2. expected a share proportional to the land area they contributed, while
the new land owners or the developers demanded for an un-pro-
portionally larger share on the basis of their belief that the added value
was created by their investment. The local government also argued for a
larger share for their planning and infrastructure efforts. The rural
collective sought for compensation to their loss of property right, to be
calculated according to differential rent. Apparently, rural land is a
highly contested asset, and poor management of the process has already
resulted in social and political instabilities (Pils, 2016; Lin et al., 2018).
This paper provides a systematic account on the farmers’ complaints
in the contexts of rights and procedures in the BAR policy im-
plementation, by examining farmland reclamation in Chongqing - one
of the 24 local governments chosen by the central government to pio-
neer the BAR policy. Chongqing represents a unique case where a ‘land
coupon’ approach has been introduced since 2008 to run in parallel
with the ‘quota turnover’ (zhibiao zhouzhuan) approach3
. Both ap-
proaches need to balance the changes between farmland and urban
built-up area, but they are different as the former requires reclamation
of rural construction land before converting farmland to urban-land on
a city-wide scale, while the latter allows urban encroachment to
farmland to occur first within districts and counties. Moreover, the
‘quota turnover’ approach is administrative in nature but the ‘land
coupon’ approach is market-driven (Gu et al., 2014)4
. This paper
identifies and discusses complaints of the participating farmers in using
the ‘land coupon’ approach. A brief review of farmland reclamation is
presented before reviewing the rights and procedures in reclamation of
rural housing land, followed by an outline of the conceptual framework
and data, discussion of the empirical findings and a conclusion of the
study.
2. Farmland reclamation as a solution to urban land shortage and
a source of rural conflicts
2.1. The context
Since 1978, China has been urbanized at an extraordinary pace.
More than 600 million rural residents moved to cities and towns in the
period 1978–2015, resulting in a sharp increase in the level of urba-
nization from 17.9% to 56.1% (National Bureau of Statistics of China,
1979, 2016). This rapid urbanization has created enormous pressure on
land supply for sustaining urban expansion nation-wide, as the in-
creasing population and economic activities in cities demand for more
spaces for housing, industrial parks, facilities and services, as well as
infrastructure. These demands have been met largely by greenfield
development, which encroaches into farms and takes arable land away
from food production. Land cover change studies reveal that 14.6
million hectares of arable land was taken away from farming in the
period 1978–2015 (National Bureau of Statistics of China, 1979, 2016).
In addition, China’s arable land has been reduced by rural housing
construction. It is ironic that the decline of rural population had not
reduced the demand for rural housing.5
Rather, it was widely observed
that peasants who migrated to cities sent back cash and re-built their
rural houses (Liu and Chen, 2010). The demand for rural housing was
further strengthened by the changing family structure, i.e., the tradi-
tional large families dissolved into small ones, and the rising income
level (Liu and Fang, 2014). Statistics from the Ministry of Land and
Resources (MLR) show that in 1996, the rural built-up area was
164,500 km2 whilst in 2010, it was 182,100 km2. In contrast, the urban
built-up areas were 26,500 km2 and 40,300 km2 respectively. There
were a total of 31,400 km2 additional built-up areas in China in the
period 1996–2010, where urban expansion contributed 13,800 km2
and rural construction contributed 17,600 km2 (MLR, 1997, 2011).
The combined effect of urban expansion and rural housing con-
struction was that the amount of arable land in China had been reduced
to its threshold level. According to calculations for food security, China
needs at least 1.8 billion mu6
arable lands; this threshold amount has
been seriously observed in government land policies (Long et al., 2012;
Liu, 2018; Han and Wei, 2015).
2.2. Farmland reclamation
The Land Management Act 1998 made it clear that ‘…non-agri-
cultural development using arable land with permission must be ac-
companied by reclamation of the same amount of land as taken; the
work-unit which initiates the development is responsible for the re-
clamation’. This practice is generally known as zhanbu pingheng
(Balance between Taken-for-construction and Reclamation, or, BTR).
Researchers claim that on surface, BTR ‘has made significant progress in
slowing the farmland losses’ but due to illegal construction and the
Return Farmland to Forrest Program ‘the Chinese government did not
effectively control the rapidly decreasing amount of farmland’ (Xin and
Li, 2018)7
. In 2004, the BAR policy was introduced in order to further
explore the potential of reclaiming rural construction land (Long et al.,
2012; Han and Wei, 2015; Zhao and Zhang, 2017). The main difference
between BTR and BAR is that reclamation in BTR is not necessarily from
rural construction land, whilst BAR is active in seeking rural con-
struction land to be reclaimed in order to accommodate urban expan-
sion (Tan, 2014).
Anecdotal evidences show that the BAR policy has not been received
well by farmers. Long et al (2012) show that the policy has inherited
problem of its top-down design thus has failed to engage local actors in
dealing with hollowed villages. Zhao and Zhang (2017) demonstrate
that the ‘planned’ policy benefits are not appreciated by the farmers.
These issues not only reduce the effectiveness of the policy but also lead
to conflicts. In the Chinese language publications, some commentators
debated on the possibility of discarding the BAR policy but others
proposed changes for improvement (Ren and Zhou, 2013). A notably
dominant angle of the comments is from a macro-level strategic per-
spective focusing on how the policy addresses national and local de-
velopment concerns. None of the existing publications has examined
the policy implementation process from the farmers’ perspective.
2.3. Farmers in farmland reclamation
Farmers have played a passive role in the policy design and im-
plementation processes but are placed under spotlight in land-related
3
Yep and Forrest (2016, p477) translate ‘dipiao’ to ‘land bill system’ in re-
cognition of that the essence of Chongqing’s ‘dipiao’ is financialisation and
securitization of land-use rights but the alterative translations such as ‘land
voucher’ or ‘land coupon’ ‘have a connotation of subsidy attached or con-
sumption related’. This paper acknowledges the lack of consensus in translation
and chooses to use the term ‘land coupon’ to represent ‘dipiao’. In urban eco-
nomics, ‘development coupon’ has been used as a tool to manage development
right transfer (O’Sullivan, 1996, pp 296-8), which plays a similar functional role
of ‘dipiao’ in Chongqing’s land market.
4
This approach allows urban development into greenfield to occur after ob-
taining a ‘turnover quota’ from the central government. The reclamation of
rural construction land will follow at a later stage. There were evidences to
show that heavy financial burden of urban development often meant that the
land reclamation plan could not be carried out, and the farmers would not be
fully compensated.
5
This was so in the period at least until 2010. More recent evidences show
that apartments in small cities and towns have been attractive to farmers in the
real estate market.
6
Mu is an area measurement used in China. 1 ha = 15 mu.
7
Xin and Li (2018) argue that ‘China should not massively reclaim new
farmland’ on the basis of a possible false alarm of food insecurity, scarcity of
non-farmland to be claimed, high economic cost of reclamation and inefficient
use even abandonment of existing farmland. There isn’t any official decision to
discard the BTR policy.
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
371
3. disputes. The starting point of rural land reclamation policy was a
macro-level national food security concern aggravated by rapid urba-
nization. This has placed the central government, rather than the
farmers, in a leading and active role in policy formulation. In policy
implementation, it has been the local governments which are keen to
evacuate farmers from their rural ‘homesteads’8
for the purpose of
boosting their land-use quota and money-making opportunities
(Lichtenberg and Ding, 2009; Zhao and Zhang, 2017). Though playing a
passive role in policy design and implementation, many farmers,
especially those who have little alternative income sources other than
farming, are highly sensitive to land reform (Luo and Timothy, 2017).
Lin et al (2018) summarize from the literature that more than 65% of
farmers’ petition in China are land-related, and the issues spread widely
into the various stages of land acquisition such as the overall project
purpose, procedure, compensation and settlement. Land-acquisition
induced protests threat social stability, some of which (e.g. the Wukan
village uprising in 2011) attracted international attention (Yep and
Forrest, 2016; Zhao and Zhang, 2017; Lin et al., 2018).
An assessment of farmers’ satisfaction with rural land consolidation
programs in three government-designated experimental townships in
Zhejiang, Hunan and Guizhou provinces show that more than three
quarter of the correspondents (76.5%) were happy with the outcomes
(Luo and Timothy, 2017). However, other programs showed less-posi-
tive outcomes. For example, Zhao and Zhang (2017) demonstrated
‘some potential problems’ in a village in Shaanxi Province, including
high cost, weak influence on farmers’ quality of life, little change in
agricultural production, insufficient consideration of industrial devel-
opment, and limited improvement in rural ecology. From a farmers’
perspective, their willingness to withdraw from their homesteads were
shaped by convenience of transportation, level of compensation, dis-
tance from their new housing to work which could be the farm or non-
agricultural jobs, the services and facilities available at the new housing
location, and the quality (i.e., whether or not the house is structurally
sound) of their homesteads to be reclaimed (Chen et al., 2017). Ap-
parently, some imagined benefits (e.g., the provision of biogas which
replaces plant stalks burning for cocking) were not appreciated by
farmers because of the high cost (Zhao and Zhang, 2017). Farmers’
dissatisfaction were always associated with the government, such as
their misconducts (e.g. land acquisition with no agreement, low or no
compensation), their corruptive officials, and the unclear land owner-
ship under their care (Zhao and Zhang, 2017).
3. Critical rights and procedures
3.1. Farmers’ rights to land for rural housing
It is not always clear about the rights to land and housing in rural
China due to policy changes over time. In the first 1950s, all farmers
were given the right to own their houses and the associated land blocks.
This ownership right was affirmed by a certificate - a legal document -
issued in most areas in the Mainland. In 1962, the Central Government
amended its policy and authorized the removal of the land ownership
right from farmers (State Council, 1962). Rural collectives has become
the land owners since then and this arrangement was affirmed in the
Chinese Constitution 1975 and 1982.
Farmers’ right to their homestead land has thus turned into a user-
ship right since 1962. Under this arrangement, farmers have the right to
occupy and use their ‘homestead’ land blocks permanently. However,
farmers are not the only user group with such a right. In 1982, the State
Council stipulated that both urban and rural residents would have the
right to use land for rural housing (State Council, 1982). Though in
reality land for rural housing was mainly used by farmers, it was not
until 1998 that the then newly endorsed Land Administration Act made
it official, i.e., only farmers have the right to use land for permanent
rural housing.
The size of homestead land blocks is another area with changing
definitions. The Land Administration Act 1986 stipulated that the size
of land block for rural housing should not exceed the standard imposed
by the respective governments in provinces, autonomous regions, and
municipalities. If the land block exceeded the standard size, the rural
collective would take back the excessive land when the siting farmer
decided to demolish or reconstruct their house or to resettle. The Land
Administration Act 1998 introduced for the first time the ‘one land
parcel for one household’ principle and stipulated that the construction
of rural housing has to conform to the long-term and annual land-use
plan. It pronounces that land blocks exceeding the standard must be
returned to rural collectives. As to the right of obtaining homestead
land, only the local residents are qualified. Non rural residents are
prohibited from using rural land for housing.
In 2008, after almost five decades without a land right certificate,
the Ministry of Land Resource (2008) decided to push forward the re-
gistration of rural land-use right and to make clear about land-use
standards for rural housing. Three scenarios were provided to guide the
registration process. 1) Land occupied for rural housing before the
implementation of the 1982 policy without further expansion since
then would be registered according to its existing area of usage. This
means that it is legal to have some homestead land blocks larger than
the standard size. 2) For land blocks brought into use during the period
1982–1987, the land area exceeding the standard should be registered
according to the existing area of usage after adjustment abiding to re-
levant regulations issued then by national and local governments.
Practically, there was rarely any guidance for adjustment so the official
records reflect the existing usage. 3) For homestead land blocks occu-
pied since 1987, the excessive area should be noted in the land regis-
tration and land-use right certificate. Land blocks in this group should
be re-registered according to relevant regulation and standards when
the household is to construct another house, to resettle, or to upgrade
the present house. In this scenario, the excess remains until the existing
land and housing is to change.
Farmers’ right to their houses has been more consistent than that to
the land. They have kept the housing ownership right since 1949, and
maintained the right to lease, sell and inherent the houses. However,
according to Land Administrative Act 1998, farmers are prohibited
from selling rural house to urban residents. They have the right to be
properly compensated and to be resettled well if their houses were
expropriated, though no details are given about what constitutes an
appropriate compensation and/or a good resettlement. Together with
the return of land-use registration, the certificate of housing ownership
have been issued since 1998.
3.2. Land coupon in Chongqing
3.2.1. Shortage of land supply
Chongqing has a mountainous topography which limits land avail-
able for large urban projects (Han and Wang, 2001). The master plan of
Chongqing 2006 has posed further restrictions to land supply, as
Chongqing has been set to slightly increase the amount of its arable
land while its additional construction area has been planned to increase
by 1084 km2
in the period 2006 – 2020. These targets meant that
Chongqing would be allocated a land-use quota smaller than that al-
located to the previous planning period (i.e., 1997–2005). Chongqing
obtained 104 km2
land-use quota per annum during the periods 1997 -
2005. For the period 2006–2020, the Central Government would only
allocate 72.27 km2
land-use quota to the city per year. Ceteris paribus,
the annual shortage of 32 km2
meant that Chongqing wouldn’t maintain
the same rate of urban development and industrialization in the current
plan period.
8
Many researchers translate the Chinese phrase zhaijidi (literally ‘land for
peasants’ housing’) into ‘rural homestead’. For example, see Chen et al (2018)
and Kong et al (2018).
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
372
4. The BAR policy came from the central government in the right time
and provided a foundation to experiment with barter and quota trans-
action approaches. In 2009, the State Council approved Chongqing’s
plan to "steadily implement BAR, set up the Chongqing Rural Land
Trade Market, and build a market on unified urban and rural con-
struction land" (State Council, 2009). A Chongqing version of BAR using
"land coupon", coupled with the land “quota turnover” system has been
put in place since then.
3.2.2. The land coupon approach
The BAR policy in Chongqing is implemented with the aims of
achieving “true reclamation” and “timely compensation” on “legal
property” with “accurate measurement” and “just price” (Chongqing
Municipal Government 2008). A 603-day process was used in its initial
years until 2012 when it was shortened to a 307-day process involving
20 steps organized into 5 stages within 3 phases for efficiency (Table 1).
Farmers are involved directly in 9 out of the 20 steps.
There had been a popular response to the land coupon initiative. In
its first six years of implementation, there were 152,600 mu rural
housing land blocks involved in the trade, amounting to a total of RMB
30.76 billion yuan (Huang, 2015). By 2018, some 258,000 mu rural
housing blocks were reclaimed, registering a total of RMB 50.5 billion
yuan traded (Xie and Bai, 2018). This was about 172 km2 for the 10
years 2008-2018. On an annual basis, the land coupon scheme
Table 1
The 307-day process in land coupon generation, trade and compensation.
Stages & main steps Person/organization in charge Farmers’ participation Length (days)
Phase 1: Land coupon generation 244
1. Application
(1)Policy explanation Village leaders To acknowledge reading of notice
(2)Reclamation Application Sitting farmers To complete the application form
(3)Application processing Village leaders
(4)Application processing and public notification Town officials
(5)Application approval County land administration bureau
2. Rehabilitation 159
(6)Land boundary specification and survey County land administration bureau To give consent to the land boundary
identified
(7)Survey data review and filing Registered survey agency; district and county
bureau
(8)Public notification, contract sign off Town and township, district and county
administration
To sign off the contract
(9) Formulation of project execution plan County land administration bureau
(10)Archiving City land administration bureau
(11)Carrying out reclamation project Construction company or town and/or
township administration
To be informed about project commencement
3. Acceptance 85
(12)Acceptance review application and survey Construction company; district and county
administration
(13)Review and revision of completion survey Registered survey agency; district and county
administration
(14)Acceptance checking by district and county, distribution of
completion certificate
District and/or county land administration
bureau
To be informed about official outcomes of
reclamation projects
(15)Acceptance checking by City City land administration bureau
Phase 2. Trade & Compensation 63
4. Land coupon trade 48
(16)Application for land coupon trading County land exchange institute & commercial
banks
To submit bank account information
(17)Execution of trade County land exchange institute
(18)Payment accounting County land exchange institute
5. Compensation 15
(19)Compensation confirmation County land exchange institute To be informed the amount of compensation
(20)Payment transfer County land exchange institute
Commercial banks To receive the payment
Phase 3. Land coupon utilization
Fig. 1. Framework of research.
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
373
5. contributed 17.2 km2 extra land quota for urban expansion. This was
about half of the annual shortage in reference to the land quota allo-
cated for 1997–2005 (refer to Section 3.2.1).
4. Framework and data
4.1. Framework of analysis
Fig. 1 shows the framework of inquiry for this study. At the core of
this inquiry is the relationship between farmers and their usership right
to their homestead land, which is to be changed through generation and
trade of land coupons for the purpose of supporting a continuous urban
land expansion. Farmers’ complaints are raised mainly to the local
governments which implement the central government BAR policy.
These complaints could focus on step-specific and non-step-specific is-
sues as well as the effects of the policy implementation on their quality
of life. Within these foci, broad policy purposes could be a part of the
non-step-specific concerns.
4.2. Data
Data were collected from the Chongqing Network Platform for
Residents’ Participation in Governance which was developed by the
Chongqing Municipal Government in July 2010. As a repository the
Network Platform provides residents an opportunity to clarify, ques-
tion, complain and appeal government policies, decisions and projects.
Anyone who wishes to voice a concern can do so after registering with
his/her mobile phone (thus no post is anonymous because mobile
numbers are linked to personal IDs in China). Technically, registered
members could post multiple messages, as long as no inappropriate
language (i.e. cursing and swearing) is used. However, those messages
deemed by the government as politically sensitive, hostile or embar-
rassing could be blocked out through a nation-wide automatic filtering
process using selected keywords. On the other side of the platform, all
government departments could be involved to investigate and respond
depending on the nature of the inquiry, and their actions are recorded
and linked to the triggering messages.
By using keyword search among the entries, a total of 1631 pages
were captured with usage of ‘reclamation (fugeng)’ and ‘homestead
land (zhaijidi)’ in the title and/or text. These represent 1631 entries of
raw data covering the period August 2010 to August 2018. After
eliminating the repeating records, incomplete records and empty posts,
1455 pages were selected for analysis. One of the 1455 data entries is a
re-posted message as it was deleted the first round due to a language
problem in the original inquiry. Each raw data entry includes two parts:
the inquiry detailed by its title, author, issue, and the authority assigned
if any to answer the inquiry, as well as the response given by either the
Network Platform or the authority in charge.
The Network Platform data are open to the public thus are partially
transparent. However, anyone who uses these data has to be mindful
that 1) there was no way to be entirely sure that all records were kept in
the dataset. We didn’t have access to the data log book; but even there
was such access, log books could be modified too; 2) there was no of-
ficial list of keywords which were declared as politically sensitive or
hostile or embarrassing. Messages were filtered out in a black-box and
no one knew whether there was any messages denied from being
posted, and if there were, how many; 3) there might be age, gender,
income, and/or geography divide in Internet literacy so not all residents
had equal access to the Platform. In addition, some would-be partici-
pants might be scared off by village/town officials – as revealed in the
latter sections, residents were sometimes threatened by losing com-
pensation if they complained. Despite these limitations, the open nature
of the Platform provides an opportunity to any determined residents to
write in, thus the dataset is sufficiently representative of the collective
sentiment.
5. Farmers’ complaints
Empirical results show that farmers’ complaints concentrated on
step-specific issues (602 entries) and non-step-specific issues (1292
entries). 439 of the complaints included both step-specific and non-
step-specific concerns. There was no complaints extending to broader
policy goals of either the central (i.e. maintaining 1.8 billion mu arable
land as minimum) or local (i.e., stimulating economic growth) gov-
ernments. There was neither complaint to the quality of life, nor con-
cerns about how their homestead land would be used after reclamation.
The three issues relating to explanation of the land coupon scheme,
registration for participation, and compensation attracted majority of
the complaints.
5.1. Step-specific complaints
Problems arose in 6 out of the 9 official steps. They are policy ex-
planation, reclamation application, land boundary specification and
survey, site work of demolition and clearance, distribution of comple-
tion certificate, and compensation payment (Table 2).
Table 2
Number of step-specific complaints.
Steps 2011*
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018*
sub-total
(8-12) (1-8)
1) (1)Policy Explanation 1 1 1 13 13 6 35
2) (2)Reclamation Application 1 5 21 36 33 35 35 10 176
2a.Qualification criteria not clear 1 3 7 9 3 23
2b.Housing omitted in official base map 1 4 6 7 2 1 1 22
2c.Homestead land used by emigrant farmers 9 13 12 13 7 3 57
2d.Rural construction land for collective purposes 1 1 4 7 13 10 2 38
2e.Conflicts between neighbors 4 6 12 3 4 29
2f. Reclamation deposit 1 1 4 1 7
3) (6)Land boundary specification and survey (surveyor boosting the area for a high survey fee) 2 1 2 3 1 3 12
4) (11) Site work on demolition and clearance (farmers were asked to pay the demolition company or to
demolish by themselves)
3 5 1 3 1 13
5) (14)Distribution of completion certificate 5 18 13 25 19 10 1 91
14a.compensation area is smaller than expected 5 18 13 25 18 8 87
14b. surveyor asking for a fee in exchange of a manipulated outcome, i.e. a larger area 1 2 1 4
6) (20)Payment transfer 1 5 6 18 101 109 35 275
20a.Not receiving compensation 1 1 55 72 22 151
20b.Compensation paid to village leaders’ account 1 5 5 17 46 37 13 124
Subtotal 2 13 48 63 81 172 171 52 602
* No data was available for the entire year. The months covered by data are listed in parentheses.
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
374
6. Almost half of the 602 complaints (45.6%) were associated with
compensation payment; and 30% were about reclamation application.
The third largest group (15.1%) was related to the distribution of
completion certificate. Complaints associated with the other three steps
accounted for about 10% of the total. Over time, the complaints had
increased. However, the trends vary among the issues. Complaints as-
sociated with policy explanation (step 1) and payment transfer (step
20) increased; those relating to mapping such as step 14 and the base
map used in step 2 decreased; the combined outcome of step 2 (re-
clamation application) was rather constant from 2014.
1) Policy explanation
35 complained that village leaders exaggerated the benefits of the
scheme in order to persuade farmers to participation. The unrealistic
high expectation of compensation boosted the participation numbers.
This helped village and town officials to demonstrate a desirable per-
formance level in carrying out the BAR policy; it also helped these of-
ficials to reclaim rural construction land under collective usership by
obtaining the compulsory minimum number (i.e. 30) of participating
farmers – this would create rent-seeking opportunities for some.
Nevertheless, unrealistically high expectations were not achievable thus
invited complaints.
2) Reclamation application
The 176 complaints relating to reclamation application focused on
six issues (Table 2). Reclamation applications for homestead land used
by emigrants and those used by collective facilities formed the two
largest concerns. 57 complaints were about village leaders who filed
reclamation application on behalf of the emigrant farmers without their
authorization, or, those who manipulated the land and housing area to
benefit themselves at the expense of the emigrant farmers. The latter
was possible due to redefinition of land block standards (refer to Sec-
tion 3.1) for rural housing. The excessive ‘homestead’ land might not be
compensated to the siting farmer but to a collective account controlled
by village leaders.
38 complaints were about that village leaders applied for the re-
clamation of land on which collectively-owned structures sat but
without the required majority consent from two-thirds collective
members. Though not abiding to the policy, the village leaders were
eager to proceed because the potential income could be used under
their discretion. Due to the absence of auditing and low risk of being
penalized, it was tempting for village leaders to cheat for monetary
gain.
There were 29 complaints associated with disputes between
neighbors due to shared building structure. Farmers who owned houses
built next to each other and separated by a common wall often ran into
situations in which one household might want to participate in the
reclamation project but their neighbor might not. Complaints were
raised by farmers whose houses became structurally unstable because of
the demolition of the neighboring house, or, by those who wished to
demolish for reclamation but were not allowed to by the authority
because of the potential damage to their neighbors’ property.
23 complained about they not being given the chance to participate
because their homestead land was not adjacent to an existing farm, thus
the potentially reclaimed land would end up as an isolated patch. These
farmers argued that it was not fair to them to be excluded from parti-
cipation.
22 complaints were about the omission of houses on the base map,
which meant that the farmers could not apply for participation. This
was challenged as the omission was caused by government mistakes.
A few complaints (7) revealed disagreement about town officials or
village leaders who collected deposit in order to guarantee applicants
not withdrawing from the project once they signed up. The official
policy does not include a deposit requirement for the purpose of
securing farmers’ participation.
3) Land boundary specification and survey
14 farmers complained that their land blocks were deliberately
exaggerated because the survey agency was paid according to the size
of the area surveyed. This would not benefit the farmers because
compensation would be determined by a different survey outcome after
completion of the project. However, as both survey companies were
appointed by the government, the complaint farmers believed that they
should be paid according to the larger size.
4) Site work on demolition and clearance
Nine complaints were about site works which involved demolition
of the houses and conversion of the land to farms. By policy design site
works were to be carried out by a construction company contracted by
the county or town government, and the cost were paid after the land
coupon was traded. However, some construction companies asked for
payment from the sitting farmers. In other situations, farmers were
asked to contribute free labor to carry out the site works. There were
also complaints that site works failed to meet the official reclamation
standards. As a result of the shoddy site work, the sitting farmers were
harmed by having their houses demolished but being turned down by
the government for compensation.
5) Distribution of completion certificate
87 farmers complained that their land blocks were mapped smaller
on the survey outcome, some even deliberately by the survey company
as farmers did not respond to the hint to bribe the surveyor for an ex-
aggeration to the land size. Four complaints were specifically about
surveying companies asking for bribes in exchange of a manipulated
survey outcome to cheat on block size for more compensation payment.
These incidents happened in occasions outside the nine steps which
farmers were designated an official presence in the process. In reality,
site works including surveying would generate opportunities for the
farmers to be in touch with the fieldwork crew. Such incidents were
indicators to farmers that the process might not be fair.
6) Payment transfer
275 complaints pointed to the transfer of compensation payment.
The majority (151 out of 275) complained that they did not receive the
compensation payment. 124 complained that the compensation did not
go to the farmers’ (usually the emigrants) bank account but rather to
the village leaders’ pockets partially or wholly.
5.2. Non- step-specific complaints
Non-step-specific complaints doubled the number of complaints
associated with specific steps in the study period. Main issues of con-
cern include policy integrity, length of process, information transpar-
ency, trust-worthiness of village and town officials, and project delays
(Table 3).
1) Policy integrity
283 grievances pointed to inconsistency in policy delivery. One such
complaint reveals that
“In 2012 we took part in the rehabilitation project. Soon after the
survey was done, our old house was demolished. In 2013 the com-
pensation area was reconfirmed, which was consistent with the area
surveyed in 2012. At the end of 2013, we received the first instal-
ment of compensation payment in line with the policy. Four years
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
375
7. later in 2016, we were shocked to learn that the compensation area
of all reclamation sites was cut by half… Why should we short
changed in compensation payment?”
104 farmers complained the unlawful customization of the policies
associated with illegal or erratic behaviors of village or town officials.
One complaint reveals that
“The village leaders … told us that we would be compensated at
250,000 yuan per mu if we converted our household registration to
urban hukou and bought a house from the New Countryside
Construction project. For those who did not wish to convert their
hukou, they would be paid at 120,000 yuan per mu. According to
the policy about subsidizing the needy families, we were supposed
to get 5000 yuan per head. But village leaders told us that everyone
was compensated 3000 yuan instead, or, no money would be paid to
those who complained.”
The government responses to this complaint show that the village
leaders made their own policies. It was confirmed that first, the re-
habilitation compensation of rural housing had to conform to the
standard of 120,000 yuan per mu no matter whether the household
would convert to urban hukou or not. Second, if house purchase from
the New Countryside Construction Project was involved, the compen-
sation would be calculated by taking off the newly purchased land area
from the rehabilitation area. A subsidy was also said in place by the
policy for families that relocated to the New Countryside housing and
met criteria including income, the disability status, and housing con-
ditions (e.g., dilapidated housing) or location of residence (e.g., land-
slide areas). The response also acknowledged the poor publicity as an
area for future improvement on the government side.
The third group of complaints (53 in number) pointed to the lack of
technical specifications in defining the reclamation land area. For ex-
ample, there were usually small patches of greeneries and/or vegetable
farms next to the rural house and all the patches were considered part
of the homestead land. These small land patches were included in re-
clamation documentation but understandably (by the participating
farmers) they might not be compensated. However, knowing the policy
customization possibility by village leaders, farmers complained that it
was unclear whether the small patches generated land coupons and if so
who pocketed the compensation payment.
2) The lengthy process
337 farmers complained about the lengthy process from project
initiation to compensation payment. According to Table 3, the number
of complaints reached its peak in 2015. In particular, delays of 2–4
years before receiving compensation payment accounted for 76% of the
total complaints, whilst complaints of more than 5 years compensation
delay were rare (only 18 cases in the dataset). In contrast, one-year-
delay of compensation fallen from 15 cases in 2012 to 4 cases in 2015.
According to the Annual Bulletins (2008–2016) published by the
Chongqing Land Resource and Housing Management Bureau, the delays
was caused by oversupply of land coupons as a result of a land market
slump. The sale of land-use right increased steadily in the period
2008–2013, but since 2013 the sale had been declining. Though the
Municipal Government had a timeline to complete the payment pro-
cess, the empirical evidence showed that the market did not cooperate
thus some of the land coupons couldn’t be cashed out for compensation
payment.
3) Information transparency
301 complaints pointed to the lack of transparency especially re-
lating to public notification in the reclamation process. The problem
escalated over the years as the complaints increased consistently from
11 in 2012 to 41 in 2013 then to 73 in 2014 and reached its peak (104)
in 2015. One key complaint in this group was the lack of information
about project progress, which gave room for speculating the fate of
projects and spreading rumors. Some farmers were frustrated by being
kept in dark for too long in their reclamation application and other
steps of the process, thus wished to be informed about the progress in
all the steps. Some participating farmers were placed in a dilemma as
they did not want to spend money to improve their old houses which
were soon to be demolished, but the house structure might not be sound
enough to last without improvement for an unknown period of time. In
a response to such query about the timing of site work, village and town
officials explained that the existing large number of land coupons in
market caused uncertainty to the implementation and compensation
schedule.
4) Trust-worthiness of village and town officials
101 farmers complained about that village and town officials are
distrustful. Some of the complaints expressed anger of farmers who
were not comfortable with the idea that market auction was to de-
termine the compensation rate. They thought that the lack of a standard
compensation rate was due to village and town officials cunning ar-
rangement for their own benefit. Others expressed their fear about their
compensation payment being embezzled. To many, these complaints
were not baseless as some farmers had evidences in hand about cor-
ruptive officials. The complaints included 17 families that sued the
village and town officials for having distributed compensation payment
to some farmers but not all the participating farmers.
5) Project delays
113 complaints were about delays of rehabilitation after official
announcement of farmers’ participation to reclamation project. Many
farmers stopped investment on their housing maintenance after
Table 3
Non-step-specific complaints.
Issues 2011
(8-12)
2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018*
sub-total
(1-8)
1) Policy Integrity 9 22 57 58 111 86 72 25 440
1.1) Inconsistency in policy delivery 1 9 8 10 28 35 13 104
1.2) Unlawful policy customization 9 21 46 45 92 43 21 6 283
1.3) Lack of technical specifications 2 5 9 15 16 6 53
2) Unacceptable length of the whole process 1 12 44 72 123 75 6 4 337
3) Lack of information 11 41 73 104 38 22 12 301
4) Project delays 1 3 2 15 47 32 10 3 113
5) Trust-worthiness of village and town officials 6 8 30 44 13 101
5.1) Doubt of compensation payment 5 7 29 44 13 98
5.2) Illegal conducts 1 1 1 3
Sub-total 11 48 144 224 393 261 154 57 1292
S.S. Han and W. Lin Land Use Policy 83 (2019) 370–378
376
8. confirmation of homestead withdraw. Some lived in dilapidated
housing which could be just strong enough to sustain for the short time
period before the planned demolition. Any progress delay meant an
increased chance of experiencing a collapse, which was especially risky
under bad weather conditions. As such, some farmers were very upset
by project delays. Nevertheless, some project delays were unavoidable
because the land coupon trading was dependent on the land market,
which was affected by the overall economic situation in Chongqing, and
to a certain extent, in China and the world.
6. Discussion and conclusion
Chongqing’s land coupon approach provides an innovation to land
management in China. Since its inception and operation in 2008,
258,000 mu (172 km2) rural housing land has been reclaimed, con-
tributing half to the shortage of annual land-use quota and almost
quarter of the annual land quota allocated by the central government.
Apparently, in the first 10 years of implementation, rural housing land
reclaimed via land coupon initiative could not meet the need of urban
expansion in Chongqing. Nevertheless, the land coupon scheme is a
novel land management method as it blends the national goal of arable
land protection with local goals of economic development and in-
dividual goals of a just redistribution of income associated with land.
Different from the conventional quota turnover approach, the land
coupon scheme takes a bottom-up approach and allows farmers to play
an active role in its implementation.
Farmers travel through a lengthy process from application for par-
ticipation in rural housing land reclamation to reception of compen-
sation payment. This is a dynamic and complex process shaped by
historical bags of inconsistent policies, rent-seeking individuals and
organizations, and market uncertainties. For the past six decades,
peasants’ right to land and housing has changed, so has the standard of
land block for rural housing as well as the approaches to rectify pro-
blems. The discrepancies in policy directions and technical details have
generated confusions, uncertainties and conflicts. The situation has
been further complicated by the behavior of village and town leaders,
some of whom were keen to fulfill their own interest at the expense of
farmers. The rent-seeking behavior of some surveyors and demolition
contractors add on to farmers’ grievances. Furthermore, farmers have to
learn and be patient with market uncertainties and cycles in waiting for
their compensation payment.
Fluctuation of the real estate market led to changes in the number of
complaints over time, which peaked in 2015 for non-step-specific
concerns and in 2016–2017 for step-specific concerns. The downturn of
housing market since 2013 (Chongqing Land Resource and Housing
Management Bureau, 2008-2016; Chongqing Land Resource and
Housing Management Bureau, 2008) and of office market since 2015
(Savills, 2018) not only reduced demand for but also led to an over-
supply of construction land. These changes effectively slowed down the
cash out rate of land coupons. Major spurt of non-step-specific com-
plaints in 2015 was caused by farmers who became grumpy in the long
waiting process, whilst the spurts of step-specific complaints in 2016
and 2017 were caused by a combination of the long-wait and a rushed
delivery of partial and/or unjustified amount of compensation. A
common thread in the peak period complaints was that the expected
compensation payment did not arrive on time wholly or partially.
Although the complaints were results of different circumstances,
compensation payment was the focal point. Missing payment, delayed
funds transfer and inadequate compensation thus were all the top
concerns. Rent-seeking officials and organizations angered the farmers.
Any matters that affect compensation calculation, entry for participa-
tion, and expectation of financial return were also raised in the com-
plaints. Interestingly, none of the complaints went beyond farmers’
immediate financial interest from the land. There was no single com-
plaint that connects farmers’ experiences and/or unhappiness with the
national land policies, or, with local government ambitions for
economic development. There was no sign that the farmers cared about
the future of the land on which they lived for generations. These
findings point to a question for further research, i.e., do the Chinese
farmers care about intangible influences at local, national and global
levels and why?
The farmland reclamation process is a kaleidoscope in which a
range of players interplay with others at their own pace. Farmers were
given the opportunity to initiate the land coupon generation process
and actively participate in the phases and steps. However, the scope of
their participation, as reflected by their complaints, was rather limited
to the tangible financial losses and/or gains. Farmland reclamation
through the change of land-use right is a life and death issue to some as
they will be detached from the land which provides them security. The
Chongqing farmers who were brought to face this life and death issue
were accompanied in the process by various rent-seeking parties who
were keen to share the benefit associated with land reclamation. The
narrow focus of farmers’ concerns on receiving a compensation without
any interest on the broad policy directions pose a challenge to both the
government and the farmers themselves for making innovative policies
towards a secured future. At its current value, the compensation is
probably negligible compared to the security that land provides to the
Chinese farmers.
Acknowledgements
The authors would like to thank the anonymous reviewers for their
constructive comments. All the remaining errors, if any, are the re-
sponsibility of the authors’.
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