This document provides information on operational safety in the oil and gas industry. It discusses committing to process safety, understanding hazards and risks, managing risk, and learning from experience. Specific topics covered include process safety culture, compliance with standards, hazard identification, qualitative and quantitative risk assessment methodologies, managing risk through procedures and emergency response, and learning from incidents through investigation and continuous improvement. The document emphasizes the importance of leadership, clear accountability, adequate resourcing, workforce involvement, and applying lessons learned to prevent future incidents.

1. OperationalSafetyinOil&Gas
WarrenFothergillCMIOSH
TrainingAssessmentManager
KnowledgeGrid

2. CommittingtoProcessSafety
UnderstandingtheHazards&Risks
ManagingRisk
Learningfromexperience
SafetyManagementinContext

3. CommitmenttoProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
ProcessSafety
Culture
CompliancewithStandards
ProcessSafetyCompetency
Workforceinvolvement
StakeholderOutreach

4. CommitmenttoProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
WhoImpactsonProcessSafety
Operators
ShiftManagers
Engineers
SeniorLeaders,Managers

5. PrinciplesofProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
LeadershipPrinciplesinProcessSafety
Clearandpositiveprocesssafetyleadership
Processsafetyleadershiprequiresboardlevelinvolvement
andcompetence.
Goodprocesssafetymanagementrequiresconstantactive
engagement;
Boardlevelvisibilityandpromotionofprocesssafety
leadershipisessentialto;
Engagementoftheworkforceisneeded;
Monitorprocesssafetyperformance;
Publicationof;and
Sharebestpracticeacrosssectors

6. ArrangementsforProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
Organisation&Resourcing
Accountabilitiesdefined
MemberofBoardtobefullyconversantinProcessSafety
Management
Appropriateresourcesmadeavailable
DevelopmentofprogrammeofpromotionofProcessSafety
Systemsandarrangementsestablished
PeriodicreviewsofProcessSafetyrisks
Settingofleading&laggingindicators
Engagementoforganisationswithinsectorgroups
Systemof‘retention’intermsofcorporateknowledge

7. FailingProcessSafetyinOil&Gas
The‘BlindSpots’
ProjectExecution
SafetyAssessment
Technology
HumanFactors
Organisation
Operations&Maintenance
RiskAcceptance
AccidentInvestigations
Management&Leadership

8. UnderstandingHazards&RisksinOil&Gas
UnderstandHazards&Risks
ProcessKnowledgeManagement
HazardIdentificationandRiskAnalysis

9. Qualitativevs.QuantitativeRiskAssessment
•Usingqualitativemethodstodeterminefrequencyandseverity
Qualitative(Q)
•Wherefrequencyandseverityareapproximatelyquantifiedwithin
ranges
Semi-qualitative(SQ)
•Wherefullquantificationisdemonstrated
Quantifiedriskassessment(QRA)
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas

10. Semi-Quantitative(SQ)
Usethisifitisadequatefordecidingonappropriatecontrols.
Recordfindingsandrecommendations.
Ifnotadequate,firstincreasethedepthofmodellingoftheriskassessmentandseeifitnowmeets
requirements.
Ifitdoes,recordthefindingsandrecommendations.
DeterminingtheRightMethodofRiskAssessment
Qualitative(Q)
Usethismethodifitisadequatefordecidingonappropriatecontrols.
Recordthefindingsandrecommendations.
Ifnotadequate,thenuse
(Continued)
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas

11. QuantifiedRiskAssessment(QRA)
Ifadequate,useQRA.
Ifnot,increasedepthoftheriskassessmentmodeluntilitanswersallquestions.
Recordfindingsandrecommendations
IntheirOffshoreInformationSheetNo3/2006,theUKHSEgivemore
industryspecificguidanceonhowtodeterminewhichriskassessment
methodisappropriate.
Ifnotadequate,thenuse
AssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas

12. HAZOP
Purpose-toidentifyanydeviationsfromdesignintent,
theircausesandconsequences.
Usefulatdesignstageofhazardousinstallations/
processes.
Multi-disciplinaryteamandbrainstorming
Usesguidewordstoidentifydeviationse.g.MORE,LESS
Deviseactionstoreduceriskdowntoacceptablelevel.
MethodologyAssessingtheRisksinOil&Gas

13. HAZID
Purpose-toidentifyallhazardsforlaterriskassessment
Uses“brainstorming”,aidedbykeywords.
Usefulwhenconsideringchangestoexistingplantlayout.
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas

14. FMEA
Howcaneachcomponentfail?
Cause?
Effectsonsystemasawhole?
Howserious?
Canthefailurebedetectedbeforeeffectsbecome
serious?
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas

15. TheConceptofRiskControlBarrierModels–“bow-tie”
MethodologyforAssessingtheRisksinOil&
Gas

16. HazardsinOil&Gas
Hydrocarbons
Gases–includingHydrogenSulphide,Methane,Nitrogen
Noise
Silica
ParticulateMatter(Diesel)
Chemicals
Biocides
NaturallyOccurringRadioactiveMaterials
TemperatureExtremes
Pressure
Fatigue
HazardsinOil&Gas

17. ManageRiskinOil&Gas
ManageRisk
OperatingProcedures
SafeWorkingProcedures
AssetIntegrity&Reliability
ContractorManagement
TrainingandQualityAssurance
ManagementofChange
OperationalReadiness
ConductofOperations
EmergencyManagement

18. Risk
Management
Knowyourrisksandwhatyou
shouldbedoingaboutthem
Plan,prioritise,implementriskcontrols
Makesureriskcontrolsremaineffective
Reviewandlearn
ManageRiskinOil&Gas

19. ManageRiskinOil&Gas

20. SourcesofWritten,RecognisedGoodPracticeinclude:
(UK)HSEGuidanceandACoPs
Nationalorlocalgovernmentguidance
Internationalornationalstandards(BS,CEN,CENELEC,ISO,
IEC,etc.)
Industryspecificorsectorguidancefromtradefederations,
professionalinstitutions,etc.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

21. TypicalLegalRequirements/GoodPractice:
Regulatorsrequiresafetycase/safetyreportsubmissionfor
eachinstallationtype.
InstallationcannotoperateuntilSC/SRacceptedbyregulator
(regulatorwillinspectinstallation)
Notificationrequiredtoregulatoratdesignstage(orwhen
movedorchangeofuse).
TypicalExamples:SafetyCase(offshore),SafetyReport
(Onshore)
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

22. ThePurposeofDocumentedEvidencesuchasSafetyCases
andSafetyReports
Toensurethatdutyholdersdesign/operatetheirfacilities
safely.i.e.Measuresinplacetoidentifypotentialfor,prevent
andmitigatemajoraccidents.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

23. TheTypicalContentofSafetyCasesandSafetyReports
Identifymajoraccidenthazards–useriskassessments,bow-tiediagrams,
designcalculationsetc.
1•Eachhazardscenario
2
•threatstosafetyandtheircauses
3
•barrierstopreventthosethreats
4•consequencesofeachthreatwereittoberealised
5
•recoverymeasuresrequired
6
•factorsthatcouldescalatethehazardoritsconsequences
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

24. Evaluatemajoraccidentrisksandmeasurestaken(ortobe
taken).
1
•Identifyeachhazard/incidentscenario
2
•Assessfrequencycriteria
3
•Assessconsequencecriteria
4
•AssessEERfacilitiesandrequirements
5
•IdentifyandassessriskcontrolmeasuresagainstALARP
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

25. Arrangementsforauditsandauditreports
AdequateSMSinplace
Majoraccidentpreventionpolicies(inthecaseofsafety
reports)
Identifysafetycriticalelementsinplacetomanagemajor
accidenthazards
Detailsoftheemergencyplan.
UsingStandardstoManageRiskinOil&Gas

26. ManagementofChangeinOil&Gas
ManagementofChangeProceduresSHOULDidentify
thescopeofthechanges(whatneedstochange)
therolesandresponsibilitiesofthosemanagingand
makingthechanges
howriskanalysisistobeundertaken
methodsusedtocommunicatethechanges
trainingofpersonnelinvolved

27. LearningfromExperienceinOil&Gas
ManagementofChangecontrolwillbeneededwhen,
e.g.
equipmentisreplacedwithnon-identicalparts
newitemsorequipmentisaddedtothesystem
changesaremadetotheoperatingprocedures(ifoutside
establisheddesignbasisandsafeoperatingenvelope).

28. LearningfromExperienceinOil&Gas
LearningfromExperience
IncidentInvestigation
Measurement&Metrics
Auditing
ManagementReviews&ContinuousImprovement

29. ReasonsWhyWeDON’TLearn?
Ifitisn’taregulatoryrequirement,wearenotgoingtodo
it!
ManagementSystemsareoveremphasisedwhilethe
technicalaspectsofprocesssafety,whichactuallycontrol
thehazardsandmanagerisk,areneglected
Auditingcostsarehighandtheyfocusonsymptomsand
notthecauses
Managementdoesnotunderstand
Verbalsupportforimplementationisinconsistentwith
fiscalsupport
LearningfromIncidents

30. InvestigationtoLearning
Thefailuretocomplywithsystemsofworkandcontrols
Focuson‘realcauses’
Viewtheincidentas"theconsequenceofafailureor
inadequacyinthesafetymanagementsystem"
Identifyfailuresinthemanagementsystem
LearningfromIncidents

31. LearningfromIncidents
Causal
Factor(s)
EventConsequence

32. LearningfromIncidents
CausalFactor.v.RootCause
Causal:Anybehaviour,omission,
ordeficiencythatifcorrected,
eliminated,oravoidedprobably
wouldhavepreventedthe
incident
Root:Underlyingdeficienciesin
thepolicies,procedures,training,
expectationsandcommunications
thatallowedtheCausalFactorto
exist

33. LearningfromIncidents

34. DeepwaterHorizonExplosion–GulfofMexico2010
“Theteamdidnotidentifyanysingleactionorinactionthat
causedthisincident.Rather,acomplexandinterlinkedseriesof
mechanicalfailures,humanjudgments,engineeringdesign,
operationalimplementation,environmentalconditionsand
teaminterfacescametogethertoallowtheinitiationand
escalationoftheaccident.”
ExcerptfromthereportpreparedbyBPpostincident
LearningfromIncidents

35. LearningfromIncidents–CausationModel
LOSS
•Harm
•Damage
•Substandard
quality
product/
service
•Liability,etc.
INCIDENT
•Potential
Loss
Producing
Event
IMMEDIATE
CAUSES
ROOT
CAUSES
INADEQUATE
SYSTEMS
CONTROL
INADEQUATE
RISK
ASSESSMENT
Inadequate:
•Baseline
•IssueBased
•Continuous
•Human
Factors
•Workplace
Factors
IncidentCausationModel
ProblemSolvingModel
•Substandard
Acts
•Substandard
Conditions
Inadequate:
•Systems
•Standards
•Compliance
Pre-contactContactPost-Contact
Thresholdlimit
MeasurementofControlMeasurementofCauseMeasurementofConsequence

36. E.I.DuPontdeNemours&CoInc.
Buffalo,NewYork
FlammableVapourExplosion
WeldingonTankContainingVinylFluoride(1Killed,1injured)
November9,2010
IdentifytheCRITITCALFACTORS–andanalyseONEofthem
(45mins)
LearningfromIncidents–CaseStudy

37. LearningfromIncidents–ImmediateCauses

38. LearningfromIncidents–ImmediateCauses

39. Questions