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UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAYS™

1st Ibero-American Industrial Cybersecurity Congress
How Security Can Be Stronger Than a Firewall
13 Different Ways Breaking Through Firewalls
Andrew Ginter
VP Industrial Security
Waterfall Security Solutions
Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.
-- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

2013
Industrial Security Priorities

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

2
Safety, Reliability, Confidentiality
Attribute

Enterprise / IT

Control System

Scale

Huge – 100,000’s of devices

100-500 devices per DCS

Priority

Confidentiality

Safety and reliability

Target

Data Theft

Sabotage

Exposure

Constant exposure to Internet
content

Exposed to business network,
not Internet

Equipment
lifecycle

3-5 years

10-20 years

Security
discipline:

Speed / aggressive change –
stay ahead of the threats

Security is an aspect of
safety - Engineering
Change Control (ECC)

Most IT controls are not appropriate. You manage IT and ICS
networks differently
Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

3
Elephants in the Room
● Plain text communication protocols – at least for local / DCS
communications
● Anti-virus / constant change is hard – many sites limit use of AV
● Security updates / constant change is worse
● Vulnerable designs / components: 100,000 vulnerabilities
● Old equipment – will anyone sell you anti-virus signatures for
Windows 2000?
● Timing, network traffic and other sensitivities

Industrial sites deploy compensating
measures such as physical security
and cyber-perimeter security
Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

4
13 Ways Through a Firewall
1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls attack
2) Social engineering / steal a password / keylogger
3) Compromise domain controller – create fwall acct
4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / etc
5) Attack exposed clients – compromise web servers
6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies
7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunnelling / viruses

8) Firewall vulnerabilities –zero-days / design vulns
9) Errors and omissions – bad rules / IT errors
10) Forge an IP address –rules are IP-based
11) Bypass network perimeter – eg: rogue wireless
12) Physical access to firewall – reset to fact defaults
13) Sneakernet – removable media / laptops

Photo: Red Tiger Security

Keeping a firewall secure takes people and processes…
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

5
#1 Phishing / Spam / Drive-By-Download
● Single most common way through (enterprise) firewalls
● Client on business network pulls malware from internet, or activates
malware in email attachment
● “Spear-phishing” – carefully crafted email to fool even security experts
into opening attachment

Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

6
#2 Social Engineering – Steal a Password
● VPN password on sticky note on monitor, or under keyboard
● Call up administrator, weave a convincing tale of woe, and ask for the
password
● Ask the administrator to give you a VPN account
● Shoulder-surf while administrator enters firewall password
● Guess
● Install a keystroke logger

Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

7
#3 Compromise Domain Controller – Create Account
● More generally – abuse trust of external system
● Create account / change password of exposed ICS server, or firewall
itself
● Other external trust abuse – compromise external HMI, ERP, DCS
vendor with remote access, WSUS server, DNS server, etc.

Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

8
#4 Attack Exposed Servers
● Every exposed port is vulnerable:
● SQL injection
● buffer overflow
● default passwords
● hard-coded password
● denial of service / SYN-flood

Night Dragon Attack
Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

9
13 Ways Through a Firewall
1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls attack
2) Social engineering / steal a password / keylogger
3) Compromise domain controller – create fwall acct
4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / etc
5) Attack exposed clients – compromise web servers
6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies
7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunnelling / viruses

8) Firewall vulnerabilities –zero-days / design vulns
9) Errors and omissions – bad rules / IT errors
10) Forge an IP address –rules are IP-based
11) Bypass network perimeter – eg: rogue wireless
12) Physical access to firewall – reset to fact defaults
13) Sneakernet – removable media / laptops

Photo: Red Tiger Security

Keeping a firewall secure takes people and processes…
Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

10
Unidirectional Security Gateways
● Laser in TX, photocell in RX, fibre-optic cable – you can send data out,
but nothing can get back in to protected network
● TX uses 2-way protocols to gather data from protected network
● RX uses 2-way protocols to publish data to external network
● Absolute protection against online attacks from external networks
Industrial Network

Corporate Network
Waterfall RX
Server

Waterfall TX
Server

Waterfall
TX appliance

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

Waterfall
RX appliance

11
Secure Historian Replication
● Hardware-enforced unidirectional historian replication
● Replica historian contains all data and functionality of original
● Corporate workstations communicate only with replica historian
● Industrial network and critical assets are physically inaccessible from
corporate network & 100% secure from any online attack
Industrial Network
Historian

Corporate Network

Waterfall
TX agent

Waterfall
RX agent

PLCs
RTUs
Unidirectional
TX appliance

Unidirectional
RX appliance

Unidirectional Historian replication

Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

12

Replica
Historian

Workstations
Waterfall Unidirectional Gateway Connectors
Leading Industrial Applications/Historians
● OSIsoft PI, PI AF, GE iHistorian, GE iFIX
● Scientech R*Time, Instep eDNA, GE OSM
● Siemens: WinCC, SINAUT/Spectrum
● Emerson Ovation, Wonderware Historian
● SQLServer, Oracle, MySQL, SAP
● AspenTech, Matrikon Alert Manager

Leading Industrial Protocols
● OPC: DA, HDA, A&E, UA
● DNP3, ICCP, Modbus
Remote Access
● Remote Screen View™
● Secure Manual Uplink

Leading IT Monitoring Applications
● Log Transfer, SNMP, SYSLOG
● CA Unicenter, CA SIM, HP OpenView,
IBM Tivoli
● HP ArcSight SIEM , McAfee ESM SIEM

Other connectors
● UDP, TCP/IP
● NTP, Multicast Ethernet
● Video/Audio stream transfer
● Mail server/mail box replication
● IBM MQ series, Microsoft MSMQ
File/Folder Mirroring
● Antivirus updater, patch (WSUS)
● Folder, tree mirroring, remote folders (CIFS)
updater
● FTP/FTFP/SFTP/TFPS/RCP
● Remote print server
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

13
Use Case: Iberdrola Confrentes Nuclear Plant
● Replicates plant historian to corporate network
● Unidirectional gateways are deployed at the majority of American
nuclear generators
● Protect safety networks, control networks and plant networks
● Routinely replicate OPC, historians, Syslog, Modbus and SNMP
● Specified in NRC 5.71 and NEI 08-09 regulatory guides

NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71
Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

14
Use Case: New Brunswick Power – Power Generation
● Inter Control Center Protocol (ICCP) replication to regional electric
system control center
● OSIsoft PI Server replication at all generating plants
● Deployed fleet-wide: 3000 MW
● Absolute protection from
external network attacks

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

15
Use Case: Detroit Water – Waterfall Solution
● Replaced firewall a service provider was managing: $10,000/mo
● Deployed OSIsoft PI Server and replica: aggregate all information to
be shared with business network
● Hydraulic optimization reduces $50M/year power costs by 3-7%
● Cell-phone loop-check improves field technician productivity
● Real-time sewage utilization to client utilities reduces their costs and
increases customer satisfaction

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

16
Trends in Standards and Guidance
● Increasingly, regulations, standards and best-practice guidance recognizes
hardware-enforced unidirectional communications
● Most recent: ISA SP-99-3-3/IEC 62443-3-3 and NERC-CIP V5

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd.

17
Waterfall Security Solutions
● Headquarters in Israel, sales and operations office in the USA
● Hundreds of sites deployed in all critical infrastructure sectors
Best Practice Award 2012, Industrial Network Security
2013 Oil & Gas Customer Value Enhancement Award
IT and OT security architects should consider Waterfall
for their operations networks
Waterfall is key player in the cyber security market –
2010, 2011, & 2012
● Strategic partnership agreements /
cooperation with: OSIsoft, GE, Siemens,
and many other major industrial vendors

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

18
Unidirectional Gateways: Secure IT/OT Integration
● Firewalls are porous
● Security: absolute protection of safety and reliability of control system
assets, from network attacks originating on external networks
● Compliance: best-practice guidance, standards and regulations are
evolving to recognize strong security
● Costs: reduces security operating costs:
improves security and saves money

andrew . ginter @ waterfall – security . com

www.waterfall-security.com

Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions

19

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How Security can be stronger than a Firewall: 13 different ways breaking through firewalls

  • 1. UNIDIRECTIONAL SECURITY GATEWAYS™ 1st Ibero-American Industrial Cybersecurity Congress How Security Can Be Stronger Than a Firewall 13 Different Ways Breaking Through Firewalls Andrew Ginter VP Industrial Security Waterfall Security Solutions Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 2013
  • 2. Industrial Security Priorities Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 2
  • 3. Safety, Reliability, Confidentiality Attribute Enterprise / IT Control System Scale Huge – 100,000’s of devices 100-500 devices per DCS Priority Confidentiality Safety and reliability Target Data Theft Sabotage Exposure Constant exposure to Internet content Exposed to business network, not Internet Equipment lifecycle 3-5 years 10-20 years Security discipline: Speed / aggressive change – stay ahead of the threats Security is an aspect of safety - Engineering Change Control (ECC) Most IT controls are not appropriate. You manage IT and ICS networks differently Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 3
  • 4. Elephants in the Room ● Plain text communication protocols – at least for local / DCS communications ● Anti-virus / constant change is hard – many sites limit use of AV ● Security updates / constant change is worse ● Vulnerable designs / components: 100,000 vulnerabilities ● Old equipment – will anyone sell you anti-virus signatures for Windows 2000? ● Timing, network traffic and other sensitivities Industrial sites deploy compensating measures such as physical security and cyber-perimeter security Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 4
  • 5. 13 Ways Through a Firewall 1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls attack 2) Social engineering / steal a password / keylogger 3) Compromise domain controller – create fwall acct 4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / etc 5) Attack exposed clients – compromise web servers 6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies 7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunnelling / viruses 8) Firewall vulnerabilities –zero-days / design vulns 9) Errors and omissions – bad rules / IT errors 10) Forge an IP address –rules are IP-based 11) Bypass network perimeter – eg: rogue wireless 12) Physical access to firewall – reset to fact defaults 13) Sneakernet – removable media / laptops Photo: Red Tiger Security Keeping a firewall secure takes people and processes… Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 5
  • 6. #1 Phishing / Spam / Drive-By-Download ● Single most common way through (enterprise) firewalls ● Client on business network pulls malware from internet, or activates malware in email attachment ● “Spear-phishing” – carefully crafted email to fool even security experts into opening attachment Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 6
  • 7. #2 Social Engineering – Steal a Password ● VPN password on sticky note on monitor, or under keyboard ● Call up administrator, weave a convincing tale of woe, and ask for the password ● Ask the administrator to give you a VPN account ● Shoulder-surf while administrator enters firewall password ● Guess ● Install a keystroke logger Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 7
  • 8. #3 Compromise Domain Controller – Create Account ● More generally – abuse trust of external system ● Create account / change password of exposed ICS server, or firewall itself ● Other external trust abuse – compromise external HMI, ERP, DCS vendor with remote access, WSUS server, DNS server, etc. Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 8
  • 9. #4 Attack Exposed Servers ● Every exposed port is vulnerable: ● SQL injection ● buffer overflow ● default passwords ● hard-coded password ● denial of service / SYN-flood Night Dragon Attack Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 9
  • 10. 13 Ways Through a Firewall 1) Phishing / drive-by-download – victim pulls attack 2) Social engineering / steal a password / keylogger 3) Compromise domain controller – create fwall acct 4) Attack exposed servers – SQL injection / DOS / etc 5) Attack exposed clients – compromise web servers 6) Session hijacking – MIM / steal HTTP cookies 7) Piggy-back on VPN – split tunnelling / viruses 8) Firewall vulnerabilities –zero-days / design vulns 9) Errors and omissions – bad rules / IT errors 10) Forge an IP address –rules are IP-based 11) Bypass network perimeter – eg: rogue wireless 12) Physical access to firewall – reset to fact defaults 13) Sneakernet – removable media / laptops Photo: Red Tiger Security Keeping a firewall secure takes people and processes… Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 10
  • 11. Unidirectional Security Gateways ● Laser in TX, photocell in RX, fibre-optic cable – you can send data out, but nothing can get back in to protected network ● TX uses 2-way protocols to gather data from protected network ● RX uses 2-way protocols to publish data to external network ● Absolute protection against online attacks from external networks Industrial Network Corporate Network Waterfall RX Server Waterfall TX Server Waterfall TX appliance Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Waterfall RX appliance 11
  • 12. Secure Historian Replication ● Hardware-enforced unidirectional historian replication ● Replica historian contains all data and functionality of original ● Corporate workstations communicate only with replica historian ● Industrial network and critical assets are physically inaccessible from corporate network & 100% secure from any online attack Industrial Network Historian Corporate Network Waterfall TX agent Waterfall RX agent PLCs RTUs Unidirectional TX appliance Unidirectional RX appliance Unidirectional Historian replication Proprietary Information – Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 12 Replica Historian Workstations
  • 13. Waterfall Unidirectional Gateway Connectors Leading Industrial Applications/Historians ● OSIsoft PI, PI AF, GE iHistorian, GE iFIX ● Scientech R*Time, Instep eDNA, GE OSM ● Siemens: WinCC, SINAUT/Spectrum ● Emerson Ovation, Wonderware Historian ● SQLServer, Oracle, MySQL, SAP ● AspenTech, Matrikon Alert Manager Leading Industrial Protocols ● OPC: DA, HDA, A&E, UA ● DNP3, ICCP, Modbus Remote Access ● Remote Screen View™ ● Secure Manual Uplink Leading IT Monitoring Applications ● Log Transfer, SNMP, SYSLOG ● CA Unicenter, CA SIM, HP OpenView, IBM Tivoli ● HP ArcSight SIEM , McAfee ESM SIEM Other connectors ● UDP, TCP/IP ● NTP, Multicast Ethernet ● Video/Audio stream transfer ● Mail server/mail box replication ● IBM MQ series, Microsoft MSMQ File/Folder Mirroring ● Antivirus updater, patch (WSUS) ● Folder, tree mirroring, remote folders (CIFS) updater ● FTP/FTFP/SFTP/TFPS/RCP ● Remote print server Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 13
  • 14. Use Case: Iberdrola Confrentes Nuclear Plant ● Replicates plant historian to corporate network ● Unidirectional gateways are deployed at the majority of American nuclear generators ● Protect safety networks, control networks and plant networks ● Routinely replicate OPC, historians, Syslog, Modbus and SNMP ● Specified in NRC 5.71 and NEI 08-09 regulatory guides NRC Regulatory Guide 5.71 Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 14
  • 15. Use Case: New Brunswick Power – Power Generation ● Inter Control Center Protocol (ICCP) replication to regional electric system control center ● OSIsoft PI Server replication at all generating plants ● Deployed fleet-wide: 3000 MW ● Absolute protection from external network attacks Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 15
  • 16. Use Case: Detroit Water – Waterfall Solution ● Replaced firewall a service provider was managing: $10,000/mo ● Deployed OSIsoft PI Server and replica: aggregate all information to be shared with business network ● Hydraulic optimization reduces $50M/year power costs by 3-7% ● Cell-phone loop-check improves field technician productivity ● Real-time sewage utilization to client utilities reduces their costs and increases customer satisfaction Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 16
  • 17. Trends in Standards and Guidance ● Increasingly, regulations, standards and best-practice guidance recognizes hardware-enforced unidirectional communications ● Most recent: ISA SP-99-3-3/IEC 62443-3-3 and NERC-CIP V5 Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2012 by Waterfall Security Solutions Ltd. 17
  • 18. Waterfall Security Solutions ● Headquarters in Israel, sales and operations office in the USA ● Hundreds of sites deployed in all critical infrastructure sectors Best Practice Award 2012, Industrial Network Security 2013 Oil & Gas Customer Value Enhancement Award IT and OT security architects should consider Waterfall for their operations networks Waterfall is key player in the cyber security market – 2010, 2011, & 2012 ● Strategic partnership agreements / cooperation with: OSIsoft, GE, Siemens, and many other major industrial vendors Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 18
  • 19. Unidirectional Gateways: Secure IT/OT Integration ● Firewalls are porous ● Security: absolute protection of safety and reliability of control system assets, from network attacks originating on external networks ● Compliance: best-practice guidance, standards and regulations are evolving to recognize strong security ● Costs: reduces security operating costs: improves security and saves money andrew . ginter @ waterfall – security . com www.waterfall-security.com Proprietary Information -- Copyright © 2013 by Waterfall Security Solutions 19