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1. An Alternative Way of Confucian Sincerity: Wang Yangming's
"Unity of Knowing and Doing" as a Response to Zhu Xi's
Puzzle of Self-Deception
Zemian Zheng
Philosophy East and West, Volume 68, Number 4, October 2018, pp. 1345-1368
(Article)
Published by University of Hawai'i Press
DOI:
For additional information about this article
Access provided by Wuhan University (20 Feb 2019 07:18 GMT)
https://doi.org/10.1353/pew.2018.0109
https://muse.jhu.edu/article/717057

2. AN ALTERNATIVE WAY OF CONFUCIAN SINCERITY: WANG
YANGMING’S “UNITY OF KNOWING AND DOING” AS A
RESPONSE TO ZHU XI’S PUZZLE OF SELF-DECEPTION
Zemian Zheng
School of Philosophy, Wuhan University
zemian@gmail.com
Introduction
In this essay I offer a new interpretation of Wang Yangming’s 王陽明
(1472–1529) well-known doctrine of zhi xing he yi 知行合一 (unity of
knowing and doing) by contextualizing it in his endeavor to seek an alternative
way of Confucian learning other than Zhu Xi’s 朱熹 (1130–1200). Both Wang
and Zhu Xi understand the ideal of a Confucian sage as cheng 誠 (sincerity),
but propose different ways to attain it. To some extent, Wang’s original
concern has long been neglected. The recent scholarship on Wang’s unity of
knowing and doing focuses on whether Wang’s notion of zhi (knowing) is
restricted to moral knowledge, and whether the dictum makes sense when
facing the challenge of weakness of will. Frisina takes Wang’s notion of zhi 知
(knowing) to be inclusive of theoretical knowledge (Frisina 1989). Yang, as
well as Cua, Tu, and Ching, restricts zhi to the realm of moral knowledge
(Yang 2009, Cua 1982, Tu 1976, Ching 1976), but both Frisina and Yang
believe that, for Wang, xing means action. Yang’s account shows why it is not
bizarre to believe that knowledge and action are one and the same, offering a
defense against the common view that they are separate or can be separated
by weakness of will and other factors. However, I argue that Wang’s zhi 知
(knowing), especially liangzhi 良知 (original knowledge of the good) refers to a
capacity for value-perception and self-examination, or to its exercise, rather
than a set of moral knowledge. Xing 行 (doing) does not necessarily refer to
action per se, but can also refer to motivations or even to wishful thoughts. For
Wang, all these special usages of terms serve to answer a question: how is
sincerity possible?
In section 1, I explain the term cheng (sincerity), and re-formulate the
classical view of sincerity as “the purest form of integrity.” Both Wang’s and
Zhu Xi’s discourses on knowledge and action are meant to articulate an
approach to attain the ideal of sincerity. In section 2, I briefly discuss Zhu
Xi’s puzzle of sincerity and self-deception as the background of Wang’s
thought. Section 3 deals with Wang’s new way to attain sincerity. After a
long pursuit of sagehood under the guidance of Zhu Xi’s doctrine, Wang
discarded Zhu Xi’s approach and came up with the dictum “unity of
Philosophy East & West Volume 68, Number 4 October 2018 1345–1368 1345
© 2018 by University of Hawai‘i Press

3. knowing and doing.” Section 4 introduces Wang’s later doctrine of liangzhi
as a developed version of “unity of knowing and doing” to tackle the
problem of self-deception. Liangzhi has the capacity of value-perception and
self-examination that pre-empts any danger of self-deception and motiva-
tional impurity. The development of Wang’s thought can be understood as
seeking a way to solve Zhu Xi’s puzzle.
I. Sincerity (Cheng) as the Common Ideal of Self-Cultivation for Zhu Xi and
Wang Yangming
Confucius says, “at seventy I could follow my heart’s desire without
transgressing moral principles” (Analects 2:4; Chan 1963, p. 22). In Confucian
culture, this statement best describes the state of sincerity as the ideal for self-
cultivation.
Sincerity in the present essay is used as a translation of the Chinese term
cheng 誠. Cheng can be used as an adjective or as an adverb, meaning
“real(ly),” “honest(ly),” or “sincere(ly).” Yanming An summarizes that cheng
has been translated as “sincerity,” “perfection,” “truth,” “realness,” or
“integrity” (see An 2004, pp. 157–158). In my journal article “Self-
Deception, Sincerity (Cheng), and Zhu Xi’s Last Word” (Zheng 2015) I
highlighted two basic meanings of cheng in the context of Confucian moral
psychology: (1) the wholeness of a personality, devoid of inner divisions or
struggles, and (2) the unity of the internal (e.g., private thoughts, or self) and
the external (e.g., objects; one’s public image in the view of others).
The Zhongyong (Doctrine of the Mean) describes the person of cheng to
be the one who “hits upon what is right without effort and apprehends
without thinking” (Chan 1963, p. 107) and who “ensure[s] that ten thousand
things take their proper places” naturally and without deliberate effort (Shun
2003, p. 38). In both the Zhongyong and the Mencius, cheng is the Way of
Heaven, while the Way of humanity consists in focusing one’s thoughts and
endeavors on cheng, the ultimate ideal of spontaneous straightforwardness
(Chan 1963, pp. 74, 107). Since the Zhongyong and the Mencius, cheng
has long been regarded as an ideal of sagehood. Its significance was
elevated by Zhou Dunyi 周敦頤 (1017–1073), one of the founders of Song-
Ming Neo-Confucianism, who unambiguously states that “sincerity (cheng)
is the foundation of the sage” (Zhou 1990, p. 12; Chan 1963, p. 465), and
equates sagehood with sincerity (Zhou 1990, p. 14; Chan 1963, p. 466).
Cheng is not a mere state of moral purity in motivation without any
knowledge of how to cope with things in the world. Rather, both the
Zhongyong and Zhou Dunyi state that cheng brings insight or enlightenment
(Chan 1963, p. 107; Zhou 1990, p. 16), which enables us to know the
principle without deliberation and to cope with things without strenuous
effort. Learning to attain the state of cheng is not simple-minded motiva-
tional rigor, but a fundamental reshaping of the relationship between the self
1346 Philosophy East & West

4. and the world. In the Zhongyong, cheng is the Dao (way) that unifies the
internal and the external.1
As a common ideal for most Song-Ming Neo-Confucians, sincerity is the
purest form of integrity. It entails two requirements:
(1) Integrity. A person’s action and words should be consistent, or,
inwardly, a person’s affective and conative part of the self should be united
with the cognitive part to form an integral whole.
(2) Purity. There should be no deviant elements (even a tempting
thought) that undermine such integrity, as though one’s knowledge, desires,
emotions, and actions melt into one.2
Modern interpreters focus on 1 and neglect 2. In fact, 1 is the basic
condition for 2, but does not entail 2. For example, a person who
withstands the pressure and temptation of desires just to keep a promise is
a person of great integrity, but integrity is still not sincerity (cheng) because
the latter requires that one should transcend such inner struggle. Although
pains and struggles are natural and normal, and in some cases even
admirable, they might be harmful to a person’s life, especially when one
harbors regret or a grudge. For example, a person who knows that he
should forgive and makes a gesture that he accepts an apology is a person
of integrity, even if he is somewhat reluctant to do this; but a person
of sincerity would be the one who can undo all suspicion, and let go of
resentment and all other negative feelings. The person of sincerity no
longer feels the inner friction, just as a violin virtuoso’s performance
demonstrates perfect, skillful ease to the extent that he or she encounters
no technical obstacles.
Sincerity in the Confucian context is an ideal of virtue for learners
themselves. Its requirements should be self-directed, not imposed on others
regardless of their feelings and inner struggles. Confucianism is sympathetic
to these struggles and seeks to strike a balance in emotions rather than to
extinguish them. Learning to be sincere is a way to protect oneself from
harmful inner conflict. A person can long persist in the pursuit of virtue
when and only when he learns a way of natural ease, just like a car drives
far when its inner friction is reduced considerably.
Those who draw on Wang’s zhi xing he yi to address the problem of
weakness might miss Wang’s original concern, because Wang unambigu-
ously states that he intends by this doctrine to alert Confucian learners that
they should be watchful over their inner thoughts in order to maintain
motivational purity.3
While common people consider only outward beha-
viors as xing (doing), and do not find it problematic to have an occasional
bad thought, Wang stresses that by zhi xing he yi he means exactly to let
people understand that even an activation of a thought is already a xing
(doing), and thus evil thoughts should be nipped in the bud (Wang 2011,
pp. 109–110). Thus, sincerity is Wang’s real concern when he advocates zhi
xing he yi.
Zemian Zheng 1347

5. II. The Background of Wang Yangming’s Zhi Xing He Yi: Zhu Xi’s Puzzle of
Self-Deception
Wang Yangming’s zhi xing he yi stands in striking contrast to Zhu Xi’s thesis
that knowledge precedes action, yet they share a basic commitment that
(1) a human heart-mind originally has a priori knowledge of the good (see
Zhu 1986, p. 95); and (2) genuine knowledge leads to spontaneous action.
It is perhaps perplexing for many readers why Wang, given such a basic
commitment, would still focus his criticism on Zhu Xi. The major
discrepancy lies in the issue of whether one should seek from the external
world the knowledge of what is the best to do before taking action. It is the
task of this section to explain why Zhu Xi would take this “quasi-objectivist”
attitude toward moral knowledge.
Zhu Xi’s “knowledge precedes action” is based on the famous “eight
stages” in the Great Learning. This essay, according to Zhu Xi, teaches that
in order to manifest brilliant virtue to the world, one should follow a
sequence of learning that consists of eight stages: (1) ge wu 格物
(investigating things), (2) zhi zhi 致知 (extending knowledge), (3) cheng yi 誠
意 (making thoughts sincere), (4) zheng xin (rectifying the mind), (5) xiu shen
(cultivating the body or personal life),4
(6) qi jia (harmonizing the family), (7)
zhi guo (ruling the country), and (8) ping tian xia (bringing peace to the
world). This essay explains “making thoughts sincere” with the imperative:
“Don’t deceive yourself!” According to Zhu Xi, “investigating things” and
“making thoughts sincere” are the beginning of knowing and of doing,
respectively (see Zhu 1986, p. 305). Zhu Xi’s order of “to know and then to
act” parallels the sequence in the Great Learning. He provides a very
persuasive argument for this order in a letter:
However, thoughts [yi 意] cannot render themselves sincere on their own. Thus,
as I ponder the order of the learning procedure [in the Great Learning], the
effort of “making thoughts sincere” should be preceded by “investigating things”
and “extending knowledge.” Everyone has the heart-mind of humanity and
righteousness; but so long as one has a body, one will not be free from the
obscuration induced by material desires: therefore, one cannot get to know
oneself on one’s own. If one can investigate [the principles] in things to the
utmost extent of clarity, to the extent that the qualities of all things, whether
great or small, refined or coarse, will all be apprehended, then one sees that
principle and righteousness please the heart-mind naturally—just like meat
pleases the mouth: no need for self-deception. Otherwise, if one simply
suppresses [the heart-mind or desires] so that they dare not deceive themselves,
and if one thinks that the way of “rendering thoughts sincere” is nothing but
this, I am afraid that [this way of self-cultivation] is too harsh, though in vain,
since it cannot avoid a covert self-deception.5
Zhu Xi contends that “thoughts cannot render themselves sincere on their
own,” because (1) “so long as one has a body, one will not be free from the
1348 Philosophy East & West

6. obscuration induced by material desires”; (2) desires, when suppressed,
would disguise their petitions as good, and thus breed “covert self-
deception.” At the completion of self-deception, the deceived would not
even notice that they are in a state of delusion. In these cases, thoughts
themselves have no criteria whatsoever in the subjective realm to tell right
from wrong. This problem is not about occasional neglects that are indeed
detectable and correctable under scrutiny; rather, it is intrinsic: the structural
defect of subjectivity entails that the acquisition of genuine knowledge
requires an external objective proof.
As to the question whether the person who is self-deceived has had the
intention to lie, Zhu Xi oscillates for a long period: sometimes Zhu Xi tends to
think that there is an overt intention to lie to oneself, but at other times he
thinks that the obscuration of heart-mind by desires could occur uncon-
sciously. He eventually comes to the conclusion that the self-deceivers have
covert intentions to allow wishful thoughts of desires to slip into their mind,
thus undermining their commitment to what they previously believed to be
good to do, and leading to self-deception and weakness of will (see Zheng
2015). It is not inconsistent to say that there is a minute purposiveness in self-
deception, but at its completion, the self is unaware of its state of delusion.
Zhu Xi struggled for more than a decade in the last period of his life
tackling the problem of self-deception. Three days before his death he was
still revising his commentary in the Great Learning on the passage about
sincerity. It is perhaps the greatest challenge to his moral psychology: given
his view that genuine knowledge leads to spontaneous action, a question
remains to be answered: how can we tell genuine knowledge from false
beliefs? If false beliefs are engendered by self-deception induced by desires,
do not these beliefs equally lead to spontaneous actions in the same way
that genuine knowledge would lead to action?
This worry was aggravated upon Zhu Xi’s encounter with Lu Jiuyuan, the
forerunner of Wang Yangming and the school of “learning of the heart-
mind” (xinxue 心學). Zhu Xi comments that Lu Jiuyuan “should not rely
solely on private thoughts” (Zhu 2002, vol. 21, p. 1549) and that he does
not realize the danger that bad qi (material forces) can induce bad opinions
that blend in and disguise themselves as the li (pattern/principle) that the
heart-mind originally has (see Zhu 1986, p. 2977). In this respect, Zhu Xi
thinks that Lu Jiuyuan’s teaching resembles Zen Buddhism, though Zhu Xi
acknowledges that Lu Jiuyuan shares the Neo-Confucian belief that the
heart-mind and the li (pattern/principle) are originally one, and that Lu also
differs from Zen Buddhists, who regard the heart-mind as devoid of li. Zhu
Xi comments:
Even if one believes that the heart-mind and li are one, he might still neglect
the fact that bad temperament and material desires have a bad influence that
tends to be privately kept. Such a failure is all due to his not having genuine
knowledge [translated literally, his not truly seeing it, that is, telling the li from
Zemian Zheng 1349

7. bad opinions]. That is why I highly value the effort of investigating things.
(Zhu 1986, pp. 3015–3016—translation and interpolation mine; the same text
appears in Zhu 2002, vol. 23, p. 2689)
Zhu Xi believes that, due to the influence of desires, the realm of subjective
thoughts lacks criteria to tell right from wrong. The only way to testify to
them is through an objective investigation of things. The objects to be
investigated are the li universal in all things. However, there is a leap from
accumulative learning to sincerity and natural ease. Zhu Xi never thinks
sagely straightforwardness has anything to do with a Confucian learner’s
way of self-cultivation, for a learner’s action should always be mediated by
the guidance of a cognitive act, and by no means directly from desires. Only
through a long process of strenuous training can a person reach the acme of
virtue, which is characterized by natural ease, straightforwardness, and
spontaneity, or, rather, sincerity (cheng). But how is this leap possible?
III. Wang Yangming’s Zhi Xing He Yi as a Response to Zhu Xi
Most Confucians in the Ming dynasty shared Zhu Xi’s vision of sincerity as the
goal of self-cultivation, but some were dissatisfied with Zhu Xi’s approach to
attain sincerity. Wang endeavored twice to follow Zhu Xi’s instructions. At the
Chinese age of twenty-one, or perhaps fifteen or sixteen,6
Wang investigated
the li in the bamboos from morning till night, and became sick on the seventh
day because he thought too hard (Chan 1963, p. 689). He later comments,
“even if we could succeed in investigating every blade of grass and every tree,
how can we return to ourselves and make the will [thoughts] sincere?” (Wang
2011, p. 135; Wang 1963, no. 318, p. 247). At twenty-seven, Wang realized
that he had not followed the well-defined procedure of learning that Zhu Xi
had prescribed; then he endeavored again under Zhu Xi’s instructions to read
the Classics, only to find that “the li in things and my heart-mind are still two
distinct things” (Wang 2011, p. 1350)—the same frustration Chen Xianzhang
陳獻章 (1428–1500) had experienced.7
The fundamental turn in Wang’s thought took place after he was
banished to a semi-civilized area of what is now Guizhou. At thirty-seven, it
dawned upon him one night that the Dao is complete in the nature of every
human being. This theme is later formulated by Wang as “the heart-mind is
li ” (xin ji li 心即理), in contrast to Zhu Xi’s “re-unification of heart-mind and
li ” (xin yu li yi 心與理一), as an approach to sincerity that indicates the gap
between li and the heart-mind of the common people. Wang believed that
human nature or heart-mind on its own is sufficient for the pursuit of
sagehood. He reflected on his previous endeavor under Zhu Xi’s instruc-
tions, and said that “there is really nothing in the things in the world to
investigate,” and that “the effort to investigate things is only to be carried
out in and with reference to one’s body and mind” (Chan 1963, p. 689).
1350 Philosophy East & West

8. Wang thus contends that ge wu 格物 is not “investigating things” as Zhu
Xi’s interpretation holds. Ge 格 means to rectify, and wu 物 does not mean
external entities, but actions intended by thoughts of the heart-mind (Wang
2011, pp. 6–7). “Ge wu” means to rectify one’s thoughts toward one’s own
action. In this way, he diverts the attention to the self, rather than follow
Zhu Xi’s instructions to seek external criteria for thoughts. In the next year
(at thirty-eight) he proposed his famous dictum that knowing and doing are
one.
Wang’s debates over the relation of knowledge and action are intertwined
with his refutation of Zhu Xi’s interpretation of the Great Learning, especially
of the passage about sincerity. Four facts testify to this observation.
(1) Indeed, when Wang first came up with the dictum zhi xing he yi at
thirty-eight, it served as a response to the questions about the discrepancy
between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan (Wang 2011, p. 1355). At forty, Wang
adjudicated a debate over the discrepancy between Zhu Xi and Lu Jiuyuan.
His representation of Zhu Xi betrayed that he was very knowledgeable about
Zhu Xi’s final edition of commentary on “making thoughts sincere,” and of
Zhu Xi’s concern about Lu Jiuyuan’s teaching, although Wang might not
have known the whole story of Zhu Xi’s repeated revision of this
commentary. Wang says, “[Zhu Xi] insists that one should first investigate
things and extend knowledge until one attains a comprehensive insight, and
then substantiate it through the effort to make thoughts sincere and rectify
the heart-mind so that it does not err” (Wang 2011, p. 1359—interpolation
mine). Wang was at least aware that Zhu Xi interpreted the “cheng” in
cheng-yi (making thoughts sincere) as “to substantiate” in the final edition of
his commentary.8
Moreover, Wang sees clearly that Zhu Xi proposed this
precedence of cognition over action because he was worried that some
learners might “ignore normal procedure.” By “some learners,” Wang
probably means those learners influenced by Lu Jiuyuan, for the context of
Wang’s words is his comments on the disputes between Zhu Xi and Lu
Jiuyuan. As is mentioned above, Zhu Xi believed that his teaching differed
greatly from Lu Jiuyuan’s because he stresses the effort to “investigate things”
and its precedence over “making thoughts sincere.” To some extent, zhi xing
he yi answers Zhu Xi’s deep concern. Not only was Wang knowledgeable
about Zhu Xi’s concern when he adjudicated the dispute at forty, he even
showed his sympathy for Zhu Xi, acknowledging that Zhu Xi’s goal in
seeking knowledge was to cultivate virtue, while later Confucian learners
neglected Zhu Xi’s real concern and abandoned themselves to seeking
knowledge in petty details.9
(2) At thirty-nine, Wang once regretted that the doctrine of zhi xing he yi
caused so much dispute that his students were too engaged in discussion
rather than reflecting on their own heart-mind (Wang 2011, p. 1357). He
strategically focused on “making thoughts sincere” and adopted the ancient
edition of the Great Learning to articulate his view.10
Zhu Xi altered the
Zemian Zheng 1351

9. order of the passages in the Great Learning, setting the passage on “making
thoughts sincere” after a passage Zhu Xi supplemented in his explanation of
“investigating things” and “extending knowledge.” Wang advocates using
the ancient edition unaltered by Zhu Xi, because sincerity, rather than
cognitive effort, should be set up as the goal of “the great learning.” Wang
wrote the “Preface to the Ancient Edition of the Great Learning” (Daxue
guben xu 大學古本序), the first draft of which (in 1518, at forty-seven)
emphasizes that “making thoughts sincere” is the key to self-cultivation in
the Great Learning (Wang 2011, pp. 1383–1384).11
Clearly, sincerity is
Wang’s central concern. This concern becomes clear in his early articulation
of his earliest doctrine that “when the mind is free from the obscuration of
selfish desires, it is the embodiment of the Principle of Nature” (Wang 2011,
pp. 3–4; Wang 1963, no. 3, p. 7), where he frequently uses such expressions
as “if one is sincerely filially pious” and “if the heart-mind is pure principle,”
and says that without this sincerity and purity, practicing the routine of filial
piety would be like play-acting.
(3) In Wang’s definition of key terms such as heart-mind, thoughts,
knowledge, and things (four key terms from the Great Learning), he puts yi
(thoughts) at the center of the terminological field, with other terms defined
in relation to it (Wang 2011, p. 6—to be elaborated in section 4 on the
genetic model). This is obviously intended to provide a new approach to
“making thoughts sincere.”
(4) In Wang’s most famous argument for zhi xing he yi, he adduces an
example from the passage of sincerity, a case about liking good color and
disliking bad odor, to show a genuine case when the “original substance of
knowing and doing” is “not separated by selfish thoughts” (to be elaborated
below in this section).
In fact, Wang’s arguments for zhi xing he yi go hand in hand with his
refutation of Zhu Xi’s prioritizing of cognitive acts. Drawing on Wang’s
dialogues and correspondence, we can re-construct Wang’s refutation in the
following passages. At some points, Wang does not entirely do justice to
Zhu Xi in his presentation of the latter’s thoughts. In order to have a fluent
discussion of Wang’s view, we will concentrate on Zhu Xi’s thoughts as
presented by Wang, rather than Zhu Xi’s own thoughts. Brief caveats, if
necessary, will be added to avoid misunderstanding.
(1) Wang thinks that the cognitive act of attaining knowledge is itself a
process of learning that involves the activities of the body; hence, a
cognitive act is itself an action. This argument was provided by Wang in a
letter to Gu Dongqiao, a scholar sympathetic with Zhu Xi’s teaching, who
casts doubt on Wang’s zhi xing he yi, repeating Zhu Xi’s view that without
extensive studies of things in the world, one cannot on one’s own become
aware of the boundary between good and evil; thus, knowledge should be
prior to proper action. In reply, Wang equates cognitive acts with the
process of learning, just as getting to know archery is through the process of
1352 Philosophy East & West

10. practicing how to use bows and arrows (see Wang 2011, p. 51). In this
sense, as Cua has pointed out, Wang’s knowledge in zhi xing he yi is
embodied knowledge in a sense similar to “know-how”: “to know” entails
that one has managed to do.12
(2) Zhu Xi thinks that since thoughts themselves contain no inner criteria
to tell true belief from falsity inflicted through self-deception, he advocates
the way of discussion in the course of investigating things. However, Wang
contends, discussion is itself an action. Even in discussing the li (pattern/
principle) about what is right or wrong, one might already have some bad
thoughts and intentions that contain some preconception influenced by
desires (see Wang 2011, p. 28). It is self-defeating to say that one should get
to know the truth before taking action, when the process of “getting to
know” is itself an action, and when “getting to know” has in itself what the
cognitive acts intend to preclude. We might help Wang articulate the point:
Zhu Xi fails to distinguish between two kinds of zhi (knowledge/to get to
know). Zhu rightly holds that genuine knowledge (zhi 知—as a noun) guides
correct actions, but here zhi (knowledge) is a state of awareness of belief,
not a process of learning (zhi 知—as a verb meaning “to get to know”),
which is by nature an action and could therefore be misled by false
preconception. Thus, Zhu Xi commits a fallacy in concluding that the
process of acquiring knowledge should precede action, from the premise
that genuine knowledge guides correct actions.
(3) Though Zhu Xi distinguishes between profound and superficial
knowledge (subject to self-deception and obscuration) and thus designs a
learning process to deepen knowledge, it seems to Wang that the
followers of Zhu Xi, in prioritizing genuine knowledge over action, fail to
realize that to understand li is a dynamic process. It is a predicament that
the undertaking of learning li always begins with an imperfect subjective
state. When Wang was asked the question how one can make thoughts
sincere if one does not truly know the boundary between moral principle
and selfish desires, Wang replied that if one exerts effort in self-cultivation
without ceasing, one will gradually, day by day, see the subtlety of the
Principle of Nature and selfish desires in one’s mind: “It is like walking on
the road to go somewhere. As one walks one section of the road, he
recognizes the next section. When he comes to a fork, and is in doubt, he
will ask and then go on. Only then can he gradually reach his destination”
(Wang 1963, no. 65, p. 46) In contrast, the common learners of Wang’s
time were reluctant to act according to the knowledge they already had,
and worried about things they did not know, using them as an excuse to
postpone action (Wang 2011, pp. 23–24). At this point, the difference
between Zhu Xi and Wang is not as substantial as it seems. Zhu Xi also
realized the importance of practice as a source of moral knowledge, and
held that knowledge inquiry and practice strengthen each other (Zhu
1986, p. 148).
Zemian Zheng 1353

11. (4) As a corollary of the views stated above, especially of the view that
cognitive acts are action, the question of whether one knows is then
transferred to the question of whether one is willing to know. When Wang
was asked, “people all say that when knowledge has not been attained,
action is ineffective. Now I do not have knowledge; how can I take action?”
Wang replied, “the heart-mind of right and wrong is an innate capacity of
knowledge. Everyone has it. Don’t worry that it does not know, only worry
that you are unwilling to know. Don’t worry about knowledge not yet
attained, only worry about not taking action to extend knowledge” (Wang
2011, pp. 307–308). In defending his view that everyone has liangzhi 良知
(original knowledge of the good), Wang states, “Mencius said, ‘The way of
truth [Dao] is like a great road. Is it difficult to know? The trouble is that
men do not follow it.’ In innate knowledge and innate ability, men and
women of simple intelligence and the sage are equal. Their difference lies in
the fact that the sage alone can extend his innate knowledge while men and
women of simple intelligence cannot” (Wang 1963, no. 139, p. 108; cf.
Wang 2011, p. 56).
(5) For Zhu Xi, moral knowledge is a priori, present in the heart-mind but
susceptible to obscuration of desires: we only seek validation in things. For
Wang, each recognition of a genuine reaction of the heart-mind to a particular
situation is a unique discovery of liangzhi. In order to better understand Wang,
we should resist the tendency to construe moral knowledge as an awareness
of a set of moral rules already present in things or a priori in mind. As an
example, Wang takes sage-king Shun’s choice when facing a moral dilemma:
As for Shun’s marrying without first telling his parents [because his father would
have stopped this, but at the same time having no male offspring was then
considered to be the greatest offense against filial piety], was there someone
before him who did the same thing and served as an example for him, which
he could find out by looking into certain records and asking certain people,
after which he did as he did? Or did he search into the innate knowledge in an
instant of thought in his own mind and weigh all factors as to what was proper,
after which he could not help doing what he did? (Wang 1963, pp. 109–110—
interpolation mine)
In this sense, moral knowledge for Wang is just a report of the response of
the heart-mind in a person’s active engagement with the world.
Wang points out that “unity of knowing and doing” is the authentic
phenomenon everyone can discover when they pay closer attention to their
heart-mind’s genuine reaction to things. Wang agrees with Zhu Xi that
sincerity is the unity of knowing and doing, or the unity of the heart-mind
with principle. But unlike Zhu Xi, who regards such unity as an ideal that
only a sage can attain, Wang advises that we start thinking through things
near at hand: there are some moments in which we can be sure that we are
perfectly sincere. Why don’t we start our cultivation of sincerity with that?
1354 Philosophy East & West

12. The famous example Wang uses to support zhi xing he yi is borrowed
from the passage on sincerity in the Great Learning: a virtuous person is
sincere “just like loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors.” Wang says,
When sages and worthies taught people about knowledge and action, it was
precisely because they wanted them to restore the original substance . . .
Therefore the Great Learning points to true knowledge and action for people to
see, saying, they are “like loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors.” Seeing
beautiful colors appertains to knowledge, while loving beautiful colors appertains
to action. However, as soon as one sees that beautiful color, he has already loved
it. It is not that he sees it first and then makes up his mind to love it. Smelling a
bad odor appertains to knowledge, while hating a bad odor appertains to action.
However, as soon as one smells a bad odor, he has already hated it. It is not that
he smells it first and then makes up his mind to hate it. A person with his nose
stuffed up does not smell the bad odor even if he sees a malodorous object before
him, and so he does not hate it. This amounts to not knowing bad odor. Suppose
we say that so-and-so knows filial piety and so-and-so knows brotherly respect.
They must have actually practiced filial piety and brotherly respect before they
can be said to know them. (Chan 1963, p. 669)
In the state of sincerity, knowledge of the good is not a passive acknowl-
edgment of value that still needs to be substantiated with motivation before
one can actually wholeheartedly act on it. Rather, knowledge of the good is a
report of the values that have already suggested themselves in a sincere
person’s responses to things. In this sense, knowledge does not precede action.
Wang does not deny the importance of seeking guidance before action in
concrete situations. What he stresses is that in any value-perception, recogniz-
ing value goes hand in hand with the feeling of agreeableness or repulsiveness.
Wang’s instruction for his disciple is that knowledge of the good is attained
through value-perception that only occurs in our engagement with the world.
Therefore, extending moral knowledge is a matter of action, not a purely
cognitive act prior to action. To pursue sagely sincerity, we may start thinking
via this original state we already have. From Wang’s point of view, Zhu Xi’s
quasi-objectivist attitude toward learning principle in things is so foreign to
real life. When Wang says, “It is not that he sees it [beautiful colors] first and
then makes up his mind to love it”; he probably has in mind Zhu Xi’s
prioritizing of knowing over doing (and, correspondingly, prioritizing the
“extending of knowledge” over “making thoughts sincere”).
However, can Wang persuasively respond to Zhu Xi’s challenge that
“thoughts cannot render themselves sincere on their own”? If one can
become totally self-deceived without even noticing it, how can one be
certain about one’s own belief? How can one not start from seeking
knowledge in things first? In fact, Wang denies the possibility of such utter
ignorance, constructing two models of moral consciousness that answer the
challenge. Following this line, we now understand why, after his zhi xing he
yi, Wang further advocates “extending liangzhi.”
Zemian Zheng 1355

13. This logical development from Zhu Xi’s puzzle of self-deception to
Wang Yangming’s zhi xing he yi has long been neglected by modern
historians, partially because Wang seldom used this term “self-deception”
(zi qi 自欺) to discuss the phenomenon of the obscuration of the heart-mind
by desires, which Zhu Xi would diagnose as self-deception—partially because
later, Wang, based on his view of liangzhi, did not locate self-deception as the
central issue in moral psychology as did Zhu Xi. Although Wang was alert
to the same problem (as can be seen earlier, his disputers also alerted him to
this phenomenon), he did not use the term “self-deception” to label the
phenomenon. In the course of defending zhi xing he yi, he expressly said that
it is a matter of whether one is willing to know. When he proposes “extending
liangzhi,” he strongly believes that liangzhi cannot be totally obscured by
material desires. This move enables him to explain moral failures without
using the theory-laden label “self-deception”—unlike Zhu Xi, who took pains
to explain self-deception using a terminology of moral psychology that catches
the nuances of this phenomenon.
IV. From Zhi Xing He Yi to Liangzhi: The Later Wang’s Response to Zhu Xi’s
Puzzle of Self-Deception
From the above-mentioned observation of the genesis of Wang’s philosophy,
we can see how crucial a role Zhu Xi’s puzzle of self-deception and
sincerity plays in Wang’s teaching of zhi xing he yi. Furthermore, we can
even claim that Wang’s later doctrine of “extending liangzhi” (first
appearance in 1521) is a continuation of the inner logic of Wang’s zhi xing
he yi (first appearance in 1509). A great amount of evidence testifies to this
claim; for instance:
(1) Wang explicitly says that such original unity of knowing and doing is
the liangzhi and liangneng 良知良能 (originally good knowledge and ability)
that everyone has. Even those with poor ethical quality who have difficulty
in learning to become good can rely on such an innate endowment (Wang
2011, p. 78).
(2) Echoing his own comment on “loving beautiful colors and hating bad
odors,” Wang says, “Innate knowledge [liangzhi] is nothing but the sense of
right and wrong, and the sense of right and wrong is nothing but to love
[the right] and to hate [the wrong]. To love [the right] and to hate [the
wrong] cover all senses of right and wrong and the sense of right and wrong
covers all affairs and their variations” (Wang 1963, no. 288, p. 228; cf.
Wang 2011, p. 126). Liangzhi is the authentic knowledge in a state of unity
of knowledge and action.
(3) Trying to understand Wang’s “extending liangzhi,” Chen Jiuchuan
陳九川, one of Wang’s students, displays the inner logic of Wang’s doctrine
as follows: in order to attain the ultimate goal of “manifesting brilliant
virtue” in the Great Learning, one should make one’s thoughts sincere; in
1356 Philosophy East & West

14. order to tell whether a thought is sincere, one should be able to notice and
take seriously any minute incipient bad thoughts, just like Yan Hui, who
“never failed to notice whenever there was a bad [thought].” Wang
comments that Chen gets the point when he illustrates liangzhi by Yan Hui’s
顔回 example (see Wang 2011, pp. 102–103). Elsewhere Wang says that
“Confucius never acted without knowing why and whenever Yen Hui [Yan
Hui] did anything wrong [or, rather, had a bad thought] he never failed to
realize it. This is the real essence of the doctrine of the Sage” (Wang 1963,
no. 259, p. 216—interpolation mine; cf. Wang 2011, p. 118).13
In his
Inquiry on the Great Learning he states that making thoughts sincere requires
that the good and bad aspects of thoughts be distinguished; thus, it is
dependent on “extending liangzhi” (Wang 2011, p. 1070).
(4) After Wang came up with his new doctrine of “extending liangzhi,”
he revised his “Preface to the Ancient Edition of the Great Learning.” In the
final version, though retaining his old claim that “making thoughts sincere”
(rather than using Zhu Xi’s cognitive effort) is the key to the Great Learning,
he adds that “making thoughts sincere” hinges on “extending the [original]
knowledge [of the substance of the heart-mind].”14
How does the notion of liangzhi contribute to the solution of Zhu Xi’s
puzzle that one could be totally self-deceived, as thoughts cannot render
themselves sincere on their own?
There are at least two models of liangzhi that answer the challenge, one
structural and the other genetic. By “structural model” I mean that liangzhi
and thoughts pertain to different levels of the structure of mental acts, which
enables liangzhi to directly see the good and the bad in thoughts; by
“genetic model” I mean that deviant thoughts are generated from the
original unity of knowing and doing, just like waves come from water; thus,
any deviant thoughts can be at least indirectly detected through the
restlessness and inner conflicts of mental states.
The Structural Model: The Distinction between Liangzhi and Yi (Thoughts)
For Wang, liangzhi is an innate capacity of the moral knowledge that all
people have, a source of sagehood that all common people share (Wang
2011, pp. 312, 870). Even a thief would be bashful when he is called a thief
(Wang 2011, p. 105). Wang compares liangzhi to the sun: though it might
sometimes be clouded, it can never be totally obscured (Wang 2011, p.
126). Those who know how to rely on their liangzhi will not be obscured
by any deviant thoughts that might lead to the obscuration of the heart-mind
(Wang 2011, p. 106). Wang Yangming distinguishes liangzhi and thoughts
as follows:
You spoke about following one’s ch’ing [feelings] and thoughts, and acting
according to these as though they were liang-chih [liangzhi], rather than
according to the real liang-chih. This shows that you have already located the
danger. Thought and liang-chih should be clearly distinguished one from the
Zemian Zheng 1357

15. other (意與良知當分別明白). Thought arises out of response to an object, and
may be either good or bad. Liang-chih is that which can distinguish between
the good and the bad in thought (知得意之是與非者, 則謂之良知). When one
follows one’s liang-chih, all that one does cannot be wrong. (Wang 1972,
p. 114—interpolation mine; Wang 2011, p. 242)
We may vaguely characterize liangzhi as a second level of awareness whose
objects are not thoughts or events themselves, but their value-qualities.
Liangzhi can directly perceive the values of the thoughts in the same way that
the eyes perceive colors and distinguish light from darkness without mediation
of reflection or deliberation (Wang 2011, p. 126).15
Wang says, “The shining
mind will of course shine, but the erroneous mind will also shine.” Therefore,
to realize that the ideal heart-mind, whose substance is liangzhi, never ceases
to shine through is “learning to achieve the state of absolute sincerity without
cease” (Wang 1963, no. 151, p. 132). Whenever there is a deviant thought, it
can be immediately noticed through self-awareness. Wang thinks that the only
problem is that the common people simply do not wish to see.
Besides the capacity of value-perception, liangzhi has another aspect:
the capacity of self-awareness and self-examination, which I believe is
crucial to his solution to Zhu Xi’s puzzle of self-deception. Liangzhi has the
capacity to be cautious toward problematic thoughts. This capacity pre-
empts self-deception or any sources of obscuration of the heart-mind. Wang
says, “It is innate knowledge [liangzhi] that can be cautious and apprehen-
sive” (能戒慎恐懼者是良知也) (Wang 1963, no. 159, p. 139; Wang 2011,
p. 74). Wang describes liangzhi as the capacity for self-awareness or duzhi
獨知, knowing what other people do not know but the subject alone knows
(see Wang 2011, p. 871).16
In light of the notion of duzhi, the logical move
from “making thoughts sincere” to zhi xing he yi and then to “extending
liangzhi” can be clearly seen, for example, in the following:
Only when the effort reaches this point of sincerity of the will [thoughts] will it
find a solution. However, the foundation of the sincerity of the will [thoughts]
lies in the extension of knowledge. What has been described as “what people
do not know but I alone know” [duzhi] is exactly the innate knowledge
[liangzhi] in our mind. If one knows what good is but does not do it right then
and there according to this innate knowledge [liangzhi], or knows what evil is
but does not get rid of it according to this innate knowledge, this innate
knowledge will be obscured. This means that knowledge cannot be extended.
(Wang 1963, no. 318, p. 248—interpolation mine; cf. Wang 2011, p. 135)
The Genetic Model: How Thoughts Deviate from the Original Unity of
Knowing and Doing
From the case of “loving beautiful colors and hating bad odors,” we can see
that there is at least a standard for the test of sincerity: in a sincere state, a
person has neither second thoughts nor contrived reactions, which normally
1358 Philosophy East & West

16. appear in the cases of the deluded or obscured state of mind. This leads us
to another thesis of Wang’s liangzhi, namely that liangzhi in its original state
is an undifferentiated unity in which cognitive and affective elements are not
divided. A problematic thought is a deviation from the originally sincere
state of awareness. Due to this genetic connection between thoughts and
liangzhi, deviations are noticeable whenever a person exerts caution.
Wang briefly defines the relation among heart-mind, thoughts, knowl-
edge, and things—four key terms from the Great Learning—as follows:17
The master of the body is the mind [“heart-mind”]. What emanates from
[is activated in] the mind is the will [yi 意, “thought”]. The original substance of
the will [thought] is knowledge, and wherever the will [thought] is directed is a
thing. For example, when the will [thought] is directed toward serving one’s
parents, then serving one’s parents is a “thing.” (Wang 1963, no. 6, p. 14—
interpolation mine; Wang 2011, p. 6)
In defining the relationship between liangzhi and thoughts, Wang states:
“the substance (benti 本體) of thoughts is zhi (knowing/awareness)” (意之本
體便是知). If we compare this saying with a more elaborated version of this
set of definitions in his letter to Gu Dongqiu, we find that zhi here is an
abbreviation of liangzhi. In this letter Wang says,
The mind is the master of the body, and the pure intelligence and clear
consciousness of the mind are the innate or original knowledge [liangzhi].
When this innate knowledge which is pure intelligence and clear consciousness
is influenced by things and events and responds to them with activity, it is
called the will [thought] (其虚靈明覺之良知應感而動者謂之意). With knowl-
edge, there will be the will [thought]. Without knowledge, there will be no will
[thought]. Is knowledge not the substance of the will [thought]? (Wang 1963,
no. 137, p. 104; Wang 2011, pp. 53–54—interpolation mine)
Now the question of how we should understand the relationship between
liangzhi and thought hinges on the term “benti” (original substance) in
Wang’s saying “liangzhi is the benti of thoughts.” The usage of benti
(substance) is unique in Chinese philosophy. It sometimes means “original
state,” sometimes “substance.” When he says, “With knowledge, there will
be the will [thought]. Without knowledge, there will be no will [thought],”
he seems to suggest that liangzhi is a condition for thought, or even that
liangzhi is constitutive of thought.
Concerning benti as substance, the most frequently used analogy in
Chinese philosophy is that the benti (substance) of waves is water. In this
sense, liangzhi constitutes thoughts in the same way that water constitutes
waves. Water can flow peacefully and wavelessly; waves take shape only
when water hits obstacles and drops backward onto the surface of the water.
By the same token, in the state of sincerity of mind all thoughts are like
peacefully flowing water; deviant thoughts take shape when it meets
obstacles and then have second thoughts added onto the previously tranquil
Zemian Zheng 1359

17. awareness. Although they are deviant, they nonetheless take shape out of
the stream of awareness. This could mean that the restlessness of deviant
thought is itself an indicator of discrepancy of mind, by which one can
notice, at least indirectly, the possible roots of self-deception. In the line of
this logic we find Wang saying:
Innate knowledge [liangzhi] is where the Principle of Nature is clear and
intelligent. Therefore innate knowledge is identical with the Principle of Nature.
Thinking [si 思] is the emanation and functioning of innate knowledge. If one’s
thinking is the emanation and functioning of innate knowledge, whatever he
thinks about is the Principle of Nature. Thoughts resulting from the emanation
and functioning of innate knowledge are naturally clear, simple, and easy. The
faculty of innate knowledge knows them as such. But thoughts issuing from
manipulation according to one’s personal wishes (si yi 私意, thoughts) are
naturally troublesome and disturbing, and the innate faculty is naturally able to
distinguish them. For whether thoughts are right or wrong, correct or perverse,
the faculty of innate knowledge itself knows them all. (Wang 1963, no. 169,
p. 152—interpolation mine; Wang 2011, pp. 81–82)
An objection to Wang’s using “without second thoughts and contrived
action” as an indicator of sincerity is that these two do not necessarily imply
each other. On the one hand, a self-deceived person might seem to have
neither second thoughts nor contrived action, or even if he has, he might
not notice that he has them. On the other hand, not all restlessness could be
regarded as an indicator of the discrepancy of the mind. A morally good
form of knowledge could be accompanied by restlessness of the heart, for
instance a person’s restless striving to correct his bad habits. In such cases,
having second thoughts is normal. In fact, Wang does distinguish these
good striving actions from the contrived actions that show discrepancy
between one’s belief and the executive will. Wang criticized a person who
felt that extending liangzhi is a strenuous and exhausting task, saying that
this is because “in wanting to extend innate knowledge one lacks the true
and earnest effort toward sincerity and single-mindedness . . . Have you ever
seen a person hating a bad odor or loving a beautiful color rouse himself in
order to hold on, or getting completely exhausted when the work is done?
Or forced by circumstances and exhausted in spirit and energy?” (Wang
1963, no. 170, pp. 154–155; Wang 2011, p. 83).
The difference between the structural model and the genetic model of
liangzhi is that the former contrasts the function of liangzhi with that of
thoughts, while the latter stresses the genetic connection between them.
They correspond to two kinds of scenarios: the former to the cases in which
the good or bad quality of thoughts is directly perceived by liangzhi, the
latter to the cases in which the moral agent has been disturbed by bad
thoughts, but can still indirectly detect with liangzhi the non-ideal state
through the restlessness and inner conflict of the heart-mind.
1360 Philosophy East & West

18. It seems as if Wang believes that it is sufficient to rely solely on liangzhi
in moral issues. In fact, we may distinguish two kinds of knowledge: moral
knowledge (about the end of action), and technical knowledge (about the
means). The former sets the general direction for actions, while the latter
ascertains the accurate path. To borrow Wang’s case, it is the love for
parents that motivates a person to serve them, while the details of routines
are only techniques to serve this end (Wang 2011, p. 3). Therefore, Wang
does not mean that liangzhi includes all knowledge that one should have
for action. He only means that it is the guide for action, the “head” (tounao
頭腦) for Confucian learning (Wang 2011, p. 44); as Wang says, “The reason
why the sincerity of the will [thoughts] is singled out for discussion is
precisely because it is the basis [or head, 頭腦] of learning” (Wang 1963,
no. 129, p. 86).
One of the challenges for Wang, I believe, is whether there is an infinite
regress in his solution to Zhu Xi’s puzzle by the notion of liangzhi. As we
recall that Wang’s liangzhi has two aspects—value-perception and self-
examination—we find that Wang’s solution to the problem of the obscuration
of liangzhi is circular: when he claims that liangzhi has the power of telling
good and bad, right and wrong, he has to face the problem of moral
misjudgment; when he explains that moral misjudgment is due to the
obscuration of liangzhi by material desire, he claims that another aspect of
liangzhi as the capacity for self-examination could exclude any possible
obscuration of thought. This is to defer the problem in moral judgment to the
realm of moral self-examination. But then how does self-examination work? It
surely relies on a certain power of judgment to know either what is right or at
least that one is aware that one is deluded. In either case, the challenge is
deferred back to the realm of moral judgment. It seems to be running in a
circle, in an infinite regress in which the task of answering the challenge is
deferred back and forth between the two aspects of liangzhi.
Conclusion
After the analysis of Wang’s refutation of Zhu Xi’s prioritizing of knowledge
over action, and of his strong belief that liangzhi is capable of noticing any
self-deceptive element whenever it exercises caution, it is now clear that
Wang’s “unity of knowing and doing” is advice for a Confucian learner to
pay attention to the original state where a person’s cognitive, affective, and
conative parts are not separate, and then, in order to preserve this ideal state
that one already has, one should search for and extinguish all deviant
elements of thoughts obstructive to experiencing sincerity. To borrow
Wang’s own example, if someone feels tempted to do something wrong, he
should reflect on the fact that he does not even have a thought of stealing
anything, not to mention of deliberating over it (Wang 2011, p. 25). This
absence of deviant thoughts is an indicator of his sincerity or “unity of
Zemian Zheng 1361

19. knowing and doing.” Therefore, his thoughts and behavior toward bad
temptations should be the same as he has toward theft.
As self-deception always paves the way for weakness of will, in most
cases keeping sincerity is a fundamental way of pre-empting weakness of
will, just like keeping a healthy lifestyle and avoiding exposure to harmful
viruses is a much easier way of protecting life than curing serious diseases.18
In weakness of will, the discrepancy among cognitive, affective, and
conative parts of the self becomes salient, while at the beginning, the cause
might simply be a deviant thought that issues from the originally undiffer-
entiated unity.
Influenced by a Western conceptual framework, especially the Platonic
tripartite treatment of moral agency, scholars in reading Wang’s zhi xing he yi
usually focus on whether it can respond to the challenge of weakness of will.
Though such discussions are fruitful and insightful, this might only be a
derivative question. Wang does not deny that there are cases in which one has
superficial moral knowledge but does not act on it. His answer to this
challenge resembles that of Zhu Xi: this only means that the person does not
know something deeply enough. To use Wang Yangming’s example, those
who know that something is bad and still do it are like those whose noses are
stuffed up and thus do not hate odorous things as much as others, even when
they know that they would hate these. If we focus on this issue of weakness of
the will, we might fail to recognize what is unique in Wang’s thought in
contrast with Zhu Xi’s: while Zhu Xi would urge learners to get to know the
good first, and then cultivate the motivational basis accordingly, Wang would
let learners observe the originally undifferentiated unity, and use it as a model
for the cultivation of sincerity. Zhu Xi assumes such cognitive/non-cognitive
division and advocates a procedure of learning that re-unites the two, while
Wang disagrees with such a division (at least in ethics).
By paying closer attention to the puzzle of self-deception, I have
reconstructed in this essay a line of development of Wang Yangming’s
thought, giving an account of how Wang proposes an alternative way of
attaining sincerity, a way through which Wang bypasses Zhu Xi’s theoretical
and practical obstacles. This new narrative is compatible with—but more
profound than and explanatory of—the commonly accepted, somewhat
dramatic narrative (especially in the story of how Wang took sick in
investigating principle in the bamboo) about how Wang followed Zhu Xi’s
instruction on investigating things and later rejected Zhu Xi’s doctrines.
Notes
I am indebted to Kwong-loi Shun, Genyou Wu, Bryan Van Norden, Winnie
Sung, Yong Huang, Ben Cross, Cheng Yuan, and the anonymous referees of
this journal for their helpful comments on a previous draft of this article. I
was lucky to have the opportunities to give talks on this topic at the
1362 Philosophy East & West

20. Philosophy Department of the Chinese University of Hong Kong and at
Nanyang Technological University, Singapore, and I am grateful to the
organizers and the audience for their constructive feedback.
Work on this article was supported by the research project “The Origin and
Modern Transformation of Wang Yangming’s Learning of Heart-Mind” (陽明
心學的歷史淵源及其近代轉型) (Project Number: 16JJD720014, Humanities
and Social Sciences Research, Ministry of Education, China).
1 – For a full discussion about the relationship between the self and the
world in the Zhongyong, see Tu 1989, pp. 67–92.
2 – Drawing on a distinction between two notions of purity introduced by
Walker (1978), Kwong-loi Shun distinguishes two connotations of purity:
(1) “entirety or wholeness” and (2) the “absence of impurity understood
as contaminating elements that are negatively evaluated” (Shun 2010). In
the present essay, impurity refers to deviant thoughts or intentions that
have the potential for undermining one’s integrity, namely the consis-
tency between beliefs and affective and conative parts of a moral agent.
3 – This concern pertains to the second of what Kwong-loi Shun categorizes
as three dimensions of zhi xing he yi: (1) “corresponding action is
needed before one can truly be described as having knowledge.” (2)
“According to Wang, advocating the unity of knowledge and action
serves to alert people to the fact that just the emergence of a thought is
itself an action, and so if there is something bad in one’s thought, one
needs to correct it immediately.” (3) “[T]he teaching is also intended to
convey a certain view about how knowledge and action are related in
the original state of the heart/mind [. . .] According to Wang, when the
heart/mind responds in its original state, knowledge and action are just
parts of one single response without the former guiding the latter” (Shun
2011, pp. 98–99). I agree that in the second dimension there is some
agreement between Wang and Zhu Xi, for it points to their common
ultimate ideal of sincerity.
4 – Shen 身 could mean either body or self. “Shen” in the Great Learning
is translated by Wing-tsit Chan as “personal life” (Chan 1963, p. 86).
5 – Zhu 2002, vol. 23, p. 2883. Cf. Zheng 2015, p. 350. According to
Chen Lai, this letter might have been written after 1188 (see Chen Lai
2007, p. 288).
6 – In traditional texts, a person’s age was reckoned according to the
Chinese lunar calendar. The age of a newborn is already one before its
first birthday, and so forth, so a person’s Chinese age may be one or
two years older than the age reckoned according to the modern
Western calendar. In what follows I use Chinese age in order to stay
Zemian Zheng 1363

21. consistent with the traditional text. The Chronicles of Wang Yangming
seems to date the story of investigating bamboo’s principle to the age
of twenty-one, but Chen Lai argues that it should be dated to the age
of fifteen or sixteen; see Chen Lai 2003, p. 613.
7 – Chen Xianzhang exerted great effort in reading the Confucian Classics,
yet felt frustrated and said, “there is nowhere my heart-mind and the li
(pattern/principle) can converge” (Chen Xianzhang 1987, p. 145).
8 – Zhu 1983, pp. 3–4. Here “thoughts” corresponds to the original text
“xin zhi suo fa” 心之所發 (what is activated in the heart-mind). In this
context, concerning the Great Learning, they are interchangeable.
9 – Wang is sometimes less sympathetic to Zhu Xi’s teaching. A saying of
Wang’s seems to suggest that he is dissatisfied with Zhu Xi’s approach
because of Zhu Xi’s neglect of making thoughts sincere (Wang 2011,
p. 44; Wang 1963, no. 129, pp. 86–87). But if we consider the fact
that Wang is aware that Zhu Xi regards making thoughts sincere as the
goal for investigating things and extending knowledge, we can see that
what is at issue in this text is whether making thoughts sincere should
be preceded by investigating things and extending knowledge, which
is the crucial difference between Zhu Xi’s edition of the Great Learning
and Wang’s. According to Wang’s diagnosis, Zhu Xi’s insistence that
making thoughts sincere depends on the guidance of knowledge leads
learners to suspend the effort of making thoughts themselves sincere,
and to focus on seeking objective knowledge, but then Zhu Xi needs
other efforts such as jing 敬 (respect/seriousness) to alert the learners to
the cultivation of virtue. For Wang, this way of learning is an
unnecessary detour that renders Zhu Xi’s followers (rather than Zhu Xi
himself) forgetful of his real ethical concern, which is sincerity.
10 – I am grateful to one of the reviewers for this point.
11 – His students reported that at forty-one he already had the idea that ge
wu (“rectifying things that are intended by the thoughts,” instead of
Zhu Xi’s reading of ge wu as “investigating things”) is an effort of
cheng yi (making thoughts sincere) (Wang 2011, p. 1362).
12 – If “know-how” is understood as an embodied knowledge of what it is
like to do something, not simply a skill, I would adopt the view that
Wang Yangming’s zhi 知 (knowing/to know) in zhi xing he yi is
“know-how.” Yang Xiaomei argues against Cua’s view that it is “know-
how” by pointing out that knowing that “it is right to repay one’s debt”
does not entail that “one actually pays it.” Thus moral knowledge “is
not a matter of skill or know-how” (Yang 2009, p. 175). Yang’s
contention might hold if know-how were understood merely as a skill.
However, know-how can be much more than a skill. Having a skill
1364 Philosophy East & West

22. does not necessarily entail being willing to employ such a skill, but
having the knowledge of what it is like, or rather having a good sense
of doing something, is usually already feeling empathy toward it and
finding a good reason to keep doing it. “Knowing how to repay a debt”
as an embodied knowledge could be much more than just a financial
skill; it could involve, for instance, knowing what it is like to respect
others, knowing how to relieve oneself of a burden of guilt. In real life,
most skills are learned because they are meant to be used; most
“know-how” includes skill and knowing what it is like. Those skills
that are not meant to be used are rare exceptions. In this restricted
sense, I tend to adopt Cua’s formulation of zhi as know-how. Huang
Yong recently argued that Wang Yangming’s liangzhi is neither
knowing-how nor knowing-that, but knowing-to (cf. Huang 2017).
13 – Here “a bad thought” corresponds to bu shan (not good), which in this
context refers to bad thoughts rather than bad actions. Zhu Xi also
quotes the same line about Yan Hui in his discussion about “making
thoughts sincere.” See Zhu 1986, p. 328; Zheng 2015, p. 354.
14 – Wang 2011, pp. 270–271. In this context, zhi (knowledge) refers to
liangzhi. For a detailed study on Wang’s revision of this preface, see
Chen Lai 1991, pp. 119–125.
15 – Nivison says, “Wang Yang-ming, like Mencius, sees the mind as like
the senses” (Nivison 1973, p. 131). For a full discussion of Wang
Yangming’s color analogy, see Ivanhoe 2011.
16 – For a textual analysis of Wang Yangming’s notion of jie shen kong ju
(being cautious and apprehensive) and duzhi (self-awareness), and for
a historical account of how Wang Yangming’s doctrine of liangzhi was
developed via his response to Zhu Xi’s notion of jie shen kong ju, cf.
Zheng 2017.
17 – There are at least five places (Wang 2011, pp. 6, 53–54, 86–87, 103,
1069–1071) where Wang defines the relations among heart-mind,
thoughts, knowledge, and things (xin 心, yi 意, zhi 知, and wu 物) in
different, but not inconsistent, ways. The briefest definition quoted here
is documented in the early period when Wang came up with the
dictum “zhi xing he yi.”
18 – Here I do not claim that self-deception is the only root of weakness of
will, for there could be cases when a person knows that something is
wrong, and yet does it, without the aid of self-deception. I am grateful
to one of the reviewers for pointing this out. For these cases, Zhu Xi
would say that this person does not have genuine knowledge (zhenzhi
真知), while Wang Yangming would say that this person does not
establish his will to let liangzhi function properly. Both of them might
Zemian Zheng 1365

23. not use the term “weakness of will” or akrasia, but both can account
for such phenomena, and they would avoid positing a fundamentally
recalcitrant element of human nature.
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