1. 1
‘Yes, Prime Minister’: After failing to gain
approval for military intervention against the
Assad regime in Syria, 2013, how did David
Cameron successfully acquiesce opposition
into approving intervention against Daesh in
2015? A Critical Discourse Analysis of the
House of Commons debates on Syria 2013 and
Daesh 2015.
Cameron Pitt
Supervisor: Philip Daniels
Submitted in partial fulfilment of the requirements for the
degree of Master of Arts in International Politics (Critical
Geopolitics)
School of Geography, Politics and Sociology, University of Newcastle
upon Tyne.
August 2016 Word count: Approx. 11,660

2. 2
Abstract
This dissertation is a Critical Discourse Analysis of Prime Minister
David Cameron’s justification for military intervention. To understand
the dialectical relationship between particular discourse structures
and mental representations of events, situations, opinions and
experiences, Critical Discourse Analysis aims to demonstrate the
ways in which shared knowledge, ideologies and attitudes can be
manufactured through the reproduction of particular discursive
practices (Van Dijk, 1993: 258-9). An important component of
dominance in any given society entails the framing of mental models
of positive ‘Self’ representation that appear inherently ‘normal’, ‘just’
or ‘enlightened’, while simultaneously framing the actions of ‘Others’
as particularly deviant or against the grain of ‘normality’ and
‘acceptable behaviour’ (Van Dijk, 1993: 263). Moreover, by drawing
on themes of ‘identity’ within security communities, political elites
suggest, through implicature, specific roles a state should adopt
within the structure of international life. Through various discursive
practices appearing in a multiplicity of public and private texts,
speeches and debates, and not strictly limited to political platforms,
mental models are expressed and constantly contrast ‘Us’ with
‘Them’. Using an interpretivist and qualitative model of Critical
Discourse Analysis, this paper will analyse David Cameron’s
statements in the House of Commons debates on Assad and Daesh in
Syria on 29th August 2013 and 2nd December 2015, respectively.
What the analysis will demonstrate is while the motion against Assad
in 2013 may have been relatively coherent in terms of recent British
foreign policy trends, Cameron failed to acquiesce parliament due to
the historical context of the invasion of Iraq and his failure to
adequately highlight the ‘national interest’. Furthermore, increasing
democratisation of foreign affairs meant public opinion played a more
pivotal role, and that this consequence of Iraq delimits national
leaders’ predominance over foreign policy. The findings from
Cameron’s statements during the 2015 debate on Daesh, however,
will exemplify dominance over foreign policy discourse. Through
bringing salience to the ‘national interest’ and drawing on concepts of
sovereignty, security communities, identity, and positive ‘Self’-
representation, while also maintaining humanitarianism as a
secondary justification, Cameron created a specific ‘discourse world’
that limited rhetorical opposition.

3. 3
Contents
Chapter 1 – Introduction (p.4)
Chapter 2 – Critical Discourse Analysis (p.8)
2.1 – Ideology and dominance (p.11)
2.2 – Hegemony (p.14)
Chapter 3 – Legitimising strategies and overseas military
intervention (p.16)
3.1 – Legitimisation (p.16)
3.2 – Coercion (p.17)
3.3 – Overseas intervention (p.18)
Chapter 4 – British foreign policy in the 21st century (p.21)
4.1 - Britain’s ‘global role’ under New Labour (p.21)
4.2 – Iraq and consequences of intervention (p.23)
4.3 – Foreign policy under coalition government (p.25)
4.4 – Syria 2013 (p.27)
Chapter 5 – Public opinion, Syria 2013, and Cameron’s ‘war of
words’ (p.30)
5.1 – Public opinion (p.30)
5.2 – Winning (or losing) the ‘war of words’: Syria 2013 (p.33)
5.2a – Intelligence (p.35)
5.2b – Legitimising features (p.37)
5.3 – Discussion (p.40)
Chapter 6 – The 2015 debate on Daesh in Syria: achieving a
hegemonic discourse (p.43)
6.1 – Language of justification (p.44)
6.2 – Primary justification (p.46)
6.3 – Rhetorical devices (p.48)
6.3a – Representational force (p.51)
6.3b - Positive ‘Self’ juxtaposed against the ‘Other’ (p.53)
Chapter 7 – Conclusion (p.57)
Bibliography (p.59)

4. 4
Chapter 1
Introduction
Political discourse generally, and foreign policy discourse
particularly, is a space in which political elites attempt to use
language as a coercive mechanism. To (re)produced particular
hegemonic discourses, political actors deploy an array of linguistic
devices used to engage those receiving the text or talk to frame
particular mental models of representation. In the changing
international-political environment of the twenty-first century,
political elites’ justifications for military intervention have adapted to
ever-changing political contexts. From the ignominious ‘war on
terror’, through multilateral interventions under the auspices of
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) and the concept of liberal
humanitarian intervention, political leaders have had to reproduce
certain themes of justification to acquiesce potential opposition.
The case of achieving dominance over foreign policy in Britain is
particularly interesting. In the context of the invasion and occupation
of Iraq, to achieve any unilateral foreign policy objectives would
necessitate a dramatic discursive turn. As the study will show, while
Prime Minister David Cameron was successful in his foreign policy
objectives in Libya, he was humiliated in his defeated motion of
military intervention against the Assad regime in Syria. In conducting
a discourse analysis of Cameron’s speech acts during the House of
Commons debate on Syria, 29th August 2013, this paper will

5. 5
demonstrate that while the justification for intervention was not
indifferent to that in Libya, he failed to close off the discursive space
for oppositional rebuttal. Ultimately, Cameron failed in his motion.
Two years later, however, Cameron presented to the House a new
motion of military intervention in Syria; this time against the terrorist
group, Daesh. A further discourse analysis of Cameron’s speech acts
during the House of Commons debate on Daesh in Syria, 2nd
December 2015, will demonstrate how Cameron was successful in
closing the discursive space for opposition. Through particular
rhetorical devices drawing on sovereignty, security communities,
positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’ representations, and national
security as the primary justification while maintaining a continued
humanitarian mission as secondary, Cameron balanced his case
sufficiently enough to acquiesce Members of Parliament (MPs) into
accepting his motion.
The analysis in this dissertation will take a strong social
constructivist epistemology. One of the core features of Cameron’s
rhetoric pertains to notions of identity within the structure of a
security community. As Hopf (1998: 174-5) contends, identities are a
vital aspect in maintaining the international order by suggesting a
“particular set of interests or preferences with respect to choices of
action in particular domains, and with respect to particular actors”
and, more fundamentally, “The identity of a state implies its
preference and consequent actions”. While many traditional theories
of international politics claim to an endgame – for example realism’s

6. 6
claim that states will always act when their relative share of power
may increase in a system of anarchy, or neoliberalism’s claim that
states always act in self interest – constructivism instead identifies
that in any number of social, historical, or political contexts a state’s
behaviour may change in accordance with the identities and
preferences shared and reproduced within it (Hopf, 1998: 176).
Emanuel Adler (1997: 322) defines constructivism in
international politics as “the view that the manner in which the
material world shapes and is shaped by human interaction depends
on dynamic normative and epistemic interpretations of the material
world”. Agency, constructivism claims, is restricted by the everyday
practices within certain structures in the international – as well as
domestic – theatre. This proposition suggests radical change and
removal of structures to be greatly inhibited by the hegemonic forces
of (re)production.
Kowert and Onuf (1998) highlight the performative nature of
language in international politics. By stressing the constantly
changing and developing relationship between social agents and
social practices, the directive, commissive, and assertive linguistic
choices made by political elites has, fundamentally, the illocutionary
and prelocutionary effect of coercion or acquiescence to desired
political goals. Similarly, Klotz and Lynch (2008: 99) focus on
concepts of identity, (national) interests, and structure and agency by
examining how governments generally and political elites particularly
can reframe the ‘national interest’ through specific rhetorical and

7. 7
linguistic devices; identified in language game and communicative
action theory. Moreover, Francoise Debrix (2003) analyses language
use as the force (re)producing certain power structures, and
constituting identity through the fabrication of agent, ‘Self’, and
‘Other’. For Debrix (2003: 24), constructivism “seeks to counter
certain foundational claims that seek to ground knowledge of/about
the world in a predetermined set of postulates” through using
methodological tools focussing on the hegemonic and coercive
mechanisms of political rhetoric.
This paper will be broken down into three primary sections: the
first section introduces Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) , tracing its
early manifestations and application before moving on to highlight its
use as a research method elucidating ‘how possible’ rather than ‘why
possible’ (Doty, 1993) political elites produce hegemonic discourses
through dominance, legitimation, and coercion; the second section
will trace some recent British foreign policy to provide the historical
and political context for the final section; a CDA of Cameron’s speech
acts within the 2013 debate on Assad in Syria and 2015 debate on
Daesh in Syria. The analysis will be strictly qualitative and
interpretivist, seeking to move away from the highly empirical
foundational claims to knowledge inherent in other international-
political theories. The final section will conclude by succinctly
explaining the findings from the research.

8. 8
Chapter 2
Critical Discourse Analysis
CDA can be employed to highlight the ideological assumptions
within a particular discourse(s) by deconstructing the various
representations and features of text and talk. A multi-disciplinary
approach, CDA attempts to address the “role of discourse in the
(re)production and challenge of dominance” (Van Dijk, 1993: 283).
Critical discourse analysts are essentially concerned with the
strategies employed in various instances of text, talk, interaction, and
other communicative events that seem to reproduce power and
dominance of one particular social group over another. Discourse
Analysis emerged in the 1960s and 1970s through research within
various fields including anthropology, psychology, sociology and
linguistics, and with the added social theories of Foucault and Bordieu
CDA was formed as a separate and distinct field of inquiry. CDA, as
opposed to Discourse Analysis, is a concern not just with the
superficial nature of language use in given contexts, but extends
much further to contend with themes of power, dominance and
hegemony. Indeed, this is the ‘critical’ aspect of CDA.
It was in the 1970s that a form of discourse text analysis
identified the role of language in (re)producing and sustaining
existing power structures in society (Meyer & Wodak, 2001: 5). In
pragmatics, where the relationship between language and context
was considered (Levinson, 1983), sentence structure and components

9. 9
were regarded as basic units, with sociolinguistic research concerned
with structure, change and interaction, with little focus on issues
surrounding power structures, hegemony and dominance (Labov,
1972; Hymes, 1972). Turning to these hierarchical power structures,
work by van Dijk (1985), Fairclough (1989), and Wodak (1989)
began to provide a more politically engaged form of analysis.
Hardy and Phillips (2002: 3) define discourse as an “interrelated
set of texts, and the practices of their production, dissemination, and
reception, that brings an object into being”. In that respect, social
reality is created through discourses and therefore any social
interaction cannot be genuinely comprehended without first giving
reference to the particular discourses that give them meaning.
Discourses are not merely embedded within individual texts,
artefacts, images, and communicative events from which the analyst
studies but exist beyond the unitary measure of such artefacts as
part of a complex of social meanings:
Texts are the sites of the emergence of complexes of social
meanings, produced in the particular history of the situation of
production, that record in partial ways the histories of both the
participants in the production of the text and of the institutions
that are “invoked” or brought into play, indeed a partial history
of the language and the social system, a partiality due to the
structuring of relations of power of the participants (Kress, 1995:
122).
It follows, then, that texts have little meaning individually, but how
they are linked intertextually with pre-existing discourses that allow

10. 10
those consuming a particular discourse more likely to internalise and
reproduce a particular reality.
An important facet of CDA is in recognising that particular
discourses do not appear in a vacuum. All spoken and written activity
ultimately takes place in the context of a number of political, social,
and historical events or sequence of events that, over time, shape
and are shaped by the shared social interactions of groups within the
complex structures in which a particular discourse is embedded
(Hardy and Phillips, 2002: 4). Chilton and Shaffner (in Van Dijk,
1997: 215) view the primary question of any discourse analyst when
studying communicative events of political discourse to be “In which
ways can the linguistic choices of the speaker be interpreted as
functioning in a politically strategic manner, given the wider political
culture and the narrower political context”. While keeping this specific
question in mind, the researcher can link a speaker’s linguistic
choices to categories of coercion, dissimulation, legitimisation and
delegitimisation, and resistance, opposition and protest.
One of the predominant functions of CDA is in demonstrating
how the use of language in text and talk is implemented to develop
or sustain unequal power relations through forms of ideological
positioning and hegemony. This is why and where CDA entails a
strong political agenda. According to Van Dijk (1993), a vital facet in
conducting credible discourse analysis is understanding the role of
social power and dominance; power, that is, not in the traditional

11. 11
sense of physical control over the political, economic, and social
arena, but more cognitively; in the sense that over time particular
discourses and particular ways of thinking within a given society are
absorbed and reproduced. While it is important to remember that
most communicative action is not overtly conducted in some
manipulative or insidious manner, “dominance may be enacted and
reproduced by subtle, routine, everyday forms of text and talk that
appear ‘natural’ and quite ‘acceptable’” (Van Dijk, 1993: 254).
Indeed, CDA is concerned with both the opaque and transparent
manifestations of structural forms of dominance, power, and control
inherent in language; and in its appropriation in particular contexts
and discourses language is also a force in itself. As Habermas
highlights, “[language] serves to legitimize relations of organized
power. In so far as the legitimations of power relations….are not
articulated,…..language is also ideological” (Habermas, 1997: 259).
In other words, certain linguistic choices in specific circumstances,
and in reference to specific acts, actors and events, construct
predetermined mental models of representation by drawing on
socially shared knowledge.
2.1 – Ideology and dominance
Ideologies can be defined as a socially held system of beliefs or
principles representative of a particular social group, and these
representative principles provide the basic foundation for all
discourses and social practices (Van Dijk, 2006: 120-1). Given that

12. 12
all discourses arise from the specific social processes and structures
that in turn allow for the (re)production of a specific text, and that
these texts are interpreted and given meaning by individuals given
the socio-historic context and interaction with a particular text,
discourse can be viewed as being structured by dominance. Wodak
and Mayer (2001: 3) explain succinctly “that every discourse is
historically produced and interpreted, that is, it is situated in time and
space; and that dominance structures are legitimated by ideologies of
powerful groups”.
Ideology in discourse is grounded in the everyday assumptions
of worldly phenomena and our expected, collective response to them.
This world of assumption, as Fairclough (1989: 77) understands it,
dictates not only the responses of members of any given group to
any particular event, but also determines our interpretation of the
actions of others through implicitly held, commonsensical knowledge
that is rarely examined or brought into question. For Fairclough,
(1989: 85) commonsense ideology is most effective when it is not
overtly visible, as once an individual or group of individuals become
aware that such commonsense ideology works in sustaining existing
inequalities in power relations, those who profit from maintaining the
status quo lose the propensity to further existing power inequalities.
In the context of the this paper, as will become salient later, by
creating a positive ‘Self’ image and ‘proud history’ of fighting ‘evil’ in
solidarity with Britain’s traditional ‘partners’, ‘allies’ and ‘friends’,

13. 13
Prime Minister David Cameron draws upon ideological assumptions of
Britain’s role in the world, its responsibility to respond in
preconceived ways to ongoing crises, and most crucially for the wider
social group (in this case the British public) to deem the response and
actions of Cameron to be proportionate and appropriate given the
historical context in which that particular discourse emerged; thus
reproducing that particular discourse and sustaining existing power
relations. Indeed, as Fairclough (1989: 86) rightly points out, “As a
whole, and at all times, the efficiency of the truly national leader
consists primarily in preventing the division of attention of a people,
and always concentrating it on a single enemy”. The more a
particular ideology or discourse is homogenised throughout a given
society, the greater becomes the political elite’s grasp on maintaining
existing power relations and ability to bring uniformity to a nation’s
cause; this is particularly true on matters of foreign affairs where
stark ideological differences are manifest in crises spanning various
geopolitical arenas.
Important to CDA is the proposition that the not-by-accident
selection of particular language embedded in discourse actively
forwards the ideological position of the author to any given topic.
What CDA offers is the evaluative tools necessary to identify what
methods are used to construct ideologies across and through texts.
However, the ideological position of the author, especially in political
discourse, is rarely demonstrated overtly through the use of
language. As Stubbs (1996: 93) recognises, “Ideology need not

14. 14
function at the level of conscious or intentional bias…Once it is
realized that choices have been made, it is also realized that other
choices could be made, and that reality could be represented
differently”. This control over a particular, commonsensical
‘knowledge’ not only reframes individuals’ understanding of the world
or interpretation of specific crises, but also shapes the forms of
discourses that individuals can partake in (Van Dijk, 1993: 258).
Fairclough (1992, cited in Blommaert and Bulcaen, 2000: 448) has
viewed this as a three-dimensional process: a “discourse-as-text”
process that seeks to analyse the particular patterns in language,
grammar, cohesion and structure; the “discourse-as-discursive-
practice” process, whereby discourse is “produced, circulated,
distributed, [and] consumed in society” that seeks to highlight the
intertextuality and interdiscursivity within and among texts as a tool
enabling the author to project a homogenised form of discourse; and
thirdly the “discourse-as-social-practice, i.e., the ideological effects
and hegemonic processes in which discourse is a feature”.
2.2 – Hegemony
What Gramsci (1971) has termed “hegemony” need not only be
used in the context of traditional power struggles concerning physical
force, but have myriad other representations in different fields. Van
Dijk (1993: 355) understands power as being manifested in different
ways according to the different “resources employed to exercise such
power”; be that power generated through wealth, knowledge, or the

15. 15
ability to project force on an individual or group. Yet this power is
never absolute. At any given time the “dominated groups may more
or less resist, accept, condone, comply with, or legitimate such
power, and even find it ‘natural’”. Where the dominated groups tend
to adopt a more compliant, accepting, condoning or legitimating
stance, the dominant groups achieve greater power through process
of hegemony.
Hegemony is not just domination across a social, cultural,
political, or economic landscape, but also leadership in the
“ideological domains of a society” (Fairclough, 1995: 61). Hegemony,
rather than being a coercive and violent struggle for power among
social groups, is instead a process of integration, a process, which
Fairclough (1995: 61) claims, is “about constructing
alliances…..through concessions or through ideological means, to win
[other opposing groups’] consent”. Indeed, as Van Dijk (1993:255)
makes clear, “if the minds of the dominated can be influenced in such
a way that they accept dominance, and act in the interest of the
powerful out of their own free will, we use the term ‘hegemony’”. For
Van Dijk, (1993: 255) hegemony also implies a hierarchy of power,
that is, where the most dominant individuals of a group have
privileged access to resources and control over the “processes of the
enactment of power”. The control of dominant groups over particular
discourses is not tantamount to a mere form of “social action
control”, but is more fundamentally the control over the “minds of
other people” and the management of their “social representations”

16. 16
(Van Dijk, 1993: 255). For political elites to achieve this type of
hegemonic power, particularly in democratic states where physical
force would undermine those exercising power, they employ various
discursive strategies to garner legitimation from their prospective
audiences. This is particularly true in the realm of foreign policy;
where citizens are generally less engaged than they are in domestic
policy.
Chapter 3
Legitimising strategies and overseas military
intervention
3.1 – Legitimisation
Another closely interrelated aspect of hegemony is the
legitimising of a particular discourse through coercively emotive
language selection. Essentially, legitimising features of text and talk
adopt two specific categories; epistemic and deontic. The former
relates to the speaker’s claim to have better knowledge, the ‘real’
facts, and a more objective and rational thought processes than
rivals, while the latter attests to not only the speaker’s cognitive
credibility but also his/her moral righteousness (Chilton, 2004: 111-
17). Legitimising features of text and talk seek to marry both
epistemic and deontic statements, or emotive ‘feelings’, with factual
representations that few listeners would challenge and most would
accept as authoritative.

17. 17
Chilton further highlights the prevalence in political discourse of
constructing mental schemas of ‘Self’ versus ‘Other’ which is the
foundation of maintaining the concept of security as being
concentrated within a specific geographical limitation and throughout
a basic group with whom the listeners share an affinity (Chilton,
2004: 117). It is through appealing to these primitive, cognitive
features that political elites can construct, reconstruct, or maintain
various discourses in legitimising conceptions of ‘Self’/’Other’ or
‘close’/’distant’ through emotively charged language use. The analysis
of Cameron’s speech acts will demonstrate, much like Chilton’s
analysis of Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of Blood’ speech, is Cameron’s use
of question/answer pairs which portray a more epistemic rationality
and deontic reasonableness (Chilton, 2004: 118).
3.2 – Coercion
Nearly all political speech acts could be viewed as coercive in
one form or another. From rival-bashing, election campaign speeches
claiming a political adversary to be the wrong choice for the country,
the family and the individual, to parliamentary debates on overseas
intervention, all demonstrate particular forms of language as the
means to achieving political ends. There are, however, very particular
forms of language style and structure that are implemented for the
specific purpose of coercion.
As Chilton explains, the use of particular words and language
styles are linked neurologically to the limbic system of the brain,

18. 18
meaning those listening to or reading particular texts or talk are
hardwired in such as way to produce a certain emotional response
that construct mental models of representation (Chilton, 2004: 118).
Indeed, Fairclough (1989: 3-4) made the important distinction
between the “exercise of power through coercion of various
sorts…and the exercise of power through the manufacture of consent
to or at least acquiescence towards it”. By this, Fairclough identifies
that power is not just a matter of language, but the use of
particularly emotive forms of language for coercing a certain group or
individuals into accepting what a speaker or elite has to say as
authoritative, thereby maintain existing power relations. The two
primary methods of maintain existing power relations are through
coercion and consent. However, particularly in modern democratic
societies where the threat of force as a coercing strategy would
ultimately delegitimise the elites’ hold on power, coercion must take
the form of legitimising strategies in text and talk in order to gain
consent and maintain their monopoly of power.
3.3 – Overseas intervention
The global arena provides a distinct but interrelated space
where devices of political discourse are manifest to produce specific
political ends. While the above analysis has provided a foundational
understanding of how power and ideology are constructed through
hegemonic activities concerning legitimising and coercive strategies in
text and talk, the international arena, where many view the state as

19. 19
having less power and less sovereignty in an era of increasing
globalisation, require (re)conceptualisations of various geopolitical
spaces.
Overseas wars in particular are a complex and multifaceted
arena in which political discourse unfolds. It is too narrow and
reducible to speak of a particular speech act or acts as having a
purpose of ‘legitimising’ war, as on the one hand overseas
intervention can be viewed as legitimate or illegitimate, while on the
other a more former conception of legal or illegal based on
international law. As Chilton (2004: 152) explains, “To ‘legitimise’ a
particular war might be understood to mean showing or claiming it to
be legal, or making it legal with respect to some system of law” by
interpreting, for instance, an ambiguous statement from an
international institution such as the UN as a means of achieving a
political or military goal. Furthermore, whether a war is viewed as
‘just’ or ‘unjust’ – another classification commonly used in political
discourse – largely depends on normative conceptions of what role a
particular state plays in the international arena i.e., whether
benevolent humanitarianism, liberal interventionist, pacifist etc.
Justifying military intervention in distant geopolitical arenas
necessarily requires those elites who seek to gain most from the
conflict to use conceptions of space, geography, sovereignty, and
territory within their particular language choices. As certain
discourses are constructed through language, and create, in Chilton’s

20. 20
(2004: 138) words, “‘conceptual domains’ or ‘ontological
spaces’….carry[ing] a deictic ‘signature’ for space, time and modality,
and relationships among them”, the analysis of political discourse
must encompass an understanding of how discourse transcends these
spaces and encapsulates epistemological notions of
cause/consequence and deontic conceptions of reason/purpose; often
forwarded through implication and presupposition rather than overt
statements. What elites must achieve in order to justify military
intervention overseas to the wider public is to create an order of
discourse that most accurately represents both the mental models of
distant places and people, and the widely accepted global role the
particular state encompasses.
In choosing a course of action that contradicts how wider
society conceives of their country to behave internationally, that
course of action is inherently ‘illegitimate’. Indeed, in post-Iraq
Britain there is a distinct lack of coherence on what Britain’s role
should be, most strikingly exemplified in Cameron’s defeat of his
proposal for military intervention against the Assad Regime in Syria
on August 29th, 2013. The following section will trace British foreign
policy in the 21st century and governmental justifications for
intervention to provide a context to the 2013 House of Commons
debate on Syria and 2015 debate on Daesh in Syria.

21. 21
Chapter 4
British foreign policy in the 21st
century
The following section will provide an overview of British Foreign
Policy in the 21st Century to give a foundation to the analysis
provided above and a contextual backdrop for the forthcoming CDA of
Cameron’s case for intervention in Syria. As the previous section
highlighted the basic requirement of political elites to “have some
sense of who [their] community is and how its members would like
the government to act internationally on their behalf” (Gaskarth,
2013: 59) it is important to understand some of the changes in
identity that have occurred in Britain’s Foreign Policy this century.
This section will provide a brief analysis of the post-9/11 conflicts in
Afghanistan and Iraq, the Coalition Government’s intervention in
Libya, culminating with a more thorough focus on the repercussions
of Cameron’s defeat on military intervention against the Assad regime
in the House of Commons on August 29th, 2013. The analysis of the
latter part of this section will provide the evidence the important
context in which the topic of this paper is concerned with.
4.1 – Britain’s ‘global role’ under New Labour
Dean Acheson appeared to be the harbinger of Britain’s half-
century long identity crisis when, in 1962, he famously remarked that
Britain has ‘lost an empire and not yet found a role’ in the world.
Successive governments and prime ministers have struggled with

22. 22
reconstituting Britain’s global role post-1945. From Thatcher’s ‘middle
power’ to one that ‘punched above its weight’, New Labour, under the
leadership of Tony Blair, proclaimed Britain as a ‘pivotal power’ in
keeping with this foreign policy continuum (Daddow & Gaskarth,
2011: 32). As Edmunds et al. (2014: 503) have noted, Britain’s
global role has been dominated by “narratives of empire, Atlanticism,
Europeanism, internationalism and isolationism” and these various
conceptions have all changed with the dynamic understanding of the
national interest. At the end of the 20th Century, however, with the
demise of the Soviet Union as primary adversary and increasing
European integration and globalisation, Britain’s global role has
necessarily had to be reconceptualised even further.
The difficulty that faced New Labour governments and those of
different colours thereafter, according to Daddow and Gaskarth, is in
the delimiting nature of the types of language used, bringing foreign
policy from the higher realms of politics in all of its multifaceted
complexities to reducible sound-bites that fail to provide a fluid
rethinking of Britain’s global role (Daddow & Gaskarth, 2011: 33).
While the first half of Blair’s tenure as prime minister was marked by
reinventing Britain as the bridge between ‘Atlanticism’ and
‘Europeanism’ through being a faithful ally and good neighbour to the
United States (US) and European Union (EU), his decision to act
unilaterally in the US led invasion of Iraq in 2003 would have far-
reaching consequences for both the New Labour project and British
foreign policy at large.

23. 23
4.2 – Iraq and consequences of intervention
For the British public, Blair’s decision to join the US-led invasion
of Iraq is one of the most ignominious in recent history. The decision,
having been protested by an estimated one million citizens marching
through London (still the largest protest in British history) and one-
hundred and thirty-nine Labour MPs who voted against the war, was
clearly at odds with the expectant role that Britain should play in the
world. There were international repercussions to Blair’s decision to go
to war, too. Buzan and Gonzalez-Peleaz (2005: 31) highlighted how
“the invasion and occupation of Iraq created deep divisions within and
among countries” by damaging the international community through
placing the UN in a precarious position, distancing the US from
Europe, jeopardising EU integration, and conflating the conflict as a
“clash of civilizations”. Blair’s unshakable belief in the moral
righteousness of his decision to become sole partner to the US in the
invasion of Iraq meant a clear UN mandate and wider international
support for the intervention would be a mere adjunct to this alliance.
Hood (2008: 189) identifies that Blair’s decision to pursue the
‘special relationship’ with the US, rather than international security
procedures, undermined three fundamental claims of the Churchillian
model he hoped to revive: That there is an inherent “harmony of
values and interests” between the US and Europe; that the ‘special
relationship’ with the US “qualifies [Britain] to act as a privileged
interlocutor within the Atlantic community”; and lastly, and most

24. 24
importantly to the topic of this paper, the claim that Britain’s “pursuit
of a global role is actively desired by the electorate”. Indeed, this
implicit ignorance/acceptance relationship between political elites and
the British electorate that Hood speaks of was shattered in the
aftermath of Iraq, and had significant ramifications for how
successive governments could and should respond to international
crises. Moreover, the intelligence in which the whole case for
intervention was built – that Saddam Hussein possessed and would
use, when given the chance, weapons of mass destruction (WMD) –
was brought in to question after years of searching uncovered no
evidence to suggest this was the case.
The Chilcot Report of the Iraq Inquiry, finally released on July
6th 2016, seemed to confirm the British public’s scepticism over
Blair’s case for intervention. That no WMDs had been uncovered in
the years of war in Iraq, long before the inquiry’s publication there
seemed a growing consensus that Blair had ‘sexed up’ the findings of
British intelligence services and the Joint Intelligence Committee
(JIC). As Kennedy-Pipe and Vickers (2007: 211) have rightly pointed
out, while Blair himself may have had a firm belief in Iraq’s continued
proliferation of WMDs, public doubts emerged as early as September
2002 with the publication of the ‘Iraq’s Weapons of Mass Destruction’
dossier in which Blair was accused of fabricating “intelligence
information in order to boost his case for war”. Indeed, the Chilcot
Report (2016: 74) corroborated earlier public uncertainties by
confirming “The assessed intelligence had not established beyond

25. 25
doubt that Saddam Hussein had continued to produce chemical and
biological weapons”.
Blair’s beefing up of intelligence assessments leading up to the
invasion of Iraq had perhaps one of the most enduring legacies on
British foreign policy. After public scepticism in the use of secret
intelligence to forward a government’s case for war was proved
correct in the decade since the initial invasion of Iraq, public opinion
on matters of war became a significant variable in successive
government’s abilities to commit British forces to foreign policy
objectives without a wider international mandate. However, though
the material and human costs of Iraq were so heavy, Britain did not
retreat into isolation in its aftermath. In an address to the World
Summit in 2005, Blair commended the introduction of the
‘Responsibility to Protect’ (R2P) that seemed to fit with his continued
impetus on the ‘doctrine of international community’; providing the
basis for liberal humanitarian intervention that would be the focus of
future foreign policy (Ralph, 2014: 11). Indeed, Cameron’s coalition
government would pursue R2P by joining the North Atlantic Treaty
Organisation’s (NATO) military operation in Libya in 2011.
4.3 – Foreign policy under coalition government
Less than a year after the Conservative-led coalition
government was formed, British forces were engaged in military
operations in Libya against the Gaddafi regime in March 2011. In his
analysis of the traditions and ideas shaping Cameron’s foreign policy,

26. 26
Beech (2011) has identified a distinct shift in the classical, national-
interest based conservatism of previous governments. In addressing
historical accounts of influential Conservative Party members, Beech
has highlighted that Cameron has imposed a sense of foreign policy
idealism, stressing the “importance to transcend national self-interest
and to value one’s humanitarian responsibility to the vulnerable
within the international community” (Beech, 2011: 359-60).
Though NATOs intervention in Libya has been criticised for
exceeding the remit of liberal humanitarian intervention, it provided
the first opportunity for Cameron to espouse his new idealism in
foreign policy. Holland and Aaronson’s (2014) study of rhetorical
balancing in the foreign policy objectives of US and UK political elites
in Afghanistan and Libya has demonstrated two key features in
Cameron’s argument. Vitally, in the aftermath of Iraq, Cameron
downplayed regime change as a political goal, while pushing “the
strategic rhetorical balancing of calls to protect civilians with the
language of national interest” (Holland & Aaronson, 2014: 14).
Indeed, Cameron was able to find the justification for intervention in
Libya through the procedural framework provided by the UN and the
multilateral military alliance of NATO. For the first time in history, in
March 2011, the UN proclaimed the establishment of a no-fly zone in
order to protect civilians and populated areas from attack (Morris,
2013: 1271).

27. 27
While Cameron had downplayed regime change as a political
goal, the Gaddafi regime ended with the Libyan leader’s death
nonetheless. Britain’s role in the NATO intervention ultimately raised
questions during a time when “the concept of failed or failing states
and an emphasis on preventative interventions have combined to
create an environment in which wars of choice rather than necessity
are a key feature of security debates” (Dover & Pythian, 2011: 434).
What is striking is that while there was a clear UN mandate for
intervening on humanitarian grounds under R2P auspices, R2P
featured very little in the thinking or official discourse of Cameron’s
government. As Morris (2013: 1273-4) has highlighted, the evidence
provided for and deliberated on the Defence Committee’s inquiry
showed that the concept of R2P was afforded little attention, and
“only made it into the pages of the committee’s final report as an
afterthought”. This inconsistency between the official government
position and how government generally – and Cameron particularly –
view international crises, Britain’s role and the national interest would
have significant consequences on the ongoing crisis in Syria.
4.4 – Syria 2013
UN Secretary General Ban Ki-Moon, on September 16th 2013,
announced that a UN mission to the Ghouta area of Damascus
“concluded that chemical weapons were used on a relatively large
scale…..result[ing] in numerous casualties, particularly among
civilians” (Ban, 2013). In his statement to the United Nations Security

28. 28
Council (UNSC) Ban reminded members that the use of chemical
weapons was a violation of the 1925 Protocol, and called on the
“international community to…..hold the perpetrators accountable and
to ensure that chemical weapons never re-emerge as an instrument
of warfare” (Ban, 2013). However, while there was no confirmation
on the identity of the perpetrators, Prime Minister David Cameron, in
his opening statement to the House of Commons during the August
29th debate on Syria, “Deplores the use of chemical weapons by the
Assad regime, which caused hundreds of deaths and thousands of
injuries of Syrian civilians” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1425). While
ultimately failing to gain the support for his motion against the Assad
regime in Syria, there have been several accounts as to why.
Kaarbo and Kenealy (2015) squarely places the growing power
of parliament and increasing democratisation of foreign affairs as the
deciding factor in Cameron’s defeat. Viewing the vote from the
conventional Westminster model of governance, Kaarbo and Kenealy
(2015: 30) highlight that this particular debate “presents a challenge
to conventional understandings of parliamentary influence in security
policy”. They go on to stress the “UK parliament’s weak reputation in
foreign policy generally, and security policy specifically, and its
tendency when consulted to respond with strong cross-party
consensus in support of [Prime Minister’s] preferences”. Explaining
the 2013 Syria vote encompassed five specific areas of inquiry
regarding parliamentary prerogative: Institutional, legal and

29. 29
constitutional authority; public opinion; coalition government; intra-
party factionalism, and; Prime Ministerial leadership.
In keeping within the scope of this paper, public opinion will be
of particular importance here. Identifying that where Cabinet
Ministers are out of touch with the wider public, Kaarbo and Kenealy
(2015: 32-3) rightly point out that Parliament – sometimes with
ulterior motives in mind running up to elections – can defy the
government’s position by playing to public opinion. Indeed, surveys
reveal that 61% of the public felt parliamentary approval was needed
before the government could involve British forces in overseas
interventions, and on numerous occasions MPs raised the issue of
public opinion in the debate, including Cameron himself; professing
that “the well of public opinion was well and truly poisoned by the
Iraq episode” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1428). Given the salience in
matters of public opinion within the Syria vote in 2013, the next
chapter will address the issue further. Moreover, that following
sections will provide discourse analysis of Cameron’s statements
during the House of Commons debate on tackling Daesh in Syria,
public opinion becomes an important facet in the understanding
political coercion as a tool for garnering support for overseas
interventions.

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Chapter 5
Public opinion, Syria 2013, and Cameron’s ‘war of
words’
The following sections will examine, in context of the
ignominious war in Iraq, how public opinion on foreign policy in
general and security policy in particular has become a prominent
feature of democratic debate. As the previous chapter explained,
recent failures in British foreign policy and numerous, protracted
interventions has had a dramatically negative effect on the propensity
for government to mobilise military methods in achieving global
ambitions. The 2013 Syria debate, in particular, has demonstrated
how historical precedent and public negativity towards recent failures
meant Cameron was unable to successfully implement the rhetorical
tools necessary to persuade parliament to vote in favour of his
government’s motion.
5.1 – Public opinion
In democracies, public opinion is tantamount to a particular
government’s success or failure. Unlike the antonymic totalitarian
regimes, where policy is created and carried out largely without the
necessity of legitimation, democracies must remain sensitive to the
opinions of individuals within the society it operates. It follows then,
as chapter three elucidated, that a particular set of discursively

31. 31
coercive strategies must be employed by political elites to persuade
the wider public into legitimising a particular policy choice.
Public opinion has become an ever-growing obstacle to British
foreign policy with the spectre of Iraq. As Clements (2013: 119)
explains, “the controversy surrounding the invasion and occupation of
Iraq, as well as Britain’s role in multinational operations in
Afghanistan since 2001, has arguably led to a diffuse sense of public
‘fatigue’ with overseas military interventions”, and the further
debilitating dimension of global recession and austerity since 2008
only seems to have exacerbated the situation.
Drury et al. (2010) have examined whether or not public
support for military intervention can best be described as logical,
informed, or, as they term it, ‘prudent’ choice, or whether public
opinion is more easily influenced by the rhetoric employed by political
elites. To situate the work of Drury et al. within the context of this
paper, they highlight that “the more knowledgeable citizens are about
international affairs, the more they should be able to determine if the
policy is one restraining aggression or affecting internal change,
regardless of rhetoric” (Drury et al., 2010: 86). The example
provided in their work could easily be replaced with one reflecting this
paper: having read and heard about the escalating civil war in Syria
prior to the 2013 debate, the British public will be receptive to the
fact that intervention in Syria would not simply entail restraining

32. 32
aggression, but also a great deal of state-building necessitating
internal change in the country.
As a YouGov (2013) article headline proclaimed, ‘Public Opinion
drove Syria Debate’. With the front page of the Sun, the Times, and
featuring in other national papers, YouGov polling findings “showed
the British public opposed the most likely military action – missile
strikes – by a ratio of two to one” (Jordan, 2013). In a statement
following the vote, and reported in the Guardian, the Prime Minister
said “it is clear to me that the British parliament, reflecting the views
of the British people, does not want to see British military action”
(Watt & Hopkins, 2013). Strong (2015: 1123) highlighted that public
and press opposition to military intervention in 2013 was in large part
due to “years of war in Afghanistan and Iraq, and….watching post-
Gaddafi Libya slide into chaos”. An article in the Economist entitled
‘Vote of Shame’ stresses Cameron’s failure to “adequately prepare
the ground for [the August 29th, 2013] debate” and successfully shut
down the ‘war of words’ over the “parallels between what he was
proposing and Tony Blair’s use of the dodgy dossier to take Britain to
war in Iraq” (M. J. S., 2013).
A brief analysis of the 2013 debate on military intervention in
Syria can demonstrate how Cameron’s failure in rhetorically balancing
his case for war contributed to the motion being rejected by
parliament. The analysis will aim to show how Cameron’s inability to
close off oppositional arguments, particularly concerning (supposed)

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similarities with the 2003 invasion and occupation of Iraq, left open
doors for opposition which proved too difficult to close. Following this,
a discourse analysis of the 2015 debate on military intervention in
Syria will be provided in a comparative capacity. What this
comparative analysis will aim to address is how the rhetorical
justification for intervention was formed through primary and
secondary methods. Succinctly, how Cameron ‘closed off’ the
discursive space for rebuttal in 2015 after failing to do so in 2013
through stronger emphasis on the ‘national interest’ and ‘national
security’.
5.2 – Winning (or losing) the ‘war of words’: Syria 2013
Iraq was a prominent feature of the 2013 Syria debate, and on
no fewer than ninety-nine occasions was Iraq referenced in the
context of the debate (Hansard, 2013). More interesting still was
Cameron raising the historical precedent of Iraq immediately
following his opening statement and in the absence of a direct
intervention by other MPs on the matter:
I am deeply mindful of the lessons of previous conflicts and, in
particular, of the deep concerns in the country that were caused
by what went wrong with the Iraq conflict in 2003. However, this
situation is not like Iraq ……The differences with 2003 and the
situation with Iraq go wider…..Back in 2003, the Arab League
was opposed to action; now, it is calling for it. It has issued a
statement holding the Syrian regime fully responsible and asking
the international community to overcome internal disagreements
and to take action against those who committed this crime
(Hansard, 2013: Col. 1427).

34. 34
Following an intervention by Mr Arbuthnot, Cameron further
distanced himself and his partnership with the US President, Barack
Obama, from that of Tony Blair and George W. Bush by highlighting
his determination for consensus building and proper legal procedure:
In drawing up my motion I want to unite as much of the country
and of this House as possible. I think it is right, on these vital
issues of national and international importance, to seek the
greatest possible consensus. That is the right thing for the
Government to do and we will continue to do it. The President of
the United States, Barack Obama, is a man who opposed the
action in Iraq. No one could in any way describe him as a
President who wants to involve America in more wars in the
middle east (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1428).
Cameron further highlights his sensitivity to the public mood on
matters of war and peace, including a reference to his own memory
and sentiment at the time; suggesting he is attune to the scepticism
of parliament and the British public towards national leaders:
because of the damage done to public confidence by Iraq, we
would have to follow a series of incremental steps, including at
the United Nations, to build public confidence and ensure the
maximum possible legitimacy for any action…..I remember 2003.
I was sitting two rows from the back on the Opposition Benches.
It was just after my son had been born and he was not well, but
I was determined to be here. I wanted to listen to the man who
was standing right here and believe everything that he told me.
We are not here to debate those issues today, but one thing is
indisputable: the well of public opinion was well and truly
poisoned by the Iraq episode and we need to understand the
public scepticism (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1428).
Cameron suggests that bringing before the House the motion of
military action in Syria has demonstrated his awareness of public
interest in foreign affairs since Iraq. Stating that “The deep public

35. 35
cynicism imposes particular responsibilities on me as Prime Minister
to try to carry people in the country and people in this House with
me…..That is why I wanted Parliament recalled, and….to bring the
country together, not divide it” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1428). On
numerous other occasions Cameron and other MPs speak about
‘learning lessons’ from the past, and ensuring the best possible
legitimacy of any military involvement in the conflict (Hansard, 2013:
Col. 1439-40, 1443, 1450, 1451, 1454, 1457, 1458, 1460, 1461,
1462, 1463, 1464, 1465, 1466, 1470, 1473, 1474, 1476, 1479,
1480, 1486-7, 1488, 1490, 1504, 1505, 1506, 1513, 1516, 1521,
1522, 1523, 1525, 1527, 1531, 1534, 1536, 1537, 1538, 1543,
1546).
5.2a - Intelligence
Much of the scepticism of MPs and the British public, as has
been noted earlier, pertain to Blair’s use of ‘beefed up’ – even
fabricated – intelligence. Indeed, this is one area in which Cameron
failed to close off the discursive space for oppositional rebuttal.
Where Cameron’s choice of language concerning the (supposed) use
of chemical weapons by the Assad regime might have been better
portrayed in a courtroom style, ‘beyond reasonable doubt’ manner,
instead he accepts that “in the end there is no 100% certainty about
who is responsible….. [and] also no 100% certainty about what path
of action might succeed or fail” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1432). Cameron
attempts to convince parliament into voting for military intervention

36. 36
by expressing the differences between the intelligence surrounding
Iraq and that of Syria:
The case for ultimately supporting action—I say “ultimately”
because there would have to be another vote in this House—is
not based on a specific piece or pieces of intelligence. The fact
that the Syrian Government have, and have used, chemical
weapons is beyond doubt. The fact that the most recent attack
took place is not seriously doubted. The Syrian Government have
said it took place. Even the Iranian President said that it took
place. The evidence that the Syrian regime has used these
weapons, in the early hours of 21 August, is right in front of our
eyes. We have multiple eye-witness accounts of chemical-filled
rockets being used against opposition-controlled areas. We have
thousands of social media reports and at least 95 different
videos—horrific videos—documenting the evidence (Hansard,
2013: Col. 1427)
To support his view that the Assad regime was responsible for the
chemical weapons attack, Cameron organises the structure of this
passage in a persuasive manner. By highlighting the “fact that the
Syrian Government have, and have used, chemical weapons”
previously draws the listener(s) to accept implicitly the assumption
that they were responsible for the specific attack in mind.
Furthermore, Cameron attempts to close off the discursive space of
contestation when addressing the Opposition amendment by
espousing knowledge-based ‘truth claims’. In highlighting that the
amendment fails to qualify the Assad regime as the responsible party,
Cameron claims it to be “at odds with almost everyone across the
world….by NATO, by President Obama and every European and
regional leader [he] has spoken to; by the Governments of Australia,
Canada, Turkey and India….and the whole Arab League” (Hansard,

37. 37
2013: Col. 1429). Particular attention must be drawn to Cameron’s
mention of leaders ‘he’ has spoken to. This could demonstrate an
attempted coercive strategy insofar as the listener is expected to take
what is being said as authoritative and, more fundamentally, truthful.
Cameron draws on the findings of the JIC with emphasis on the
post-Iraq reforms it has undergone:
There is intelligence that Syrian regime forces took precautions
normally associated with chemical weapons use.
Examining all this evidence, together with the available
intelligence, the Joint Intelligence Committee has made its
judgments, and has done so in line with the reforms put in place
after the Iraq war by Sir Robin Butler (Hansard, 2013: Col.
1432).
It is possible that this emphasis is an intelligence-legitimising
technique given the wider context of the ‘dodgy dossier’ in Iraq.
Indeed, rather than dealing in unwavering assurances that was the
case in Iraq, the JIC concludes that “there are no plausible alternative
scenarios to regime responsibility” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1432).
Moreover, the passage containing JIC findings contain some of the
legitimising features mentioned in chapter three; specifically
epistemic and deontic features.
5.2b – Legitimising features
Cameron states that:
I am not standing here and saying that there is some piece or
pieces of intelligence that I have seen, or the JIC has seen, that
the world will not see, that convince me that I am right and
anyone who disagrees with me is wrong. I am saying that this is
a judgment; we all have to reach a judgment about what
happened and who was responsible (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1432).

38. 38
By turning previous JIC findings that the Assad regime has, and has
previously, used chemical weapons, Cameron attempts to persuade
the listener into coming to the same conclusion he has drawn: that
these facts are “enough to conclude that the regime is responsible
and should be held accountable” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1432.) In
doing this, Cameron implicitly suggests that those who make the
judgment that the Assad regime was not responsible for the attack
have made an inherently wrong judgement. Further examples within
the 2013 debate demonstrate epistemic and deontic features; most
notably question/answer pairs.
Question answer pairs provide the author opportunity to stress
both their epistemic rationality and deontic reasonableness. On three
occasions during the 2013 debate does the Prime Minister present
question/answer pairs:
it is also about chemical weapons. It is about a treaty the whole
world agreed to almost 100 years ago, after the horrors of the
first world war. The question before us is this: is Britain a
country that wants to uphold that international taboo against the
use of chemical weapons? My argument is that yes, it should be
that sort of country (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1430).
Then, when pressed on his supposed willingness to become involved
in Syria long before the chemical weapons attack in Damascus,
Cameron responds with:
I am not arguing that we should become more involved in this
conflict. I am not arguing that we should arm the rebels. I am
not making any of those arguments. The question before us—as
a Government, as a House of Commons, as a world—is that
there is the 1925 post-first world war agreement that these

39. 39
weapons are morally reprehensible, so do we want to try to
maintain that law? Put simply, is it in Britain’s national interest to
maintain an international taboo on the use of chemical weapons
on the battlefield? My argument is: yes, it is.
After a lengthy response in which Cameron again cites the 1925
agreement prohibiting the use of chemical weapons, warning “doing
nothing is a choice—it is a choice with consequences”; a choice that
sends a message to Assad an others worldwide that they will be met
with impunity when using chemical weapons (Hansard, 2013: Col.
1434). Cameron continues by highlighting the historical precedent
and Britain’s responsibility to uphold international law, in terms of the
national interest, with another question/answer pair:
The global consensus against the use of chemical weapons will
be fatally unravelled. A 100-year taboo will be breached. People
ask about the British national interest. Is it not in the British
national interest that rules about chemical weapons are upheld?
In my view, of course it is, and that is why I believe we should
not stand idly by (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1435).
Furthermore, in acknowledging a question from Penny Mordaunt MP
(Con), Cameron rephrases her raising the issue of national security in
terms that recognise its importance to the British public in matters of
war:
One of the questions our constituents ask most is where the
British national interest is in all of this. I would argue that a
stable middle east is in the national interest, but there is a
specific national interest relating to the use of chemical weapons
and preventing its escalation (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1437).
And an example where Cameron reframes question/answer pairs to
make him appear more attune to the British public’s mood:

40. 40
I am fully aware of the deep public scepticism and war-weariness
in our country, linked to the difficult economic times people have
had to deal with, and that they are asking why Britain has to do
so much in the world. I totally understand that, and we should
reassure our constituents that this is about chemical weapons,
not intervention or getting involved in another middle eastern
war (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1435-6).
Interestingly, Cameron only explicitly mentions the national interest
in terms of the proposed motion on military intervention against the
Assad regime on three occasions (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1431, 1435,
1437) and only loosely basis these on the premise of upholding an
international agreement and maintaining a stable Middle-East. This is
perhaps one of his major failings.
5.3 - Discussion
As Holland and Aaronson (2014: 2) have rightly pointed out,
“while international support is usually desired, domestic support takes
priority for a number of western (interventionist) states”, and it that
particular moment in time, with the wider political context of Iraq in
mind, Cameron clearly had neither international support (in the form
of a clear UN mandate or NATO coalition) or public support for his
proposed motion. No doubt greatly affected by the memories of Iraq,
as is abundantly clear by its salience within the debate, and in part by
the intervention in Libya under the auspices of R2P that has been
accused of being a guise for regime change, Cameron failed to
rhetorically balance his case for war. Indeed, during and following the
Libya intervention a number of permanent members of the United

41. 41
Nations Security Council (UNSC) expressed doubts over the efficacy
of military intervention for humanitarian ends. Most notably,
Germany and Brazil stressed that intervention on humanitarian
grounds could cause more harm than good, and India raised concerns
over how NATO members supporting humanitarian intervention
interpret ambiguities in the UN authorisation (Morris, 2013: 1272).
Moreover, Russia feared military intervention on humanitarian
grounds could open “the door to more large-scale military
intervention[s]” (Williams & Bellamy, 2012: 279). These earlier
concerns surrounding the conflict in Libya no doubt featured heavily
in the minds of those involved in the House of Commons debate on
Syria in 2013.
We can see the Prime Minister’s proposed intervention as
encompassing the moral idealism of liberal humanitarian intervention.
In his opening statement, Cameron begins by denouncing the use of
chemical weapons on civilians and highlighting the global prohibition
on their use, before insisting that a “strong humanitarian response is
required from the international community” that could use military
force legitimately through “the principle of humanitarian intervention
[to provide] a sound legal basis” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1425-6). In
order to by-pass some of the disagreements within the UNSC,
Cameron also “Notes the failure of the [UNSC] over the last two years
to take united action in response to the Syrian crisis” while assuring
the House that the motion “relates solely to efforts to alleviate
humanitarian suffering….and does not sanction any action in Syria

42. 42
with wider objectives” (Hansard, 2013: Col. 1425-6). The earlier
criticism from UNSC members over the potential for humanitarian
intervention to extend beyond the stated objectives is addressed
implicitly in this last statement.
The similarities between Libya and Syria are palpable. The
fundamental difference is that while Libya and Syria were justified
primarily in terms of humanitarian intervention, the former had a
wider coalition and clear(er) UN mandate. Moreover, the context of
Iraq made any military intervention without a wider consensus, and
absence of clear national security concerns, particularly distasteful to
parliament and the wider British public. Ultimately, Cameron failed to
produce a hegemonic discourse of humanitarian intervention. Holland
and Aaronson’s (2014: 2) view that strategic rhetorical balancing as a
form of coercion in achieving a dominant narrative in foreign policy
discourse necessitates a certain degree of resonance among the
public it seeks to acquiesce. However, “efforts to craft compelling
justifications for intervention are indicative of a more sophisticated
attempt to ensure official narratives win out” (Holland & Aaronson,
2014: 2).
In Cameron’s defeated motion on humanitarian intervention
against the Assad regime there was clearly not the level of
sophistication or wider resonance with the concept that allowed for a
hegemonic discourse. Given that Cameron’s defeat was the first for a
Prime Minister on matters of war since Lord North in 1782, the
following analysis of the 2015 House of Commons debate on Daesh in

43. 43
Syria will demonstrate how Cameron successfully closed the
discursive space for any rebuttal and achieved parliamentary
acquiescence through a strongly coercive discourse.
Chapter 6
The 2015 debate on Daesh in Syria: achieving a
hegemonic discourse
The 2015 debate on Daesh in Syria provided Prime Minister
David Cameron the flexibility to rhetorically balance his case for
British military intervention. In 2013, the crisis in Syria was one
relatively limited to its geopolitical boundaries, with only the
secondary consequence of increasing refugee numbers to European
and Middle-Eastern countries. By 2015, however, in the instability
caused by years of civil war, there emerged a growing threat to
global security; one that would – ostensibly – threaten the way of life
in Britain. After terrorist attacks in France, Tunisia, Canada, the US,
Egypt, Denmark, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Turkey, Kuwait, Belgium, among
many other countries, and all sponsored, inspired, or contributed to
Daesh in some way, Cameron’s government forwarded a motion to
extend pre-existing airstrikes in Iraq across the border to
neighbouring Syria. This chapter will identify some of the rhetorical
devices and coercion strategies present in Cameron’s argument for
military intervention against Daesh in Syria. By focussing on national

44. 44
security as the primary reason for intervening, with humanitarian
relief as a secondary measure, the analysis will hope to show how
Cameron successfully closed the discursive space for any meaningful
objection to his motion.
6.1 – Language of justification
Unlike the Syria debate in 2013, Cameron’s case for military
intervention was more clearly premised on the concept of national
security and protection of British citizens from an outside ‘threat’. The
humanitarian aspect, that was central to intervention in 2013, filled a
secondary position in justifying intervention. Cameron makes his
intended justification clear in the structure of his opening statement
to the House of Commons:
I beg to move,
That this House notes that ISIL poses a direct threat to the
United Kingdom; welcomes United Nations Security Council
Resolution 2249 which determines that ISIL constitutes an
‘unprecedented threat to international peace and security’ and
calls on states to take ‘all necessary measures’ to prevent
terrorist acts by ISIL and to ‘eradicate the safe haven they have
established over significant parts of Iraq and Syria’; further
notes the clear legal basis to defend the UK and our allies in
accordance with the UN Charter; notes that military action
against ISIL is only one component of a broader strategy to
bring peace and stability to Syria; welcomes the renewed
impetus behind the Vienna talks on a ceasefire and political
settlement; welcomes the Government’s continuing commitment
to providing humanitarian support to Syrian refugees; underlines
the importance of planning for post-conflict stabilisation and
reconstruction in Syria (Hansard, 2015: Col. 324).
Clearly, the order in which Cameron orates this statement
places rhetorical justification in, firstly; that ISIL (Islamic State of

45. 45
Iraq and the Levante; referred to previously and from now on as
Daesh) “poses a direct threat to the United Kingdom” and Cameron’s
proposed response has legitimacy through UNSC Resolution 2249,
secondly; that military intervention is one part of a broader strategy
to “bring peace and stability to Syria – including a political
settlement, humanitarian support for refugees, and post-conflict
reconstruction. After closing his formal motion, Cameron moves on to
include a short statement of his own before interventions from
members of the House:
The question before the House today is how we keep the British
people safe from the threat posed by ISIL. Let me be clear from
the outset that this is not about whether we want to fight
terrorism but about how best we do that. I respect that
Governments of all political colours in this country have had to
fight terrorism and have had to take the people with them as
they do so. I respect people who come to a different view from
the Government and from the one that I will set out today, and
those who vote accordingly (Hansard, 2015: Col. 325).
This particular statement is interesting when examining tactics of
rhetorical justification. The second sentence, “that this is not about
whether we want to fight terrorism but how best we do that”, seems
to imply that “we” (the government, the Conservative Party, the
House, Britain) have an imperative to fight terrorism at all times.
Moreover, the term “fight”, when used in reference to terrorism,
clearly has militaristic and violent undertones. Equally appropriate
phrases (tackle, handle, stop, prevent etc.) could have all been used.
By using this language, Cameron immediately subsumes the military
or violence within the discourse. Indeed, he acknowledges that

46. 46
“Governments of all political colours….have had to fight terrorism”
which brings to the fore memories of previous military interventions
against terrorism. Cameron clearly sets out his motion as part of the
same ongoing ‘fight’ against terrorism.
Indeed, the term ‘fight’ in reference to terrorism is used
throughout Cameron’s contributions to the debate on nine separate
occasions (Hansard, 2015: Col. 324, 325, 337). As a first and
fundamental role of government, justifying military intervention with
reference to protecting its citizens is a formidable coercive
mechanism. However, in the absence of a direct attack within Britain,
Cameron deployed some powerful rhetorical devices.
6.2 – Primary justification
Cameron framed his justification for military intervention
against Daesh in terms of national security and keeping British people
safe. While there had been no successful Daesh sponsored or inspired
attack within Britain leading up to the 2015 debate, Cameron reminds
member of the House that:
We face a fundamental threat to our security. ISIL has brutally
murdered British hostages. They have inspired the worst terrorist
attack against British people since 7/7 on the beaches of Tunisia,
and they have plotted atrocities on the streets here at home
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 324).
Following this statement, Cameron provides some information that he
expects listeners to accept as authoritative, highlighting that in the
past year alone British security services have foiled seven separate

47. 47
attacks in Britain (Hansard, 2015: Col. 324). In a later statement,
Cameron links national security imperatives with concepts of
sovereignty and power:
We possess the capabilities to reduce this threat to our security,
and my argument today is that we should not wait any longer
before doing so. We should answer the call from our allies. The
action we propose is legal, necessary and the right thing to do to
keep our country safe. My strong view is that the House should
make it clear that we will take up our responsibilities, rather than
pass them off and put our own national security in the hands of
others (Hansard, 2015: Col. 325).
The first sentence pertains to notions of power – in this case, power
is implicitly assumed as military superiority. Following this, the next
sentence, “We should answer the call from our allies”, implies that
Britain has some specialised and important role to play in taking the
‘fight’ to Daesh; again, this also relates to notions of military power.
The final sentence, and in light of the wider political context of the
then-upcoming referendum on British membership of the EU, the final
sentence suggests that handing over responsibilities involving
national security is a degradation of national sovereignty. Indeed,
sovereignty was a primary focus of the ‘Brexit’ campaign (See
Murray, 2016; Luyendijk, 2016; Foster, 2016; Roff, 2016; Lowry,
2016; Elliot, 2016 for just some examples of how ‘sovereignty’ was
central to the referendum on British membership of the European
Union).
Throughout the debate, Cameron makes direct reference to
‘national security’ three times (Hansard, 2015: Col. 325, 327, 338);

48. 48
to ‘our security’ six times (Hansard, 2015: Col. 324, 325, 327, 328,
331, 339); and to ‘safety’ relating to the British people and/or the
country four times (Hansard, 2015: Col. 324, 325, 335, 339). In
reference to many of the instances above, Cameron uses similar
question/answer, or epistemic/deontic pairings that he had during the
2013 debate; though phrased slightly differently. The following
passage is just one example of how Cameron deployed this particular
device to link concepts of sovereignty with national security and close
off the discursive space for objection within the House:
What are we doing to strengthen our borders? What are we
doing to exchange intelligence information across Europe? What
are we doing to strengthen our intelligence and policing
agencies, which the Chancellor spoke about so much last week?
We should see all of this through the prism of national security.
That is our first duty. When our allies are asking us to act, the
intelligence is there and we have the knowledge that we can
make a difference, I believe that we should act (Hansard, 2015:
Col. 338).
By highlighting some of the important questions that have arisen
during the narrow context of the debate and wider political context of
the EU referendum, Cameron uses questions to bring salience to
those particular issues, while displaying deontic reasonableness in the
course of action he proposes in response.
6.3 – Rhetorical devices
To justify Britain’s involvement in tackling Daesh in Syria,
Cameron includes examples of positive ‘Self’ and negative ‘Other’
representation as a coercive technique to acquiesce potential ‘no’ or

49. 49
‘abstain’ votes. As a concept that has gained much attention since
9/11 and the global ‘war on terror’, the good/evil dichotomy has
become a hegemonic discourse that provides little room for discursive
rebuttal. What Philip Wander has termed ‘prophetic dualism’, the
division of the world into two opposing camps engaged in conflict
“resolved only through the total victory of one side over the other
[and] Since no guarantee exists that good will triumph, there is no
middle ground. Hence, neutrality may be treated as a delusion,
comprise appeasement, and negotiation a call for surrender”
(Wander, 1984: 142).
Krebs and Lobasz (2007: 426) contend that the use of ‘evil’ in
political rhetoric “implies a force that operates almost independent of
human agents…. [and] In a Christian political culture ….the villains of
the moment would be portrayed as the personification of evil”. Taking
this perspective in understanding Cameron’s portrayal of Daesh as
the ‘evil doers’, we can understand the use of the term in coercing
political opposition into following a certain path to military
intervention. As Susan Neiman has argued, in choosing to speak of
acts or actors as ‘evil’ rather than ‘crimes against humanity’ or
‘atrocities’, the author is making a conscious discursive decision that
necessitates a particular type of discourse; in this sense, ‘crimes
against humanity’ implies a response through international legal
procedures, whereas ‘evil’ acts are more indicative of something that
is beyond comprehension and therefore beyond the boundaries of
pre-existing legal procedures (Neiman, 2004: 8-9).

50. 50
Indeed, Cameron’s unique framing of the 2015 debate on
Daesh speaks frequently of the ‘evil’ facing Britain and the world
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 324, 327, 328, 331, 339). Moreover, the
concept of ‘evil’ within a traditionally Christian country (though
largely secular democracy) is given greater attention through the use
of a particular metaphor that is reproduced by other MPs throughout
the debate (Hansard, 2015: Col. 388, 482, 489): Cameron refers to
JIC findings in the aftermath of attacks in Paris, stating that “This was
the head of the snake in Raqqa in action” (Col. 328). In the story of
Adam and Eve, the snake or serpent is indicative of original sin; the
deceptive and malevolent entity that tricks people by promoting
things as good that God had forbidden. In contemporary terms, this
metaphor could be used as producing a certain mental model of that
which is sly, deceptive, cunning or underhanded. In representing
Daesh terrorists this way, Cameron also suggests those who reject
his motion or abstain from the vote to have been tricked by them;
and this has important ramifications when considering a public
statement he made just prior to the 2015 debate.
Cameron’s bad-tasting quip prior to the 2015 debate
encouraging Conservative MPs to give him a majority vote rather
than vote alongside “Jeremy Corbyn and a bunch of terrorist
sympathisers” (Cameron cited in Watt, 2015) aptly fits Wander’s
assessment. On a number of occasions during the debate MPs made
interventions explicitly related to Cameron’s comments (Hansard,
2015: Col. 323, 324, 325, 326, 328, 329, 330, 331-2, 335, 338, 340,

51. 51
351, 373, 384, 391, 395, 435, 442, 459, 483). This is no doubt a
strong coercive method insofar as Cameron could close off opposition
through bounding up those who would wish to vote against military
intervention as being on the same side as those terrorists the motion
pertains to. While it may not have affected greatly the outcome of the
debate, it almost certainly shaped the discursive space through which
any opposition could be forwarded.
Cameron’s comment becomes particularly coercive when placed
back in the context of terrorists (or ‘them’, ‘they’, the ‘Other’) as ‘bad’
vs Britain (or ‘us’, ‘we’, the ‘Self’) as ‘good’. While this is a highly
effective coercive method, it is not exclusive to the same time or
space in which Cameron uses it. As Krebs and Lobasz (2007: 426)
have made clear, the good/evil dichotomy has existed long before the
2015 debate on Daesh in, for example, President Bill Clinton’s
response to the Oaklahoma bombing of 1995 and President George
W. Bush’s grandiose narrative of the ‘war on terror’. However, as
ignominious as the ‘war on terror’ and its infamous discursive
practices were, similar trends in Cameron’s appeal for military
intervention appear to have the same effect of dominance,
legitimation, and coercion.
6.3a – Representational force
While parallels can be drawn between Cameron’s and Bush’s
rhetoric, there are some very unique and effective differences. Due to
the wider context of Iraq and the more specific context of Britain’s

52. 52
future in the EU and relationship between its European neighbours,
Cameron adopts what Mattern (2001: 358) has termed
‘representational force’. While we have covered in some detail
coercion as an optional-delimiting strategy that attempts to leave
little discursive room for rebuttal, representational force, on the other
hand, assaults the psyche in other ways (Mattern, 2001: 359).
Representational force is particularly effective inside security
communities where physical force is not a legitimate form of coercion.
Indeed, in the context of this paper, “representational force may be
fundamental to the process by which we-ness is maintained”
(Mattern, 2001: 360), invented, and reinvented as a form of
coercion. Some examples of Cameron’s statements during the 2015
debate can give salience to the concept: “notes the requests from
France, the US and regional allies for UK military assistance”
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 324), and further; that “We should answer the
call from our allies” (Col. 325), and again; “the importance of
standing by our allies” (Col. 326), and on occasion offers warnings as
to possible consequences of Britain’s hesitancy in joining a military
campaign against Daesh; “That sort of delay endangers the lives of
those fighting Daesh on the ground, and does nothing for a
reputation with our vital allies” (Col. 330).
All of these statements contribute to the concept that
representational force is being used as a form of coercion, by
highlighting Britain’s responsibility within a security community. More
fundamentally, these statements imply that if the House does not

53. 53
vote in favour of the motion put forward by Cameron’s government
Britain’s international standing will be negatively impacted. Indeed,
the culmination of Cameron’s statements to the House, that can be
viewed in terms of representational force, are in the form of a
rhetorical question; that has, at its heart, shared and implicitly
understood knowledge:
The question for us is, do we answer the call of our allies, some
of our closest friends in the world—the French and the
Americans—who want us to join them and Arab partners in this
work, or do we ignore that call? If we ignore that call, think for a
moment what that says about Britain as an ally. Think for a
moment what it says to the countries in the region who will be
asking themselves, “If Britain won’t come to the aid of France,
its neighbour, in these circumstances, just how reliable a
neighbour, a friend and an ally is this country?” (Hansard, 2015:
Col. 337-8).
The final hypothetical posed in this statement is a strongly coercive
mechanism. The suggestion is that if Britain decides against military
intervention against Daesh, for what may be perfectly acceptable or
rational reasons, then it is likely to lose international standing and
credibility.
6.3b – Positive ‘Self’ juxtaposed against the ‘Other’
Indeed, allusions to Britain as a vital actor within security
communities are indicative of positive ‘Self’-representational framing;
and this concept is prevalent throughout Cameron’s statements
during the debate. Identifying that Britain has a key role and
responsibility in defeating the threat posed by Daesh, Cameron uses
statements that juxtapose the ‘uncivilised’ nature of Daesh against

54. 54
the inherent ‘goodness’ of British society. In highlighting that other
nations look to Britain to take a leading role in the world, Cameron
states:
The Turks are taking part in this action and urging us to do the
same. The Saudis are taking part in this action and urging us to
do the same. The Jordanians have taken part in this action and
urge us to do the same. I have in my notes quote after quote
from leader after leader in the Gulf world begging and pleading
with Britain to take part so that we can take the fight to this
death cult that threatens us all so much (Hansard, 2015: Col.
337).
The final sentence of this statement claiming that leaders in the Gulf
world have been “begging and pleading with Britain to take part”
undoubtedly situates Britain as an ‘older brother’ character that
others turn to for help. Further, Cameron emphasises the
humanitarian role Britain plays:
We have played a huge part in Europe as the biggest bilateral
donor. No other European country has given as much as Britain.
We are also going to take 20,000 refugees, with 1,000 arriving
by Christmas (Hansard, 2015: Col. 339).
This is another example of Cameron closing the rhetorical space for
any contestation of his motion. Indeed, he mentions Britain’s
humanitarian work seven times during his statements to the House
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 323, 324, 325, 336, 338, 339). Furthermore, as
a way to effectively endorse military intervention, Cameron presents
the positive effect British military forces are having in Iraq against
Daesh:
we should remember that 15 months ago, facing a threat from
ISIL in Iraq, the House voted 524 to 43 to authorise airstrikes in
Iraq. Since then, our brilliant RAF pilots have helped local forces

55. 55
to halt ISIL’s advance and recover 30% of the territory ISIL had
captured. On Monday, I spoke to the President of Iraq in Paris,
and he expressed his gratitude for the vital work our forces were
doing. Yet, when our planes reach the Syrian border—a border
that ISIL itself does not recognise—we can no longer act to
defend either his country or ours, even though ISIL’s
headquarters are in Raqqa in Syria and it is from there that
many of the plots against our country are formed (Hansard,
2015: Col. 325).
The passage above must be taken as authoritative, and is used to
close the discursive space that may arise when the question is asked
of the contribution British forces can make in Syria when French and
US warplanes are already conducting mission.
Cameron also alludes to why Daesh plot attacks on Britain and
the British people; these passages stem from the classic good/evil
dichotomy. By highlighting Daesh’s willingness to plot terrorist
attacks in terms of ‘because of who we are’, Cameron can absolve
Britain (and the West generally) of any responsibility for past,
present, and future terrorist attacks. As Cameron states explicitly,
“They attack us because of who we are, not because of what we do”
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 329). And later, “They attack us because of who
we are, not because of what we do, and they want to attack us again
and again” (Hansard, 2015: Col. 337). This type of struggle, as
discussed previously, is endless and enduring – one that leaves little
room for negotiation.
Indeed, several other MPs reinforce positive ‘Self’-
representations throughout the debate. Cheryl Gillan (Con) (Hansard,
2015: Col. 380) intervenes with a statement suggestive of Britain’s

56. 56
superior military capabilities having a positive impact on the
situation; Mark Pritchard (Con) (Hansard, 2015: Col. 386) reflects on
Britain’s socialist past, “defending our allies, defending our values,
defending the weak and marginalised”; Nigel Huddleston (Con)
(Hansard, 2015: Col. 417-8) interjects with a comment stating “ that
part of what makes Britain great is the fact that when our friends ask
for help, we deliver”; Jim Shannon (DUP) (Hansard, 2015: Col. 478)
speaks of “this great country – this great democracy, this beacon of
liberty through this House” voting on whether to “join the coalition of
the civilised”; and Ben Howlett (Con) (Hansard, 2015: Col. 481)
reflecting on Britain’s historical leadership in “helping to fight tyranny
and promote democracy and freedom around the world”, juxtaposing
this against Daesh as “the antithesis of everything we hold dear”.
Moreover, Tim Farron (LD) also reflects on the historical precedent for
Britain’s involvement, metaphorically suggesting Britain should “stand
tall in the world….opening its arms to the desperate” (Hansard, 2015:
Col. 382). On many occasions across the political spectrum MPs share
Cameron’s positive ‘Self’-representation as a way of discursively
producing particular mental models of the issue at hand.

57. 57
Chapter 7
Conclusion
After defeat in his motion against the Assad regime in 2013, Cameron
successfully achieved his first – and only – interventionist and
unilateral foreign policy victory as leader of a united Conservative
Government. As the analysis has shown, Cameron crafted a more
convincing and rhetorically balanced narrative of intervention that
closed the discursive space to any significant contestation. Through
portraying the ‘threat’ posed by Daesh as something Britain had to
‘fight’ as a matter of vital ‘national security’, as well as constant
reference to the continued ‘humanitarian’ effort to support Syrian
civilians and refugees, Cameron promoted primary and secondary
justifications for intervention that could only feasibly be opposed in
their scope rather than nature. Moreover, by employing various
strategic linguistic choices he was able to (re)produce various mental
models of representation.
By reinventing the good/evil dichotomy that gained great
prominence following 9/11 and the ‘war on terror’, Cameron
discursively produced a world of inconceivable acts and actors that
could be stopped only through a constant and unforgiving struggle.
This ‘discourse world’ necessitated a very particular set of discourses:
one that encompassed concepts of ‘security communities’ between
and among Western liberal democracies; positive ‘Self’-

58. 58
representations and moral responsibility; and its anachronistic,
negative ‘Otherness’. Cameron’s performative use of language should
not be overstated. By repeatedly suggesting Britain’s global standing
would be diminished should MPs vote against military intervention,
Cameron solidified notions of ‘we-ness’ among Britain’s allies as a
coercive technique aimed to acquiesce any dissidents in his party and
the wider House. Through posing question/answer pairs and
rhetorical questions, Cameron drew upon implicit assumptions to
achieve political goals.
Finally, as the analysis has shown, the wider political context of
the British referendum on membership of the European Union may
have also played a role in Cameron’s rhetorical logic. Through
implicature, Cameron draws on concepts of sovereignty inherent in
not participating in military adventures initiated as a response to the
killing of British citizens. Succinctly, Cameron employed a range of
linguistic techniques in his case for military intervention that had the
desired effect of coercing opposition into acquiescence, therefore
reinforcing existing power structures.

59. 59
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