WELFARE ECONOMICS
Prof. Prabha Panth,
Osmania University,
Hyderabad
Welfare Economics
• Classical economists assume “the greatest good
for the greatest number.”
• Total welfare of the economy =  individual
welfare (welfare is additive).
• Interpersonal comparison of welfare possible.
• An individual’s welfare is independent of others
welfare.
• Welfare is measured in terms of Utility (Cardinal
Analysis).
• Only Economic welfare – consumption.
• Based on egalitarian distribution of income.
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New Welfare Economics
• Normative economics, not positive.
• Equity and Social Well being and Value Judgment.
• No cardinal measure of welfare possible.
• Only ordinal measurements.
• Compares the social welfare of one type of
allocation with another.
• Hicks, Pigour, Kaldor, Scitovsky, Bergson
contributed to New Welfare Economics
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• Pareto Optimality:
• At Pareto Optimum both parties are satisfied.
• There is social welfare.
• But this is not the only unique equilibrium point.
• If one person improves his welfare, another’s will
decrease.
• What happens then to social welfare?
• New welfare economics suggests that
compensation can be paid by those who are
better off (welfare ), to those who are worse off
(welfare ) to keep Social welfare constant.
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Compensation Principle
• If a change in allocations or economic policy
makes A better off, without making B worse off,
then Social Welfare (SW) will increase if A can
compensate B for his loss, and still be better off.
• For e.g. if fishing is prohibited in a lake, but
swimming and boating are allowed, then
fishermen are worse off, but tourists are better
off. Has social welfare increased or decreased?
• If the latter pay compensation to the fishermen
for the loss of their income due to the new law,
then Social welfare can remain constant.
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Hicks - Kaldor Compensation Principle
• Kaldor’s Criterion: Allocation X is socially
preferable to allocation Y, if those who gain from
X could compensate the losers, and still be better
off.
• Hick’s Criterion: Allocation X is socially preferable
to allocation Y, if those who lose from X, cannot
bribe the gainers into not making the change
from Y to X.
• (In the former example, the fishermen cannot pay
off the tourists to not use the lake).
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1. Hicks – Kaldor Compensation Principle
The Utility Possibility Curve : Contact Curve of Consumption,
drawn in outer space. If both consumers are at Z, A’s U is A0
and B’s is B0. Not an optimal point.
If A moves to point R, his U  to Ar, but B’s U falls to Br.
If A can compensate B worth B0Br, so that B is back to Z with
his original U: B0, i.e. point S, then A’s U still  to As.
At S, A is still better off, while B’s U has not , he is not worse
off. So movement from Z to S is improvement in social welfare.
E.g. At point R, if A’s welfare
increases by Rs.1000, and B’s
utility falls by Rs.200, then A
can pay Rs.200 to B as
compensation, and still be
better off with extra Rs.800
than at point Z.
So from Z  S is improvement
in SW.
B’sUtility
A’s Utility
S
0
V
T
B0
R
Z
A0 Ar
Br
AsAv
Bt
Bv
Scitovsky’s Paradox
• Scitovsky pointed out an important limitation of Kaldor-
Hicks criterion.
• This could lead to contradictory results.
• It is possible that if R is an improvement for A, then another
point, V could be an improvement for B.
• Based on the same criterion.
• So there is inconsistency in the Kaldor – Hicks proposition.
• For getting consistent results if V is preferred to R on the
basis of a welfare criterion,
then position R must not be preferred to position V on the
same criterion.
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• In the same way, B may try to improve his
welfare, and move to point V from Z.
• His U increases to Bv, but A’s falls to Av, and he
may not allow B to move to V.
• If B pays a compensation of AvA0 to A, then A
can move back to Z.
• B moves to T, but still has higher U = Bt,
compared to at Z.
• So B is better off, while A is not worse off.
• So which of the two, A’s movement or B’s
movement leads to Social welfare?
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Scitovsky’s Double Criterion
• To ensure that there is no inconsistency in SW
improvements, he suggests a Double
Criterion.
– If the gainers of a change can persuade losers to
accept the change,
– But losers are not able to persuade the gainers to
remain in the original situation,
It leads to improvement in Social Welfare.
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• But:
– Assumes that welfare can be measured in money
terms. But many types of welfare cannot be
measured in money terms.
– Assumes equal distribution of income. But if B is a
poor man, and A is rich, then latter can dominate
over B.
– Assumes MUm for both are equal. If B is poorer,
then his MUM will be > than of A.
– Theoretical only. Actually no real compensation is
paid.
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Welfare economics

  • 1.
    WELFARE ECONOMICS Prof. PrabhaPanth, Osmania University, Hyderabad
  • 2.
    Welfare Economics • Classicaleconomists assume “the greatest good for the greatest number.” • Total welfare of the economy =  individual welfare (welfare is additive). • Interpersonal comparison of welfare possible. • An individual’s welfare is independent of others welfare. • Welfare is measured in terms of Utility (Cardinal Analysis). • Only Economic welfare – consumption. • Based on egalitarian distribution of income. 2Prabha Panth
  • 3.
    New Welfare Economics •Normative economics, not positive. • Equity and Social Well being and Value Judgment. • No cardinal measure of welfare possible. • Only ordinal measurements. • Compares the social welfare of one type of allocation with another. • Hicks, Pigour, Kaldor, Scitovsky, Bergson contributed to New Welfare Economics 3Prabha Panth
  • 4.
    • Pareto Optimality: •At Pareto Optimum both parties are satisfied. • There is social welfare. • But this is not the only unique equilibrium point. • If one person improves his welfare, another’s will decrease. • What happens then to social welfare? • New welfare economics suggests that compensation can be paid by those who are better off (welfare ), to those who are worse off (welfare ) to keep Social welfare constant. Prabha Panth 4
  • 5.
    Compensation Principle • Ifa change in allocations or economic policy makes A better off, without making B worse off, then Social Welfare (SW) will increase if A can compensate B for his loss, and still be better off. • For e.g. if fishing is prohibited in a lake, but swimming and boating are allowed, then fishermen are worse off, but tourists are better off. Has social welfare increased or decreased? • If the latter pay compensation to the fishermen for the loss of their income due to the new law, then Social welfare can remain constant. Prabha Panth 5
  • 6.
    Hicks - KaldorCompensation Principle • Kaldor’s Criterion: Allocation X is socially preferable to allocation Y, if those who gain from X could compensate the losers, and still be better off. • Hick’s Criterion: Allocation X is socially preferable to allocation Y, if those who lose from X, cannot bribe the gainers into not making the change from Y to X. • (In the former example, the fishermen cannot pay off the tourists to not use the lake). Prabha Panth 6
  • 7.
    Prabha Panth 7 1.Hicks – Kaldor Compensation Principle The Utility Possibility Curve : Contact Curve of Consumption, drawn in outer space. If both consumers are at Z, A’s U is A0 and B’s is B0. Not an optimal point. If A moves to point R, his U  to Ar, but B’s U falls to Br. If A can compensate B worth B0Br, so that B is back to Z with his original U: B0, i.e. point S, then A’s U still  to As. At S, A is still better off, while B’s U has not , he is not worse off. So movement from Z to S is improvement in social welfare. E.g. At point R, if A’s welfare increases by Rs.1000, and B’s utility falls by Rs.200, then A can pay Rs.200 to B as compensation, and still be better off with extra Rs.800 than at point Z. So from Z  S is improvement in SW. B’sUtility A’s Utility S 0 V T B0 R Z A0 Ar Br AsAv Bt Bv
  • 8.
    Scitovsky’s Paradox • Scitovskypointed out an important limitation of Kaldor- Hicks criterion. • This could lead to contradictory results. • It is possible that if R is an improvement for A, then another point, V could be an improvement for B. • Based on the same criterion. • So there is inconsistency in the Kaldor – Hicks proposition. • For getting consistent results if V is preferred to R on the basis of a welfare criterion, then position R must not be preferred to position V on the same criterion. Prabha Panth 8
  • 9.
    • In thesame way, B may try to improve his welfare, and move to point V from Z. • His U increases to Bv, but A’s falls to Av, and he may not allow B to move to V. • If B pays a compensation of AvA0 to A, then A can move back to Z. • B moves to T, but still has higher U = Bt, compared to at Z. • So B is better off, while A is not worse off. • So which of the two, A’s movement or B’s movement leads to Social welfare? Prabha Panth 9
  • 10.
    Scitovsky’s Double Criterion •To ensure that there is no inconsistency in SW improvements, he suggests a Double Criterion. – If the gainers of a change can persuade losers to accept the change, – But losers are not able to persuade the gainers to remain in the original situation, It leads to improvement in Social Welfare. Prabha Panth 10
  • 11.
    • But: – Assumesthat welfare can be measured in money terms. But many types of welfare cannot be measured in money terms. – Assumes equal distribution of income. But if B is a poor man, and A is rich, then latter can dominate over B. – Assumes MUm for both are equal. If B is poorer, then his MUM will be > than of A. – Theoretical only. Actually no real compensation is paid. Prabha Panth 11