This document analyzes class voting patterns in Italian elections from 1987 to 2018. The author finds that class is no longer a strong predictor of voting behavior, with explained variation being medium-low and the direction of the class-party relationship often incorrect. Parties have shifted their class bases, with the left-wing PD becoming more upper-class oriented and the populist Five Star Movement behaving like a lower-class party. These findings have implications for theories of linear class-party associations and suggest the need for alternative conceptualizations of class coalitions in voting.

1. Class voting in Italy: a new
realignment?
Dr Paolo Chiocchetti
Postdoctoral Researcher
Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin
paolo.chiocchetti@hu-berlin.de

2. Outline
1. Introduction
2. Results: class voting in Italy, 1987-2018
3. Implications

3. The impact of class on political and voting behaviour is one of the classic
areas of political research
Lipset & Rokkan 1967; Bartolini 2000; Alford 1962; Manza & al. 1995; Evans 1999; Van der Waal & Achterberg 2007
The theory of class voting narrowly defined rests on two hypotheses:
1. societies are divided into hierarchical “social classes” which show differential patterns of
voting behaviour
e.g. relations of production (Marx, Rokkan), control over social resources (Weber), occupational categories (Erikson &
Goldthorpe 1992, Rose & Harrison 2010)
2. there is a coherent and stable class-party association: upper categories tend to support
right-wing parties, lower categories tend to support left-wing parties
Some problems (theoretical, methodological and empirical)
Empirical research on Italy: literature divided on the continued
relevance of class voting after 1992
Bellucci 2001; Ballarino et al 2009; Maraffi 2018
1. Introduction

4. Puzzle: who is right? I will revisit the empirical evidence to find
out
Data: Italian National Election Studies (ITANES) datasets for the
1987, 1996, 2006 and 2018 elections
intermediate elections to be filled in later, previous elections not entirely
Improved class scale based on relations of production (primary)
and occupational status (secondary)
1. self-employed (and employers)
2. cadres (and managers)
3. teachers
4. skilled employees
5. unskilled employees
6. manual workers
7. unemployed
 based on individual positions (inactive population excluded)

5. Testing
1.series of linear regressions for each party and year
coefficient of determination (R2): fitness of the model
regression coefficient (m): direction and strength of class voting
2. visual inspection of the class voting curve for each party and year
Expectations (ideal case)
0.0%
10.0%
20.0%
30.0%
40.0%
50.0%
60.0%
70.0%
80.0%
90.0%
100.0%
Self-employed
Cadre
Teacher
Skilledemployee
Unskilledemployee
Manualworker
Unemployed
Left-wing party
Right-wing party
Left-wing party
R2: 100% (perfect)
m: +11% (pos. &
str.)
Right-wing party
R2: 100%
(perfect)
m: -11% (neg. &
str.)

6. The empirical analysis does not confirm the importance of class voting in
Italy (except for 1987)
1. Medium-low explained variation (R2): model not very explanatory
2. Small strength of effect (m): effect of class scale on party vote small
3. Direction of effect frequently wrong!
2. Results
Election R2
(non directional)
m
(non directional)
correct
direction
1987 24.5 1.5 100.0
1996 29.4 0.8 41.9
2006 33.7 0.7 67.8
2018 36.0 1.0 40.1
WEIGHTED
AVERAGE
28.4 1.0 62.5
Table 1. Results by election (in %)

7. Party Type Avg.
share
R2 m
(normalize
d)
correct
direction
PCI (1) left 23.6 40.1 +16.7 100.0
PRC (3) left 4.7 25.7 +1.7 66.7
PD (3) left 18.3 22.7 -1.5 33.3
PSI (1) left 12.0 3.3 +3.3 100.0
PRI-PSDI-PLI-
DINI (2)
mixed 5.6 33.1 -11.4 (100.0)
OTHER (4) mixed 9.8 25.9 -6.7 (0.0)
POP (1) unclear 5.3 7.4 -6.3 (0.0)
DC (1) right 25.9 18.6 -4.1 100.0
UDC (2) right 5.2 57.3 -10.9 100.0
FI (3) right 14.5 4.7 -0.4 33.3
LN (3) right 8.4 2.1 -0.4 33.3
FdI (3) right 7.9 14.7 -4.9 100.0
M5S (1) - 23.1 80.5 +12.0 (100.0)
Abstention (4) - 20.1 55.2 +13.1 (100.0)
Table 2. Results by party (in %)

8. EXAMPLE 1: PD (left)
progressive shift from lower-class (PCI 1987) to upper-class
party (PD 2018)
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
Self-employed
Cadre
Teacher
Skilledemployee
Unskilledemployee
Manualworker
Unemployed
PCI 1987
PDS 1996
Ulivo 2006
PD 2018

9. EXAMPLE 2: FI (right)
does not behave like an upper-class party (U-shaped behaviour)
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
Self-employed
Cadre
Teacher
Skilledemployee
Unskilledemployee
Manualworker
Unemployed
FI 1987
FI 1996
FI 2006
FI 2018

10. EXAMPLE 3: FIVE STARS MOVEMENT (populist)
behaves like a lower-class party
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
Self-employed
Cadre
Teacher
Skilledemployee
Unskilledemployee
Manualworker
Unemployed
M5S 1987
M5S 1996
M5S 2006
M5S 2018

11. EXAMPLE 4: NON-VOTERS
behave like a lower-class party
0.0%
5.0%
10.0%
15.0%
20.0%
25.0%
30.0%
35.0%
40.0%
Self-employed
Cadre
Teacher
Skilledemployee
Unskilledemployee
Manualworker
Unemployed
Abstention 1987
Abstention 1996
Abstention 2006
Abstention 2018

12. More analysis needed on explaining the causes of these shifts
1) declining relative salience of class cleavage → probably
true, but cannot explain much in itself
2) occupational categories not reflecting class relations →
possible
3) changing class nature of Italian parties (ideology, policies,
organization…) → likely, see M5S in 2018
4) class-based coalitions are not linear → also likely
Serious implications for the theory of class voting
1) traditional class-party association (lower-class & left,
upper-class & right) cannot be assumed to be a valid
hypothesis
2) focus on contingent class coalitions rather than on a
dichotomy or scale
3) devise alternative measurements not based on
3. Implications

13. Stay in touch
www.gbz.hu-berlin.de
scholar.google.at/citations?user=z1f8NnQAAAAJ&hl=en
twitter.com/p_chiocchetti
paolo.chiocchetti@hu-berlin.de
mail@paolochiocchetti.it