OMG DDS Security Submission Presentation (September 2013 - 6th Revised Submission)

1. Your systems. Working as one. DDS SECURITY 6th Revised Submission (Joint) Presented at OMG Mars Task Force on September 24, 2013 Doc num: mars/2013-‐09-‐09 SpeciﬁcaTon lead: Gerardo Pardo-‐Castellote, Ph.D. CTO, Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. SubmiVers: Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. PrismTech Corp. eProsima (supporter) © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved

2. Outline for DDS Security Spec •  Status recap •  Scope •  Threats •  Summary of RFP requirements •  SpeciﬁcaTon details –  Overview –  Security Model –  DDS & RTPS support for security –  Security Plugin Architecture •  Security Plugins –  AuthenTcaTon plugin –  AccessControl plugin –  Cryptographic plugin –  DataTagging plugin –  DataLogging plugin 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 2

3. Status recap •  Started with two separate submissions by RTI and PrismTech •  As of the December 2012 all joined the RTI submission •  Several reviews, last one in Berlin idenTfied a couple of vulnerabiliTes – Sequence Number AVack on reliable channels – Cuckoo aVack on ParTcipant GUID •  Most current version cleaned spec and addresses idenTfied vulnerabiliTes •  Some under-‐specified issues remain 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 3

5. Security as a system problem •  UlTmately security is a system property –  Involves hardware, soaware, humans, procedures… •  Most directly related: 1.  Securing the data-‐centric bus 2.  IntegraTng across security domains 3.  Securing the operaTng system 4.  Securing the hardware & soaware conﬁguraTon 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 5 Scope of the RFP Out of Scope

6. Scope of the DDS Security RFP Three security boundaries •  Boundary security •  Transport-‐Level – Network (layer 3) security – Session (layer 4/5) security •  Fine-‐grained Data-‐Centric Security 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved Ul5mately you need to implement the 3 of them 6

7. Fine-‐Grained Data-‐Centric Security •  Access control per Topic •  Read versus-‐write permissions •  Field-‐speciﬁc permissions (not addressed) Topics 10/9/13 7 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved

9. Threats 1.  Unauthorized subscripTon 2.  Unauthorized publicaTon 3.  Tampering and replay 4.  Unauthorized access to data by infrastructure services 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 9 Alice: Allowed to publish topic T Bob: Allowed to subscribe to topic T Eve: Non-‐authorized eavesdropper Trudy: Intruder Trent: Trusted infrastructure service Mallory: Malicious insider

10. Data-‐centric/mulTcast Insider Threats •  Two insider threats aﬀecTng (mulTcast) data-‐ centric systems are of unique signiﬁcance 1.  Reader mis-‐behaves as unauthorized writer An applicaTon uses knowledge gained as authorized reader to spoof the system as a writer 2.  Compromise of Infrastructure Service A service that is trusted to read and write data on behalf of others (e.g. a persistence service ) becomes compromised 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 10

11. Reader mis-‐behaves as unauthorized writer •  SituaTon: –  Alice -‐ creates a Crypto Key per Topic/DataWriter –  Alice -‐ shares its Key with all intended readers as needed to mulTcast –  Mallory – is an authorized reader so it has Alice’s key –  Mallory – behaves maliciously and uses Alice’s key to create fake UDP messages pukng Alice’s informaTon (IP, Port, GUIDs, etc.) but with bad data. •  ImplicaTons: –  Bob sees message from Mallory and processes it believing it is from Alice –  Mallory can provide a system-‐wide failure for all subscribers to topic T, making them process wrong data, delete instances, –  Depending on the Topic this can be catastrophic for the system •  Notes: –  The problem is that all secrets shared by Alice and Bob are also known to Mallory •  So the aVack cannot be solved with a MAC or HMAC if Alice’s key is also shared with all readers… –  The problem can be solved with a digital signature but that is 1000X slower than a MAC 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 11

12. Session Sequence Number AVack •  Background: –  Reliable protocols rely on a session_id and a sequence number to avoid duplicates and detect message loss –  RTPS protocol can use GAP messages and HeartBeat messages to advance the session (DataWriter) sequence number •  Vulnerability: –  An aVacker can spoof a packet with the session ID and Hearbeat/GAP causing the DataReader to advance the session sequence-‐numbers blocking future messages recepTon –  AVacker only needs GUID of the DataWriter to aVack, which can be obtained from snooping traﬃc. –  AaVack can be used to prevent the AuthenTcaTon of legiTmate ParTcipants 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 12

13. Cuckoo AVack on GUID •  Background: –  DDS DomainParTcipants are idenTfied by unique GUID, Readers/Writers derive their GUID from it. –  GUID used to uniquely idenTfies the RTPS sessions and the locaTon of each parTcipant •  Vulnerability: –  An aVacker with legit IdenTty can authenTcate using the GUID of another ParTcipant –  AVacker with be accepted with “cuckooed” GUID blocking legiTmate ParTcipant from using its GUID –  AVacker only needs GUID of the ParTcipant to aVack, which can be obtained from snooping traffic. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 13

15. RFP Mandatory Requirements Proposals shall deﬁne … 6.5.1 … a Plasorm Independent Security Model for DDS independent of the programming language used… 6.5.2 … a collecTon of Plasorm Independent IntercepTon Points and SPIs … 6.5.3 … built-‐in Plasorm Independent Security Plugins that implement the Plasorm Independent Interfaces 6.5.4 … plasorm speciﬁc mappings for the built-‐in plugins to all the language PSMs supported by DDS 6.5.5 … how the DDS Interoperability Wire Protocol is used to allow DDS applicaTons to interoperate securely 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 15

16. Mandatory Requirements 6.5.1: Security Model The Security Model for DDS shall … 6.5.1.1 … support mechanisms that establish the ability for a DDS ParTcipant to run in a plasorm 6.5.1.2 … support mechanisms to configure and access the credenTals of the underlying DDS ParTcipants … 6.5.1.3 … allow specificaTon of authorizaTon policies, controlling [1] Joining a DDS Domain [2] Access to DDS Discovery Data [3] Publishing a DDS Topic, [4] Subscribing to a DDS Topic [5] Publishing on a DDS ParTTon, [6] Subscribing on a DDS ParTTon 6.5.1.4 … include the concept of data tagging 6.5.1.5 … support mechanism for ensuring data integrity, including [1] traceability, pedigree, and tamper [2] digital signatures [3] data encrypTon [4] use of different keys for data from different DataWriters 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 16

17. Mandatory Requirements 6.5.2: Set of IntercepTon Points and SPIs The Plugin SPIs shall … 6.5.2.1 … allow applicaTons to exchange credenTals with a DDS ParTcipant [1] exchanging credenTals for authenTcaTon [2] delegaTon of authority for authenTcaTon 6.5.2.2 … allow an external plugin to perform all the authorizaTon funcTons [1] full support of the authorizaTon policies [3] support delegaTon of authority [4] support delegaTon of authority separately for each DDS Topic 6.5.2.3 … allow an external plugin to perform all the tagging and tag-‐accessing funcTons 6.5.2.4 … allow an external plugin to perform all the encrypTon and decrypTon funcTons 6.5.2.5 … external plugin to perform all the digital signing and veriﬁcaTon funcTons 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 17

18. RFP OpTonal Requirements Proposals may define authorizaTon policies that control … 6.6.1 … the content a DDS ParTcipant is allowed to publish on a Topic. 6.6.2 … the content a DDS ParTcipant is allowed to subscribe on a Topic.. 6.6.3 … the QoS Policies a DDS ParTcipants can use when publishing a Topic 6.6.4 … the QoS Policies a DDS ParTcipant can use when subscribing to a Topic. Proposals may define … 6.6.5 … data-‐tagging plugins that apply different tags for each data-‐sample published by a DDS DataWriter. 6.6.6 … built-‐in plugins that interoperate with standard authenTcaTon and authorizaTon protocols and services, such as, LDAP and SAML. 6.6.7 … a PSM mapping of the DDS-‐RTPS Interoperability Wire Protocol to a secure transport, such as, DTLS. 6.6.8 … a PSM of the DDS-‐RTPS Interoperability Wire Protocol allowing interoperability over UnidirecTonal Transports. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 18

20. Submission Guiding Principles •  Performance & Scalability –  Do not impact parts of the system that do not have security needs –  Allow opTng out of specific features such as MAC, EncrypTon. Digital Signature with sufficient granularity –  Limit use of asymmetric keys to discovery & session establishment –  Support MulTcast •  Robustness & Availability –  Be robust to the failure or compromise of any single component. –  Limit privileges of infrastructure services and relays –  Avoid centralized policy decisions/services –  Avoid mulT-‐party key agreement protocols •  Fitness to data-‐centric model –  Express policies and permissions in terms of familiar DDS terminology and objects –  Support all of DDS: consumpTon of samples out of order, best efforts, Tme filters, history cache, etc. •  Leverage exis5ng technologies –  Support plugging in exiTng technologies for ciphers, MAC, PKI •  Ease of use & Flexibility –  Do not preclude integraTng with their exisTng security and crypto infrastructure. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 20

21. Audience and Purpose for this SpecificaTon •  Audience: –  DDS vendors/implementers, not the users of DDS •  Purpose: –  Define a Security Model for DDS systems –  Define concrete IntercepTon points in the middleware where SPI interfaces must be called –  Define concrete SPI Interfaces vendors must invoke at the IntercepTon Points and the behavior upon various returns –  Define specific SPI implementaTons to the extent required for interoperability –  NOT guidance to users implemenTng secure DDS systems –  NOT defini5on of security technologies beyond what is required to implement the specificaTon 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 21

22. DDS Security covers 4 related concerns 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 22 Security Plugin APIs & Behavior DDS & RTPS support for Security Buil5n Plugins Security Model

24. Security Model •  A security model is deﬁned in terms of: – The subjects (principals) – The objects being protected •  The operaTons that are protected on the objects – Access Control Model •  A way to map each subject to the objects they can perform operaTons on and which are the allowed operaTons 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 24 MR# 6.5.1

25. Security Model Example: UNIX FileSystem (simplified) •  Subjects: Users, specifically processes execuTng on behalf of a specific userid •  Protected Objects: Files and Directories •  Protected OperaTons on Objects: –  Directory.list, Directory.createFile, Directory.createDir, Directory.removeFile, Directory.removeDir, Directory.renameFile –  File.view, File.modify, File.execute •  Access Control Model: –  A subject is given a userId and a set of groupId –  Each object is assigned a OWNER and a GROUP –  Each Object is given a combinaTon of READ, WRITE, EXECUTE permissions for the assigned OWNER and GROUP –  Each protected operaTon is mapped to a check, for example •  File.view is allowed if and only if –  File.owner == Subject.userId AND File.permissions(OWNER) includes READ –  OR File.group IS-‐IN Subject.groupId[] AND File.permissions(GROUP) includes READ 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 25

26. DDS Security Model •  Subjects: DDS DomainParTcipant (ParTcipant GUID) •  Protected Objects: DDS Domain and DDS Topic •  Protected Opera5ons on Objects (logical view): –  DomainParTcipant.join –  DomainParTcipant.set_read_parTTons .set_write_parTTons –  Topic.create –  Topic.set_qos –  Topic.set_reader_qos –  Topic.read –  Topic.set_writer_qos –  Topic.write –  Topic.create_instance –  Topic.update_instance –  Topic.dispose_instance 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 26 MR# 6.5.1

27. Mapping of DDS API to protected operaTons 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 27 DDS API Call Protected Opera5on DomainParTcipantFactory.create_parTcipant Discovery.match_remote_parTcipant DomainParTcipant.join DomainParTcipant.create_publisher Publisher.set_qos DomainParTcipant.set_write_parTTons DomainParTcipant.create_subscriber Subscriber.set_qos DomainParTcipant.set_read_parTTons DomainParTcipant.create_topic Discovery.dicover_topic Topic.create, Topic.seq_qos Topic.set_qos Topic.set_qos Subscriber.create_datareader Discovery.dicover_datareader Topic.read, Topic.set_reader_qos DataReader.set_qos Discovery.change_datareader_qos Topic.set_reader_qos Publisher.create_datawriter Discovery.dicover_datawriter Topic.write, Topic.set_writer_qos DataWriter.set_qos Discovery.change_datawriter_qos Topic.set_writer_qos DataWriter.register_instance DataWriter.write Protocol.receive_instance_new Topic.create_instance DataWriter.dispose Protocol.receive_dispose Topic.dispose_instance MR# 6.5.1

29. Support for Security in DDS & RTPS •  DDS ParTcipants need to exchange security informaTon –  CerTﬁcates for AuthenTcaTon & Permissions –  Handshake messages for mutual authenTcaTon and shared-‐ secret establishment –  KeyTokens for key-‐exchange •  Some reuse of exisTng DDS mechanisms –  Discovery topics –  BuilTn data readers / writers •  AddiTon of a InterparTcipantStatelessWriter/Reader •  EncrypTon and signatures introduce new RTPS Submessage and Submessage elements –  SecureSubMessage –  SecuredData 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 29

30. Extensions to BuilTnTopics •  DCPSParTcipants: – AddiTonal members: idenTty_token : IdenTtyToken (PID 0x1001) permissions_token : PermissionsToken (PID 0x1002) •  DCPSPublicaTons and DCPSSubscripTons: – AddiTonal member: data_tags : DataTag (PID 0x1003) struct Tag { string name; string value; }; struct DataTags { sequence<Tag>; }; struct DataHolder { string classid; StringMap properties; OctetsMap properties; StringSeq strings_value; OctetSeq binary_value1; OctetSeq binary_value2; LongLongSeq longlongs_value; }; //@Extensibility MUTABLE_EXTENSIBILITY struct Token DataHolder ; typedef <XXX>Token Token; Changed

31. InterParTcipantStateless channel •  Inherent “sequence number” vulnerability with any stateful channel. –  Send a Heartbeat for a future sequence number eﬀecTvely shuts down channel •  Well-‐known in TCP. But miTgated via: –  Random start sequence number per session –  RejecTon of sequence numbers outside window These “works” for TCP because it is point-‐to-‐point and is not communicaTng state (so no GAPs). It would not work for discovery, using mulTcast, etc. To be robust to this aVack you need a protocol that does not reject things based on sequence numbers This is already supported in the RTPS speciﬁcaTon 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 31

32. InterParTcipant Stateless channel •  InterparTcipantStatelessWriter and InterparTcipantStatelessReader •  InterparTcipantStatelessGenericMessage 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 32 struct MessageIdenTty { octet source_guid[16]; long long sequence_number; }; typedef string<> GenericMessageClassId; struct InterParTcipantStatelessGenericMessage { // target for the request. Can be GUID_UNKNOWN BuilTnTopicKey_t des5na5on_par5cipant_key; MessageIdenTty messageIdenTty; MessageIdenTty relatedMessageIdenTty; GenericMessageClassId msgClassid; DataHolder msgData; //@shared }; //@Extensibility MUTABLE_EXTENSIBILITY Uses the RTPS stateless writers and readers RTPS v. 2.1 SecTon 8.4.7.2 and 8.4.10.2

33. Security informaTon exchanged via InterParTcipantStatelessWriter/Reader Behavior: RTPS v 2.1 stateless writer/rdr (secTon 8.4.7.2 & 8.4.10.2) •  Does not reject messages based on sequence number •  Robust against sequence number aVack 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 33 struct MessageIdenTty { octet source_guid[16]; long long sequence_number; }; typedef string<> GenericMessageClassId; struct InterParTcipantStatelessGenericMessage { // target. Can be GUID_UNKNOWN BuilTnTopicKey_t des5na5on_par5cipant_key; MessageIdenTty message_idenTty; MessageIdenTty related_message_idenTty; GenericMessageClassId message_classid; DataHolder message_data; //@shared }; //@Extensibility MUTABLE_EXTENSIBILITY Changed 4 message kinds: GMCLASSID_SECURITY_AUTH_HANDSHAKE GMCLASSID_SECURITY_PARTICIPANT_CRYPTO_TOKENS GMCLASSID_SECURITY_DATAWRITER_CRYPTO_TOKENS GMCLASSID_SECURITY_DATAREADER_CRYPTO_TOKENS

34. Security informaTon exchanged via InterParTcipantStateless Writer/Reader 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 34 struct CryptoTokensMsg { octet sending_guid[16]; octet receiving_guid[16]; sequence<CryptoToken> crypto_tokens; }; typedef Token HandshakeTokenMsg; typedef CryptoTokensMsg Par5cipantCryptoTokensMsg; typedef CryptoTokensMsg DatawriterCryptoTokensMsg; typedef CryptoTokensMsg DatareaderCryptoTokensMsg; 4 message kinds: GMCLASSID_SECURITY_AUTH_HANDSHAKE GMCLASSID_SECURITY_PARTICIPANT_CRYPTO_TOKENS GMCLASSID_SECURITY_DATAWRITER_CRYPTO_TOKENS GMCLASSID_SECURITY_DATAREADER_CRYPTO_TOKENS

35. Protocol-‐level support Background: RTPS 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 35 RTPS SubMessage RTPS Header RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage SubMsg Header SubMsg Element SubMsg Element SerializedData RTPS SubMessage RTPS Message

36. Cryptographic SPI at the wire-‐protocol level © 2012 RTI • UNCLASSIFIED • PROPRIETARY RTPS SubMessage SerializedData RTPS SubMessage SerializedData RTPS Header RTPS Header RTPS SubMessage (*) RTPS SubMessage SecuredData SerializedData RTPS SubMessage SecuredData SerializedData RTPS SubMessage (*) RTPS SubMessage (*) Secure encoding Secure decoding Message TransformaTon

38. Plasorm Independent IntercepTon Pts + SPIs 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 38 Service Plugin Purpose Interactions Authentication Authenticate the principal that is joining a DDS Domain. Handshake and establish shared secret between participants The principal may be an application/process or the user associated with that application or process. Participants may messages to do mutual authentication and establish shared secret Access Control Decide whether a principal is allowed to perform a protected operation. Protected operations include joining a specific DDS domain, creating a Topic, reading a Topic, writing a Topic, etc. Cryptography Perform the encryption and decryption operations. Create & Exchange Keys. Compute digests, compute and verify Message Authentication Codes. Sign and verify signatures of messages. Invoked by DDS middleware to encrypt data compute and verify MAC, compute & verify Digital Signatures Logging Log all security relevant events Invoked by middleware to log Data Tagging Add a data tag for each data sample MR# 6.5.2

40. BuilTn Plugins 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 40 SPI Buil5n Plungin Notes AuthenTcaTon DDS:Auth:PKI-‐RSA/DSA-‐DH Uses PKI with a pre-‐configured shared CerTficate Authority. DSA and Diffie-‐Hellman for authenTcaTon and key exchange Establishes shared secret AccessControl DDS:Access:PKI-‐Signed-‐ XML-‐Permissions Permissions document signed by shared CerTficate Authority Cryptography DDS:Crypto:AES-‐CTR-‐ HMAC-‐RSA/DSA-‐DH Protected key distribuTon AES128 and AES256 for encrypTon (in counter mode) SHA1 and SHA256 for digest HMAC-‐SHA1 and HMAC-‐256 for MAC DataTagging Discovered_EndpointTags Send Tags via Endpoint Discovery Logging DedicatedDDS_LogTopic MR# 6.5.3

41. Mapping to DDS Language PSMs •  Plugin SPIs to be defined using IDL •  IDL-‐to-‐Language mappings used for each Language PSM •  No need to define mappings to new Javs5 PSM and STD-‐C++ PSM – IDL-‐derived Language PSMs suffice as these are low-‐level interfaces that will only be exercised by SPI plugin implementers. NOTE: IDL file is missing from submission 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 41 MR# 6.5.4

44. Full AuthenTcaTon SPI •  validate_local_idenTty •  get_idenTty_token •  set_permissions_credenTal_and_token •  validate_remote_idenTty •  begin_handshake_request •  begin_handshake_reply •  process_handshake •  get_shared_secret •  get_peer_permissions_credenTal_token •  set_listener •  return_idenTty_token •  return_peer_permissions_credenTal_token •  return_handshake_handle •  return_idenTty_handle •  return_sharedsecret_handle 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 44

46. BuilTn DDS:Auth:PKI-‐DSA-‐DH •  Uses shared CerTficate Authority (CA) – All ParTcipants pre-‐configured with shared-‐CA •  Performs mutual authenTcaTon between discovered parTcipants using the Digital Signature Algorithm (DSA) •  Establishes a shared secret using Diffie-‐ Hellman. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 46

47. ConfiguraTon of Auth:PKI-‐DS-‐DH •  Three things: –  X.509 cerTficate that defines the shared CA. This cerTficate contains the Public Key of the CA. –  RSA private key of the DomainParTcipant. –  A (PEM-‐encoded) X.509 cerTficate that chains up to the CA, that binds the DomainParTcipant public key to the disTnguished name (subject name) for the parTcipant and any intermediate CA cerTficates required to build the chain. •  ConfiguraTon API outside scope of specificaTon –  Vendors can use file, QoS property, etc. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 47

48. Behavior of Auth:PKI-‐DS-‐DH •  validate_local_parTcipant –  IdenTtyCredenTalToken has X.509 cerTficate –  Validates cerTficate against CA •  begin_handshake_request –  Sends X.509 CerTficate to peer parTcipant –  Sends Signed Permissions to to peer parTcipant –  Sends Challenge •  begin_handshake_reply –  Sends X.509 CerTficate to peer parTcipant –  Sends Signed Permissions to to peer parTcipant –  Replies to Challenge & sends counter Challenge •  process_handshake –  Verifies challenge response –  Responds to final challenge –  Exchanges SharedSecret 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 48

49. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 49 Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon ParTcipants receive Hash(X.509 IdenTtyCert) & Hash (Permissions Doc) of remote parTcipant via discovery

50. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 50 Each ParTcipant calls validate_remote_idenTty(). ParTcipant with highest GUID returns PENDING_HANDSHAKE_REQUEST, the other PENDING_HANDSAHKE_MESSAGE Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon

51. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 51 ParTcipant1 creates CHALLENGE1 = “CHALLENGE:<nonce> and sends message via ParTcipantMessageWriter with HanshakeMessageToken := {CHALLENGE1, IdenTty, Permissions} Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon

52. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 52 ParTcipant2 validates IdenTty of ParTcipant1 against CA ParTcipant2 creates CHALLENGE2 := CHALLENGE:<nonce> ParTcipant2 sends to ParTcipant1 message with MessageToken := {SIGN(CHALLENGE1), CHALLENGE2, IdenTty, Permissions} Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon

53. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 53 Part1 validates IdenTty of ParTcipant2 against CA Part1 veriﬁes SIGN(CHALLENGE1) using ParTcipant2’s PK Part1 computes a SharedSecret Part1 sends message with contents: MessageToken := { ENCRYPT(SharedSecret), SIGN( HASH(CHALLENGE2 # ENCRYPT(SharedSecret))) } Encrypt uses Part2’s PK. Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon

54. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 54 Part2 veriﬁes SIGN( HASH(CHALLENGE2 # ENCRYPT(SharedSecret))) using Part1’s PK Part2 decrypts ENCRYPT(SharedSecret) using its own PK We have Mutual Authen5ca5on and a SharedSecret Remote ParTcipant AuthenTcaTon

57. Full AccessControl SPI •  check_create_parTcipant •  check_create_datawriter •  check_create_datareader •  check_create_topic •  check_local_datawriter_register_instance •  check_local_datawriter_dispose_instance •  check_remote_parTcipant •  check_remote_datawriter •  check_remote_datareader •  check_remote_topic •  check_local_datawriter_match •  check_local_datareader_match •  check_remote_datawriter_register_instance •  check_remote_datawriter_dispose_instance •  get_permissions_token •  get_permissions_credenTal_token •  set_listener •  return_permissions_token •  return_permissions_credenTal_token •  validate_local_permissions •  validate_remote_permissions 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 57

58. Support for AccessControl on data-‐tags and parTTons •  check_local_datawriter_match •  check_local_datareader_match – OperaTons receive the reader & writer Permissions Handles and DataTags •  The PermissionsHandles can cache any QoS that is relevant to access control decisions Supports AccessControl rules based on DataTags or matching of other writer/reader aVributes (e.g. based on parTTon names) 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 58

59. BuilTn DDS:AC:PKI SPI •  Configured with: –  X.509 CerTficate of shared Permissions CA –  PermissionsCredenTalToken •  PermissionsCredenTalToken contains –  XML file with permissions –  Includes SubjectName matching the one on IdenTtyCredenTalToken –  All signed by Permissions CA –  FormaXed as PKCS#7 document of type signed data This binds the permissions to the idenTty established by the AuthenTcaTonPlugin 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 59

63. Full Cryptographic SPI (CryptoKeyFactory) •  register_local_parTcipant •  register_matched_remote_parTcipant •  register_local_datawriter •  register_matched_remote_datareader •  register_local_datareader •  register_matched_remote_datawriter •  unregister_parTcipant •  unregister_datawriter •  unregister_datareader 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 63

64. Full Cryptographic SPI (CryptoKeyExchnage) •  encode_serialized_data •  encode_datawriter_submessage •  encode_datareader_submessage •  encode_rtps_message •  decode_rtps_message •  preprocess_secure_submsg •  decode_datawriter_submessage •  decode_datareader_submessage •  decode_serialized_data 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 64

65. Full Cryptographic SPI (CryptoTransform) •  register_local_parTcipant •  register_matched_remote_parTcipant •  register_local_datawriter •  register_matched_remote_datareader •  register_local_datareader •  register_matched_remote_datawriter •  unregister_parTcipant •  unregister_datawriter •  unregister_datareader 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 65

66. RTPS SubMessage SerializedData RTPS Header RTPS Header RTPS SubMessage SecuredData SerializedData encode_serialized_data RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage

67. RTPS SubMessage RTPS Header encode_datawriter_submessage RTPS Header RTPS SecureSubMsg RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS Header encode_datareader_submessage RTPS Header RTPS SecureSubMsg RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage

68. RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS Header RTPS Header RTPS SecureSubMsg encode_rtps_message RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage RTPS SubMessage

69. RTPS SubMessage SerializedData RTPS SubMessage SerializedData RTPS Header RTPS Header RTPS SecSubMsg RTPS SubMessage SecuredData SerializedData RTPS SubMessage SecuredData SerializedData RTPS SecSubMsg RTPS SecSubMsg encode_rtps_message encode_datawriter_submessage encode_serialized_data

70. Crypto-‐AES-‐CTR-‐HMAC-‐DSA-‐DH •  EncrypTon uses AES in counter mode –  Similar to SRTP, but enhanced to support mulTple topics within a single RTPS message and infrastructure services like a relay or persistence •  Use of counter mode turns the AES block cipher into a stream cipher –  Each DDS sample is separately encrypted and can be decrypted without process the previous message •  This is criTcal to support DDS QoS like history, content filters, best-‐efforts etc. •  DSA and Diffie-‐Hellman used for mutual authenTcaTon and secure key exchange 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 70 MR# 6.5.3

71. BuilTn DDS:Crypto-‐AES-‐CTR-‐HMAC-‐DSA-‐ DH SPI •  Shared secret used to create a KeyExchangeKey •  KeyExchangeKey used to send following Master Key Material using the BuilTnPublicaTonWriter: –  MasterKey –  MasterSalt –  MasterHMACSalt •  Based on this the following Key Material is computed: –  SessionSalt := HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionSalt" + MasterSalt + SessionId + 0x00) [ Truncated to 128 bits] –  SessionKey := HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionKey" + MasterSalt + SessionId + 0x01) –  SessionHMACKey := HMAC(MasterKey,"SessionHMACKey" + MasterHMACSalt + SessionId) Note: SessionId goes on the EncryptedMessage Envelope •  EncrypTon uses AES in Counter (CTR) mode –  The session counter is sent on EncryptedMessage Envelope. 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 71

73. DataTagging: DDS:Tagging:DDS_Discovery •  DataWriter and DataReader enTTes have associated tags •  DataWriter Tags are propagated via DDS discovery •  AccessControl plugin has visibility into tags and can make decisions based on that •  BuilTn plugins –  AccessControl plugin ignores tags –  Permissions document format does not allow rules based on data-‐tags –  Rules can be added when use-‐case is beVer understood 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 73

75. DataLogging: DDS:Logging:DDS_LogTopic [SecTon sTll missing] •  Intent is to use a dedicated DDS Topic to Log the security-‐relevant messages •  DDS Secure Log Topic will be encrypted 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 75

76. Status & Conclusions •  We feel specificaTon will be ready to adopt in December •  Tasks/Missing items –  Update UML with added operaTons –  Complete secTons 7.2.3 and 7.2.4 (extra details on how RTPS is affected) –  Add descripTon on how discovery traffic is secured (Kx for builTn topics) –  Add descripTon of the built-‐in Logging plugin –  Review document for grammar 10/9/13 © 2012 Real-‐Time InnovaTons, Inc. -‐ All rights reserved 76

77. Find out more… www.rT.com community.rT.com demo.rT.com www.youtube.com/realTmeinnovaTons blogs.rT.com www.twiVer.com/RealTimeInnov www.facebook.com/RTIsoaware www.slideshare.net/GerardoPardo dds.omg.org www.omg.org © 2012 RTI • ALL RIGHTS RESERVED 77

OMG DDS Security Submission Presentation (September 2013 - 6th Revised Submission)

You are reading a preview.

Check these out next

OMG DDS Security Submission Presentation (September 2013 - 6th Revised Submission)

More Related Content

Slideshows for you (20)

Similar to OMG DDS Security Submission Presentation (September 2013 - 6th Revised Submission) (20)

More from Gerardo Pardo-Castellote (20)

Recently uploaded (20)