1. Farley 1
Icy Pathways:
Defining Categories of Frozen Conflict
Dylan Farley
17 December 2014
Professor Pickering
Sources and Remedies of Conflict in Eurasia
2. Farley 2
Dylan Farley
17 December 2014
Professor Pickering
Sources and Remedies of Conflict in Eurasia
Icy Pathways:
Defining Categories of Frozen Conflict
Introduction
Once upon a time there was an impressive, ancient city. It was extremely wealthy and sat
upon the most strategic ground in the region. It was coveted by all of its neighbors, but retained
its independence. Wars had been fought back and forth over it, but still held on to all of its
grandeur and importance. Its two closest neighbors wanted the city for themselves though, so
they raised massive armies to take over the city. The armies stared across the border at each other
and at the magnificent city. This lasted for many years, with anger coursing through the veins of
the armies. Small confrontations would flare up quickly, but receded just as quickly as they
appeared. This lasted for many years and no one knew how to stop the conflict, until 1939 when
one of the armies, called the Wehrmacht, annihilated the Polish Army, took over Danzig, and
started the greatest war ever known to man.
Conflicts have intrigued man from the beginning of time. Throughout history, humans
has readily participated in warfare, studied mythological battles, and dreamed of glorious
battlefield triumphs. From great wars spanning the globe to the smallest clan feuds, man fights to
achieve a variety of goals. Naturally, scholars and historians have analyzed such a pervasive
historical theme for ages, dissecting and examining causes, actions, results, and effects. The
modern world studies conflict intensely, with the masses of government bureaucracy supporting
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research into various conflict types. One of the most important types of conflicts in the modern
world is frozen conflict. Frozen conflicts have never been universally defined. For the clarity of
this paper, the understood definition of a ‘frozen conflict’ is a conflict that does not consistently
cause a high number of deaths, but still lasts an extended period of time with no resolution.
Although by definition not a large military action, frozen conflicts are important because
of how large their geostrategic impact is. They are geostrategically important because they
increase military presence in border regions and also obstruct trade flow and resource
development, which are significant causes of interstate conflicts. Frozen conflicts are typically
applied to the post-Soviet region, stretching from the plains of Eastern Europe to the deserts of
Central Asia. Although other conflicts, such as the simmering conflict in Northern Ireland, can
be termed frozen conflicts, it is the conflicts in the spheres of global powers that are the most
impactful. The smallest of events in frozen conflicts in faraway lands like the Georgian province
of Abkhazia reverberate on the international stage. The length and unpredictable volatility of
these conflicts make these conflicts remarkably dangerous for international politics.
The issue with frozen conflicts is that because they have been applied to such a wide
definition, the causes are not expressly addressed. Instead, it is only the present surface attributes
that scholars and politicians analyze. Breaking down and categorizing frozen conflicts by their
causes would enhance the effectiveness of any efforts to solve the conflicts.
The question of ‘how can the concept of frozen conflict be refined and further
categorized?’ is very pertinent in international security. At present, because there is no universal
definition of frozen conflict, and any discussion on the topic is limited in scope to the post-Soviet
realm. Frozen conflicts should be defined and applied to conflicts across all regions of the world.
There is no reason that similarities cannot be drawn and the same definition used to describe
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conflicts in Africa and Western Europe as have been used to describe conflicts in the Eurasian
border region. This is important because if a similar definition can be used, scholars and
diplomats can find common, successful ways to mediate the conflict. Another significant issue
with the concept of frozen conflicts is that they are grouped into one large category that does not
accurately represent the nature of the conflict. By over-simplifying the roots of conflicts and
grouping them together, they cannot be resolved easily and diplomatic and security mistakes can
be made. If conflicts are studied on a basis of very specific groupings identifying these roots,
they can be more carefully addressed, which would lead to a more successful conflict resolution
or de-escalation. My goal for this research is to develop the subcategories of frozen conflicts by
applying a set of distinguishing variables.
Theoretical Framework
Scholars have innumerable paradigms through which they view conflicts. My research
will draw from theories based on social distance, political elites, and ethno-religious differences.
I will pursue this question through the clash of cultures perspective (Huntington 1996), which
highlights ethno-religious differences. I will explore how ethnic wars benefit involved parties,
seeking to explain why leaders purposefully choose to pursue wars that become frozen conflicts
(King 2010). I will explore social-distance theories in order to gauge the differences felt between
groups. A specific perspective that my research draws from is that the political goals of the
actors involved can affect the severity of a conflict (Lynch 2004). An issue relating to ethnic
conflict is the inherent nationalism of the nation-state, so I will be utilizing the theory that
“irredentism [is] a 'natural' inclination of ethnic nationalism” (Yagcioglu 1996). I will be
combining these theories and perspectives to guide my explanation of the divergent types of
frozen conflict. No scholar has researched frozen conflicts from a perspective that breaks the
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conflicts into categories based off of their attributes. This marks a significant improvement in the
study of frozen conflicts, as it seeks a more specific definition of the categories of frozen
conflicts, which equates to more knowledge on how they can be solved.
Some conflicting theories that I have encountered include ones related to conflict as a
result of propaganda and rhetoric espoused by self-interested political elites, otherwise known as
the cognitive framework model (Oberschall 2000). Scholars may try to point out that certain
conflicts can be better described as instigated from the top down and not bottom up. However,
conflicts such as this are likely to end within a significantly shorter period of time than a frozen
conflict, as well as are much more consistent with a high level of violence. Therefore, such
conflicts cannot be considered frozen conflicts.
Hypotheses
My research question is what explains the types of frozen conflict. My independent
variables are based off cultural conflict theory as well as attributes of involved actors1. The
variables are compiled in order to categorize the types of frozen conflict.
I propose that there are a basic three forms of frozen conflict. These forms are symmetric
conflict, foreign-perpetuated2 wars, and drawn-out independence struggles. They are categorized
off of my variables of goals of actors, military assets, social distance, and duration of conflict.
Symmetric conflicts are those that have very few deaths per annum and are between actors of
relatively equal population and military size. Foreign-perpetuated wars are those where an
outside actor uses either arms deliveries, military force, or both to extend a conflict that
1 An ‘actor’ will throughout the paper indicate both internationally recognized states, de facto
states, and separatist movements.
2 I use the term perpetuate based off the definitions “to make an undesirable situation…continue
indefinitely” and “to preserve something from oblivion or extinction” (Oxford Online
Dictionary).
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otherwise would have been resolved. Drawn-out independence struggles fluctuate between
extended minor flare-ups and periods of few deaths per annum, while maintaining certain
separatist political institutions and paramilitary organizations. These are typically reiterations of
historical conflicts, although only the most current iteration will be explicitly explored in this
research.
I have three independent hypotheses for correlations between variables that can lead to a
conflict being categorized as a specific brand of frozen conflict. Hypothesis 1: Symmetric
conflicts are caused by nationalistic goals for actors, relatively equal military capabilities, ethno-
social distance3, and last for a medium length amount of time compared to other frozen conflicts.
Hypothesis 2: Conflicts propped up by an outside state show signs of impassioned separatists
with the support state having a goal of maintaining instability, a totally unequal military before
the support of the outside state, and last for the shortest time. Hypothesis 3: Continual
independence struggles are caused by political desires for some degree of political autonomy, an
asymmetric military struggle typically involving some level of insurgency, ethno-social mixing
but not friendly, and last for the longest time.
Table 1 Here
Symmetric conflicts can often be extremely noticeable, as no matter if they are between
two states or a state and a de facto state, because the conflicts are between such evenly matched
participants in terms of military size and materiel available. I link symmetric conflicts with
nationalistic goals because the actors involved incur significant risk by being at odds with an
equal strength enemy. Because of this high stakes, they are involved for a particularly important
reason, normally related back to some form of nationalism. They have nationalistic goals
3 ‘Ethno-social distance’ indicates how comfortable different ethnic groups feel socially around
other ethnic groups. If groups are ‘distant’ then they do not feel comfortable around each other.
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because the governments view pursuit of such goals as increasing the power of the state
somehow. Therefore, when actors participate in symmetric frozen conflicts I propose that they
will have nationalistic goals. In addition to nationalistic goals and equal military strength, I
suggest that there is ethno-social distance present in the populations engaged in the conflict. This
is because in order for a prolonged stalemate to not be resolved from a grassroots level, there is
likely some sort of an ‘otherization’4 of the enemy population. Although the actors are very
balanced, these conflicts would last only for a medium amount of time because the goals are so
difficult to achieve in a world system that has overarching bodies designed to protect
sovereignty, negating many nationalistic goals.
Foreign-perpetuated conflicts do not necessarily mean conflicts where international
actors have no vested interests or even involve actors that they are not nominally allied with or
have trade deals with. Rather, a foreign-perpetuated conflict is a conflict that would be quickly
resolved in the absence of overwhelming financial and resource backing of the weaker actor, as
well as some form of extraordinary military contribution, oftentimes in the form of committing
troops. These are identifiable because with the original two actors, the conflict was completely
asymmetric but with the third actor the conflict reaches equilibrium, freezing it. The weak
original actor has set goals of maintaining instability in an effort to sustain its struggle and not be
crushed, whereas the sovereign state openly desires to crush the separatists. The third actor,
normally a regional power, seeks to maintain instability in the region, therefore does not want the
conflict to end in favor of either side. Another aspect of these conflicts is that on the individual
level there is little ethno-social distance and oftentimes integration, usually because of historical
economic ties. These conflicts typically last for the shortest amount of time because there is no
4 ‘Otherization’ means some form of negative portrayal of outsiders, leading to dehumanization
and a view of those people as a block enemy group instead of as individuals.
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overwhelming grassroots support that allows the conflict to be prolonged, due to the ethno-social
integration.
Continual independence struggles are those conflicts that are remarkably persistent, with
a noted difficulty in pinpointing the origins of the conflict. A significant factor in this type of
conflict is that it is an asymmetric conflict, with ‘actor A’ (typically a state) has remarkably more
men and resources at its disposal than ‘actor B’ (typically a non-state actor seeking
independence). Because of the goals of the independence seeking ‘actor B’, which is by
definition independence, ‘actor B’ will not submit and will instead prolong their struggle. The
independence seeking ‘actor B’ has its set goals of independence but has a difficult time
achieving that in the face of a much stronger ‘actor A’. Therefore, ‘actor B’ views its best option
for achieving its goals as some form of insurgency, in order to grind down ‘actor A’. For this
reason, continual independence struggles last for the longest time of any kind of frozen conflict.
This independence campaign mirrors other independence conflicts, but the distinguishing factor
is the sheer duration and low-level of conflict. The last factor in this type of frozen conflict is the
medium level of social distance between groups. There is often some level of inter-group
integration due to existing governmental structures and proximity of culture within the same
borders. This relates to the conflict because the conflict is not an over-arching grassroots
campaign by either side, but rather just a simmering level of violence between hardline activists
on each side. If there was significant ethno-social distance, a grassroots campaign would be
significantly enhanced with more recruits and would lead to greater violence, making the conflict
no longer frozen.
In order to answer my question, I will be exploring several variables concerning the
attributes and roots of frozen conflicts. My independent variables are the goals of ethno-political
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actors, military assets, ethnic social distance, and duration of conflict. The goals of ethno-
political actors can be classified as either seeking a degree of autonomy, irredentism and other
forms of nationalism, or causing instability. Military assets can be operationalized through
compiling data on annual budgets and size of land forces. The ethnic social distance explains to
what degree ethno-national groups engage in civil relations with each other. Duration of conflict
denotes the length of a conflict, specifically the most recent iterations in habitual struggles.
Table 2 Here
The data sources I will be using are mostly web-based databases. For goals of actors, I
will be using official documentation5 that explicitly outlines goals. In some cases, actors will
choose to save face and not admit to their plans, so in these cases I will borrow the analytics of
scholars as to why actors are pursuing specific policies. My data for military assets will come
from various armed conflict databases, which has many extra components, such as religious
cleavages, in addition to the ones that I am looking at. In addition, certain authors such as
Charles King have compiled such data already (King 2010). In order to determine social
distance, I will use the minorities at risk site to gauge the relationship between the competing
ethnic groups. I may have to quantify variables here, as there is no given scale for severity of
ethnic tension. If a case is not listed on that site, I will use the World Value Survey to determine
if citizens are comfortable having members of a different race or religion (depending on the case)
as neighbors. For duration of conflict, it will be operationalized in terms of years and the
definition will be the most recent iteration of the conflict. For example, the recent struggles in
5 ‘Official documentation’ includes separatist publications, such as manifestos and group
constitutions, as well as government documents like executive orders and laws. These can
readily be found online in databases.
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Nagorno-Karabakh will be focused on instead of the depiction of historic Armenian-Muslim
tension.
My own quantifications of variables will be military capabilities and also social distance.
I will research size of the land forces as well as national military budget. Codified, it would be a
representation of the difference in capabilities. A representative number from one to three will be
determined for each conflict, with one indicating a balanced set of forces, two representing a
slight weight in favor of the sovereign state, and three representing an entirely asymmetric
conflict. For social distance, a similar one to five scale will be used. Based off factors such as
degree of religious and ethnic differences, a number will be determined, with one representing
little difference and five representing severe splits. The goals of actors will be coded as five for
aggression or independence, four for irredentism or revanchism, three for sovereignty, two for
disruption, and one for other. The duration of the conflicts will be coded as one for under 20
years, two for between 20 to 30 years, three for 30 to 40 years, four for 40 to 50 years, and five
for over 50 years.
Case Criteria and Data Selection
I will try to discern correlations between several different independent variables and my
dependent variable. I will do an in depth discussion of three distinct cases, one per category of
conflict. For symmetric conflicts I will explore the Nagorno-Karabakh struggle between ethnic
Armenians and ethnic Azeris over a disputed border region. I will research the case of Russia
supporting South Ossetia within the metropolitan territory of Georgia for a case of foreign-
perpetuated wars. Within drawn-out independence struggles I will research the most recent
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period of Uighur unrest in western China6. This is the diverse technique of case-selection, as it
highlights “the full range of variation” using “factor analysis” of my variables in order to “denote
categorical values” (Gerring 89).
The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict originates from ethnic disputes between Azerbaijan and
Armenia over Nagorno-Karabakh. Nagorno-Karabakh is an autonomous region of Azerbaijan
that is populated by ethnic Armenians. Azeris are culturally Shia Muslims and are related to
Iranians, whereas the Armenians are Christians with unknown roots, but are generally recognized
as an independent culture group. Both groups had their own national republic within the Soviet
Union, and each became independent during the breakup. During Soviet rule, the Armenian
populated area of Nagorno-Karabakh was allocated to Azerbaijan. Armenians heavily contested
this issue throughout Soviet times, but independence allowed a significant flare up due to the
increased powers of the actors involved. Armenians kept pressing the issue and in 1988 invaded
Azerbaijan, commencing the struggle. This case is a good example of symmetric struggles
because of the relative similarity between both sides (Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic being on the ‘Armenian side’) in terms of not only strength, but also in overall goals.
Both Armenia and Azerbaijan display emotionally charged nationalism in an attempt to defend
their ethnic kin, which they both define as including Nagorno-Karabakh.
South Ossetia is a good example for a foreign-perpetuated conflict because the Republic
of South Ossetia has been clearly sustained by Russia past a point that it could not have
maintained on its own. South Ossetia is a region of Georgia on the Russian border, which
declared independence from Georgia in 1990, just after Georgia had declared independence from
the Soviet Union. Open fighting occurred in the open 1990s, with South Ossetia retaining de
6 Uighur may be spelled in sources as Uyghur. Additionally, China’s western regions may be
referred to as Sinkiang or Xinjiang in Chinese sources, or East Turkestan in Uighur sources.
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facto independence, although the Georgians controlled some areas. Georgia tried to decisively
defeat the separatists in 2008, but Russia in turn invaded Georgia, giving South Ossetia back the
little territory that the Georgians had controlled. Georgia and South Ossetians are both Orthodox
Christians, but are very distinct ethnic groups. Because South Ossetia is such a small region
without a lot of resources, it would have been able to maintain a low-level conflict for only a
short amount of time in the face of considerable pressure from the Georgian government.
However, Russia’s material support and eventual intervention in 2008 effectively prolonged the
conflict. This key factor makes it a prime choice for a case of a foreign-perpetuated conflict.
Uighur nationalism in China’s western border regions is a good example for continual
independence movement because it has been such a low violence conflict for a considerable
amount of time. Uighurs are a Muslim Turkic peoples that live in China’s province of Sinkiang,
which is experiencing an aggressive increase in its Han Chinese population, at the expense of the
Uighurs. The Uighurs have tried to overcome this through a series of independence seeking
movements for the past fifty years, under the umbrella terms of East Turkestan independence
movement. There is also increasingly violent Islamist activity in the area, the most recent
development being the East Turkestan Islamic Movement, which is nominally allied with al
Qaeda. Because the Uighurs have constantly shifted their independence movement while still
maintaining the same goal over an extended period of time, they make a good base selection for
a continual independence movement.
My data comes from a variety of sources and most of these are already quantified. In
order to determine the goals of the actors involved in each conflict, I will do web-based research
on stated goals. All political movements espouse certain beliefs and clearly state their goals in
order to reach certain populations and clarify their intentions. This can be found through
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memorandums, laws, and group constitutions. Even for non-state actors that may not have
political institutions set up, they still release manifestos or at least preach certain views. All of
this information can be found through the internet, mostly on official websites for states and
other actors. For actors who do not have official websites, there are still web-based accounts of
clearly defined goals.
To determine the relative military strength of involved parties, I will use several sources
that compile statistics on size of the armed forces, which will include personnel in all branches of
service. My first set of data on armed forces size comes from Charles King’s research in the
book Extreme Politics. He has information on the military size of Azerbaijan, Nagorno-
Karabakh, and Georgia in Table 6.1 on page 111 (King 2010). My next source for data comes
from a web-based statistics source called NationMaster. This site compiles significant data on all
military variables in states. I will use the information from this site to get information on
Armenia and China. South Ossetia is difficult to get proper information on, because of its
geographical and political isolation. However, by using a Russian language news source called
Lenta, I was able to find a solid estimate of South Ossetia’s military size. For the military
strength of Uighur separatists no accurate estimates of size exist, so I will instead show the
dichotomy of power base in terms of the sheer size of the Chinese military.
My data sources for ethno-social distance are the World Values Survey and the
Minorities at Risk Database. The Minorities at Risk site is a university research project that gives
an in depth explanation of the risk that minorities risk in given states. I will use the ‘Risk
Assessment’ section of this site to get information on the status of Armenians in Azerbaijan and
the status of Ossetians in Georgia. Because there is no quantification of the analysis, I will use a
scale of one to five to determine the severity of the ethno-social distance based off of the site’s
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analysis. For the Uighur case, I will use the World Values Survey question of “would not like to
have as neighbors: people of a different religion” to find out the ethno-social distance between
Buddhist and other traditional religion Chinese and Muslim Uighurs. I would again have to
quantify this myself on the same one to five scale.
To determine how long conflicts last, I will use web-based historical accounts. These are
an efficient and accurate source, because it is easy to document when conflicts started or when
separatist groups formed. These data sources can be found through repudiated news channels as
well as databases. Because there is little variability in a conflict start date, this method will be
non-cumbersome. I will only address the most recent spate of conflicts when I mark a start date.
For example, although ethnic Iranians and Armenians have had numerous cultural clashes for
millennia, I will only address the modern manifestation of the specific conflict between the
Armenians and Azeris.
Most limits to my data generally relate to the size of the project. Given the limited scope
of the research, the data also is curtailed as a result. For example, for military strength I defaulted
to using size of the armed forces to denote strength. However there are many other components
to military strength, such as equipment available and defense expenditure. Ideally I would have
been able to group this data together and get a rough estimate of total military strength, instead of
just categorizing the actors by the size of their armed forces. Further, issues with reliability of
information plagues regions with separatist governments, as accurate numbers are hard to attain.
Social scientists are therefore forced to use alternative sources, such as my use of the Russian
newspaper Lenta. With the Uighurs, no data even existed about their size, so I had to
demonstrate the same differences through other comparisons.
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Other data issues that could present themselves are the natural biases in sources. When
using documents that espouse goals and ideology, researchers need to be cognizant of any
rhetoric being used that does not reflect the actual situation of the group. Governments may
claim to adhere to a strict code, but all of their legislation actually goes against that. In other
cases like the historical annals of a conflict, some biased groups may try to frame the conflict in
a certain way such as describing it as starting earlier or later than it actually did. By using
primary sources, there is an inherent risk of these biases. Social scientists can overcome this by
weeding out biased sources and double-checking their information. For my research specifically,
I will have to ensure that I am not using sources with politically charged rhetoric and only using
peer reviewed sources. My best sources are definitely my scholarly databases, as their
information is both accurate and peer reviewed.
In my ideal project, all of the information would be able to be garnered through scholarly
databases. They are the most accurate sources and also operationalize data sets most efficiently
for use by researchers. Currently, my ethno-social distance scale and some of my armed forces
strength variables come from these sorts of sources. However, I did have to quantify ethno-social
distance. A more optimal source would be a dataset that already has this quantified. I also would
ideally have access to data sources that have accurate numbers on military strength of both states
as well as the non-state actors that I am studying. The ideal source for the goals of actors would
be a database that catalogs these goals. These would not necessarily be constantly changing
political motivations, but rather overarching political goals. A typical example might read
‘Actor: South Ossetia, Goal: Independence’. For a historical demarcation of a conflict starting
point, the ideal source would be charts compiling conflict start dates.
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Findings
My findings yielded solid results for all cases and variables. After coding the variables
and comparing them, the results supported most of my hypotheses, although not completely for
certain individual cases. The various coding and combinations not expressly dictated in Tables
within the paper can be found in the appendix at the end of the paper. The Tables listed there are
Table 4.1 – Codebook, Table 4.2 – Combined Military Strength Codebook Annex, Table 5.1 –
Coded Actor Variables, and Table 5.2 – Compressed Conflict Variables.
Table 3 Here
For the case of the symmetric frozen conflict in the Nagorno-Karabakh region of
Azerbaijan, my hypothesis was accurately represented. I had projected that the goals of the actors
to be nationalistic, with Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh seeking some form of unification and
Azerbaijan simply trying to maintain sovereignty over the region. My research showed that
Azerbaijan did indeed fully intend on the full reintegration of Nagorno-Karabakh as part of
Azerbaijan. I based this off the President of Azerbaijan’s website clearly stating that the conflict
would be resolved “in favor of the citizens of the multinational Azerbaijan”, with the
multinational Azerbaijan phrase meaning that Azerbaijan wanted to retain Nagorno-Karabakh
and its Armenian population (Official Website of President of Azerbaijan Republic). The
Nagorno-Karabakh Republic views itself as independent at least from a de facto standpoint. It is
appealing for more legal independence and international recognition currently, as demonstrated
by its call of the United States government to “formally recognize the right of its people to live
free of external threats and be masters of [their] own destiny” (Office of the Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic in USA). I determined that Armenia in turn was clearly supporting Nagorno-Karabakh’s
independence, with phrases expressing that Armenia “will stand by” Nagorno-Karabakh being
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published on Armenian government websites (“Armenia Stands By Nagorno-Karabakh
Republic”). However, I found no evidence that Armenian government policy was to annex
Nagorno-Karabakh, which does not fully support my hypothesis, but still explains why Armenia
remains embroiled in the conflict. One explanation for this is that Armenia would incur the wrath
of the international community if it annexed the land of an internationally recognized state. By
supporting Nagorno-Karabakh and perhaps waiting to make more politically refined expansionist
moves, such as annexing it after Nagorno-Karabakh gains independence, it would still achieve
irredentist goals but not necessarily become international pariahs.
Using my various data sources, I found the armed forces of the two sides7 of the conflict
to be relatively even. Armenia has a military force of about 42,000 personnel, and the Nagorno-
Karabakh Republic has between 15,000 to 20,000 personnel (NationMaster; King 2010). Added
together, this is between 57,000 and 62,000 personnel. Azerbaijan on the other side has 66,740
personnel (King 2010). This makes the military forces relatively equal, fitting in with my
hypothesis.
I used the Minorities at Risk site to determine the ethno-social distance between ethnic
Armenians and ethnic Azeris in Azerbaijan. The site explains that “Armenians in Azerbaijan are
at a high risk of conflict”, which I coded as significant ethno-social distance (Minorities at Risk).
I coded it this way because it shows that the conflict is not just military based, but also ethnically
based. Because of the high risk, I coded the distance as high. This matched up well with my
hypothesis, as I had projected high social distance as adding to the conflict.
For the historical records, I determined the start of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict to be
1988, meaning that the conflict is roughly 26 years old. Although this is clearly a long-lasting
7 One side being Armenia and the Nagorno-Karabakh Republic and the other side being
Azerbaijan.
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conflict, within the context of frozen conflicts, which are all very long, this is a medium-length
frozen conflict. This connects back to my hypothesis, as I had predicted that the symmetric
conflicts would show a medium duration. Overall, the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict matched up
consistently with my hypothesis of symmetric frozen conflicts.
The South Ossetia conflict, categorized by me as a foreign-perpetuated frozen conflict,
mostly held up my hypothesis but there were some minor discrepancies. For official
documentation of actor goals, Georgian government publications clearly stated their goal to be
the “peaceful reintegration” of South Ossetia into Georgia (State Strategies on Occupied
Territories: Engagement Through Cooperation). I coded this goal as sovereignty, as Georgia
desires South Ossetia to remain part of its territory. On the other hand, South Ossetia’s
constitution clearly declares a “sovereign government”, indicating its intentions of independence
(Constitution of the Republic of South Ossetia). This matches up with my prediction of a
struggle based between a state trying to retain its sovereignty and another actor seeking its own
independence.
Georgia’s forces are clearly superior to the forces of South Ossetia. Georgia has 21,150
military personnel, which is not a large by global standards (King 2010). However, compared
with the 3,000 personnel in the South Ossetian armed forces, this is quite a significant advantage
(“Alignment of Forces”). This is over a seven-to-one advantage for the Georgians, so I coded the
contrast as very different. I expected this large gulf to exist because with such a disparity, the
Georgians should have easily won. However, because the Russians intervened, the Georgians
were not able to end the conflict quickly, which ended up freezing it.
I once again turned to the Minorities at Risk site to determine the ethno-social distance
between Ossetians and Georgians in Georgia. The site explained that “most of the good-will that
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had built-up between the two sides…was seriously damaged” due to recent events (Minorities at
Risk). I coded this as medium ethno-social distance because there were clear pre-existing inter-
communal ties present throughout the society as a whole, but those ties were not overwhelming
due to recent flare-ups and likely also due to political rhetoric. The key factor though is that good
will was present and social memory aligned itself with inter-communal ties and cooperation.
This matched up well with my hypothesis, because I projected that the middle level of ethno-
social distance contributed to the conflict not being resolved decisively by either side, due to
pressures from the people and a lack of support for political elites.
To determine the length of the conflict, I used a news article from an unaligned Turkish
news source program called Today’s Zaman, which lends it credibility because it is more fact
based than popular media based. The site describes the conflict as starting in 1989, making it 25
years old (Kanbolat 2008). In the context of frozen conflicts, this length is coded as medium
length. This did not match up with my projection of a short-term conflict. The reason that the
results differed likely stem from the fact that the political elites of South Ossetia see
independence as in their best interests, due to perceived wrongs by the Georgian government.
This is interesting, because the conflict is by no means an overwhelmingly popular conflict, and
mostly just inconveniences the local population by disrupting trade and travel. It is therefore
likely that solely the South Ossetian government or maybe even the meddling Russian
government that is maintaining the conflict on the separatist side.
The data for the Uighur conflict in China held up my hypothesis for continual
independence struggles. To determine the general goals of the Uighur separatists, I used the
World Uighur Congress website. The website explained the reasons that the Uighurs should be
independent, saying that the modern Uighurs are “carrying on resistance” against the Chinese
20. Farley 20
(“Brief History of East Turkestan”). Therefore, I coded this as the independence variable.
Chinese National Minorities Policy dictates that all ethnic groups are equal and that “unity
among ethnic groups” is the primary doctrine to solve conflict (“National Minorities Policy and
Its Practice in China”). Although not explicitly stating that China intends to retain sovereignty
over the Uighurs, it clearly implied as such, so I coded this variable as proclaimed Chinese
sovereignty. This matched up exactly with my projections.
The Chinese armed forces have somewhere around 2.88 million personnel. This is an
extremely large military, but makes sense due to the size of the population and also geographic
expanse of the country. Unfortunately, no accurate data exists for the size of Uighur military
forces. There are many reasons for this. First, the Chinese government is very strict with
information, so any information would be difficult to obtain. Second, the conflict and region is so
remote, many people are not studying it, as it is viewed as with secondary importance. The most
significant reason however, is that the Uighurs are unable to maintain any large standing armed
forces, because their style of warfare has not moved from the terrorism to insurgency phase.
Therefore, they really do not have a military to quantify. For their implication in this research,
their military force is best quantified as negligible. Compared with China’s gigantic military
though, this can be used in this paper because it shows how severely understrength the Uighurs
are in the face of the entire Chinese military. This followed my hypothesis that there was going
to be significant military strength differences between actors in a continual independence frozen
conflict.
To determine the ethno-social distance of Uighurs within Chinese society, I decided that
the best way to figure out such a difficult variable in a difficult region was to use the World
Values Database question of how comfortable the majority population was with living with
21. Farley 21
people of another religion. In China, Uighurs and other Turkic minorities are associated with
Islam, whereas the rest of Chinese society follows Buddhism and Chinese traditional religions.
Using the database, I inputted China and the question “would not like to have as neighbors:
people of a different religion” (World Values Database). The data showed that only 9.2% of
those surveyed would not want people of a different religion as their neighbor, whereas 90.8% of
those surveyed did not mention any qualms. I quantified this as little ethno-social distance
between ethnic Chinese and Uighurs. Although this is a very imprecise measurement, it still
holds validity because Chinese associate Muslims with the Turkic peoples on its western borders,
including the Uighurs. A more ideal source would have asked a more direct question about
Uighurs, which would have alleviated some of the discrepancies that may present themselves.
My projection of little ethno-social distance holds up with this case.
By using an American University research project that catalogued the history of the
Uighur unrest, I determined the most accurate start date to be 1954. The site explained that “the
first major incident of resistance [against the Chinese] occurred in 1954 (“Uyghur Separatist
Conflict in Western China”). This would make the conflict continuous in some form or another
for 60 years. This puts the conflict in my highest range of conflict length, indicating how long it
is even compared with other frozen conflicts. This followed my hypothesis, where I had
projected continual independence movements to last a significantly long time.
Several scholarly works complement my explanations well. The most significant one is
the suggested reasons that groups pursue a long term, low intensity conflict. All of my cases
indicated significant nationalistic motivation by one side of the conflict, and a desire to return to
full sovereignty by the other side. This falls in line with theories about natural nationalism, such
as Yagcioglu’s discussed earlier in the paper. If nationalism, whether demonstrated by seeking
22. Farley 22
independence, irredentism, or keeping a strong state, is the most important thing to an actor, then
these goals will inevitably prolong a conflict due to their importance in national myth and
politics. Further, actors who have a significant disadvantage view their survival as connected to
slowly wearing down the enemy by sheer time.
My paper also support’s Huntington’s theories about cultural clash between distinct
civilization types. It is interesting to note that although each of these conflicts were between
distinct ethnic groups, the one with a similar religious base (the Orthodox people in Georgia and
South Ossetia) had a low amount of ethno-social distance which has only started to increase
recently. But two states that have significant ethno-social distance, Armenia and Azerbaijan, are
distinct in their ethnicity and religion. These show both sides of Huntington’s spectrum of
connected cultures and distinct cultures. However, Huntington’s theory is not supported by the
Uighur-Chinese conflict, as they are very distinct but given my calculations do not have
significant ethno-social distance.
Some alternative explanations exist for some of my findings. As discussed earlier, the
cognitive framework model discussed by scholars such as Oberschall is sometimes used to
describe conflict between actors with little ethno-social distance. With the Uighur-Chinese
example, this can be alternatively explained as nationalistic because no stable set of elites exists
to organize the Uighurs against the Chinese. Instead, the movement is much more grassroots
based. To explain why the conflict is continued although the ethno-social distance does not
appear to be significant, I suggest that the Uighurs do not view the conflict as an ethnic conflict
against the Chinese people, but rather against the Chinese government. This distinction is
important because it explains why the Uighur separatists use targeted terrorist tactics instead of
just widespread random killings of Chinese in the western provinces. Part of the reason that no
23. Farley 23
organized leadership can take root and lead the Uighurs is because of the intense pressure from
the Chinese government. A small way to represent this is the sheer size of the Chinese military,
which I catalogued earlier as 2.88 million. As discussed earlier, this is remarkably larger than
any force the Uighurs could field, but also implies that there are significant Chinese resources to
counter any Uighur rebels. This would certainly curtail any higher organizational structure for
independence-seeking Uighurs in China.
Implications
My findings offer some interesting conclusions for international security scholars and
policy makers, especially in terms of the sources of conflict in Eurasia. The most important
overall contribution is the cataloging of the distinct types of frozen conflict and the attributes
attached to them, represented through the variables. With the clear charts describing the
attributes of the types of frozen conflicts and their comparative relationships, scholars and policy
makers are better able to address the conflict. Knowing that they are different, they can make
distinct protocols for how to engage actors in frozen conflict zones and remedy these conflicts.
An important thing for scholars to take away from this paper is that holistic approaches to
issues better describe the problem. Granted, these are significantly harder to undertake, but their
results are drastically more worthwhile. My study is decidedly small, but it does demonstrate a
good precedent for theoretical approaches to research. Our modern scholarly base has used
specific targeted paradigms to view conflict, instead of being open to wide-reaching
explanations. This does not necessarily mean to not pick to an initial theoretical framework and
base research work off of that, but rather it means to try to pick out the most sensible
explanations and combine them, in order to make correlations that make sense in practice instead
of just in theory. Conflicts are such a complex topic to study because of all of the aspects
24. Farley 24
involved. Addressing them or studying them through a single framework therefore does not
make sense. The most logical way to study conflicts, especially extremely intricate frozen
conflicts, is through holistic theoretical perspectives, incorporating a series of important
variables.
My research could be expanded upon by adding other variables to my study on the
attributes of the different categories of frozen conflicts. Some variables that I would like to add
are deaths per annum (to show severity) and the number of times that conflict became ‘hot’.
These would help me show how different conflicts are perhaps more dangerous than others given
the other variables such as actor goals and ethno-social distance. I would also add a column to
explore the specific ethnic differences, categorizing them based on Huntington’s nine world
civilizations and their inherent relations (Huntington 1996). This would seek to explain the
severity of the tensions and how that relates to conflicts. I would also like to compare other
frozen conflicts and apply them to my categories to see how they stand up to my definitions. For
example, I would potentially compare Transnistria and maybe even Abkhazia to South Ossetia as
foreign-perpetuated conflicts. Another interesting aspect would be to code Russia’s role in the
South Ossetia conflict and analyze its effects on that conflict. These are significant opportunities
for additional research, as they would further clarify my results and make my definitions even
more applicable across a wide breadth of conflicts.
The research in this paper would be significantly improved with better data sources and
information on hard to reach conflicts, such as the Uighur-Chinese struggle. I found the lack of
information for certain variables, such as ethno-social distance, as particularly frustrating
because of the difficulty in quantifying the variables. I particularly desired to have a better
explanation and clarification of the ethno-social distance between ethnic Chinese and Uighurs.
25. Farley 25
Additional research may serve to remedy this by determining ethno-social distance through a
different variable, such as amount of ethnically based hate crimes. However, such information
may not exist from unbiased sources. Further research would help my findings because it would
also offer more examples of the applicability of my definitions.
Conclusion
My paper clearly describes three distinct categories of frozen conflict. The readers should
have learned two significant things from this paper. The first is that broad terms and concepts are
not as helpful in international politics as clearly defined, specific definitions that can be applied
throughout global cases. By determining categories based on conflict attributes instead of simply
by geographic expanse, a better approach to remedying the conflict can be determined by policy
makers. The second important idea for the reader to understand is that frozen conflicts is a
catchall definition and really should be broken down into three distinct conflict types. The first
type is a symmetric conflict, with two groups of actors that are of relatively equal strength pitted
against each other for a medium amount of time. The second type is a foreign-perpetuated
conflict, where one actor is considerably weaker but an outside actor militarily supports it to a
degree that the conflict is substantially prolonged. The third and final type is a continual
independence struggle, where the weaker actor is able to maintain a series of unrest and the
conflict stays unresolved due to the widespread support for independence. These are three
distinct and equally important types of frozen conflicts.
By addressing frozen conflicts as individual categories instead of simply a post-Soviet
byproduct, true remedies can be addressed. Determining sources and attributes of conflicts
bracket the conflict and allow for the best remedies. Conflicts are remarkably complex, so must
be addressed holistically. Unfortunately, they will never go away, so it is prudent to determine
26. Farley 26
the best ways to study and address these conflicts. Instead of throwing money or soldiers at a
conflict, states should address the base issues with concerted efforts based off set protocols for
the specific conflict type. Through the proper researching and analytical techniques, conflicts can
be addressed more effectively and much earlier, thereby ensuring a more secure global system.
27. Farley 27
Works Cited
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"Assessment for Armenians in Azerbaijan." MAR. Minorities at Risk Project, 28 July 2014.
"Assessment for Ossetians (South) in Georgia." MAR. Minorities at Risk Project, 30 December
2006.
"Brief History of East Turkestan." World Uyghur Congress. World Uyghur Congress, n.d.
"Countries Compared by Military." NationMaster. NationMaster, 2008.
Cornell, Svante E. Small Nations and Great Powers: A Study of Ethnopolitical Conflict in the
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of the Republic of Azerbaijan, n.d.
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Lynch, Dov. Engaging Eurasia's Separatist States: Unresolved Conflicts and De Facto States.
Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2004.
"National Minorities Policy and Its Practice in China." Xinhua Net. Information Office of the
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29. Farley 29
Table 1 – Conceptualization of Variables
Ind. Var. is short hand for ‘Independent Variable’
Name Type Operationalize
Goals of actors Ind. Var. Either degree of autonomy, irredentism, incite instability
Military assets Ind. Var. Budget, land forces
Social distance Ind. Var. Distance between ethnic groups
Duration Ind. Var. Length of conflict (or most recent form)
30. Farley 30
Table 2 – Hypotheses
Hypothesis Goals Military Strength Ethno-Social Distance Duration
Symmetric Irredentism vs. Sovereignty Even Very Distant Medium
Foreign-Perp.
Independence vs.
Sovereignty Weighted Sov. Medium Short
Cont. Ind.
Independence vs.
Sovereignty Weighted Sov. Slight Long
Foreign-Perp. is short hand for ‘Foreign Perpetuated’
Cont. Ind. is short hand for ‘Continual Independence Movement’
Weighted Sov. is short hand for ‘Weighted in favor of the Sovereign state’
31. Farley 31
Table 3 – Raw Data
States Goals Military Strength Ethno-Social Distance Duration
Armenia Irredentism 42000 x x
Nagorno-Karabakh Independence 15000-20000 x x
Armenians Combined Irredentism 62000 x x
Azerbaijan Sovereignty 66740 Very distant 26
Georgia Sovereignty 21150 Medium 25
South Ossetia Independence 3000 x x
China Sovereignty 2.88 million Slight 60
Uighurs Independence No data x x
In the ethno-social distance and duration columns, the conflict as a whole is measured. The raw
data is inputted in the row of the actor that de jure controls the conflict area.
‘x’ is a placeholder for the rows where the above is coded.
32. Farley 32
Table 4.1 – Codebook
Goals Military Strength Ethno-Social Distance Duration
1=Other 1=Under 20,000 1=Very slight 1=Under 20 years
2=Disruption 2=20,000-50,000 2=Slight 2=20-30 years
3=Sovereignty/Integrity 3=50,000-100,000 3=Moderate 3=30-40 years
4=Irredentism/Revanchism 4=100,000-200,000 4=Distant 4=40-50 years
5=Aggression/Independenc
e 5=Over 200,000 5=Very distant 5=Over 50
Table 4.2 – Codebook Annex – Combined Military Strength
1=Comparable
2=Slightly weighted
3=Very different
33. Farley 33
Table 5.1 – Coded Actor Variables
States Goals Military Strength Ethno-Social Distance Duration
Armenia 4 x x x
Nagorno-Karabakh 5 3* x x
Azerbaijan 3 3 5 2
Georgia 3 2 3 2
South Ossetia 5 1 x x
China 3 5 2 5
Uighurs 5 U x x
U = Unidentifiable
* = Measurement for Armenia and Nagorno-Karabakh as a combined unit
In the ethno-social distance and duration columns, the conflict as a whole is measured. The raw
data is inputted in the row of the actor that de jure controls the conflict area.
‘x’ is a placeholder for the rows where the above is coded.
Table 5.2 – Compressed Conflict Variables
Conflicts Goals Military Difference Ethno-Social Distance Duration
Nagorno-Karabakh 4/5 v. 3 1 5 2
South Ossetia 5 v. 3 3 3 2
Uighur Independence 5 v. 3 3 2 5
V stands for versus, with the non-state actor (or alliance) on the left and the state actor on the
right
