Causality, epistemic norms, social research

1. Causality and Epistemic
Norms
in Social Research
Federica Russo
Philosophy | Humanities | Amsterdam
russofederica.wordpress.com |
@federicarusso

2. Overview
Where it all begun:
The longstanding debate on norms and values as
background to this paper
Existing approaches to causality and causal
modelling
The notable absence of normative discourse
Causality as an epistemic norm
An attempt to make the normative epistemic
dimension of causality explicit
2

3. NORMS,
EPISTEMIC AND NON-EPISTEMIC
3

4. A (positive) spiral
Kuhn proposing epistemic values for theory
choice
Feminist epistemology explaining how values
that matter are not just epistemic
Broadening to non-feminist camps to
investigate role of values in science (see e.g.
revival of inductive risk)
Are we not slightly unbalanced about non-
epistemic values / norms now?
Whence the relevance of the question
What role for epistemic norms?
4

5. Why causality?
Causality is more than just a
Concept
Condition to test
Causality is an essential epistemic norm:
It shapes the way we conceptualise the world
and (decide) how to study it
It has also effects on normative
(ethical/moral/political) aspects of research
5

6. CAUSALITY AND MODELLING
6

7. Causality is in the world
A ‘thing’ in the world, but not a norm in our head
Typically held by (philosophers of) the natural
sciences
Scientific realism and causal realism and laws
If causes are out there, we ‘just’ need tools to
discover them
Models of increasing sophistication will allow us to
pick out the true causes
The best tools are arguably (allegedly?)
experimental
7

8. Causality is in the model
Statistical modelling
The whole literature from
economics/econometrics, up to Pearl and
Bayes Nets
Exogeneity: the new holy grail
A condition to test
A test and a super test to ensure you get
causality out of very sophisticated statistical
modelling
8

9. How to find causality in the social
world
The gold standard of experimental methods spreads to
social science (and epidemiology)
See debate on potential outcome models
Sociologist and methodologist Goldthorpe: experimental
methods do not suit the object of study of the social sciences
Epidemiologists Vandenbrouke et al: one can’t treat e.g.
race and ethnicity as proper causes
General methodological points
Pluralism
No gold standards
9

10. Causality is not in the social
world
There are no causes in the social world
Too unstable and mutable to be pinned down
Two options
Pragmatic: We can describe, at best
Principled: Everything interacts anything else
(systemism)
10

11. CAUSALITY
AS AN EPISTEMIC NORM
11

12. More than
‘no causes in, no causes out’
Cartwright’s law
Right overall
You can’t infer causes from correlations. You infer
causes from causal hypotheses
But just talking about the model
What happens before and after the model?
12

13. Two functions of the epistemic
norm
Before: Guiding modelling choices
Some models fundamentally depend on specific
conceptualisations of causality (or lack thereof)
After: Shaping conclusions and
recommendations of empirical studies
One ought to reflect on how far causal
conclusions should go beyond modelling
13

14. CAUSALITY GUIDES
MODELLING CHOICES
14

15. Contrast and compare
Causal modelling
Closure of the system and
mechanisms
The agent is external
Causal mechanisms are
established using prior
information
Systemic approach
• Every thing interacts with
everything else
• The agent is internal
• Structures are identified
without prior information
15

16. A case study:
health system and mortality
54
4
13
34
12
2
X1
Economic
development
X2
Social development
X3
Sanitary
infrastructures
X4
Use of sanitary
infrastructures
X5
Age structure
Y
Mortality

17. A criticism from within social
science
Lauriaux (1994):
Theoretical weaknesses of causal analysis:
choice of variables, conceptualisation, closure of the system
Specifically:
• Principal variables are theoretical constructs according to well
established economicand sociological theories
• Assumption: economic development generates social development
• Problem: counterexamples exist, the arrow might be reversed with
serious problems for policy
• To intervene on an effect which is not an effect won’t deliver the
planned results

18. An alternative: systemism
Systems are homeostatic:
They keep themselves in a stable state by means
of regulatory interdependent mechanisms
Changes in the system re-establish the equilibrium
in consequence of too strong internal/external
influences
In the process of balancing, components jointly
evolve
Those joint evolutions are covariations we call
causal

19. Lauriaux’s systemic story

21. Causality as an epistemic norm
It is about a fundamental difference in
Thinking what the (social) world is like
Designing and implementing methods to study
(social) reality
Explaining a (social) phenomenon
Making recommendations for intervention (see
next)
21

22. CAUSALITY SHAPES
CONCLUSIONS
(OR OUGHT TO)
22

23. Causes & mechanisms of
health & disease
Several types of practices in the health sciences
Biomedical research; clinical practice; EBM; narratives;
(public health) interventions; …
Variety of practices to study what makes us
healthy/sick
Here: practices in which we causally understand
health&disease by studying biological and social
factors
23

24. Bio-social causes of
health&disease
Historically, 19th century public health is much
about social factors
Recently, characterised as ‘the causes of causes’
Sociology of health / social epidemiology
Health&disease are associated with social factors
Inequalities in health are associated with inequalities at
the social level
Health&disease happen in a social context
24

25. Descriptive and normative
Descriptively: plenty of research to establish
correlations <social social factors--
health&disease>
Normatively: social factors are active causes in the
mechanisms of health&disease
We need a concept of causation/mechanisms that
accounts for the mixed nature of health&disease
Social factors are proximate, not distant causes
25

26. A general argument
IF we conceptualise X such-and-such
THEN what actions should follow?
Replace X by your favourite: health, evidence,
probability, …
A double normativity
Philsci concepts are non-neutral
Philosophy is part and parcel of science/policy, not a
cherry on the cake
26
Most (all?) of our concepts act
as epistemic norms!

27. The specific argument
IF the social has active causal role in
health&disease
THEN what public health interventions
should follow?
27

28. OBESITY AND
FOOD LABELLING
An example
28

29. Social causes, biological
interventions
Obesity ‘epidemic’
Wide recognition of social factors (besides biological
ones)
Top priority for EU health policy
EU announces to tackle social factors (e.g. behaviour)
One of the biggest actions: regulating food labelling
Ultimately tackles the biology of obesity
Claims to target food industry, but in fact it makes info
available and leaves the choice to the individual person
Pulls in opposite directions with actions to improve on
competitiveness of SMEs
29

30. TO SUM UP AND CONCLUDE
30

31. Epistemic norms
Rooted in well-established, now classic
debates in phil sci
Plenty of room develop on these topics
further (and beyond question of ethico-
political norms)
Theoretical and applied dimensions and
relevance
31

32. How causality acts as a norm
Guiding fundamental choices about
modelling
These are not unrelated to one’s worldview
Deeply influence modelling
Shaping conclusions of empirical studies
These may not remain epistemic and easily spill
over the ethico-political domain
32

33. Causality and Epistemic
Norms
in Social Research
Federica Russo
Philosophy | Humanities | Amsterdam
russofederica.wordpress.com |
@federicarusso
Thank you!