CTP’s Threat Update series is a weekly update and assessment of Iran and the al Qaeda network. CTP’s Iran team follows developments on the internal politics, nuclear negotiations, and regional conflicts closely. The al Qaeda network update includes detailed assessments of al Qaeda’s affiliates in Yemen, the Horn of Africa, and the Maghreb and Sahel. Below are the top three takeaways from the week: 1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army (SNA) troops. It seized ten towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations. AMISOM forces are stretched thin, and even coordinating with the SNA, are insufficient to secure Somalia’s territory. 2. Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the July 2 ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed at least five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others. Further, there is evidence showing that the AQIM-linked Ansar al Din, a Tuareg Islamist group in Mali, is expanding its connections to other militants groups in the country. 3. The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine—a plan spearheaded by Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei to make the Iranian economy strong and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—into its national economic planning as it weighs the implications of a potential nuclear deal.

1. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
July 8, 2015

2. TOP THREE TAKEAWAYS
2
1
3
1. Al Shabaab is on the offensive against AMISOM and Somali National Army troops. It seized ten
towns in Lower Shabelle region following the withdrawal of AMISOM troops from the locations.
2. AQIM is resurging in northern Mali. It claimed the 02 JUL ambush near Timbuktu, Mali, that killed
five UN peacekeepers and injured nine others.
3. The Iranian regime is taking steps to strengthen Iran’s economy and make it resistant to Western
sanctions as it pushes for sanctions relief in the ongoing nuclear talks.
2

3. ASSESSMENT:
al Qaeda Network
Al Qaeda may be moving into cyber warfare as well. Al Qaeda Electronic, a pro-al Qaeda hacking group, announced the
appointments of Qatada al Sainawi as the deputy leader and Moaaz al Tikriti as the head of fundraising for the group. Al
Sainawi previously served as spokesman for the group, while al Tikriti was a fighter with al Qaeda in Iraq (AQI). Al Qaeda
Electronic has been active lately, having defaced 22 British websites on 03 JUL and several Russian, Norwegian, and
Vietnamese websites between 25 and 29 JUN.
Outlook: Al Qaeda Electronic will likely continue its recent surge in hacking activity, in an effort to establish its presence on the
internet.
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent, and al Qaeda associates
Bangladeshi security forces arrested 12 militants affiliated with al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS) during raids in
different parts of Dhaka. The security forces also arrested Mainul Islam, the chief of AQIS Bangladesh and his top adviser,
Zafar Amin, during the raids. Police seized a large number of weapons and explosives from the arrested militants.
Pakistani police recovered ISIS propaganda, maps of London and documents threatening Pakistan’s army from three militants
arrested in Peshawar. Of the arrested, two are Afghan nationals, while the other is Pakistani. It is suspected that these militants
could have been planning an attack in London on the 10th anniversary of the 07 JUL 2005 London bombings, which killed about
52 civilians and injured over 700 more.
Pakistani military launched the final phase of Operation Zarb-e-Azb, the offensive against militancy, in Shawal Valley.
Outlook: The Pakistani government will continue its attacks against militancy in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas
(FATA).
3
AL QAEDA

4. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Yemeni stakeholders continue to seek a political solution to the ongoing crisis. Representatives from President Abdu Rabbu
Mansour Hadi’s government and the al Houthi movement stated that they expect a draft humanitarian ceasefire agreement that
will last through Eid al Fitr, the last day of the Islamic holy month of Ramadan, after meetings with UN Special Envoy Ismail
Ould Cheikh Ahmed in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia and in Sana’a, Yemen. The ceasefire conditions are still being negotiated, though
Hadi’s government stated that it seeks full implementation of UNSCR 2216, which calls for complete al Houthi disarmament.
Outlook: A brief humanitarian ceasefire may be agreed to given the rapidly deteriorating conditions in Yemen, although the
insistence on full implementation of UNSCR 2216 will continue to be an obstacle in negotiations.
Security
The al Houthi movement appears to be overstretched and is struggling to maintain control of territory. Local popular resistance
fighters repelled an al Houthi attack in al Dhaleh governorate, and popular resistance fighters have been contesting the al
Houthi presence in Taiz, Yemen’s third-largest city. During a peak in the fighting there, approximately 1,200 prisoners broke out
of the central prison. The al Houthi-run state media described the escapees as dangerous criminals and alleged there were al
Qaeda suspects among them.
Outlook: The al Houthis may be willing to withdraw from certain areas in south Yemen as part of a humanitarian ceasefire. A
ceasefire would also be an opportunity for both sides to replenish supplies and reposition.
Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and ISIS in Yemen
ISIS Wilayat Sana’a is conducting a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) campaign in Yemen’s capital in addition
to sustaining IED attacks. Wilayat Sana’a detonated a VBIED near a military hospital in Shu’aub district in Sana’a on June 29,
the third such attack claimed by Wilayat Sana’a since the beginning of Ramadan.
Outlook: ISIS Wilayat Sana’a will continue its VBIED campaign to provoke a response from the al Houthis in Yemen’s capital.
4
YEMENGULF OF ADEN

5. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: YEMENGULF OF ADEN
5
1) 30 JUN: ISIS
Wilayat Sana’a
detonated a VBIED
near a military
hospital in Shu’aub
district in Sana’a.
2) 01 JUL: Popular
resistance fighters
repelled an al Houthi
attack north of
Dhaleh city.
3) 06 JUL: Popular
resistance fighters
secured a key
position in Radfan
district along the
road to al Anad, Lahij.
4) 05 JUL: Reported
U.S. airstrike killed 4
AQAP members in al
Mukalla, Hadramawt.
1
4
2
3

6. ASSESSMENT:
Political
The breakaway region of Puntland’s administration remains unwilling to settle its border dispute with the new central state of
Galmudug, despite international and local calls for reconciliation. Puntland Information Minister Mohamed Hassan Soo-adde
announced that his administration would not be attending talks proposed by Galmudug President Abdikarin Hussein. Puntland
supported the moderate Islamist group Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a’s claim that the new Galmudug state was not legitimate.
Outlook: Tensions between the newly formed state of Galmudug and local splinter groups, including Ahlu Sunna wa al Jama’a
and local clans, and the Puntland administration are likely to continue as the federalization process moves forward. Al Shabaab
is likely to use these tensions to its advantage as the group moves on Mogadishu.
Security
Security forces throughout East Africa remain on high alert for possible terrorist attacks as the Islamic holy month of Ramadan
nears its end on July 17. Kenyan officials arrested two Ugandans in Nairobi they believe to be recruiters for the Islamic State of
Iraq and al Sham (ISIS). Meanwhile, African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and Somali National Army officials
announced a plan to increase security in the key areas of Kismayo, Baidoa, Beledweyne, Adado, and Mogadishu.
Outlook: Regional security forces will continue to remain on high alert as the possibility for a large-scale al Shabaab attack
during the final days of Ramadan and as information about potential ISIS cells in East Africa is uncovered.
Al Shabaab
Al Shabaab made significant territorial gains in the past week. The group seized ten towns in the Lower Shabelle region
between July 2 and July 5 from which AMISOM had previously withdrawn for tactical reasons. Al Shabaab was also linked to
several low-profile assassination attempts, including a car bomb that injured a Somali intelligence officer and the ambush of
Turkish officials in Mogadishu.
Outlook: Al Shabaab will continue its campaign against AMISOM military bases in the Lower Shabelle region and will continue
to attempt high-profile assassinations of foreign officials before the end of Ramadan.
HORN OF AFRICAGULF OF ADEN
6

7. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
77777
1
2
3
4
7
1) 01 JUL: AMISOM
withdrew from bases
in Buufow, Yaq-bari
Weyne, Awdheegle,
and Qoryole, Lower
Shabelle.
2) 03 – 05 JUL: Al
Shabaab seized ten
towns deserted by
AMISOM and SNA in
Lower Shabelle.
3) 03 JUL:
Unidentified gunmen
ambushed a vehicle
containing Turkish
officials in Lido
Beach, Mogadishu.
4) 05 JUL: Al Shabaab
seized Jalalaqsi,
Hiraan region, after
clashing with SNA.
GULF OF ADEN HORN OF AFRICA

8. ASSESSMENT:
Political
Updates from the UN-led peace negotiations in Sakhirat, Morocco, have ceased following protests and demonstrations from
General National Congress (GNC) President Sahmain over Draft 5’s political rebalance in favor of the House of
Representatives. However, the continuing publication of endorsements from a wide variety of Libyan factions and political
actors supports the notion that the talks are not over.
Outlook: Increasing political pressure from both international and domestic groups will force the GNC to remain at the
negotiating table and accept necessary compromises, partly due to the revelations that ISIS’s presence is growing in northwest
Libya and that ISIS Wilayat Tarablus is capable of attacks in Misrata.
Security
A resumption in large-scale fighting throughout Benghazi has supplanted the threat of gunmen from Derna, and the prospect of
a new military front in Derna is a secondary concern to the Libyan National Army (LNA). Resources will be refocused on the
crucial territories of Laithi, Sabra, and Buhdeima in Benghazi to reinforce the LNA against future operations by the Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura Council.
Outlook: The shift in the Benghazi Revolutionary Shura Council’s posture from a defensive to an offensive one reflects a
change in tactical and/or strategic thinking. It is unclear if the Buhdeima assault on 04 JUL is simply an anomaly or the
beginning of a new operation to break the military stalemate in Benghazi.
Ansar al Sharia Libya and ISIS in Libya
ISIS-affiliated forces in Derna remain on the defense. They conducted three vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED)
attacks on the same day, but have not regained control of the city. ISIS Wilayat Tarablus’s 06 JUL bombing of Misrata’s air force
base indicates growing capabilities and an attempt to weaken ISIS’s opponents in Libya. Additionally, ISIS forces have been
moving into new villages outside of Sirte on the main roads along the coast.
Outlook: ISIS groups in Libya appear to be creating conditions on the ground to support ISIS’s expansion from Sirte and
attempting to maintain some positions near Derna.
8
LIBYAWEST AFRICA

9. ASSESSMENT:
Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)
AQIM demonstrated that it has regained its ability to carry out asymmetrical attacks in northern Mali since the French
intervention in 2013. It claimed credit for an attack in Timbuktu, Mali that killed six MINUSMA peacekeepers, which was the
group’s first attack against peacekeepers in Mali since May. Separately, low-level fighters continue to splinter from AQIM.
Algeria dismantled a large terrorist cell comprised of former AQIM members who now support ISIS.
Outlook: AQIM will continue to operate in Mali and take advantage of the more permissive environment now that the French
have largely withdrawn. AQIM will also look to counter ISIS support through increased operations and recruitment.
Ansar al Sharia (Tunisia)
Tunisia began a heavy security crackdown in response to the June 26 Sousse attack. President Essebsi declared a state of
emergency in effect from July 4 though August 2, giving the executive and security branches more power and autonomy. This
may lead to increased concerns and protests from citizens concerned about the possible evolution of a police state. Five
terrorist cells were dismantled in two days after the declaration, showing the immediate effect of these increased powers.
Outlook: The expansion of government and military power will likely continue as President Essebsi looks to ensure citizens’
safety during Ramadan, but many will protest these new measures due to their similarity to the laws of the Ben Ali regime. Such
restrictions may create a valuable recruiting tool for terrorist groups.
Associated Movements in the Sahel (Ansar al Din, al Murabitoun)
Ansar al Din continues to expand its influence in southern Mali, and bordering countries are growing increasingly concerned
over potential spill over. The Ivory Coast deployed troops to the Malian border and conducted security operations with the
Malian army in response to a threat from Ansar al Din to expand operations in Mali and extend its influence into the Ivory Coast
and Mauritania. Ansar al Din also confirmed coordination with the Massina Liberation Movement (MLM) and referred to the
MLM as one of its katibas. This may indicate that Ansar al Din has fully incorporated the MLM into its network. Separately,
Mauritanian security forces dismantled a dormant ISIS cell in Nouakchott, Mauritania. Security forces reported that former
members of this cell also participated in fighting in Syria and Iraq, indicating that communication likely occurred between the
Mauritanian cell and ISIS fighters in other areas.
Outlook: Ansar al Din is likely to continue using local militia groups to solidify its position in southern Mali.
9
MAGHREB AND SAHELWEST AFRICA

10. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:
10
LIBYAWEST AFRICA
10101010101010
1
2
3
4
1) 01 JUL: ISIS forces
continued expansion
efforts in Sirte,
occupying the
neighborhood of al
Sawawa without
resistance.
2) 03 JUL: ISIS
conducted 3 SVBIED
attacks throughout
Derna, targeting both
Mujahideen Shura
Council and civilian
targets.
3) 04 JUL: Benghazi
Revolutionary Shura
Council militants
besieged LNA forces in
Buhdeima, Benghazi.
4) 06 JUL: ISIS
infiltrated Misrata AFB
and destroyed 4 jets.

11. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: MAGHREBWEST AFRICA
1) 30 JUN: Algerian
authorities
dismantled an 18-
member ISIS cell in
Tizi Ouzou, Algeria.
2) 30 JUN - 02 JUL:
Tunisian authorities
arrested numerous
suspects in
connection to the 26
JUN Sousse attack.
3) 02 - 05 JUL:
Tunisian authorities
dismantled six
terrorist cells in
various cities. Two
were directly linked
to ISIS and one to
Ansar al Sharia
Tunisia.
1
3
2
11

12. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY: SAHELWEST AFRICA
1) 01 JUL:
Mauritanian security
forces dismantled a
dormant ISIS cell in
Nouakchott,
Mauritania.
2) 02 JUL: AQIM
militants attacked a
MINSUMA convoy
outside of Timbuktu,
Mali, killing 6
peacekeepers.
3) 05 JUL: French
Special Forces killed
AQIM leader
Mohammed Aly Ag
Wadoussene in an
operation in Kidal,
Mali.
2
1
12
3

13. ASSESSMENT:
Nuclear Talks
President Hassan Rouhani warned, “If the opposite side ignores the [possible nuclear] agreement we will go back to the old path
faster than they [the West] could imagine,” in a July 1 address. The “old path” likely refers to previous uranium enrichment levels.
In July 5 comments, Artesh Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Ahmad Reza Pourdastan stated, “the U.S. might
make a deal with us within the framework of the [P5+1]…we should never see this as a positive gesture on the part of our
enemy.” This articulation of distrust demonstrates that a possible nuclear agreement will not significantly improve existing
strained relations between the U.S. and Iran. The negotiations continued past the extended July 7 deadline, as EU Foreign
Policy Chief Federica Mogherini stated on July 7 that the talks will continue “for the next few days.”
Outlook: These comments indicate that Iran will pursue its nuclear program’s full potential should a possible P5+1 nuclear deal
be breached.
Economy
Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei outlined provisions of the 6th five-year national development plan, in a letter to President
Hassan Rouhani on July 1. Khamenei identified the resistance economy doctrine—his plan to make the Iranian economy strong
and resistant to Western sanctions and global financial crises—as a pillar of the 6th five-year plan. The plan called for enhanced
deterrence capabilities, with an emphasis on boosting the country’s cyber infrastructure, and instructed the government to
allocate five percent of the public budget for defense expenditures. Expediency Discernment Council (EDC) Secretary Mohsen
Rezaei, meanwhile, stated “If [we] are not able to reach a [nuclear] deal…the sanctions will continue, but we will certainly decide
to change our economic policy...”
Outlook: The Iranian regime will continue to integrate the resistance economy doctrine into its economic planning as it weighs
the implications of a potential nuclear deal.
13
IRAN

14. SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY:IRAN
1430 JUNE – 06 JULY 2015
30 JUN: The P5+1 and Iran extended nuclear negotiations to July 7.
30 JUN: Head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI) Ali Akbar Salehi said that “many technical issues have already
been resolved” during the nuclear talks in Vienna.
30 JUN: IRGC Qods Force Commander Maj. Gen. Qassem Soleimani attended a commemoration for Iranian fighters killed in
Syria.
01 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei announced the provisions for the Islamic Republic’s 6th five-year
development plan.
01 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani warned the P5+1 that Iran will “go back to the old path [Iran’s previous levels of uranium
enrichment]” if Western powers do not uphold their commitments under the final nuclear deal.
02 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani met with International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Director General Yukiya Amano in
Tehran.
02 JUL: Expediency Discernment Council Secretary Mohsen Rezaei claimed “if [we] are not able to reach a [nuclear] deal…the
sanctions will continue, but we will certainly decide to change our economic policy.”
02 JUL: Artesh Navy Commander Rear Admiral Habibollah Sayyari announced that the Fatah submarine is continuing field
testing.
04 JUL: Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei stated that Iran’s scientific progress should not slow down and described
university professors as commanders of the “soft war” against the West.
04 JUL: The Supreme Leader’s Senior Foreign Policy Advisor Ali Akbar Velayati stated “Iran, Syria, and Iraq, which are on the
front line of resistance, are jointly fighting terrorism.”
04 JUL: Khatam al Anbia Air Defense Base Commander Brig. Gen. Farzad Esmaili unveiled a long-range Ghadir radar
installation near Ahvaz city in southwestern Khuzestan province.
06 JUL: The foreign ministers of the P5+1 and Iran, along with EU Foreign Policy Chief Federica Mogherini, met in Vienna.
06 JUL: President Hassan Rouhani received an official invitation from Russian President Vladimir Putin to attend the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization (SCO) Summit on July 12 and the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) Summit
on July 11.

15. ACRONYMS
15
Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (AEOI)
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM)
al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP)
al Qaeda in the Indian Subcontinent (AQIS)
Ansar al Sharia Tunisia (AAS-T)
Asa’ib Ahl al Haq (AAH)
Coordination for the Movement of the Azawad (CMA)
Imghad Tuareg and Allies Self-Defense Group (GATIA)
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)
Islamic State in Iraq and al Sham (ISIS)
Kata’ib Hezbollah (KH)
Lebanese Hezbollah (LH)
Libyan National Army (LNA)
Arab Movement of Azawad (MAA)
United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA)
The Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO)
North Waziristan (NWA)
Pakistani Military (PakMil)
Possible military dimensions (PMD)
Somalia National Army (SNA)
South Waziristan (SWA)
Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP)

16. AEI’S CRITICAL THREATS PROJECT
Katherine Zimmerman
senior al Qaeda analyst
katherine.zimmerman@aei.org
(202) 888-6576
Alexis Knutsen
al Qaeda analyst
alexis.knutsen@aei.org
(202) 888-6570
Paul Bucala
Iran analyst
paul.bucala@aei.org
(202) 888-6573
Heather Malacaria
program manager
heather.malacaria@aei.org
(202) 888-6575
Marie Donovan
Iran analyst
marie.donovan@aei.org
(202) 888-6572
Mehrdad Moarefian
Iran analyst
mehrdad.moarefian@aei.org
(202) 888-6574
For more information about AEI’s Critical Threats Project, visit www.criticalthreats.org.
Frederick W. Kagan
director
fkagan@aei.org
(202) 888-6569
16