1. Chapter
CONCLUDING COMMENTS
AND FUTURE OUTLOOK
Jennifer Pomeroy
Department of History and Political Science, York College
of Pennsylvania, York, PA, US
INTRODUCTION
National security policy making is a challenging arena, involving
competing priorities and complex circumstances. It becomes especially
difficult in an increasingly interconnected world that changes at an
accelerating pace. This book provides a comprehensive qualitative assessment
about the national security threats to the United States at present and the years
to come by using President Obama’s final National Security Strategy (NSS) as
a roadmap.
In brief, the book is organized as follows. Chapter 2 offered an overview
of homeland security in the areas of immigration, transnational organized
crime, increasing travel vulnerability, and terrorism inside of the United
States, Chapters 3, 4, 5, and 9 focused on specific nation-state actors of Russia,
China, North Korea, and Iran, respectively. Chapters 6, 7, and 8 investigated,
respectively, the national threats at regional level by including Asia-Pacific,

Corresponding author: Jennifer Pomeroy. Department of History and Political Science, York
College of Pennsylvania. Email: jpomeroy@ycp.edu.

2. Jennifer Pomeroy2
Africa, and CENTCOM that are essential in global peace of the 21st
century.
Chapter 10 and 11 examined non-state actors of terrorism: al Qaeda and ISIS
that are characteristically network-based and information-mobile driven.
Using the instruments of diplomacy, information, military, and economics
(D.I.M.E.) as an overarching theoretical framework, this book is a result of
extensive implementation of the York Intelligence Red Team Model (YIRTM)
which has four instruments presented (Weaver, 2015). The YIRTM model
based off the D.I.M.E. framework with consistent applications of the Federal
Qualitative Secondary Data Case Study Triangulation Model (Federal
Triangulation Model), the trend, pattern, and processes of various national
threats that the U.S. faces today are carefully examined. Several larger themes
and general conclusions emerged and they are noted below.
Chapter 2 presented three leading elements that impact homeland security.
These are (1) that illegal immigration has affected the official diplomatic
policy of the United States; and (2) a lack of information on serialization of
weapon’s owners, illegal weapon sales, and sale of unauthorized materials
have hampered the United States’ efforts fighting against organized crimes
that are transnational in nature. A third element, related to travel safety, is the
U.S. is encountering shortage of TSA staff and lack of more effective
equipment. Concurrently presented are terrorist attacks inside of the homeland
that are increasing in frequency and intensity. Implementation of the YIRTM
which is a derived model looking at how diplomacy, information, military, and
economic instruments, has successfully helped reavelation of how the
adversaries of the United States utlize these instrument weakening hegemony
of this nation on the global stage. Only improved synergy among the four
D.I.M.E. instruments can result more successful efforts to “protect, prevent,
and prepare” for attacks the homeland may encounter for the years to come.
While it is clear that such a wide range of national threats is facing at the
U. S. at present, state actors, regional actors, and non-state actors are serious
challengers of the hegemony of the United States. State actors that were
examined in great details in the earlier chapters can be grouped into two
categories: nuclear-oriented threats (which include Russia, North Korea, and
Iran) and economic/military-oriented threats presented by China. As noted in
chapter 3, Russia’s annexation of the Crimea and other aggressive, muscle
flexing military activities demonstrated through its land grabbing. Russia’s
spills its yearning for a re-emerging role as a regional and global player. It also
suggests that the United States needs to continue to explore other leadership
pathways in stopping Russia’s ambitions. In the case of North Korea (chapter
5), given the country’s constant and erratic military activities, it is thought that

3. Concluding Comments and Future Outlook 3
diplomacy by the US would not be fruitful. Current economic sanctions are
not sufficient. As much more close and better monitoring that should be
carried out, the US also needs to be more militarily ready. In the case of Iran
(chapter 6), a particular problem is the state-sponsorship of terrorist groups
and activities, which certainly establish the country as a regional player in
military actions and physically show this establishment beyond its national
border. Iran’s outreach to other countries using its diplomacy could be more
harmful to the U.S. national security as the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action and the International Atomic Energy Agency has done little to contain
Iran’s nuclear power and military influence within and beyond the Middle East
Region. Additionally, greater collaboration with the international community
should be exercised by the U.S. as well. Possessing nuclear programs and
excessively employing military actions is a common strategy for each of these
three state actors to downgrade the position of the U.S.. Endicott (2013, p. 10)
argues that nuclear force has best ability of defending a country and the
international nuclear balance that is kept by the US’s current nuclear power is
worthy of more thoughts.
Chapter 4 anchored China’s recent economic boom as a powerful
instrument to examine the threat posed to the US’ hegemony at the global
stage. China’s increasingly powerful and sophisticated military capacity and
fast improved cyber capability clearly threats the global role of the U.S.
China’s increasing military presence in the South China Sea and more
frequently detected cyber-attacks are just two examples. It is suggested by
chapter 4 that the US needs to continue to rigorously monitor China’s cyber
activities and military maneuvers in the hotspot of the South China Sea. It is
also concluded that the US should stay constant alert and pay much more
attention to the strength of China domestic economic development and its
impact on China’s ambition.
The Asia-Pacific (chapter 6), Africa (chapter 7), and CENTCOM (chapter
8) regions are important larger geographic theaters that the United States must
pay equal attention to in the forthcoming years. The Trans-Pacific Partnership
(TPP) agreement may become a useful tool for the U.S. to maintain existing
economic partners and recruit new nation-state actors as alliance in the Asia-
Pacific region to counterbalance China’s economic growth. The extension and
expansion of terrorist events in the parts of the African region is partially due
to its geographic proximity to and some specific cultural connections to the
Middle East. Combined with weak state institutions, this region has not been
exercised with steady attention. The authors suggested that the U.S. should
broaden its collaboration and become more inclusive by carrying out more

4. Jennifer Pomeroy4
diplomatic actions and economic development assistance. As what is pointed
out by Hill (2015, p. 83), he suggests to use the Trans-Sahara Counter
Terrorism Partnership organization as an extention of the US anti-terrorism
front. In the CENTCOM region, the U.S. is practicing a low-key military
strategy (Goodson, 2014, p. 33) by providing military assistance programs in
Afghanistan and Pakistan. These actions may not directly help defeat terrorist
attacks, but in a long run it might buy the US extra time to use economic and
diplomatic mechanisms while the military instrument remains strong. It is
suggested that the U.S. should continue its current supportive efforts in the
military instrument as they reduce the capacity of non-state actors and cut
down terrorist group’s activities further destabilizing inside the nations within
this region.
At the core of U.S. national security challenge are the non-state actors,
including al Qaeda and ISIS. Non-state actors like these two organizations are
the key destabilizers of international peace. After in-depth examination of al
Qaeda and ISIS appeared in chapter 10 and 11 respectively, it is clear that
avenues of obtaining funds and transferring them to finance these two major
terrorist organizations are important factors contributing to the distribution of
terrorist attacks threatening safety of more population and in wider geographic
locations. In addition, improvements of use of social media and internet
occurring on a almost daily basis provides safety net for such geographic
distribution. The U.S. needs to increase the intensity of monitoring operations,
fast developing more sophiscated cyber infrastructure to detect signs of
terrorist attacks and trace their operation pathways, and conducting near real-
time analyses. In addition, continuing emphasis on improving our military
capacities must be materialized.
To assess the current national threats of the U.S., information, more
precisely, cyber power must be placed as a top priority as cyber infrastructure
is a repository of data and information that provides advanced capability
linking all stakeholders in different places. As McCarthy and his fellow
scholars conclude that “the cyber infrastructure of the United States is vital in
national defense, the US government, and the global economy” (McCarthy,
Burrow, Dion, & Pacheco et al., 2016, p. 543). Endicott (2013, p. 41) also
stresses that cyberspace technologies should be in “effective use, control, and
restraint” when it comes to national security issues. Some of recent
development in building effective cyber infrastructure includes advances in
automation of military supply and logistics, rapid geo-spatial information
systems among government emergency services, and networking of critical
business services and migrated into Internet protocol and they could help

5. Concluding Comments and Future Outlook 5
improve precision military acts, more effective emergency responses, and
better management of critical business infrastructure. Unfortunately, the
federal government has displayed “irresolute and inconsistent leadership
regarding cyber critical infrastructure protection” (MaLay, 2015, p. 17).
Traditional economic sanctions have proved to be somewhat effective in
curbing adversaries’ activities that pose threats to the U.S.. However, the
effect of such tactic might only be functional when these economic sanctions
are put in place to state actors. When dealing with the challenge from non-state
actors, it becomes more ineffective and inefficent such as al Qaeda and ISIS.
The authors of each of the chapters use past five years as the window of
analyses investigating the national security issues and challenges facing the
U.S., which in some ways limits a longer longitudinal perspective that could
reveal richer and more in-depth insights on the behaviors of state and non-state
actors. The adoptions of the D.I.M.E. theoretical framework may have not
allowed it to cover other factors contributing to complexity of national security
concerns.
RECOMMENDATIONS
State actors including Russia, North Korea and Iran have their national
diplomatic strategies largely shaped by how each state sees the outside world.
These national strategies are practically controlled by one man – the country’s
leader. For example, Vladimir Putin in Russia, Kim Jong-Un in North Korea,
and Hassan Rouhani in Iran. The U.S. must understand, fully understand, those
internal political, economic, and cultural conditions inside of these countries
before using the D.I.M.E. instruments. While each instrument of the D.I.M.E.
that are aligned with the U.S. national security priorities must be weighted in
each specific country or situation, more systematic assessment of holistic
impact of the D.I.M.E. must be equally examined. As what is happening in
anti-terrorism campaign, the central tenet of using military tactics have not
been effective. Conversely, to adversaries of the U.S., military weapons are
possessed to pose the threats in aggressively manner from distance. Regarding
the information instrument, as summarized earlier, some of US-targeted
retaliation by state actors might exhibit a somewhat contradicting approach
from time to time. The U.S. needs to continue to invest and advance its
cyberinfrastucture capability for data collection, mining, and analysis. Often,
the interconnectedness between and among each D.I.M.E. instrument is
overlooked and thus should be explored more. For instance, Phsyical land

6. Jennifer Pomeroy6
grabbing activities are not going to be militarily sustainable in the long run.
State-run media via firewalls, media regulations puts Russia at an unfavorable
position on the international stage is rather effective isolating Putin. Economic
sanctions can increase the US power in resolving these national security issues
when they are posed to state actors; however, they are not effective with non-
state actors and more Muslim-included base fighting alliance against terrorism
needs to be explored. Integrating all four instruments will work out best.
Moreover, a broader context such as a regional approach could be helpful.
However, how to best integrate these interrelated four aspects remain as a
significant challenge as movement of people and fluidity of money.
Non-state actors such as al Qaeda and ISIS share unique characteristics in
the 21st
century which is network-based and mobile-information driven
organizations. These organizations fully recognize the advantages of modern
mass communication media technology and its efficiency reaching wider
geographic places and faster and have best taken advantage of it. The
information instrument, if it can be used globally to the benefits of the U.S.
with more understanding and colloborations with others, particilary Islamic
institutions, can influence the political, military, economic, and social behavior
of people (McLay, 2015, p. 18). Perhaps it is the U.S. that has one of the best
computer technological capabilities with a more sophiscated systematic
monitoring system can provide its matching leadership in the world. Lastly,
the U.S. should exercise what White (2014, p. 11) discusses which is that
establishing a whole-of-Government Campaign Strategy Management
structure and better coordination mechanism for this structure with
multidimensional instruments (Oliveira, 2016, p. 51).
REFERENCES
Clark, Robert M. 2016. Intelligence Analysis: A Target-centric Approach. Los
Angeles: CQ Press.
Cimbala, Stephen J. 2013. Arms for Uncertainty: Nuclear Weapons in US and
Russian Security Policy. New York: Ashgate Publishing.
Endicott, Troy L. A National Defense Fellow’s Debrief for the 2012-2013
Academic Year: Lessons on The Value of a Military Fellowship, North
Korea and Iran’s Nuclear Pursuits, and the Evolving Cyberspace Domain.
Research Paper. John F. Kennedy Schoolof Government Belfer Center for

7. Concluding Comments and Future Outlook 7
Science and International Affairs International Security Program, Harvard
Kennedy School, April 2013.
Goodson, Larry P. (2014). US Policy and Strategy toward Afghanistan after
2014. United States Army War College Press [Accessed on July 12,
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