ECPR general conference 2020

1. Leavers versus
Remainers
Dr Paolo Chiocchetti
Centre for British Studies, Humboldt University of Berlin

2. SUMMARY
RESEARCH QUESTION contribution of Brexit to the realignment of British politics
DATA British Election Study (BES) Internet Panel (03.2014–12.2019, 19 waves)
 whole panel (N=97,006)
 persistent respondents to all waves (N=1,394)
METHODOLOGY descriptive statistics & calculation of flows
FINDINGS major impact of Brexit
 European issue becomes dominant (salience)
 formation of large and passionate Brexit identities
 Brexit-led realignment of parties
 Brexit-led realignment of voters
IMPLICATIONS extreme example of politicization of the transnational cleavage
sustained mobilization leads to realignment of parties and voters
transversal issue integrated over time in the left-right dimension

3. 1. INTRODUCTION

4. Theory
Spatial models of political competition
one-dimensional left/right (Downs 1957)
two-dimensional economic & cultural issues (Kitschelt 1988; Rovny & Edwards 2012)
multi-dimensional cleavages (Rokkan & Lipset 1967)
ideologies (Rokkan 1970; Seiler 1980; Wasner 2000)
issues (Meguid 2005; Wagner 2012; Meyer & Miller 2015)
Cleavages in European politics
structural 1. centre-periphery (Rokkan & Lipset 1967)
2. state-church (Rokkan & Lipset 1967)
3. land-industry (Rokkan & Lipset 1967)
4. owner-worker (Rokkan & Lipset 1967)
cultural 5. materialist-postmaterialist (Inglehart 1977)
6. libertarian-authoritarian (Kitschelt 1994; Hooge et al. 2002; Bornschier 2010;
Norris & Inglehart 2019)
unclear 7. transnational cleavage (globalization + Europeanization)
(Kriesi et al. 2006, 2008; Hooge & Marks 2009;
Hutter & Kriesi 2019)
other? (geography, religion, education, race/ethnicity/language, age, populism…)
(Ford & Jennings 2020)

5. Empirical developments
Western Europe
 politicization of European integration (Hooge & Marks 2009; Kriesi 2016)
 rise of Europhobic & Europhile attitudes
 growth of Eurosceptic parties (number, vote share)
 increase of referendums and protests on European issues
United Kingdom
 late joiner (1972) then “awkward partner” of the EU
 growth of right-wing Euroscepticism within the Conservative Party and outside of it (UKIP)
 in-out withdrawal referendum (2016), “Leave” wins (51.2%)
 political deadlock, polarization on Europe
 Johnson’s election victory (2019) and Brexit (2020)
Interest of the case study
 first withdrawal of a member state from the EU (unlike cancelled accessions or withdrawal of parts of a state)
 protracted and high-profile public discussion and mobilization around transnational issues (2015-20)
 excellent survey data covering the whole period and beyond (2014-19, panel data, recalled vote back to 2005)

6. 2. RESULTS

7. Figure 1. Most important issue facing the country
1. rise of the salience of the issue of Europe
 rise from marginal (3.5% in 2015) to dominant (56.7%) issue
 stays at the top until now (4 years)

8. Figure 2. Size and intensity of Brexit identities
2. rise of Brexit identities (Leavers vs. Remainers)
 widely held (tot: 89.6%)
 intensely held (strong: 47.5%)
 apparently stronger than party identifications!
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0.2
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0.6
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Mar-14
May-14
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Jan-15
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May-16
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Nov-18
Jan-19
Mar-19
May-19
Jul-19
Sep-19
Nov-19
Brexit identity (tot) Brexit identity (strong) Party identity (tot) Party identity (strong)

9. Figure 3. Affective polarization (March 2019)
3. affective polarization centred on Brexit identities
 positive in-group feelings (50.1%)
 negative out-group feelings (27.9%)
50.1%
27.9%
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
In-group positivity (6 items)
Out-group negativity (1 item)

10. 4. programmatic realignment of parties
 smaller parties embraced extreme Europhobic (UKIP/Brexit) and Europhile (Lib-Dem, SNP, Greens) positions
 Conservative Party forced to move from Remain (Cameron) to Leave (Johnson)
 Labour Party repeatedly wavered between the two options

11. Figure 4. How did 2016 Leavers and 2016 Remainers voted in general elections?
5. partisan realignment of voters
 Leavers shifted from an even spread to a clear Conservative vote
 Remainers shifted toward Labour, Lib-Dem, SNP and Greens
 the support for each party acquired a very clear Leaver or Remainer profile
People who voted Leave in the 2016 referendum
2005 2010 2015 2017 2019
REMAIN PARTIES 32.8 28.0 21.1 22.9 14.3
Labour 20.3 15.3 14.1 18.6 9.9
Lib-Dem 10.8 11.2 3.4 2.1 2.0
SNP 0.8 0.9 2.2 1.1 1.1
PC 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
Green 0.5 0.4 1.1 0.8 1.2
LEAVE PARTIES 34.7 40.6 56.2 54.0 55.3
Conservative 31.6 36.1 36.4 50.9 52.3
UKIP-BP 3.0 4.5 19.9 3.1 3.0
OTHER PARTIES 4.5 6.2 2.4 3.4 3.4
People who voted Remain in the 2016 referendum
2005 2010 2015 2017 2019
REMAIN PARTIES 45.8 48.9 52.7 62.5 65.7
Labour 25.4 25.1 33.3 46.2 40.3
Lib-Dem 17.9 21.0 9.0 10.1 16.6
SNP 1.1 1.4 5.1 3.9 5.1
PC 0.5 0.5 0.7 0.5 0.6
Green 0.9 0.9 4.7 1.9 3.1
LEAVE PARTIES 13.3 17.1 23.6 21.0 15.5
Conservative 13.1 16.8 22.7 20.9 15.3
UKIP-BP 0.2 0.3 1.0 0.1 0.1
OTHER PARTIES 2.1 2.0 2.5 2.0 2.3

12. Figure 5. Components of change, 2015-2019 (selected parties)
6. causes of this partisan realignment?
 electoral flows (incoherent voters exit, incoherent voters enter) or party cues (faithful voters adopt party stance)
 can be disentangled by looking at the change of behaviour of voters between the 2015 and the 2019 election (smaller panel)
 altogether, the two factors make a roughly similar contribution to the overall shifts
Conservative Party
Leave Remain Other
2015 voters 45.1 34.0 20.9
outflows
Core 50.5 29.1 20.4
change of mind
Changed core 78.0 16.3 5.7
inflows
2019 voters 84.0 11.5 4.5
Labour Party
Leave Remain Other
2015 voters 25.4 58.8 15.7
outflows
Core 18.4 66.1 15.5
change of mind
Changed core 13.9 79.2 6.9
inflows
2019 voters 14.7 78.6 6.7
Liberal Democrats
Leave Remain Other
2015 voters 17.6 60.2 22.2
outflows
Core 7.5 70.0 22.5
change of mind
Changed core 10.0 82.5 7.5
inflows
2019 voters 6.2 88.4 5.5

13. 3. IMPLICATIONS

14. extreme example of politicization of the transnational cleavage
 length (5 years) & intensity (1 referendum, 2 elections, media, participation)
 potential cleavage transformed into an actual one thanks to long-standing Euroscepticism, effective political
entrepreneurs (Farage, ERG, Johnson), a high-profile stage (2016 referendum), the convergence of diffuse
grievances, and the failure of Brexit negotiations
 emergence of strong and radicalized Brexit identities
sustained mobilization leads to realignment of voters and parties
 major shifts of voters and volatility
 opportunity for the breakthrough of new and minor parties (UKIP/Brexit, LibDem)
 major parties first tried to depoliticize the issue, then forced to embrace it
 threat to mainstream parties neutralized
transversal issue integrated over time in a one-dimensional left-right axis of competition
 the cleavage between Europhiles and Europhobes, initially partially transversal to the traditional axis of
competition, progressively tended to align with it (Left=Remain vs. Right=Leave)

15. Stay in touch
www.gbz.hu-berlin.de
scholar.google.at/citations?user=z1f8NnQAAAAJ&hl=en
twitter.com/p_chiocchetti
paolo.chiocchetti@hu-berlin.de
mail@paolochiocchetti.it