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Note: originally written for the course Propaganda and Information, Anglo-American
University, Humanities and Social Sciences Major, Spring 2009
By Ondřej Šmejkal
Ancient Egyptian State Propaganda in New Kingdom
Battle of Kadesh Case Study
Somewhat general philosophizing for introduction
To put it frankly, the notion of propaganda machine being in operation in times of the
first human civilizations may sound at a glance strange to say the least. After all, regarding
the origin of the term “propaganda” as a specific type of discourse, the usual starting point,
from which said concept in a sense of as it is most usually perceived today is applicable
onwards, is the 16th
century Catholic Church organization “Congregatio de Propaganda Fide”
established to combat the spreading Reformation movement (Walton, 383). Thus, one might
reasonably question the merit of attempting to extend this phenomenon further backwards into
the ancient history. If propaganda, more or less in its current definition, emerges in the Early
Modern Period, is there a point then to posit it behind its point of origin?
I believe there is. In my mind, against such obvious question and objection stands a
notion that the elements constituting the fabric of human civilization, the phenomena be it
abstract or concrete, do not usually emerge out of thin air. The mankind as such very rarely
develops on the basis of sudden insights, unexpected enlightenments, or, shall we say, kisses
of the muse. More often it is the case of gradual development driven by a cause, a need, and
based on reflection and re-evaluation of previously accumulated knowledge. It is in my
opinion plausible to argue that even in the prehistoric era, at very dawn of human race, there
was no magic moment that would sow the first seeds of civilization, but rather acting upon
knowledge gained either through instincts which human beings inherited in the course of
natural evolution, as we are after all just another organisms, or upon knowledge gained

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through the most elementary technique, observation. Thus, it is possible to state that today’s
fruits of civilization – medicine, mathematics, philosophy, religion, communication, you
name it – did not come to us like a proverbial lightning out of clear sky, bur rather are the
outcome of centuries-long process of research, experimentation and analysis of the knowledge
gained from those. If we can agree on this point, then we can ask why propaganda should be
any different. Did the Catholic Church invent this new method of conducting a discourse from
scratch, or is it more plausible to say that the Church rather refined and improved an already
existing phenomenon? Given the above stated chain of thought, I opt for the latter case.
Further substantiation is obtainable from the definitions of propaganda as being “deliberate
and systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate cognitions, and direct behavior to
achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the propagandist”, or in simpler terms as
“control of what people believe” (Walton, 401 & Propaganda…). If we characterize
propaganda in this fashion, we presumably imply that it is a crucial social unifier, that is, by
conditioning people to accept and identify with certain sets of ideas or principles, the
propaganda source then gives them something to believe in, to rally behind, and possibly even
to act upon. It is then plausible to hypothesize that propaganda, or something acting as
propaganda, is one of the key elements for the endurance of any unified societal entity, as it
propagates and thereby maintains the status quo established within this entity. In other words,
in a non-coercive manner it gives an authority to the authorities. It is impossible for any given
society to maintain its integrity and cohesion solely by force; rather it has to manufacture
consent among its constituents to remain participant in the society so that system has the
human resources it needs for continuous operation. To put it differently, the society has to
persuade people to support and continue supporting it. If propaganda is about shaping
believes and cognitions and subsequently about directing behavior, then it is an optimal
method to accomplish the above stated task. Then next step emerging from this hypothesis is
then to suppose that if propaganda does indeed have this function, then we cannot limit

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ourselves to account propaganda from 16th
century onwards, since unified societies existed
long before that and usually endured and prospered for a long time. Therefore, there must
have been something within those societies that enabled them to maintain their internal
cohesion over an extended timeframe without constant use of direct force, something
engineering the support, something manufacturing the consent, something acting as
propaganda. It is then the purpose of this enterprise to make an incursion into a particular
ancient society to locate this “something” and to ascertain its modus operandi.
Shortly on methodology and structure
For the aim outlined above a specific ancient state has been selected, that being the
Ancient Egypt. To focalize further the research, the selection has been narrowed to specific
period in Ancient Egyptian history, the New Kingdom, and to a specific event of that time, the
Battle of Kadesh, to serve as a case study. The reason for such choice is that said battle
represents a moment of crisis for Ancient Egypt, and it is plausible to state that in general the
propaganda apparatus manifests itself most vividly in a time of crisis as it puts the status quo
under pressure, thereby making the consent manufacturing machine to act in a more
pronounced manner to maintain the status quo intact.
The body of the essay following this methodological overview is structured as follows:
first main section (third in the overall essay) focuses on the historical context of the
protagonists of the Battle of Kadesh, the Ancient Egypt and the Hittite Empire. The second
main section then reconstructs the battle itself according to available archeological findings.
The third main section is devoted to the analysis of the representations of the battle in Ancient
Egyptian cultural artifacts, specifically literature and imagery that arguably provide a spin
version of the incident. The fourth main section then links this analysis to the Ancient
Egyptian state dogma as well as it discusses the media abilities of the Pharaoh state for
dissemination of this dogma. The final fifth main section attempts to ascertain by taking into

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account the principles of propaganda whether it is truly possible to speak of this phenomenon
in this specific environment.
The historical framework
The need to establish the historical context is obvious. The key event in our case is the
Battle of Kadesh that occurred in the year 1285 B.C. and meant a collision of two ancient
superpowers – Egypt and the Hittite empire (Vachala, 60-1). The centuries preceding this year
were quite troubling for the Pharaoh state. In the 17th
century B.C. the existence of the second
centralized state in Egypt, known as the Middle Kingdom, was abruptly terminated by
invasion of Semitic tribes from Asia Minor, called the Hyksos, who managed to defeat the
Egyptian armies, mainly due to their usage of war chariots that were as a weapon at that time
unknown to the Egyptians, and occupy the Nile delta region (Verner et al., 46-7). The Hyksos
settled in the conquered land, adopted some elements of the Egyptian culture and established
their own ruling dynasty. Their reign over the Lower Egypt, which was the Egyptian
designation for the Nile delta region, lasted for about a century. In approx. 1540 B.C. the anti-
Hyksos resistance had strength sufficient enough to allow Pharaoh Ahmose to finally
reconquer the delta, thereby banishing the Hyksos and unifying the land once again (ibid).
This action meant in consequence the establishment of the third centralized state on Egyptian
soil, named the New Kingdom.
Though united and stretching from Sinai Peninsula to Nubia, internally the re-
established state was not in a perfect shape. Another seat of power was emerging to the
already existing one symbolized by the Pharaoh. It was forming in the city of Veset, known
also as Thebes, among the ranks of the priesthood of the god Amon. During the Hyksos
occupation, Veset was the birthplace of anti-Hyksos movement and it was its rulers that
waged the campaign against the invaders culminating in Ahmose’s triumph (ibid). Since
Amon was the patron deity of this city, the victory over Hyksos was attributed to his divine

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aid. Consequently, to honor his intervention, Amon was established as the chief deity of the
new state, which in turn made his priesthood to significantly rise in power and influence. Thus
it was that the Pharaohs ruling after Ahmose on hand managed to enlarge Egypt’s territory
through foreign expansion and internally initiate significant economic prosperity, but on the
other hand had to cope with this growing power division that eventually reached a point in
which the Amon priesthood directly contested the Pharaoh for power (ibid, 48-50). When
Amenhotep IV became king he decided to combat this alarming interior development by
initiating a vast religious reform designed to inhibit the ambitions of Amon’s priests. He
denounced the entire pantheon of Egyptian deities and installed a single universal deity named
Aton, the Solar Disc. Amenhotep then proclaimed himself to be the only son of Aton, sole
harbinger of his will, and sole mediator between the god and the people (ibid, 50-4). Though
this one and only Egyptian experiment with monotheism did succeeded in negating the Amon
cult’s rise to power, it did not vanquished the cult as such, and furthermore it did not outlast
its architect. When Amenhotep was succeeded by his son-in-law Tutanchamon, the
suppressed cult of Amon returned with full force, and as the new king was very young, the
High Priest named Aje in fact ruled in his stead (ibid, 54-5). This then became official after
Tutanchamon’s premature death at the age of 20. Aje however had no heir to succeed him, so
at the end of his life, he passed the kingship to his closest ally, Haremheb, chief commander
of Egyptian armies. His reign completed the destruction of Aton’s monotheistic cult, yet the
ruler himself again had no one from his own bloodline to succeed him on the throne.
Haremheb thereby appointed his loyal officer Paramesse as the new king, who then was
enthroned as Ramesse I, founder of the 19th
dynasty (ibid).
The advent of Ramesse I on the Egyptian throne marks the beginning of the terminal
golden age of Egyptian civilization, referred to by the historians as the Ramessean Era. The
most notable of the 19th
dynasty kings was the grandson of Ramesse I, named Vesermaatre
Setepenre Ramesse Meriamon, or shortly Ramesse II, who ruled Egypt for 67 years (ibid, 56).

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As his name suggests, Ramesse II belonged to the cult of the sun god Re, yet at the advent of
his reign he issued a decree confirming the unique position and privileges of the powerful
Amon cult, presumably to keep them satisfied. Through such political maneuvering he
thereby managed to secure his position as a king. His rule also witnessed a vast construction
boom that enriched Egypt of many pieces of monumental architecture, such as the mountain
temple of Abu Simbel near Aswan, the mortuary temple called Ramesseum in western Veset,
or a new cosmopolitan capital city of Per Ramesse in eastern Nile delta (ibid). On the
international stage, Ramesse inherited the task of dealing with the Hittite presence expanding
to Syria where it was colliding with Egyptian interests. Syria was conquered by Egyptian
armies during the reign of Tuthmose III, then lost during the rule of Amenhotep IV, and then
partially reclaimed by Sethi I, father of Ramesse II. It was Ramesse who decided to resolve
this international issue once and for all, thus after gathering the full might of his forces, in
1285 B.C. he marched to Aleppo in northern Syria to conquer the Hittite stronghold in this
region Kadesh and add definitively the surrounding lands to Egypt (Vachala, 59).
The civilization that collided with Egypt at Kadesh was the Hittite empire – a nation
of Indo-European origin that settled in Asia Minor, in the territory of present day Turkey, in
several waves between 3rd
and 2nd
millennium B.C. (Zamarovský, 133). This ancient nation
remains till today somewhat an enigma of the ancient history. Their arrival in Asia Minor is
indeed very much clouded by the mists of antiquity, so it is impossible to say with certainty
from where the Hittites originally came. In a short time compared with other great
civilizations in the region, the Hittites managed to create a vast empire stretching at its peak
from Smyrna (Izmir) in the west to present day Georgia and Armenia in the east, and from
Damascus in the south to Black Sea coast in the north (ibid, 35). Then in 13th
century B.C.,
approximately 85 years after the Battle of Kadesh, the Hittite state was completely obliterated
by a sudden invasion of so-called Sea Nations, who ravaged the region comprising Asia
Minor, Syro-Palestine and Egypt, and then basically disappeared. Since then, the Hittite

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empire was forgotten, lost in the abyss of history, until it was gradually rediscovered in pre-
World War I period. A very significant impulse boosting the interest in this ancient nation
was the deciphering of the Hittite language by the Czech archeologist Bedřich Hrozný around
1915 (ibid, 82).
So what is known about the Hittites? As was mentioned above, nothing certain about
their origin. We do know however, that upon their arrival in Asia Minor, the organized Hittite
tribes subjugated the native inhabitants, called Chattij or proto-Hittites, and established
several city states across the region, with most important ones being Néšaš, Zalpa and Kuššar
(ibid, 134). Shortly after, these cities began to struggle among themselves for power. Around
1800 B.C. the ruler of the Hittite city state Kuššar, named Anittaš, managed to defeat the rival
cities and becomes the first Hittite king. Néšaš becomes the new capital of the unified realm,
but after the death of Anittaš, the title of the first city is transferred by his successors to
Chattušaš which originally the most important settlement of the native Chattij tribe (ibid,
135). The true completion of the unification of the land is achieved around 1670 B.C. and
marks the reign of the High King Tabarnaš I, who is considered to be the founder of what
became the Hittite empire. It is interesting to note that his name latter became the title of
Hittite kings just as the name Caesar became latter the title of Roman emperors. Internal
structure-wise and system of governance-wise, the Hittite states was rather unusual compared
to the remaining civilizations in the region that were highly centralized despotisms – it was a
federation, a collection of autonomous city states, whose supreme ruler had his power limited
by two state institutions, tulia, which was a council composed of king’s sons, other blood
related relatives and members of the aristocracy, and pankuf that was a forum of military
officers and commanders (ibid, 136). When Tabarnaš was succeeded by his son Chattušiliš I
the Hittites turned their attention outwards to neighboring territories, thus beginning a period
of expansion, during which, in 1670 B.C., the Hittite armies conquered Northern Syria and
Northern Mesopotamia. The next king in line, Muršiliš I, went even further and his

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expansionist campaign was crowned by a colossal achievement in form of conquest of the
great city of Babylon (ibid, 142-3). Muršiliš however did not add Babylon to the Hittite state,
merely pillaged the city and returned home with hefty booty. As every civilization has its
troubled periods of decline, the Hittite one was no exception. Shortly after his return, Muršiliš
was assassinated during a palace conspiracy regarding the question of the succession to the
throne (ibid). His death thereby initiated a time of internal power struggle between the Hittite
royals over power and kingship, as well as of external invasions of neighboring tribes that
used this internal weakness of the Hittite state to their advantage.
The situation began to reverse by 1375 B.C. when Šuppiluliumaš I overthrew his
brother and became the new king (ibid, 144). He managed to drive back the foreign invaders
and in counteroffensive capture the Mitanni Empire. His archives also reveal a singular rarity
related to Ancient Egypt. The contemporary of Šuppiluliumaš on the Egyptian throne was
Tutanchamon, and when he died in his youth, his young widow wrote a letter to the Hittite
king and asked him to give her one of his sons as a new husband. Though Šuppiluliumaš was
initially skeptic of this undertaking, he was eventually persuaded by the young Egyptian
queen and agreed (ibid, 144-5) His son however never reached Egypt. He was murdered by
Egyptians, presumably on the order of the High Priest Aje, who would otherwise loose his
position as a ruler, along the way. In 1334 B.C. Muršiliš II becomes the new Hittite king. The
state under his reign is once again internally united and strong. Internationally, his reign
represents the moment from which Egyptian and Hittite interests began to collide in Syria.
This tension culminated during the reign of his son Mutavalliš, who met Ramesse II at the
Battle of Kadesh in 1285 B.C.
Battleground Kadesh
Before delving into how the battle was afterwards presented by the Egyptian side, it is
perfectly apt to present somewhat realistic account of this engagement, which is being

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regarded by historians as one of the greatest battles of ancient history. I say somewhat
realistic account, as it is of course impossible to reconstruct the battle as it really occurred.
The whole thing happened over 3 000 years ago and therefore all the eyewitnesses and direct
participants are most certainly all dead. The reconstruction has to thereby rely on available
archeological findings and on cross-referencing of Egyptian and Hittite records of the battle,
where one can be very much sure that neither account is entirely accurate and reliable. In fact,
the Egyptian texts present a distorted and exaggerated version of events, as will be shown
latter on. The truth must therefore be searched for somewhere in between. The following
reenactment of the Battle of Kadesh is what I would call history’s best guess thus far as to
what really happened there.
The battle itself took place towards the end of May 1285 B.C. at the gates of the
Hittite fortress of Kadesh at the Orontes River in western Syria (Vachala, 60). Today, it is the
site of the Syrian city of Tell Nabí Mend, which lies approx. 180 km north of Damascus. Each
side had roughly 20 000 men divided between war chariots and infantry. The attacker here
was Ramesse II, who as mentioned before wanted to block the Hittite expansion into Syria.
His forces were organized into four armies, each named after a specific Egyptian god –
Amon, Re, Ptah and Sutech, and one support unit (ibid). During the march towards the
battlefield, the Amon’s army led by the Pharaoh himself was in the lead, Re’s, Ptah’s and
Sutech’s armies followed in this order in various distances behind. With the Hittite fortress in
sight, Amon’s army encountered two Bedouins, who claimed on behalf of their tribal
chieftains, when brought before the Pharaoh, that their tribes are fed up with the Hittite rule
and wish to join the Egyptians. They also disclosed that the Hittite army is not waiting at
Kadesh but further north as the Hittite king Mutavalliš was seemingly afraid to face Ramesse
in combat (ibid, 61). Acting on this information, Ramesse ordered his army to stop and build a
camp. He intended to wait for the rest of his forces to arrive before launching the attack on the
fortress. In the meantime, Egyptian scouts operating in the area managed to capture two

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Hittite scouts, who upon being interrogated revealed that the Hittite army is actually hiding
just behind the Kadesh fortress. The two Bedouins encountered earlier were in fact Hittite
agents sent to misinform the Egyptians (ibid, 62). It was a trick that Ramesse, presumably to
Mutavalliš’s delight, swallowed.
Ramesse did not have much time to rectify his mistake, as the Hittites suddenly
charged against the Egyptians. Their first target was the Re’s army that was arriving at the
battlefield from the west unaware of the situation and therefore unprepared to fight. With a
sudden Hittite ambush, the Egyptian troops were quickly overwhelmed and the bulk of them
decimated. The surviving troops, chased by Hittite war chariots, were fleeing towards the
encampment that was being built by the soldiers of the Amon’s army in the northern part of
the battlefield (ibid). The Hittites took advantage of the chaos and rode straight into the camp
and began to decimate Amon’s troops as well. Very soon, the Pharaoh was left with only a
handful of his troops to defend his very life. Before the Egyptian defeat could have been
sealed, a proverbial twist of the fate occurred – the Egyptian support unit appeared on the
battlefield and attacked the Hittites from the rear (ibid, 64). Their war chariots were then
suddenly caught between the surviving troops from Amon’s and Re’s armies on one side and
Egyptian reinforcements on the other, and began to retreat towards the Orontes River. For
whatever reason, Mutavalliš did not send any reserves to reinforce his army in the field,
whose fate was thereby sealed as the Egyptian Ptah’s army also arrived and joined the fight
(ibid).
The first act of the battle was concluded in Egyptians’ favor though initially it did not
seem so in the slightest. In the evening, the Egyptian forces were finally joined by the
remaining Sutech’s army that was significantly delayed on its way (ibid, 65). It is rather ironic
that the army marching under the banner of the Egyptian god of war was too far behind to
take part in the battle. With his forces finally consolidated, Ramesse opened the second act of
the confrontation by charging the next day against the battlements of Kadesh itself.

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Mutavalliš, who still had almost full infantry complement, managed to repel the attacked, but
did not go into counteroffensive as his war chariots were almost all destroyed the previous
day (ibid). At this point, both sides reached an impasse. The Egyptians had insufficient force
to take the fortress; the Hittites had sufficient force to defend it, but not to defeat the
Egyptians. As a way out of such mess, the Hittite king turned to diplomacy. He proposed a
ceasefire as well as retention of the territorial status quo that kept Kadesh and the adjacent
lands under Hittite control (ibid, 66). Ramesse eventually accepted the terms, very reluctantly
I would guess, and the Egyptian forces returned home.
What followed was very tensed years. Shortly after the battle, Hittites managed to
regain initiative and drove the Egyptians away from Syrian territory. In 1283 B.C. Ramesse
reacted by launching another campaign that reestablished Egyptian control over the Southern
Syria (ibid, 67-9). The Hittite empire did not mount any reaction as it was internally troubled
by a dynastic crisis after the death of Mutavalliš. To make matters worse for the Hittites, the
following decade witnessed a sharp increase of Assyria which began to execute its territorial
ambitions at the Hittite expense (ibid, 76). Given the gravity of the situation, the new Hittite
king Chattušiliš III initiated extensive diplomatic negotiations with Ramesse II regarding
lasting peace and alliance. His initiative was indeed successful and in 1270 B.C. Egypt and
the Hittite empire signed a peace treaty of friendship and mutual assistance that was never
broken by either side. The aftermath of this document witnessed an intense contact between
the two nations, Ramesse’s marriage to two Hittite princesses, and the official visit of
Chattušiliš in Egypt (ibid, 86-8).
Spinning history
From a purely military standpoint, the Battle of Kadesh meant somewhat success for
the Egyptians as they managed to avoid crushing defeat and inflict heavy casualties upon the
Hittites. From a general, say political and national, perspective, the skirmish was an Egyptian

12. Šmejkal 12
debacle. Not only Ramesse failed to conquer the Kadesh fortress and the surrounding
territories, but he also failed to definitely secure Syria for Egypt, which was the main
objective of this campaign. So what to do then with such a failure? Two options come to
mind, either a) deny everything, totally downplay the whole incident, burry it quietly and
pretend nothing really happened, or b) spin it, turn it around, alter the reality of the matter in
question. Based on the archeological evidence, Ramesse opted for the second choice. He did
not try to hide the battle away, quite the contrary; he intensified this event and made it the
very milestone of his rule. Images from the battle were included into the decoration of
virtually every monument that was built during his reign. Furthermore, the account of the
battle was incorporated into the body of Egyptian literature in a form of a poem. As was
already hinted in the previous section, each of these cultural artifacts depicts the battle, but not
quite as it happened, compared to our history’s best guess. Therefore, we are dealing here
with an altered account of the events that borders in my opinion propaganda, in case of the
poem, and direct disinformation, in case of the imagery.
Why can the poem be regarded as a propaganda discourse? Firstly, propaganda in
general deals with the truth, but not the whole truth (Propaganda…). Likewise, the poem deals
with what really happened at Kadesh, of course as far as history can tell, but spins it to create
a more favorable image of the Egyptian involvement. Secondly, any propaganda piece has the
following tripartite structure: the situation, the crisis and the solution (ibid). Likewise, the
poem can be divided into such segments – with situation being the opening passages about the
preparations for the battle, the crisis being the Hittite ambush and the destruction of almost a
half of the Egyptian forces, and finally the solution being bravery of the Pharaoh and the
divine aid of the god Amon that save what appears to be a lost battle. Thirdly, any propaganda
piece employs various techniques that shape the message to achieve the desired effect (ibid).
Likewise, within the poem text itself, a number of said rhetorical devices can be spotted. The

13. Šmejkal 13
text contains a high concentration of assertions that are in essence the basic propaganda
technique. Consider the following excerpts1
:
His majesty was a youthful lord,
Active and without his like…
Hailed when his beauty is seen;
Victorious over all lands…
A thousand men cannot withstand him…
Like a wild lion in a valley of goats.
Who goes forth in valour, returns in triumph…
Firm in conduct, good in planning,
Whose first response is ever right.
Then his majesty drove at a gallop and charged the forces of the Foe from Khatti, being alone by
himself, none other with him…
And the wretched Chief of Khatti stood among his troops and chariots,
Watching his majesty fight all alone,
Without his soldiers and charioteers,
Stood turning, shrinking, afraid…
Assertion in propaganda discourse is defined as a statement that cannot be proven wrong
and/or does not have to be proven right (ibid). The verses above match that definition. Only
someone in regular contact with the Pharaoh could ascertain whether his description in the
text fits the reality, though such could mostly limit him or herself to assess the surface
appearance and even then such appearance could be deceiving. Simply put, the receiver has
no way to confirm or deny the truthfulness of these statements. Furthermore, in the Egyptian
context there is no need to do so, as the king is not the subject of doubts. The second excerpt
regarding Pharaoh’s actions in the actual battle is also impossible to disproof. Only someone
1
Note: all quotations of the poem are cited - “The Battle of Kadesh – the poem.” Egypt – Land of Eternity.
2008. Mar. 2009. <http://ib205.tripod.com/kadesh_poem.html>.

14. Šmejkal 14
directly participating in combat could tell what Ramesse did or did not, yet that someone
would more likely have his hands full with fighting and would not have the time to observe
Pharaoh’s actions, and again there is actually no need to provide evidence given the king’s
status. Regarding the final excerpt, only the Hittite king himself could contradict his alleged
mental state during the battle and he obviously cannot do so. Furthermore, the previous verses
detail the brave actions of the lone Pharaoh on the battlefield, thus given the preceding
content of the poem it seem only “logical” that when Mutavalliš is confronted with Ramesse
slaying single-handedly his armies, he gets afraid. No further evidence is thereby necessary,
and in addition this passage hints another propaganda technique, false logic. These excerpts
moreover enable us to detect yet another instrument, the virtue words, that is, words designed
to invoke specific connotations in the receiver (ibid). Words like “valor”, “triumph”, or
“majesty” all serve to communicate a very positive image of the Egyptian side, especially the
Pharaoh who is the main focus of the text. This technique is not the only one operating in the
text when it comes to orchestrate the perception of either side in this conflict. As the Egyptian
side is extolled, the Hittite side is consequently demonized:
Now the vile Foe from Khatti had come and brought together all the foreign lands as far as the end of
the sea…
They covered the mountains and valleys and were like locusts in their multitude. He had left no silver in
his land. He had stripped it of all its possessions and had given them to all the foreign countries in order
to bring them with him to fight.
Now the vile Chief of Khatti stood in the midst of the army that was with him and did not come out to
fight for fear of his majesty, though he had caused men and horses to come in very great numbers like
the sand and they had been made to stand concealed behind the town of Kadesh.
What are these Asiatics to you, O Amun,
The wretches ignorant of god?

15. Šmejkal 15
The intent here is clear – to present the Hittite forces and their king in a very hostile manner.
Twin propaganda techniques are operating here, the presenting the other side and name-
calling, both designed to shape the perception of the opposition in the desired manner (ibid).
By referring to the Hittites as “wretched” or “vile”, it is implied that these are not indeed nice
and friendly people. Their label of “Asiatics” further alienates the Hittites as it suggests that
they are not indigenous to the land. To keep the tone of the text, they are intruders from
somewhere else, mere newcomers, who are trying to take something which is not inherently
theirs. Worse, they are “ignorant of god”, which connotes their infidelity. In other words, they
lack the transcendental guidance and protection the Egyptians enjoy. In addition, the Hittites
are compared to “locusts” in their numbers, and as it is known by common sense, the swarms
of locusts are a disaster that consumes what comes before it leaving only desolation behind.
Quite a dreadful depiction indeed; as for the Hittite king, he is no better off so to speak. As the
text states, he plundered his own land, extracted all wealth from it so that he could raise his
army. This assertion directly questions his abilities as a king. After all, what king would
destroy his lands to muster a fighting force? Only a mad or desperate one I would say.
Throughout the text, Mutavalliš is furthermore constantly referred to as “Chief”, which
inevitably diminishes his authority and significance. There is an abysmal difference between
the titles “king” and “chief”. King is usually someone, who has a great deal of respect and
power, controls vast territories, is the master of many subjects and holds prestige among other
rulers. Chief on the other hand is of lesser rank; this title is applicable more on a tribal level
rather than referring to an actual head of state. Thus, the poem disproportionates the leaders of
the opposing sides – chief against king. Who is more likely to win? By common sense the
king, as he is attributed with more power. As the poem asserts, power is something Ramesse
has plenty of, even alone surrounded by enemies:
No officer was with me, no charioteer,
No soldier of the army, no shield-bearer;

16. Šmejkal 16
My infantry, my chariotry yielded before them,
Not one of them stood firm to fight with them.
His majesty spoke: "What is this, father Amun?
Is it right for a father to ignore his son?
Are my deeds a matter for you to ignore?
Have I not made for you many great monuments,
Filled your temple with my booty…
Given you all my wealth as endowment?
I brought you all lands to supply your altars,
I sacrificed to you ten thousands of cattle…
I call to you, my father Amun,
I am among a host of strangers;
All countries are arrayed against me,
I am alone, there's none with me!
My numerous troops have deserted me…
Now though I prayed in the distant land,
My voice resounded in Southern On.
I found Amun came when I called to him,
He gave me his hand and I rejoiced.
He called from behind as if near by:
"Forward, I am with you,
I, your father, my hand is with you,
I prevail over a hundred thousand men,
I am lord of victory, lover of valor!"
All I did succeeded…
I shot on my right, grasped with my left,
I was before them like Seth in his moment.
I found the mass of chariots in whose midst I was
Scattering before my horses;
Not one of them found his hand to fight,

17. Šmejkal 17
Their hearts failed in their bodies through fear of me…
I slaughtered among them at my will,
With the risk of sounding melodramatic, in the darkest moment when the enemy is upon him,
the Pharaoh invokes Amon’s presence on the battlefield, which empowers him to vanquish
the attackers all by himself. That is what the passage above is basically about. The technique
at stake here is the testimonial, that is, a transposition of some greater authority to reinforce
the subject of the propaganda message (ibid). In the case of the preceding verses, we have
somewhat a double testimonial: a) Ramesse asserting his deeds of devotion, and b) Amon
granting the Pharaoh his assistance. The first testimonial transfers the authority of Amon’s
chief standing in the New Kingdom to back up his plea for aid. If actions speak louder than
words, then by recounting the deeds of worship of Amon, Ramesse in a sense increases his
chances as a petitioner for the divine intervention. He is not asking merely as a king, but
rather as a king who is devoted to Amon. It is then again quite “logical” that Amon grants his
powers to the one who so dutifully worships him. In reality this is not entirely true, as we
know that Ramesse had much greater preference for the sun god Re (Verner et al., 56). Why
Amon and not Re then? In my opinion, this is related to the power division between the
Pharaoh and the Amon priesthood, but we will get to this later. The second testimonial then
reinforces Ramesse’s triumph, and in turn Ramesse himself, with Amon’s divine authority. As
soon as Amon answers the Pharaoh’s plea, Ramesse essentially becomes Amon, as he then
vanquishes the enemy with ease. Amon’s presence makes the Egyptian “victory” more
believable, for Ramesse overpowering the Hittite forces by himself just like that would
presumably be too wild claim even for the Egyptian environment, even though he is a king
and therefore a living god, but with Amon behind him, that is a completely different story and
perfectly acceptable for the Ancient Egyptian mindset.
Throughout the text, simplification and repetition, another essential propaganda
techniques, are also at play. The poem does not provide minute by minute report on the battle

18. Šmejkal 18
situation, and understandably omits the fact that Ramesse was misled by Mutavalliš as to true
whereabouts of the Hittite army. It would no doubt be bad for the image if the Pharaoh
“whose first response is ever right” is fooled by the very first trick Mutavalliš pulls out of his
arsenal. As for the repetition, the poem on numerous occasions restates that the Pharaoh
defeated the enemy single-handedly after his troops fled. For example:
I am alone, there's none with me!
My numerous troops have deserted me…
I found the mass of chariots in whose midst I was
Scattering before my horses;
Not one of them found his hand to fight,
Their hearts failed in their bodies through fear of me…
Not deeds of man are these his doings,
They are of one who is unique,
Who fights a hundred thousand without soldiers and chariots,
Come quick, flee before him
Behold me victorious, me alone…
Therein in my opinion lie the prime emphasis and the purpose of the text – to perpetuate and
extol the notion that Ramesse won the battle by himself with Amon’s help, without the
support of his armies.
Leaving the poem aside for now, our focus shifts to the imagery related to the Battle of
Kadesh. Regarding those, it is more of a case of a direct disinformation as all the scenes
depicted are the scenes of Egyptian triumph. Searching for a scene that could be entitled “we
were fooled and screwed up initially” would be a search in vain. Consider the two following
examples:

19. Šmejkal 19
The first relief can be found in Ramesseum, the mortuary temple of Ramesse II, the second
one is from the Amon’s temple at Karnak. Both depict a different phase of the battle – the
former the charge against the fortress itself that occurred the second day of the fighting, the
latter the initial confrontation between the Egyptian and Hittite forces. Both relieves capture
the Egyptian army on the offensive. The Ramesseum image is a straightforward portrayal of
the Egyptian army storming the Kadesh battlements. We see a ladder against the wall, troops
running towards it, protecting themselves with their shields, defenders trying to repel the

20. Šmejkal 20
Egyptian force, and the Pharaoh amidst the front line. The horses that are the biggest object
on the image are towing his war chariot, the figure of the Pharaoh himself is unfortunately out
of the frame, but he is there. We can be sure because of the size of the horses. In the canon of
Egyptian figural art, size and significance went hand in hand. The bigger the figure is, then
the more important it is on the relief. Consequently, the biggest figures are the most
significant ones. This technique is called the hierarchic principle (Siliotti, 444-8). From the
Egyptian perspective, at the Battle of Kadesh the most important person was the Pharaoh, thus
he is then biggest figure in all related depictions, thereby easily identifiable. The second
image is a bit more interesting. We see the Pharaoh charging through the center of the image,
with enemies either dead around him or fleeing toward the fortress. On top, there is a line of
war chariots. Those above the Pharaoh are Hittite; those above the fortress are Egyptian. It is
possible to tell by the number of people inside the chariot. The Hittite chariots had three-man
crew, one acting as the driver, other as shield bearer, and the last one as archer or spear
thrower, whereas the Egyptian chariots were manned by only two soldiers, one driving it, the
other acting both as an attacker and a defender (Zamarovský, 161). Adding one extra man was
one of many innovations of war chariots by the Hittites, who used these war machines as a
backbone of their military. The Karnak relief apparently depicts the moment of the battle in
which the delayed Egyptian units arriving on the battlefield attacked the Hittite assault force
from its rear. That would explain why the positions of the Hittite and Egyptian chariots are
switched.
Generally speaking, the readability of the Kadesh imagery is very limited, very
narrow. The crisis presented in the poem is completely absent here, and the sole focus is on
the Egyptian victory. Indeed, should the battle be reconstructed only according to the
Egyptian relieves, it would be easy to mistakenly say that Battle of Kadesh seemed to be “no
big deal” for the Egyptians, which is obviously not the case. That is why these depictions are
to be regarded as operating more along the lines of disinformation. They present only a mere

21. Šmejkal 21
fraction of the truth, do not establish a sequence of events as the poem does, totally omit the
initial Hittite ambush and apprehend the battle as one big Egyptian triumph from start to
finish.
The nexus
Such distorted presentation was however in order for either cultural artifact to fit the
general framework of Egyptian state dogma. Ancient Egypt had indeed a very intricate state
philosophy, heavily interconnected with religion, mythology and cosmogony, altogether
creating a massive unified stream of communication conveying the essential existential
principles upon which the Egyptian society rested. It is then no wonder that given this close
bond between the state and the spiritual domain the Egyptian societal system is being at times
labeled as theocratic, which is not entirely accurate (Verner et al., 414). The primary source of
power in Egypt was the Pharaoh, who was not only the ruler, but he was also considered to be
a god living on earth. Furthermore, the state dogma postulated that the state itself was of
divine origin, architected by the gods themselves who appointed it a sacred mission (ibid).
The societal system was thereby understood as the divine order of things that had to be upheld
and protected as the elementary condition for existence and prosperity of the society as such.
Only in accordance with this order, called Ma’at in ancient Egyptian and personified by a
goddess of the same name, could an individual achieve a true happiness of being. The
Pharaoh, simultaneously god and man, was then the guarantee of the endurance of Ma’at, of
the prosperity of the society. He also guaranteed that the forces of evil and chaos would never
triumph, as it was the Egyptian belief that the world outside the borders was a domain of
chaos, of darkness, inhabited by demons, monsters and other malevolent forces, who
constantly strived to consume Egypt, the island of tranquility and sense (ibid). Accordingly,
the Egyptian cosmogony portrayed the creation of the world as an emergence of a creator
deity from corporeal chaos of primordial waters, who then spawned the physical reality. This

22. Šmejkal 22
initiation of existence had to be then constantly repeated through cult and ritual, and the
Pharaoh himself had to, in course of his reign, triumph over evil, build monuments more
splendid than those of his predecessors, and establish peace and prosperity for the people
greater than before (ibid). Only then, the Ma’at was secured and with it the very existence of
Egypt.
For this conception to spread and establish itself within the Egyptian mindset, it had to
be communicated on a mass scale. Of course, today’s mass media were unavailable at that
time, thus the state had to employ other means of mass communication it had at its disposal.
First and foremost is the language, primarily in its spoken form, since literacy in Ancient
Egypt was less than 1% in the total population (Davies, 33-5). On the other hand, Egyptians
had a very rich oral tradition encompassed mainly in hymnic poetry, such as “Hymn for Nile”,
songs and lyrics, such as the “Harpist’s Song”, fables, tales and short stories, like the “Tale of
the Two Brothers”, and finally theatre plays, such as “The Victory of god Hor” (Verner et al.,
177, 237, 355). All of these were part of the Egyptian folklore and widely circulates among
the masses. Though some of the oral genres had purely entertaining function, the majority
carried deeper symbolic content focusing primarily on delineating normal, therefore socially
acceptable, and abnormal, therefore socially punishable, behavior, as well as in some cases on
transmitting wider mythological and religious principles and concepts. Another significant
carriers of symbolic content were art and architecture, both being entirely state commissioned
with no private artistic consumption existing. The Egyptian art, be it painted or embossed, in
essence catalogued the life of the state, with depictions ranging from everyday life scenes,
over religious and mythological motifs, to politics and famous events in the history of Egypt
(Siliotti, 444-8). The Egyptian monumental architecture was designed to specifically embody
the Ma’at principle. Each monument was constructed in perfect mathematical and
architectural harmony to mimic the cosmic order and each with its practical function also
possessed a particular symbolic place within Ma’at – the tomb was an instrument for reaching

23. Šmejkal 23
afterlife; the temple was the residence of a deity and a place of cult; obelisk symbolized the
emergence of order from chaos at the beginning of time (Verner et al., 142-5). These
monuments that were the centerpieces of Egyptian cities (except the tombs of course) thereby
acted as physical beacons of Ma’at and a constant reminder for the commonplace Egyptians
of the grand design of things. The final prominent exponent of mass communication was the
religion and mythology. The myths, especially those regarding cosmogony and theogony,
were the prime interpretative instrument for apprehension and comprehension of the world
around. These were then constantly perpetuated within the religious cult, whose outward
manifestation towards the masses was the vast range of feasts and celebrations that occurred
at a fixed day of the year and were subjected to lunar calendar (ibid, 418-9). As an example
we can name two of the most significant feasts – the “Ipet”, which was a symbolic journey of
Amon from Karnak to Luxor and to Medinit Habu to make a ritual sacrifice to his ancestors;
and “Sed”, which was a royal jubilee, an anniversary of the Pharaoh’s reign over Egypt (ibid).
Through the prism of Ma’at, it is then no doubt that the record of the Battle of Kadesh
had to be altered and presented in a triumphant manner. A more realistic and therefore
unfavorable account of this whole enterprise would threaten to destabilize the whole doctrine.
Such thing in fact happened – three times in the course of Ancient Egyptian history, twice
before Ramesse became the Pharaoh. Those cases were the infamous Intermediary periods in
which the Ma’at dogma was so destabilized due to either internal or external causes, too wide
scaled for the doctrine to cope with them, that the state itself collapsed. To prevent frequent
repetition of this unfortunate phenomenon, the Egyptian ruling elite therefore had to spin and
control information to keep the empire intact and consequently to keep themselves in a
position of power. Ramesse as the Pharaoh was expected to be always triumphant over the
forces of evil, thus he could not present the skirmish at Kadesh as something else than his
victory. Should he deviated and told what really happened, he would risk loosing the public
support thereby weakening his position and opening doors for the relatively newly established

24. Šmejkal 24
priesthood opposition to once again seize power over the land. In this perspective, the
imagery and especially the poem commemorating the battle had a twofold purpose. Firstly to
communicate to the masses that the Pharaoh upheld his task as Ma’at guardian, therefore
reassuring their sense of existential security. A common Egyptian could have witnessed the
relieves on the monuments, but more likely listened to the poem which presumably, in
accordance with Egyptian tradition of poetry being primarily an oral genre, was recited in
public and then rested assured that everything is as it should be. No dark clouds on the
horizon, so to speak. Secondly, the poem in my opinion was fashioned to send a clear
message to priestly opposition about the unchallengeable position of the king. It would
explain the paramount emphasis on a) the Ramesse’s single-handed victory and b) that it was
Amon, the god whose will the opposition claimed to mediate, who granted Ramesse his
divine aid. The poem was written down, otherwise we would not have the text today, and
since the priests were all literate, they could have easily read it to find in the text from their
perspective a rather disturbing notion that the Pharaoh is in much closer contact with the deity
than they are – Amon descends on the battlefield upon Ramesses request, calls him his son,
and gives him his powers to vanquish an army that counts in tens of thousands:
Forward, I am with you,
I, your father, my hand is with you,
I prevail over a hundred thousand men,
I am lord of victory, lover of valor!
In light of this magnificent gift bestowed upon Ramesse, the priests could have thought that
should they perhaps challenged his reign, they could easily evoke Amon’s wrath. Of course,
this is purely a priori speculation. There is no way to be sure what the priesthood’s reaction
was, if there was any. Yet the fact remains, that Ramesse II ruled unchallenged for 67 years
till his death.

25. Šmejkal 25
Further inquiries and final remarks
Given our discussion thus far, is it then truly possible to regard the Egyptian state
dogmatic discourse, represented as an example in this case by mainly the Battle of Kadesh
poem, as propaganda? To attempt to answer this, let us correlate the basic propaganda
principles with the Egyptian state dogma and see what result we get. For the sake of clarity, it
is necessary to say that the Ma’at, the state dogma, can be identically regarded as the
dominant ideology, in terms of its principles, and as the dominant state discourse, in terms of
the way it shaped the Egyptian society. In other words, the Ma’at ideology is the basic
concepts and principles, the Ma’at discourse is then the perpetuation and application of those
within the Egyptian societal environment. Therefore, these two go hand in hand inseparably.
Onward to the correlation then:
1. To be informed – the propagandist must, obviously, know what is happening in order to
spin it, and he furthermore aims at educated people as much as possible as these are the
most proper audience for the propaganda message (Propaganda…). In Ancient Egypt,
literacy and education was solely a privilege of the elite, not of the masses. This however
does not mean that the bulk of the Egyptian population was entirely ignorant. Common
sensical wisdom was past from one generation to the next, especially in the environment
of Egyptian families, where the father always though his son or sons (remember that
Egypt was a highly patriarchic society) everything they needed to know for their lives and
for their occupation (Verner et al., 458). Apart the practical aspects necessary for earthly
being, this fatherly schooling presumably included a sketch of the grand design of things.
This way, the commonplace Egyptians were socialized into the Ma’at doctrine. However,
we cannot speak of any stable system of schools or any population-wide basic education.
The Egyptian elite was sufficiently informed to control information, yet the general public
had no means to gain any larger insight into matters beyond everyday business. Thus it is
possible to object that under such conditions the ruling class did not have to employ

26. Šmejkal 26
propaganda, they could simply tell people what to do and what to believe and they would
do so. This does not however explain more than fare share of public discontent Egypt
experienced in the course of its history. In fact, the fall of the Old Kingdom was entirely
due to internal cause, as the Ma’at doctrine basically failed. Thus, the masses were not
entirely mere ploys in the elite’s hands, but they were not that difficult to manipulate
either. This propaganda principle is therefore not entirely applicable in the Ancient
Egyptian environment.
2. Just one head – propaganda must have one recognizable symbol in its lead to be efficient
(Propaganda…). This principle is entirely applicable. The Ma’at doctrine had its
centerpiece, the Pharaoh, the guardian of the cosmic order.
3. Create a nexus – propaganda must function as a network and not to limit itself to isolated
cases (ibid). Again entirely applicable, as it was demonstrated that the Ma’at dogma was
virtually omnipresent in the Egyptian society, communicated heavily through culture and
personified by the state itself.
4. Stick to the truth as much as possible – partially applicable. The truth of the Ma’at itself
cannot be proven at all. Its foundation, being the divine origin of the state, is a purely
transcendental matter that precludes any possibility of obtaining empirical evidence that
would confirm or deny its essential claims. As for the presentation of events to fit this
dogmatic framework, it was shown that in some cases we are dealing with the truth but
spun, in others with pure disinformation.
5. Be able to use the strength of your adversary – applicable. The Ma’at doctrine operated
along the essential duality between the chaos and the order. Such dichotomy was however
highly disproportionate as the order was confined only to Egypt, whereas the chaos was
everywhere else. This overwhelming presence of this hostile force just outside the borders
then accentuated the high stature of the Pharaoh as he alone was required to keep the vast
sea of chaos at bay, and therefore must have “logically” possessed unique abilities to do

27. Šmejkal 27
so. In the specific case of the Battle of Kadesh poem, the strength of the Hittite army
serves to create a more impressive image of Ramesse’s victory, and the involvement of
Amon then takes the chief status of this deity established by the priesthood and assigns it
to the Pharaoh.
6. Be hidden – the best propaganda is the non-obvious one (Propaganda…). Not applicable
in the Egyptian environment, as the source of the perpetuation of Ma’at was crystal clear,
that being the state apparatus and the ruling elite. If Ma’at as a discourse is regarded as
propaganda, then it is the white propaganda in which the source is obvious.
7. Prestige and titles – propaganda frequently employs subjects or objects of prestige and
authority to reinforce the position of its message (ibid). Entirely applicable, as the core
principles of the Ma’at doctrine are vested with the divine authority of the gods as are its
immediate manifestations that are in some cases, the poem for instance, further reinforced
by the authority of the Pharaoh.
8. Timing – the efficient propaganda always releases the right thing at the right time (ibid).
Presumably applicable in this context; the presence of Ma’at in Egyptian society was
constant. The predetermined sequence of festivals and ceremonies structured in
accordance with the calendar then provided periodical new impulses for the perpetuation
of the doctrine. As for the specific presentation of significant events, it is highly plausible
to suggest that there was no extensive delay between the event itself and the discourse
reaction. The imagery from the Battle of Kadesh were incorporated into the décor of the
monuments constructed during Ramesse’s actual reign, not centuries latter. The poem
presumably also originated in this time, thought its exact date of creation is unknown.
9. Condition the reaction – in a very special environment, a specific propaganda stimulus
can condition a specific reaction (ibid). Though this principle is very problematically
achievable for today’s propaganda, it is theorizeable that in the ancient times this was
easier to accomplish. If Ma’at was promoting the belief in the divinity of the Egyptian

28. Šmejkal 28
state, as well as inducing the desired behavior among the masses, that is, worship of the
gods, participation in the rites and rituals, loyalty to the state and obedience to the
Pharaoh, then, given its omnipresence in Egyptian society and absence of other stimuli
negating it, for the most part it accomplished what it was communicating. I say for the
most part, as there were instances at which Ma’at was unable to cope with reality of the
situation, which then led to civil disturbances against the system. This final principle can
thereby be regarded as theoretically applicable in the Egyptian environment.
Quite a mixed picture emerged here. The Egyptian state dogmatic discourse fits some
principles entirely, other principles not at all, the rest either partially or hypothetically; no
definite answer then. Of course, if we account propaganda only by its modern standards, then
we cannot employ it here as we do not have a democratic society with informed electorate and
functioning Public Sphere. Still, there is a remarkable similarity between propaganda and this
Ancient Egyptian “something”. The analysis of a specific cultural artifact, the Battle of
Kadesh poem, revealed this text to possess a structure identical to a modern propaganda piece,
as well as to employ several modern propaganda techniques to shape the message in a desired
manner. Further analysis then indicated a larger dogmatic network orchestrating the state
discourse according its congruent ideological principles using mass reach carriers of the
symbolic content. Indeed, in some aspects very much alike to what we today label without
hesitation as a propaganda machine. Then again, rephrasing the point that opened this whole
discussion, anything modern has been preceded by something ancient. In this case then, we
may not call it propaganda, but rather mass indoctrination, proto-propaganda, or perhaps
archaic means of controlling the ancient public opinion. Whatever the name, the diachronic
connection between the old and the new is there.

29. Šmejkal 29
Work Cited
Davies, W. V. Egyptské hieroglyfy: čtení v minulosti. Trans. Hedvika Vlasová. Praha:
Volvox Globator, 2002.
“Propaganda and Information – course notes.” Anglo-American College. Spring 2009.
Siliotti, Alberto. Egypt: Chrámy, bohové a lidé. Trans. Naďa Benešová. Praha:
Rebo Productions CZ, 1994.
“The Battle of Kadesh – the poem.” Egypt – Land of Eternity. 2008. Mar. 2009.
<http://ib205.tripod.com/kadesh_poem.html>.
Vachala, Břetislav. Mír na Nilu. Praha: Makropulos, 1997.
Verner, Miroslav, Ladislav Bareš, and Břetislav Vachala. Ilustrovaná encyklopedie starého
Egypta. Praha: Univerzita Karlova, 1997.
Walton, Davies. “What is Propaganda, and what exactly is wrong with it.” Public Affairs
Quarterly. Vol. 11, Number 4, Oct. 1997.
Zamarovský, Vojtěch. Za tajemstvím říše Chetitů. Praha: Perfekt, 2006.