AN ESSAY ON THE SYNTHESIS OF RELIGION AND SCIENCE IN N SSIAN DEEP ECOLOGY

A N E S S A Y O N T H E
SYNTHESIS
O F
RELIGION AND SCIENCE
I N
NÆSSIAN DEEP ECOLOGY
CHERYL ANG
H O N O U R S T H E S I S P R E S E N T E D T O T H E
D E P A R T M E N T O F P H I L O S O P H Y
N A T I O N A L U N I V E R S I T Y O F S I N G A P O R E
( S E S S I O N 2 0 1 3 / 2 0 1 4 )

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“At some point the pain of the deadline becomes greater than the pain of indecision.
Deadlines are the only reason I finish anything.”
–Eric Whitacre

iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
think I speak for many of my fellow students when I quote my friend
Denise, who declares: “This thesis has been an experiment in self destruction.”
Many a sleep-deprived moment of writing has been spent crippled in self-doubt,
questioning what could have possessed me to write an honours thesis, by far the most
challenging task of my short academic career. I have only survived the demands of this
project, from conception to completion, because of invaluable support from the many
people whose immense kindness and help I can only repay with my sincerest gratitude
(and beer). I thank the following people:
It is my honour and privilege to have had Associate Professor Saranindranath
Tagore as my supervisor, and it is him that I must thank first of all. His classes have
been some of the most challenging and intellectually rewarding that I have ever taken.
I am grateful to him for his wealth of philosophical knowledge, for the many hours
spent in consultation and review, for believing in my abilities even when I did not and
for his calming reassurance particularly in moments of panic.
I am indebted to Assistant Professor Christopher A. Brown, who has been both a
teacher and a friend, and who is one of the best educators I have had the pleasure of
knowing. He has been patient with my many emails asking for help, and has
constantly pushed and challenged my thinking. I am thankful for his knowledge,
guidance, and concern.
Thank you to the philosophy department of the National University of Singapore,
from the oft-underappreciated staff in the admin office (Melina, Angela and Hassan),
to all the professors I have had the honour of taking classes with in my years at NUS.
I am proud to have studied under you.
To my fellow philosophers – Carmen, Shang Long, Sheng Wei, Samuel Lee, Hao
Pu, Samuel See, Isaac, Ying, Bernadette, Alexis and Rubin – thanks for the hours we
shared in the Honours Room, talking and laughing about philosophy, life, the
universe, and everything in between. You brilliant jokers.
Thanks to Mr Wong Yew Leong and the KI Twits & Co. – Kevin, Kenny, Basil,
Nicholas, Alyssa, Rhoda and Keith – from my days at Victoria Junior College. It was
you who sparked my love for philosophy. All of this is your fault.
I

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To all my friends who have put up with my endless nonsense and rants, with
whom I have shared late-night Starbucks study dates and innumerable all-nighters,
shared laughter and tears, and who have provided me with unending moral support:
thank you. There are so many of you, more than I can hope to name. Please know
that I value each and every single one of you dearly. Thanks especially to my team of
personal cheerleaders, you know who you are – you guys are the bees’ knees!
Thank you to my parents, who feed me and give in to my constant and
obnoxiously bipolar demands for heart attack-inducing deep-fried chicken and clean,
healthy salads (sometimes both at the same time). To Mom, for words. To Dad, for
questions.
Thank you, Ah Ma. I hope you know that you are my favourite person, even if I
don’t always have enough language to express it properly.
Thank you, Grace. You inspire me every day and remind me that every moment I
have is precious. I miss and love you, little sis. It is for you that I do everything.
And finally to you, dear reader, if you have made it this far. Maybe you’ll find the
rest of this paper somewhat interesting. Maybe you won’t. But if you have made the
time to read this, thank you all the same.
Cheryl Ang
April 2014

v
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Title page i
Acknowledgements iii
Table of contents v
1 Introduction 1
2 Definition of Key Terms 6
Deep ecology 7
Ecosophy 9
Self-realisation 12
3 On Religion 15
The religious attitude 17
Innate responsibility 20
Universal sublimity 22
4 On Science 27
Ecological science 28
From ecological science to deep ecology 34
5 Synthesis and New Prospects 40
Bibliography 46

1
One
Introduction
his paper is concerned with showing that religious and scientific features can
exist in the same system of thought. Religion and science is quite popularly
construed as diametrically opposed to each other, as Richard Dawkins often seems
to suggest – among the most vocal contemporary critics of religion, he declares:
“Are religion and science converging? No. There are modern scientists whose
words sound religious but whose beliefs, on close examination, turn out to be
identical to those of other scientists who straightforwardly call themselves
atheists.” 1
One of his most famous arguments is of that against “God, all gods,
anything and everything supernatural, wherever and whenever they have been or
will be invented” 2, 3
– he is hostile to religions both organised and disorganised,
stating that he is “suspicious of strongly held beliefs that are unsupported by
evidence: fairies, unicorns, werewolves, any of the infinite set of conceivable and
unfalsifiable beliefs epitomized by Bertrand Russell’s hypothetical china teapot
orbiting the Sun.” 4
But to characterise religion in the manner that Dawkins has done is
incomplete: it fails to take into account the wide variety of activities that we do
commonly accept as religions today. There are many religions that are pantheistic,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1
Dawkins, Richard. A Devil’s Chaplain: Reflections on hope, lies, science, and love. 1st ed.
New York, NY: First Mariner Books, 2004. 146. Print.
2
Dawkins, Richard. The God Delusion. 1st ed. London: Transworld Publishers, 2006. 3.
Print.
3
I take Dawkins to mean, by ‘everything supernatural’, entities such as angels, ghosts,
demons, and the like – personal entities both supernatural and superhuman in nature.
4
Dawkins, “A Devil’s Chaplain,” 117.
T

2
agnostic or even atheistic. 5
In Religion Without God (2013), Ronald Dworkin notes
that “religion is not restricted to theism just as a matter of what words mean.” 6
He
separates the two notions of God and religion, suggests an adoption of the religious
attitude in order to explain how someone can be “religious without believing in a
god,” and so may be able to soften Dawkins’s hostile argument. The religious
attitude is about the acceptance of two central value judgements: firstly that each
person has ethical and moral responsibilities to oneself and others (innate
responsibility), and secondly that the universe or “nature” is sublime, of intrinsic
value and wonder (universal sublimity).
My aim in this paper is to apply Dworkin’s notion of the religious attitude
to deep ecology, exploring it as an instance of a system of thought where both
religious and scientific attitudes combine. I will not argue for deep ecology
uniquely, but merely that it is one of many possible syntheses between religion (or,
the religious attitude) and science. I hope to show at the very least that the popular
view of irreconcilable cleavage between science and religion, à la Dawkins, is not
valid – and dare I say, that the example of deep ecology is testament to the
potentiality of an eventual reconciliation between science and religion.
Deep ecology, the environmental philosophical movement first articulated
in 1973 by Norwegian philosopher Arne Næss, is a system of thought that, I argue,
simultaneously exhibits features of both religion and of science. (I am not arguing
for deep ecology or presenting any defense of it as a normative system of thought;
the purpose of my argument is only to show that deep ecology is a system of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
5
Ibid., 37.
6
Dworkin, Ronald. Religion without God. 1st ed. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University
Press, 2013. 5. Print.

3
thought that does have these two features.) This paper is structured as follows: I
will define the terms deep ecology, ecosophy and Self-realisation; define the
religious attitude and show how it exists within these trio of concepts; define
science and show how deep ecology is supported by ecological science; and finally
review deep ecology as a system of thought that combines both the religious
attitude and science.
According to Næss, a person subscribes to a personal ecosophy – a practical
guide to living harmoniously with the environment. 7
Any ecosophy must
ultimately be capable of supporting deep ecology, which is comprised of eight
platform principles that both assert the existence of intrinsic value in biodiversity
and provides policy change suggestions that protect them. 8
The ecosophy that
Næss personally subscribes to is Ecosophy T; within this framework, Self-
realisation (roughly, seeing the individual as part of a wider ecological Self and
caring for the environment as an extension of one’s identity) and Ecosophy T (the
Næssian system of thought and practical guide that one would adopt to pursue
Self-realisation) both exhibit features characteristic of the Dworkinian religious
attitude. Firstly, Ecosophy T asserts that there is innate moral obligation to the
achievement of Self-realisation, and this serves as its guiding norm. In deep
ecology, the prescription of normative statements presuppose the existence of some
ethical responsibilities which one has to fulfil. Secondly, there is a transcendental
experience in moving from shallower to deeper levels of identification – from the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
Næss, Arne. Ecosophy, Community and Lifestyle: Outline of an Ecosophy. 1st ed. New York,
NY: Cambridge University Press, 1989. Print.
8
Næss, Arne. "The Deep Ecological Movement: Some philosophical aspects." Deep
Ecology for the 21st Century: Readings on the philosophy and practice of the new
environmentalism. 1st ed. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications, 1995. 64-84. Print.

4
ecological self to the deeper ecological Self. Contained in this transcendental
experience is, for those who have the religious attitude, a reaction to something in
nature of real and intrinsic value.
At the same time, deep ecology is a normative system with prescriptions
and goals that can be supported and verified by the findings of respectable science.
Since it does not rely on the prior existence of personal gods or some otherwise
ontologically questionable cosmology, deep ecology is itself an ontologically
conservative platform; its directives that are supported by findings of respectable
science operating on some basic value claim. It makes use of what ecological science
has learned about ecological complex interdependence in order to support ideas
about how humans and individuals are ultimately a part of their environment, then
formulates policy prescriptions that protect them. Science can also support claims
that deep ecology makes on the nature of intrinsic value: if we accept, as some
ecologists do, that the ecosystem has to be treated with gestalt (holistic) character,
then if anything is to have intrinsic value at all this value must extend to everything.
Furthermore, if we accept that biodiversity and the well-being of humans and non-
humans on Earth has intrinsic value, ecology can provide us with courses of action
that both promote this value and are in line with deep ecological proposals.
Deep ecology is interesting because it is a synthesis with at once both
scientific respectability and the religious attitude. It stands on its own even if we
strip it of its religious components, and unlike many religions does not rely on an
ontologically radical claim for support; ecological science can and does support the
goals of deep ecology. Merely examining this one example will of course not be able
to solve every instance of such conflict, but hopefully this will nonetheless pave the

5
way for examining future reconciliations between science and religion. One hopes
that it may mitigate the more general conflict between religion and science; or as
Dworkin says, to “lower, at least, the temperature of these battles.” 9
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
9
Dworkin, “Religion without God,” 9.

6
Two
Definition of Key Terms
he concepts of deep ecology, ecosophy and Self-realisation (from
Norwegian Selvrealisering) are a complicated trio that must be carefully
separated from one another, although when taken together they exhibit features of
the religious attitude. The normative propositions of deep ecology are loosely
dependent on the foundation previously laid by the concepts ecosophy and Self-
realisation. (While the intricately linked character of many of the ideas Næss uses
makes it difficult to follow a linear explanation of many of the key terms he
employs, I will do my best.) Viewed through the lens of the religious attitude, the
process – at least, within the space of Ecosophy T – that leads us to deep ecology is
roughly this: (1) a mature individual inevitably identifies with the rest of their
natural community, giving rise to a conception of the ecological Self; (2) the
ecological Self is directed toward the ultimate norm of ‘Self-realisation!’; 10
(3) the
individual adopts and practices some personal ecosophy that directs them to live in
ecological harmony with the rest of their community, which leads us toward the
goal of Self-realisation; and (4) the adoption of this ecosophy imposes a directive
on persons to abide by the norms laid out by deep ecology.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
10
Næss uses the exclamation mark ‘!’ to distinguish between hypotheses and normative
statements. For example, ‘Self-realisation!’ reads as ‘one should love/value Self-realisation!’.
T

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Deep ecology
Introduced by Arne Næss in 1973, deep ecology is an environmental, philosophical
movement that advocates the inalienable right of all living beings in the natural
environment to live and flourish, regardless of their instrumental worth to human
beings. It claims that there is inherent value in biodiversity and that human society
should be restructured to reflect a more ecocentric view. 11
The platform principles
of deep ecology, I quote from Næss, are as follows:
1. The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth
have value in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These
values are independent of the usefulness of the non-human world for
human purposes.
2. Richness and diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these
values and are also values in themselves.
3. Humans have no right to reduce this richness and diversity except to satisfy
vital needs.
4. The flourishing of human life and cultures is compatible with a substantially
smaller human population. The flourishing of non-human life requires a
smaller human population.
5. Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the
situation is rapidly worsening.

8
6. Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will
be deeply different from the present.
7. The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating life quality
(dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an
increasingly higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness
of the difference between bigness and greatness.
8. Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an obligation directly or
indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes. 12
I will use the numbering system “P1, P2, …” to refer to the numbered points of the
platform principles. (This should not be confused with the common use of “P1, P2,
…” to refer to argument premises.) Three types of statements are present here: P1-
P3 are statements about value, P4-P5 are factual statements about some situation of
the world, and P6-P8 are normative statements.
In Ecosophy T (which I will shortly discuss), an argument for the
acceptance of intrinsic value in biodiversity is established by the ecological Self and
Self-realisation. The first three points of the platform principles, then, are simply a
restatement of this. It becomes clear that the contribution of deep ecology is
normative: its aim is to incite some change at the policy level. Again, deep ecology
is a system of thought that exhibits both features of religion and of science; it
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11
Næss, Arne. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movements: A
summary." Deep Ecology for the 21st Century. 1st ed. Boston, MA: Shambhala Publications,
1995. 151-155. Print.
12
Næss, “The Deep Ecological Movement,” 68.

9
exhibits both features of Dworkin’s religious attitude while at the same time
maintaining the ontological conservatism that is characteristic of science; a
proponent of deep ecology does not rely on scientifically radical claims about
cosmological ontology. 13
Ecosophy
From the Greek words οἶκος (oikos – household) and Σοφíα (sophia – wisdom), an
ecosophy is a type of ecological philosophy that Næss describes as any articulated
philosophy of life in harmony with ecocentric values. 14
The vagueness of this
description of ecosophy, however, presents us with the problem of what ecosophy
precisely is: there has not been a clearly stated definition. Næss is often deliberately
vague in the definitions of his terminology, claiming that the diverse and global
character of his system of thought makes “derivation in any exact sense impossible.”
15
He prefers instead to clarify directions of interpretation, without assigning “too
definite a meaning” to any one term. 16
Although this is problematic when trying to
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13
Some might argue that deep ecology’s attribution of intrinsic value to biodiversity is in
itself a scientifically radical claim, seeing as it is something that has not been scientifically
confirmed. This is, however, only a minor objection to the science demonstrated in deep
ecology. Claiming the existence of intrinsic value is extremely different from claiming the
existence of, for instance, a personal god. Unlike accepting the existence of personal gods,
which may entail the acceptance of claims that are fundamentally different to and
contradict those that have been proven and established by respectable science, accepting
the existence or non-existence of intrinsic value does not have such impact on matters that
are significant to science. In other words, while the existence of intrinsic value may be
scientifically unconfirmed, it is also scientifically irrelevant: it is something that is not
important to respectable science, and so does not pose a problem.
14
Næss, “The shallow and the deep.”
15
Næss, “Ecosophy, Community and Lifestyle,” 84.
16
This articulation of deep ecology, ecosophy and Self-realisation is only to illustrate the
religious-type features that are present, not to argue that is a religion (which is an

10
transmit the idea of ‘ecosophy,’ this peculiarity is both deliberate and acknowledged
by Næss, who describes ecosophies as being “global in character rather than precise
in detail.”
Since the adoption of an ecosophy is that which guides how we approach
practical situations that involve ourselves, the choice of an ecosophy is a personal
one. To adopt an ecosophy means to accept and adopt ecologically wise and
harmonious living; Næss notes that there can be any number of available diverse
ecosophies as long as they conform to the requirements of being harmonious with
ecocentric values. Ecosophies may also be elaborated through existing ultimate
philosophies – religions such as Buddhism or Taoism may be examples of
ecosophies – but it may also be the case that ecosophies be purely based on
philosophical analysis. The function of an ecosophy is both descriptive and
prescriptive: since the personal nature of its adoption considers a vast scope of
relevant ecological and normative material, and its social, political and ethical
implications, its exposition is necessarily only moderately precise. The ecosophy
that Næss personally adopts he calls ‘Ecosophy T.’ He is, however, careful not to
impose this on anyone, instead encouraging that individuals find and develop their
own personal ecosophies; Ecosophy T serves only as a guide to developing them.
Although inspired by the objective science of ecology, Næss admits that
science alone cannot provide principles for action; it is here that ecosophy provides
motive for political and individual efforts. 17
It is key that an ecosophy “should be
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
organised, social manifestation of the religious attitude). My purpose is not to argue for
Næss but merely to illustrate how his ideas are like religion and science, so I have chosen
for the most part simply to quote him without providing too much interpretation of
concept.
17
Ibid. 40.

11
directly relevant for action. Through their actions, a person or organisation
exemplifies sophia, sagacity, and wisdom – or lack thereof.” 18
An ecosophy is
practice. The philosophy and structure of this practice may be developed with the
input of several persons – scientists of various disciplines, students of politics and
active policy-makers, together forming an ecological team capable of formulating
policies that adhere to ecosophical prescriptions. The practical nature of ecosophy
makes it possible, even probable, that ecosophies employ current methods of
ecological study and conservation in their development.
Taken together, then, an ecosophy is this: an adopted worldview and way of
living in harmony with the environment, with any such worldview capable of
serving as grounding for an individual’s acceptance of deep ecology. For Næss, Self-
realisation is the goal and practical details are guided through an application of
Ecosophy T; in other words, the practice and adoption of Ecosophy T leads us to
the achievement of Self-realisation. This is how Næss personally arrives at and
supports deep ecology.
The wide variety of possible ecosophies make it impossible to describe how
every ecosophy is like the religious attitude, for specific instances will vary from one
to the next. There may even be some ecosophies that are not like the religious
attitude at all, but are nonetheless capable of supporting deep ecology. Since I am
concerned with the Næssian version, it is this that I will primarily discuss:
Ecosophy T, and Self-realisation, which is its top norm, or ultimate goal. And as we
shall see, in the Ecosophy T worldview, the religious attitude rings loud and clear.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18
Ibid., 37.

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Self-realisation
According to Næss’s formulation in Ecosophy T, humans underestimate ourselves,
confusing our ‘self’ with the narrow ego when such identification really should be
with a more comprehensive ecological self. 19
With sufficient maturity, humans
cannot help identifying ourselves with all living beings. While the self traditionally
matures through three stages – the ego, social self, and metaphysical self – this
traditional conception fails to take into account the relationship with our
immediate environment, home, and nonhuman living beings that should be
considered. At this level of maturity, one’s identity takes on the gestalt, or holistic,
character that Næss describes as identification with the ecological self. Our personal
self-realisation is linked with the self-realisation of others with whom we identify,
and if their self-realisation is hindered so becomes ours. Eventually we identify with
the ecological community on an even deeper level that is described as the Self (with
a capital S to denote this deeper type of identification and unity). Personal self-
realisation is finally identical with gestalt Self-realisation, which Næss describes as
the same as ‘the universal self.’
At all levels, we “see ourselves in others” – linking our own identity with
that of other members of the community with whom we identify. For the
ecological self this would be with the environment, home and nonliving human
beings. “From the identification process stems unity, and since the unity is of a
gestalt character, the wholeness is attained.” 20
While identification with the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
19
Næss, Arne. "Self-Realisation: An ecological approach to being in the world." The
Ecology of Wisdom: Writings by Arne Næss. 1st ed. Berkeley, CA: Counterpoint Press, 2008.
81. Print.
20

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ecological self is gestalt, the deeply aware individual is maintained at the centre of
this vast ecological Self.
Upon reaching the ecological self level of identification, “our behaviour
naturally and beautifully follows norms of strict environmental ethics… healing our
relations to the widest community, that of all living beings.” 21
Through this
identification, one’s individual interests are served by care and concern for the wider
environment; this allows us to take the step to self-realisation, which describes a
certain kind of self-interest. Næss offers a clarification of this term in the sense of
‘realising inherent potentialities’, describing it as something like Spinoza’s notion of
‘persevere in his being’ (perseverare in suo esse) and acting from one’s own nature. 22
One’s personal self-realisation now becomes linked to the realisation of the
ecological Self, so that self-realisation becomes Self-realisation.
Næss describes ‘Self-realisation’ as being something akin to “‘the universal
self’, ‘the absolute’, ‘the ātman’” and in particular contrasts this with narrower
conceptions of the ego-self. 23
He conceives Self-realisation as “a process, but also
as an ultimate goal.” 24
(The ecological Self undergoes a process of Self-realisation,
but also aims ultimately to attain it as a state of being.) Crucial to understanding
Self-realisation as a process is the nature of interdependency between different
entities: Self-realisation indicates a kind of perfection, but because it relies on the
combined self-realisations of all members of that community which the individual
identifies, it is highly unlikely that one will ever achieve total Self-realisation. As
the ultimate goal of Ecosophy T, the top norm of Self-realisation is that which
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
21
Næss, “Ecology of Wisdom,” 93.
22
Ibid. 86.
23

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provides the justification for action, such as action that may be described in a
personal ecosophy or deep ecology.
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24
Ibid., 84.

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Three
On Religion
matter of practical concern is that of the distinction between religion and
the religious attitude. Religions are the established and organised sociological
manifestation of the religious attitude; a person may have a religious attitude
without necessarily being part of any practical activity. The religious attitude is
necessary to a religion, which is often ornamented with other features such as
congregation and ritual, but it is not so vice versa – a religion is religious, but not
everything religious is part of a religion. There are therefore two important parts to
religiosity that should be noted – the idea and its practice – and any conflict should
be distinguished into the philosophical (between religious beliefs and the body of
knowledge in established science) and political (between organised religions and
those groups that are non-adherents). The political conflict is outside the scope of
this paper, but I hope to show at the very least that there is no philosophical
tension between the values of religious attitude and the values of established
science.
A caveat about the use of the word ‘religion’. Much of the contemporary
debate about religion in the West, as in Dawkins, seems to think about religion in
terms of the Judeo-Christian tradition. But such a use of the word is both narrow
and incomplete; the variety of religions in the world extends beyond the Judeo-
Christian tradition and thus demands a far more comprehensive use of the word
‘religion’. Asian religions such as Buddhism and Taoism, for instance, vary
dramatically from the Abrahamic religions. The many varied characteristics of
A

16
global religions are such that the term ‘religion’ becomes best understood in the
sense of Wittgenstein’s family resemblance terms – a network of many overlapping
similarities, where there is no one single fibre that runs through the entire thread.
In Philosophical Investigations (1953), Wittgenstein puts forth the notion of
family resemblance, describing it as a:
complicated network of similarities overlapping and criss-crossing:
sometimes overall similarities… for the various resemblances between
members of a family: build, features, colour of eyes, gait, temperament,
etc. etc. overlap and criss-cross in the same way. – And I shall say:
"games" form a family… The strength of the thread does not reside in
the fact that some one fibre runs through its whole length, but in the
overlapping of many fibres. 25
This notion of family resemblance is something that well-describes the relationship
between the variety of world religions and what we mean when we say that
something is a religion: there is no one single tenet of religious belief or worship
that is found in all those activities called religions. To accommodate this fact of
religiosity, it is useful that we should, instead of relying on precise definitions of
when something is or is not a religion, employ use of the religious attitude such as
the sort suggested by Ronald Dworkin. (Henceforth when I use the word ‘religion’
it will refer to this Dworkinian religious attitude rather than religious groups or
practice.)
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25
Wittgenstein, Ludwig. Philosophical Investigations. Trans. Anscombe, Hacker and
Schulte. 4th ed. Hoboken, NJ: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009. §66-§67. Print.

17
The religious attitude
Dworkin’s notion of the religious attitude enables us to pursue a broader definition
of religion, one that is inclusive of even non-Abrahamic traditions. Since it does
not rely on a notion of a supernatural god or deity, it is also better able to account
for world religions that may be pantheistic, agnostic or atheistic (such as Buddhism
and Jainism) than the more traditionally defined monotheistic god that is usually
discussed in philosophical literature. 26
The religious attitude, for Dworkin, is
fundamentally about the acceptance of two value judgements:
The religious attitude accepts the full, independent reality of value. It
accepts the objective truth of two central judgements about value. The
first holds that human life has objective meaning or importance. Each
person has an innate and inescapable responsibility to make his life a
successful one: that means living well, accepting ethical responsibilities
to oneself as well as moral responsibilities to others, not just if we
happen to think this is important but because it is in itself important
whether we think so or not. The second holds that what we call
“nature” – the universe as a whole and in all its parts – its not just a
matter of fact but is itself sublime: something of intrinsic value and
wonder. 27
The two central components of the religious attitude I shall refer to as ‘innate
responsibility’ and ‘universal sublimity’ respectively. Innate responsibility is the
fundamental value judgement or conviction that there is importance in human life,
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
26
Rowe, William. Philosophy of Religion: An introduction. 1st ed. Belmont, CA:
Wadsworth, 2007. 6. Print.

18
leading to the acceptance of certain moral and ethical responsibilities to oneself and
others; universal sublimity (that is to say, sublimity of the universe or of nature rather
than sublimity of everything) is the fundamental value judgement that the universe
is intrinsically valuable, capable of giving rise to reactions of wonder, or some
numinous, transcendental experience. Dworkin emphasises that having a conviction
to belief, of course, is not in itself an argument for those beliefs being true – “a
conviction of truth is a psychological fact, and only a value judgement can argue for
the conviction’s truth” 28
– and all that one can say, if one rejects these value
judgements, is that one does not have the religious point of view.
Innate responsibility is an idea that requires little explanation: simply, such
a person believes that it matters how well a human life is lived. 29
It is of course
subjective what is meant by a life lived well; a person may believe that there is a
certain manner of living that maximises living well. Dworkin is not concerned with
what this may be, only that there is a conviction that this is the case. Organised
religions do often contain normative codes of conduct that guide followers toward
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
27
28
A felt, irresistible conviction is based on faith, not the final truth or falsity of that value
judgement. “Acknowledging the role of felt, irresistible conviction in our experience of
value just recognizes the fact that we have such convictions, that they can survive
responsible reflection, and that we then have no reason at all, short of further evidence or
argument, to doubt their truth.” Dworkin, “Religion without God,” 20.
29
Dworkin splits conventional, theistic religions into two parts: a science part and a value
part. The science part offers “answers to important factual questions about the birth and
history of the universe… scientific in virtue of their content, not their defense.” The value
part “offers a variety of convictions about how people should live and what they should
value… they accept that it matters objectively how a human life goes and that everyone has
an innate, inalienable ethical responsibility to try to live as well as possible in his
circumstances.” These two parts of religion are conceptually independent of each other –
the science part cannot ground the value part – so what a religion believes to be true of how
a human life is lived ultimately reduces to value judgements, not to its cosmology. See
Dworkin, “Religion without God,” 23-25.

19
what they believe to be living well. (Christians, for instance, may turn to the Ten
Commandments, and many religions have similar such guides.)
The idea of universal sublimity is a little more complex. A person with the
religious attitude believes that the universe is intrinsically valuable, and that it is
capable of inspiring some transcendental (synonyms: numinous, divine, awe-
inspiring, sublime) experience. This is an experience in response to something
which is taken to be real, not to something of subjective value, but objective – or at
least which the person holds to exist objectively, whether or not this existence is
something scientifically accessible or otherwise. “There is wonder or beauty or
moral truth or meaning or something else of value in what they experience.
Their reaction is produced by a conviction of value and a response to that
conviction; it cannot be accurately understood without recognizing that a real value
is its object.”30
There are many ways for a person to have a transcendental experience. A
theist, say a Hindu, may have an experience of ātman and think it sublime because
it is a valuable experience of the deity. A scientist experiences the universe as
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
30
Dworkin uses the example of mathematical or physical inevitability to illustrate how
value in beauty may objectively exist, but it is only one example in this category – he does not
rule out that those with the religious attitude may also believe other types of value to exist.
Someone, say a scientist, can find that the inevitability of the universe’s existence,
according to known physical and mathematical laws, is intellectually beautiful. They think
the universe is necessarily a certain way: our known physical and mathematical laws are
shielded in such strong integrity that shows some state of affairs could not have been any
other way – for a scientist, the appeal of the universe’s beauty is intellectual, mathematical
proof, that the final theory will reveal ‘resplendent beauty.’ Here is Dworkin: “Physicists
find beauty in what they have so far discovered because they imagine a final, all-embracing
beauty and then radiate its brilliance backward into each step toward its revelation. They
call their discoveries beautiful by proxy: beautiful because they seem to hint at a yet
unknown, a still mysterious, final beauty… The physicists’ faith, at least for a great many of
them, falls naturally into a category we have constructed. It is a felt conviction that the
universe really does embody a sublime beauty that does not suppose any god as a ground
for that beauty.” See Dworkin, “Religion without God,” 43, 64, 68-69, 73, 82-104.

20
sublime because it possesses intellectual beauty (they may also find it is sensually
beautiful). Both the Hindu and the scientist have an experience of a sublime
response to something they believe is real, independent and objective value. The
important point is that there are any number of ways in which a person may
attribute value to any feature of nature or the universe; it is not necessary that those
values be actually present, only that those with the religious attitude have a
conviction that it does.
I argue the deep ecology-ecosophy-Self-realisation trio of concepts contain
precisely this religious attitude that Dworkin describes. For persons beholden to an
innate responsibility, the platform principles of deep ecology provides a normative
directive as to how their lives should be led and how they can fulfil their ethical and
moral responsibilities. There is also the recognition of natural sublimity, with the
ecological Self and its realisation giving rise to wonder and oneness with the world,
as well as the presence of intrinsic value in biodiversity, human and nonhuman life.
Innate responsibility
Many religions provide some form of direction as to how its followers should
regard the world around them. There is often the presence of a code of conduct
that tells followers how they should best fulfil their ethical and moral
responsibilities. Some schools of Buddhism, for example, require vegetarianism in
order to preserve the life of other beings, as well as following the Noble Eightfold
Path to bring an end to personal suffering; these are two Buddhist interpretations
of the innate responsibilities that form part of the religious attitude. On this

21
account, deep ecology is both an environmental ethic and a code of conduct that
recognise the presence of this innate responsibility.
An ecosophy is a practical guide to action – it is this that provides specific
details about how precisely they should best fulfil their ethical and moral
responsibilities. Ecosophy T is Næss’s guide toward the goal of Self-realisation; a
person’s life is successful if he has been capable of achieving the highest level of
Self-realisation that he can. Recall that the mature individual identifies with the
environment as their widest community so that no one can deny others their self-
realisation without also denying their own – one’s self-realisation can only occur as
part of Self-realisation of the whole environment. A human life is lived well if it
tends to Self-realisation, which is the flourishing of all the members of the
ecological Self community. The fulfilment of ethical responsibilities to oneself is
the same as the fulfilment of ethical responsibilities to others.
Since ecosophies are personal, there can be multiple possible guides that
help each person lead and achieve a successful life. But ecosophies must ultimately
be able to support the platform principles of deep ecology, and the responsibilities
requested here are a little more demanding. P6-P8, as previously mentioned, are
normative statements, stating that there should be a change of policies that affect
basic structures in society, there should be an appreciation of life quality rather than
higher standards of living, and that there is an obligation to try to implement these
changes. 31
An acceptance of these norms is not arbitrary – the deep ecologist
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
31
P6: Policies must therefore be changed. These policies affect basic economic,
technological, and ideological structures. The resulting state of affairs will be deeply
different from the present; P7: The ideological change will be mainly that of appreciating
life quality (dwelling in situations of inherent value) rather than adhering to an increasingly
higher standard of living. There will be a profound awareness of the difference between

22
accepts them because she innately accepts ethical responsibilities to others (human
and nonhuman life). Perhaps she accepts that these responsibilities stem from
intrinsic value as is claimed in the platform principles (and, of course, that it is good
to maintain or increase intrinsic value where she can, through carrying out these
responsibilities). To the religious deep ecologist, the well-being and flourishing of
human and nonhuman life and the biodiversity and richness of life-forms are what
constitute a successful life; P6-P8 guide a person in achieving these goals as best as
they can. Abiding by these norms are part of leading a successful life.
Universal sublimity
It is not uncommon for many things in the natural world to be found beautiful,
sometimes imbuing people with a deep sense of awe. The approaching of pristine,
untouched nature, or laying under a clear and dark night sky to see the Milky Way
high above can inspire this feeling. To the religious attitude, as Dworkin says, “they
are discoveries of innate beauty: they are wonderful in themselves, not in virtue of
how they strike us.” 32
Something that strikes us as wonderful also contains intrinsic
value, independent of our judgement.
Dworkin quotes Einstein in asserting that “‘the centre of true religiousness’
is an appreciation of the ‘radiant beauty’ of the universe.” 33
As a physicist, it is
natural Einstein should have conceived of his appreciation of nature in terms of the
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
bigness and greatness; and P8: Those who subscribe to the foregoing points have an
obligation directly or indirectly to try to implement the necessary changes.
32
33
Ibid., 49.

23
whole universe, but there is no reason that Næss should be prevented from applying
this appreciation, for his purposes, only to the earth, environment, human and non-
human life forms. Recall that universal sublimity is when something in nature has
intrinsic value and is capable of inspiring a wonderful reaction, or a transcendent
experience. The attribution of intrinsic value is most clearly seen in P1, P2 and P7
of the platform principles, with the transcendence that follows seen in Ecosophy T
when Næss’s conception of the ecological self moves to the ecological Self. 34
Næss’s explicit declaration of intrinsic value in P1 and P2 refers to a part of
nature that he thinks has intrinsic value; this is obviously aligned with Dworkin’s
assertion that in the religious attitude there is a conviction that nature has intrinsic
value. Later in P7, his suggestion that “there will be a profound awareness [emphasis
mine] of the difference between bigness and greatness” is clearly a numinous or
transcendental response to the earlier conviction in the intrinsic value of nature.
Under Dworkin’s view, Næss clearly has a religious attitude toward nature – he
believes that there is intrinsic value in nature (biodiversity), has a transcendental
response to it, and believes that there is moral responsibility to preserve it as part of
a successful life.
In Ecosophy T, as in P7, the experience when an individual moves from
identifying with an ecological self to Self is a transcendental one in which the
individual sees themself as a humble part of the whole. In this profound state, one
tends toward Self-realisation, not as a process but as an ultimate goal. As Næss
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
34
P1: The well-being and flourishing of human and non-human life on Earth have value
in themselves (synonyms: intrinsic value, inherent worth). These values are independent of
the usefulness of the non-human world for human purposes; and P2: Richness and
diversity of life forms contribute to the realization of these values and are also values in
themselves.

24
describes, “We are more than our egos, and are not fragments, hardly small and
powerless. By identifying with greater wholes, we partake in the creation and
maintenance of this whole. We thereby share in its greatness.” 35
While both the self
and Self maintain the same numerical scope of identification (in that it identifies
with the same community) the ecological Self is a far deeper and more personal kind
of identification. The more narrow sense of mere preservation of life-forms is
rejected in favour of the more sophisticated élan vital, or ‘vital force’ – not simply
existence, but life in all its multitudinous and wonderful forms. The important
thing about universal sublimity is that it is not merely concerned with having
something strike the individual as wonderful or awesome, but also that the
individual must have a conviction that they respond to exists objectively. To the
religious attitude, such élan vital exists in this way; it is something out there and real
and as something of independent value, to which one can have a transcendental
experience in response. Again, Dworkin says “they are discoveries of innate beauty:
they are wonderful in themselves, not in virtue of how they strike us.” 36
Both P7 and Self-realisation are transcendental experiences that give rise to
senses of oneness and wholeness with the world. This is best described by William
Rowe’s notion of an introvertive mystical experience where one is able to look
within and ‘[find] the divine in the soul’s core… detach[ment] from the ordinary
state of consciousness… a sense of encountering ultimate reality, experiences a
oneness with this reality, and has a sense of complete peace and bliss.” 37
The same
attitude that is gleaned during episodes of introvertive mystical experiences can and
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
35
36
37
Rowe, “Philosophy of Religion,” 79.

25
does persist in the more general religious attitude. Rowe describes an introvertive
mystical experience thus:
1. A state of consciousness devoid of its ordinary contents: sensations, images,
thoughts, desires and so forth
2. An experience of absolute oneness, with no distinctions or divisions
3. Sense of reality, that one is experiencing what is ultimately real
4. Feeling that what is experienced is divine
5. Sense of complete peace and bliss
6. Timelessness, no awareness of the passage of time during the experience
The Hindu ātman fits the description of this unity with the ultimate, capturing the
vastness of daunting nature that helps us realise just how small we as humans are in
the grander scheme of things.
In Rowe we find the best available general articulation of what occurs
during experiences of transcendence in most major religions, but this does not
mean that every instance of transcendence must conform exactly to this. Most
transcendental responses do, however, at least agree with points 2-4 of the above –
point 3, in particular, agrees exactly with Dworkin’s idea of universal sublimity, in
that it is an experience of something objectively real. Again, Næss, referring to Self-
realisation, describes this kind of concept in the same way that we do Rowe’s
introvertive experience: ‘the universal self’, ‘the absolute’, and ‘the ātman’.

26
Dworkin describes further examples of transcendental experiences. He
describes the ‘numinous’ experience of scientists working at the cutting edge of
their field as experiences of greatness, quoting Carl Sagan as saying that “he revered
the universe. He was utterly imbued with awe, wonder, and a marvelous sense of
belonging to a planet, a galaxy, a cosmos that inspires devotion as much as it does
discovery.” 38
So when Næss describes “a profound awareness of the difference
between bigness and greatness,” it is just this that he means.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
38

27
Four
On Science
cience, from its Latin root word scientia meaning knowledge, in its modern
form is a body of organised knowledge that is formed on the basis of testable
and predictable hypotheses about the world, beginning in the realm of the pre-
Socratic natural philosopher. The pre-Socratics were concerned with the formation
of reliable knowledge, gathering empirical observations and forming systems of
organised knowledge based on those observations. Discussion of the modern
natural sciences is usually restricted to the explanation of phenomena in the
material universe – biology, chemistry, physics, and their various applications.
Science is concerned with empirical methods of gaining knowledge, and the
phenomena it concerns itself with has measurable evidence that leads to repeatable
and testable results.
The really special thing about deep ecology is that even if we strip the idea
of its associated concepts the ecological Self, Self-realisation and ecosophy, the
platform principles calling for political change lose very little of their normative
force, if any at all. These platform principles are still compelling when presented
with the relevant scientific findings and information on how the complexity of
ecological interdependence has impact on human life. That is to say – even if we
strip deep ecology of its religious features, its scientific content may still be enough
to support the platform principles on the basis of what science has established
about ecological interdependence, ecological economics, and the impacts of
biodiversity loss.
S

28
Ecological science
Modern ecology studies the interaction between organisms and their environment.
As a multidisciplinary science, ecology is “the scientific study of the processes
regulating the distribution and abundance of organisms and the interactions among
them, and the study of how these organisms in turn mediate the transport and
transformation of energy and matter in the biosphere (i.e., the study of the design
of ecosystem structure and function).” 39
Healthy ecosystem function usually refers
to, but is not limited to, “basic processes of ecosystems, such as nutrient cycling,
biological productivity, hydrology and sedimentation, as well as the ability of
ecosystems to support life.” 40
The scientific study of biodiversity is a key feature of
ecology, with measures of diversity often being used as indicators of the well-being
or health of ecosystems.
In ecosystems, organisms and their resources interact via biophysical
feedback mechanisms that moderate processes acting on both living and nonliving
components of the planet. These processes sustain life-supporting functions, as well
as producing natural capital such as biomass (food, fuel, fibre and medicine),
regulating climate, global biogeochemical cycles, water filtration, soil formation,
erosion control, and flood protection among others. The number of essential life
processes upon which continued ecosystem function depends makes its
conservation of extreme importance – the loss of any one function in an ecosystem
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
39
DeLong, Edward, and Penny Chisholm. 1.018J Ecology I: The Earth System, Fall 2009.
(MIT OpenCourseWare: Massachusetts Institute of Technology),
http://ocw.mit.edu/courses/civil-and-environmental-engineering/1-018j-ecology-i-the-
earth-system-fall-2009 (Accessed 5 Apr, 2014). License: Creative Commons BY-NC-SA
40
Barbier, Edward, Joanne Burgess and Carl Folke. Paradise Lost?: The ecological economics
of biodiversity. 1st ed. London: Earthscan Publications, 1994. 17. Print.

29
may give rise to immense destruction of the natural environment, since the many
functions are often linked and the total collapse of one particularly important
function can mean the collapse of the entire system. Among the primary concerns
of modern ecology is the “rapid depletion and degradation of the world’s biological
resources, and the implications of this loss for the global biosphere and human
welfare… Conversation of biological diversity is of vital importance to humankind
because some level of biodiversity is essential to the functioning of ecosystems on
which not only human consumption and production but also existence depends.” 41
The dynamic cycling of materials and energy is a vital characteristic of an
ecosystem. Understanding metabolic and thermodynamic principles enables us to
trace and account for these cycles, so that their different components can be
understood and linked together in the study of systems ecology. Since the entire
system is both complex and dynamic – multiple processes feed into each other, the
result of one processes being the input of another so that the entire system is in
some way dependent on some other process within it – any one change can, in the
right circumstances, potentially shut down total system function. With this
understanding of complex interdependence, the intricate interaction of components
demands a holistic understanding of the entire system. It may be suggested that
appropriate treatment of the system is one which is holistic, or gestalt, in nature;
the entire system must be seen in unity. 42
The study of ecology is not merely limited to the biotic and abiotic
functions and processes, but also influenced by its species community composition
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41
Ibid., 4.
42
Osborne, Patrick L. Tropical Ecosystems and Ecological Concepts. 1st ed. New York, NY:
Cambridge University Press, 2000. Print.

30
and interaction. Ecosystems are fragile but resilient, with the essential functions
being potentially performed by several different species under different
environmental conditions; “it is now generally recognised that on land, at least,
animals and plants can shape their ecosystems and that species dynamics can be
more sensitive to ecosystem stress than are ecosystem processes. That is, an
ecosystem under stress apparently keeps much of its functions even though species
composition changes.” 43
Resilience is often linked to biodiversity, with more
biologically diverse ecosystems also being more capable of bouncing back from
shocks to the system – to recover from external shock to the system, whether
natural or human-induced. A minimal level of biological diversity is necessary to
maintain ecological function and resilience. Being of such immense importance in
the health of ecosystems, it is essential to tackle and manage the problems of
biodiversity and species loss – forest clearing and degradation is a primary culprit in
species loss, and if current trends continue even the most conservative of
calculations predict a species loss rate of around 1-5 per cent per decade. 44
The
potential irreversibility of biodiversity loss suggest that it is wise to err on the side
of caution when exploiting natural resource, especially as the consequences for
future generations may be severe and welfare damaged by current unsustainable
practices.
The ecological implications of biodiversity loss are immense. Since “the
structure and functioning of an ecosystem are sustained by synergistic feedbacks
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
43
Holling, C. S., D. W. Schindler, Brian W. Walker and Jonathan Roughgarden.
“Biodiversity in the functioning of ecosystems: an ecological synthesis.” Biodiversity loss:
economic and ecological issues. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 44-
83. Print.
44
Barbier, Burgess and Folke, “Paradise Lost?,” 11.

31
between organisms and their environment” there is immense interdependence
between the many functions of an ecosystem that together maintain the health of
an ecosystem; “a minimum amount of species is required to develop the cyclic
relations between producers (plants), consumers (animals) and decomposers
(micro-organisms).” 45
The cycling of nutrients in ecosystems and the biosphere is
crucial to the persistence of life on earth, and it is the presence of biodiversity that
provides this, allowing ecosystems to preserve resilience: “first, biodiversity provides
the units through which energy and material flow… second, it provides the system
with the resilience to respond to unpredictable surprises... some species are more
critical than others in maintaining the present functions of the system, but the
continued depletion of populations… will at some stage reach the critical threshold
and eventually lead to collapse.” 46
The mere presence of ecosystem function may not be sufficient for
ecosystem sustainability. While there may be a few keystone species which carry out
the essential functions of an ecosystem, the ability of these particular species to
continue doing so is not guaranteed in all circumstances; the health of any
ecosystem is contingent on its ability to function and continue essential processes in
light of present environmental conditions, which are not permanent and are very
much susceptible to change. Under different environmental conditions, keystone
species may be unable to continue performing their functions, in which case it is
possible that a different species may take over that role. For this reason, biodiversity
is often accorded insurance or option value – species that may not be currently
essential in preserving ecosystem function, but may nonetheless in the future
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
45
Ibid., 26.

32
perform these functions under a different set of environmental conditions,
preserving that ecosystem, so that a species is in that way latently valuable.
Biodiversity fuels the resilience of ecosystems, acting as regenerative insurance that
ensures an ecosystem’s ability to continue functioning even when environmental
conditions change. “If wild grasses perform the same ecological functions as
domesticated grasses but under a different range of environmental conditions, and
if those environmental conditions may occur with some probability greater than
zero, then wild grasses have insurance value. They contribute to the resilience of
the system before shocks and stresses that alter those environmental conditions.” 47
Therefore, the less diverse an ecosystem is, the more it becomes:
sensitive to disturbances that otherwise could have been absorbed.
Moreover, such changes can be essentially irreversible because of
accompanying changes in soils, hydrology, disturbance processes
and keystone species complexes. Control of ecosystem function shifts
from one set of interacting physical and biological processes to a
different set. 48
Perhaps the most visible impact of humans on the natural environment is the
extinction of species in the past couple of hundred years at a rate that far exceeds
that which would be expected on an evolutionary time scale and “in the absence of
a catastrophic global environmental effect. The factors that have had the greatest
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
46
Ibid., 26.
47
Perrings, Charles, Karl-Göran Mäler, Carl Folke, C. S. Holling, and Bengt-Owe
Jansson. "Introduction: framing the problem of biodiversity loss." Biodiversity loss: economic
and ecological issues. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 1-17. Print.
48
Holling, C. S., D. W. Schindler, Brian W. Walker and Jonathan Roughgarden.
“Biodiversity in the functioning of ecosystems: an ecological synthesis.” Biodiversity loss:
economic and ecological issues. 1st ed. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1995. 53.
Print.

33
impact on species loss include loss of habitat, harvesting/hunting, altered fire
regimes, direct changes in herbivory (e.g., by livestock grazing), introduced
predators and diseases, home-range/habitat fragmentation and atmospheric
changes (e.g., impacts on species in soft water lakes because of acid rain).” 49
The
impact of humans selectively clearing and converting areas of habitat to agriculture,
as well as using chemical pesticides and fertilisers, result in changes of the
atmosphere, hydrology and soil chemistry, leading to the reduction of growth in
certain species and enhancement of others so that there is an altered species
composition. An example is of the change in composition in European forest
ecosystems – “in some areas it has resulted in such vigorous growth of grasses on
the forest floor that it has effectively stopped tree seedling establishment, and is
therefore preventing forest regeneration… a flip into an irreversible state with loss
of resilience.” 50
With the study of ecology revealing the extent of human impact on the
natural environment, conservation movements started to form in response. They
gained momentum alongside increasing awareness of sustainable management of
resources for human use as well as championed the protection of natural areas and
wildlife, applying principles of scientific ecology and conservation. Næss’s
articulation of deep ecology in 1973 found favour with environmentalists and
proponents of the ecology conservation movement, many of them respected
scientists working in ecology. Aldo Leopold was one of the first scientists to
strongly support an environmental ethic in a form similar to that advocated by deep
ecology. Like Ecosophy T, where the mature individual identifies with an
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
49
Ibid., 79.

34
ecological self, The Land Ethic (1949) advocates an ethic that “simply enlarges the
boundaries of the community to include soils, waters, plants, and animals, or
collectively: the land.” 51
Nested within the science of ecology, deep ecology is a philosophical system
of thought that preserves the principles of its scientific counterpart. Beyond those
principles that have been studied and verified by the sciences, the key ontological
assumption made by deep ecology is the existence of intrinsic value and its
attachment to certain types of objects. This is, however, a type of ontological claim
that is outside the domain of the natural sciences; the actual existence or non-
existence of intrinsic value has no effect on the type of knowledge that science is
interested in producing, and it can be safely ignored. For our purposes, we will
focus on the interconnectedness and interdependency that deep ecology (and also
to some extent, the ecological Self) claims.
From ecological science to deep ecology
Sterelny and Griffiths discuss equilibrium principles in ecology, such as that of
competitive exclusion: “at equilibrium, no two species can occupy the same niche in
the same community.” 52
Ecological communities are also regulated in population
size through a mechanism of checks and balances. Strong interactions in
communities – including those of competition, predation, and parasitism –
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
50
Ibid., 81.
51
Leopold, Aldo. A Sand County Almanac: And sketches here and there. Special
commemorative ed. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1989. 205. Print.

35
determine both the niche and population size of each species. These powerful
internal checks and balances are what help maintain equilibrium for ecological
communities, unless it is devastated by outside forces.
From the principle of competitive exclusion, then, it is easy to see how
Næss derives P5. 53
If, at equilibrium, there are no two species that can occupy the
same niche in the same community, necessarily some species must give way to
another. For every new community or niche that humans occupy, there are
innumerable species that lose their place in that habitat. Humans, particular among
the types of forces that upset and devastate ecological communities, have the
potential to subvert natural balance or equilibrium; when destruction of the
environment is excessive, damage is often irreparable with little chance of
communities being able to restore themselves to their previous state. Even if such
chance exists, native species often need help to reestablish themselves, as they may
have been put on the brink of extinction or become entirely extinct in the wild.
“Human interference with the non-human world is excessive.” 54
It is of
course debatable what exactly Næss means by ‘excessive,’ but even a conservative
guess supposes that it has something to do with the amount of irreparable
destruction of natural habitat and corresponding loss of species that humans have
been responsible for. As the dominant species over most of the earth, humans have
disturbed “more than half the world’s terrestrial ecosystems to some extent…
Conversion of natural habitat to human uses is the largest single cause of
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
52
Sterelny, Kim, and Paul E. Griffiths. Sex and Death: An introduction to philosophy of
biology. 1st ed. Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 1999. 266. Print.
53
P5: Present human interference with the non-human world is excessive, and the
situation is rapidly worsening.
54
Næss, “The Deep Ecological Movement,” 68.

36
biodiversity losses.” 55
There is constant conflict between human and natural
interests, with large swathes of land converted to agricultural farmland or tree farm
forests, with significant impact on the species that occupied the habitat that existed
prior to its conversion. In other places, the introduction of non-native species has
devastated communities that are unable to cope with the new introductions – in
Australia, for example, cane toads are an extremely problematic invasive and feral
species that spread damage and disease, poisoning animals that die eating them and
depleting the native plant species that are their food source.
When the scale of ecological communities is expanded, at some point
humans themselves become part of an ecological community; human civilisation is
not and cannot be entirely separate from nature. In 1798, Thomas Malthus’s An
Essay on the Principle of Population was among the first to recognise the link
between exponential population growth and the capability, or lack of it, for
corresponding required food production. 56
Excessive population growth would lead
to resource depletion, and without the ability to provide for the population
starvation and misery would result. Even in today’s society, a large portion of
traditionally farmed production of agricultural crop remains at the mercy of nature;
human attempts to mitigate the effects of natural pests and bad weather with dams
and pesticides have still not succeeded in making farming immune from nature.
“Because of the complex inter-relationships that characterize ecosystems and the
inter-connectedness across different systems, at the extreme it is possible to claim
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
55
Cunningham, William P., and Mary Ann Cunningham. Environmental Science: A global
concern. 10th ed. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, 2008. 111. Print.
56
Malthus, Thomas R. An Essay on the Principle of Population. 1st ed. London: J. Johnson,
1798. Print.

37
that all ecological components and functions ultimately influence human well-
being.” 57
In P4, Næss suggests that the well-being or flourishing of both human and
nonhuman life is be achieved with a substantially smaller human population. He
suggests that the flourishing of the human species requires that there be fewer
humans, a view that is supported by Malthus’s 1798 Essay, but also by numerous
studies that suggest modern consumption of natural resources is not sustainable,
leading to environmental problems such as global warming and pollution that pose
risk to humans. Anthropogenic global warming, for instance, causes an increase in
global temperature that affects the melting of glaciers and ice-caps so that sea levels
rise and cities that are built below sea level are at risk of flooding; the situation in
Amsterdam is one such example. 58
A careless treatment of the environment and
resources is also responsible for disease-causing pollution, as in the thick smog in
Beijing which has been linked to increased levels of lung cancer, and pollution of
the Ganges River in India which is correlated to dysentery, cholera, hepatitis and
severe diarrhoea. 59
In an overpopulated world, the demand for food and fresh water
outstrips supply, leading to an overall lowering of human quality of life.
It has already been established that there is current and severe risk to the
health of ecosystems with the loss of biodiversity, but it is also important to
highlight how human activity has been a main contributor to this decline: “the
primary cause of the decay of organic diversity is not direct human exploitation or
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
57
Barbier, Burgess and Folke, “Paradise Lost?,” 23.
58
Kerr, Richard. "Global Warming Is Changing the World." Science 316.6822 (2007):
188-190. Print.
59
Mayur, Rashmi. "Environmental Problems of Developing Countries." Annals of the
American Academy of Political and Social Science 444 (1979): 89-101. Print.

38
malevolence, but the habitat destruction that inevitably results from the expansion
of human populations and human activities.” 60
The human threat to ecosystems is
a result of an inability in the environment to simultaneously sustain sufficient
resource to support both a healthy ecosystem and a runaway human population –
returning to the principle of competitive exclusion, either one must give way in an
environment of limited resources. For the continued health of ecosystems, it is
necessary that human population be reduced so as to free up resource for the
maintenance of biodiversity. “Habitat modification and destruction and the
extinction of populations and species go hand in hand.” 61
So we recognise that humans have the potential for incredible impact on
their surrounding environment, and we can formulate scientifically respectable
arguments, both ecocentric and anthropocentric, for this environmental ethic. It is
the case, then, that at least the active policy goals of deep ecology can be supported
by respectable science.
Finally, P2 claims that there is intrinsic value in “richness and diversity of
life forms” – not for the sake of the many lives that comprise biodiversity, but for its
own sake. We have, as described in ecology, an argument for the importance of
biodiversity that lies “in its role in preserving ecosystem resilience, by underwriting
the provision of key ecosystem functions under a range of environmental
conditions.” 62
Næss himself realises this: “The fertility of the Earth depends on an
unsurveyable, intricate interaction – a crazily complex symbiotic network which
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
60
Ehrlich, Paul R. "The loss of diversity: Causes and consequences." Biodiversity. 1st ed.
Washington, DC: National Academy Press, 1988. 21-35. Print.
61
Ibid., 23.
62
Perrings, Mäler, Folke, Holling, and Jansson, “Biodiversity loss,” 4.

39
embraces all these small living beings.” 63
Biodiversity is essential to the support of a
healthy ecosystem, and it is at least in that way valuable. Furthermore, ecological
thinking suggests that gestalt, holistic thinking should be applied to the treatment
of whole ecosystems; then, if a system is a unity in this manner, any attribution of
intrinsic value must extend to the entire system. It is not simply that the parts of
the system are connected. In gestalt, the entirety is treated before or the same as the
treatment of any individual part – if there is anything at all that is intrinsically
valuable, gestalt thinking extends this feature to the entire system. This in turn
extends intrinsic value to biodiversity, just as P2 claims.
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
63

40
Five
Synthesis and New Prospects
e have now seen how deep ecology may be championed both by the
religious attitude and by the findings of ecological science. The religious
attitude exists – both in innate responsibility and universal sublimity – in Ecosophy
T, Self-realisation and deep ecology. At the same time, ecological science has
provided us with reasons for supporting the goals that deep ecology advocates. Now
we will see how a combination of the two attitudes are found in deep ecology.
While the ideas of deep ecology and ecosophy were first articulated by a
philosopher, many of its first adoptees were ecologists or scientists. This
determinedly scientific pedigree makes deep ecology and ecosophy special among
religious systems of thought – it is religious in nature, but solidly scientific in
inspiration. Where most religions are inspired by superhuman deities (the
Abrahamic religions) or the extraordinary feats of humans (Buddhism), in deep
ecology it is merely respectable science that inspires the religious attitude.
Investigating how science inspires the religious attitude helps shed some
light on how both science and religion combine. The first scientists who developed
a religious attitude from ecology may have done so in the following manner. (Since,
as I said in the beginning, I do not argue for deep ecology uniquely but merely that
it is one version of a religion-science synthesis, it is possible that the following
rough sketch can also be applied to other inspirations of the religious attitude – this
does not need to be a unique formulation.) An ecologist studies interaction between
organisms and their environment. The more they study, the more it becomes
W

41
evident that there is a great degree of ecological interdependence in the natural
world, and the more it becomes evident that all systems are on some level linked to
each other. No natural system is a closed system: there is no system that can be
entirely independent of the rest, and if there is change in the output of one system,
this will inevitably affect some other system, no matter how big or how small the
effects may be. This makes it overwhelmingly apparent that in a complete
ecosystem, the parts are inseparable and nature should be treated holistically –
something like, as Næss would say, ‘gestalt unity.’ They may further have the
conviction that this gestalt unity is somehow valuable in and of itself, perhaps
because it is beautiful or it is intrinsically valuable in some other way, and so may be
wowed or humbled by it. They are inspired by the universe, find it sublime, and
have a transcendental experience in response to it. There may even be religious
ecologists who identify as naturalistic or scientific pantheists, holding the
conviction that the intrinsic value of nature is also divine in some way.
But universal sublimity is not by itself sufficient for someone to have a
religious attitude. They must also believe that people have innate responsibilities,
and this is a conviction independent of the contributions of ecological science. A
person must already have the existing conviction that a human life matters and that
they must do things to make their life a successful one; all ecology can do is offer
possible courses of action that might go some way towards this aim, but it is
ultimately up to the individual whether or not they accept ecological proposals. If
the ecologist accepts the two value claims on innate responsibility and universal
sublimity, they can be said to have a religious attitude. As part of the religious
attitude, they may adopt deep ecology as their guiding worldview and act according

42
to its principles. Or, they may reject either (or both) of these value claims and then
not gain a religious attitude at all, but nonetheless continue to support deep ecology
because their principles are corroborated by what ecological science has learned, so
accepting and adopting deep ecology on those grounds.
So both in the religious attitude and in ecological science there is support
for deep ecology; deep ecology is a system of thought that is both religious and
scientific. As the normative guide to innate responsibility in the religious attitude,
deep ecology is interesting because unlike most religions it does not depend on the
ontology that is laid down by prior radical assumptions. Indeed, it is defensible
solely on the grounds of ecological science, which is more ontologically conservative
than the deities or radical cosmology that many religions claim. For Næss,
Ecosophy T is “inspired by ecology, but it cannot be derived from ecology or any
other science.” 64
But deep ecology can be independently derived from ecology: even
if we strip the idea of support in Ecosophy T, the ecological Self and Self-
realisation, the platform principles calling for political change lose very little of its
normative force, if any at all. These platform principles are still compelling when
presented with the relevant scientific information on complex ecological
interdependence and its impact on all life, including human life. Even if we strip
deep ecology of its religious features, it is capable of holding its own.
Does it matter if deep ecology is in fact a religion, or is it sufficient that it is
something that is approached with a religious attitude? It does not. As I have
mentioned, religions are simply the sociological manifestation of the religious
attitude; the difference lies in the social acceptance of the activity. When an activity
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
64

43
is approached with a religious attitude and becomes organised in some way – say,
ritualised to some degree – we call it a religion. It may be a worry, though a minor
and mostly semantic one, that certain types of activities could be said to have a
religious following without actually being religions themselves (some football or
cricket fans may be described as being ‘religious’ in their dedication), but an
application of Dworkin’s religious attitude easily handles this worry. No matter
how fervent the fan, they cannot truly believe that there is intrinsic value in their
sport, or that their sport somehow contributes to a more successful life – we must be
careful to separate the use of the word ‘religious’ as ‘fervent’ from ‘religious’ in the
religious attitude. When the fan says that football is like a religion, all they mean is
that participating in football-related activities gives them great pleasure. (Whether
or not Liverpool wins the next English Premier League has no bearing on whether
or not fans find nature intrinsically valuable or sublime.)
Some may find that this Dworkinian religious attitude is similar to what
some people might call ‘spirituality’. This is a topic that would fill the pages of
several more papers on its own, but here is a brief response to those who are
inclined to think this way: they are extremely similar, but they are not the same.
Those who identify as spiritual but not religious are often hesitant to do so because
they are fed by the historical background of organised religion and negative
associations of wars fought in their name. Contemporary, popular use of the word
‘spirituality’ is often positive, associated with the new age movement and
independent, open-minded thinkers, while ‘religion’ brings to mind
institutionalised division and dogmatic constraint. But spirituality often only
describes their sense of wonder in their relationship with the world, or their

44
conviction in universal sublimity. While a spiritual person may have an additional
value conviction in innate responsibility, this is not always so. Failure to fulfil the
innate responsibility criterion of Dworkin’s religious attitude is the clearest
distinction between those who describe themselves as religious and those who
describe themselves as spiritual. 65
Having discussed Dworkin’s idea of religion, then, it seems to be one that
popular critics of religion, such as Dawkins, cannot disagree with. Indeed, Dawkins
has expressed some level of sympathy for this account of reconciliation. “If you
allow… the cosmic awe of Ursula Goodenough, Paul Davies, Carl Sagan and me as
true religion, then religion and science have indeed converged.” 66
Yet, he is
hesitant to accept this position fully. “If ‘religion’ is allowed such a flabbily elastic
definition, what word is left for real religion… If God is a synonym for the deepest
principles of physics, what word is left for a hypothetical being who answers
prayers; intervenes to save cancer patients or help evolution over difficult jumps;
forgives sins or dies for them? If we are allowed to relabel scientific awe as a
religious impulse, the case goes through on the nod. You have redefined science and
religion, so it’s hardly surprising if they turn out to ‘converge’.” 67
But what
Dworkin has done is not to redefine, but to essentialise religion: it “is deeper than
god.” 68
It is problematic to say that ‘real’ religion is restricted to the systems with a
belief in supernatural persons or creatures; the religious attitude requires belief in
neither. No wonder Dawkins finds that the beliefs of scientists who seem religious
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
65
For more, see Hill, Peter, Kenneth Pargament, Ralph Hood, Jr., Michael McCullough,
James Swyers, David Larson, and Brian Zinnbauer. "Conceptualizing Religion and
Spirituality: Points of Commonality, Points of Departure." Journal for the Theory of Social
Behaviour 30 (1): 51-77. Print.
66

45
turn out to have beliefs “identical to those of other scientists who straightforwardly
call themselves atheists” 69
– it is not in the ontology of creature entities that their
belief differs, but in their value convictions towards that belief. Perhaps, then,
Dawkins can become less hostile in his treatment of religion.
So religion and science are not incompatible with each other. Knowing
what they do about ecology, scientists make fewer ontological claims to support
their move from science to an ethic of protecting the ecosystem; the scientific
background of deep ecology means that religious ecologists make less unjustified
claims in declaring that they do indeed possess the religious attitude. There is, at
least, no conceptual disagreement. In deep ecology, science and religion do not
conflict – in fact it is quite the opposite, that they are found in combination, and
that the scientific background is a part of the religious attitude. Here lies an
example of a religious attitude inspired by science.
It is unrealistic to expect that this example will resolve all conflict between
religion and science. But through this exploration and synthesis, philosophical
conflicts have been somewhat softened. I have said what I can of their coming
together; there is still much more that can be said, and I rely on the words of a
better author for their eventual reconciliation and . After all, in the famous words
of Albert Einstein, “Science without religion is lame, religion without science is
blind.”
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
67
Ibid., 147.
68
69

46
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