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Securing	
  the	
  IIoT	
  with	
  DDS-­‐Security	
  
	
  
June	
  2015	
  
Gerardo	
  Pardo-­‐Castellote,	
  Ph.D.,	
  	
  
CTO,	
  Real-­‐Time	
  InnovaEons	
  (RTI)	
  
Co-­‐Chair	
  OMG	
  DDS	
  SIG	
  
www.rE.com	
  
The	
  Industrial	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  
Industrial	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  (IIoT)	
  Consumer	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  (CIoT)	
  
Cyber-­‐Physical	
  Systems	
  (CPS)	
  
The	
  Industrial	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  
Industrial	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  (IIoT)	
  Consumer	
  Internet	
  of	
  Things	
  (CIoT)	
  
Cyber-­‐Physical	
  Systems	
  (CPS)	
  
ARAMCO	
  
produces	
  13%	
  
of	
  world’s	
  oil	
  
Hardly	
  an	
  isolated	
  incident…	
  
•  2013:	
  	
  ASack	
  on	
  Pacific	
  Gas	
  &	
  Electric's	
  Metcalf	
  substaEon	
  
California.	
  
–  17	
  transformers	
  damaged.	
  Approx.	
  $15	
  Million	
  in	
  repairs	
  [1]	
  
•  2014:	
  Steel	
  Mill	
  aSack	
  in	
  Germany	
  
–  According	
  to	
  German	
  BSI	
  mill	
  suffered	
  "massive	
  damage”	
  	
  [2]	
  
•  2014:	
  Reports	
  of	
  79	
  Hacking	
  incidents	
  at	
  US	
  Energy	
  companies	
  
[3]	
  
•  2018:	
  	
  Worldwide	
  spending	
  on	
  cyber	
  security	
  for	
  oil	
  and	
  gas	
  
DDS-Use Cases
PracEcal	
  ConnecEvity	
  Requires	
  NormalizaEon	
  
©	
  Duke	
  Energy	
  Co.	
  hSp://www.duke-­‐energy.com/pdfs/DEDistributedIntelligencePlalormVol01.pdf	
  
©	
  2014	
  RTI	
  
©	
  Duke	
  Energy	
  Co.	
  
DocBox	
  and	
  Integrated	
  Clinical	
  Environment	
  
(ICE)	
  Standard	
  
•  Hospital	
  error	
  is	
  
the	
  6th	
  leading	
  
cause	
  of	
  
preventable	
  
death	
  
•  DocBox	
  integrates	
  
devices	
  to	
  
improve	
  paEent	
  
safety	
  
Unite	
  Real-­‐Time,	
  Mobile,	
  and	
  Cloud	
  
•  Largest	
  EMS	
  
equipment	
  provider	
  
supplies	
  ER	
  equipment	
  	
  
to	
  60%	
  of	
  the	
  world’s	
  
emergency	
  vehicles	
  
•  Uses	
  DDS	
  for	
  in-­‐
vehicle	
  plalorm,	
  
mobile	
  device	
  bus,	
  
cloud	
  connecEvity	
  
Power	
  CriEcal	
  Infrastructure	
  (GC	
  Dam)	
  
•  DDS	
  controls	
  the	
  6.8	
  GW	
  GC	
  Dam	
  
–  Largest	
  power	
  plant	
  in	
  North	
  America	
  
–  Fastest-­‐responding	
  major	
  power	
  
source	
  on	
  the	
  Western	
  Grid	
  
–  Requires	
  24x7	
  operaEon	
  
•  DDS	
  met	
  the	
  challenges	
  
–  Extreme	
  availability	
  
–  Wide	
  area	
  communicaEons	
  
–  MulE-­‐level	
  rouEng	
  
–  High	
  security	
  
–  300k	
  data	
  values	
  
Siemens	
  Wind	
  Power	
  turbine	
  control	
  
•  Siemens	
  Wind	
  Power	
  
fields	
  farms	
  of	
  500	
  
turbines	
  with	
  100m	
  
blades	
  
•  DDS	
  implements	
  fast	
  
control	
  within	
  turbines	
  
and	
  gust	
  control	
  across	
  
the	
  array	
  
•  DDS	
  enables	
  distributed	
  
intelligent	
  machines	
  	
  
DDS-Security
DDS:	
  Data-­‐Centric	
  Qos-­‐Aware	
  Pub-­‐Sub	
  Model	
  
Persistence	
  
Service	
  
Recording	
  
Service	
  
Virtual,	
  decentralized	
  global	
  data	
  space	
  
CRUD	
  operaEons	
  
Source
(Key)
Speed Power Phase
WPT1 37.4 122.0 -12.20
WPT2 10.7 74.0 -12.23
WPTN 50.2 150.07 -11.98
Is	
  there	
  a	
  Conflict?	
  
•  PubSub/DDS	
  
– Create	
  a	
  ‘global	
  data	
  space’	
  where	
  informaEon	
  is	
  
shared	
  
– Publishers	
  are	
  unaware	
  of	
  subscribers	
  and	
  vice-­‐versa	
  
•  Security…	
  
– Share	
  informaEon	
  only	
  with	
  authorized	
  subjects	
  
– Requires	
  IdenEfying	
  who	
  produces	
  and	
  consumes	
  the	
  
informaEon	
  and	
  cryptographic	
  protecEon	
  of	
  the	
  data.	
  
16	
  
A CONFLICT?
Is	
  there	
  a	
  Conflict?	
  
•  PubSub/DDS	
  
– Create	
  a	
  ‘global	
  data	
  space’	
  where	
  informaEon	
  is	
  
shared	
  
– Publishers	
  are	
  unaware	
  of	
  subscribers	
  and	
  vice-­‐versa	
  
•  Security…	
  
– Share	
  informaEon	
  only	
  with	
  authorized	
  subjects	
  
– Requires	
  IdenEfying	
  who	
  produces	
  and	
  consumes	
  the	
  
informaEon	
  and	
  cryptographic	
  protecEon	
  of	
  the	
  data.	
  
17	
  
NO CONFLICT: Must Use
Data-Centric Security Model!
Boundaries	
  at	
  which	
  security	
  should	
  be	
  applied	
  
•  System	
  Boundary	
  
•  Network	
  Transport	
  
–  Media	
  access	
  (layer	
  2)	
  
–  Network	
  (layer	
  3)	
  security	
  
–  Session/Endpoint	
  (layer	
  4/5)	
  security	
  
•  Host	
  
–  Machine/OS/ApplicaEons/Files	
  
•  Data	
  &	
  InformaEon	
  flows	
  
Ul#mately	
  all	
  need	
  to	
  be	
  implemented	
  
This	
  is	
  addressed	
  by	
  DDS	
  Security	
  
Threats	
  
1.  Unauthorized	
  subscripEon	
  
2.  Unauthorized	
  publicaEon	
  
3.  Tampering	
  and	
  replay	
  	
  
4.  Unauthorized	
  access	
  to	
  data	
  by	
  
infrastructure	
  services	
  	
  
6/25/15	
  ©	
  2012	
  Real-­‐Time	
  InnovaEons,	
  Inc.	
  	
  -­‐	
  	
  All	
  rights	
  reserved	
   19	
  
Alice:	
  Allowed	
  to	
  publish	
  topic	
  T	
  
Bob:	
  Allowed	
  to	
  subscribe	
  to	
  topic	
  T	
  
Eve:	
  Non-­‐authorized	
  eavesdropper	
  	
  
Trudy:	
  Intruder	
  
Trent:	
  Trusted	
  infrastructure	
  service	
  
Mallory:	
  Malicious	
  insider	
  
	
  
DDS	
  Security	
  Standard	
  
•  DDS	
  enEEes	
  are	
  authenEcated	
  
•  DDS	
  enforces	
  access	
  control	
  for	
  
domains/Topics/…	
  
•  DDS	
  maintains	
  data	
  integrity	
  and	
  
confidenEality	
  
•  DDS	
  enforces	
  non-­‐repudiaEon	
  
•  DDS	
  provides	
  availability	
  through	
  
reliable	
  access	
  to	
  data	
  	
  
…while maintaining DDS interoperability & high performance
PracEcal	
  Fine-­‐Grain	
  Security	
  
•  Per-­‐Topic	
  Security	
  
–  Control	
  r,w	
  access	
  for	
  each	
  funcEon	
  
–  Ensures	
  proper	
  dataflow	
  operaEon	
  
•  Complete	
  ProtecEon	
  
–  Discovery	
  authenEcaEon	
  
–  Data-­‐centric	
  access	
  control	
  
–  Cryptography	
  
–  Tagging	
  &	
  logging	
  
–  Non-­‐repudiaEon	
  
–  Secure	
  mulEcast	
  
–  100%	
  standards	
  compliant	
  
•  No	
  code	
  changes!	
  
•  Plugin	
  architecture	
  for	
  advanced	
  uses	
  
CBM	
  Analysis	
  PMU	
   Control	
   Operator	
  
State	
   Alarms	
   SetPoint	
  
Topic	
  Security	
  model:	
  
•  PMU:	
  State(w)	
  
•  CBM:	
  State(r);	
  Alarms(w)	
  
•  Control:	
  State(r),	
  
SetPoint(w)	
  
•  Operator:	
  *(r),	
  
Setpoint(w)	
  
DDS	
  Security	
  covers	
  4	
  related	
  concerns	
  
Security	
  Plugin	
  APIs	
  
&	
  Behavior	
  
DDS	
  &	
  RTPS	
  support	
  for	
  
Security	
  
Buil#n	
  Plugins	
  
Security	
  Model	
  
BuilEn	
  Plugins	
  
SPI	
   Buil#n	
  Plungin	
   Notes	
  
AuthenEcaEon	
   DDS:Auth:PKI-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐DH	
  	
   Uses	
  PKI	
  with	
  a	
  pre-­‐configured	
  shared	
  CerEficate	
  Authority.	
  
DSA	
  and	
  Diffie-­‐Hellman	
  for	
  authenEcaEon	
  and	
  key	
  exchange	
  
Establishes	
  shared	
  secret	
  
AccessControl	
   DDS:Access:PKI-­‐Signed-­‐XML-­‐
Permissions	
  	
  
Governance	
  Document	
  and	
  
Permissions	
  Document	
  
Each	
  signed	
  by	
  shared	
  CerEficate	
  Authority	
  
Cryptography	
   DDS:Crypto:AES-­‐CTR-­‐HMAC-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐
DH	
  	
  
Protected	
  key	
  distribuEon	
  
AES128	
  and	
  AES256	
  	
  for	
  encrypEon	
  (in	
  counter	
  mode)	
  
SHA1	
  and	
  SHA256	
  for	
  digest	
  
HMAC-­‐SHA1	
  and	
  HMAC-­‐256	
  for	
  MAC	
  
DataTagging	
   Discovered_EndpointTags	
   Send	
  Tags	
  via	
  Endpoint	
  Discovery	
  
Logging	
   DedicatedDDS_LogTopic	
  
DDS	
  Security	
  Flow	
  
Domain	
  
ParEcipant	
  
Create	
  Fails	
  
AuthenEcate	
  
DP?	
  Yes	
  
AuthenEcate	
  
DP?	
  
No	
  
Ignore	
  Remote	
  
DP	
  
AuthenEcate	
  
Remote	
  DP?	
  
No	
  
Yes	
  
No	
  
Yes	
  
Access	
  OK?	
  
Ignore	
  remote	
  
endpoint	
  
Message	
  
security	
  
Endpoint	
  Create	
  
Fails	
  
Yes	
  
Access	
  OK?	
  
No	
  
Create	
  Domain	
  
ParEcipant	
  	
  
Create	
  Endpoints	
  
Discover	
  remote	
  
Endpoints	
  
Send/Receive	
  
data	
  
Discover	
  remote	
  
DP	
  
Network	
  
Encrypted	
  Data	
   MAC	
  
ConfiguraEon	
  PossibiliEes	
  
•  Is	
  the	
  access	
  to	
  a	
  parEcular	
  Topic	
  protected?	
  
– If	
  so	
  only	
  authenEcated	
  applicaEons	
  with	
  the	
  correct	
  
permissions	
  can	
  read/write	
  
•  Is	
  data	
  on	
  a	
  parEcular	
  Topic	
  protected?	
  How?	
  
– If	
  so	
  data	
  will	
  be	
  sent	
  signed	
  or	
  encrypted+signed	
  
•  Are	
  all	
  protocol	
  messages	
  signed?	
  Encrypted?	
  
– If	
  so	
  only	
  authenEcated	
  applicaEons	
  with	
  right	
  
permissions	
  will	
  see	
  anything	
  
Domain	
  
Governance	
  
Document	
  
P2	
  IdenEty	
  
CerEficate	
  
P2	
  Private	
  
Key	
  
P2	
  
P2	
  Permissions	
  
File	
  
P1	
  IdenEty	
  
CerEficate	
  
P1	
  Private	
  
Key	
  
P1	
  
P1	
  Permissions	
  
File	
  
•  PKI.	
  Each	
  parEcipant	
  has	
  a	
  pair	
  of	
  public	
  &	
  private	
  keys	
  used	
  in	
  authenEcaEon	
  process.	
  
•  Shared	
  CA	
  that	
  has	
  signed	
  parEcipant	
  public	
  keys.	
  ParEcipants	
  need	
  to	
  have	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  CA	
  cerEficate	
  as	
  well.	
  
•  Permissions	
  File	
  specifies	
  what	
  domains/parEEons	
  the	
  DP	
  can	
  join,	
  what	
  topics	
  it	
  can	
  read/write,	
  what	
  tags	
  are	
  associate	
  
with	
  the	
  readers/writers	
  	
  
•  Domain	
  Governance	
  specifies	
  which	
  domains	
  should	
  be	
  secured	
  and	
  how	
  
•  Permissions	
  CA	
  that	
  has	
  signed	
  parEcipant	
  permission	
  file	
  as	
  well	
  as	
  the	
  domain	
  governance	
  document.	
  ParEcipants	
  need	
  
to	
  have	
  a	
  copy	
  of	
  the	
  permissions	
  CA	
  cerEficate.	
  
Configuring	
  &	
  Deploying	
  Secure	
  DDS	
  
IdenEty	
  CA	
  
Permissions	
  CA	
  
DDS-­‐SECURITY	
  Key	
  Aspects	
  
•  Standard	
  &	
  Interoperable	
  
•  Complete:	
  Handles	
  AuthenEcaEon,	
  AuthorizaEon,	
  Key	
  
distribuEon,	
  EncrypEon,	
  Integrity,	
  …	
  
•  Scalable:	
  Supports	
  mulEcast	
  
•  Fine-­‐grain:	
  Access	
  control	
  at	
  Topic	
  and	
  QoS	
  level;	
  	
  
Configure	
  Encrypt/Sign	
  per	
  Topic	
  
•  Flexible:	
  Create	
  your	
  own	
  plugins	
  
•  Generic:	
  Works	
  over	
  any	
  (RTPS)	
  Transport	
  
•  Transparent:	
  No	
  changes	
  to	
  exisEng	
  DDS	
  App	
  Code!	
  
DDS:	
  The	
  best	
  connecEvity	
  standard	
  for	
  the	
  
IIoT	
  
•  ReacEve	
  and	
  Data-­‐Centric	
  
•  Scalable,	
  reliable,	
  high-­‐performance	
  protocol	
  
•  Qos	
  support	
  that	
  meets	
  the	
  IIOT	
  requirements	
  
•  Supports	
  Edge	
  to	
  Cloud	
  deployments	
  
•  Built-­‐in	
  data-­‐centric	
  security	
   	
  	
  	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  DDS	
  v	
  1.4	
  
	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  	
  DDSI-­‐RTPS	
  
SECURIT
Y	
  
DDS-­‐
RPC	
  
XTYPES	
  
ApplicaEon	
  
UDP	
   TCP	
  
C++	
   JAVA	
   C	
   C#	
  
Custom	
  
IP	
  
IDL	
  4.0	
  
TLS/DTLS	
  
About RTI
RTI	
  Company	
  Snapshot	
  
•  World	
  leader	
  in	
  fast,	
  scalable	
  communicaEons	
  so€ware	
  for	
  real-­‐Eme	
  operaEonal	
  systems	
  
•  Strong	
  leadership	
  in	
  Aerospace	
  and	
  Defense,	
  Industrial	
  Control,	
  AutomoEve,	
  Healthcare	
  and	
  more	
  
•  Over	
  400,000	
  deployed	
  licenses,	
  ~800	
  designs,	
  $1T	
  designed-­‐in	
  value	
  
•  Based	
  in	
  Silicon	
  Valley	
  with	
  Worldwide	
  offices	
  
•  Global	
  leader	
  in	
  DDS	
  
–  Over	
  70%	
  market	
  share1	
  
–  Largest	
  Embedded	
  Middleware	
  vendor2	
  
–  2013	
  Gartner	
  Cool	
  Vendor	
  
–  DDS	
  authors,	
  chair,	
  wire	
  spec,	
  security,	
  more	
  
–  First	
  with	
  DDS	
  API	
  and	
  RTPS	
  protocol	
  
–  IIC	
  steering	
  commiSee;	
  OMG	
  board	
  
–  Most	
  mature	
  &	
  widely	
  deployed	
  soluEon	
  
©	
  2014	
  RTI	
  
1Embedded	
  Market	
  Forecasters	
  
2VDC	
  Analyst	
  Report	
  
Find	
  out	
  more…	
  
www.slideshare.net/GerardoPardo	
  
www.slideshare.net/
RealTimeInnovaEons	
  
www.rE.com	
  
community.rE.com	
  
demo.rE.com	
  
www.youtube.com/realEmeinnovaEons	
  
blogs.rE.com	
  
www.twiSer.com/RealTimeInnov	
  
www.facebook.com/RTIso€ware	
  
	
  
	
  
dds.omg.org	
  
www.omg.org	
  
www.iiconsorEum.o
rg	
  
	
  
Thank	
  You!	
  
©2015	
  Real-­‐Time	
  InnovaEons,	
  Inc.	
  	
  ConfidenEal.	
  

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Using DDS to Secure the Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT)

  • 1. Securing  the  IIoT  with  DDS-­‐Security     June  2015   Gerardo  Pardo-­‐Castellote,  Ph.D.,     CTO,  Real-­‐Time  InnovaEons  (RTI)   Co-­‐Chair  OMG  DDS  SIG   www.rE.com  
  • 2. The  Industrial  Internet  of  Things   Industrial  Internet  of  Things  (IIoT)  Consumer  Internet  of  Things  (CIoT)   Cyber-­‐Physical  Systems  (CPS)  
  • 3. The  Industrial  Internet  of  Things   Industrial  Internet  of  Things  (IIoT)  Consumer  Internet  of  Things  (CIoT)   Cyber-­‐Physical  Systems  (CPS)  
  • 4. ARAMCO   produces  13%   of  world’s  oil  
  • 5. Hardly  an  isolated  incident…   •  2013:    ASack  on  Pacific  Gas  &  Electric's  Metcalf  substaEon   California.   –  17  transformers  damaged.  Approx.  $15  Million  in  repairs  [1]   •  2014:  Steel  Mill  aSack  in  Germany   –  According  to  German  BSI  mill  suffered  "massive  damage”    [2]   •  2014:  Reports  of  79  Hacking  incidents  at  US  Energy  companies   [3]   •  2018:    Worldwide  spending  on  cyber  security  for  oil  and  gas  
  • 7. PracEcal  ConnecEvity  Requires  NormalizaEon   ©  Duke  Energy  Co.  hSp://www.duke-­‐energy.com/pdfs/DEDistributedIntelligencePlalormVol01.pdf  
  • 10. DocBox  and  Integrated  Clinical  Environment   (ICE)  Standard   •  Hospital  error  is   the  6th  leading   cause  of   preventable   death   •  DocBox  integrates   devices  to   improve  paEent   safety  
  • 11. Unite  Real-­‐Time,  Mobile,  and  Cloud   •  Largest  EMS   equipment  provider   supplies  ER  equipment     to  60%  of  the  world’s   emergency  vehicles   •  Uses  DDS  for  in-­‐ vehicle  plalorm,   mobile  device  bus,   cloud  connecEvity  
  • 12. Power  CriEcal  Infrastructure  (GC  Dam)   •  DDS  controls  the  6.8  GW  GC  Dam   –  Largest  power  plant  in  North  America   –  Fastest-­‐responding  major  power   source  on  the  Western  Grid   –  Requires  24x7  operaEon   •  DDS  met  the  challenges   –  Extreme  availability   –  Wide  area  communicaEons   –  MulE-­‐level  rouEng   –  High  security   –  300k  data  values  
  • 13. Siemens  Wind  Power  turbine  control   •  Siemens  Wind  Power   fields  farms  of  500   turbines  with  100m   blades   •  DDS  implements  fast   control  within  turbines   and  gust  control  across   the  array   •  DDS  enables  distributed   intelligent  machines    
  • 15. DDS:  Data-­‐Centric  Qos-­‐Aware  Pub-­‐Sub  Model   Persistence   Service   Recording   Service   Virtual,  decentralized  global  data  space   CRUD  operaEons   Source (Key) Speed Power Phase WPT1 37.4 122.0 -12.20 WPT2 10.7 74.0 -12.23 WPTN 50.2 150.07 -11.98
  • 16. Is  there  a  Conflict?   •  PubSub/DDS   – Create  a  ‘global  data  space’  where  informaEon  is   shared   – Publishers  are  unaware  of  subscribers  and  vice-­‐versa   •  Security…   – Share  informaEon  only  with  authorized  subjects   – Requires  IdenEfying  who  produces  and  consumes  the   informaEon  and  cryptographic  protecEon  of  the  data.   16   A CONFLICT?
  • 17. Is  there  a  Conflict?   •  PubSub/DDS   – Create  a  ‘global  data  space’  where  informaEon  is   shared   – Publishers  are  unaware  of  subscribers  and  vice-­‐versa   •  Security…   – Share  informaEon  only  with  authorized  subjects   – Requires  IdenEfying  who  produces  and  consumes  the   informaEon  and  cryptographic  protecEon  of  the  data.   17   NO CONFLICT: Must Use Data-Centric Security Model!
  • 18. Boundaries  at  which  security  should  be  applied   •  System  Boundary   •  Network  Transport   –  Media  access  (layer  2)   –  Network  (layer  3)  security   –  Session/Endpoint  (layer  4/5)  security   •  Host   –  Machine/OS/ApplicaEons/Files   •  Data  &  InformaEon  flows   Ul#mately  all  need  to  be  implemented   This  is  addressed  by  DDS  Security  
  • 19. Threats   1.  Unauthorized  subscripEon   2.  Unauthorized  publicaEon   3.  Tampering  and  replay     4.  Unauthorized  access  to  data  by   infrastructure  services     6/25/15  ©  2012  Real-­‐Time  InnovaEons,  Inc.    -­‐    All  rights  reserved   19   Alice:  Allowed  to  publish  topic  T   Bob:  Allowed  to  subscribe  to  topic  T   Eve:  Non-­‐authorized  eavesdropper     Trudy:  Intruder   Trent:  Trusted  infrastructure  service   Mallory:  Malicious  insider    
  • 20. DDS  Security  Standard   •  DDS  enEEes  are  authenEcated   •  DDS  enforces  access  control  for   domains/Topics/…   •  DDS  maintains  data  integrity  and   confidenEality   •  DDS  enforces  non-­‐repudiaEon   •  DDS  provides  availability  through   reliable  access  to  data     …while maintaining DDS interoperability & high performance
  • 21. PracEcal  Fine-­‐Grain  Security   •  Per-­‐Topic  Security   –  Control  r,w  access  for  each  funcEon   –  Ensures  proper  dataflow  operaEon   •  Complete  ProtecEon   –  Discovery  authenEcaEon   –  Data-­‐centric  access  control   –  Cryptography   –  Tagging  &  logging   –  Non-­‐repudiaEon   –  Secure  mulEcast   –  100%  standards  compliant   •  No  code  changes!   •  Plugin  architecture  for  advanced  uses   CBM  Analysis  PMU   Control   Operator   State   Alarms   SetPoint   Topic  Security  model:   •  PMU:  State(w)   •  CBM:  State(r);  Alarms(w)   •  Control:  State(r),   SetPoint(w)   •  Operator:  *(r),   Setpoint(w)  
  • 22. DDS  Security  covers  4  related  concerns   Security  Plugin  APIs   &  Behavior   DDS  &  RTPS  support  for   Security   Buil#n  Plugins   Security  Model  
  • 23. BuilEn  Plugins   SPI   Buil#n  Plungin   Notes   AuthenEcaEon   DDS:Auth:PKI-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐DH     Uses  PKI  with  a  pre-­‐configured  shared  CerEficate  Authority.   DSA  and  Diffie-­‐Hellman  for  authenEcaEon  and  key  exchange   Establishes  shared  secret   AccessControl   DDS:Access:PKI-­‐Signed-­‐XML-­‐ Permissions     Governance  Document  and   Permissions  Document   Each  signed  by  shared  CerEficate  Authority   Cryptography   DDS:Crypto:AES-­‐CTR-­‐HMAC-­‐RSA/DSA-­‐ DH     Protected  key  distribuEon   AES128  and  AES256    for  encrypEon  (in  counter  mode)   SHA1  and  SHA256  for  digest   HMAC-­‐SHA1  and  HMAC-­‐256  for  MAC   DataTagging   Discovered_EndpointTags   Send  Tags  via  Endpoint  Discovery   Logging   DedicatedDDS_LogTopic  
  • 24. DDS  Security  Flow   Domain   ParEcipant   Create  Fails   AuthenEcate   DP?  Yes   AuthenEcate   DP?   No   Ignore  Remote   DP   AuthenEcate   Remote  DP?   No   Yes   No   Yes   Access  OK?   Ignore  remote   endpoint   Message   security   Endpoint  Create   Fails   Yes   Access  OK?   No   Create  Domain   ParEcipant     Create  Endpoints   Discover  remote   Endpoints   Send/Receive   data   Discover  remote   DP   Network   Encrypted  Data   MAC  
  • 25. ConfiguraEon  PossibiliEes   •  Is  the  access  to  a  parEcular  Topic  protected?   – If  so  only  authenEcated  applicaEons  with  the  correct   permissions  can  read/write   •  Is  data  on  a  parEcular  Topic  protected?  How?   – If  so  data  will  be  sent  signed  or  encrypted+signed   •  Are  all  protocol  messages  signed?  Encrypted?   – If  so  only  authenEcated  applicaEons  with  right   permissions  will  see  anything  
  • 26. Domain   Governance   Document   P2  IdenEty   CerEficate   P2  Private   Key   P2   P2  Permissions   File   P1  IdenEty   CerEficate   P1  Private   Key   P1   P1  Permissions   File   •  PKI.  Each  parEcipant  has  a  pair  of  public  &  private  keys  used  in  authenEcaEon  process.   •  Shared  CA  that  has  signed  parEcipant  public  keys.  ParEcipants  need  to  have  a  copy  of  the  CA  cerEficate  as  well.   •  Permissions  File  specifies  what  domains/parEEons  the  DP  can  join,  what  topics  it  can  read/write,  what  tags  are  associate   with  the  readers/writers     •  Domain  Governance  specifies  which  domains  should  be  secured  and  how   •  Permissions  CA  that  has  signed  parEcipant  permission  file  as  well  as  the  domain  governance  document.  ParEcipants  need   to  have  a  copy  of  the  permissions  CA  cerEficate.   Configuring  &  Deploying  Secure  DDS   IdenEty  CA   Permissions  CA  
  • 27. DDS-­‐SECURITY  Key  Aspects   •  Standard  &  Interoperable   •  Complete:  Handles  AuthenEcaEon,  AuthorizaEon,  Key   distribuEon,  EncrypEon,  Integrity,  …   •  Scalable:  Supports  mulEcast   •  Fine-­‐grain:  Access  control  at  Topic  and  QoS  level;     Configure  Encrypt/Sign  per  Topic   •  Flexible:  Create  your  own  plugins   •  Generic:  Works  over  any  (RTPS)  Transport   •  Transparent:  No  changes  to  exisEng  DDS  App  Code!  
  • 28. DDS:  The  best  connecEvity  standard  for  the   IIoT   •  ReacEve  and  Data-­‐Centric   •  Scalable,  reliable,  high-­‐performance  protocol   •  Qos  support  that  meets  the  IIOT  requirements   •  Supports  Edge  to  Cloud  deployments   •  Built-­‐in  data-­‐centric  security                                                        DDS  v  1.4                              DDSI-­‐RTPS   SECURIT Y   DDS-­‐ RPC   XTYPES   ApplicaEon   UDP   TCP   C++   JAVA   C   C#   Custom   IP   IDL  4.0   TLS/DTLS  
  • 30. RTI  Company  Snapshot   •  World  leader  in  fast,  scalable  communicaEons  so€ware  for  real-­‐Eme  operaEonal  systems   •  Strong  leadership  in  Aerospace  and  Defense,  Industrial  Control,  AutomoEve,  Healthcare  and  more   •  Over  400,000  deployed  licenses,  ~800  designs,  $1T  designed-­‐in  value   •  Based  in  Silicon  Valley  with  Worldwide  offices   •  Global  leader  in  DDS   –  Over  70%  market  share1   –  Largest  Embedded  Middleware  vendor2   –  2013  Gartner  Cool  Vendor   –  DDS  authors,  chair,  wire  spec,  security,  more   –  First  with  DDS  API  and  RTPS  protocol   –  IIC  steering  commiSee;  OMG  board   –  Most  mature  &  widely  deployed  soluEon   ©  2014  RTI   1Embedded  Market  Forecasters   2VDC  Analyst  Report  
  • 31. Find  out  more…   www.slideshare.net/GerardoPardo   www.slideshare.net/ RealTimeInnovaEons   www.rE.com   community.rE.com   demo.rE.com   www.youtube.com/realEmeinnovaEons   blogs.rE.com   www.twiSer.com/RealTimeInnov   www.facebook.com/RTIso€ware       dds.omg.org   www.omg.org   www.iiconsorEum.o rg    
  • 32. Thank  You!   ©2015  Real-­‐Time  InnovaEons,  Inc.    ConfidenEal.