Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society

CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION
DIVIDED BELARUS – MYTH OR REALITY?
Society segmentation – where the data come from
Main groups: quantitative and qualitative evaluation
THE SOURCE OF BELARUS'S STABILITY
(AND INSTABILITY)
Testing 2020. Attempting unstable coalitions
FORMULAS FOR SUCCESSFUL POWER
TRANSITIONS
About media work
Ukraine's game: with whom and how to cooperate
03 /
05 /
13 /
19 /

3
More than ever before, the question of “what to do with Belarus” in 2023 has
become urgent.
The previous algorithms for stimulating changes, applied both by part of the opposi-
tion forces and by external actors, are failing. Lukashenko is complicit in the aggres-
sion against Ukraine. But internally, two seemingly incompatible processes are taking
place:
The position of the Belarusian power elites is becoming more stable. This
has been noted not only by Belarusian state sociologists but also by independent
researchers. They can hardly be suspected of being sympathetic to Lukashenko.
However, there is a stable public consensus that Belarusian forces should not
participate in military operations against Ukraine.
Meanwhile, Russia is re-emerging in Belarus. So, there are questions about the Krem-
lin's influence, apart from the question of Belarusian politics itself. And the problem
of influencing public opinion is at the root of all this. The latter issue is relevant both
for external actors in the context of the war and for Belarusian forces in favour of the
transformation of state policy.
But the popular algorithms are reduced to two extremes: either to increase support for
the Belarusian opposition forces (those that exist now) or to work on a foreign policy
that decreases the Kremlin's sphere of influence (including resuming dialogue with
Lukashenko). We guess that neither approach is a guarantee of success and, on the
whole, has no effect on the feelings (and political preferences) of a significant part
of the country's population. It is worth looking at the reasons for such a situation.
01
02

5
Society segmentation – where the data
come from
In 2021, after masses of protests had failed and Lukashenko's power had begun
to stabilise, divided Belarusian society had become a hotly debated topic. The
sociological services that conducted the research drew two conventional poles of
opinion – Lukashenko's opponents and supporters. Several groups could be classified
as neutral. Logically, there has been a gradual narrowing of the poles, as well as a
quantitative expansion of the conventionally neutral groups. This approach is still
valid today. However, it does not provide an answer to the key question of “how to
appeal to the different groups”, from the talking points to the means of providing
information.
The answer can be found by looking at how Belarusian society divides itself according
to values. Belarus has an excellent set of instruments at its disposal. At least once
every two years, extensive surveys are conducted on the values of Belarusians. Among
the reports available today (without a long search), the first can be considered “Study
of Values of Belarusian Society”, prepared for “Кастрычніцкага эканамічнага форума”
in 20181
. The Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies (BISS – not to be confused with
the state institute) has been conducting monitoring since the same year. It published
a report on the transformation of Belarusians' values in 20222
.
In 2018, Russian sociologists conducted a large-scale survey of Belarusians' values,
which resulted in the book “Understanding Belarus: Notes of Wandering Sociologists”,
against the backdrop of deteriorating relations between Minsk and Moscow3
. A major
study entitled “Каштонасьці і нацыянальная ідэнтычнасць беларуса” was published
in 20204
. For the first time, it clearly described Belarusian society's segmentation
by values. Finally, in 2022, P. Bakanov's study “Belarusian Nationality in 2022: an
experience of quantified research” was released. The data from the 2020 study is
updated, expanded and supplemented in this document. Among other things, it
attempts to quantify the key groups.
Divided Belarus –
myth or reality?

6
UNDERSTANDING BELARUSIANS
Main groups: quantitative and
qualitative evaluation
Belarusian society is divided into several groups. This thesis has already been the
subject of many discussions. However, it is worthwhile to have a look at sociology.
There are data available concerning Lukashenko and those around him.
But an even deeper, value-based division is superimposed. This manifests itself in
how individuals and groups react to external stimuli. This answers the question of
why integration with the Russian Federation resembles the winged phrase about the
samurai: “The samurai has no goal, but there is a way”. The same division helps explain
why Lukashenko remains both resilient and vulnerable.
Superficial segmentation –
attitudes towards incumbent power
To assess the segmentation, there are two approaches. The first one is related to the
political preferences and attitudes towards the current political crisis in Belarus. On
the basis of this approach, sociologists distinguish the following groups:
Ardent supporters of the Lukashenko regime (20-24% of the population)
Pro-Russian oriented citizens (their attitude to the conflicting sides in Belarus
depends on the position taken by the Kremlin) – up to 4-6%.
Apolitical citizens. People who consciously try to distance themselves from
political processes – up to 15%.
Neutral citizens. A group of people who are not inclined to support Lukashenko,
but who are also not inclined to support the new opposition (in 2020 they gave
massive support to the protest). This group is the largest. Its share is about 28-
30%.
Ardent supporters of the protests (2020). Irreconcilable opponents of
Lukashenko, a significant part of whom are loyal to the leaders of 2020. They
make up the majority and its share is 25-26%.
Given the political situation over the past year, it is customary to lump together
Lukashenko's ardent supporters and the pro-Russian bastion in the above gradation.
This brings us to a large group of between 28-43% of the population. This correlates
with consuming information from Russian and Belarusian state media and supporting
Russian narratives (maximum).
On the other hand, some analysts do not make a distinction between “apolitical” and
“neutral”. But this is not quite accurate.

7
The apolitical ones consciously withdraw from the “political” information field. The
“neutral”, on the other hand, tend to consume information from a variety of sources.
Below there is a breakdown of media audiences (important disclaimer: the survey
excludes rural dwellers (i.e. around 20% of the population), which is conducted
online) according to the Chatham House Poll in March 20235
:
This survey is conducted regularly, at least quarterly (2022-2023). The political
processes in the country are reflected in the distribution of the audience:
repression of independent media, its classification (not only media but also
YouTube channels, social networks, etc.) as extremist, with the prospect of
criminal prosecution of its subscribers (!!!), results in a gradual decrease in the
loyal audience of non-state media.
a second reason for the diminishing role of non-state media is the disappearance
of “bridges”. These are media that had an audience in several groups at the same
time. And also, the tough stance (incompatible with the events in Belarus) taken
by a significant part of the opposition media based abroad.
while still within the “large” group of supporters of Lukashenko, the loyal
audience of the state media is growing. At the same time, within this group, the
popularity of the Russian media is slightly higher (by 2-3%) than that of the
Belarusian media. This is probably due to the loyal audience in the form of the
pro-Russian part of the society.

8
rejection of state propaganda and propaganda of Lukashenko's opponents against
the background of a negative information agenda leads to an increase in the
number of people who “prefer not to read newspapers or watch TV”.
Profound differences –
the value gap in Belarusian society
Examining the values of Belarusian society is the second approach to assessing social
segmentation. Moreover, analysing the segmentation according to this criterion helps
to understand both the 2019-2021 processes and the current political situation in
Belarus. Five key groups of the population have been identified by researchers of
Belarusian national identity.
Here are some charts from the report “Belarusian National Identity in 2022: Experience
of Quantitative Research” to help understand the differences between the groups.
Starting with identification:
“Conscious” Belarusians are a group where national values are very powerful.
They prefer to get involved. This group is also one of the most active in the
political sphere. “Conscious” Belarusians have been the backbone of the Belarusian
opposition for a long time.

9
People in this group are in favour of the transformation of the political system in
Belarus in the direction of greater democratisation. Their foreign policy orientation
tends to be pro-European (but without the kind of mass “Euro-optimism” typical of
Ukraine). There are about 14% of such respondents, according to the 2022 survey.
Pro-Russian Belarusians, or “Russified”. This is a small group of about 4% of the
population who do not consider themselves to be “Belarusians”. These are people
who are patriots of the Russian Federation, not of Belarus, and who are completely
loyal to the construct of the “Russian world” thesis. Significantly, the share of
“Russified” is smaller than the share of ethnic Russians living on Belarusian territory.
Indifferent(13%) are the group that considers no national or political identification
important. Furthermore, the group is heterogeneous. On the one hand, there are
citizens who live in a paternalistic matrix of relations with the state. On the other
hand, this group also includes relatively successful representatives of the younger
generation who can be classified as “world citizens” who are “not interested in
politics”.
“Soviet” Belarusians. An interesting group in itself. It is clearly Belarusocentric.
That is, they understand that national values are important. On the other hand,
“nostalgia for the USSR” is common in this group, and from the point of view of
the RF, this group stands for “integration”, but at the same time it does not accept
“absorption” or “union into a single state”. In Belarusian society, the “Soviet” group
is numerous. They make up about 29%.
Finally, the most numerous group is the “emerging” group. According to
sociologists, it makes up 39% of Belarusians. None of the three basic concepts –
“conscious”, “Soviet” and “pro-Russian” – is consistently supported by this group.
It can be considered transitional – people have left the “Soviet” camp, but have
not moved into any of the others. Even in terms of consuming information, the
“emerging” ones are the audiences of both state and non-state media.
This gradation is nothing new. After independence, the vast majority of citizens were
traditionally “Soviet”. And later, with a further drift into the camp of the “conscious” or
“Russified” (although the Russified existed from the beginning), the destruction of the
Soviet myth transferred them into a kind of analogue of the “emerging”.
For the Ukrainian part of the audience, we would like to give some examples from the
Ukrainian reality:
The “Soviet”. In Ukraine, this category also exists and it is a big one. Ask yourself
a simple question: how did people vote for politicians who propose to “turn the
page” against the background of the annexation of Crimea and the war in Donbas?
And it wasn't just a few. There were enough votes for a decent faction in the Rada.
They continued to vote in the elections which followed the Dignity Revolution, too.
The “Indifferent”. They are the children of the universe and at the same time
followers of the simple phrase “it's no business of mine”. They don't feel any
nationality, but they do understand the territory in which they live. It is difficult to
describe such people as being stupid. They simply live in a different world, where
identity is relegated to second place.

10
Here is another table, showing how different groups feel about several key values:
The “Soviet” and the “Russified” perceived state violence, believed in the supernatural
and perhaps had a mystical consciousness. However, the situation is quite the opposite
for the “conscious”. If we look at the “emerging” group, they have essentially moved
away from “Soviet” and are far from “indifferent”.
At the same time, our assessment of Belarusocentrism is as follows:

11
In other words, to the point of denying the Russian myth of the “triune nation”, we have
a clear Belarusocentrism of the “conscious” and the “emerging”. At the same time, the
“Soviet” are more Belarusocentric when it comes to the country's independence – they
do not see themselves as part of “Russia”. The myth of “fraternity” is deeply ingrained
in their thinking.
The “indifferent” are also a little more Belarusocentric than the “mother group of the
Soviet”. However, even in this group there is a widespread belief in the “artificiality”
of the Belarusian nation.
Finally, media consumption by value group.
The percentages of the state media audience among the “Soviet”, “indifferent” and
“Russified” are striking. Broadly speaking, these groups tend to support Lukashenko.
Moreover, the “indifferent”, due to their apolitical nature, tend to represent the “silent”
observers. The core group consists of the “Soviet” and, to some extent, the “Russified”.
This amounts to 35-37% (up to 48% with the “indifferent”). Now we have in mind
the segmentation data in terms of political perceptions. The same 35-40% actively
support Lukashenko.

13
Parasitizing nostalgia for the USSR, Alexander Lukashenko constantly refers to the
experience of the “Soviet Union”. On the national issue, his key thesis is “our” Russian
nation, but also a “brotherly nation”, i.e. separate ones. Let us now take a look at the
key values of the various groups mentioned above. Lukashenko is elected by “Soviet”
Belarusians. And it is on this group that the Belarusian power elites have been count-
ing as their base of support. Lukashenko did his best to “monopolise” the field of the
“Soviet” electorate between 1995 and 2003. And he succeeded. All attempts to oppose
the course of the state from 2002 to 2013 were based on a different set of values.
Lukashenko, therefore, felt relatively secure as long as there was no outlet for “Soviet”
Belarusians.
But there are also some “weaknesses”. The year 2010 (presidential elections) was the
first serious test for the Belarusian authorities. It was accompanied by disputes over
the Customs Union (Belarus' entry into the Union) and the deterioration of relations
with the Russian Federation. This caused a rift in the absolute loyalty of the “Soviet”
and the “Russified” temporarily found themselves on the other side. The 2011-13 po-
litical crisis ended this process.
Society began to change rapidly after 2012. By 2015, there were less than half of the
“Soviet” Belarusians, and in 2018 there were less than 30%. In other words, Lukashen-
ko lost his guaranteed base of support, which allowed him to go to the polls without
risk.
Speaking of oppositional groups in society, the first to be mentioned are the “con-
scious”. Or “сьвядомых”, as Lukashenko's aides insist on calling the group in the Be-
larusian language. The “conscious” is, first and foremost, committed to opposing the
Soviet Union. In the same way, they oppose the Russian theories of “the triune nation”,
“the everlasting fraternity”, etc. On the level of values, this group does not perceive
Lukashenko's power. And the issue is not what happened in 2020, that goes back to
the 1990s, when there were very few conscious people. But in the period from 2000
to 2020, this group was a consistent opponent of “Lukashism”. This is what the “con-
scious” call the political system in Belarus.
By the way, this is also the reason why Lukashenko has such hatred for this group. Even
in his speeches. But, and here's the rub, when it comes to “national identities”, the
“conscious” may well come closer to the “Soviet”.
The source
of Belarus's
stability
and instability)

14
Moreover, they came from the “Soviet”. The attitude of the “Soviet” towards the “con-
scious” can be briefly described as that of an “unworthy brother”. You don't accept
his way of life, you can argue, you can fight, but he is your brother. And that is why
Lukashenko cannot afford to “exterminate” this group. His electorate, the basis of his
power, will not understand. They will not put up resistance, but they will no longer
consider their leader to be not only “wise and infallible”, but even “clever”. As a result,
they will easily defect to anybody else who is playing on Soviet values.
At the same time, a social consensus has emerged twice in the last ten years. This has
allowed both the stabilisation of the situation and the implementation of political
reforms. Lukashenko and his entourage tried to play the stabilising role. They did not
have the courage to reform the system fast enough. Independence for the country
was the first consensus.
It emerged in 2015, when the Belarusian authorities quietly held presidential
elections, just as the Russian Federation began to wage war on Ukraine. At that
time, the process was initiated by the “conscious” – they didn't want to escalate.
For the second time, against the backdrop of Russian pressure on the “roadmap
to integration”, the consensus “on independence” emerged at the end of 2019.
The situation was paradoxical at the time. Even the protests against integration
with the Russian Federation were not anti-Lukashenko. Incidentally, parliamen-
tary elections were brought forward to 2019 (from 2020) and held in a calm at-
mosphere for Lukashenko. At the same time, the possibility of early presidential
elections instead of parliamentary elections was being considered. But those
surrounding the Belarusian President did not dare to do this.
In 2022, a second national consensus emerged. The Belarusian public agreed that
the involvement of the Belarusian army in the war was unacceptable against the back-
ground of a new phase of the Russian-Ukrainian war. 70-80% of the population sup-
ports it. And since March 2022, this parameter has remained stable.
Otherwise, at a deeper level than the attitude towards the authorities, Belarusian so-
ciety remains segmented.

15
Testing 2020.
Attempting unstable coalitions
The year 2020 is the year of the revolution of the “emerging” and of the “indifferent”.
These two groups became the core and driving force of the protest movement, having
been “out of politics” for a long time. The urban middle class was the most active. It
was widely represented among both the “emerging” (the middle class finds it difficult
to be “Soviet”) and the “indifferent” (a relatively small proportion of the “children
of the world” within the group). The Belarusian authorities' failure to communicate
about Covid was the catalyst for activism. For some it became a demonstration of the
inadequacy of the authorities; for others, apolitical, it became the arrival of “poli-
tics” in their lives. In both cases, fear for their future was the driving force behind the
activism. The active and oppositional group of the “conscious” was initially rejected
(by those organising the political campaign) as “not useful”. This gave rise to many
disputes, ranging from the question of symbols (yes, the leaders of the “protest” were
extremely sensitive to the white-red-white flags at their rallies, at least until June,
and tried to impose an alternative in the form of a “joint staff flag”) to foreign policy
priorities and questions of national identity. These were key, fundamental issues for
the “conscious”. Some from the core of the new opposition really did not understand
“what the grievances were about”.
But let's look at the underlying groups. In 2022, the “undecided” and the “indifferent”
together accounted for 43%; in 2020, this figure was no more than 55%. Simulta-
neously, the “indifferent” (i.e. politically inactive) were 25%. This means that it was
relatively easy to mobilise a third of the electorate (the “indifferent”), it is difficult,
but you could try to pull up another 25 and discard as an unnecessary partnership with
13% of the “conscious”. In theory, majority support was possible. In practice, how-
ever, it was extremely difficult to get the coveted 50% (as the failure of the “Golos”
platform in the Gomel, Mogilev and eastern Vitebsk regions proved). (To compare, the
“Soviet” had 34%, which Lukashenko used as a basis).
In August 2020, part of the “conscious” and nearly all of the “emerging” activists
came into active struggle. But it was too late – starting in October, Lukashenko be-
gan to consistently strengthen his position while pursuing a policy of repressing the
media – he was destroying “informational bridges” between segments of Belarusian
society. The process of campaigning both for and against him was, of course, made
more difficult. But for the Belarusian authorities, the main thing was to avoid mobi-
lising “against” him and to keep their core support groups intact.
By the end of 2020, some of the “conscious” had finally started to enter the structures
of the new opposition. In other words, the base of the “emerging” movement had been
eroded. At the same time, however, the connections with the processes inside the
country were lost due to the emigration of activists. The “portrait” of the new oppo-
sition has become blurred. I'd like to illustrate this by asking you to “remember the
information”. Try Google “who were the key figures in Lukashenko's opponents” teams
(as well as Tihanova's, Babarko's, Tsepkalo's) before August 2020. And compare them
with the entourage formed in October 2020. But at the same time several key figures,
and leaders, were (and some still are) typical representatives of the “emerging” or
even “indifferent” groups. It is therefore not surprising that in August 2022 (!!!!), at a
conference in Vilnius, one of the speakers declared: “Russia is not our enemy”.

16
Thus, from today's perspective, the political sphere in Belarus is still divided into four
areas.
Lukashenko's supporters are represented by “Soviet” and “Russified” Belarusians.
In total, the solid support does not amount to more than 35-40%.
Active supporters of the protest are “conscious” and part of “undecided”
Belarusians. In total they make up about 25-27%.
In between there are most of the “undecided” and the apolitical, “neutral”
Belarusians.
At the same time, there is a public consensus not to get involved in the war. And there
is a consensus (59% according to Chatham House) that the political and economic
systems need reforming. But assessments of the pace and nature of reform vary widely6
.
Thus, Lukashenko cannot have the firm support of at least 50% of the population with-
out the system reform. Today's results (growing trust in the authorities, in some cases
by more than half) tend to show the lack of an alternative – most groups are alienated
by the “Soviet” ideological constructions. However, they also do not have a clear im-
age “instead of the USSR”.
On the other hand, the active opposition also found itself “reserved”. Lacking infor-
mation resources, it works to keep its support base – the “conscious” ones (just as
Lukashenko works for the base of the “Soviet”) – but is unable to offer an alternative to
the Belarusian authorities in the construction of values, for example, of the “undecid-
ed” and, even more, the “Soviet” Belarusians. Because the existing opposition media
would be perceived by their audience as having “betrayed”.

19
This begs the question: what conditions are needed for a successful transition to oc-
cur? And under what conditions will the “new power” be able to transform the system?
A relatively small group that is not perceived as hostile by at least half the population
could take power, especially if it is a violent takeover. But that does not guarantee that
they get to stay in power.
There are at least two criteria that should be used to assess the prospects not only for a
change of name but also for a transformation of the political and economic system of
the state:
Relative proximity to groups that collectively constitute a societal majority (50%
or more of those entitled to vote).
In such a “coalition of the groups”, there should not be any insurmountable contra-
dictions that would be able to destroy the consensus between the groups.
On this basis, it is possible to assess a number of configurations that could form the
basis of a new (or existing) political force and ensure that it takes over and maintains
power.
Above all, Belarusocentrism. The ideal configuration for initiating the processes of
profound social transformation is “conscious” + “emerging” + “Soviet”. It does reflect
a certain national consensus. But the existence of the political figure of Lukashenko is
not a prerequisite for such a consensus. And that is precisely why “Kolya's father” cannot
imagine this happening. Moreover, such a configuration is a nightmare for the Kremlin,
because it is a consensus of more than 70% of the society. And in this group, the ques-
tion of “national identity” and “Belarusocentrism” is not even discussed. Belarusocen-
trism is modified when this configuration exists for at least one generation. And the new
formula, to use Putin's expression of “flies and cutlets”, can be “Russians – separately,
Belarusians – separately”, where the role of the “flies” is clearly assigned to the com-
rades from behind the curb.
The formula of personal success (with elements of Belarusocentrism). The second con-
figuration, which can initiate the transformation of society, first of all in the sphere of
the perception of personal success, is the “conscious”, “emerging”, “indifferent”. This
configuration, however, initially rejects the “Soviet”.
Formulas for
successful power
transitions
01
02

20
They then seek allies in the pro-Russian part of the society. And as far as the Russian
Federation is concerned, we get an extremely unstable structure: in both conditional
political camps there are either supporters of “dissolution into Russia” or people “for
whom the strengthening of the Russian Federation is not important”. This is an opportu-
nity for the Kremlin, in view of the resources available, to play a political game with the
expectation of victory in the next round (after the collapse of the power configuration).
Lukashenko's formula 2.0. The third coalition is relatively stable. It is the “Soviet”,
“emerging”, “indifferent”. They are less numerous – about 60% of the population. Its
basis is moderate Belarusocentrism. It rejects both extreme pro-Russian and anti-Rus-
sian vectors. This coalition can be described as “Lukashenko 2.0, on local ground”. But
this configuration contains internal contradictions at a deep level: the “Soviet” part of
it is characterised by extremely strong paternalistic sentiments because the “indifferent”
and “emerging” paternalism is rather evil. This means that any attempt at a deep trans-
formation of society and the economy carries the risk of the configuration collapsing.
Incidentally, such a configuration was to some extent created by Lukashenko himself at
the turn of 2013-2017. And it helped to ensure that the presidential and parliamenta-
ry elections went off smoothly and without a hitch. But then there were contradictions
between the ideas of some of the leaders (the young generation) on the transformation
of the country and the non-acceptance of such ideas by the “Soviet” part of the society
and the nomenclature.
Coalitions of “large lookout”. That is, configurations where two or more groups come
together, but without changing the political regime. But it also creates major upheavals.
Indifferent + pro-Russian. A configuration potentially protesting and even
opposing Lukashenko. A configuration that plays on the theses of economic
transformation and real integration (fusion) with Russia. Given the Kremlin
factor, any political activity in this format has excellent media support. And
also, it is financially supported. It does not lead to a political regime change,
although it creates problems for any (including post-Lukashenko) authorities.
Simply because the cumulative potential of such a configuration is 30% of votes.
Indifferent + emerging. A strong configuration with potential for around 50%
of votes. But this is a heterogeneous configuration which fails to prioritise
foreign policy. Consequently, it faces opposition from the poles. It threatens
power, but cannot overthrow it. Only because the “indifferent” do not see any
value in identity, in the construction of state mechanisms. Ideally, a political
campaign is organised to “scare” the ruling groups, bring them to the negotiating
table, and make them “share power”. But such a configuration is inherently a
losing proposition if the frightened power elites go on the defensive instead
of waving the white flag. After all, at least some other groups need to be won
over to its side. “Conscious”, “Soviet” or “pro-Russian”. But each of the three
groups mentioned above has its own well-established construction of its own
identity. And communication with them is only possible “in their own language”.
Therefore, this configuration either degenerates into the first of the options
described above (but this is accompanied by the removal of “indifferent” from
the scheme). Or, if “indifferent” remains in the core, it does not create stable
constructions and degenerates at the expense of internal conflicts. It is somewhat
exaggerated to say but still, the first mobilisation of 2020 (which lasted until
around September) occurred in this configuration.

21
Conscious + emerging. A conditional group of the “national revolution”. By
having an “identity” base it can be internally resilient. But without expanding to
include other groups, it cannot ensure full control. And even after taking power,
it quickly loses it at the expense of opponents – the “indifferent” (who criticise
for lack of economic courage) and the “Soviet” (who do not like the reduction of
the state's “tutelage”).
About media work
The value-based division of Belarusian society encourages creating separate, loosely
connected “informational spaces”. In simple terms, each group receives information
from sources that are closer to its values, or at least have theses that are close to its
values. Anything that is alien to them is not perceived, and such sources of information
quickly lose their popularity within the group.
Bridges between such “information reservations” existed until 2020. They differed in
nature and specificity:
An independent local press. With its focus on local issues and local agendas,
it was close to representatives of different groups living in the same area. And,
as a result, it could act as a tool for communicating ideas across “reservation”
borders;
Some popular Belarusian online publications. Like Onliner, Tut. bay and
others. The popularity of Nasha Niva gradually grew beyond the boundaries of
the reservation, especially among the “conscious”;
Profile sources. Like Dev. by for IT specialists. The IT sector employees'
fragmentation according to their value orientation has not been studied. However,
the reaction of industry representatives to the processes in society allows us to
assume that the core of the group was the “undecided” and “indifferent”, with a
noticeable share of the “conscious”;
Such a bridge (between some groups) was social networks, mainly FB and
Vkontakte, at a certain stage (from 2008-2009 to 2015-2016). However, the
audience there is fragmented due to changes in the display algorithms on these
platforms. As a result, today social networks, or more precisely the “interest
groups” that have formed within them, play a more divisive role;
“Komsomolskaya Pravda in Belarus”. This Russian paper edition was the most
popular in the country. In the regions where there was an independent local
press, it was not as popular as the latter. It suggests that Lukashenko's “campaign”
against the local media, which began at the turn of 2001-2002, has resulted in
no strengthening of the "pro-government agenda" in this area – it simply cleared
the place for the Russian ones.

22
Russia, by the way, has been very active in the creation of other “bridges”, and the story
of “Sputnik” in Belarus is a case in point. At the initial stage of its existence (the first
year), the agency actively tried to keep hold of even the “conscious” Belarusians, putting
part of its information resources on the national agenda and recruiting, among others,
correspondents and on-air guests (articles) from this group.
In 2020, Lukashenko, trying to retain power and strengthen his position, did what
seemed tactically correct. He first destroyed most of the local press (the repression
of journalists and publications began in the regions, not in Minsk), and then “worked”
with the national “bridges”. Tut.bay was liquidated and the resource “Zerkalo” appeared
in its place. Due to the peculiarities of the political crisis, the basic audience was lim-
ited to Lukashenko's opponents (the “conscious” + a part of the “undecided” + a part
of the “indifferent”). After the “prophylaxis” by the law-enforcement agencies, Onliner
deliberately distanced itself from the political agenda.
In fact, most of the bridges between groups in Belarusian society were destroyed by the
above-mentioned repression of the press. This allowed Lukashenko to stabilise his own
positions on the basis of the “Soviet” Belarusians. The Russian vector gave support to
the “pro-Russian” ones. The other groups remained sceptical about the ability of the
Belarusian power elites to conduct a rational policy. By 2022, they had shifted to the
perception of Lukashenko as the “least evil”. In other words, the new opposition has no
clear message for them. And that makes sense. Those active in opposing Lukashenko have
their own resources to inform. But trying to change their editorial policy to appeal to
at least the “undecided” living in Belarus, let alone the “Soviet”, is going to provoke ex-
treme rejection in the diaspora. But the support of the diaspora is important. It demon-
strates its “legitimacy” to European and American politicians, as well as to sponsors of
the activities. The logical consequence of such a situation is to ignore the problem of
Belarusian society’s segmentation. It is necessary to find theses and forms of presenta-
tion that are different for each group.
But Lukashenko is faced with a similar problem. He does not have the means to reach out
to the majority of the “undecided” and the “indifferent”. His information machine, like
that of the Russians, actively works for “Soviet” and “pro-Russian” Belarusians. That is
about 35-40% of the population. Nothing more. By the way, the sociology of the Rus-
sian-Ukrainian war is a perfect example of this. The Kremlin's assessments of the events
(the West's war against Russia, the inadequacy of Ukrainian authorities, the need for
peace on any terms) do not exceed these percentages, despite the absence of any signif-
icant Ukrainian content in Belarusian information and the dominance of Russian prop-
aganda. This is the second year of the war. It is also three years since the beginning
of the active phase of the political crisis. In this situation, Lukashenko is perceived by
a significant part of the other groups as the “least evil”. But only in this role, and only
because they do not see any alternative (and where is it going to come from in the
information bubble?). This means that the illusion of Lukashenko's “stability” is imme-
diately destroyed by the presence of any strong idea, properly communicated.
This brings us to another interesting trend. It is not unique to Belarus. We are talking
about gradual declining viewing. Today, the stable daily audience of Belarusian and
Russian channels does not exceed 45-50% of the population (those watching weekly
or more). Once again, we meet conditionally “Soviet” + “pro-Russian” Belarusians. There
are small inclusions of other groups. At the same time, the loyal audience of Belarusian
and Russian TV (they watch and trust it) does not exceed 35% of the population. And
part of the TV audience has no objection to CNN, BBC and the like in addition to the
state channels.

23
At the same time, the influence (and audience) of traditional television is growing.
Belarusian and Russian propaganda dominates this segment. Even sociologists close to
the government admit this. We would like to illustrate the process using a slide from the
presentation of the results of the May measurement of television audiences in Belarus.
The company MediaMeter CJSC carries out the measurements8
.
What makes Belarus unique is the fact that a rather large part of the population (up to
10%, according to sociologists) uses international media as a source of information
(not to retell the local mass media, but to source it).
By way of illustration, according to Chatham House, the level of trust in various media
in Belarus is as follows7
.

24
At the same time, the influence of “new media” is on the rise. YouTube channels,
podcasts, social networks, Telegram, etc.
These resources can be used to create “media” to reach new audiences. For both
sides. The Belarusian authorities are (and will be) trying to project the image of “new
independent media” through the parallel development of YouTube channels, platforms
in social networks and Telegram, which are not formally powerful. Given the acute
shortage of qualified personnel and the history of political crisis in the country, this
is not a trivial task for them. Put simply, a person who has not been seen in the
“roundup of Lukashenko's propagandists” can be the spokesperson and “opinion leader”
for a part of the “undecided”, for example. At least since 2020. Otherwise, it's going to
be difficult to win over the public, even if this is budgeted for. But such a “new leader”
would be at risk of quick repression (or at least an attempt at repression) by a section
of the security forces frightened by the threat of “various bloggers”.
The situation is slightly better for the authorities' opponents. There are the same
problems of finding new faces. The old “members of headquarters, offices, etc.”, who
have some publicity, are unlikely to be noticed by an audience disillusioned with
the new opposition. The appeal to the target audience is the second limitation. Put
simply, “conscious” Belarusians will be “hostile” to the use of “Soviet” narratives for
the “Soviet” Belarusians. But on the other hand, the choice of personalities is wider and
there is more flexibility. The above-mentioned algorithms of “creating an audience”
by the main platforms (FB, YouTube, etc.) can be advantageous.
Message delivery mechanisms exist. It is about identifying the audiences, looking at
the value matrix and choosing the messages and ways to communicate. It is not just
about blogging. Even copying (and adding to) TV formats quickly finds an audience.
For example, a kind of talk show analogue (or at least a discussion with the possibility
of feedback) is becoming increasingly popular. Or my experiment of having a news
stream on my channel at the most inconvenient time possible (11:00 p.m.), and
discussing the news with the audience. The format immediately found an audience
(and quite a number of them). There are dozens of similar formats and concepts when
you think about it. Talking about the criminal regime, about repression as a dominant
theme, reaches those who do not need to be agitated, that is, the basic audience of the
protests. There must be something for those who are not in favour of one thing or the
other. Or, for the time being, they see Lukashenko as the spokesman for their interests
(“a bad one, but there is no other”).

25
The “conscious” are natural allies of Ukraine, as we can see. Their views on key
processes and the future coincide with the conscious Ukrainians' views. These include
regional alliances (inter-maritime) and partnerships and combined containment of the
Russian Federation. There is no point in agitating this group. They are working in their
information field. Supporting perceptions, not destroying them, is the key here.
The second group, which is potentially interesting, is the “emerging”. They have
maintained a positive attitude towards Ukraine against the background of pro-Russian
propaganda. And of all the other groups, they have the lowest positive assessment of
Russia. This is a very interesting group. It can potentially come close to conscious
Belarusians. Therefore, important for Ukraine. Moreover, this group has only a limited
influence on the poles of the Belarusian political magnet. And the values of this group
are alien to both poles. They are already irritated by Lukashenko's “Soviet views”. But they
are not yet ready, as it seems to them, to perceive the “radical” theses of the “conscious”.
Ukraine's game: with whom and how to
cooperate
For Ukraine (if it wants to influence the situation in Belarus), there are three
main objectives:
To keep Belarusian society united in not having the Belarusian armed forces
involved in the war. This is a way of constraining Lukashenko: taking a decision
that is not perceived by more than 70% of the population will not only shake his
power but also create opportunities for broad public support to retaliate.
To stimulate the popularity of the idea of distancing Belarus from Russia. Not
just now, during the war, but in the future as well.
To influence the changes in the mood of the Belarusian citizens. This can become
the basis for the creation of a stable, nationally oriented (Belarusocentric)
configuration in society. This, in turn, will lead to changes in the neighbouring
country's political regime.
With this in mind, there is a need for an assessment of the basic attitudes of various
groups. First, regarding the Russian Federation and Ukraine. Differences in perceptions
are indicated (positive minus negative).
01
02
03

26
The “Soviet”. The group is interesting as it is Belarusocentric. And this group is a “donor”
for the majority of the others, except for the “pro-Russian” (this group is declining,
despite the migratory influx of ethnic Russians). But it's influenced to the greatest
extent by Russian (and Belarusian state) propaganda. It is possible to actively work on
the formation of new value constructions for this group (to work for the positive). It
is possible to actively work on the formation of new value constructions for this group
either if there are substantial resources available, or if the propaganda vectors of the
Russian Federation and Belarus are multidirectional (another conflict between Moscow
and Minsk).
The “indifferent”. The group is interesting in terms of sentiment. But it is apolitical,
it is extremely inactive. And strong paternalistic feelings lead this group to support the
authorities (except for periods of acute crisis).
Working methods – a brief outline of a values framework
As an example, let's have a look at how to work with Belarusian society on the theses of
cooperating with Russia or distancing from Russia. Knowing what people care about, it
is easy to frame messages that do not go beyond their values but still play the required
role.
The “indifferent” is a complex and heterogeneous group. The majority of them are
people with a relatively low income who are dependent on the social policies of the
state. But there is much to be done. The “indifferent” are activated by fear. In this case,
it means intensifying the physical threat:
The possibility of “invasion” by a Russian soldier in Belarus.
Nuclear weapons are not a guarantee of safety. Half of Belarus will be wiped
out in a retaliatory strike even if a single warhead is used (if it can be used).
Dependence on social programmes is the second direction:
Money for nuclear weapons = less money for social security
The Belarusian authorities have thoughtlessly entered into conflict with their
neighbours *(avoid the word West – all except the Russian Federation). This
means that they have created problems for normal life.
Lukashenko may have been a spokesman for the people, but he got bogged down.
But he got stuck. He has “lost his grip” and he has become stupid.

27
The “emerging” (and part of the “indifferent” who belong to the middle class). This
group has a strong aversion to the “Soviet narrative”. Therefore, a simple set of theses
(with examples of idiocy) is “The Soviet Union – nothing but a sham”. There is no
need to even mention Lukashenko's name – people will do their own thinking. The
second component is the focus on achieving personal success. In this case, we have
messages that can be put into the constructs “there will be no prospects with Russia”
(this is problematic – you have to do research and create constructs) and “even with
Lukashenko” (but here it can work). And, in contrast, there are examples of how national
identity is important and is a part of the success of the state. But as such, it's worth
mentioning countries which were in similar positions (regarding the development of
national identity) – Norway, Ireland, and Denmark, from the modern ones, starting with
Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan. Ukraine (at this stage, given the political crises and the
work of propaganda) would be an unsuccessful example (however offensive this may
sound to Ukrainians).
The “Soviet”. The most interesting group is worshipping Lukashenko. But there
are also weaknesses. First of all, playing with identity and the factor of Russia. Many
amusing articles about “artificial nations” and the promotion of a “Russian world” have
been written in the Russian Federation. They have been seen and analysed in Ukraine
as well. But if the Kremlin is prepared to allow concentration camps for the Ukrainians,
why can't it do the same for the Belarusians? Especially if they are not too eager to
get rid of their identity and become “certified Russians”. The second direction is
paternalism and Soviet worldviews. In this case, it is even easier to find the “weakest
link”. Lukashenko is Soviet in spirit. But the system in Belarus is far from being Soviet.
It is simply constructed according to the idea that “something like this did not exist in
the BSSR – it was a wilderness”. It concerns civil servants, social guarantees, and even
speaking Russian. Moreover, the parallels are important not with the USSR, but with the
BSSR – on the one hand, the energy of Lukashenko's “pro-Soviet rhetoric” is being used.
On the other hand, a bifurcation is created. “Kolya's father” talks about the “Soviet past”
without emphasising the uniqueness of the BSSR. And the “Soviet” Belarusians still have
their own identity. It is not linked to the USSR but to the BSSR.
These are just a few very simple ideas, taken from the mind.
But even they serve to illustrate: if you want to influence another nation, you should at
least study it a little. Attempts at extrapolation of “their view of the world” are regularly
on Russia's agenda. This is, by the way, the reason why it has not been very successful in
Ukraine in most cases. And even this example should serve as a warning against using
Russian approaches in the Ukrainian version.
At the same time, it is possible to achieve the desired results by competently assessing
the initial situation and allocating resources (and that doesn't mean so much money as
people, time and knowledge).

28
1. http://web.archive.org/web/20220515224924/http://kef.by/publications/research/tsennosti-
naseleniya/opros-izuchenie-tsennostey-belorusskogo-obshchestva/
2. https://belinstitute.com/ru/article/mentalnaya-demokratizaciya-izmeneniya-v-sfere-cennostey-
belorusov
3. Borisov S., Yushkova-Borisova Yu. (2019) Ponyat Belarus: zapiski stranstvuyuschih sotsiologov.
[Understanding Belarus: Notes of Wandering Sociologists]: Izd. Resheniya. 214 p
4. https://budzma.org/news/prezentavanyja-vyniki-dasliedavannia.html
5. https://belaruspolls.org/wave-15
8. https://mediameter.by/
Links

Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society

Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

Similar to Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society

Similar to Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society (20)

More from PRDepartment

More from PRDepartment (20)

Recently uploaded

Recently uploaded (20)

Divided Belarus - Understanding the value gaps in society