Thesis Martijn van Ballekom

RUSSIAN AND U.S. CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: THE ROAD
TOWARDS CHEMICAL DISARMAMENT IN SYRIA.
Martijn van Ballekom
May 2016
Master of Science in International Relations and Diplomacy
First Reader: Dr. Peter van Ham
Second Reader: Dr. Siniša Vuković

2
Abstract
This study examines the process of conflict management that led to the chemical disarmament
of the Syrian regime. First, it attempts to define the intractable nature of Syria’s conflict. In
order to provide a concise examination, it uses five characteristics and four phases to define
the Syria’s conflict. Within the definitional limits of intractability, international efforts of
conflict management conducted by the Action Group for Syria are categorized as a phase of
failed peace-making efforts. Subsequently, the chemical attacks in the Ghouta suburb of
Damascus on August 21, 2013, are labelled as a vital tipping point within the conflict
management process of the Syrian civil war. It marks a period in which the Geneva peace
process was overshadowed by Russian and American attempts to find a short-term solution for
Syria. Through its theoretical framework of structural realism and methods of critical
discourse analysis, this study seeks to explain how the decision was made to disarm the Syrian
regime from its chemical weapons, and why it was made at this particular stage of the conflict.
This study will argue that a strategic interdependence defined by the American threat to use
military force and Russia’s successful efforts to manipulate the Syrian government into
accepting the formulated solution, resulted in the process of chemical disarmament.
Ultimately, this solution served the interests of both the United States and Russia, as the former
saw the agreement as an important step towards fulfilling the objectives as stipulated in the
Geneva peace process, whilst the latter regained a stronger geopolitical foothold in the Middle
East.

3
Table of Contents
1.1 Introduction 4
1.2 Defining the Syrian Conflict 7
1.2.1 The Five Characteristics of Intractable Conflict 8
1.2.2 The Four Phases of Intractable Conflict 13
1.3 Placing Chemical Disarmament in the Context of the Geneva Peace Process 18
2.1 Theoretical Framework 22
2.1.1 Placing Structural Realism in Realist Thought 22
2.1.2 Strategic Interdependence between the United States and Russia 24
2.1.3 The Exercise of Power of Hegemonic States onto Weaker States 26
2.1.4 The Role of International Institutions 27
2.2 Research Design 28
3.1 United States Conflict Management in Syria 34
3.1.1 Deterrence and the United States’ Red Line 35
3.1.2 United States’ Credibility 37
3.2 The Ghouta Attacks as Tipping Point 39
3.3.1 Russian Formulation and Manipulation 42
3.3.2 Russia’s Renewed Geopolitical Influence in the Middle East 44
3.4 Discussion 45
4 Conclusion 47
List of Abbreviations 51
Bibliography 52

4
1.1 Introduction
This study examines the conflict management processes that led to the chemical disarmament
of the Syrian Arab Republic in 2013. The Syrian conflict provides a unique case study within
conflict management, considering the fact that an agreement was established in a relatively
short time frame. Furthermore, the decision to remove and destroy Syria’s chemical weapons
was taken during a period of intense violent conflict. This analysis will scrutinize how this
decision was made, by whom, and why it was it was struck at that particular stage of the
conflict. This examination is conducted in three separate chapters.
First, it aims to define the conflict’s intractable nature. Since 2011, Syria has been engulfed in
a bloody and intractable civil war as insurgent forces attempt to overthrow the regime of
President Bashar al-Assad.1
For definitional purposes, it is important to keep in mind that this
study considers Syria to be a weak state. Following Thomas Ohlson and Mimmi Söderberg,
this means that Syria is characterized by:2
1. Lack of societal cohesion and consensus on what organising principles should
determine the contest for state power and how that power should be executed.
2. Low capacity and/or low political will of state institutions to provide all citizens with
minimum levels of security and well-being.
3. High vulnerability to external economic and political forces.
4. Low degree of popular legitimacy accorded to the holders of state power by portions of
the citizenry.
With these characteristics, societal and political disputes can rapidly evolve into full-fledged
conflict. This study refers to this process as conflict intractability. As Jacob Bercovitch
summarises, intractable conflicts are characterized by ever-present tension and violence and
continue over an extended period of time, often becoming the arena for many futile attempts at
management or resolution.3
In order to provide a concise examination, this analysis uses five
characteristics and four phases to define the intractable nature of Syria’s conflict. The purpose
of this is mainly to answer the question why the partial settlement to disarm the Syrian regime
1
J. Mitton, ‘Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria’,
Contemporary Security Policy, Vol. 36, No. 3, 2015, p. 410.
2
T. Ohlson and M. Söderberg, ‘From Intra-State War to Democratic Peace in Weak States’, Uppsala Peace
Research Papers, No. 5, 2002, p. 6.
3
J. Bercovitch, ‘Mediation in the Most Resistant Cases’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P.
Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press,
Washington DC, 2005, p. 101.

5
from its chemical weapons was taken at this particular stage. Furthermore, defining the Syrian
conflict allows chemical disarmament to be placed within the context of the Geneva peace
process.
The Geneva peace process is marked by the diplomatic approaches to bring the conflict parties
to the negotiation table. The Action Group for Syria included state members of the European
Union, the Arab League, and the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), who tried to initiate
processes of political transition and the cessation of violence as stipulated in the Geneva
Communiqué drafted on 30 June 2012. Up until August 2013, this study labels this process as
a failed peace-making effort. This brings the first chapter to its most important section; the
Ghouta attacks on 21 August 2013.
The atrocities that occurred on this particular day mark a tipping point and a transition in the
conflict management process. Mark Fitzpatrick notes that it eventually ‘took 1,400 deaths on
21 August 2013, including those of over 400 children, to shock the United States and its
partners into action.’4
As such, the Action Group’s progress in formulating a solution within
the terms of the Geneva Communiqué was severely overshadowed by intensified state rhetoric
of U.K. Prime Minister David Cameron, French President François Hollande, and U.S.
President Barack Obama in justifying punitive military strikes against Syrian military assets,
with or without Security Council approval.5
This segment of this study primarily answers the
question of who brokered the agreement to disarm Bashar al-Assad from his chemical weapons.
The second chapter mainly shapes the theoretical framework and explains the methodologies
of analysis. Regarding the transition of conflict management conducted by the Action Group
for Syria towards the intensified efforts of unitary state actors, this study adopts a structural
realist framework. It serves to justify the analysis of Russian and American conflict
management. Even though both state efforts are analysed separately, the theoretical framework
stresses the strategic interdependence that existed between both states. Kenneth Waltz argues
that ‘interdependence in some ways promotes peace by multiplying contacts among states and
contributing to mutual understanding.’6
Moreover, the structure of international politics
4
M. Fitzpatrick, ‘Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, Survival’, Global Politics and Strategy, Vol. 55, No.
6, 2013, p. 107.
5
J-P. Zanders and R. Trapp, ‘Ridding Syria of Chemical Weapons: Next Steps’, Arms Control Today, Vol. 43,
No. 9, 2013, p. 2.
6
K. Waltz, ‘Structural Realism after the Cold War’, International Security, Vol. 25, No. 1, 2000, p. 14.

6
mediates the outcomes that states produce, as internal and external circumstances change,
causing states to adapt according to the fluctuations within the international system.7
Structural realism also explains how powerful states exercise their influence onto weaker states.
In the case of the United States, their threat to intervene militarily constitutes their pressure on
the Syrian regime to consider the option of chemical disarmament. In the case of Russia, its
impact is defined within the confines of their alliance with Bashar al-Assad. Furthermore,
structural realism explains how international institutions serve as a tool of statecraft. For
example, to execute chemical disarmament, Syria had to become a state party to the Chemical
Weapons Convention (CWC). Their membership was in part due to the promotional political
efforts made by the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW)—the
international agency established under the Convention to supervise its implementation, conduct
international verification of compliance with its provisions, and act as a forum of consultation
and cooperation among its member states on all issues related to the implementation of the
Convention.8
After establishing structural realism as the theoretical framework, the second chapter continues
to explain the methodology of analysis. It emphasizes that it views chemical disarmament as a
partial settlement, and not as a fully mediated outcome. This operationalization is important in
distinguishing between what had been achieved in the short-term, and what is hoped to be
accomplished in the long-term. Clearly, chemical disarmament does not encompass a full
cessation of violence, nor does it constitute political transition. Nevertheless, limiting the
capabilities of unconventional warfare can arguably signify an important step towards the
desired mediated outcome as formulated in the Geneva peace process. Furthermore, the
methodology section highlights its two hypotheses.
First, the analysis aims to investigate if chemical disarmament was considered a sufficient
result by the U.S. government. A large focus is placed on the credibility of the U.S. red line,
which encapsulates the threat of military action in the case that chemical weapons were used
in the Syrian civil war. This study regards the threat to be perfectly credible. In fact, perfect
U.S. credibility is considered to be one of the main driving forces behind the agreement of
chemical disarmament. The second hypothesis aims to investigate how the disarmament
7
K. Waltz, ‘Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990, p.
36.
8
R. Trapp, ‘Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria’, Journal of Conflict & Security Law,
2014, Vol. 19 No. 1, p. 8.

7
process gave Russia a stronger foothold in the Middle East. In order to exercise more influence
on Middle Eastern geopolitics, much depended on Moscow’s ability to manipulate Assad into
accepting the formulated solution of chemical disarmament. In other words, chemical
disarmament had to be perceived as the best possible solution for the Syrian regime. Following
the conceptualization of the terms set in conflict management studies, such a process
constitutes the broadening of the Zone of Possible Solutions (ZOPS), and is operationalized
accordingly. Finally, the analysis is conducted through a critical analysis of state discourse
within a set timeline. The period surrounding the Ghouta attacks especially marks different
changes of state rhetoric, which will be examined thoroughly within this study’s third and final
chapter.
Here, the main arguments are brought forward. This chapter particularly aims to explain how
the disarmament process was agreed upon. First, the U.S. threat to use military action was
perceived to be perfectly credible by the Syrian regime, mainly because Moscow seriously
considered the possibility that Washington would enforce its red line. However, this changed
when U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry mentioned that military action could be averted if
Assad would place his chemical stockpile under international control. This was an opportunity
for Russian state representatives to initiate negotiations with the Syrian regime and convince
Assad that U.S. military action would impact his war efforts to such an extent that he would
eventually be unable to consolidate his executive power. If Assad was to remain in power,
Russia would also be able to support his military campaign in targeting resisting rebel forces.
In sum, the U.S. threat of military action combined with the positive incentives offered by
Russia, induced partial ripeness towards the successful negotiations of chemical disarmament.
1.2 Defining the Syrian Conflict
Since 2011, Syria has featured as a priority on the international political agenda, fostering the
reputation of a conflict that is intricately complex to manage and of which the outcome is
largely unclear. Michael Greig notes that ‘not only have third-party efforts to manage the
conflict been unsuccessful, but conditions have continued to deteriorate in Syria with the level
of violence mounting on both sides and civilian suffering deepening.’9
Although Greig wrote
this in April 2013, his observation is, to a great extent, still accurate today.
9
M. Greig, ‘Intractable Syria? Insights from the Scholarly Literature on the Failure of Mediation’, Penn State
Journal of Law & International Affairs, Vol. 2, No. 1, 2013, p. 49.

8
Before this thesis enters its analysis of Russian and American attempts to manage the conflict,
it is important to define the exact severity and intractability of the Syrian civil war. Following
Oliver Ramsbotham and his colleagues, this study uses ‘the term “conflict” to refer to the
widest set of circumstances in which conflict parties perceive that they have mutually
incompatible goals.’10
Conflicts are thus not intractable per definition. For example, it can also
exist in times of negative peace in which tension and suspicion among parties run high but
violence is either absent or only sporadic.11
Furthermore, it has to be taken into consideration
that as a result of the idiosyncratic nature of intractable conflicts, it is difficult to generalize
knowledge across levels of analysis, including the identification of specific characteristics.12
With this in mind, at the hand of the five characteristics described by William Zartman and the
four phases noted by Louis Kriesberg, this thesis determines the intractable nature of the Syrian
civil war. Although these analyses are closely interlinked, the following sub-sections will treat
them separately in order to illustrate a clear account of the conflict.
1.2.1 The Five Characteristics of Intractable Conflict
Zartman identifies five internal characteristics: (1) protracted time, (2) identity denigration, (3)
conflict profitability, (4) the absence of ripeness, and (5) solution polarization.13
Before each
characteristic is examined separately it is important to consider some key features. Firstly,
intractable conflicts ‘are not static; they grow, in both degree and nature, extending and
defending themselves, so that efforts to overcome them must penetrate several layers and deal
with their protective dynamics.’14
Secondly, intractable conflict ‘is usually conducted through
destructive means and characterized by repeated acts of militarized activity and violence.’15
Throughout this study it will become evident that the Syrian conflict possesses these two
negative qualities. For example, although the exact numbers of casualties in conflict are
complex to verify, Greig relies on the claim that ‘from June 2012 to August 2012, the number
of Syrian casualties increased sharply, growing from 2204 deaths in June to 5037 killed in
10
O. Ramsbotham, T. Woodhouse, and H. Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution, Polity, Cambridge, 2011,
p. 9.
11
M. Lund, Preventing Violent Conflicts: A Strategy for Preventive Diplomacy, US Institute of Peace Press,
12
P. Coleman, ‘Characteristics of protracted, intractable conflict: Toward the development of a metaframework-
I’, Peace and Conflict: Journal of peace psychology, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2003, p. 8.
13
W. Zartman, ‘Analyzing Intractability’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall (Eds.),
Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press, Washington DC,
2005, p. 48.
14
Ibid, p. 48.
15
J. Bercovitch, p. 100.

9
August.’16
This does not only indicate extreme levels of violence but equally demonstrates a
vast escalation of conflict.
1.2.1.1 Protracted Time
Edward Azar and his colleagues argue that protracted conflicts are hostile interactions which
extend over long periods of time with sporadic outbreaks of open warfare fluctuating in
frequency and intensity.17
Ronald Fischer adds that ‘protracted social conflict are often rooted
in the frustration of basic needs, such as denial of recognition, participation, or distributive
justice.’18
It is impossible to give a fixed-time threshold to protraction, however, its importance
lies not in its numerical duration but in that duration’s effect.19
Furthermore, protraction
exhibits a strong capacity to grow in terms of the involved actors and sub-actors and in terms
of goals, objectives, and types of grievances that sustain the conflict setting.20
For example, as
Greig notes, ‘a large number of groups, each with different goals and backgrounds complicates
the identification of all the actors needed in any potential peace process.’21
In other words,
protraction conditions the internal and external dynamics that are inherent to the intractable
nature of conflict.
The Syrian case exemplifies this social malignant process, in which the actors are enmeshed in
a web of threats and escalating manoeuvers that cannot be easily brought to an end.22
Such
degeneration turns old scars into new wounds reaffirming history with new proofs and
transforming momentary incidents into primordial hostility.23
In the case of Syria, Brian
Jenkins notes that ‘what began as a rebellion against the Assad regime has been transformed
into an existential sectarian war in which none believe they can survive in a Syria dominated
by their foes.’24
As such, parties ‘look for opportunities to escalate the conflict to possible
advantage (transitive escalation) and at the same time become vulnerable to internal and
external dynamics of the conflict to escalate on its own, by accident or incident (intransitive
16
M. Greig, p. 52.
17
E. Azar, P. Jureidini, and R. McLaurin, ‘Protracted Social Conflict; Theory and Practice in the Middle East’,
Journal of Palestine Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1, 1978, p. 50.
18
R. Fischer, ‘The Potential for Peace Building, Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking’, Peace
and Change, Vol. 18, No.3, 1993, p. 247-48.
19
W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 48-49.
20
E. Azar et al., p. 50.
21
M. Greig, p. 51.
22
J. Bercovitch, p. 101.
23
W. Zartman, Analyzing Intractability, p. 49.
24
B. Jenkins, ‘The Dynamics of Syria’s Civil War’, Rand Corporation, 2014, p. 3.

10
escalation)’.25
The continuance of looking for such opportunities eludes to an absence of
ripeness, which will be discussed in sub-section 1.2.1.4.
1.2.1.2 Identity Denigration
As it was implied in the previous sub-section, protracted conflict is often accompanied by a
widening of societal and cultural identity gaps. Zartman argues that ‘identities in intractable
conflicts not only are polarized but are actually dependent on the denigration of the Other.’26
This is formed through processes of selective perception, including prejudice and stereotyping,
malign perceptions of the ‘Other’, dehumanization and the formation of enemy images, and
the displacement of feelings of fear and hostility through suppression and projection.27
Such
structural victimization entails that people’s most basic human needs for dignity, safety, and
control over their life are jeopardized or denied.28
This catalyses the polarization of salient
identities.
Civil unrest in the Middle East is often characterized by the Sunni-Shia divide which also
features in the Syrian Civil War. Jenkins predicts that ‘atrocities against Sunni civilians ensure
loyalty of the Assad regime’s security forces – Assad’s soldiers and militiamen cannot expect
to survive under any other government and will continue to fight even if Assad falls.’29
Although the Syrian conflict transcends the Sunni-Shia divide exponentially, it is important to
note that the conflict took on existential dimensions: it became a fight for life, for the survival
of the party itself.30
These existential dimensions particularly juxtaposed the identity of the
people versus the government elite representative of the oppressive government institutions.
The zero-sum perception of identity fed the escalation of conflict in Syria. In the words of Ted
Gurr, it is important to note that ‘communal groups organize around their shared identity to
seek gains for members of their group.’31
Opposing parties of the Assad regime in Syria wanted
access to the political system, leading to conventional political action and protest campaigns,
most notably in the months of February and March, 2011.32
When the demands for democratic
25
26
Ibid. p. 50.
27
O. Ramsbotham et al., p. 47.
28
P. Coleman, Characteristics of Protracted, Intractable Conflict, p. 12.
29
B. Jenkins, p. 3.
30
31
T. Gurr, ‘Minorities, Nationalists, and Islamists’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall
(Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press,
32
Ibid, p. 133.

11
reforms and the release of political prisoners were supressed and ignored, the opposition chose
for strategies of violence, marking the beginning of an escalation of protracted communal
warfare.33
At this stage, resolution becomes impossible.
1.2.1.3 Conflict Profitability
As Zartman notes, profitability is a characteristic of conflict that is often forgotten, as attention
focuses much more on the costs and losses, the pain and suffering.34
Nevertheless, David
Malone and Jake Sherman argue that ‘in many conflicts, violence is a means to control trade,
appropriate land, exploit labour, extract benefits from humanitarian aid, and ensure continued
control of economic privileges and assets.’35
In other words, securing strategic financial hubs
and (re)sources plays a significant role in feeding the conflict’s intractability.
In the case of Syria, Russia and Iran openly came to Assad’s aid, providing him with financial
support at a critical juncture, when it appeared that the rebel forces had a chance of taking over
Damascus.36
Furthermore, the dimensions of profitability were severely impacted by the
increased role of the Islamic State (IS). Government forces were deployed to target or protect
revenue opportunities such as oil fields, key arterial road and centres of commerce, whilst IS
has used methods of taxation and trade, establishing a significant level of self-reliance and
financial autonomy.37
As such, while the ability to bear the costs of conflict is basic to its duration, that ability is
highly elastic, particularly under conditions of high commitment.38
This implies that
profitability fuels the protracted nature of conflict, as the disputant parties have the means to
sustain their violent efforts in an attempt to escalate the conflict and induce their opponents’
conflict fatigue. If conflict profitability is high for all belligerent parties, the perception of a
mutually hurting stalemate is unlikely, contributing to further escalation.
33
T. Gurr, p. 133.
34
35
D. Malone and J. Sherman, ‘Economic Factors in Civil Wars’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson
and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace
Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 639.
36
B. Jenkins, p. 7.
37
T. Keatinge, ‘The Importance of Financing in Enabling and Sustaining the Conflict in Syria (and Beyond)’,
Perspectives on Terrorism, Vol. 8, Issue. 4, 2014, p. 53-54.
38

12
1.2.1.4 Absence of Ripeness
Ripeness as a pressure toward negotiation is one of the central themes of this thesis and will be
referred to particularly within section 1.3. It also strongly alludes to sub-section 1.2.2.3 on the
stage of failed peace-making efforts as described by Kriesberg. The determination of whether
the conflict of Syria is “ripe” for negotiation towards a peaceful settlement is intrinsically
complicated since the conflict is still ongoing. This thesis argues that, after the Ghoutta attacks
of 21 August 2013, it reached a stage of partial ripeness, leading toward the disarmament of
chemical weapons. However, till this date, the stage of ripeness for negotiations on the
implementation of full political transition and cessation of violence as stipulated by the Geneva
Talks, has not been reached. Accordingly, the absence of ripeness constitutes a key
characteristic of intractable conflict.
Zartman notes that this absence illustrates a perception of a stable, soft, self-serving (4-S)
stalemate which is bearable to the parties both in the absolute and relative, leaving them in
control of some portion of the territory and population.39
In such a scenario, violence between
the parties increases, inducing a further escalation of hostility, the closing of communication
channels, thereby reinforcing the zero-sum identities. An absence of ripeness thus reinforces
other characteristics of intractable conflict. In contrast, ‘the concept of a ripe moment centres
on the parties’ perception of a Mutually Hurting Stalemate (MHS), optimally associated with
an impending, past or recently avoided catastrophe.’40
Furthermore, a hurting stalemate
emerges as costs grow for the belligerents, with neither perceiving the ability to overcome the
other whilst suffering increases for each.41
Peter Coleman identifies two other driving forces
that can induce ripeness: threats and the use of physical force and the offering of positive
incentives.42
At the outset of the uprising in Syria, the government possessed one of the most powerful
armed forces in the Middle East; its total strength numbered over 300,000, including 220,000
in the army and another 70,000 in the air force and air defence command.43
Such numbers are
just an example that indicate the extent to which military exhaustion is difficult to reach and
39
W. Zartman, ‘Analyzing Intractability, p. 52.
40
W. Zartman, ‘The Timing of Peace Initiatives’, Global Review of Ethnopolitics, Vol. 1, No. 1., 2001, p. 8.
41
M. Greig, p. 53.
42
P. Coleman, ‘Fostering Ripeness in Seemingly Intractable Conflict: An Experimental Study’, The
International Journal of Conflict Management, Vol. 11, No. 4, 2000, p. 304.
43
B Jenkins, p. 5.

13
feeds the perception that outright military victory is still achievable. In sum, this constitutes the
absence of ripeness and the existence of a 4-S stalemate.
1.2.1.5 Solution Polarization
Intractable conflicts are generally characterized by the competing pulls of two salient solutions,
posing an extreme prisoner’s dilemma or collaboration problem, where non-cooperation,
though mutually hurtful, is the outcome logically preferred to unilateral attempts at
cooperation.44
One of the demands voiced by the parties opposed to the Syrian government at
the outset of civil unrest was democratic reforms. In contrast, the use of excessive force was a
clear sign of the regime’s determination to safeguard their claim to power by extension of their
command of the military and (secret) police (mukhabarat).45
Democratic reforms (or perhaps
more strongly; political transition) and the reinforcement of state control by the political elites
are the polarized solutions that define the basis of the Syrian Civil War. Within intractable
conflict, attempts of finding a middle ground or an agreed-on sense of justice through the
process of negotiation is absent.46
This solution polarization accompanied by the increasing levels of violence constitutes the fact
that the conflict reached the stage of institutionalization. Sub-Section 1.2.2.4 further elaborates
on this particular segment.
To conclude in the words of Zartman, ‘together, these five characteristics-protraction, identity,
profitability, ripeness, and solutions-are generally shared by intractable conflicts and go far to
explain the difficulty of bringing them under control. While the characteristics are independent
of one another, they also tend to reinforce one another, which in itself is an additional
characteristic of intractability, making it hard to pry them apart and deal with them one by
one.’47
The next sub-sections are designed to identify the exact stages of the Syrian conflict,
featuring the abovementioned characteristics.
1.2.2 The Four Phases of Intractable Conflict
Louis Kriesberg identifies six phases of intractable conflict: (1) the eruption of conflict with
high potentiality of generating intractability, (2) escalation marked by destructive qualities, (3)
44
45
J. Landis, ‘The Syrian Uprising of 2011: Why the Asad Regime is Likely to Survive to 2013’, Middle East
Policy, Vol. 14, No. 1, 2012, p. 73.
46
47
Ibid, p. 54.

14
failed peace-making efforts, (4) institutionalization of destructive conflict, (5) de-escalation
leading to transformation, and (6) termination and recovery from the intractable conflict.48
It
is important to note that “true intractability” would mean perpetual conflict, a condition that
exists nowhere.49
As such, within the analysis of Kriesberg, conflicts are more or less
intractable, not wholly intractable.50
This explains the inclusion of the last two stages he
describes, phases Syria has not yet reached and which are therefore not included in the analysis
of this thesis. This sub-section will accordingly identify four stages of the Syrian conflict
separately in order to shape the extent of intractability and justify this thesis’ analysis of conflict
management. Additionally, it helps to consider the Geneva Communiqué drafted on 30 June
2012 merely as a stage of failed peace-making efforts (phase 3). Moreover, it reinforces the
definition of the five characteristics defined by Zartman, completing the eventual definition of
the intractable nature of the Syrian Civil War.
1.2.2.1 The Eruption Phase
Kriesberg describes the eruption phase as an episode that intensifies and prolongs a conflict
whilst oppression and injustices become starkly visible and unacceptable through new and
brutal encounters.51
Peter Coleman and his colleagues note that ‘most protracted conflicts do
not begin as intractable, but they become so as escalation, hostile interactions, sentiment, and
time change the quality of the conflict.’52
Within this particular phase, the salience of identities
tend to augment whilst long-standing grievances may be reshaped by new expectations and
threats.53
Ted Gurr analyses that the salience of ‘ethno cultural identity depends on how much
difference it makes in people’s lives; if a communal group is treated differently, by denial or
privilege, its members will become more self-conscious about their common bonds and
interests.’54
In Syria, the main political representative of the opposition is the Syrian National Council
(SNC) and is composed of three main factions: The Muslim Brotherhood, the National Bloc –
primarily secular, whose members tend to come from elite Syrian families – and members of
48
L. Kriesberg, ‘Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson
and P. Aall (Eds.), Grasping the Nettle: Analyzing Cases of Intractable Conflict, US Institute of Peace Press,
49
50
L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractability, p. 66.
51
Ibid, p. 70.
52
P. Coleman et al., ‘Intractable Conflict as an Attractor: A Dynamical Systems Approach to Conflict
Escalation and Intractability’, American Behavioral Scientist, Vol. 50, No. 11, 2007, p. 1456.
53
54
T. Gurr, p. 138.

15
the National Coordinating Committees.55
This coalition is predominantly Sunni in character,
constituting their primary bond. Their common interest of political transition by removing
Assad from power is also aligned with other resistance groups such as the Kurdish Bloc and
the Free Syrian Army (FSA). However, the lack of leadership and internal power struggles
showcase the inherent weakness of the opposition when the conflict erupted in 2011. Therefore,
the eruption phase of the Syrian conflict was predominantly characterized by a lack of unity
and coordination within the opposition, and effective violent state repression of the Syrian
government.
In sum, due to the well-armed and disciplined government forces, the lack of opportunity to
mobilize, and the general unstable forms of organization,56
the opposition was unable to
effectively act upon their common interests and bonds. Nevertheless, the Syrian government’s
strategy of violent subordination invariably increased the collective grievances.57
The
increased hostile interactions thus reinforce the process of identity polarization in which groups
become starkly opposed to each other, leading to further escalation.
1.2.2.2 The Escalation Phase
Louis Kriesberg argues that ‘once a conflict is in the phase of escalation, identities, grievances,
goals, and methods often change in ways that perpetuate the conflict in increasingly destructive
fashion.’58
Whereas the phase of eruption constitutes the rising salience of identities and the
reshaping of threats and expectations, escalation encompasses the existence of zero-sum, “us
against them” perceptions.
Within these dynamics, Kriesberg argues that an important role is played by agents – political
leaders, intellectuals, and religious leaders – by formulating the grievances and identifying the
injustices suffered and those responsible for them.59
Leadership thus becomes an important
element within the escalation phase, particularly for the fragmented opposition. However, it
was exactly this element that was lacking within the opposition groups. Arguably, this is
exemplified by the short-termed leadership of Burhan Ghalioun. The SNC leader was criticized
55
J. Landis, p. 75.
56
C. King, ‘Power, Social Violence and Civil Wars’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson and P. Aall
(Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace Press,
57
M. Ayoob, ‘State Making, State Breaking and State Failure’, in C. A. Crocker, A. Chester, F. O. Hampson
and P. Aall (Eds.), Leasing the Dogs of War: Conflict Management in a Divided World, US Institute of Peace
Press, Washington DC, 2007, p. 145.
58
L. Kriesberg, Nature, Dynamics, and Phases of Intractable Conflict, p.74.
59
Ibid, p. 72.

16
by the Muslim Brotherhood for trying to strike an agreement with the leftist National
Coordination Body (NCB), after which he quickly backed away from the tentative alliance.60
Both the internal fragmented nature of the SNC and the disunity of opposition parties, served
the existing 4-S stalemate during which the fighting lost its practical connection with the goals
of the resistance groups, as anger, hate, and revenge-seeking resulted in atrocities that further
inflamed the conflict.61
In the Syrian case, zero-sum perceptions between the Syrian government and the opposition
were clearly manifested. However, what reinforced the intractability of the conflict even further
was the increased polarization of identities within the opposition. In other words, the lack of a
common effort to combat the government led to a sub-level dispute between the opposition
groups, sustaining the existing 4-S stalemate.
1.2.2.3 The Phase of Failed Peace-Making Efforts
This sub-section merely refers to the definitional elements of this phase considering that the
contextual components are elaborately discussed in section 1.3. The reason for this approach
is to create a direct linkage between labelling the Geneva peace process as a failed peace-
making effort, and the structural realist framework which theoretically shapes and justifies the
analysis of Russian and American conflict management in the Syrian case. This phase is
marked by an international collective of third parties attempting to bring the conflicting parties
at the negotiation table.
What has to be taken into account is that in unstable regimes, leaders’ major concern is their
own political survival.62
Accepting an invitation to the negotiation table can be interpreted as
a sign of goodwill by observing parties. Kriesberg argues it can also be used as a tactic by a
disputant party to ‘mobilize constituency support or to demonstrate to allies and observers that
the other side is the obstacle to a peaceful resolution of the conflict.’63
This would imply an
anticipation of negotiation failure and high levels of mistrust. Michael Greig and Paul Diehl
argue that especially in times of armed conflict, leaders and domestic audiences become
habituated and psychologically committed, whilst some segments of the population profit
60
J. Landis, p. 76.
61
62
K. Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, Cornell University Press, New York, 2011, p. 47.
63

17
politically and economically from the fighting.64
Disrupting such patterns by peace-making
efforts becomes increasingly complicated when levels of violence augment.
From a third-party perspective, peace-making generally starts with the aim of facilitating
communication and building trust by trying to alter perceptions and influence the resolve of
belligerents by restructuring conflict issues.65
In other words, third parties attempt to frame the
conflict in order to raise awareness of similarities between the disputant parties. However,
Kriesberg notes that, ‘this can be severely strained by the multiplicity of the intermediaries as
it may interfere with effective assistance due to poorly coordinated interactions among the
intermediaries and the impact that has on the adversaries.’66
Such coordination becomes
particularly problematic when a civil conflict takes on international dimensions, thereby
affecting state power dynamics within the peace-making coalition.
To conclude in the words of Kriesberg, ‘the repeated failure of one adversary to impose an
ending, the failure of parties to negotiate an ending after trying to do so, and the failure of
external intervention to stop or transform the intractable, confirm the conflict’s intractability.’67
In other words, failed peace-making efforts marks a lack of readiness from the disputant parties
to explore alternative routes. It implies that the conflict has reached a stage of
institutionalization in which conflict is perceived to be a permanent element of everyday life.
1.2.2.4 The Phase of Institutionalization
The phase of institutionalization encompasses all the characteristics and phases analysed in the
preceding sub-sections and constitutes the stage in which conflict becomes the norm within the
state. It entails the self-perpetuating growth in nature and degree of the conflicts’ intractability.
Furthermore, it reaffirms identity polarization in which ‘members of each side increasingly
view members of the other side as enemies with many bad qualities, as cruel and
untrustworthy.’68
Salient solutions also become increasingly polarized as the political elite
holds onto power by means of force rather than peoples’ loyalty. Such developments could
64
M. Greig and P. Diehl, ‘The Peacekeeping-Peacemaking Dilemma’, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 49,
Issue. 4, 2005, p. 625.
65
T. Ohlson, ‘Understanding Causes of War and Peace’, European Journal of International Relations, Vol. 14,
No. 1, 2008, p. 147.
66
L. Kriesberg, ‘Coordinating Intermediary Peace Efforts’, Negotiation Journal, Vol. 12, Issue 4, 1996, p. 343.
67
68
Ibid, p. 74.

18
prove unsustainable for the Syrian regime as ‘sectarian entities with loyalties that transcend
Syria’s borders are replacing Syrian national institutions.’69
As such, there are two sides to the coin of conflict institutionalization. On one hand it marks
an absence of ripeness. On the other hand, the increase of destructive means by which the
conflict is fought could contribute to a perception of MHS. In sum, the phase
institutionalization represents a melting pot of the fundamental characteristics of intractable
conflict as described by William Zartman, whereby alternative courses of action become even
more difficult to undertake.70
It signifies that conflict has not matured sufficiently for conflict
management, something the international community underestimated whilst publishing the
ambitious final draft of the Geneva Communiqué on 30 June 2012.
1.3 Placing Chemical Disarmament in the Context of the Geneva Peace Process
In this section it is of essence to follow the chronological order of the Geneva peace process in
order to identify the key elements that make up its failure. It all started with the proposed six-
point plan drafted by Kofi Annan, the United Nations-League of Arab States Joint Special
Envoy for the Syrian Crisis. Although peace talks in Geneva regarding the cessation of
hostilities and a Syrian-led transition of government are still ongoing, this section limits its
scope no further than the Ghouta attacks of 21 August 2013. It does so in function of the
argument that the disarmament process of chemical weapons after Ghouta was an agreement
primarily brokered by the United States and the Russian Federation and not by an international
coalition. Following this section, this thesis will justify its theoretical approach of structural
realism, in which the utility of international institutions and the coalitions they represent is
recognised yet subjected to state behaviour.
The argument postulated in this section dictates that the multi-party mediation efforts of the
Action Group for Syria proved inefficient due to the group’s inability to resolve the severity of
elements inherent to the conflict’s intractable nature as described in the abovementioned
sections. Global state powers only explored “all means necessary” in their mediation efforts
when ‘pure’ mediation efforts such as reasoning, persuasion, control of information and the
69
B. Jenkins, p. 3.
70

19
suggestion of alternatives seemed to fail in facilitating a negotiated settlement.71
There was
thus a need for a more assertive approach.
Michael Greig and Paul Diehl argue that ‘what separates mediation and negotiation from one
another is the inclusion of a third party in mediation efforts.’72
In the case of Syria, these efforts
were initially conducted by the Action Group for Syria, initiated by Kofi Annan and later
resumed by Lakhdar Brahimi, who replaced Annan as the Joint Special Envoy to Syria on 17
August 2012.
A notable and important first step was made by Annan when he outlined his six-point proposal
on 14 April 2012 as an annex to UNSC Resolution 2042 and 2043, becoming the foundation
on which the Geneva Communiqué was drafted on 30 April 2012. The essential objectives
stipulated in these documents are encompassed in point three of the Communiqué:
“They [the Action Group Members] are determined to work urgently and intensively to bring about an
end to the violence and human rights abuses and the launch of a Syrian-led political process leading to
a transition that meets the legitimate aspirations of the Syrian people and enables them independently
and democratically to determine their own future.”73
At the time, these were ambitious objectives. When in June 2012 activities by the U.N.
monitoring mission were suspended without renewal of the mandate following its expiration,
a lasting ceasefire had proven elusive.74
Although the mission merely suggests an investigation
on the possibilities of implementing a ceasefire, it exemplifies how initiatives of peace-keeping
during active combat fail to promote an effective peace process. In general terms, it confirms
the (rather pessimistic) conclusion drawn by Michael Greig and Paul Diehl who found
‘virtually no support for the optimistic view that peace-keeping promotes peace-making.’75
Although Annan introduced an important first step, the further escalation of Syria’s conflict
undermined the results of his tenure. On 2 August 2012 at the announcement of his resignation
he stated:
“Yet the bloodshed continues, most of all because of the Syrian government’s intransigence and
continuing refusal to implement the six-point plan, and also because of the escalating military
71
S. Vuković, ‘Soft Power, Bias and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation’,
International Negotiation, Vol. 20, No.3, 2015, p. 416.
72
M. Greig and P. Diehl, p. 623.
73
‘Final Communiqué from the Action Group for Syria’, The United Nations, 30 April 2012,
http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/Syria/FinalCommuniqueActionGroupforSyria.pdf.
74
M. Greig, p. 49.
75
M. Greig and P. Diehl, p. 641.

20
campaign of the opposition – all of which is compounded by the disunity of the international
community.”76
Here Annan implicitly refers to the reality that both parties were still seeking to escalate the
conflict in order to obtain outright military victory, whilst indicating the fragmented nature of
the international community. Within this line of reasoning, we can extract the argument that
the conflict’s intractability caused a reluctance of Action Group members to further invest in
the peace process.
As the belligerent parties did not perceive the moment to be ripe for a ceasefire, neither did the
important members of the mediating coalition. The on 17 August 2012 newly appointed Special
Envoy Lakhdar Brahimi recognised this issue and attempted to approach the conflict from a
more diplomatic angle. Whilst upholding the aims stipulated in the Communiqué, he strived to
initiate negotiations by assembling the Syrian delegations alongside the United States and
Russia representatives in order to discuss how the conflict could be managed.
Although objective indicators such as the number of casualties, financial costs, material
damage, and the number of refugees suggested a hurting stalemate, it was Brahimi’s goal to
help the belligerent parties perceive and understand the unbearable nature of the conflict, and
more importantly, advocate for the benefits that can be obtained through means of
negotiation.77
In theory, Brahimi thus had to conceive the conflict parties’ perception of MHS
and consequently offer negotiation as a way out. According to Zartman, ‘a way out’ describes
a situation where ‘parties do not have to be able to identify a specific solution, only a sense that
a negotiated solution is possible for the searching and that the other party shares that sense and
the willingness to search too.’78
In the words of Kyle Beardsley, ‘they may simply desire a
breather during which negotiations can take place with some chance of success but with no
delusions about the prospects for full resolution.’79
Therefore, accepting negotiations as a way
out can be used as stalling-tactic through which the belligerents can save face.
Additionally, Brahimi would have to provide prospects for a more attractive future to pull them
out of their conflict, once a MHS has pushed them into negotiations.80
Such prospects are
76
‘Kofi Annan resigns as UN-Arab League Joint Special Envoy for Syrian crisis’, UN News Centre, 2 August
2012, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=42609#.Vyn0m_l97IU.
77
S. Vuković, International Multiparty Mediation and Conflict Management: Challenges of Cooperation and
Coordination, Routledge, Oxford, 2015, p. 16.
78
W. Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 9.
79
K. Beardsley, The Mediation Dilemma, p. 46.
80
W. Zartman, The Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 14.

21
labelled as Mutually Enticing Opportunities (MEOs). In sum, a taxonomy of Brahimi’s tasks
can be created: (1) bring parties to the negotiating table, (2) create perception of MHS, (3) offer
negotiation as a way out of MHS and (4) provide MEOs.
However, Brahimi’s efforts were violently disrupted early in the morning of August 21 2013,
just a few days after the arrival of the U.N. Mission to Damascus, suggesting the use of
chemical weapons causing a large number of casualties in the opposition-controlled area of
Ghouta in the Damascus suburbs.81
This event marked a tipping point in which the United
States and the Russian Federation – on invitation of Brahimi – started to assume a more
prominent role within resolving the conflict.
Furthermore, the Ghouta attacks also indicated that the Syrian regime welcomed the process
towards the Geneva Talks II to create a perception of willingness towards negotiating peace.
Eventually would take place in the first few months of 2014. To a certain degree it could be
argued that the regime failed to perceive ripeness for negotiations and revived hopes of being
able to find a unilateral solution through escalation.82
Moreover, since conflict management
measures tend to carry with them the promise of conflict resolution at a later moment, the
conflict flares up again when that next step is not taken, heightening feelings of betrayal and
faithlessness, hardening the parties against sensitivity to ripeness and again contributing to the
conflict's intractability.’83
The Ghouta incidents indicated that, in the direct aftermath of the
events, the Syrian case required a more assertive approach.
This thesis argues that at this point, initiatives from the Action Group became overshadowed
by direct negotiations between U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry and Russian Foreign
Minister Sergey Lavrov and the belligerent parties, to find solutions for Syria. As power
mediators, both the United States and Russia sere able to use economic, military, and political
resources to pull or push the parties in their preferred direction, take measures in order to secure
their own interests in the country of the conflict, and exercise leverage over the parties in order
to make them comply.84
Syria was in desperate need of, at least, a partial settlement which
would limit, to a certain extent, the human suffering bared by the conflict. This thesis alludes
to the crux of its analysis; the methods of conflict management employed by the United States
and Russia resulting in the chemical weapon disarmament process. It will use the theoretical
81
R. Pita and J. Domingo, ‘The Use of Chemical Weapons in the Syrian Conflict’, Toxics, Vol. 2, 2014, p. 393.
82
W. Zartman, Timing of Peace Initiatives, p. 14.
83
84
I. Svensson, ‘Mediation with Muscles or Minds? Exploring Power Mediators and Pure Mediators in Civil
Wars’, International Negotiation, Vol. 12, 2007, p. 230.

22
framework of structural realism to justify its conclusions and its hypotheses will be tested
through critical discourse analysis.
2.1 Theoretical Framework
The purpose of adopting a structural realist framework is threefold. First, defining the relational
dynamics between Russia and the United States is important so to understand how strategic
interdependence was necessary in order to achieve full chemical disarmament of the Syrian
regime. Secondly, this theoretical framework examines how powerful hegemonic states as third
parties use threats to get other states to cooperate.85
This is particularly relevant to the role of
the United States and its deterrence policy. Thirdly, it is important to place the role of
international institutions within the theoretical approach of structural realism. Through the
examination of these three factors, a link between the structural realist framework and Russian
and American conflict management activities is established. However, before structural realism
is acknowledged as the most comprehensive approach, it should be differentiated from other
variants of realist thought.
2.1.1 Placing Structural Realism in Realist Thought
In order to justify the use of structural realism as a theoretical framework for this thesis, the
debate between different approaches of international relations, and more specifically, the
debate between different realist doctrines, should be understood. This can prove to be tricky,
as core assumptions are often shared and distinctions are subtle. For example, one of the most
shared notions across international relations theory is that the international arena is
characterized by the absence of an overarching authority and of reliable enforcement
mechanisms.86
Differentiating theories can thus prove to be complicated, certainly when strains
of theory are derived from each other. Therefore, the following sub-section will examine how
structural realism distinguishes itself from (neo)classical realism.
First, it has to be noted that structural realism is derived from classical realism. Although
disagreements galvanize contemporary debate within the realist approach itself, all classical
realists ultimately appear to agree that human activity occurs within transhistorically proscribed
85
K. Favretto, ‘Should Peacemakers Take Sides? Major Power Mediation, Coercion, and Bias’, American
Political Science Review, Vol. 103, No. 2, 2009, p. 249.
86
S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias, and Manipulation of International Organizations in International Mediation, p.
419.

23
limits and that human beings do not control or determine the range of these limits.87
As such,
realism is founded on a Hobbesian pessimism regarding moral progress and human
possibilities.88
Departing from this Hobbesian stance, prominent realists such as Hans
Morgenthau draw the conclusion that war and conflict are deeply-rooted into human nature.
Second, as Robert Jervis notes, ‘realism is well known for arguing that power must be mustered
in order to reach the state’s possible goals; Morgenthau’s “interest defined in terms of power”
is its most familiar formulation.’89
In other words, classical realists seek to explain the foreign
policy strategies of individual states. On the other hand structural realism seeks to explain
international outcomes, such as the likelihood of major war, the prospects for international
cooperation, and aggregate alliance patterns among states.90
In this light, Kenneth Waltz argues
that structural realists view power simply as the combined capability of a state and as a possibly
useful means, whilst the ultimate concern of states is not for power but for security.91
In other
words, Waltz notes that states only seek to increase their security, with means which may
decrease the security of other states.92
However, states are often willing to settle for a status
quo which is driven primarily by fear rather than by the desire to make gains.93
This study shares Waltz’s argument in relation to the state behaviour of the United States and
Russia within the Syrian civil war. Their involvement was not to maximize their power per se,
but rather to guarantee their security and positions within the international system; specifically,
in the Middle East. Although an analysis of the role of terrorist organizations in Syria is
avoided, terrorism does justify the role of Russia and the United States in Syria. As René Pita
and Juan Domingo note, for both Russia and the United States, ‘the Syrian conflict has been
and still is of special concern, not only because the Syrian government had a chemical
capability, but also because there are many actors in the conflict apart from the FSA, including
terrorist organizations, such as Jabhat al-Nusra and the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham.’94
87
J. Sterling-Folker, ‘Realism and the Constructivist Challenge: Rejecting, Reconstructing, or Rereading’,
International Studies Review, Vol. 4, No. 1, 2002, p. 76.
88
R. Gilpin, ‘The Richness of the Tradition of Political Realism’, International Organization, Vol. 38, No. 2,
1984, p. 290.
89
R. Jervis, ‘Realism in the Study of World Politics’, International Organization, Vol. 52, Issue 4, 1998, p. 986.
90
J. Taliaferro, ‘Security Seeking under Anarchy: Defensive Realism Revisited’, International Security, Vol.
25, No. 3, 2001, p. 132.
91
K. Waltz, Realist Thought and Neorealist Theory, p. 36.
92
J. Taliaferro, p. 129.
93
R. Jervis, ‘Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate’, International Security, Vol.
24, No. 1, 1999, p. 49.
94
R. Pita and J. Domingo, p. 392.

24
In order to combat the dangers of terrorism and the threat of chemical warfare destabilizing the
Middle East, Russia and the United States thus had to establish a form of cooperation. The
temporary solution of disarmament essentially notes a struggle for both states to maximize their
security and solidify their status as an international power in the Middle East. However,
fostering cooperation was not evident seen the increased sentiment of mistrust and suspicion
surrounding the developments of the crisis of Ukraine.
2.1.2 The Strategic Interdependence between the United States and Russia in the
Middle East
Although the analysis of conflict management activities of both the United States and the
Russian Federation will be scrutinized separately, it is important to note that some degree of
cooperation was needed to coerce Bashar al-Assad into placing his chemical weapon arsenal
under the control of the international community. Robert Jervis argues that ‘the difficulty status
quo powers have in recognizing one another, in part because of deeply rooted political and
perceptual biases, is compounded by the high price to be paid for mistaking an expansionist
state for a partner that seeks mainly security.’95
However, from a defensive structural realist
perspective it can be noted that anarchy in the international system and the need for state
survival often force states to forgo mutually beneficial cooperation.96
As such, this section thus
rejects that aggression and expansionism are omnipresent, stressing the prevalence of extreme
conflict of interest.97
Instead, it argues that the collaboration between the United States and
Russia in the Syrian case seems to describe a situation entailing strategic interdependence, in
which one state’s optimal strategy depends on the other actors’ strategies.98
In 2009, the Obama Administration initiated a “reset” in U.S.-Russian relations. These were
overburdened by a legacy of disagreements and mutual mistrust from both the Cold War and
post-Cold War periods; yet, despite that, the Obama administration in its first term did manage
to improve both the atmospherics and the substance of the relationship.99
An example of this
improvement is the Geneva Communiqué and the general collaboration on disarming Bashar
al-Assad from his chemical weapons. Although relations were still frosty, both the United
States and Russia relied on their strategic interdependence to come to an agreement in Syria.
95
R. Jervis, Realism, Neoliberalism, and Cooperation: Understanding the Debate, p. 49.
96
J. Taliaferro, p. 138.
97
R. Jervis, Realism in the Study of World Politics, p. 986.
98
R. Powell, ‘Review: Anarchy in International Relations Theory: the neorealist-neoliberal debate’,
International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 2, 1994, p. 315.
99
A. Stent, The Limits of Partnership: US-Russian relations in the twenty-first century, Princeton University
Press, Princeton, 2015, p. 212.

25
On the one hand, it allowed Russia to reassert its position of power in the Middle East, on the
other, the United States was able to achieve a satisfactory result by limiting the military
capabilities of the Syrian regime.
Although the strategic interdependence surrounding the chemical disarmament in Syria proved
beneficial, U.S.-Russian relations severely deteriorated elsewhere. The Maidan civil protest in
Kiev, Ukraine, started out peacefully but turned into violent clashes, unchaining a sequence of
events including the ouster of President Viktor Yanukovych, the annexation of Crimea by
Russia, Russia-backed separatist mobilisation and war in the Donbas region, constituting the
most serious political standoff between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War.100
At this stage, it is important to understand the neorealist notion that anarchy is not a general
condition of the international sphere, but rather a structure that mediates the outcomes that
states produce.101
Subsequently, neorealists like Waltz argue that interdependence, such as the
one that existed between Russia and the United States, is a relatively weak force that shapes
international politics.102
Therefore, the interdependence that existed between the United States and Russia in Syria
cannot be regarded as a prerequisite for the general improvement of their relations in other
regions. Instead, the deterioration of US-Russian relations also influenced the relational
dynamics between these hegemons in the Middle East. Ondrej Ditrych goes as far as to argue
‘that it became plain that no rapprochement was in place when the brutal civil conflict in Syria
was effectively turned into a ‘proxy war’ between Washington and its allies on one hand, and
Moscow, pursuing its geopolitical interest in the Levant, but also deliberately increasing the
costs of US hegemony globally, on the other.’103
The strategic interdependence that stood at
the basis of achieving the disarmament of Bashar al-Assad was quickly mitigated by the
escalation of conflict in Ukraine. Nevertheless, further examination of the causal relationship
between the crisis of Ukraine and the Syrian conflict after the disarmament deal was struck
escapes the scope of this analysis. Instead, the ultimate focus of this study remains with the
examination of how this disarmament deal was brokered. Therefore, the next section
scrutinizes how hegemonic power is exercised onto weaker states.
100
O. Onuch and G. Sasse, ‘The Maidan in Movement: Diversity and the Cycles of Protest’, Europe-Asia
Studies, 2016, p. 1.
101
K. Waltz, Realist though and Neorealist theory, p. 36.
102
K. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, p. 16.
103
O. Ditrych, ‘Bracing for Cold Peace. US-Russia Relations after Ukraine’, The International Spectator, Vol.
49, No. 4, 2014, p. 81.

26
2.1.3 The Exercise of Power of Hegemonic States onto Weaker States
Waltz notes that ‘relatively weak and divided states may find it impossible to concert their
efforts to counter a hegemonic state despite ample provocation.’104
In the case of the Syrian
regime, countering the influence of American power on the dynamics of its civil conflict,
especially after the Ghouta attacks, was indeed close to impossible. In fact, the Syrian civil war
instigated a renewed discussion about the extent of the United States’ hegemonic influence in
the Middle East. By using chemical warfare, Bashar al-Assad had crossed a red line,
constituting a ‘breach of international law so severe that it cannot be tolerated and warrants a
repressive response, including the legitimate threat of, or resource to, the use of force.’105
Enforcing this red line particularly crossed the minds of some of President Barack Obama’s
more conservative senior foreign policy staff. On the premise that chemical warfare severely
violates international law and the norms upheld by the constituency of the United States,
American military intervention can thus be defined as an international outcome as a result of
interactions at the unit [state] level.106
More detailed attention to this particular notion will be
paid in the eventual analysis of American conflict management.
The reasons behind the abandonment of using punitive military airstrikes in Syria in the direct
aftermath of the Ghouta incident is in part due to the alliance between Russia and the Syrian
regime. Alliances are a means to security against adversaries in which the decision to defend
another state that is threatened by an imminent attack may be motivated partly to prevent the
attacker from gaining power resources and partly to keep the victim’s resources available to
defend oneself.107
Within the context of the alliance between Russia and Syria, this statement
becomes a bit ambiguous but still remains valid. Although Assad’s chemical weapons were
taken away, his compliance with the disarmament process did safeguard his domestic political
power and ability to continue waging the conflict (somewhat) conventionally. Again, this
particular subject will be analysed more thoroughly in the section on Russian conflict
management.
104
K. Waltz, Structural Realism after the Cold War, p. 37.
105
C. Stahn, ‘Syria and the Semantics of Intervention, Aggression and Punishment’, Journal of International
Criminal Justice, Vol. 11, 2013, p. 957.
106
K. Waltz, ‘The Origins of War in Neorealist Theory’, The Journal of Interdisciplinary History, Vol. 18, No.
4, 1988, p. 618.
107
G. Snyder, ‘Alliance Theory: A Neorealist First Cut’, Journal of International Affairs, Vol. 44, No. 1, 1990,
p. 106.

27
2.1.4 The Role of International Institutions
The role of international organisations such as the U.N. and the OPCW also has to be placed
within this structural realist framework, keeping in mind that ‘so long as the major states are
the major actors, the structure of international politics is defined in terms of them.’108
Nevertheless, as Jervis notes ‘realists claim not that institutions lack utility, but that they are
not autonomous in the sense of being more than a tool of statecraft.’109
This particularly defines
the role of the U.N. and the OPCW in Syria.
As noted before, the utility of these two international organisations is explained by their role
of executing the agreement struck by the United States and the Russian Federation to disarm
the Syrian regime. This agrees with John Mearsheimer’s view that ‘institutions have minimal
influence on state behaviour’ but starkly opposes his argument that institutions ‘hold little
promise for promoting stability in the post-Cold War world.’110
This is where the analysis risks
to promote neoliberal tendencies. Alluding to the earlier discussed strategic interdependence,
Lakhdar Brahimi did facilitate (minimal) forms of cooperation between the United States and
Russia. Consequently, ‘neoliberalism does not see more cooperation than does realism; rather,
neoliberalism believes that there is much more unrealized or potential cooperation than does
realism.’111
Hence, a fine line divides neoliberalism and structural realism in their assessment
of the roles of international institutions, which is often misunderstood. In summary, albeit its
more pessimistic stance, structural realism still values the utility of international institutions in
the way that they can facilitate cooperation, on the condition that it serves the interests of both
states.
As such, Syria thus provides a unique case in which, not only cooperation between two
hegemonic powers was (albeit temporarily) fostered, but also supported through the execution
of the disarmament process. As Jean Pascal Zanders and Ralf Trapp point out, ‘never before
had the international community attempted to secure and destroy a chemical weapons stockpile
in a war, let alone a civil war in which multiple factions are fighting each other for territorial
and ideological control.’112
108
K. Waltz, Theory of International Politics, Addison-Wesley, Reading, 1979, p. 93-94.
109
110
J. Mearsheimer, ‘The False Promise of International Institutions’, International Security, Vol. 19, No. 3,
1995, p.24.
111
112
J-P. Zanders and R. Trapp, p. 8.

28
The previous few sub-sections have demonstrated how structural realism can be applied to the
case of Syria. Structural realism supports explanations on how the disarmament process was
agreed upon, but proves insufficient in clarifying what the underlying state motives may have
been to agree on executing such a process. In order to do so, the main analysis of this thesis
will apply concepts of conflict management and critical discourse analysis to examine the
underlying reasons and interests of Russia and the United States in brokering the disarmament
process.
2.2 Research Design
Defining a set timeline for the examination of US-Russian negotiations leading up to the
process for the elimination of Syria’s chemical weapon arsenal can prove to be tricky, as it is
unsure when negotiations started. This thesis adopts the events of Ghouta on 21 August 2013
as a starting point. As noted before, the chemical attacks in Ghouta mark a period when
initiatives of the Action Group for Syria became overshadowed by the bilateral negotiations
between the United States and the Russian Federation. Additionally, it is important to note the
date of 27 September 2013 on which the UNSC adopts resolution 2118, endorsing Executive
Council decision EX-M-33/DEC.1, which stipulates that Syria will complete as soon as
possible, and in any case, not later than 1 November 2013, the destruction of chemical weapons
production and mixing/filling equipment and will complete the elimination of all chemical
weapons material and equipment in the first half of 2014.113
Between these two dates, state
representatives of both the United States and Russia reflected elaborately on the disarmament
process.
The end point of the timeline is marked by the completion of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission
activities on 30 September 2014, just after the final movement of chemicals out of Syria was
completed. For the purpose of this analysis, it seems futile to look beyond this particular
development as it primarily evolves around the negotiations leading up to the process.
Furthermore, the finalization of the UN-OPCW Joint Mission more or less marks the end of an
episode within the strategic interdependence between the the United States and Russia. Further
elimination of Syria’s chemical stockpile was completed by private entities, a process which is
unimportant for this study. Additionally, it is important to note that the conflict is still ongoing
113
For a complete overview of the disarmament process see: R. Trapp, ‘Lessons Learned from the OPCW
Mission in Syria’, Submitted to the Director-General of the Technical Secretariat of the OPCW, OPCW, 16
December 2015, Annex II,
https://www.opcw.org/fileadmin/OPCW/PDF/Lessons_learned_from_the_OPCW_Mission_in_Syria.pdf

29
and has experienced new developments that fall beyond the scope of this analysis. As such, the
justification for limiting the time period of this analysis is derived from the fact that the roles
of the United States and Russia underwent structural changes that might risk to undermine the
observations noted. Nevertheless, although these time parameters set a defined timeline for the
examination that follows, it is sometimes unavoidable for the analysis to detract discourse
outside it limits.
As suggested earlier in this thesis, the disarmament process will be operationalized as a partial
settlement and not as a fully mediated outcome. In doing so, it follows the methodology
composed by Zeev Maoz and Lesley Terris114
:
MEDOUTCOME: {
0 𝑖𝑓 𝑁𝑜 𝑀𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛, 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑒𝑟𝑒𝑑 𝑜𝑛𝑙𝑦, 𝑚𝑒𝑑. 𝑓𝑎𝑖𝑙𝑢𝑟𝑒
1 𝑖𝑓 𝑃𝑎𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑎𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
2 𝑖𝑓 𝐹𝑢𝑙𝑙 𝑠𝑒𝑡𝑡𝑙𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡
A full settlement (2) in the case of Syria would suggest the accomplishment of the principal
objectives set out in the Geneva Communiqué; the launch of a Syrian-led political process
leading to transition and the end of violence and human rights abuses. Mediation failure (0)
would constitute no agreement whatsoever.
Within the timeframe of this case, the subsequent chapter will conduct critical discourse
analysis on discourse that is representative of both the United States and Russia. In order to
justify structural realism as the theoretical framework, the analysis will only be applied to
documents that entail discourse exclusively representative of the state, in the search for
indicators that help identify their behaviour. This primarily includes discourse transcribed in
official government and institutional documentation. As such, it avoids an analysis of discourse
voiced by media outlets, as they do not directly reflect the positions of the states in question.
Consequently, sources will be detracted from the online databases that represent or influence
executive branches of government. In the case of the United States, the databases of the
Department of State and the White House will be used. In the case of the Russian Federation,
this analysis will rely on sources retracted from the online site of the Kremlin and the Russian
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
114
Z. Maoz and L. Terris, ‘Credibility and Strategy in International Mediation’, International Interactions, Vol.
32, No. 4, p. 428.

30
Critical discourse analysis is not just concerned with the semiotic element, but also works in
an interdisciplinary way to identify and understand the relations between semiotic and material
elements.115
It can only make a significant and specific contribution to critical social or political
analyses if it is able to provide an account of the role of language, and its public use, within
their geopolitical and/or historical contexts.116
This research method can be particularly useful
when analysing state interests, positions, and strategies. It allows the drawing of assumptions
from the language used and the behaviour shown by those involved within the mediation
process surrounding the agreement to disarm Syria from its chemical weapons.
However, there are some weaknesses in applying this methodology on the hypotheses the next
chapter will examine. First of all, the primary weakness of using critical discourse analysis in
the examination of Russian conflict management, is the language barrier. The scope of the
analysis is limited to English sources, thereby disregarding those written in Russian. Therefore,
it has to be taken into consideration that the possibility of misinterpretation exists. Secondly,
through discourse analysis, the next chapter looks for specific discourse that identifies
particular state interests, positions, and strategies. These risk to become subject to the bias of
perception. In other words, the author might look for particular vocabulary and choose to ignore
others. Thirdly, adding onto point two, this thesis cannot offer any concrete conclusions but
merely make assumptions in support of the theoretical examination of the context. Finally,
concrete information about the fundamental interests of all actors is, at times, unobtainable,
mainly because the conflict is still ongoing.
With this in mind, this analysis will scrutinize the following hypothesis in relation to the
conflict management methodology of the United States:
H1: Cancelling punitive strikes after the Ghouta attacks signals that the Obama administration
considered chemical disarmament as a “sufficient” settlement for Syria.
Within this hypothesis, the analysis aims to investigate if chemical disarmament was
considered a sufficient result by the US government. Of course, perceptions within the Obama
administration differed considerably, however, this study cannot control for these diverting
opinions. Therefore, this study only accounts for the rhetoric of the executive. Considering the
operationalization chemical disarmament as a partial settlement, this analysis rationalizes that,
115
I. Fairclough, and N. Fairclough, Political Discourse Analysis: A Method for Advanced Students, Routledge,
New York, 2012, p. 82.
116
T. van Dijk, ‘Critical Discourse Analysis’, Discourse and Society, Vol. 4, No. 2, 1993, p. 279.

31
within the timeframe described above, chemical disarmament was considered as a satisfactory
mediated outcome. This would imply that in the short-term aftermath of the Ghouta attacks,
the United States did not push to reach a full settlement of political transition and cessation of
violence.
The principal explanation for the outcome within this hypothesis is the cancellation of
launching punitive military airstrikes. As noted by Erik Sterner, ‘disarming Assad from his
chemical weapons was not considered an unwelcome outcome, however, it was not the result
of an effective deterrent strategy.’117
Sterner indirectly refers to the credibility of the threat
carried out by the Obama administration. Within this analysis, the credibility of the threat of
the United States is operationalized as follows:
USCRED: {
0 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝑛𝑜𝑛 − 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
1 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑒𝑐𝑡 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
Since the partial settlement was reached, United States’ credibility is valued at 1. This, in part,
implies that American diligence and persistence in planning to launch airstrikes was the driving
factor behind the disarmament agreement. In support of this argument, John Mitton notes that
the bargaining position of the United States was strengthened via its threat to launch military
airstrikes. In a co-authored article with Frank Harvey, he argues that ‘despite these strong
criticisms, dire warnings and impassioned policy recommendations, the Obama administration
discarded critics’ advice and continued to bolster its coercive threat, openly moved forward
with operational plans to mount punitive airstrikes against the Assad regime, approached the
US Congress for authorization, and buttressed the threat by extending the deployments of
warships and aircraft carriers in the eastern Mediterranean.’118
As a result, ‘on the strength of
this threat, the United States was able to secure a disarmament deal in which the Assad regime
agreed to accede to the CWC and dismantle and destroy its chemical weapons stockpiles.’119
However, the numerical value of United States’ credibility in the Syrian case is also largely
dependent on the qualities of Russia as a mediating partner within their relation of strategic
interdependence. As an ally to the Syrian regime, Russia needed to render, or even perceive
117
E. Sterner, ‘Dictators and Deterence: Syria’s Assad, Chemical Weapons, and the Threat of U.S. Military
Action, Comparative Strategy, Vol. 33, No. 5, 2014, p. 416.
118
F. Harvey and J. Mitton, ‘Fighting for Credibility: US Reputation Building in Asymmetric Conflicts from the
Gulf War to Syria (1991-2013)’, Canadian Journal of Political Science, Vol. 48, No. 3, 2015, p. 506.
119
J. Mitton, Selling Schelling Short: Reputations and American Coercive Diplomacy after Syria, p. 411.

32
the American threat credible to establish the regime’s compliance in accepting the disarmament
process.
This brings us to the second hypothesis examined in this analysis:
H2: The disarmament process has given Russia a stronger foothold in the Middle East.
This hypothesis aims to investigate how the disarmament process gave Russia a stronger
foothold in the Middle East. Within the timeframe of the disarmament process, this is not
exponentially measurable by material indicators. However, Russia’s growing influence is
observable through discourse. Even though it is complicated to use critical discourse analysis
in this instance, there are some indicators that suggest Russia was assuming a more dominant
role in the Middle East. For example, after the process of chemical disarmament, the Iranian
Nuclear deal features predominantly within Moscow’s state discourse as a solution that was
brought to the negotiation table by Russian President Vladimir Putin.
However, before it could increasingly manifest its influence over Middle Eastern politics,
Russia had to contribute significantly into disarming Assad from his chemical weapons. In the
direct aftermath of the Ghouta incident, Russian discourse was changed as its alliance with
Syria was endangered by the imminent threat of US military action. Taking this into account,
the Kremlin was quickly on the defensive in order to protect its biggest ally in the Middle East.
At first, it is observable that Russia defends Assad by claiming that accusations on the use of
chemical weapons are based on inconclusive evidence. Secondly, there is also a continuance
in referrals to the successes achieved by the ‘international community’ and that any unilateral
forceful action bypassing the United Nations would disrupt these successes. This indirectly
reminds the public of past military endeavours of punitive warfare conducted by the United
States, which were not well received. Such defensive rhetoric clearly signalled to which extent
Moscow thought the American threat to be credible. However, when the United States
indicated that chemical disarmament as a partial settlement was negotiable, the Russians were
more than willing to collaborate and coerce their ally into compliance.
Russian coercion of the Syrian regime was mainly shaped through their strategies of
formulation and manipulation. Formulating chemical disarmament as the best possible solution
was predominantly based on creating the perception of an impending hurting stalemate as a
result of punitive military airstrikes. In a broad sense, ‘manipulation was used with the aim of

33
enlarging the spectrum of possible solutions.’120
To induce partial ripeness, Russia had to offer
positive incentives in order to convince Assad that surrendering his chemical weapons to the
international community would serve his efforts in escalating the civil war into victory.
Moscow’s promised efforts to support the legitimacy of Assad’s rule served to manipulate the
regime in surrendering its chemical weapons. Additionally, it could be assumed that Putin
promised Assad to support his military campaign against the rebellion forces. As such, through
formulation and manipulation, Assad’s zone of possible solution was thus expanded. This Zone
of Possible Solutions (ZOPS) is operationalized as follows:121
In the diagram above, chemical disarmament is defined by ZOPS2
. It constitutes a broadening
of ZOPS1
which, in the case of Syria, signifies a continuance of violent conflict and chemical
warfare. The zones on the extreme ends of the diagram constitute the solutions as stipulated by
the Geneva Communiqué. In the case of Russia these zones are not desirable, nor is ZOPS1
.
Instead, ZOPS2
offered the Russians a gateway to re-establish and strengthen their geopolitical
position in Syria, and to a certain extent, the Middle East. As Mark Fitzpatrick argues, ‘the
UN-approved chemical weapons deal effectively serves to legitimise and perpetuate Assad’s
regime.’122
In sum, manipulating the Syrian regime into accepting chemical disarmament did
not only constitute a perceived step towards political transition and cessation of violence, but
also served as a driving force for a stronger Russian foothold in the Middle East.
In conclusion, the two catalysts that induced ripeness for reaching the partial settlement of
chemical disarmament were a) the American threat to use military force, and b) the positive
120
Coordination, p. 27.
121
Derived from model used in S. Vuković, Soft Power, Bias, and Manipulation of International Organizations
in International Mediation, on Zones of Possible Agreement (ZOPA).
122
M. Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, p. 107.
ZOPS1
Political Transition
Cessation of violence
ZOPS2
ZOPS2

34
incentives that were offered by Russia to Assad if he allowed his chemical weapons to be placed
under international control. This study now proceeds to its analysis of state rhetoric vis-à-vis
the discussed hypotheses.
3. Analysis
Ralf Trapp notes that ‘in the Middle East, the question of chemical weapons disarmament has
been linked to nuclear weapons arms control and the wider concept of creating a zone free of
nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction.’123
In this regard, the disarmament process in
Syria can be seen a positive step. Additionally, within the dynamics of the Syrian conflict itself,
‘weapons destruction is one aspect, but losing the doctrinal capacity to deploy and employ
those weapons is by far the most important factor in preventing future rearmament with those
weapons.’124
Another example which indicates success is ‘Russia’s constructive involvement
in initiating the plan and bringing Assad on board, reversing what has been a growing
divergence between Moscow and the West.’125
Whether Syria showcases a stronger
relationship between Russia and the United States is debatable, however, it does signal that
strategic interdependence between these two global powers is possible. Such political
cooperation between the United States and Russia is relatively unique in the field of conflict
management. Therefore, this chapter will analyse the discourse of both states separately, in
order to establish how both efforts complemented each other in reaching the agreement to
disarm the Syrian regime from its chemical stockpile. Furthermore, it will investigate the events
surrounding the Ghouta attacks, defining it is as a tipping point which consolidated the
agreement.
3.1 The Conflict Management of the United States
The involvement of the United States in Syria is predominantly characterized by the setting of
its red line and the subsequent abandonment from its plan to launch punitive military airstrikes.
In the view of Erik Sterner, the events in 2013 serves as prima facie evidence that the Obama
administration failed to make its threat credible, thus implying that the President’s “bluff” to
act militarily was read by the Syrian regime.126
Since U.S. credibility within this study is valued
123
R. Trapp, Elimination of the Chemical Weapons Stockpile of Syria, p. 8.
124
J.P. Zanders and R. Trapp, p. 13.
125
M. Fitzpatrick, Destroying Syria’s Chemical Weapons, p. 113.
126
E. Sterner, p. 108

35
at 1, it does not adopt this argument. Contrarily, it is assessed that Washington threatened to
use military force only to create the perception that it might execute its threat, thereby creating
the perception of an impending catastrophe which would harm the regime’s claim to power.
As noted before, such developments are associated with the recognition of MHS and inducing
the perception of ripeness for (partial) conflict resolution. The following sub-sections will
identify, through discourse analysis, how a combination of the red line and U.S. credibility led
to the ripening of a partial settlement.
3.1.1 Deterrence and the United States’ Red Line
First, it is important to note that deterrence invokes threats to dissuade an adversary from
initiating an undesired action, while coercive diplomacy is a response to an action that has
already been taken.127
Building on the work of Alexander George, Jack Levy continues to argue
that ‘even more fundamentally, strategies of deterrence, coercive diplomacy, and crisis
management cannot be pursued in isolation, but must be subsumed within a coherent foreign
policy or grand strategy that includes crisis prevention as an important aim and that specifies
the conditions under which the limited use of force might be appropriate.’128
Ultimately the
goal is to create the opponent’s expectation of unacceptable costs, leading to erosion of
resistance to the coercing state’s demand.129
For this analysis, American coercive diplomacy started on 20 August 2012, when President
Obama declared his red line on the use of biological and chemical weapons:
“I have, at this point, not ordered military engagement in the situation. But the point that you made
about chemical and biological weapons is critical. That’s an issue that doesn’t just concern Syria; it
concerns our close allies in the region, including Israel. It concerns us. We cannot have a situation
where chemical or biological weapons are falling into the hands of the wrong people. We have been
very clear to the Assad regime, but also to other players on the ground, that a red line for us is we start
seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized. That would change my
calculus.130
”
127
J. Levy, ‘Deterrence and Coercive Diplomacy: The Contributions of Alexander George’, Political
Psychology, Vol. 29, No. 4, 2008, p.539.
128
Ibid, p. 538.
129
S. Tarzi, ‘Hypotheses on the Use and Limitations of Coercive Diplomacy’, International Studies, Vol. 36,
No. 1, 1999, p. 65.
130
‘Remarks by the President to the White House Press Corps’, The White House, 20 August 2012,
https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2012/08/20/remarks-president-white-house-press-corps.

36
There are a few important contextual elements that have to be noted. First, this declaration by
Obama was made not long after Syrian Foreign Minister spokesman Johad Makdissi officially
confirmed that Syria has chemical weapons, stating that these weapons would never be used
against the Syrian people, but only against “external aggression”.131
This proved to be an
inherently deceiving statement, especially after the Ghouta attacks. Furthermore, for the United
States “seeing a whole bunch of chemical weapons moving around or being utilized” shaped a
security dilemma. For example, Hezbollah fighters have played an important role in the Assad
regime’s effort by protecting arms supply routes, bringing with them years of combat
experience gained in Lebanon’s civil war and its two wars with Israel.132
If Hezbollah would
have potential access to Assad’s chemical stockpile, this would greatly threaten Israel,
Washington’s most important ally in the Middle East. As noted by Glenn Snyder, as an ally,
the United States has ‘an interest in maintaining their reputation for loyalty to their allies
[Israel] and their reputation for resolve vis-à-vis their adversaries.’133
As such, a decrease in
Israel’s security would constitute a decrease in American security.
Secondly, there is no question that this statement signalled the beginning of Obama’s
deterrence strategy vis-à-vis Bashar al-Assad. In the words of Erik Sterner, the exact purpose
of such a strategy is to make ‘a dictatorship such as Assad understand that the consequences of
committing an act will be worse for it than the consequences of not committing it.’134
As noted
before, loyalty to Israel and reputation towards the Assad regime could develop enough cause
to use coercive action. In light of the grand strategy to prompt political transition and cessation
of violence as stipulated in the Geneva Communiqué (which was signed just before Obama set
his red line), the first policy option was to apply financial pressure on the regime by “providing
non-lethal assistance…depriving Assad of the financial resources to continue waging his
war…by freezing assets of senior regime officials, restricting transactions with the commercial
and central banks and embargo Syrian oil.”135
Such power mediation was primarily aimed at
increasing the costs of non-compliance, thereby altering the cost-benefit calculations and
inducing the recognition of political transition as a viable alternative to the continuation of the
131
‘Timeline of Syrian Chemical Weapons Activity, 2012-2015’, Arms Control, 19 August 2014,
https://www.armscontrol.org/factsheets/Timeline-of-Syrian-Chemical-Weapons-Activity.
132
B. Jenkins, p. 1.
133
G. Snyder, p. 108.
134
E. Sterner, p. 407.
135
‘Press Availability Hillary Rodham Clinton Following the Friends of he Syrian People Ministerial Meeting’,
U.S. Department of State, 6 July 2012,http://www.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2012/07/194634.htm.

37
conflict.136
Such a strategy signals the intentions of the United States to render its threat of
military action credible. In other words, the United States applied sticks with few carrots as a
warning to Assad and reassuring Israel.
Thirdly, it has to be noted that President Obama does not explicitly clarify that the use of
chemical weapons will trigger military action. He merely mentions he has not yet ordered
military engagement, thereby creating the perception that he might if necessary. Consequently,
the causal nexus between military action and the red line remains relatively loose within
Obama’s discourse. It also implies that he relies on the United States known track-record of
military intervention to render his threat credible.
3.1.2 United States Credibility
The debate on U.S. credibility in Syria remains complex. On the one hand, scholars such as
Erik Sterner argue that Washington’s red line was received as a bluff, leading to the failure of
its deterrence policy and setting the precedence for other states to cross U.S. red lines.137
On
the other hand, authors such as John Mitton and Frank Harvey note that the credibility of
American threats are still viable because of its reputations and past actions from previous
cases.138
Within this thesis’ methodology, U.S. credibility is operationalized as perfect (1), thus
supporting the argument that the threat of military action was credible. However, there are
some indicators that suggest otherwise.
On both 23 March and 29 April, the Syrian regime allegedly defied the red line on chemical
weapons, resulting in several deaths near Damascus and the town of Saraqeb. In reaction to
these events, Deputy National Security Advisor Ben Rhodes stated the following:
“Following a deliberative review, our intelligence community assesses that the Assad regime has used
chemical weapons, including the nerve agent sarin, on a small scale against the opposition multiple
times in the last year … The President has been clear that the use of chemical weapons – or the
transfer of chemical weapons to terrorist groups – is a red line for the United States … Following on
the credible evidence that the regime has used chemical weapons against the Syrian people, the
President has augmented the provision of non-lethal assistance to the civilian opposition, and also
authorized the expansion of our assistance to the Supreme Military Council (SMC), and we will be
consulting with Congress on these matters in the coming weeks… The United States and the
136
Coordination, p. 27.
137
E. Sterner, p. 418.
138
J. Mitton and F. Harvey, p. 520.

38
international community have a number of other legal, financial, diplomatic, and military responses
available.”139
With this statement, the White House clearly does not deviate from its foreign policy of
deterrence and coercive diplomacy but reinforces that it will not resort to military action,
despite the fact that the events in March and April clearly manifest a violation of the red line.
In other words, the United States did not develop its threat but continues the path of utilizing
non-lethal means to harm Assad’s war efforts. According to Sterner, ‘the Syrian Government
was willing to gamble on the [U.S.] president’s credibility, as the odds of getting away with
using chemical weapons looked to be in its favour.’140
However, as Mitton and Harvey note,
‘Obama may have issued a red-line warning, but it was never clear to Syrian leaders whether
he was committed to the deterrent threat, or what the red-line actually meant.’141
Moreover,
taking the domestic pressures into account, there were low interests and limited capabilities to
effect any significant change in Syria.142
The Syrian regime thus remained uncertain what
would trigger military action. Washington’s continued interest in the conflict was preserved by
keeping the implicit threat to intervene, upholding American presence in Syria.143
Therefore,
American credibility vis-à-vis future confrontations with the Assad regime was maintained,
although the red line was not a definitive or automatic deterrent.144
In conclusion, the statement of Ben Rhodes served to create the perception of non-credibility
(0) as part of a larger strategy of conflict management. Moreover, the moment for direct
military intervention was not ripe yet and would have bared little result. However, by
maintaining a vested interest through economic sanctions, the United States forced a certain
degree of uncertainty with the Syrian government. As it will be discussed later in this chapter,
the direct aftermath of the Ghouta attacks notes how the Obama administration reinforces its
credibility (1), triggering the negotiations of the disarmament process as partial settlement.
139
‘Statement by Deputy National Security Advisor for Strategic Communications Ben Rhodes on Syrian
Chemical Weapons Use’, White House, 13 June 2013, https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/2013/06/13/statement-deputy-national-security-advisor-strategic-communications-ben-.
140
E. Sterner, p. 408.
141
J. Mitton and F. Harvey, p. 518.
142
Ibid, p. 520.
143
K. Beardsley et al., ‘Mediation Style and Crisis Outcomes’, The Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 50, No.
1, 2006, p. 70.
144
J. Mitton, p. 411.

Thesis Martijn van Ballekom

Recommended

Recommended

More Related Content

What's hot

What's hot (19)

Viewers also liked

Viewers also liked (7)

Similar to Thesis Martijn van Ballekom

Similar to Thesis Martijn van Ballekom (20)

Thesis Martijn van Ballekom