof. Under the principle of retroactivity of a marriage being declared void ab initio,
the tw o were nevermarried "fromthe beginning." The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical conclusion,
for legal purposes, petitioner w as not married to Lucia at the time he contracted the marriage w ith Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the
first marriage being an essentialelement of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no
first marriage to speak of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished fromMercado v. Tan.25
In the latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage w as likew ise obtained after the second marriage w as already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessarybefore a subsequent one can be legally contracted. One w ho enters into a
subsequent marriage w ithout first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This principle applies even if the earlier union is
characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage w as actually solemnized not just once, but tw ice: first before a judge w here a marriage
certificate was duly issued and then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first marriage appeared to have
transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, how ever, no marriage ceremony at all w as performed by a duly authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely
signed a marriage contract on their ow n. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no
judicial declaration of nullity. Such act alone, w ithout more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for w hich petitioner might be
held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicialdeclaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute in favor of an accused and w eigh everycircumstance in favor
of the presumption of innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we held that petitioner has not committed
bigamy. Further, w e also find that w e need not tarry on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lackof criminal intent, w hich is now moot
and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October 21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA -G.R. CR No. 20700, as
w ellas the resolution of the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is ACQUITTED fromthe charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven w ith moral
certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.

10. G.R. No. 138509 July 31, 2000
IMELDA MARBELLA-BOBIS, petitioner,
vs.
ISAGANI D. BOBIS, respondent.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
On October 21, 1985, respondent contracted a first marriage w ith one Maria Dulce B. Javier. Without said marriage having been annulled, nullified or
terminated, the same respondent contracted a second marriage w ith petitioner Imelda Marbella-Bobis on January 25, 1996 and allegedly a third
marriage w ith a certain Julia Sally Hernandez. Based on petitioner's complaint-affidavit, an information for bigamy w as filed against respondent on
February 25, 1998, w hich wasdocketed as Criminal Case No. Q98-75611 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226, Quezon City. Sometime thereafter,
respondent initiated a civil action for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity of his first marriage on the ground that it w as celebrated without a
marriage license. Respondent then filed a motion to suspend the proceedings in the criminal case for bigamy invoking the pending civil case for nullity of
the first marriage as a prejudicial question to the criminal case. The trial judge granted the motion to suspend the criminal case in an Order dated
December 29, 1998.1
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but the same w as denied.
Hence, this petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner argues that respondent should have first obtained a judicial declaration of nullity of his first
marriage before entering into the second marriage, inasmuch as the alleged prejudicial question justifying suspension of the bigamy case is no longer a
legal truism pursuant to Article 40 of the Family Code.2
The issue to be resolved in this petition is w hether the subsequent filing of a civilaction for declaration of nullity of a previous marriage constitutes a
prejudicial question to a criminal case for bigamy.
A prejudicial question is one w hich arises in a case the resolution of w hich is a logical antecedent of the issue involved therein.3
It is a question based on
a fact distinct and separate fromthe crime but so intimately connected w ith it that it determines the guilt or innocence of the accused.4
It must appear not
only that the civil case involves factsupon w hich the criminal action is based, but also that the resolution of the issues raised in the civil action w ould
necessarily be determinative of the criminal case.5
Consequently, the defense must involve an issue similar or intimately related to the same issue raised
in the criminal action and its resolution determinative of w hether or not the latter action may proceed.6
Its tw o essentialelements are:7
(a) the civil action involves an issue similar or intimately related to the issue raised in the criminal action; and
(b) the resolution of such issue determines w hether or not the criminal action may proceed.
A prejudicial question does not conclusively resolve the guilt or innocence of the accused but simply tests the sufficiencyof the allegations in the
information in order to sustain the further prosecution of the criminal case. A party w ho raisesa prejudicialquestion is deemed to have hypothetically
admitted that all the essentialelements of a crime have been adequately alleged in the information, considering that the prosecution has not yet
presented a single evidence on the indictment or may not yet have rested its case. A challenge of the allegations in the information on the ground of
prejudicial question is in effect a question on the merits of the criminal charge through a non-criminal suit.
Article 40 of the Family Code, w hich waseffective at the time of celebration of the second marriage, requires a prior judicial declaration of nullity of a
previous marriage before a party may remarry. The clear implication of this is that it is not for the parties, particularly the accused, to determine the
validity or invalidity of the marriage.8
Whether or not the first marriage w as void for lackof a license is a matter of defense because there is stillno judicial
declaration of its nullity at the time the second marriage w as contracted. It should be remembered that bigamy can successfully be prosecuted provided
all its elements concur – tw o of which are a previous marriage and a subsequent marriage w hich would have been valid had it not been for the existence
at the material time of the first marriage.9
In the case at bar, respondent's clear intent is to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage and thereafter to invoke that very same
judgment to prevent his prosecution for bigamy. He cannot have his cake and eat it too. Otherw ise, allthat an adventurous bigamist has to do is to
disregard Article 40 of the Family Code, contract a subsequent marriage and escape a bigamy charge by simply claiming that the first marriage is void
and that the subsequent marriage is equally void for lackof a prior judicial declaration of nullity of the first. A party may even enter into a marriage aw are
of the absence of a requisite - usually the marriage license - and thereafter contract a subsequent marriage without obtaining a declaration of nullity of
the first on the assumption that the first marriage is void. Such scenario w ould render nugatory the provisions on bigamy. As succinctly held in Landicho
v. Relova:10
(P)arties to a marriage should not be permitted to judge for themselves its nullity, only competent courts having such authority. Prior to such
declaration of nullity, the validity of the first marriage is beyond question. A party w ho contractsa second marriage then assumes the riskof
being prosecuted for bigamy.
Respondent alleges that the first marriage in the case before us w asvoid for lackof a marriage license. Petitioner, on the other hand, argues that her
marriage to respondent w asexempt fromthe requirement of a marriage license. More specifically, petitioner claims that prior to their marriage, they had
already attained the age of majority and had been living together as husband and w ife for at least five years.11
The issue in this case is limited to the
existence of a prejudicial question, and w e are not called upon to resolve the validity of the first marriage. Be that as it may, suffice it to state that the
Civil Code, under w hich the first marriage w ascelebrated, providesthat "every intendment of law or fact leans towardthe validity of marriage, the
indissolubility of the marriage bonds."12
[] Hence, parties should not be permitted to judge for themselves the nullity of their marriage, for the same must
be submitted to the determination of competent courts. Only w hen the nullity of the marriage is so declared can it be held as void, and so long as there is
no such declaration the presumption is that the marriage exists.13
No matter how obvious, manifest or patent the absence of an element is, the
intervention of the courts must alw ays be resortedto. That is w hy Article 40 of the Family Code requires a "finaljudgment," w hich only the courts can
render. Thus, as ruled in Landicho v. Relova,14
he w ho contractsa second marriage before the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage assumes
the riskof being prosecuted for bigamy, and in such a case the criminal case may not be suspended on the ground of the pendency of a civil case for
declaration of nullity. In a recent case for concubinage, we held that the pendency of a civil case for declaration of nullity of marriage is not a prejudicial
question.15
This ruling applies here by analogy since both crimes presuppose the subsistenceof a marriage.
Ignorance of the existence of Article 40 of the Family Code cannot even be successfully invoked as an excuse.16
The contracting of a marriage know ing
that the requirements of the law have not been complied w ith or that the marriage is in disregard of a legal impediment is an act penalized by the
Revised Penal Code.17
The legality of a marriage is a matter of law and every person is presumed to know the law . As respondentdid not obtain the
judicial declaration of nullity w hen he entered into the second marriage, w hy should he be allow ed to belatedly obtain that judicial declaration in order to
delay his criminal prosecution and subsequently defeat it by his ow n disobedience of the law ? If he w ants to raise the nullity of the previous marriage, he
can do it as a matter of defense when he presents his evidence during the trial proper in the criminal case.
The burden of proof to show the dissolution of the first marriage before the second marriage w as contracted restsupon the defense,18
but that is a
matter that can be raised in the trial of the bigamy case. In the meantime, it should be stressed that not every defense raised in the civilaction may be
used as a prejudicial question to obtain the suspension of the criminal action. The low er court, therefore, erred in suspending the criminal case for
bigamy. Moreover, w hen respondent wasindicted for bigamy, the fact that he entered into tw o marriage ceremonies appeared indubitable. It w as only
after he w as sued by petitioner for bigamy that he thought of seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his first marriage. The obvious intent, therefore, is
that respondent merely resorted to the civil action as a potential prejudicial question for the purpose of frustrating or delaying his criminal prosecution. As
has been discussed above, this cannot be done.1awphi1
In the light of Article 40 of the Family Code, respondent, w ithout first having obtained the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage, can not be
said to have validly entered into the second marriage. Per current jurisprudence, a marriage though void still needs a judicial declaration of such fact

11. before any party can marry again; otherw ise the second marriage w illalso be void.19
The reason is that, w ithout a judicial declaration of its nullity, the
first marriage is presumed to be subsisting. In the case at bar, respondent w asfor alllegal intents and purposes regarded as a married man at the time
he contracted his second marriage w ith petitioner.20
Against this legal backdrop, any decision in the civilaction for nullity w ould not erase the fact that
respondent entered into a second marriage during the subsistence of a first marriage. Thus, a decision in the civilcase is not essentialto the
determination of the criminal charge. It is, therefore, not a prejudicial question. As stated above, respondent cannot be permitted to use his ow n
malfeasance to defeat the criminal action against him.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The order dated December 29, 1998 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 226 of Quezon City is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the trial court is ordered to IMMEDIATELY proceed w ith Criminal Case No. Q98-75611.
SO ORDERED.
Davide, Jr., C.J., (Chairman), Puno, Kapunan, and Pardo, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 167684 July 31, 2006
JAIME O.SEVILLA, petitioner,
vs.
CARMELITA N. CARDENAS, respondent.
D E C I S I O N
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks the reversalof the Decision1
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 74416 dated 20 December 2004
w hich set aside the Decision2
of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City, in Civil Case No. 94-1285 dated 25 January 2002.
In a Complaint3
dated 28 March 1994 filed by Jaime O. Sevilla before the RTC, he claimed that on 19 May 1969, through machinations, duress and
intimidation employed upon him by Carmelita N. Cardenas and the latter's father, retired Colonel Jose Cardenas of the Armed f orces of the Philippines,
he and Carmelita w ent to the City Hall of Manila and they w ere introduced to a certain Reverend Cirilo D. Gonzales, a supposed Minister of the Gospel.
On the said date, the father of Carmelita caused him and Carmelita to sign a marriage contract before the said Minister of the Gospel. According to
Jaime, he never applied for a marriage license for his supposed marriage to Carmelita and never did they obtain any marriage license fromany Civil
Registry, consequently, no marriage license w as presented to the solemnizing officer.
For her part, Carmelita refuted these allegations of Jaime, and claims that she and Jaime w ere married civilly on 19 May 1969,4
and in a church
ceremony thereafter on 31 May 19695
at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish in Quezon City. Both marriages w ere registered with the localcivil registry of
Manila and the National Statistics Office. He is estopped frominvoking the lack of marriage license after having been married to her for 25 years.
The trial court made the follow ing findings:
In support of his complaint, plaintiff [Jaime] testified that on May 19, 1969, he and defendant [Carmelita] appeared before a certain Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales, a Minister of the Gospel, at the city hall in Manila w here they executed a Marriage Contract (Exh. "A") in civil rites. A certain
Godofredo Occena w ho, plaintiff alleged, w as an aide of defendant's father accompanied them, and w ho, together w ith another person, stood
as w itness to the civilw edding. That although marriage license no. 2770792 allegedly issued in San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969 w as
indicated in the marriage contract, the same w as fictitious for he never applied for any marriage license, (Ibid., p. 11). Upon verifications made
by him through his law yer, Atty. Jose M. Abola, w ith the Civil Registry of San Juan, a Certification dated March 11, 1994 (Exh. "E") w as issued
by Rafael D. Aliscad, Jr., LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, that "no marriage license no. 2770792 w asever issued by said office." On May 31,
1969, he and defendant w ere again w ed, this time in church rites, before Monsignor Juan Velasco at the Most Holy Redeemer Parish Church
in Brixton Hills, Quezon City, w here they executed another marriage contract (Exh. "F") w ith the same marriage license no. 2770792 used and
indicated. Preparations and expenses for the church wedding and reception w ere jointly shared by his and defendant's parents. After the
church w edding, he and defendant resided in his house at Brixton Hills until their first son, Jose Gabriel, w as born in March 1970. As his
parents continued to support him financially, he and defendant lived in Spain for some time, for his medical studies. Eventually, their marital
relationship turned bad because it became difficult for him to be married he being a medical student at that time. They started living apart in
1976, but they underw ent family counseling before they eventually separated in 1978. It w as during this time w hen defendant'ssecond son
w as born whose paternity plaintiff questioned. Plaintiff obtained a divorce decree against defendant in the United States in 1981 and later
secured a judicial separation of their conjugal partnership in 1983.
Atty. Jose M. Abola, then counselfor the plaintiff, himself manifested that w hen his service wasengaged by plaintiff, and after the latter
narrated to him the circumstances of his marriage, he made inquiries w ith the Office of Civil Registry of San Juan w here the supposed
marriage license w as obtained and w ith the Church of the Most Holy Redeemer Parish w here the religious w edding ceremony wasc elebrated.
His request letters dated March 3, 1994 (Exh. "J"), March 7, 1994 (Exh. "L"), March 9, 1994 (Exh. "M") and March 11, 1994 (Exh. "K") w ere all
sent to and received by the Civil Registrar of San Juan, w ho in reply thereto, issued Certifications dated March 4, 1994 (Exh. "I"), and March
11, 1994 (Exh. "E") and September 20, 1994 (Exh. "C"), that "no marriage license no. 2770792 w as everissued by that office."Upon his
inquiry, the Holy Redeemer Parish Church issued him a certified copy of the marriage contract of plaintiff and defendant (Exh. "F") and a
Certificate of Marriage dated April 11, 1994 (Exh. "G"), w herein it noted that it w as a "purely religious ceremony, having been civilly married on
May 19, 1969 at the City Hall, Manila, under Marriage License No. 2770792 issued at San Juan, Rizal on May 19, 1969."
Perlita Mercader, Registration Officer III of the Local Registry of San Juan, identified the Certificates dated March 4, 1994, March 11, 1994 and
September 20, 1994 issued by Rafael Aliscad, Jr., the Local Civil Registrar, and testified that their office failed to locate the book w herein
marriage license no. 2770792 may have been registered (TSN, 8-6-96, p. 5).
Defendant Carmelita Cardenas testified that she and plaintiff had a steady romantic relationship after they met and w ere introduced to each
other in October 1968. A model, she w as compelled by her family to join the Mutya ng Pilipinas beauty pageant w hen plaintiff who was afraid
to lose her, asked her to run aw ay with him to Baguio. Because she loved plaintiff, she turned back on her family and decided to follow plaintiff
in Baguio. When they came back to Manila, she and plaintiff proceeded to the latter's home in Brixton Hills w here plaintiff's mother, Mrs.
Sevilla, told her not to w orry. Her parents werehostile w hen they learned of the elopement, but Mrs. Sevilla convinced themthat she w illtake
care of everything, and promised to support plaintiff and defendant. As plaintiff w asstillfearfulhe may lose her, he asked her to marry him in
civil rites, w ithout the know ledge of her family, more so her father (TSN, 5-28-98, p. 4) on May 19, 1969, before a minister and w here she was
made to sign documents. After the civilw edding, they had lunch and later each w ent home separately. On May 31, 1969, they had the church
w edding, which the Sevilla family alone prepared and arranged, since defendant's mother just came fromhospital. Her family did not
participate in the w edding preparations. Defendant furtherstated that there w asno sexualconsummation during their honeymoon and that it
w as aftertwo months w hen they finally had sex. She learned from Dr. Escudero, plaintiff's physician and one of their w edding sponsors that
plaintiff w as undergoing psychiatric therapysince age 12 (TSN, 11-2-98, p. 15) for some traumatic problem compounded by his drug habit.
She found out plaintiff has unusual sexualbehavior by his obsession over her knees of w hich he w ould take endless pictures of. Moreover,
plaintiff preferred to have sex with her in betw een the knees w hich she called "intrafemuralsex," while realsex betw een themw as farand
betw een like 8 months, hence, abnormal. During their marriage, plaintiff exhibited w eird sexualbehavior which defendant attributed to
plaintiff's drug addiction (TSN, 11-5-98, pp. 5-8). A compulsive liar, plaintiff has a bad temper w ho breaks things when he had tantrums.
Plaintiff took drugs like amphetamines, benzedrine and the like, "speed" drugs that kept him from sleep and then w ould take barbiturates or
dow ners, like "mogadon." Defendant tried very hard to keep plaintiff aw ayfromdrugs but failed as it has become a habit to him. They had no
fixed home since they often moved and partly lived in Spain for about four and a half years, and during all those times, her mother-in-law
w ould send some financialsupport on and off, w hile defendant worked as an English teacher. Plaintiff, w ho wassupposedto be studying, did

12. nothing. Their marriage became unbearable, as plaintiff physically and verbally abused her, and this led to a break up in their marriage. Later,
she learned that plaintiff married one Angela Garcia in 1991 in the United States.
Jose Cardenas, father of defendant, testified that he w as not aware of the civilw edding of his daughter w ith the plaintiff; that his daughter and
grandson came to stay w ith him after they returned home fromSpain and have lived w ith him and his w ife eversince. His grandsons
practically grew up under his care and guidance, and he has supported his daughter's expenses formedicines and hospital conf inements
(Exhs. "9" and "10").
Victoria Cardenas Navarro, defendant's sister, testified and corroborated that it w as plaintiff'sfamily that attended to all the preparations and
arrangements for the church w edding of her sisterwith plaintiff, and that she didn't know that the couple w ed in civilrites some time prior to the
church w edding. She also stated that she and her parents w ere stillcivilw ith the plaintiff inspite of the marital differencesbetw een plaintiff and
defendant.
As adverse witnessforthe defendant, plaintiff testified that because of irreconcilable differencesw ith defendant and in order for them to live
their ow n lives, they agreed to divorce each other; that w hen he applied for and obtained a divorce decree in the United States on June 14,
1983 (Exh. "13"), it w as with the know ledge and consent of defendant whoin fact authorized a certain Atty. Quisumbing to represent her (TSN,
12-7-2000, p. 21). During his adverse testimony, plaintiff identified a recent certification dated July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") issued by the Local
Civil Registrar of San Juan, that the marriage license no. 2770792, the same marriage license appearing in the marriage contract (Exh. "A"), is
inexistent, thus appears to be fictitious.6
In its Decision dated 25 January 2002, declaring the nullity of the marriage of the parties, the trial court made the follow ing justifications:
Thus, being one of the essentialrequisites for the validity of the marriage, the lack or absence of a license renders the marriage void ab initio.
It w as shown under the various certifications(Exhs. "I", "E", and "C") earlier issued by the office of the LocalCivil Registrar of the Municipality
of San Juan, and the more recent one issued on July 25, 2000 (Exh. "EE") that no marriage license no. 2770792 w as everissued by that
office, hence, the marriage license no. 2770792 appearing on the marriage contracts executed on May 19, 1969 (Exh. "A") and on May 31,
1969 (Exh. "F") w as fictitious. Such a certification enjoys probativevalue under the rules on evidence, particularly Section 28, Rule 132 of the
Rules of Court, x x x.
x x x x
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby declares the civil marriage betw een Jaime O. Sevilla and Carmelita N. Cardenas solemnized by Rev. Cirilo
D. Gonzales at the Manila City Hall on May 19, 1969 as w ellas their contract of marriage solemnized under religious rites by Rev. Juan B.
Velasco at the Holy Redeemer Parish on May 31, 1969, NULL and VOID for lack of the requisite marriage license. Let the marriage contract of
the parties under Registry No. 601 (e-69) of the registry bookof the Local Civil Registry of Manila be cancelled.
Let copies of this Decision be duly recorded in the proper civil and property registries in accordance with Article 52 of the Family Code.
Likew ise, let a copy hereof be forwarded the Office of the Solicitor Generalfor its record and information.7
Carmelita filed an appeal w ith the Court of Appeals. In a Decision dated 20 December 2004, the Court of Appeals disagreed w ith the trialcourt and held:
In People v. De Guzman (G.R. No. 106025, February 9, 1994), the Supreme Court explained that: "The presumption of regularityof official
acts may be rebutted byaffirmative evidenceof irregularity or failure to performa duty. The presumption, how ever, prevails untilit is
overcome by no less than clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. Thus, unless the presumption is rebutted, it becomes conclusive."
In this case, We note that a certain Perlita Mercader of the localcivil registry of San Juan testified that they "failed to locate the book
wherein marriage license no. 2770792 isregistered," for the reason that"the employee handling isalready retired." With said
testimony We cannot therefore just presume that the marriage license specified in the parties' marriage contract w asnot issued for in the end
the failure of the office of the local civilregistrar of San Juan to produce a copy of the marriage license w as attributable not to the fact that no
such marriage license w as issued but rather, becauseit "failed to locate the book w herein marriage license no. 2770792 is registered." Simply
put, if the pertinent book w ere available for scrutiny, there is a strong possibility that it w ould have contained an entry on marriage license no.
2720792.
x x x x
Indeed, this Court is not prepared to annul the parties' marriage on the basis of a mere perception of plaintiff that his union w ith defendant is
defective with respect to an essentialrequisite of a marriage contract, a perception that ultimately w as not substantiated with facts on record.8
Jaime filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated 6 January 2005 w hich the Court of Appeals denied in a Resolution dated 6 April 2005.
This denial gave rise to the present Petition filed by Jaime.
He raises the follow ing issues for Resolution.
1. Whether or not a valid marriage license w as issued in accordance with law to the parties herein prior to the celebration of the marriages in
question;
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals correctly applied and relied on the presumption of regularity of officials acts, particularly the issuance of
a marriage license, arising solely fromthe contents of the marriage contracts in question w hich show on their face that a marriage license w as
purportedly issued by the Local Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila, and
3. Whether or not respondent could validly invoke/rely upon the presumption of validity of a marriage arising fromthe admitted "fact of
marriage."9
At the core of this controversyis the determination of w hether or not the certifications fromthe LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan stating that no Marriage
License No. 2770792 as appearing in the marriage contract of the parties w asissued, are sufficient to declare their marriage as null and void ab initio.
We agree w ith the Court of Appeals and rule in the negative.
Pertinent provisions of the Civil Code w hich wasthe law in force at the time of the marriage of the parties are Articles 53,10
5811
and 80.12
Based on the foregoing provisions, a marriage license is an essentialrequisite for the validity of marriage. The marriage betw een Carmelita and Jaime is
of no exception.
At first glance, this case can very w ellbe easily dismissed as one involving a marriage that is null and void on the ground of absence of a marriage
license based on the certifications issued by the LocalCivil Registar of San Juan. As ruled by this Court in the case of Cariño v. Cariño13
:

13. [A]s certified by the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, their office has no record of such marriage license. In Republicv. Court of
Appeals, the Court held that such a certification is adequate to prove the non-issuance of a marriage license. Absent any circumstance of
suspicion, as in the present case, the certification issued by the localcivil registrar enjoys probative value, he being the officer charged under
the law to keep a record of alldate relative to the issuance of a marriage license.
Such being the case, the presumed validity of the marriage of petitioner and the deceased has been sufficientlyovercome. It then became the
burden of petitioner to prove that their marriage is valid and that they secured the required marriage license. Although she w as declaredin
default before the trial court, petitioner could have squarely met the issue and explained the absence of a marriage license in her pleadings
before the Court of Appeals and this Court. But petitioner conveniently avoided the issue and chose to refrain frompursuing an argument that
w illput her case in jeopardy. Hence, the presumed validity of their marriage cannot stand.
It is beyond cavil, therefore, that the marriage betw een petitioner Susan Nicdao and the deceased, having been solemnized w ithout the
necessary marriage license, and not being one of the marriages exempt from the marriage license requirement, is undoubtedly v oid ab initio.
The foregoing Decision giving probative value to the certifications issued by the LocalCivil Registrar should be read in line w ith the decision in the earlier
case of Republicv. Court of Appeals,14
w here it w asheld that:
The above Rule authorized the custodian of documents to certify thatdespite diligentsearch, a particular documentdoes not exist in
his office or that a particular entry of a specified tenor was notto be foundin a register. Ascustodians of public documents, civil
registrars are public officerscharged with the duty, inter alia, of maintaining a register book w here they are required to enter all applications for
marriage licenses, including the names of the applicants, the date the marriage license w as issuedand such other relevant data. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Thus, the certification to be issued by the LocalCivil Registrar must categorically state that the document does not exist in his office or the particular
entry could not be found in the register despite diligent search. Such certification shallbe sufficient proof of lackor absence of record as stated in
Section 28, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court:
SEC. 28. Proof of lack of record. – a w ritten statement signed by an officer having the custody of an officialrecord or by his deputy that after
diligent search, no record or entry of a specified tenor is found to exist in the records of his office, accompanied by a certificate as above
provided, is admissible as evidence that the records of his office contain no such record or entry.
We shall now proceed to scrutinize whether the certifications by the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan in connection w ith Marriage License No. 2770792
complied w ith the foregoing requirements and deserved to be accorded probative value.
The first Certification15
issued by the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila, w as dated 11 March 1994. It reads:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
No Marriage License Number 2770792 w ere (sic)ever issued by this Office. With regards (sic) to Marriage License Number 2880792,16
w e
exert all effort but w e cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded w orkcannot give you our fullforce locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
March 11, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
LocalCivil Registrar
The second certification17
wasdated 20 September 1994 and provides:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that no marriage license Number 2770792 w ere ever issued by this Office with regards to Marriage License Number 2880792,
w e exert alleffort but w e cannot find the said number.
Hope and understand our loaded w orkcannot give you our fullforce locating the above problem.
San Juan, Metro Manila
September 20, 1994
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.
LocalCivil Registrar
The third Certification,18
issued on 25 July 2000, states:
TO WHOM IT MAY CONCERN:
This is to certify that according to the records of this office, no Marriage License Application w as filed and no Marriage License No. 2770792
allegedly dated May 19, 1969 w as issued by this Office to MR. JAIME O. SEVILLA and MS. CARMELITA CARDENAS-SEVILLA.
This is to further certifythat the said application and license do not exist in our Local Civil Registry Index and, therefore, appear to be fictitious.
This certification is being issued upon the request of the interested party for w hatever legalintent it may serve.
San Juan, Metro Manila
July 25, 2000
(SGD)RAFAEL D. ALISCAD, JR.

14. LocalCivil Registrar
Note that the first tw o certificationsbear the statement that "hope and understand our loaded w orkcannot give you our full force locating the above
problem." It could be easily implied fromthe said statement that the Office of the LocalCivil Registrar could not exert its best effortsto locate and
determine the existence of Marriage License No. 2770792 due to its "loaded w ork." Likew ise, both certificationsfailed to state w ith absolute certainty
w hether or not such license w asissued.
This implication is confirmed in the testimony of the representative fromthe Office of the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, Ms. Perlita Mercader, w ho
stated that they cannot locate the logbook due to the fact that the person in charge of the said logbook had already retired. Further, the testimony of the
said person w asnot presented in evidence. It does not appear on record that the former custodian of the logbook w as deceased or missing, or that his
testimony could not be secured. This belies the claim that all effortsto locate the logbook or prove the material contents therein, had been exerted.
As testified to by Perlita Mercader:
Q Under the subpoena duces tecum, you w ere required to bring to this Court among other things the register of application of/or (sic) for
marriage licenses received by the Office of the :LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan, Province of Rizal, fromJanuary 19, 1969 to May 1969. Did
you bring w ith you those records?
A I brought may 19, 1969, sir.
Q Is that the book requested of you under no. 3 of the request for subpoena?
A Meron pang January. I forgot, January . . .
Q Did you bring that w ith you?
A No, sir.
Q Why not?
A I cannot locate the book. This is the only book.
Q Will you please state if this is the register of marriage of marriage applications that your office maintains as required by the manual of the
office of the LocalCivil Registrar?
COURT
May I see that book and the portion marked by the w itness.
x x x x
COURT
Why don't you ask her direct question w hether marriage license 2880792 is the number issued by their office while with respect to
license no. 2770792 the office of the LocalCivil Registrar of San Juan is very definite about it it w as neverissued. Then askhim
how about no. 2880792 if the same w as everissued by their office. Did you askthis 2887092, but you could not find the record? But
for the moment you cannot locate the books? Which is w hich now, was this issued or not?
A The employee handling it is already retired, sir.19
Given the documentary and testimonial evidence to the effect that utmost efforts were not exerted to locate the logbook w here Marriage License No.
2770792 may have been entered, the presumption of regularity of performance of officialfunction by the LocalCivil Registrar in issuing the certifications,
is effectively rebutted.
According to Section 3(m),20
Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the presumption that officialduty has been regularly performed is among the disputable
presumptions.
In one case, it w as held:
A disputable presumption has been defined as a species of evidence that may be accepted and acted on w here there is no other evidence to
uphold the contention for w hich it stands, or one w hich may be overcome by other evidence. One such disputable/rebuttable presumption is
that an officialact or duty has been regularly performed. x x x.21
The presumption of regularity of officialacts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to perform a duty.22
The presumption of regularity of performance of officialduty is disputable and can be overcome by other evidence as in the c ase at bar w here the
presumption has been effectively defeated by the tenor of the first and second certifications.
Moreover, the absence of the logbook is not conclusive proof of non-issuance of Marriage License No. 2770792. It can also mean, as w e believed true in
the case at bar, that the logbook just cannot be found. In the absence of showing of diligent efforts to search for the said logbook, w e cannot easily
accept that absence of the same also means non-existence or falsity of entries therein.
Finally, the rule is settled that every intendment of the law or fact leans toward the validity of the marriage, the indissolubility of the marriage
bonds.23
The courts lookupon this presumption w ith great favor. It is not to be lightly repelled; on the contrary, the presumption is of great w eight.24
The Court is mindful of the policy of the 1987 Constitution to protect and strengthen the family as the basic autonomous socialinstitution and marriage
as the foundation of the family. Thus, any doubt should be resolved in favor of the validity of the marriage.25
The parties have comported themselves as husband and w ife and lived together for severalyearsproducing two offsprings,26
now adults themselves. It
took Jaime severalyears before he filed the petition for declaration of nullity. Admittedly, he married another individual sometime in 1991.27
We are not
ready to rew ard petitioner by declaring the nullity of his marriage and give him his freedomand in the process allow himto profit fromhis ow n deceit and
perfidy.28