Catch Me If You Can - Finding APTs in your network

DefCamp
DefCampDefCamp
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
DefCamp
Adrian Tudor
Leo Neagu
November 2018
1
Catch Me If You Can – Finding APTs in your network
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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• An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a cyberattack that will “fly under the
radar” and your AV/IDS will not let you know about it
What is an APT?
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
3
• targeted cyberattack in which an intruder gains access to a network
• remains undetected for an extended period of time
• traditionally has been associated with nation-state players
• in the last few years, the tools and techniques used by a few APT actors have
also been adopted by various cybercriminals groups.
What is an APT?
Key elements of an APT attack
- targeted SCADA systems and is believed to be responsible for causing
substantial damage to Iran's nuclear program (2010)
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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• Focus on
• Delivery
• Exploitation
• Installation
• Command and Control
• Action and Objectives
APT attack mechanism
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
5
APT attack mechanism
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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• Vector of compromise
APT attack mechanism - Delivery
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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Exploitation with
malicious links
APT Exploitation and Installation
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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APT Exploitation and Installation
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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Quasar RAT – Easy to use/deploy NetWire malware
APT Exploitation and Installation
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
10
Quasar RAT – Easy to use/deploy - Demo
APT Exploitation and Installation
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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APT Installation
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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- Creating services that sound legit
- Task schedule
- Malware installed as Microsoft Office Add-in. When MS Word starts, malware
executed
- DLL hijacking
- and many more
APT Installation – Persistence
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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- .bash_profile and
.bashrc
- Accessibility
Features
- Account
Manipulation
- AppCert DLLs
- AppInit DLLs
- Application
Shimming
- Authentication
Package
- BITS Jobs
- Bootkit
- Browser
Extensions
- Change Default
File Association
- Component
Firmware
- Component Object
Model Hijacking
- Create Account
- DLL Search Order
Hijacking
- Dylib Hijacking
- External Remote
Services
- File System
Permissions
Weakness
- Hidden Files and
Directories
- Hooking
- Hypervisor
- Image File
Execution Options
Injection
- Kernel Modules
and Extensions
- Launch Agent
- Launch Daemon
- Launchctl
- LC_LOAD_DYLIB
Addition
- Local Job
Scheduling
- Login Item
- Logon Scripts
- LSASS Driver
- Modify Existing
Service
- Netsh Helper DLL
- New Service
- Office Application
Startup
- Path Interception
- Plist Modification
- Port Knocking
- Port Monitors
- Rc.common
- Re-opened
Applications
- Redundant Access
- Registry Run Keys
/ Startup Folder
- Scheduled Task
- Screensaver
- Security Support
Provider
- Service Registry
Permissions
Weakness
- Setuid and Setgid
- Shortcut
Modification
- SIP and Trust
Provider Hijacking
- Startup Items
- System Firmware
- Time Providers
- Trap
- Valid Accounts
- Web Shell
- Windows
Management
Instrumentation
Event Subscription
- Winlogon Helper
DLL
APT Installation – Persistence
You can find more detailed information on https://attack.mitre.org
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
14
• PERSISTENCE USING UNIVERSAL WINDOWS PLATFORM APPS (APPX)
APT Installation – Persistence
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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PERSISTENCE USING UNIVERSAL WINDOWS PLATFORM APPS (APPX)
APT Installation – Persistence
reg add
HKCUSoftwareClassesActivatableClassesPackageMicrosoft.People_10.1807.2131.
0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbweDebugInformationx4c7a3b7dy2188y46d4ya362y19ac5a580
5e5x.AppX368sbpk1kx658x0p332evjk2v0y02kxp.mca /v DebugPath /d
"C:UsersIEUserAppDataRoamingSubDirClient.exe"
Reference: ODDVAR MOE : https://oddvar.moe/2018/09/06/persistence-using-universal-windows-platform-apps-appx/
Persistence using the People app
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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Moving laterally inside the environment, compromising additional targets and getting
closer to high value assets using different tools and techniques:
- Enumerate password data from memory using commonly available password
dumpers (Mimikatz)
- Net.exe to connect to network shares using net use commands with compromised
credentials
- Spread through the local network by using PsExec
- Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to interact with local and remote
systems
APT Lateral movement
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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- Recognizing an APT attack early in the kill chain is a tough job
- The attackers prefer to work slow blending with regular network activity and using
tools already available in the environment (PowerShell, WMI, net.exe etc.)
How can I tell I’m targeted?
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
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- Large outbound network traffic should raise questions, especially if the amount
transferred is out of the regular trendline
- Quite often APT attacks are detected when the data gathered already has been
exfiltrated, sometimes even months later
Data exfiltration: to late to detect?
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
19
The reason behind the spike
- A web shell present on a IIS server (China Chopper)
- A password encrypted RAR archive was exfiltrated
- Further analysis of the RAM memory revealed the preparation of
the data being exfiltrated
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
20
Are you ready to detect an APT?
Assess your
current state
• Identify your assets
• Know your
vulnerabilities
Know your
enemies
• Threat Intelligence
feeds
• Tools, tactics and
procedures used by
threat actors
Design and
implement your
vision
• Multi-layered
endpoint & network
protection
• Threat Hunting
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
21
Let’s go Threat Hunting – look for hidden threats
Start the
hunt
Refine
the hunt
Response
Large
unexpected
data flows
Remote
access via
RDP
Scheduled
tasks
Phishing
campaigns
Encoded
PowerShell
commands
Net.exe
use
Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc.
22
QUESTIONS?
THANK YOU!
1 of 22

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Catch Me If You Can - Finding APTs in your network

  • 1. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. DefCamp Adrian Tudor Leo Neagu November 2018 1 Catch Me If You Can – Finding APTs in your network
  • 2. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 2 • An Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) is a cyberattack that will “fly under the radar” and your AV/IDS will not let you know about it What is an APT?
  • 3. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 3 • targeted cyberattack in which an intruder gains access to a network • remains undetected for an extended period of time • traditionally has been associated with nation-state players • in the last few years, the tools and techniques used by a few APT actors have also been adopted by various cybercriminals groups. What is an APT? Key elements of an APT attack - targeted SCADA systems and is believed to be responsible for causing substantial damage to Iran's nuclear program (2010)
  • 4. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 4 • Focus on • Delivery • Exploitation • Installation • Command and Control • Action and Objectives APT attack mechanism
  • 5. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 5 APT attack mechanism
  • 6. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 6 • Vector of compromise APT attack mechanism - Delivery
  • 7. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 7 Exploitation with malicious links APT Exploitation and Installation
  • 8. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 8 APT Exploitation and Installation
  • 9. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 9 Quasar RAT – Easy to use/deploy NetWire malware APT Exploitation and Installation
  • 10. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 10 Quasar RAT – Easy to use/deploy - Demo APT Exploitation and Installation
  • 11. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 11 APT Installation
  • 12. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 12 - Creating services that sound legit - Task schedule - Malware installed as Microsoft Office Add-in. When MS Word starts, malware executed - DLL hijacking - and many more APT Installation – Persistence
  • 13. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 13 - .bash_profile and .bashrc - Accessibility Features - Account Manipulation - AppCert DLLs - AppInit DLLs - Application Shimming - Authentication Package - BITS Jobs - Bootkit - Browser Extensions - Change Default File Association - Component Firmware - Component Object Model Hijacking - Create Account - DLL Search Order Hijacking - Dylib Hijacking - External Remote Services - File System Permissions Weakness - Hidden Files and Directories - Hooking - Hypervisor - Image File Execution Options Injection - Kernel Modules and Extensions - Launch Agent - Launch Daemon - Launchctl - LC_LOAD_DYLIB Addition - Local Job Scheduling - Login Item - Logon Scripts - LSASS Driver - Modify Existing Service - Netsh Helper DLL - New Service - Office Application Startup - Path Interception - Plist Modification - Port Knocking - Port Monitors - Rc.common - Re-opened Applications - Redundant Access - Registry Run Keys / Startup Folder - Scheduled Task - Screensaver - Security Support Provider - Service Registry Permissions Weakness - Setuid and Setgid - Shortcut Modification - SIP and Trust Provider Hijacking - Startup Items - System Firmware - Time Providers - Trap - Valid Accounts - Web Shell - Windows Management Instrumentation Event Subscription - Winlogon Helper DLL APT Installation – Persistence You can find more detailed information on https://attack.mitre.org
  • 14. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 14 • PERSISTENCE USING UNIVERSAL WINDOWS PLATFORM APPS (APPX) APT Installation – Persistence
  • 15. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 15 PERSISTENCE USING UNIVERSAL WINDOWS PLATFORM APPS (APPX) APT Installation – Persistence reg add HKCUSoftwareClassesActivatableClassesPackageMicrosoft.People_10.1807.2131. 0_x64__8wekyb3d8bbweDebugInformationx4c7a3b7dy2188y46d4ya362y19ac5a580 5e5x.AppX368sbpk1kx658x0p332evjk2v0y02kxp.mca /v DebugPath /d "C:UsersIEUserAppDataRoamingSubDirClient.exe" Reference: ODDVAR MOE : https://oddvar.moe/2018/09/06/persistence-using-universal-windows-platform-apps-appx/ Persistence using the People app
  • 16. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 16 Moving laterally inside the environment, compromising additional targets and getting closer to high value assets using different tools and techniques: - Enumerate password data from memory using commonly available password dumpers (Mimikatz) - Net.exe to connect to network shares using net use commands with compromised credentials - Spread through the local network by using PsExec - Windows Management Instrumentation (WMI) to interact with local and remote systems APT Lateral movement
  • 17. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 17 - Recognizing an APT attack early in the kill chain is a tough job - The attackers prefer to work slow blending with regular network activity and using tools already available in the environment (PowerShell, WMI, net.exe etc.) How can I tell I’m targeted?
  • 18. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 18 - Large outbound network traffic should raise questions, especially if the amount transferred is out of the regular trendline - Quite often APT attacks are detected when the data gathered already has been exfiltrated, sometimes even months later Data exfiltration: to late to detect?
  • 19. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 19 The reason behind the spike - A web shell present on a IIS server (China Chopper) - A password encrypted RAR archive was exfiltrated - Further analysis of the RAM memory revealed the preparation of the data being exfiltrated
  • 20. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 20 Are you ready to detect an APT? Assess your current state • Identify your assets • Know your vulnerabilities Know your enemies • Threat Intelligence feeds • Tools, tactics and procedures used by threat actors Design and implement your vision • Multi-layered endpoint & network protection • Threat Hunting
  • 21. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 21 Let’s go Threat Hunting – look for hidden threats Start the hunt Refine the hunt Response Large unexpected data flows Remote access via RDP Scheduled tasks Phishing campaigns Encoded PowerShell commands Net.exe use
  • 22. Classification: //Secureworks/Public Use:© SecureWorks, Inc. 22 QUESTIONS? THANK YOU!