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1. J. Resour. Ecol. 2012 3 (3) 262-268
DOI:10.5814/j.issn.1674-764x.2012.03.009
www.jorae.cn
Sept., 2012 Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol.3 No.3
Article
Received: 2012-03-06 Accepted: 2012-05-23
Foundation: Natural Sciences Foundation of China (No. 41130748), Key Knowledge Innovation Project of the CAS (No. KZCX2-EW-304).
* Corresponding author: ZHANG Yifeng. Email: zhangyf@igsnrr.ac.cn.
1 Introduction
1.1 Background
China faces several major problems in terms of agricultural
land. First, the average size of household land management
is still small at the plot scale. Second, the area of abandoned
agricultural land is increasing. Like many fast developing
countries China is under mounting international pressure to
liberalize its farming sector and promote more competitive
agriculture. Against this background, the policy of land
reform should be further speeded up. In theory, agricultural
land use rights reform policy may appear effective, and
agricultural land transfer is an important way to deal with
the conflict between agricultural land fragmentation and
moderate-scale agricultural modernization in China.
The land and production approach has a long history
dating back to the 18th century, for example David Ricardo
(Sraffa and Ricardo 1995). Just and Miranowski (1993)
found that land price expectations are the most important
factor determining land prices in the USA, but point out
that these themselves are determined by yet other factors,
including inlation, the opportunity cost of capital, and farm
returns.
Land transferring issues in China have been addressed
from the perspectives of different disciplines, e.g. sociology,
geography, engineering and economics, due perhaps to the
variety of what are perceived to be important contributory
factors like family, terrain, irrigation and prices. But
transferring price of land contract and management rights1)
are not well explained by the present value model with
rational expectations. According to the theory of human-
Agricultural Land Contract and Management Rights: Transferring
Price and Countermeasures in Typical Agricultural Areas of China
MU Songlin1,2,3
, ZHANG Yifeng1,2
*, WANG Kaiyong1
and Dhruba Bijaya G. C.1,3
1 Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101, China;
2 Key Laboratory of Regional Sustainable Development Modeling, Institute of Geographic Sciences and Natural Resources Research, CAS, Beijing 100101,
China;
3 University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100049, China
Abstract: Henan is a large agricultural province and one of China’s major grain-producing areas.
Agricultural land transfer and large-scale operations will have a profound impact on regional economic
development and food security. This is a case study taken in Xiwan village in Qinyang city, Henan. This
paper builds a transferring pricing model using land use rights assessment and characteristic correction
of land contract and management rights. Results show that the transferring price of land contract and
management rights should include the economic price, social price and corrected price. The use of a
price model should focus on the distinction of theory and practical application. If there is no change in
agricultural project，the actual transferring price should be the sum of the economic price and social
security price. If there is a change in agricultural projects，such as cropland into cash crops，the actual
transferring price should be the sum of the economic price, social price and corrected price. Because of
the complexity of income distribution following the transfer, transferring gains should follow a rational
distribution in the outlow side, inlow side, managers and land owner. The government should establish
reasonable and orderly contracted management of land circulation transferring and use this to build a land
transferring price system.
Key words: typical agricultural areas; agricultural land contract and management rights; transferring price;
transferring model
1) Land contract and management rights is the basic rights of the peasants
and the main mode of collective land use in China, and has formally
been established as a stable usufructuary after the promulgation and
implementation “Property Law” in 2007.

2. MU Songlin, et al.: Agricultural Land Contract and Management Rights: Transferring Price and Countermeasures in Typical Agricultural Areas of China 263
nature relation (Wu 1991; Lu and Guo 1998; Zheng 2008;
Fan 2008; Wu 2008), land use is the core of the relationship
between man and nature (Liu 2008), man-land relationship
is established in certain social production relations. In terms
of Marxist political economics, appropriate production
relationships can promote productivity. Land Contract and
Management Rights belongs to land use rights and is very
important to the development of rural productivity. The land
use policy reform is a major method of solving the “three
rural” problems (issues concerning agriculture, countryside
and farmers in China) and productivity can be improved
through the reform of land use policy. The policy of land
use reform should be accelerated, and the government
should offer to transfer land contract and management
rights in various forms and develop various forms of
appropriate large-scale operations when conditions permit
(Mu and Gao 2009). A scientific and standardized pricing
system is the premise of transferring land contract and
management rights, thus it is only with reasonable prices
that land flow is smooth. As the current price evaluation
system lacks systematic and scientiic price assessment of
transferring land contract and management rights,it has
weakened market resource allocation, slowed down the
market allocation of land resources and hindered optimal
land resource allocation.
1.2 Hypotheses
(1) Desire for agricultural land transfer is affected by
different natural, economic, and social factors. The factors
that influence the agricultural land transfer for farmers
include income per capita, education, development level
of non-agricultural industry, resources endowment, and
land per capita. This article focuses on the transferring
price, whether farmers agree with land transfer or not, the
reasonable price is the premise.
(2) Legally, agricultural land did not change its function
after transference. Therefore, this paper argues that the price
of land contract and management rights should include the
economic, social and corrected price.
1.3 Progress
In China, current published articles on transferring land
contract and management rights have mostly concentrated
on defining this term (Ding and Li 2008), significance,
driving force (Yang 2009b), types, features (Huang 2009),
problems and causes (Yang 2009a). Transferring price
research is relatively rare. Table 1 shows the that research
into land contract and management rights have dramatically
increased, especially in 2008. This has a direct correlation
with the seventh session of the Third Plenary Session of
the Chinese Party of China meeting. A lot of geographic
scholars insist on research for national economic
construction and policy.
Statistical analyses of transferring price is the basis for
quantitative transferring price. On one hand, this method
can grasp fluctuation range of transferring price, and on
the other hand measure the validity and rationality of
the calculated transferring price. Figs. 1 and 2 show the
temporal and spatial distribution of transferring prices in
China, 2009.
2 Transferring price content
Property rights and benefits are two basic estimation
methods. Rent distribution is a social justice and political
issue (Lin 1999). Land contract and management rights is
land use rights derived from agricultural collective land in
rural China. It exists in the economic, social and natural
environment through transferring market allocation (Fig. 3).
Researchers have no doubt about the economic value
of land, and the social value should also be quantitative.
Although land ownership does not change after transferring
land contract and management rights, agricultural land
undoubtedly is the most fundamental social insurance of
farmers ever since contract responsibility systems have
been practiced in rural China. While in the process of
transference, operational risks exist on the inlow side, and
farmers’ social security cannot be ensured. That is, if the
beneits of inlow side are not obtained, the income on the
outlow side can also not be ensured. Growing grain has low
comparative beneit, so the trend of non-food has appeared
in the transference of rural land and it will have a serious
impact on China’s food security in the long term. Currently,
many farmers have transferred land for the development
of vegetables, flowers, nursery stock, special livestock
breeding and other high-beneit agricultural projects, so the
concept of agricultural land to grow grain is vague in the
hearts of the majority of farmers (Guan 2009). Therefore, its
Table 1 The number of papers looking at transferring land
contract and management rights in China.
Year Number Journals Dissertation Conference
2004 20 19 1 0
2005 37 30 5 2
2006 30 25 5 0
2007 35 28 7 0
2008 59 55 4 0
2009 182 168 9 5
2010 204 159 35 10
Note: Wanfang data, accessed on June 1st
, 2010.
Fig. 1 Time distribution of land transferring price in China,
2009 (CNY mu-1
y-1
).
456
Jan Mar Apr May
Feb Jun Jul Aug Sep Oct Nov Dec
0
200
300
400
100
500
600
700
800
900
1000
838
730
632
861
626
560
714
858
740
543
840

3. Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol.3 No.3, 2012
264
social value should be considered in the transferring price.
The corrected price is that of the transferring price
that the agriculture project has changed after land
transference. If the agriculture project did not change, then
the transferring price needs not corrected; otherwise, the
corrected price should be discussed in order to ensure the
rights and interests of the outflow side because change of
agriculture project will boost income.
3 Data and methodology
3.1 Data sources
This paper employed data mainly from the Land and
Resources Bureau of Jiaozuo city and Qinyang city (county-
level) in March 2009. Data included the level of agriculture
land area, agricultural indefinite standard land price and
social security costs. The questionnaire method of random
sampling was employed, and 250 questionnaires were sent
out in Xiwan village, and 216 valid ones were collected
(effective rate of 86%).
3.2 Assessment methods
(1) Assessment method of the economic price: Land
contract and management rights belong to land use rights.
Because of ownership characteristics and the profitability
of agricultural land, this paper selected the income
capitalization approach as the economic value assessment
method (Liu and Fu 2007).
(2) Assessment method of the social price. Social price
comprises secure price and stabile price. The insurance
method, the average living cost method, the minimum
social security method and resettlement compensation
method are four assessment methods for the social security
price. This paper selected the minimum social security
method to assess the social security price. With regard to
social stability price, we can use an indirect way to measure
it. Land reclamation fees is a measure of food security
price, based on alternative principles, it can be used as the
quantitative indicator of social stability price.
(3) Assessment methods for the corrected price. In fact,
transferring corrected price is the distribution of differential
rent for transferring land. Differential rent comes from
additional investment on land. Farmers will invest capital
and labor to which the differential rent should belong. In
fact, the land contract and management right is separated
after transferring land, the farmer retains the contract right
and becomes the outflow side, the use right (management
right) transfers to new contract customers, and the
differential rent should be allocated by the proportion of
capital.
3.3 Modeling conversion
P = PE+PS+PT, T = 1−
1
(1 + )n
r
 
 
 
;
where P is the transferring price of the land contract and
management rights, PE is the transferring economic price,
PS is the transferring social price, PT is the transferring
corrected price, T is correction of years, r is discount rate,
and n is number of years.
Fig. 2 Space distribution of land transferring
price in China, 2009 (CNY mu-1
).
Note: Missing data from Tibet Autonomous
Region, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Macao, and
their value is assumed to be 0.
Source: http://www.tuliu.com/, in Jan. of 2010 0 510,000 1,020,000 1,530,000
km
N
Legend
Value
255,000
Fig. 3 The economy-society-environment of land contract
and management rights.
Natural
environment
Transferring
market
Social
environment
Land contract and
management rights
Economic
environment

4. MU Songlin, et al.: Agricultural Land Contract and Management Rights: Transferring Price and Countermeasures in Typical Agricultural Areas of China 265
4 Empirical analyses
Xiwan Village is located south of the Taihang Mountains
and north of Qin River (Fig. 4). As one of the largest
villages of Qinyang City, Xiwan Village is a typical
densely populated village with a total population more
than 10 000, of which about 9000 are farmers. In 2008
“the irst auction” of land contract and management rights
of China occurred in Qinyang City, Henan. Hu Jintao, the
general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party Central
Committee (CCPCC) and the President of China had a
personal interview with Dong Xiaozhu, secretary of the
party committee of Xiwan Village. Hu praised him for the
transferring land work. From September 2007, according
to the law, the land contract and management rights have
changed a household of individual management into village
collective subcontracting management, uniied farming and
management and each household pays 400 kg of wheat per
year for the transferring fee. Therefore transferring of the
land contract and management rights in Xiwan Village is
representative.
4.1 Quantiication of transferring price
4.1.1 Transferring economic price
(1) Numeric value of land discount rate. Land discount
rate = security interest rates + risk coefficient: 1.98% +
1.74% = 3.72%. The land contract and management rights
belong to creditor’s rights; business risk is larger than the
average land use rights. So, land discount rate is increased
by 0.1%, whereas the inal value is 3.82%.
(2) Numeric value of transferring qualitative price.
Datum price of agricultural land refers to the quality price
of agricultural land. That is, the price of land used for
agricultural purposes is determined by earning power and
income level in the same ownership. The price of land
contract and management rights is also determined by
earning power and income level as it is transferring, so the
calculation of qualitative price is based on datum price of
agricultural land (Table 2). Agriculture land of Qinyang
City is divided into seven levels, Xiwan Town has two
levels (Table 3).
After correcting years, the 30-year qualitative price is
shown below in Table 4.
Year corrected coeficient;
T = 1
1
(1 + )n
r
 
−
 
 
= 30
1
3 82
1
(1 + . %)
 
−
 
 
= 0.675
(3) Numeric value of transferring subsidies price: State
subsidies to farmers should be included in net income.
Through investigation in 2010, Xiwan Village the food
subsidies standard was 14.08 CNY mu-1
(1 ha = 15 mu)
and rural capital subsidies standard was 66.72 CNY mu-1
.
Psubsidies= (Pfood subsidies + Prural capital subsidies) ÷ r = (14.08 + 66.72)
÷ 3.82% = 2115.18 CNY. This numerical value is the price
Fig. 4 Location of the study area.
Table 2 Agricultural indeinite standard land price in Xiwan
Town (CNY m-2
).
Land groups 802 702
Irrigated land Mean value 18.91 16.92
Amplitude 15.8712–22.0014 14.9124–19.023
Dry land Mean value 12.70 11.31
Amplitude 9.9552–15.453 9.0576–13.4232
Vegetable land Mean value 41.28 33.43
Amplitude 34.1292–48.4902 28.5294–38.5968
Gland Mean value 20.63 18.2
Amplitude 16.0956–25.2144 14.6064–21.7566
Wood land Mean value 7.03 5.90
Amplitude 4.5288–9.3228 3.6822–7.8132
Unused land Mean value 3.69 2.82
Amplitude 3.1008–4.5798 2.3664–3.4884
Table 3 Level of agriculture land area in Xiwan Town (ha).
Xiwan Town
Levels 802 702
Area 2480.04 622.42
Table 4 Transferring quality price (CNY m-2
) over the past
30 years.
Land groups 802 702
Irrigable land Mean value 12.76 11.20
Amplitude 10.71306–14.8509 10.0659–12.8405
Dry land Mean value 8.57 7.49
Amplitude 6.71976–10.4308 6.1139–9.0607
Vegetable land Mean value 27.86 22.12
Amplitude 23.0372–32.7309 19.2573–26.0528
Garden land Mean value 13.93 12.04
amplitude 10.8645–17.0197 9.8593–14.6857
Wood land Mean value 4.74 3.90
Amplitude 3.0569–6.2996 2.4855–5.2739
Unused land Mean value 2.49 1.86
Amplitude 2.0930–3.09137 1.5973–2.3547
Legend
City
County
Town
N

5. Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol.3 No.3, 2012
266
for an unlimited period; 30-year price is 1427.75 CNY mu-1
.
With level 802 irrigated land for example, 30-year
economic price =1427.75 + 8506.67 = 9934.42 = CNY
mu-1
. The annual economic price is 331.15 CNY mu-1
.
4.1.2 Transferring social price
(1) Social secure price: Assessment of social secure
price is based on the town and village as a unit. It uses the
premium rate method according to per agricultural land,
then divides social security area by price, at last ascertains
various social secure prices. Social secure price refers
to criterion established by the Department of Human
Resources of Henan (Table 5).
The social security price is 4290 CNY mu-1
. This
numerical value is the price of an unlimited period; 30-year
price is 96.53 CNY mu-1
.
(2) Social stabile price: Calculated with the numeric
value of land reclamation. According to the data provided
by the Bureau of Land and Resources in Qinyang City,
the numeric value of land reclamation is 13 CNY mu-1
for irrigated agricultural land and 11 CNY mu-1
for dry
agricultural land. The numeric value of social stabile price
= (13 ÷ 0.0015) × (27369.10 ÷ 30161.32) + (11 ÷ 0.0015)
× (2071.77 ÷ 30161.32) = 8667 × 0.9074 + 7333 × 0.06869
= 7864.44 + 503.70 = 8368.14 CNY mu-1
. The 30-year
price is 5648.49 CNY mu-1
and one year price is 188.28
CNY mu-1
. Garden land reclamation fee is 10.43 CNY m-2
,
one year social stabile price is 156 CNY mu-1
. Wood land
reclamation fee is 7.45 CNY m-2
, one year social stabile
price is 111.75 CNY mu-1
(Table 6).
4.1.3 Transferring corrected price
After land transference, agriculture project alteration will
cause change in income, such as what happens when arable
land changes to garden land. Increased income will be
allocated in transferring both sides, and the transferring
price needs to be corrected. In accordance with differential
land rent theory, differential land rent is allocated by the
percentage of capital after the transfer of agricultural land.
Agricultural land capital is changed into price of land use
rights, calculating the capital ratio of agricultural land share,
then calculating the corrected price by expected income:
Pcorrected =
( + )
p
a
p c
 
 
 
where Pcorrected is transferring price, a is expected income, p
is 30-years transferring qualitative price, and c is investment
per mu after the land transfer.
Such as the corrected price of irrigated land into garden
land after transfer, based on the investigation, the average
annual net income to grow fruit is 1130.68 CNY mu-1
in
Qinyang, so investment is 22 000 CNY mu-1
,
Pcorrected =
( + )
p
a
p c
 
 
 
=1130.68×(7466.67÷29466.67)
=286.51 CNY mu-1
.
4.2 Transferring price analysis
(1) Agricultural projects do not change after transference.
Transferring price = economic price + social secure price.
For example irrigated land, P = Pquality + Psecurity = 331.15
+ 96.53 = 427.68 CNY mu-1
. According to Fig. 2, the
average transferring price of land contract and management
in Henan is 472 CNY mu-1
, so the model is effective and
reasonable.
(2) Agricultural projects have changed after transference.
For example, if irrigated land is changed into growing
fruit. P= PE+PS+PT=331.15+96.53+284.81+286.51=99
9 CNY mu-1
. Inflow side has capacity and should pay for
it. According to the price estimated by expert of Henan
Agricultural University, 2500 mu combined land in Xiwan
Village will gain 5000 CNY mu-1
income each year. First,
through land transference, it can achieve large-scale
operation and gains, promote industrialized operation of
agriculture, and then increase output. So, inflow side will
obtain more economic beneits by raising production, saving
costs, and reducing investment and administrative costs.
Naturally, part of the differential rent to outlow side should
be assigned. In the economic price calculation process, net
income values are obtained by grain yields. In the actual
transferring process, cultivation of crops is cash crops with
higher income in many agricultural lands, the more revenue
the insider is, the more income the outlow side will have.
5 Discussion and implications
(1) The price composition of land contract and
management rights at the village level: We have established
a transferring price model by means of the philosophy of
agricultural land value, a basic land use rights assessment
and characteristic correction of land contract and
management rights.
(2) The difference between the theoretical price and
practical application price model: When agricultural
projects do not changed and continue to grow food crops,
Table 5 Social security costs in Jiaozuo City (CNY mu-1
).
Units Urban
control area
Outside urban
control area
Jiaozuo City 9080 5450
Xiuwu County 7150 4290
Boai County 7150 4290
Wushe County 7150 4290
Wen County 7150 4290
Qinyang City 7150 4290
Mengzhou City 7150 4290
Table 6 Social security costs in Jiaozuo City (CNY mu-1
y-1
).
Land groups Social secure
price
Social stabile
price
Social
price
Agricultural
land
Arable land 96.53 188.28 284.81
Garden land 96.53 156 252.53
Wood land 96.53 111.75 208.28

6. MU Songlin, et al.: Agricultural Land Contract and Management Rights: Transferring Price and Countermeasures in Typical Agricultural Areas of China 267
the transferring price is the sum of the economic price
and social security price. If there is change in agricultural
projects, such as changing into cash crops, the transferring
price should be the sum of the economic, social (including
social security price and social stability price) and corrected
price.
(3) The complexity of the profit distribution: In
practicing community ownership contract management on
a household basis, land policy, powers and functions of
land contract and management rights include occupy, use,
earnings and exclude the contractor’s right to disposition.
Therefore, the distribution of benefits becomes very
complex. The transferring income can be assigned as a part
of collective economic organizations in order to ensure
ownership is realized in the economy. According to Marx’s
rent theory, the absolute rent and differential rent should
have reasonable distribution and realization. Therefore,
gains should be reasonably distributed between the outlow
side, inlow side, managers and land owner.
6 Suggestions
(1) Establish reasonable and well-ordered land
transferring market: The value of agricultural land can
be realized through market allocation. The ideal land
contracting and management right transferring market is
the sum of economic relations in the process of circulation.
The market needs government supervision and intermediate
information services. Through sub-contracting, renting,
exchanging and share-holding cooperation, outflow side
transferred land into the inlow side. By land transfer, land
can achieve large-scale development and operation, and
land transfer contract can ensure stable interests relationship
to the outflow side and inflow side. Land contract and
management right transferring market mechanisms are
depicted in Fig. 5.
(2) Constructing agricultural land transferring price
system by transferring market: The core of the agricultural
land transferring market is to develop a reasonable
price. But the current agricultural land transferring price
mechanism has two problems: first, the transferring price
is not fully integrated into socialist market economic
competition; second, a transferring market has not yet
formed and the impact of competition mechanism on price
is insuficient. Therefore, we should construct a reasonable
and efficient land transferring price system. This will
actively propel the agricultural land transferring market
towards healthy, sustainable and orderly development but
also can attract peasants into the land transferring market.
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Fig. 5 Land contract and management right transferring
market operating mechanism.
Intermediary
organization
Local
government
Inlow side
Large-scale
operation
Outlow side
Intermediary
function
Management
function
Sub-contract, renting,
exchanging, transferring,
share-holding
cooperation, etc.
Intermediary
function
Management
function

7. Journal of Resources and Ecology Vol.3 No.3, 2012
268
典型农区农用地承包经营权流转价格及对策研究
穆松林1,2,3
，张义丰1,2
，王开泳1
，Dhruba Bijaya G. C.1,3
1 中国科学院地理科学与资源研究所，北京 100101;
2 中国科学院区域可持续发展分析与模拟重点实验室，北京 100101；
3 中国科学院大学，北京 100049
摘 要：河南既是农业大省又是中国重要的粮食主产区，农用地流转顺畅及适度规模经营对区域经济发展和国家粮食安全
产生重要影响。借助于土地使用权评估的基本方法，并使用土地承包经营权的权属特性进行修正，构建了土地承包经营权流转
价格模型，并对典型区域沁阳市西万村进行了实证分析。结果表明，土地承包经营权流转价格应该包括经济价格、社会价格和
修正价格。价格模型的应用，应甄别理论价格和实际流转费用的区分，农用地流转后经营项目没有转变，流转价格为经济价格
和社会保障价格是总和。农用地流转后经营项目发生转变，比如耕地改种经济作物，流转价格则是经济价格、社会价格与修正
价格三者的总和。收益分配格局存在复杂性，流转收益应在流出方、流入方、管理者和所有者之间合理、公平分配。政府应建
立合理有序的农用地承包经营权流转市场，并以农用地流转市场为载体，构建农用地流转价格体系。
关键词：典型农区；农用地承包经营权；流转价格；流转模型