SlideShare a Scribd company logo
1 of 25
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Identifying and Understanding Key
Challenges for Brownfield Projects in
the Region
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Challenges in Brownfield Project
Execution
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
KEY
CHALLENGES
DEMOLITION OF
EXISITNG
FACILTIES
TIE-IN WITH
EXISITNG
SYSTEMS
UNDERGROUND
UTILITIES
RESOURCE
POPULATION IN
SMALL
FOOTPRINT
HEAVY LIFTING
OPERATIONS
ADVERSE
WEATHER
CONDITIONS
HYDROCARBON
PRESENCE
H2S
ENVIRONMENT
CONFINED
SPACE WORKS
WORKING AT
HEIGHTS
Challenges in Brownfield Development Projects
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Risks Involved in Brownfield Project
Execution
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
RISKSHEAVY LIFTING
FALL / DAMAGE OF
EQUIPMENTS
PERSONNEL INJURY
LIVE STATION
FOULING WITH
EXISITNG FACILITIES
ACCESSIBILITY
DEFERREMENT
HYDROCARBON
PRESENCE
H2S ENVIRONMENT
CONSTRUCTABILITY
AND OPERABILITY
RISKS INVOLVED
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Demolition of existing facilities
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Tie-in with existing systems
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Underground Facilities
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Working in Adverse Weather Conditions
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Mitigation Plan
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Mitigation Plan
Controls
Approved
Lifting Plan
Hard
Barrication
Emergency
Response
Method
Statements
HEMP
Comprehe
nsive
Supervisio
n
Document
Isolation
Philosophy
Constructa
bility
Review
HSE
Trainings
Communic
ations
Permit to
Work
System
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• HSE Management:
PDO‟s Health, Safety, and Environment Management System (HSE MS) is a
structured approach to achieving our HSE goals, objectives, and targets, and
managing the HSE risks associated with our business.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• HSE Management:
The purpose of PDO‟s Health, Safety, and Environment Management System is
to manage threats, hazards, events, and effects to health, safety, and the
environment in a systematic and structured way. The management of these
involves a systematic process of risk identification, assessment / evaluation,
control, monitoring, and recovery where necessary.
The above is well documented in PDO code of practice.
CP-122
PDO Specification SP-1257 describes PDO's requirements for:
• Working on high structures
• Scaffolding
• Working over water
• Lifting operations
• Earthworks, roadwork and excavations.
This Specification applies to all activities involving scaffolding (onshore and
offshore), working at heights or over water, lifting operations and earthworks,
undertaken by PDO, and Contractor/Sub-Contractor personnel authorised to
work on behalf of PDO.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• Concurrent Operations :
Concurrent operations” is defined as “The simultaneous execution of drilling/hoist operations /
Construction activity and production operations, where there is less than 100m separating the
production operation from the drilling/hoist operations / Construction activity “
The following hazards arising from concurrent operations require specific controls and recovery
measures at the interface of the two operations:
• Mechanical impact from moving equipment or dropped load causing a loss of the integrity of the
production equipment
• Flaring / venting from a production station
• Uncontrolled or controlled release of hydrocarbons or toxic gasses from production facilities or
drilling rig
• Well control problems during Drilling / Hoist operations
The principal controls over hazards arising from concurrent operations are:
• Segregation of source and receiver to allow for dispersion;
• Impact protection of production facilities
• Communication.
PDO specification SP-1220 describes controls over concurrent operations.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• Permit to Work System :
The petroleum industry handles large quantities of flammable and toxic materials, so the potential
for serious accidents is clear. To prevent these accidents, it is vital that there are safe systems of
work operating.
The PDO Health, Safety and Environmental Management System Manual states that the
Company will endeavour to protect the health and safety of personnel protect the environment
and provide a safe and healthy workplace. The PTW System is an important part of the way that
PDO meets the requirements of this Policy.
When incidents do occur, human factors, such as failure to implement procedures properly, are
often a root cause. These failures may, in turn, be attributable to a lack of training, instruction or
understanding of either the purpose or practical application of the Permit to Work (PTW) system.
A Permit to Work (PTW) system does not exists simply to provide permission to carry out a
hazardous job. It is an essential part of a system, which determines how that job can be carried
out safely. The Permit is regarded as a statement that all hazards and risks have been eliminated
from or controlled in the work area. The issue of a Permit does not, by itself, make a job safe.
That can only be achieved by those preparing for the work and those carrying it out. The Permit
To Work System forms a key part of the company HSE Management System, and demonstrates
compliance with the legal framework of Oman Ministerial Decision 286/ (2008).
PDO procedure PR-1172 describes requirements for PTW system.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• Isolation Philosophy :
The objective of SP-1125 is to specify the design/engineering requirements for
isolation of a process section or equipment for carrying out the maintenance or
inspection work safely. Control of work and related documents reflecting the
operating requirements associated with isolation should be used in conjunction
with this SP.
This specification is primarily intended for use by plant designers but it may also
be used by operations personnel as a general guide for checking the appropriate
positioning of spectacle blinds and spades.
This specification primarily describes the requirement of positive isolation,
applicability of valved isolations and the correct positioning of spectacle blinds
and spades in facility pipework. While typical example applications are
described, it is stressed that these are not necessarily specific. It is the
responsibility of the user to assess the actual requirements based on the
maintenance/inspection philosophy agreed during the conceptual design of the
facility.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• Emergency Response :
PDO is committed to maintaining an effective Emergency Response Management System
(ERMS) to respond to emergencies and to minimize consequential losses.
PDO Code of Practice, CP- 123, is the top level document in a suite of emergency response
documents.
It defines the structure of the emergency response management system in PDO, and describes
the various elements that make up the ERMS.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Key Focus Areas
• Contract Management :
PDO Code of Practice CP-129 details the principles, on which all Contracting and Procurement
activities are to be identified, planned and implemented, in order for each of these key areas of
services and materials to be obtained on the best commercial terms.
The implementation of the Contracting Out and Contracting & Procurement policy involves:
• Clear definition of factors to be assessed when determining and selecting activities to be
considered for contracting out
• The appreciation of lifetime costs
• The use of competitive tendering whenever possible
• Maximum use of National Products and local resources
• The use of Supply Chain Management tools and best practices
• Managing sustainable development
• Building long term Contracting & Procurement skills in PDO
As part of the drive in PDO for improving the management of contracts, PDO guideline, GU- 546
was developed to assist Contract Holders (also Company Representatives and Company Site
Representatives) to manage all contracts under their control.
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Summary
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Sl. No: Challenges Risk Controls
1
Demolition of existing facilities
such as tanks, seperators, Heaters,
pumps, piping, etc.
Live Station, Heavy Lifting,
Station Trip
Isolation Philosophy, lifting plan, method statement, HEMP,
Barrication, Gas Detection, Adequate Supervision by PDO and
contractor, PTW, etc.
2
Tie-in with existing systems such as
Mech, elect, inst., upgradation and
migration of existing DCS/IPS
system, etc.
Live Station, Production Loss,
Compatibility with the existing
system, Obsolete equipment /
system, MOC Changes, Integrity
Issues, etc
Design Review , HAZOP, IPF, Constructability and Operability
Review, SAFOP, Proper back up, Advance Tie-ins, Hot Tapping,
Physical checks at site, NDT, MSR reviews, Stress Analysis of
piping systems, Factory acceptance testing, site acceptance
testing, Adequate Supervision, Competent execution personnel,
etc.
3
Under ground utilities such as
electrical and instrument cables,
piping, fire water networks etc..
Damage of cables, pipes, Station
Trips, Deferrement, Personnel
Injury
Latest As-Built drawings, Slit Trenching, Cable & Metal
Detections, Visual Inspections, Experienced plant operators, site
verifications, permit to work system,etc.
4
Resources Population in small
footprint e.g. around 650 persons
were working inside live station
Productivity, Personnel Injury,
H2S Environment, Accessibility,
Movement of Vehicles, etc.
Detailed Work Planning, HSE Reviews, Daily Tool Box Briefings,
PTW system, Method Statements, Interface Management, etc.
6
Handling of heavy lifting such as
seperators, Heaters, pumps,
Compressor, tanks, etc.
Live Station, Heavy Lifting,
Damage to existing facility,
Personnel Injury
Lifting plan, method statement, HEMP, Barrication, Gas
Detection, Adequate Supervision by PDO and contractor, PTW,
etc.
7
Executed the projects in adverse
weather conditions such as heat,
dust, rain, cold, etc… and the
hazardous conditions such as H2S,
NORM, etc…
Deferrement, Personnel Injury,
Damage to facility, vehicles,
resources
Emergency Response Plan, HSE Plans, Tool Box Briefings,
Journey Management, Risk Assessment Reviews
Sep 2012 – Rev-02
Thank You

More Related Content

What's hot

Mechanical completion
Mechanical completionMechanical completion
Mechanical completion
Ronie Chu
 
_Process_Safety_Management
_Process_Safety_Management_Process_Safety_Management
_Process_Safety_Management
Essam Osmaan
 
Tamas Seres Resume 2016
Tamas Seres Resume 2016Tamas Seres Resume 2016
Tamas Seres Resume 2016
Tamas Seres
 

What's hot (17)

Ipea api579
Ipea api579Ipea api579
Ipea api579
 
Mechanical completion
Mechanical completionMechanical completion
Mechanical completion
 
Rbi
RbiRbi
Rbi
 
Rbi final report
Rbi final reportRbi final report
Rbi final report
 
MS CV May 2016
MS CV May 2016MS CV May 2016
MS CV May 2016
 
Enform oil and gas safety: Process safey vs. personal safety
Enform oil and gas safety: Process safey vs. personal safety Enform oil and gas safety: Process safey vs. personal safety
Enform oil and gas safety: Process safey vs. personal safety
 
_Process_Safety_Management
_Process_Safety_Management_Process_Safety_Management
_Process_Safety_Management
 
Asset Integrity Management approach to achieve excellence in Process Safety
Asset Integrity Management approach to achieve excellence in Process SafetyAsset Integrity Management approach to achieve excellence in Process Safety
Asset Integrity Management approach to achieve excellence in Process Safety
 
A real-world introduction to PSM’s 14 Elements
A real-world introduction to PSM’s 14 ElementsA real-world introduction to PSM’s 14 Elements
A real-world introduction to PSM’s 14 Elements
 
Tamas Seres Resume 2016
Tamas Seres Resume 2016Tamas Seres Resume 2016
Tamas Seres Resume 2016
 
parveer
parveerparveer
parveer
 
instrumentation Engineering Cv
instrumentation Engineering Cvinstrumentation Engineering Cv
instrumentation Engineering Cv
 
Episode 28 : Project Management Contract
Episode 28 : Project Management ContractEpisode 28 : Project Management Contract
Episode 28 : Project Management Contract
 
Risk Based Inspection-RBI
Risk Based Inspection-RBIRisk Based Inspection-RBI
Risk Based Inspection-RBI
 
PetroSync - API 579 Fitness for Service
PetroSync - API 579 Fitness for ServicePetroSync - API 579 Fitness for Service
PetroSync - API 579 Fitness for Service
 
Ffs assessment
Ffs assessmentFfs assessment
Ffs assessment
 
cGMP Aspects of Design SMP
cGMP Aspects of Design SMPcGMP Aspects of Design SMP
cGMP Aspects of Design SMP
 

Viewers also liked (14)

ARRAYS
ARRAYSARRAYS
ARRAYS
 
Orlando felisberto t1 903096 e fólio-a
Orlando felisberto t1 903096 e fólio-aOrlando felisberto t1 903096 e fólio-a
Orlando felisberto t1 903096 e fólio-a
 
Netradi tehnika risovaniya_-_kopiya1
Netradi tehnika risovaniya_-_kopiya1Netradi tehnika risovaniya_-_kopiya1
Netradi tehnika risovaniya_-_kopiya1
 
Williams v. Mai II -- Published Opinion
Williams v. Mai II -- Published OpinionWilliams v. Mai II -- Published Opinion
Williams v. Mai II -- Published Opinion
 
Reina porto lopez
Reina porto lopezReina porto lopez
Reina porto lopez
 
Noorul CV
Noorul CVNoorul CV
Noorul CV
 
полногеномный скрининг эмбрионов методом A cgh
полногеномный скрининг эмбрионов методом A cghполногеномный скрининг эмбрионов методом A cgh
полногеномный скрининг эмбрионов методом A cgh
 
Sesión 3
Sesión 3Sesión 3
Sesión 3
 
Control presupuestario
Control presupuestarioControl presupuestario
Control presupuestario
 
Verduras
VerdurasVerduras
Verduras
 
Green Office Garden Services Pres4Dec16
Green Office Garden Services Pres4Dec16Green Office Garden Services Pres4Dec16
Green Office Garden Services Pres4Dec16
 
Ecorregiones.de panama
Ecorregiones.de panamaEcorregiones.de panama
Ecorregiones.de panama
 
SnapComms for Security Awareness
SnapComms for Security AwarenessSnapComms for Security Awareness
SnapComms for Security Awareness
 
CCTEG Drill equipment and technology
CCTEG Drill equipment and technologyCCTEG Drill equipment and technology
CCTEG Drill equipment and technology
 

Similar to Presentation for MEED - Copy

Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last updateEng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
Mohamed Zawam
 
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - finalCIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
Elise Morskieft
 
Cv of nilesh rk
Cv of nilesh rkCv of nilesh rk
Cv of nilesh rk
NILESH KAJABAJE
 
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power PlantProject Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
Ferdous Kabir
 
technical analysis
technical analysistechnical analysis
technical analysis
Ashish Singh
 
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORTINDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
Nur Ain Samsudin
 

Similar to Presentation for MEED - Copy (20)

Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last updateEng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
Eng. Mohamed Zawam CV last update
 
Process Safety Awareness | PSM | Gaurav Singh Rajput
Process Safety Awareness | PSM | Gaurav Singh RajputProcess Safety Awareness | PSM | Gaurav Singh Rajput
Process Safety Awareness | PSM | Gaurav Singh Rajput
 
Internal cleaning of fuel tanks
Internal cleaning of fuel tanksInternal cleaning of fuel tanks
Internal cleaning of fuel tanks
 
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - finalCIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
CIRED1259-No Smart MV-LV station without a smart approach - final
 
roshan-CV1
roshan-CV1roshan-CV1
roshan-CV1
 
Corrosion knowledge management: Corrosion for Managers with little or no tech...
Corrosion knowledge management:Corrosion for Managers with little or no tech...Corrosion knowledge management:Corrosion for Managers with little or no tech...
Corrosion knowledge management: Corrosion for Managers with little or no tech...
 
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation Switchgear
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation SwitchgearTrailblazers (Power) Install Substation Switchgear
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation Switchgear
 
078 switchgear install 1.0
078 switchgear install 1.0078 switchgear install 1.0
078 switchgear install 1.0
 
Cv of nilesh rk
Cv of nilesh rkCv of nilesh rk
Cv of nilesh rk
 
Tcd 2014 onsdag_03 ocean rig_presight_tp i risikoovervaaking
Tcd 2014 onsdag_03 ocean rig_presight_tp i risikoovervaakingTcd 2014 onsdag_03 ocean rig_presight_tp i risikoovervaaking
Tcd 2014 onsdag_03 ocean rig_presight_tp i risikoovervaaking
 
Pipeline integrity assessment with LRUT method
Pipeline integrity assessment with LRUT methodPipeline integrity assessment with LRUT method
Pipeline integrity assessment with LRUT method
 
Jurg hauptli resume
Jurg hauptli resumeJurg hauptli resume
Jurg hauptli resume
 
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power PlantProject Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
Project Proposal for Predictive Maintenance Power Plant
 
technical analysis
technical analysistechnical analysis
technical analysis
 
Importance of O&M
Importance of O&MImportance of O&M
Importance of O&M
 
PROJECT_STEPS
PROJECT_STEPSPROJECT_STEPS
PROJECT_STEPS
 
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation Circuit Breakers
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation Circuit BreakersTrailblazers (Power) Install Substation Circuit Breakers
Trailblazers (Power) Install Substation Circuit Breakers
 
076 circuit breaker install 1.0
076 circuit breaker install 1.0076 circuit breaker install 1.0
076 circuit breaker install 1.0
 
Sasmos Report
Sasmos ReportSasmos Report
Sasmos Report
 
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORTINDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
INDUSTRIAL TRAINING REPORT
 

Presentation for MEED - Copy

  • 1. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Identifying and Understanding Key Challenges for Brownfield Projects in the Region
  • 2. Sep 2012 – Rev-02
  • 3. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Challenges in Brownfield Project Execution
  • 4. Sep 2012 – Rev-02
  • 5. Sep 2012 – Rev-02
  • 6. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 KEY CHALLENGES DEMOLITION OF EXISITNG FACILTIES TIE-IN WITH EXISITNG SYSTEMS UNDERGROUND UTILITIES RESOURCE POPULATION IN SMALL FOOTPRINT HEAVY LIFTING OPERATIONS ADVERSE WEATHER CONDITIONS HYDROCARBON PRESENCE H2S ENVIRONMENT CONFINED SPACE WORKS WORKING AT HEIGHTS Challenges in Brownfield Development Projects
  • 7. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Risks Involved in Brownfield Project Execution
  • 8. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 RISKSHEAVY LIFTING FALL / DAMAGE OF EQUIPMENTS PERSONNEL INJURY LIVE STATION FOULING WITH EXISITNG FACILITIES ACCESSIBILITY DEFERREMENT HYDROCARBON PRESENCE H2S ENVIRONMENT CONSTRUCTABILITY AND OPERABILITY RISKS INVOLVED
  • 9. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Demolition of existing facilities
  • 10. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Tie-in with existing systems
  • 11. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Underground Facilities
  • 12. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Working in Adverse Weather Conditions
  • 13. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Mitigation Plan
  • 14. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Mitigation Plan Controls Approved Lifting Plan Hard Barrication Emergency Response Method Statements HEMP Comprehe nsive Supervisio n Document Isolation Philosophy Constructa bility Review HSE Trainings Communic ations Permit to Work System
  • 15. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas
  • 16. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • HSE Management: PDO‟s Health, Safety, and Environment Management System (HSE MS) is a structured approach to achieving our HSE goals, objectives, and targets, and managing the HSE risks associated with our business.
  • 17. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • HSE Management: The purpose of PDO‟s Health, Safety, and Environment Management System is to manage threats, hazards, events, and effects to health, safety, and the environment in a systematic and structured way. The management of these involves a systematic process of risk identification, assessment / evaluation, control, monitoring, and recovery where necessary. The above is well documented in PDO code of practice. CP-122 PDO Specification SP-1257 describes PDO's requirements for: • Working on high structures • Scaffolding • Working over water • Lifting operations • Earthworks, roadwork and excavations. This Specification applies to all activities involving scaffolding (onshore and offshore), working at heights or over water, lifting operations and earthworks, undertaken by PDO, and Contractor/Sub-Contractor personnel authorised to work on behalf of PDO.
  • 18. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • Concurrent Operations : Concurrent operations” is defined as “The simultaneous execution of drilling/hoist operations / Construction activity and production operations, where there is less than 100m separating the production operation from the drilling/hoist operations / Construction activity “ The following hazards arising from concurrent operations require specific controls and recovery measures at the interface of the two operations: • Mechanical impact from moving equipment or dropped load causing a loss of the integrity of the production equipment • Flaring / venting from a production station • Uncontrolled or controlled release of hydrocarbons or toxic gasses from production facilities or drilling rig • Well control problems during Drilling / Hoist operations The principal controls over hazards arising from concurrent operations are: • Segregation of source and receiver to allow for dispersion; • Impact protection of production facilities • Communication. PDO specification SP-1220 describes controls over concurrent operations.
  • 19. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • Permit to Work System : The petroleum industry handles large quantities of flammable and toxic materials, so the potential for serious accidents is clear. To prevent these accidents, it is vital that there are safe systems of work operating. The PDO Health, Safety and Environmental Management System Manual states that the Company will endeavour to protect the health and safety of personnel protect the environment and provide a safe and healthy workplace. The PTW System is an important part of the way that PDO meets the requirements of this Policy. When incidents do occur, human factors, such as failure to implement procedures properly, are often a root cause. These failures may, in turn, be attributable to a lack of training, instruction or understanding of either the purpose or practical application of the Permit to Work (PTW) system. A Permit to Work (PTW) system does not exists simply to provide permission to carry out a hazardous job. It is an essential part of a system, which determines how that job can be carried out safely. The Permit is regarded as a statement that all hazards and risks have been eliminated from or controlled in the work area. The issue of a Permit does not, by itself, make a job safe. That can only be achieved by those preparing for the work and those carrying it out. The Permit To Work System forms a key part of the company HSE Management System, and demonstrates compliance with the legal framework of Oman Ministerial Decision 286/ (2008). PDO procedure PR-1172 describes requirements for PTW system.
  • 20. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • Isolation Philosophy : The objective of SP-1125 is to specify the design/engineering requirements for isolation of a process section or equipment for carrying out the maintenance or inspection work safely. Control of work and related documents reflecting the operating requirements associated with isolation should be used in conjunction with this SP. This specification is primarily intended for use by plant designers but it may also be used by operations personnel as a general guide for checking the appropriate positioning of spectacle blinds and spades. This specification primarily describes the requirement of positive isolation, applicability of valved isolations and the correct positioning of spectacle blinds and spades in facility pipework. While typical example applications are described, it is stressed that these are not necessarily specific. It is the responsibility of the user to assess the actual requirements based on the maintenance/inspection philosophy agreed during the conceptual design of the facility.
  • 21. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • Emergency Response : PDO is committed to maintaining an effective Emergency Response Management System (ERMS) to respond to emergencies and to minimize consequential losses. PDO Code of Practice, CP- 123, is the top level document in a suite of emergency response documents. It defines the structure of the emergency response management system in PDO, and describes the various elements that make up the ERMS.
  • 22. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Key Focus Areas • Contract Management : PDO Code of Practice CP-129 details the principles, on which all Contracting and Procurement activities are to be identified, planned and implemented, in order for each of these key areas of services and materials to be obtained on the best commercial terms. The implementation of the Contracting Out and Contracting & Procurement policy involves: • Clear definition of factors to be assessed when determining and selecting activities to be considered for contracting out • The appreciation of lifetime costs • The use of competitive tendering whenever possible • Maximum use of National Products and local resources • The use of Supply Chain Management tools and best practices • Managing sustainable development • Building long term Contracting & Procurement skills in PDO As part of the drive in PDO for improving the management of contracts, PDO guideline, GU- 546 was developed to assist Contract Holders (also Company Representatives and Company Site Representatives) to manage all contracts under their control.
  • 23. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Summary
  • 24. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Sl. No: Challenges Risk Controls 1 Demolition of existing facilities such as tanks, seperators, Heaters, pumps, piping, etc. Live Station, Heavy Lifting, Station Trip Isolation Philosophy, lifting plan, method statement, HEMP, Barrication, Gas Detection, Adequate Supervision by PDO and contractor, PTW, etc. 2 Tie-in with existing systems such as Mech, elect, inst., upgradation and migration of existing DCS/IPS system, etc. Live Station, Production Loss, Compatibility with the existing system, Obsolete equipment / system, MOC Changes, Integrity Issues, etc Design Review , HAZOP, IPF, Constructability and Operability Review, SAFOP, Proper back up, Advance Tie-ins, Hot Tapping, Physical checks at site, NDT, MSR reviews, Stress Analysis of piping systems, Factory acceptance testing, site acceptance testing, Adequate Supervision, Competent execution personnel, etc. 3 Under ground utilities such as electrical and instrument cables, piping, fire water networks etc.. Damage of cables, pipes, Station Trips, Deferrement, Personnel Injury Latest As-Built drawings, Slit Trenching, Cable & Metal Detections, Visual Inspections, Experienced plant operators, site verifications, permit to work system,etc. 4 Resources Population in small footprint e.g. around 650 persons were working inside live station Productivity, Personnel Injury, H2S Environment, Accessibility, Movement of Vehicles, etc. Detailed Work Planning, HSE Reviews, Daily Tool Box Briefings, PTW system, Method Statements, Interface Management, etc. 6 Handling of heavy lifting such as seperators, Heaters, pumps, Compressor, tanks, etc. Live Station, Heavy Lifting, Damage to existing facility, Personnel Injury Lifting plan, method statement, HEMP, Barrication, Gas Detection, Adequate Supervision by PDO and contractor, PTW, etc. 7 Executed the projects in adverse weather conditions such as heat, dust, rain, cold, etc… and the hazardous conditions such as H2S, NORM, etc… Deferrement, Personnel Injury, Damage to facility, vehicles, resources Emergency Response Plan, HSE Plans, Tool Box Briefings, Journey Management, Risk Assessment Reviews
  • 25. Sep 2012 – Rev-02 Thank You