4. From Literature To Politics How Rousseau Has Come To Symbolize Totalitarianism
1. JOURNAL OF
INTERDISCIPLINARY
HISTORY OF IDEAS
2017
Volume 6 Issue 11
Item 4
â Section 2: Articles â
From Literature to Politics
How Rousseau Has Come to Symbolize Totalitarianism
by
Christophe Salvat
c b a
4. period. I shall argue, on the contrary, that Rousseau had often been a pretext
to take a stand on totalitarianism because he then embodied a declining polit-
ical Romanticism. Unlike Hayek, Berlin or Popper, who notoriously identified
totalitarianism with rationalism, the great majority of political commentators
interwar indeed considered Romanticismâand its âpassiveâ individualismâas
the main threat to freedom.
Before endeavouring to unravel the intricate relations between Rousseauâs
historiography and interwar politics, I present Romanticism (or âRousseauismâ,
as they called it) as it was regarded at the beginning of the century (section
2). The following section specifically deals with the political arguments raised
against Rousseauâs Romanticism in the 1930s and 1940s (section 3). A politi-
cally and morally conservative audience then accuses Rousseau of destroying
societyâs traditional bonds in favour of a democratic and liberal individualism
thatâthey believeâis but the other face of the new phenomenon called totalitar-
ianism (section 4). While a group of commentators strive to reassess Rousseauâs
political thought around the Social Contract, a new generation of liberal thinkers
(including Hayek, Popper and Berlin) move away from Rousseau and his âsocial-
isticâ politics they believe will lead to a new kind of totalitarianism (section 5).
2. Romanticism and Rousseauism
The notion of Romanticism is very difficult to define. It can either refer to
a literary movement, a political doctrine, or an ideology. It can be âsimultane-
ously (or alternately) revolutionary and counterrevolutionary, individualistic
and communitarian, cosmopolitan and nationalistic, realist and fantastic, ret-
rograde and utopian, rebellious and melancholic, democratic and aristocratic,
activist and contemplative, republican and monarchist, red and white, mystical
and sensualâ (Löwy and Sayre 2001, 1). Etymologically speaking, the adjective
4 : 2 Christophe Salvat
7. tivism pushed imagination into the background and hence prompted a fierce
and overpowering reaction of (neo)-Romanticism. Romanticism, in its turn, to-
tally dismissed reason in favour of emotions, and therefore lost touch with re-
ality. This has had terrible political consequences:
Rousseau says that he founded âan indomitable spirit of libertyâ on an âindolence that is
beyond beliefâ. True liberty, it is hardly necessary to say, cannot be founded on indolence;
it is something that must be won by high-handed struggle, a struggle that takes place
primarily in oneself and not in the outer world. Possibly the ultimate distinction between
the true and the false liberal, as I have suggested elsewhere, is that between the spiritual
athlete and the cosmic loafer. If true liberty is to survive, it is important that ethical
idling should not usurp the credit due only to ethical effort. This usurpation takes place
if we accept the programme of those who would substitute expansive emotion for the
activity of the higher will. In the real world, as I have tried to show, the results of an
expansion of this kind are not fraternal but imperialistic. (Babbitt 1924, 222-23)
Neither positivism nor Romanticism, for Babbitt, adequately dealt with the
role of imagination, which when rightly used, considerably improves our in-
sight on the world. Neo-romanticism is, according to the New Humanists, the
principal factor in the moral and political decline of modern societies. Because
they trusted entirely human nature (see, for instance, Rousseauâs idea of the
good savage), Romanticists have sanctified instinct and spontaneity to the detri-
ment of morality. Men, say the humanists, need moral rules to exercise a control
over themselves, and those rules are not to be invented or discovered through
reason alone. Romanticists were right to reassess the status of reason and expe-
rience in ethics, butâand this is arguably the reason for which the New Human-
ists are so openly critical against themâthey misled people by suggesting that
they would incarnate a sound alternative to positivism. Instead of this, argue
Lasserre, SeilliĂšre and Babbitt, they merely took the place of it.
The stark opposition introduced by the New Humanists between Romanti-
cism and rationalism is, however, somewhat overestimated. Romanticism can-
not be entirely appraised on the basis of the Sturm and Drang movement. Carl
Schmitt already pointed out in his 1919 Politische Romantik (translated in 1928
Jean-Jacques Rousseau (Babbitt 1919, SeilliĂšre 1921, Babbitt 1924, More 1913, Babbitt 1910, Lasserre
1907)
From Literature to Politics 4 : 5
8. into French) that the Romantics do not exclude reason and rationalism from
their discourse. On the contrary, the discourse of reason often has the purpose
of concealing the Romantic essence of their thought. The didactic style and the
rational method of the Social Contract, in particular, are a good illustration of
this. The less a system is founded in rationality, the more it tends to claim to fol-
low reason, in order to ground its legitimacy. Isaiah Berlin says little else when,
in 1952, he criticizes Rousseau for the rationalist tricks he uses to deceive and
to cast a spell over his readers:
In theory Rousseau speaks like any other eighteenth-century philosophe, and says: âWe
must employ our reasonâ. He uses deductive reasoning, sometimes very cogent, very
lucid and extremely well-expressed, for reaching his conclusions. But in reality what
happens is that this deductive reasoning is like a strait-jacket of logic which he claps
upon the inner, burning, almost lunatic vision within; it is this extraordinary combina-
tion of the insane inner vision with the cold rigorous strait-jacket of a kind of Calvinist
logic which really gives his prose its powerful enchantment and its hypnotic effect. You
appear to be reading logical argument which distinguishes between concepts and draws
conclusions in a valid manner from premises, when all the time something violent is be-
ing said to you. A vision is being imposed on you; somebody is trying to dominate you
by means of a very coherent, although a very deranged, vision of life, to bind a spell, not
to argue, despite the cool and collected way in which he appears to be talking. (Berlin
2003a, 43).
3. Political Romanticism
Romanticism is not per se a political movement. It is essentially an aesthetic
movement. Most of the Romanticists came to Romanticism by aesthetic rather
than ideological choice. As noticed by Cassirer âin this field [politics] the Ro-
mantic writers never developed a clear and coherent theory; nor were they
consistent in their practiceâ (Cassirer 1946, 180). The movement is composed
of a variety of intellectual and artists coming from different backgrounds and
of different political persuasions (if they have any), from fascism to liberalism
4 : 6 Christophe Salvat
9. and conservatismÂč. âThey never meant to politicizeâ continues Cassirer, âbut to
âpoeticizeâ the worldâ (Cassirer 1946, 184).
Not being politically committed does not, however, necessarily lessen the
political significance of the movement. Despite its aesthetic perspective of the
world, Romanticism never ceased to be political. Firstly, Romanticism is not po-
litical in the sense that it is a politically identifiable doctrine but, in the sense
that it profoundly affects the political structure of the society. For Russell, be-
hind the apparent aloofness of the Romantics looms a genuine and most dan-
gerous thirst for power:
The irrationalists of our time aim, not at salvation, but at power. They thus develop an
ethic which is opposed to that of Christianity and of Buddhism; and through their lust
of dominion they are of necessity involved in politics. Their geneaology among writ-
ers is Fichte, Carlyle, Mazzini, Nietzscheâwith supporters such as Treitschke, Rudyard
Kipling, Houston Chamberlain, and Bergson. [âŠ] The founders of the school of thought
out of which Fascism has grown all have certain common characteristics. They seek
the good in will rather in feeling or cognition; they value power more than happiness;
they prefer force to argument, war to peace, aristocracy to democracy, propaganda to
scientific impartiality. (Russell 2004, 59)
Secondly, political indifference is not paramount to political neutrality. When
totalitarianism is looming, indifference is often conflated with passive consent
to it (Orwell 2002, 415). The Romantic attitude is widely seen as dismissing the
present, giving up hope for the future and sinking into pessimism (Lowy and
Sayre 2001). Although difficult to define, or even to set as a homogenous group,
Âč Löwy and Sayre count six types of romanticism: the restitutionist, the conservative, the fascistic,
the resigned, the reformist and the revolutionary/utopian which can be subdivided into five ten-
dencies (the Jacobin/democratic, the populist, the utopian/humanist/socialist, the libertarian and
the Marxist). The authors admit, however, that this typology is not exhaustive. Maistre and Bonald,
for instance, âseem to be located in a transitional zoneâ (Lowy and Sayre 2001, 64).
From Literature to Politics 4 : 7
10. the Romanticists seem to convergeâor at least are considered to convergeâon
one particular point: their negative attitude towards modernity and progress.
They [Orwell mentions Joyce, Eliot, Pound, Huxley, Lawrence, Wyndham Lewis] donât
any longer believe that progress happens or that it ought to happen, they donât any
longer believe that men are getting better by having lower mortality rates, more effective
birth control, better plumbing, more aeroplanes and faster motorcars. Nearly of all them
are homesick for the remote past, or some period of the past, from D.H. Lawrenceâs
ancient Etruscans onwards. (Orwell 2002, 415)
Although often resented for jeopardizing the classical and Cartesian cul-
ture of Europe (and especially France), the philosophical or aesthetic stance of
Romanticism is rather secondary in its popular rejection. Romanticism essen-
tially represents, for its detractors, an intellectual and moral decline of modern
societies. Romanticism is âoriginally a diseaseâ, asserts Lasserre as if echoing
Goethe (Lasserre 1907, 18). For the Baron SeilliĂšre, supported by the scientific
publications of Dr. Pierre Janet, then Professor at the illustrious CollĂšge de
France, Romanticism is the symptom of a âmorbid psychological depressionâ
which itself expresses the frustration of the will to power, to which he also
refers to as âthe essential and primordial imperialism of beingâ (SeilliĂšre 1921,
152).
The populist campaign against Romanticism essentially relies on attacks against
the character of Rousseau, rather than against his theoretical work. It is easy in-
deed to criticise Rousseau. In the Confessions, he âreviewed his life with infinite
detail and infinite care, starting it anew with the keenest pleasureâ (Charpentier
1931, 273). Even those who most admire him as a writer cannot but condemn his
immorality: âThe personality of Rousseauâ, writes, for instance, his biographer
Count Morley, âhas most equivocal and repulsive sides. It has deservedly fared
ill in the esteem of the saner and more rational of those who have judged him,
and there is none in the history of famous men and our spiritual fathers that
begat us, who makes more constant demands on the patience or pity of those
who study his lifeâ (Morley 1923, 4). Wyndham Lewis even compares Hitlerâs
character favourably to Rousseauâs:
Hitler is the same class of man as Jean-Jacques Rousseau. Mein Kampf even has some
points of resemblance to Rousseauâs Confessions: in tone here and there, in the loneliness
4 : 8 Christophe Salvat
12. Europe had now to pay the price for. Romantic writings, novels and poems in
particular, are considered to primarily address women and young adults. âRealâ
men are not supposed to enjoy love stories or reveries of solitary walkers, they
prefer international politics and, as it happens, war.
4. Rousseau and Totalitarianism
The campaign led by Babbitt, Lasserre, Mauriac and SeilliĂšre immediately
before and after WWI against Romanticism essentially relies, as demonstrated
above, on Rousseauâs personal disrepute. Rousseau then symbolizes the moral
corruption they believed they were witnessing in modern societies: extreme in-
dividualism, immorality, and shallow sentimentalism. These constitute the first
wave of criticisms against neo-Romanticism. At the end of the 1920s, the eco-
nomic and political situations of many countries dramatically deteriorate. The
welfare policies that had been implemented during and after the war are con-
tested by a new generation of liberals opposed to State intervention. Democracy
is increasingly contested in Europe. Italy, Germany and Spain turn to dictator-
ships, whilst England and France are tempted by it. It is on those last two coun-
tries that I would like now to focus my analysis. I shall argue that, in addition to
its morally corruptive effects, Romanticism is then accused of being politically
hazardous, in view of the international situation. Its âsocialisticâ individualism,
in particular, is viewed by the conservatives (as well as the new generation of
liberals), as a major cause of totalitarianism.
In spite of the critical attitude adopted by many Romantic intellectualsâ
including nationals such as Thomas Mann or Stefan Zweigâtowards the Ger-
man and Italian totalitarian regimes, Romanticism has often been accused of
promoting totalitarian movements. It is true that, either out of political naivety
or personal belief, some Romantics ventured too far in their support for fascism
4 : 10 Christophe Salvat
19. Because Rousseauâs moral philosophy is ultimately an ethics of freedom and
choice, Cassirer reckons that it is absolutely incompatible with totalitarian-
ism. Few other intellectuals chooseâalong with Cassirerâto defend Rousseauâs
moral and political within the Romantic paradigm. The English historian Alfred
Cobban is one of them. In Rousseau and the Modern State (published in 1934, re-
published in 1964), Cobban is one the very few to defend Rousseauâs political
thought from a Romantic point of view. Comparing him to Burke (to whom
he also devotes a monograph), Cobban contends that âRousseau carries into
politics the fundamental ideas of the Romantic movementâ (Cobban 1934, 239).
Unlike many, however, Cobban does not link Rousseau to totalitarianism. If
anything, Romanticism exculpates him. In his 1941 study on totalitarianism, The
Crisis of Civilisation, Cobban argues that, because he was Romantic, Rousseau
could not be read as a political reformer, and certainly not as a totalitarian
thinker. According to him, the Social Contract cannot have any practical appli-
cations since âby itself it is no more than an abstract idealâ (Cobban 1941, 64).
The French liberal thinker, Bertrand de Jouvenel, adopts a similar approach in
his Essai sur la politique de Rousseau published in the 1947 edition of the Social
Contract (Jouvenel 1947). For Jouvenel, Rousseau is not a political reformer:
he is too pessimistic about the present perspectives to even consider a political reform.
It is only as an individual that man can be rescued from his social predicament. And
for this, there is no need to reform institutions. It is rather manâs relationship to the
institutions that need to be changed. Everything, in politics like in ethics, comes down
to human feelings. (Jouvenel 1947, 101)
This includes the Social Contract that Jouvenel characterizes as a âromanticâ
arrangement. Jouvenel is probably the only founding member of the Mont PĂš-
lerin SocietyÂč to still consider Rousseau as a Romantic and one of the vey few, if
not the only one, to dismiss his totalitarianism. Jouvenel, however, is somewhat
at odds amongst the new liberals, first because he embodies a welfare liberalism
that is no more fashionable after WWII, and secondly because he himself had
to face accusation of sympathy towards the Nazi regime. With him, I believe,
Âč New foundations to liberalism were set, first in 1938 at the occasion of the Lippmann Conference,
and then in 1947 with the inauguration of Hayekâs Mont PĂšlerin Society. Liberalism, it was thought,
should return to its basics in order not to convert into socialism.
From Literature to Politics 4 : 17