SY
Uploaded bySounil Yu
PPTX, PDF16,328 views

Cyber Defense Matrix: Reloaded

The document discusses the Cyber Defense Matrix, emphasizing its operational functions such as identifying, protecting, detecting, responding, and recovering from security threats. It outlines various asset classes and the functions necessary for effective cybersecurity management, including inventorying vulnerabilities and assessing risks. Additionally, it highlights the importance of balancing technology, people, and processes to enhance security capabilities within organizations.

Embed presentation

Downloaded 943 times
#RSAC SESSION ID: Sounil Yu The Cyber Defense Matrix, Reloaded STR-T09 @sounilyu
#RSAC
#RSAC Vendors shown are representative only No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here Opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer Disclaimers @sounilyu 3 All models are wrong, but some are useful - George E. P. Box …and some models are measurably more useful - Doug Hubbard
#RSAC Background on the Cyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 4
#RSAC Background on the Cyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 5 Operational Functions Inventorying assets and vulns, measuring attack surface, prioritizing, baselining normal, threat modeling, risk assessment Preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation Discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics Acting on events, eradicating intrusion, assessing damage, forensic reconstruction Returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned, resiliency Asset Classes Workstations, servers, phones, tablets, storage, network devices, IoT infrastructure, etc. Software, interactions, and application flows on the devices Connections and traffic flowing among devices and apps Information at rest, in transit, or in use by the resources above The people using the resources listed above 10011101010101010010 01001101010110101001 11010101101011010100 10110101010101101010 DEVICES APPS NETWORKS DATA USERS IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER
#RSAC The Cyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 6 Operational Functions Inventorying assets and vulns, measuring attack surface, prioritizing, baselining normal, threat modeling, risk assessment Preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation Discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics Acting on events, eradicating intrusion, assessing damage, forensic reconstruction Returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned, resiliency Asset Classes Workstations, servers, phones, tablets, storage, network devices,IoT infrastructure, etc. Software, interactions, and application flows on the devices Connections and traffic flowing among devices and apps Information at rest, in transit, or in use by the resources above The people using the resources listed above 10011101010101010010 01001101010110101001 11010101101011010100 10110101010101101010 DEVICES APPS NETWORKS DATA USERS IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Background on the Cyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 7
#RSAC Enterprise Security Market Segments @sounilyu 8 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover IAM Endpoint Detection & ResponseConfig Mgt, Vuln Scanner Data Audit, Discovery, Classification RASP, WAF Phishing Simulations DDoS Mitigation Insider Threat / Behavioral Analytics Network Security (FW, IPS/IDS) DRM Encryption, Tokenization, DLP, DRM Netflow, Network Vuln Scanner NW Forensics AV, HIPS Deep Web, Brian Krebs, FBI Backup Phishing & Security Awareness SAST, DAST, SW Asset Mgt, Fuzzers EP Forensics
#RSAC We care about more than just the assets that are owned and controlled by the enterprise @sounilyu 9 Threat Actors Vendors Customers Employees Enterprise Assets • Devices - workstations, servers, phones, tablets, IoT, peripherals, storage, network devices, web cameras, infrastructure, etc. • Applications - The software, interactions, and application flows on the devices • Network - The connections and traffic flowing among devices and applications • Data - The information residing on, traveling through, or processed by the resources listed above • Users – The people using the resources listed above 01001101010110101001 10110101010101101010 Operational Functions • Identify – inventorying assets and vulns, prioritizing, measuring attack surface, baselining, threat modeling, risk assessmt • Protect – preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation • Detect – discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics • Respond – acting on events, eradicating intrusion footholds, assessing damage, coordinating response, forensics • Recover – returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Identify Protect Detect Respond R Market Segments – Other Environments @sounilyu 10 Threat Actor Assets Threat Intel Intrusion Deception Malware Sandboxes Vendor Assets Cloud Access Security Brokers Vendor Risk Assessments Customer Assets Endpoint Fraud Detection Device Finger- printing Digital Biometrics Web Fraud Detection Employee Assets BYOD MAM BYOD MDMPCI-DSS, GDPR
#RSAC Recap from 2016 Briefing 11@sounilyu Other Use Cases Primary Use Case: Vendor Mapping Differentiating Primary & Supporting Capabilities Defining Security Design Patterns Maximizing Deployment Footprint Understanding the New Perimeter Calculating Defense-in-Depth Balancing Your Portfolio Budget Planning for Obsolescence Disintermediating Security Components Comparing Point Products vs Platforms Finding Opportunities for Automation Identifying Gaps in People, Process, Tech https://bit.ly/cdm-rsa2016
#RSAC Early Stage Expo and Sandbox Vendors 12 Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Technology People Process Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency @sounilyu Disclaimer: Vendors shown are representative only. No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here. SecurePlus Data
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Identify Protect Detect Respond R Early Stage Expo and Sandbox Vendors 13@sounilyu Threat Actor Assets Vendor Assets Customer Assets Employee Assets Disclaimer: Vendors shown are representative only. No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here.
#RSAC Use Case 12: Optimal Resource Allocation Ratios 14@sounilyu Technology People Processes Technology People Process 90 70 50 30 10 10 30 50 70 90 50 50 50 50 50 Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover ~10:1 ~2:1 1:1 ~1:2 ~1:10Tech:People Ratio RISK ADVERSE POSTURE RISK TAKING POSTURE
#RSAC Use Case 13: Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 15@sounilyu Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Endpoint Services CERT Endpoint Team LOBs App Monitoring LOBs Network Services Network Monitoring Net Svcs Chief Data Officer Data Loss Prevention CDO Human Resources Insider Threat Human Resources / Physical Security Devices Applications Networks Data Users
#RSAC Use Case 13: Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 16@sounilyu Inventory: Systems Mgt Prioritize: Function / Ownership Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Vulnerability Scanner Inventory: Application Inventories, API Inventories Prioritize: Critical App List Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: SAST/DAST/IAST Inventory: Netflow Prioritize: Function / Volume Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Path Analysis Inventory: Data Repository Lists Prioritize: Data Classification Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Level of Exposure Inventory: HR Systems / Payroll Prioritize: Hierarchy Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Background Chk/ Phishing Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Function RACI Establish Inventory RA – Owner I – Security Prioritize Inventory R – Owner I – Security Measure Vuln/ Attack Surface R – Security ACI – Owner Technology People Process • Observations: - There are greater inefficiencies when the RACI is out of alignment in a given domain - Identify functions that are largely performed manually will result in poor data quality
#RSAC Use Case 13: Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 17@sounilyu Configure: Systems Mgt Patch: Patch Mgt Policy: Endpoint / Server Security Policy Configure: Application Security Lifecycle, BSIMM Patch: Code Updates, WAF, RASP Policy: Application Security Program Configure: Network Segmentation Patch: Firewalls Policy: Network Security Policy Configure: Encryption, Tokenization Patch: Re-encryption Policy: Data Security Policy Configure: Onboarding Orientation Patch: Annual / Periodic Training / Teachable Moments Policy: User Awareness Policy Devices Apps Networks Data Users Protect Technology People Process Function RACI Configure RA – Owner CI – Security Patch RA – Owner CI – Security Policy Definition RA – Security CI – Owner
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Define Policy • Device usage policy • Baselines, standards • SaaS usage policy • App Dev policy • Network access policy • Classification guide • Acceptable use policy Repair / Correct / Patch / Remediate • Patch • Fix bugs • Patch • Modify ACLs • Encrypt • Chg permissions • Training and awareness Least Priv / Control Access/ Separation of Duties • Active Directory/ LDAP / RADIUS • Admin Priv Escalation • Mutual TLS, API keys • User authenication • Dev/Test/Prod sep • VPN • NAC • Firewalls, VLANs • Need to know • Database activity monitoring • IAM, Access review • SoD, Roles & Responsibilities Credential Management • Credential Vaulting • Credential Vaulting • API key management • Credential Vaulting • TACACS • Key management system, HSMs • Password manager • Multifactor Auth Whitelist / Blacklist • Signature-based (A/V), Behavior-based (HIPS) • Run-time application self protection • Default deny ACLs • Default allow ACLs • HMACs • Persona non grata • Full ID check Harden • Configuration hardening • Secure coding • Code obfuscation • Close comms paths • TLS encryption • AES encryption • Training and awareness Least Functionality • Unnecessary service removal • Microservices • Containers • Single packet authentication • Need to know • Differential privacy • N/A Isolation / Containment • Virtualization, sandboxing • Containers, Content Disarm and Reconstr • Walled garden, remediation network • Rights management system • Quarantine, jail Audit / Log Events • A/V, HIPS, login, and other event logs • Application logs • Authentication logs • VPN, NAC, Firewall, DNS, DHCP logs • Database logs, DB activity logs • User activity logs Change Management • File integrity monitoring • Version / release control • Network change management tools • Integrity monitoring • Manager 1:1s Patterns and Anti-Patterns in PROTECT functions 18
#RSAC Use Case 14: Understanding why do some things that we buy never get used 19@sounilyu Source: Security Shelfware: Which Products Are Gathering Dust In the Shed and Why? https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/mash-t07a-security-shelfware-which-products-gathering-dust-and-why.pdf 0 5 10 15 20 WAF Web filtering Forensics AV User awareness IDAM / SSO / Priv Mgt SIEM FIM GRC Vuln Scanners IPS IDS What ends up on the shelf? 0 5 10 15 20 Vaporware Lack of Updates Bundled / Cheap Compliance / Regulatory Requirement Budget cuts Replaced with competing product Lack of staff Internal politics Unable to use/enable features Not enough expertise Why Vendors Users
#RSAC Detect Devices Applications Networks Data Users SIEM UEBA EDR IDS SIEM UEBA UBA People Technology Process Use Case 14: Understanding why do some things that we buy never get used 20@sounilyu • Observation: People/Tech Mix - At the DETECT stage, an equal mix of people and technology are needed (i.e., you CANNOT automate everything) • Mapping: - Alignment is done by USE CASE, not by TELEMETRY - A generic analytics platform that consumes a wide range of TELEMETRY can satisfy a wide range of USE CASES - Vendors typically sell the fine tuning of DETECTION RULES to satisfy a USE CASE using specific TELEMETRY
#RSAC Use Case 15: Visualizing Attack Surfaces Devices Applications Networks Data Users Vuln Assessment OS Hardening Config Compliance SAST DAST WAF Load Balancer IAM Log Analysis Netflow DDoS Prevention Firewall IPS/IDS DDoS Mitigation PCAP Analysis Encryption Tokenization Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover @sounilyu 21 Devices Applications Networks Data Users SAST DAST WAF Load Balancer IAM Log Analysis Encryption Tokenization Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Traditional Web Application Serverless Function
#RSAC Specialized Generalized Generalized Specialized Use Case 16: Differentiating between Generalized vs Specialized Needs 22@sounilyu Technology People Processes Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Specialized: skills or capabilities needed to service security needs (e.g., vulnerability scanners, access control systems, hunting skills, incident response skills) Generalized: skills or capabilities sufficient to service security needs (e.g., analytic platforms, orchestration tools, vulnerability management skills, risk management skills) Try to avoid acquiring specific capabilities that can be supported with generalized resources
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Use Case 17: Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 23 Are the vendor's default passwords and default log-in names changed on software applications before those applications are put into operation? •Are passwords for service accounts (e.g., backupserver, sp_content) extremely complex in their character sets and length? •Are the boot sequences on the organization's computers set so that the computers cannot be booted from external media, such as USB drives or CD's? •Is each type and level of application privilegeassigned an appropriate type and level of authentication mechanism? (e.g., do administrator privileges require a more secure log-in mechanism than ordinary privileges?) •Is there a documented procedure for removing and verifying the removal of application privileges when these are no longer needed? Has the organization formally assigned sensitivity classifications to its information files? Are the sensitivity classifications that the organization employs designed to provide a good basis for encryption policies? Are the sensitivity classifications that the organization employs periodically reviewed to make sure that they are not excessively restrictive, encumbering corporate activities with necessary precautions, or insufficiently restrictive, exposing corporate activities to losses and harm? Does the organization avoid storing types of data that could create liabilities,but do not serve any important business or government function? (e.g., does the organization erase credit card numbers as soon as the transactions using those numbers have been successfully processed, if the customers are going to be asked to enter these numbers again when making future purchases?) Are all input fields for data restricted to an appropriate minimum and maximum length? (e.g., a Social Security Number field should only allow nine numerals.) Are all input fields for data restricted to the appropriate characters and expressions? (e.g., a Social Security Number field should not allow anything but numerals and dashes.) Are there limitations on the data fields for the database that correspond to the limitations in the fields on the user interface, so that improper data are not inserted directly into the database? Are the service ports for critical applications configured to filter out data that is outside the proper operating parameters for those applications? Are the limitations on what can be written into the input fields made sufficiently restrictive, wherever possible, so that those fields will not accept executable instructions? Is the ability to alter or input data into documents or databases restricted to those employees who would have a valid need to do so in the course of their normal work? Are data fields that would rarely need to be changed made read-only as soon as the data entry is verified as correct? Are documents that present the organization's work or positions converted into formats that cannot be easily modified, before they are circulated electronically outside the organization? When documents are converted into formats that cannot be easily modified, are those documents digitally signed to make them even harder to falsify? Are the digital signatures on important documents routinely checked to verify their source before those documents are accepted and utilized? Are critically important e-mails sent using an application that hashes their contents, so that the e-mails' contents cannot easily be falsified? Is there an automatic process for monitoring systems for symptoms that false information may have been inserted? If there is reason to believe an attacker could benefit greatly from altering a body of data, is that data associated with a hash that would reveal if the data has been altered? Is there a mechanism for monitoring and logging all changes to critical databases? Are all uploads of sensitive data files monitored and logged? Are all uploads of encrypted data files monitored and logged? Is there an alarm mechanism that warns if data is apparently being entered by employees in quantities or with distributions that are not consistent with those employees' normal work patterns? After a data field has been made read only, is there an appropriate procedure for correcting that field under special circumstances and for verifying that correction? Is the database designed so that sensitive information cannot be over- written, without successive, time-stamped revisions being securely archived? Wherever practical, is any authentic information that might be stolen intermixed with bogus information that would cause harm or lead to the possible prosecution of anyone who tries to use it? Are receipts for important e-mails collected and stored to provide a record verifying that they reached the intended recipients? If log files need to be preserved for an extended period of time for legal reasons, are these files stored in a tamper-proof form at more than one physical location? Are all corporate information systems protected with basic authentication mechanisms, such as log-in name and password? Are log-in attempts limited to a certain number per minute (rather than a certain number altogether)? Is the rate at which log-in's can be attempted automatically slowed further after multiple failed attempts? If the log-in process is regularly under attack, is there a queuing system that would allow someone trying to properly access the system to get a turn at logging into it? If an account is accessed only after a considerable number of failed log- in attempts, is that account then monitored for improper use? Is there a simple automated procedure for cancelling any access provided by an employee's password, authentication token, or biometric information when that employee leaves the firm? Is there a program checking passwords when they are created to make sure that they meet the prescribed minimum length and complexity requirements? Are password choices automatically rejected if they are on the list of most commonly used passwords or consist mostly of a commonly used password? Are the characters typed into password fields masked, so that they can't be read by bystanders? Are there automatic alarms triggered by multiple failed log-in attempts, even if distributed across time, across user ID's, or different systems? Are multiple failed attempts to access applications reviewed in a timely manner, even if those failed access attempts are by authorized employees? Is an effort made to identify and investigate successful access authentications that are carried out at unusual hours of the day or night? Is there an alarm mechanism that would warn of the theft of a file in which passwords are stored? If an employee needs to recover a password from a remote location, is a link to recover or reset the password sent in an e-mail to that employee's regular e-mail account after the employee has successfully answered the challenge questions? Is there a simple automated procedure for rapidly revoking the privileges for tokens and smart cards, if they become compromised? Is there an efficient procedure for replacing tokens and smart cards? Is there a simple automated procedure for revoking the privileges for any biometric identifier that is compromised? Does the organization maintain a comprehensive list of all the system names and their associated network addresses on the organization's network? Do detailed network topology diagrams exist of the corporate network, so that all the connection routes can be traced? Do the detailed network topology diagrams list the service paths and network protocols being used? Has the information on the network topology diagram been verified to be accurate, so that all the components and connections on the network are indeed included? Are all documents diagramming network topologies rigorously protected from unauthorized access? Does the organization maintain comprehensive access control lists for its routers, including the internet protocol addresses and port numbers being utilized? If the organization is maintaining a separate network for security reasons, are all unnecessary services and broadcasts disabled on the gateway between networks, including responses to ping requests and traceroute requests, so that the existence of the gateway is difficult to detect? If a network is used for highly critical functions, does the organization periodically change the port numbers used by those critical services, so that any previous unauthorized explorations by potential attackers of those port numbers and their uses will be made obsolete? If a network is used for highly critical functions, does the organization periodically change the names of servers and other devices, so that any previous unauthorized explorations by potential attackers of those names and what they designate will be made obsolete? Are the baseline standards for equipment connected to the organization's network periodically reviewed and updated? Are the vendor's default security settings, including default passwords and user names, changed on systems before those systems are connected to the network? Are vulnerability scans or penetration tests performed on critical systems both before they are connected to the corporate network and regularly thereafter? Are employees explicitly forbidden to plug unauthorized electronic devices, such as flash drives, iPods, Kindles, smart phones, and digital cameras, into equipment inside the corporate network? Are switches in criticallyimportant facilities configured so that they will not connect to any pieces of electronic equipment that are not on the list of authorized manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers? Are wireless access points in critically important facilities configured so that they will not connect to any pieces of electronic equipment that are not on the list of authorized manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers? Do the wireless connections employ strong encryption technologies? Are there strict requirements and procedures for deploying any modems within the corporate infrastructure? Is there a documented approval process for giving people remote access to modems? If it is necessary to use insecure protocols for receiving or sending data, such as the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), are these insecure protocols supplemented with security protocols at the session protocol layer (e.g., yielding FTPS) or else transmitted over a virtual private network? Does the organization have agreements with vendors in which they guarantee a specified level of network reliabilityand service? Do corporate policies limit the use of unencrypted protocols, such as FTP, Telnet, or earlier versions of SNMP, for system management, unless the system explicitly requires these protocols? If the systems require unencrypted protocols, such as FTP, Telnet, or earlier versions of SNMP, for their management, are the corresponding connections set to shut down after a limited period of time? Does the corporation use access control lists to restrict SNMP requests from unauthorized systems to networking equipment, such as routers and switches? Are there policies for limiting the use of any remote management tools that would allow systems to be controlled from outside the corporate network? Have the networking components been configured to give more critical categories of traffic, such as process control instructions, priority over less critical categories of traffic, such as e-mails? Are there procedures for rate-limiting traffic so that the network is not incapacitated by excessive loads on the services affected? Have tests been conducted to make sure that critical systems cannot be taken offline too easily by large amounts of data or traffic, such as might be employed in a denial service attack? Is the network automatically and frequently scanned for connections to pieces of electronic equipment with manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers that are not on the list of authorized devices? Does the organization monitor for symptoms of manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers being spoofed, such as a mismatched operating system, mismatched device type, incorrect device location, and uncharacteristic behavior of the device? Is a wireless analyzer periodically run to identify any unauthorized wireless devices that may have been connected to the network? Are internal war-dialing campaigns periodically carried out to identify unauthorized modems that can be reached by dialing in? Are corporate phone exchanges periodically checked to detect outside attempts at finding unauthorized modems by war-dialing campaigns? Are the logs of server configurations regularly reviewed to make sure that any changes in the configurations did not undermine security? If the servers are performing critical operations or store very sensitive information, are the logs recording changes in their configurations reviewed daily? Are all modifications of router and switch configurations logged? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that the use of an external cloud provider will require additional security measures? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that any unencrypted information stored with a cloud provider could potentially be obtained by a subpoena before the organization could take legal steps to prevent this? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that the extra encryption needed to secure information in the cloud could result in longer response times for information systems? Do all administrator accounts used for cloud computing resources require two-factor authentication? Does the organization maintain separation between virtual machines performing more critical operations and those performing less critical operations? Is the management of external cloud computing resources performed using encrypted channels? Is any remote use of the cloud management interface performed over secure communication channels, such as a virtual private network? Is the cloud management interface configured to restrict administrator access from unknown internet protocol addresses? Is the cloud management interface designed with the minimum number of functions needed to manage the virtual machines, so that there are fewer opportunities to mount an attack utilizing those functions? Is all sensitive information that the organization stores in the cloud encrypted? Is all sensitive information transmitted between the client and the cloud encrypted? Does the cloud provider maintain redundant secure communication channels for accessing the cloud management interfaces? If the organization performs critical operations using external cloud computing resources, are these operations logicallyisolated from other virtual machines by the use of a separate hardware-level hypervisor? Is the organization choosing virtual machines for its critical operations that are designed to fail to a state which protects the system from security compromises and data breaches? If the organization allows its employees to use third-party collaborative platforms, such as Google Docs or Dropbox, for standard business operations, do they require employees to use only those platforms that encrypt all files at rest? Does the organization require its employees to refrain from putting any information on third-party collaborative platforms if it is considered very sensitive? If the organization allows its employees to use third-party collaborative platforms, such as Google Docs or Dropbox for standard business operations, has two-step log- in verification been implemented for those accounts? Are employees prevented from using personally owned smart phones to access third-party collaborative platforms used for work? Are backups of sensitive information that are made by the cloud provider periodically duplicated and stored at a third site, physically separate both from the cloud provider's facilities and from the organization's main facilities? Are copies of cryptographic keys used to encrypt sensitive information at the external provider of cloud computing services stored at a third site, physically separate both from the cloud provider's facilities and from the organization's main facilities? Does the organization have a set of procedures ready for moving all of its cloud operations and data out of the cloud? Does the organization have a set of procedures ready for moving all of its cloud operations and data to another cloud provider? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? Are all smart phones issued by the organization protected by anti-virus software if those devices are vulnerable to viruses? Are the anti-virus signatures and definitions on employee laptops and smart phones updated as soon as new signatures are available? Are employee laptops protected by internet-protection software that blocks access to dangerous websites or known hostile IP address ranges? Are infrared, bluetooth, and wireless links on laptops and mobile devices disabled when not required for business functions? Are remote log-in's from employee laptops required to use IP addresses that were used in the past or are consistent with the employee's expected geographical location? Are telecommuters required to use virtual private network connections to obtain access to the corporate network? If the organization uses virtual private networks, is two-factor authentication required? If the organization uses a virtual private network to access highly- critical systems, are more stringent authentication mechanisms, such as tokens and biometrics, required? If the organization uses virtual private networks, are the connecting computers first connected to a computer in an isolated network that runs a security check on the remote computer before it is granted access to the internal network? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? Are replacements on hand for the most functionally important servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, and other equipment, in case these are stolen or physically damaged Have you disabled or modified the banners or strings that announce the name and version of the software products being used on public- facing web servers? If an employee is promoted to a considerably higher level of responsibility and access, is a new background check carried out? Are security logs for firewalls regularly reviewed to establish baselines for normal traffic patterns? Are security logs for firewalls regularly reviewed to establish baselines for normal traffic patterns? Have you disabled or modified the banners or strings that announce the name and version of the software products being used on public-facing web servers? Are replacements on hand for the most functionally important servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, and other equipment, in case these are stolen or physically damaged If an employee is promoted to a considerably higher level of responsibility and access, is a new background check carried out? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? @sounilyu *Checklist questions are from US Cyber Consequences Unit
#RSAC Use Case 17: Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 24 19/34 2/723/25 6/9 11/14 40/52 44/5913/25 18/40 13/43 18/26 34/527/59 8/29 18/33 23/38 16/396/37 25/28 25/47 27/42 8/1213/28 49/51 12/16 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover @sounilyu
#RSAC Use Case 17: Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 25 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover 56% 29%66% 67% 79% 77% 75%52% 45% 30% 69% 65%12% 28% 55% 61% 41%16% 89% 53% 64% 67%46% 96% 75% @sounilyu
#RSAC Use Case 18: Applying Security Design Patterns to Fit Business Constraints 26@sounilyu DAY EXTENDERS COMMODITY TRADERS General Specialized SENIOR EXECUTIVES BRANCH OFFICE DEVELOPERS / DATA ANALYSTS CALL CENTERS ROAD WARRIORS OFFICE WORKERS Who Are You ? O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O = 80 Max Possible Security Posture = 100 Min Required Security Posture > 70 (Due to inherent risks and risk tolerance) Max Possible Security Posture = 50 Min Required Security Posture > 55 (Due to inherent risks and risk tolerance) = 56 Going above maximum possible security posture results in a business impact and forces a conscious tradeoff between business impact and security posture
#RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Use Case 19: New Tech Areas - Vuln Assessment vs Pen Testing vs Breach and Attack Simulation vs Red Team 27@sounilyu Penetration Testing RedTeam Vulnerability Assessment Breachand AttackSim Where are we inherently vulnerable? Are those vulnerabilities mitigated or protected? For those that are not, do we log the event and get it just before the point where an analyst would have seen it? Is the event actually escalated to an incident with an associated response action?
#RSAC Use Case 20: New Tech Areas - Zero Trust 28@sounilyu Device Certs Host-Based Firewalls SSL Certs API Gateways IP Address “Zero Trust”, Single Packet Authentication Hashes, Checksums Encryption Passwords, Tokens, No-Passwords N/A Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify (From) Protect (To) Establishes trustworthiness of the asset Enforces access policy based on trustworthiness and other environmental factors
#RSAC Other Frameworks: Mapping the Kill Chain View #1 29@sounilyu Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
#RSAC Other Frameworks: Mapping the Kill Chain View #2 30@sounilyu
#RSAC Other Frameworks: Mapping ATT&CK (in progress) 31@sounilyu Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Visibility/Data Sources Mitigations Cyber Analytic Repository
#RSAC Other Frameworks: Mapping to the CIS Top 20 Critical Security Controls 32@sounilyu 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 9.1 1.7 8.3 9.5 15.6 1.8 8.5 12.12 15.9 8.1 9.2 15.4 8.2 9.4 15.5 8.4 8.8 8.6 9.3 1.6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.4 5.3 7.3 2.8 3.5 5.4 2.9 5.1 7.1 2.10 5.2 7.2 3.1 3.2 5.5 2.6 3.6 3.7 11.1 12.1 11.2 15.1 7.4 7.10 12.3 14.3 7.5 11.4 12.4 15.7 7.7 11.5 12.7 15.8 7.8 11.6 14.1 15.10 7.9 11.7 14.2 6.1 6.6 11.3 12.9 6.2 6.7 12.2 12.10 6.3 6.8 12.5 15.2 6.4 7.6 12.6 15.3 6.5 8.7 12.8 13.1 10.1 10.5 13.7 14.6 10.2 13.2 13.8 14.7 10.3 13.4 13.9 14.8 10.4 13.6 14.4 13.3 14.5 13.5 14.9 16.1 16.6 3.3 4.5 16.2 16.7 4.2 4.6 16.3 16.10 4.3 4.7 16.4 16.11 4.4 12.11 16.5 4.1 4.9 4.8 16.12 16.13 16.8 16.9 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
#RSAC Work Still Left to Do: Mapping Governance Activities and Process Oriented Functions 33 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Risk Mgt Incident Mgt Inventory Prioritization Vuln Assessment Threat Modeling Risk Assessment Controls Validation by Simulated or Actual Attacker Vuln Mgt Event Mgt Incident Response Mgt ? BCP/COOP Mgt @sounilyu
#RSAC This week – Use the matrix to categorize vendors that you encounter in the Expo Hall – Ask them where they fit and try to fit them only in one shopping aisle In the first three months following this presentation you should: – Send me feedback on how you have mapped vendors to it – Organize your portfolio of technologies to see where you might have gaps – Identify vendors that may round out your portfolio based on your security design pattern (a.k.a. security bingo card) Within six months you should: – Send me feedback on how you used the Cyber Defense Matrix and improved it 34@sounilyu “Apply” Slide
Questions? @sounilyu

More Related Content

PDF
Understanding The Security Vendor Landscape Using the Cyber Defense Matrix (R...
bySounil Yu
 
PPTX
Cyber Defense Matrix: Revolutions
bySounil Yu
 
PDF
Cybersecurity roadmap : Global healthcare security architecture
byPriyanka Aash
 
PPTX
New Paradigms for the Next Era of Security
bySounil Yu
 
PPTX
Understanding the Cyber Security Vendor Landscape
bySounil Yu
 
PPTX
CyberSecurity Portfolio Management
byPriyanka Aash
 
PPTX
Distributed Immutable Ephemeral - New Paradigms for the Next Era of Security
bySounil Yu
 
PDF
Building an effective Information Security Roadmap
byElliott Franklin
 
Understanding The Security Vendor Landscape Using the Cyber Defense Matrix (R...
bySounil Yu
 
Cyber Defense Matrix: Revolutions
bySounil Yu
 
Cybersecurity roadmap : Global healthcare security architecture
byPriyanka Aash
 
New Paradigms for the Next Era of Security
bySounil Yu
 
Understanding the Cyber Security Vendor Landscape
bySounil Yu
 
CyberSecurity Portfolio Management
byPriyanka Aash
 
Distributed Immutable Ephemeral - New Paradigms for the Next Era of Security
bySounil Yu
 
Building an effective Information Security Roadmap
byElliott Franklin
 

What's hot

PDF
Building Security Operation Center
byS.E. CTS CERT-GOV-MD
 
PDF
Purple Teaming the Cyber Kill Chain: Practical Exercises for Everyone Sector...
byChris Gates
 
PPT
SOC presentation- Building a Security Operations Center
byMichael Nickle
 
PDF
Building a Next-Generation Security Operations Center (SOC)
bySqrrl
 
PDF
Cyber Threat Intelligence
bymohamed nasri
 
PDF
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing ATT&CK Informed Defenses the CIS Way; Phili...
byMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
PDF
Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-on
bySplunk
 
PDF
Zero Trust Model Presentation
byGowdhaman Jothilingam
 
PPTX
SOC Architecture Workshop - Part 1
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Cybersecurity Roadmap Development for Executives
byKrist Davood - Principal - CIO
 
PDF
Security operations center-SOC Presentation-مرکز عملیات امنیت
byReZa AdineH
 
PDF
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
byTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
PPTX
Cyber Threat Hunting Workshop
byDigit Oktavianto
 
PDF
Threat Hunting
bySplunk
 
PDF
Threat Hunting Report
byMorane Decriem
 
PDF
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
byChris Gates
 
PDF
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
byMITRE ATT&CK
 
PPTX
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
byAmrMousa51
 
PDF
Cybersecurity Frameworks | NIST Cybersecurity Framework | Cybersecurity Certi...
byEdureka!
 
PDF
Introduction to red team operations
bySunny Neo
 
Building Security Operation Center
byS.E. CTS CERT-GOV-MD
 
Purple Teaming the Cyber Kill Chain: Practical Exercises for Everyone Sector...
byChris Gates
 
SOC presentation- Building a Security Operations Center
byMichael Nickle
 
Building a Next-Generation Security Operations Center (SOC)
bySqrrl
 
Cyber Threat Intelligence
bymohamed nasri
 
MITRE ATT&CKcon 2.0: Prioritizing ATT&CK Informed Defenses the CIS Way; Phili...
byMITRE - ATT&CKcon
 
Threat Hunting with Splunk Hands-on
bySplunk
 
Zero Trust Model Presentation
byGowdhaman Jothilingam
 
SOC Architecture Workshop - Part 1
byPriyanka Aash
 
Cybersecurity Roadmap Development for Executives
byKrist Davood - Principal - CIO
 
Security operations center-SOC Presentation-مرکز عملیات امنیت
byReZa AdineH
 
PHDays 2018 Threat Hunting Hands-On Lab
byTeymur Kheirkhabarov
 
Cyber Threat Hunting Workshop
byDigit Oktavianto
 
Threat Hunting
bySplunk
 
Threat Hunting Report
byMorane Decriem
 
Building a Successful Internal Adversarial Simulation Team - Chris Gates & Ch...
byChris Gates
 
Mapping to MITRE ATT&CK: Enhancing Operations Through the Tracking of Interac...
byMITRE ATT&CK
 
SEIM-Microsoft Sentinel.pptx
byAmrMousa51
 
Cybersecurity Frameworks | NIST Cybersecurity Framework | Cybersecurity Certi...
byEdureka!
 
Introduction to red team operations
bySunny Neo
 

Similar to Cyber Defense Matrix: Reloaded

PDF
Cyber Defense Matrix Workshop - RSA Conference
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Three Considerations To Amplify Your Detection and Response Program
byMorphick
 
PDF
Achieving Defendable Architectures Via Threat Driven Methodologies
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Implementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
A Vision for Shared, Central Intelligence to Ebb a Growing Flood of Alerts
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
RSA ASIA 2014 - Internet of Things
byWolfgang Kandek
 
PDF
What Is Next-Generation Endpoint Security and Why Do You Need It?
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Orchestrating Software Defined Networks To Disrupt The Apt Kill Chain
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Rapid Threat Modeling Techniques
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Introducing a Security Program to Large Scale Legacy Products
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
DATA BREACH LITIGATION HOW TO AVOID IT AND BE BETTER PREPARED
byPriyanka Aash
 
PPTX
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
byPaula Januszkiewicz
 
PPTX
Intelligence-Driven Industrial Security with Case Studies in ICS Attacks
byDragos, Inc.
 
PDF
Realities of Data Security
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
RSA 2016 Realities of Data Security
byScott Carlson
 
PDF
Evolve or Die, How to Stop Getting Slaughtered Due to Bad Vulnerability Manag...
byPriyanka Aash
 
PPTX
Securing Systems - Still Crazy After All These Years
byAdrian Sanabria
 
PDF
From SIEM to SOC: Crossing the Cybersecurity Chasm
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Threat intel- -content-curation-organizing-the-path-to-successful-detection
byPriyanka Aash
 
PDF
Keeping Up with the Adversary: Creating a Threat-Based Cyber Team
byPriyanka Aash
 
Cyber Defense Matrix Workshop - RSA Conference
byPriyanka Aash
 
Three Considerations To Amplify Your Detection and Response Program
byMorphick
 
Achieving Defendable Architectures Via Threat Driven Methodologies
byPriyanka Aash
 
Implementing An Automated Incident Response Architecture
byPriyanka Aash
 
A Vision for Shared, Central Intelligence to Ebb a Growing Flood of Alerts
byPriyanka Aash
 
RSA ASIA 2014 - Internet of Things
byWolfgang Kandek
 
What Is Next-Generation Endpoint Security and Why Do You Need It?
byPriyanka Aash
 
Orchestrating Software Defined Networks To Disrupt The Apt Kill Chain
byPriyanka Aash
 
Rapid Threat Modeling Techniques
byPriyanka Aash
 
Introducing a Security Program to Large Scale Legacy Products
byPriyanka Aash
 
DATA BREACH LITIGATION HOW TO AVOID IT AND BE BETTER PREPARED
byPriyanka Aash
 
RSA Conference 2017 session: Hacker’s Perspective on Your Windows Infrastruct...
byPaula Januszkiewicz
 
Intelligence-Driven Industrial Security with Case Studies in ICS Attacks
byDragos, Inc.
 
Realities of Data Security
byPriyanka Aash
 
RSA 2016 Realities of Data Security
byScott Carlson
 
Evolve or Die, How to Stop Getting Slaughtered Due to Bad Vulnerability Manag...
byPriyanka Aash
 
Securing Systems - Still Crazy After All These Years
byAdrian Sanabria
 
From SIEM to SOC: Crossing the Cybersecurity Chasm
byPriyanka Aash
 
Threat intel- -content-curation-organizing-the-path-to-successful-detection
byPriyanka Aash
 
Keeping Up with the Adversary: Creating a Threat-Based Cyber Team
byPriyanka Aash
 

Recently uploaded

PPTX
Chapter 3 Introduction to number system.pptx
byGetachewAbera9
 
PDF
Security Technologys: Access Control, Firewall, VPN
byShielaLasala
 
PDF
The major tech developments for 2026 by Pluralsight, a research and training ...
byChris Skinner
 
PDF
Making Sense of Raster: From Bit Depth to Better Workflows
bySafe Software
 
PDF
Eredità digitale sugli smartphone: cosa resta di noi nei dispositivi mobili
bySpeck&Tech
 
DOCX
iRobot Post‑Mortem and Alternative Paths - Discussion Document for Boards and...
byDave Litwiller
 
DOCX
Introduction to the World of Computers (Hardware & Software)
byALIABBAS ABASOV
 
PPTX
wob-report.pptxwob-report.pptxwob-report.pptx
byssuser0d171c
 
PDF
Day 1 - Cloud Security Strategy and Planning ~ 2nd Sight Lab ~ Cloud Security...
by2nd Sight Lab
 
PDF
Day 3 - Data and Application Security - 2nd Sight Lab Cloud Security Class
by2nd Sight Lab
 
PDF
Unser Jahresrückblick – MarvelClient in 2025
bypanagenda
 
PPTX
Cybercrime in the Digital Age: Risks, Impact & Protection
byYasir Naveed Riaz
 
PPTX
Coded Agents – with UiPath SDK + LangGraph [Virtual Hands-on Workshop]
byUiPathCommunity
 
PPTX
From Backup to Resilience: How MSPs Are Preparing for 2026
byMSP360
 
PDF
Internet_of_Things_IoT_for_Next_Generation_Smart_Systems_Utilizing.pdf
byRoshanSyed12
 
PDF
Security Forum Sessions from Houston 2025 Event
byMark Simos
 
PPTX
Cybersecurity Best Practices - Step by Step guidelines
byYasir Naveed Riaz
 
PDF
Day 5 - Red Team + Blue Team in the Cloud - 2nd Sight Lab Cloud Security Class
by2nd Sight Lab
 
PPTX
Kanban India 2025 | Daksh Gupta | Modeling the Models, Generative AI & Kanban
byLeanKanbanIndia
 
PDF
ElyriaSoftware — Powering the Future with Blockchain Innovation
byElyria Software
 
Chapter 3 Introduction to number system.pptx
byGetachewAbera9
 
Security Technologys: Access Control, Firewall, VPN
byShielaLasala
 
The major tech developments for 2026 by Pluralsight, a research and training ...
byChris Skinner
 
Making Sense of Raster: From Bit Depth to Better Workflows
bySafe Software
 
Eredità digitale sugli smartphone: cosa resta di noi nei dispositivi mobili
bySpeck&Tech
 
iRobot Post‑Mortem and Alternative Paths - Discussion Document for Boards and...
byDave Litwiller
 
Introduction to the World of Computers (Hardware & Software)
byALIABBAS ABASOV
 
wob-report.pptxwob-report.pptxwob-report.pptx
byssuser0d171c
 
Day 1 - Cloud Security Strategy and Planning ~ 2nd Sight Lab ~ Cloud Security...
by2nd Sight Lab
 
Day 3 - Data and Application Security - 2nd Sight Lab Cloud Security Class
by2nd Sight Lab
 
Unser Jahresrückblick – MarvelClient in 2025
bypanagenda
 
Cybercrime in the Digital Age: Risks, Impact & Protection
byYasir Naveed Riaz
 
Coded Agents – with UiPath SDK + LangGraph [Virtual Hands-on Workshop]
byUiPathCommunity
 
From Backup to Resilience: How MSPs Are Preparing for 2026
byMSP360
 
Internet_of_Things_IoT_for_Next_Generation_Smart_Systems_Utilizing.pdf
byRoshanSyed12
 
Security Forum Sessions from Houston 2025 Event
byMark Simos
 
Cybersecurity Best Practices - Step by Step guidelines
byYasir Naveed Riaz
 
Day 5 - Red Team + Blue Team in the Cloud - 2nd Sight Lab Cloud Security Class
by2nd Sight Lab
 
Kanban India 2025 | Daksh Gupta | Modeling the Models, Generative AI & Kanban
byLeanKanbanIndia
 
ElyriaSoftware — Powering the Future with Blockchain Innovation
byElyria Software
 

Cyber Defense Matrix: Reloaded

  • 1.
    #RSAC SESSION ID: Sounil Yu TheCyber Defense Matrix, Reloaded STR-T09 @sounilyu
  • 2.
  • 3.
    #RSAC Vendors shown arerepresentative only No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here Opinions are my own and do not represent those of my employer Disclaimers @sounilyu 3 All models are wrong, but some are useful - George E. P. Box …and some models are measurably more useful - Doug Hubbard
  • 4.
    #RSAC Background on theCyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 4
  • 5.
    #RSAC Background on theCyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 5 Operational Functions Inventorying assets and vulns, measuring attack surface, prioritizing, baselining normal, threat modeling, risk assessment Preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation Discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics Acting on events, eradicating intrusion, assessing damage, forensic reconstruction Returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned, resiliency Asset Classes Workstations, servers, phones, tablets, storage, network devices, IoT infrastructure, etc. Software, interactions, and application flows on the devices Connections and traffic flowing among devices and apps Information at rest, in transit, or in use by the resources above The people using the resources listed above 10011101010101010010 01001101010110101001 11010101101011010100 10110101010101101010 DEVICES APPS NETWORKS DATA USERS IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER
  • 6.
    #RSAC The Cyber DefenseMatrix @sounilyu 6 Operational Functions Inventorying assets and vulns, measuring attack surface, prioritizing, baselining normal, threat modeling, risk assessment Preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation Discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics Acting on events, eradicating intrusion, assessing damage, forensic reconstruction Returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned, resiliency Asset Classes Workstations, servers, phones, tablets, storage, network devices,IoT infrastructure, etc. Software, interactions, and application flows on the devices Connections and traffic flowing among devices and apps Information at rest, in transit, or in use by the resources above The people using the resources listed above 10011101010101010010 01001101010110101001 11010101101011010100 10110101010101101010 DEVICES APPS NETWORKS DATA USERS IDENTIFY PROTECT DETECT RESPOND RECOVER Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
  • 7.
    #RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process IdentifyProtect Detect Respond Recover Background on the Cyber Defense Matrix @sounilyu 7
  • 8.
    #RSAC Enterprise Security MarketSegments @sounilyu 8 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover IAM Endpoint Detection & ResponseConfig Mgt, Vuln Scanner Data Audit, Discovery, Classification RASP, WAF Phishing Simulations DDoS Mitigation Insider Threat / Behavioral Analytics Network Security (FW, IPS/IDS) DRM Encryption, Tokenization, DLP, DRM Netflow, Network Vuln Scanner NW Forensics AV, HIPS Deep Web, Brian Krebs, FBI Backup Phishing & Security Awareness SAST, DAST, SW Asset Mgt, Fuzzers EP Forensics
  • 9.
    #RSAC We care aboutmore than just the assets that are owned and controlled by the enterprise @sounilyu 9 Threat Actors Vendors Customers Employees Enterprise Assets • Devices - workstations, servers, phones, tablets, IoT, peripherals, storage, network devices, web cameras, infrastructure, etc. • Applications - The software, interactions, and application flows on the devices • Network - The connections and traffic flowing among devices and applications • Data - The information residing on, traveling through, or processed by the resources listed above • Users – The people using the resources listed above 01001101010110101001 10110101010101101010 Operational Functions • Identify – inventorying assets and vulns, prioritizing, measuring attack surface, baselining, threat modeling, risk assessmt • Protect – preventing or limiting impact, patching, containing, isolating, hardening, managing access, vuln remediation • Detect – discovering events, triggering on anomalies, hunting for intrusions, security analytics • Respond – acting on events, eradicating intrusion footholds, assessing damage, coordinating response, forensics • Recover – returning to normal operations, restoring services, documenting lessons learned
  • 10.
    #RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect DetectRespond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Identify Protect Detect Respond R Market Segments – Other Environments @sounilyu 10 Threat Actor Assets Threat Intel Intrusion Deception Malware Sandboxes Vendor Assets Cloud Access Security Brokers Vendor Risk Assessments Customer Assets Endpoint Fraud Detection Device Finger- printing Digital Biometrics Web Fraud Detection Employee Assets BYOD MAM BYOD MDMPCI-DSS, GDPR
  • 11.
    #RSAC Recap from 2016Briefing 11@sounilyu Other Use Cases Primary Use Case: Vendor Mapping Differentiating Primary & Supporting Capabilities Defining Security Design Patterns Maximizing Deployment Footprint Understanding the New Perimeter Calculating Defense-in-Depth Balancing Your Portfolio Budget Planning for Obsolescence Disintermediating Security Components Comparing Point Products vs Platforms Finding Opportunities for Automation Identifying Gaps in People, Process, Tech https://bit.ly/cdm-rsa2016
  • 12.
    #RSAC Early Stage Expoand Sandbox Vendors 12 Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Technology People Process Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency @sounilyu Disclaimer: Vendors shown are representative only. No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here. SecurePlus Data
  • 13.
    #RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect DetectRespond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Devices Applications Networks Identify Protect Detect Respond R Early Stage Expo and Sandbox Vendors 13@sounilyu Threat Actor Assets Vendor Assets Customer Assets Employee Assets Disclaimer: Vendors shown are representative only. No usage or endorsement should be construed because they are shown here.
  • 14.
    #RSAC Use Case 12:Optimal Resource Allocation Ratios 14@sounilyu Technology People Processes Technology People Process 90 70 50 30 10 10 30 50 70 90 50 50 50 50 50 Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover ~10:1 ~2:1 1:1 ~1:2 ~1:10Tech:People Ratio RISK ADVERSE POSTURE RISK TAKING POSTURE
  • 15.
    #RSAC Use Case 13:Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 15@sounilyu Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Endpoint Services CERT Endpoint Team LOBs App Monitoring LOBs Network Services Network Monitoring Net Svcs Chief Data Officer Data Loss Prevention CDO Human Resources Insider Threat Human Resources / Physical Security Devices Applications Networks Data Users
  • 16.
    #RSAC Use Case 13:Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 16@sounilyu Inventory: Systems Mgt Prioritize: Function / Ownership Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Vulnerability Scanner Inventory: Application Inventories, API Inventories Prioritize: Critical App List Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: SAST/DAST/IAST Inventory: Netflow Prioritize: Function / Volume Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Path Analysis Inventory: Data Repository Lists Prioritize: Data Classification Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Level of Exposure Inventory: HR Systems / Payroll Prioritize: Hierarchy Vuln / Attack Surface Measurement: Background Chk/ Phishing Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Function RACI Establish Inventory RA – Owner I – Security Prioritize Inventory R – Owner I – Security Measure Vuln/ Attack Surface R – Security ACI – Owner Technology People Process • Observations: - There are greater inefficiencies when the RACI is out of alignment in a given domain - Identify functions that are largely performed manually will result in poor data quality
  • 17.
    #RSAC Use Case 13:Understanding Handoffs and Responsibilities 17@sounilyu Configure: Systems Mgt Patch: Patch Mgt Policy: Endpoint / Server Security Policy Configure: Application Security Lifecycle, BSIMM Patch: Code Updates, WAF, RASP Policy: Application Security Program Configure: Network Segmentation Patch: Firewalls Policy: Network Security Policy Configure: Encryption, Tokenization Patch: Re-encryption Policy: Data Security Policy Configure: Onboarding Orientation Patch: Annual / Periodic Training / Teachable Moments Policy: User Awareness Policy Devices Apps Networks Data Users Protect Technology People Process Function RACI Configure RA – Owner CI – Security Patch RA – Owner CI – Security Policy Definition RA – Security CI – Owner
  • 18.
    #RSAC Devices Applications NetworksData Users Define Policy • Device usage policy • Baselines, standards • SaaS usage policy • App Dev policy • Network access policy • Classification guide • Acceptable use policy Repair / Correct / Patch / Remediate • Patch • Fix bugs • Patch • Modify ACLs • Encrypt • Chg permissions • Training and awareness Least Priv / Control Access/ Separation of Duties • Active Directory/ LDAP / RADIUS • Admin Priv Escalation • Mutual TLS, API keys • User authenication • Dev/Test/Prod sep • VPN • NAC • Firewalls, VLANs • Need to know • Database activity monitoring • IAM, Access review • SoD, Roles & Responsibilities Credential Management • Credential Vaulting • Credential Vaulting • API key management • Credential Vaulting • TACACS • Key management system, HSMs • Password manager • Multifactor Auth Whitelist / Blacklist • Signature-based (A/V), Behavior-based (HIPS) • Run-time application self protection • Default deny ACLs • Default allow ACLs • HMACs • Persona non grata • Full ID check Harden • Configuration hardening • Secure coding • Code obfuscation • Close comms paths • TLS encryption • AES encryption • Training and awareness Least Functionality • Unnecessary service removal • Microservices • Containers • Single packet authentication • Need to know • Differential privacy • N/A Isolation / Containment • Virtualization, sandboxing • Containers, Content Disarm and Reconstr • Walled garden, remediation network • Rights management system • Quarantine, jail Audit / Log Events • A/V, HIPS, login, and other event logs • Application logs • Authentication logs • VPN, NAC, Firewall, DNS, DHCP logs • Database logs, DB activity logs • User activity logs Change Management • File integrity monitoring • Version / release control • Network change management tools • Integrity monitoring • Manager 1:1s Patterns and Anti-Patterns in PROTECT functions 18
  • 19.
    #RSAC Use Case 14:Understanding why do some things that we buy never get used 19@sounilyu Source: Security Shelfware: Which Products Are Gathering Dust In the Shed and Why? https://www.rsaconference.com/writable/presentations/file_upload/mash-t07a-security-shelfware-which-products-gathering-dust-and-why.pdf 0 5 10 15 20 WAF Web filtering Forensics AV User awareness IDAM / SSO / Priv Mgt SIEM FIM GRC Vuln Scanners IPS IDS What ends up on the shelf? 0 5 10 15 20 Vaporware Lack of Updates Bundled / Cheap Compliance / Regulatory Requirement Budget cuts Replaced with competing product Lack of staff Internal politics Unable to use/enable features Not enough expertise Why Vendors Users
  • 20.
    #RSAC Detect Devices Applications Networks Data Users SIEM UEBA EDR IDS SIEM UEBA UBA People Technology Process Use Case 14:Understanding why do some things that we buy never get used 20@sounilyu • Observation: People/Tech Mix - At the DETECT stage, an equal mix of people and technology are needed (i.e., you CANNOT automate everything) • Mapping: - Alignment is done by USE CASE, not by TELEMETRY - A generic analytics platform that consumes a wide range of TELEMETRY can satisfy a wide range of USE CASES - Vendors typically sell the fine tuning of DETECTION RULES to satisfy a USE CASE using specific TELEMETRY
  • 21.
    #RSAC Use Case 15:Visualizing Attack Surfaces Devices Applications Networks Data Users Vuln Assessment OS Hardening Config Compliance SAST DAST WAF Load Balancer IAM Log Analysis Netflow DDoS Prevention Firewall IPS/IDS DDoS Mitigation PCAP Analysis Encryption Tokenization Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover @sounilyu 21 Devices Applications Networks Data Users SAST DAST WAF Load Balancer IAM Log Analysis Encryption Tokenization Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Traditional Web Application Serverless Function
  • 22.
    #RSAC Specialized Generalized Generalized Specialized UseCase 16: Differentiating between Generalized vs Specialized Needs 22@sounilyu Technology People Processes Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Specialized: skills or capabilities needed to service security needs (e.g., vulnerability scanners, access control systems, hunting skills, incident response skills) Generalized: skills or capabilities sufficient to service security needs (e.g., analytic platforms, orchestration tools, vulnerability management skills, risk management skills) Try to avoid acquiring specific capabilities that can be supported with generalized resources
  • 23.
    #RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect DetectRespond Recover Use Case 17: Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 23 Are the vendor's default passwords and default log-in names changed on software applications before those applications are put into operation? •Are passwords for service accounts (e.g., backupserver, sp_content) extremely complex in their character sets and length? •Are the boot sequences on the organization's computers set so that the computers cannot be booted from external media, such as USB drives or CD's? •Is each type and level of application privilegeassigned an appropriate type and level of authentication mechanism? (e.g., do administrator privileges require a more secure log-in mechanism than ordinary privileges?) •Is there a documented procedure for removing and verifying the removal of application privileges when these are no longer needed? Has the organization formally assigned sensitivity classifications to its information files? Are the sensitivity classifications that the organization employs designed to provide a good basis for encryption policies? Are the sensitivity classifications that the organization employs periodically reviewed to make sure that they are not excessively restrictive, encumbering corporate activities with necessary precautions, or insufficiently restrictive, exposing corporate activities to losses and harm? Does the organization avoid storing types of data that could create liabilities,but do not serve any important business or government function? (e.g., does the organization erase credit card numbers as soon as the transactions using those numbers have been successfully processed, if the customers are going to be asked to enter these numbers again when making future purchases?) Are all input fields for data restricted to an appropriate minimum and maximum length? (e.g., a Social Security Number field should only allow nine numerals.) Are all input fields for data restricted to the appropriate characters and expressions? (e.g., a Social Security Number field should not allow anything but numerals and dashes.) Are there limitations on the data fields for the database that correspond to the limitations in the fields on the user interface, so that improper data are not inserted directly into the database? Are the service ports for critical applications configured to filter out data that is outside the proper operating parameters for those applications? Are the limitations on what can be written into the input fields made sufficiently restrictive, wherever possible, so that those fields will not accept executable instructions? Is the ability to alter or input data into documents or databases restricted to those employees who would have a valid need to do so in the course of their normal work? Are data fields that would rarely need to be changed made read-only as soon as the data entry is verified as correct? Are documents that present the organization's work or positions converted into formats that cannot be easily modified, before they are circulated electronically outside the organization? When documents are converted into formats that cannot be easily modified, are those documents digitally signed to make them even harder to falsify? Are the digital signatures on important documents routinely checked to verify their source before those documents are accepted and utilized? Are critically important e-mails sent using an application that hashes their contents, so that the e-mails' contents cannot easily be falsified? Is there an automatic process for monitoring systems for symptoms that false information may have been inserted? If there is reason to believe an attacker could benefit greatly from altering a body of data, is that data associated with a hash that would reveal if the data has been altered? Is there a mechanism for monitoring and logging all changes to critical databases? Are all uploads of sensitive data files monitored and logged? Are all uploads of encrypted data files monitored and logged? Is there an alarm mechanism that warns if data is apparently being entered by employees in quantities or with distributions that are not consistent with those employees' normal work patterns? After a data field has been made read only, is there an appropriate procedure for correcting that field under special circumstances and for verifying that correction? Is the database designed so that sensitive information cannot be over- written, without successive, time-stamped revisions being securely archived? Wherever practical, is any authentic information that might be stolen intermixed with bogus information that would cause harm or lead to the possible prosecution of anyone who tries to use it? Are receipts for important e-mails collected and stored to provide a record verifying that they reached the intended recipients? If log files need to be preserved for an extended period of time for legal reasons, are these files stored in a tamper-proof form at more than one physical location? Are all corporate information systems protected with basic authentication mechanisms, such as log-in name and password? Are log-in attempts limited to a certain number per minute (rather than a certain number altogether)? Is the rate at which log-in's can be attempted automatically slowed further after multiple failed attempts? If the log-in process is regularly under attack, is there a queuing system that would allow someone trying to properly access the system to get a turn at logging into it? If an account is accessed only after a considerable number of failed log- in attempts, is that account then monitored for improper use? Is there a simple automated procedure for cancelling any access provided by an employee's password, authentication token, or biometric information when that employee leaves the firm? Is there a program checking passwords when they are created to make sure that they meet the prescribed minimum length and complexity requirements? Are password choices automatically rejected if they are on the list of most commonly used passwords or consist mostly of a commonly used password? Are the characters typed into password fields masked, so that they can't be read by bystanders? Are there automatic alarms triggered by multiple failed log-in attempts, even if distributed across time, across user ID's, or different systems? Are multiple failed attempts to access applications reviewed in a timely manner, even if those failed access attempts are by authorized employees? Is an effort made to identify and investigate successful access authentications that are carried out at unusual hours of the day or night? Is there an alarm mechanism that would warn of the theft of a file in which passwords are stored? If an employee needs to recover a password from a remote location, is a link to recover or reset the password sent in an e-mail to that employee's regular e-mail account after the employee has successfully answered the challenge questions? Is there a simple automated procedure for rapidly revoking the privileges for tokens and smart cards, if they become compromised? Is there an efficient procedure for replacing tokens and smart cards? Is there a simple automated procedure for revoking the privileges for any biometric identifier that is compromised? Does the organization maintain a comprehensive list of all the system names and their associated network addresses on the organization's network? Do detailed network topology diagrams exist of the corporate network, so that all the connection routes can be traced? Do the detailed network topology diagrams list the service paths and network protocols being used? Has the information on the network topology diagram been verified to be accurate, so that all the components and connections on the network are indeed included? Are all documents diagramming network topologies rigorously protected from unauthorized access? Does the organization maintain comprehensive access control lists for its routers, including the internet protocol addresses and port numbers being utilized? If the organization is maintaining a separate network for security reasons, are all unnecessary services and broadcasts disabled on the gateway between networks, including responses to ping requests and traceroute requests, so that the existence of the gateway is difficult to detect? If a network is used for highly critical functions, does the organization periodically change the port numbers used by those critical services, so that any previous unauthorized explorations by potential attackers of those port numbers and their uses will be made obsolete? If a network is used for highly critical functions, does the organization periodically change the names of servers and other devices, so that any previous unauthorized explorations by potential attackers of those names and what they designate will be made obsolete? Are the baseline standards for equipment connected to the organization's network periodically reviewed and updated? Are the vendor's default security settings, including default passwords and user names, changed on systems before those systems are connected to the network? Are vulnerability scans or penetration tests performed on critical systems both before they are connected to the corporate network and regularly thereafter? Are employees explicitly forbidden to plug unauthorized electronic devices, such as flash drives, iPods, Kindles, smart phones, and digital cameras, into equipment inside the corporate network? Are switches in criticallyimportant facilities configured so that they will not connect to any pieces of electronic equipment that are not on the list of authorized manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers? Are wireless access points in critically important facilities configured so that they will not connect to any pieces of electronic equipment that are not on the list of authorized manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers? Do the wireless connections employ strong encryption technologies? Are there strict requirements and procedures for deploying any modems within the corporate infrastructure? Is there a documented approval process for giving people remote access to modems? If it is necessary to use insecure protocols for receiving or sending data, such as the File Transfer Protocol (FTP), are these insecure protocols supplemented with security protocols at the session protocol layer (e.g., yielding FTPS) or else transmitted over a virtual private network? Does the organization have agreements with vendors in which they guarantee a specified level of network reliabilityand service? Do corporate policies limit the use of unencrypted protocols, such as FTP, Telnet, or earlier versions of SNMP, for system management, unless the system explicitly requires these protocols? If the systems require unencrypted protocols, such as FTP, Telnet, or earlier versions of SNMP, for their management, are the corresponding connections set to shut down after a limited period of time? Does the corporation use access control lists to restrict SNMP requests from unauthorized systems to networking equipment, such as routers and switches? Are there policies for limiting the use of any remote management tools that would allow systems to be controlled from outside the corporate network? Have the networking components been configured to give more critical categories of traffic, such as process control instructions, priority over less critical categories of traffic, such as e-mails? Are there procedures for rate-limiting traffic so that the network is not incapacitated by excessive loads on the services affected? Have tests been conducted to make sure that critical systems cannot be taken offline too easily by large amounts of data or traffic, such as might be employed in a denial service attack? Is the network automatically and frequently scanned for connections to pieces of electronic equipment with manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers that are not on the list of authorized devices? Does the organization monitor for symptoms of manufacturer identification (MAC) numbers being spoofed, such as a mismatched operating system, mismatched device type, incorrect device location, and uncharacteristic behavior of the device? Is a wireless analyzer periodically run to identify any unauthorized wireless devices that may have been connected to the network? Are internal war-dialing campaigns periodically carried out to identify unauthorized modems that can be reached by dialing in? Are corporate phone exchanges periodically checked to detect outside attempts at finding unauthorized modems by war-dialing campaigns? Are the logs of server configurations regularly reviewed to make sure that any changes in the configurations did not undermine security? If the servers are performing critical operations or store very sensitive information, are the logs recording changes in their configurations reviewed daily? Are all modifications of router and switch configurations logged? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that the use of an external cloud provider will require additional security measures? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that any unencrypted information stored with a cloud provider could potentially be obtained by a subpoena before the organization could take legal steps to prevent this? Are the people in the organization who are responsible for cloud computing policies made aware that the extra encryption needed to secure information in the cloud could result in longer response times for information systems? Do all administrator accounts used for cloud computing resources require two-factor authentication? Does the organization maintain separation between virtual machines performing more critical operations and those performing less critical operations? Is the management of external cloud computing resources performed using encrypted channels? Is any remote use of the cloud management interface performed over secure communication channels, such as a virtual private network? Is the cloud management interface configured to restrict administrator access from unknown internet protocol addresses? Is the cloud management interface designed with the minimum number of functions needed to manage the virtual machines, so that there are fewer opportunities to mount an attack utilizing those functions? Is all sensitive information that the organization stores in the cloud encrypted? Is all sensitive information transmitted between the client and the cloud encrypted? Does the cloud provider maintain redundant secure communication channels for accessing the cloud management interfaces? If the organization performs critical operations using external cloud computing resources, are these operations logicallyisolated from other virtual machines by the use of a separate hardware-level hypervisor? Is the organization choosing virtual machines for its critical operations that are designed to fail to a state which protects the system from security compromises and data breaches? If the organization allows its employees to use third-party collaborative platforms, such as Google Docs or Dropbox, for standard business operations, do they require employees to use only those platforms that encrypt all files at rest? Does the organization require its employees to refrain from putting any information on third-party collaborative platforms if it is considered very sensitive? If the organization allows its employees to use third-party collaborative platforms, such as Google Docs or Dropbox for standard business operations, has two-step log- in verification been implemented for those accounts? Are employees prevented from using personally owned smart phones to access third-party collaborative platforms used for work? Are backups of sensitive information that are made by the cloud provider periodically duplicated and stored at a third site, physically separate both from the cloud provider's facilities and from the organization's main facilities? Are copies of cryptographic keys used to encrypt sensitive information at the external provider of cloud computing services stored at a third site, physically separate both from the cloud provider's facilities and from the organization's main facilities? Does the organization have a set of procedures ready for moving all of its cloud operations and data out of the cloud? Does the organization have a set of procedures ready for moving all of its cloud operations and data to another cloud provider? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? Are all smart phones issued by the organization protected by anti-virus software if those devices are vulnerable to viruses? Are the anti-virus signatures and definitions on employee laptops and smart phones updated as soon as new signatures are available? Are employee laptops protected by internet-protection software that blocks access to dangerous websites or known hostile IP address ranges? Are infrared, bluetooth, and wireless links on laptops and mobile devices disabled when not required for business functions? Are remote log-in's from employee laptops required to use IP addresses that were used in the past or are consistent with the employee's expected geographical location? Are telecommuters required to use virtual private network connections to obtain access to the corporate network? If the organization uses virtual private networks, is two-factor authentication required? If the organization uses a virtual private network to access highly- critical systems, are more stringent authentication mechanisms, such as tokens and biometrics, required? If the organization uses virtual private networks, are the connecting computers first connected to a computer in an isolated network that runs a security check on the remote computer before it is granted access to the internal network? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? Are replacements on hand for the most functionally important servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, and other equipment, in case these are stolen or physically damaged Have you disabled or modified the banners or strings that announce the name and version of the software products being used on public- facing web servers? If an employee is promoted to a considerably higher level of responsibility and access, is a new background check carried out? Are security logs for firewalls regularly reviewed to establish baselines for normal traffic patterns? Are security logs for firewalls regularly reviewed to establish baselines for normal traffic patterns? Have you disabled or modified the banners or strings that announce the name and version of the software products being used on public-facing web servers? Are replacements on hand for the most functionally important servers, desktop computers, laptop computers, and other equipment, in case these are stolen or physically damaged If an employee is promoted to a considerably higher level of responsibility and access, is a new background check carried out? Are employee laptops protected by anti-virus software? @sounilyu *Checklist questions are from US Cyber Consequences Unit
  • 24.
    #RSAC Use Case 17:Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 24 19/34 2/723/25 6/9 11/14 40/52 44/5913/25 18/40 13/43 18/26 34/527/59 8/29 18/33 23/38 16/396/37 25/28 25/47 27/42 8/1213/28 49/51 12/16 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover @sounilyu
  • 25.
    #RSAC Use Case 17:Measurements: Checklist Based Approaches 25 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover 56% 29%66% 67% 79% 77% 75%52% 45% 30% 69% 65%12% 28% 55% 61% 41%16% 89% 53% 64% 67%46% 96% 75% @sounilyu
  • 26.
    #RSAC Use Case 18:Applying Security Design Patterns to Fit Business Constraints 26@sounilyu DAY EXTENDERS COMMODITY TRADERS General Specialized SENIOR EXECUTIVES BRANCH OFFICE DEVELOPERS / DATA ANALYSTS CALL CENTERS ROAD WARRIORS OFFICE WORKERS Who Are You ? O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O O = 80 Max Possible Security Posture = 100 Min Required Security Posture > 70 (Due to inherent risks and risk tolerance) Max Possible Security Posture = 50 Min Required Security Posture > 55 (Due to inherent risks and risk tolerance) = 56 Going above maximum possible security posture results in a business impact and forces a conscious tradeoff between business impact and security posture
  • 27.
    #RSAC Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process IdentifyProtect Detect Respond Recover Use Case 19: New Tech Areas - Vuln Assessment vs Pen Testing vs Breach and Attack Simulation vs Red Team 27@sounilyu Penetration Testing RedTeam Vulnerability Assessment Breachand AttackSim Where are we inherently vulnerable? Are those vulnerabilities mitigated or protected? For those that are not, do we log the event and get it just before the point where an analyst would have seen it? Is the event actually escalated to an incident with an associated response action?
  • 28.
    #RSAC Use Case 20:New Tech Areas - Zero Trust 28@sounilyu Device Certs Host-Based Firewalls SSL Certs API Gateways IP Address “Zero Trust”, Single Packet Authentication Hashes, Checksums Encryption Passwords, Tokens, No-Passwords N/A Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify (From) Protect (To) Establishes trustworthiness of the asset Enforces access policy based on trustworthiness and other environmental factors
  • 29.
    #RSAC Other Frameworks: Mappingthe Kill Chain View #1 29@sounilyu Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
  • 30.
    #RSAC Other Frameworks: Mappingthe Kill Chain View #2 30@sounilyu
  • 31.
    #RSAC Other Frameworks: MappingATT&CK (in progress) 31@sounilyu Devices Applications Networks Data Users Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Visibility/Data Sources Mitigations Cyber Analytic Repository
  • 32.
    #RSAC Other Frameworks: Mappingto the CIS Top 20 Critical Security Controls 32@sounilyu 1.1 1.4 1.2 1.5 1.3 9.1 1.7 8.3 9.5 15.6 1.8 8.5 12.12 15.9 8.1 9.2 15.4 8.2 9.4 15.5 8.4 8.8 8.6 9.3 1.6 2.1 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.5 2.7 3.4 5.3 7.3 2.8 3.5 5.4 2.9 5.1 7.1 2.10 5.2 7.2 3.1 3.2 5.5 2.6 3.6 3.7 11.1 12.1 11.2 15.1 7.4 7.10 12.3 14.3 7.5 11.4 12.4 15.7 7.7 11.5 12.7 15.8 7.8 11.6 14.1 15.10 7.9 11.7 14.2 6.1 6.6 11.3 12.9 6.2 6.7 12.2 12.10 6.3 6.8 12.5 15.2 6.4 7.6 12.6 15.3 6.5 8.7 12.8 13.1 10.1 10.5 13.7 14.6 10.2 13.2 13.8 14.7 10.3 13.4 13.9 14.8 10.4 13.6 14.4 13.3 14.5 13.5 14.9 16.1 16.6 3.3 4.5 16.2 16.7 4.2 4.6 16.3 16.10 4.3 4.7 16.4 16.11 4.4 12.11 16.5 4.1 4.9 4.8 16.12 16.13 16.8 16.9 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Degree of Dependency Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover
  • 33.
    #RSAC Work Still Leftto Do: Mapping Governance Activities and Process Oriented Functions 33 Devices Applications Networks Data Users Technology People Process Identify Protect Detect Respond Recover Risk Mgt Incident Mgt Inventory Prioritization Vuln Assessment Threat Modeling Risk Assessment Controls Validation by Simulated or Actual Attacker Vuln Mgt Event Mgt Incident Response Mgt ? BCP/COOP Mgt @sounilyu
  • 34.
    #RSAC This week – Usethe matrix to categorize vendors that you encounter in the Expo Hall – Ask them where they fit and try to fit them only in one shopping aisle In the first three months following this presentation you should: – Send me feedback on how you have mapped vendors to it – Organize your portfolio of technologies to see where you might have gaps – Identify vendors that may round out your portfolio based on your security design pattern (a.k.a. security bingo card) Within six months you should: – Send me feedback on how you used the Cyber Defense Matrix and improved it 34@sounilyu “Apply” Slide
  • 35.