0Maria%20Insecurity,_Interest_and_the_Diversionary_Military_Use_of_Force_The_Soccer_War_among_Honduras_and_El_Salvador_1969_%20actualizado.%20original[1]

非安全、利益与军事力量的转移性运用:1969 年洪都拉斯
与萨尔瓦多足球战争
Insecurity, Interests and the Military Diversionary Use of Force:
The War between Honduras and El Salvador 1969
作者姓名：米小亚
Maria Caraballo Fernandez
国籍：委内瑞拉
专业：国际关系
指导教师：刘德斌教授
咸命植博士
学位类别：全日制硕士
论文答辩日期：年月日

I
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论文级别：■硕士 □博士
学科专业：国际关系
论文题目：非安全、利益与军事力量的转移性运用:1969 年洪都拉斯
与萨尔瓦多足球战争
作者签名：指导教师签名：
年月日
作者联系地址（邮编）：吉林大学国际关系研究所（130012）
作者联系电话：0431-85168357

III
中文摘要
传统的战争理论认为，当政治领导人面临国内斗争时，他们会有一种不安全感，
他们将尝试发动国外斗争以转移国内的问题。这一说法已经在理论上不被支持了，因
为它没有注意到在国外使用武力的过程中军队发挥的相应作用。国内的冲突将导致外
部的侵略，当它威胁到军事利益时，如果不是军队拒绝向外部使用武力。只有一种国
内斗争激烈的政治机构能够威胁到军事组织的利益，鼓励他们对外使用武力作为保护
他们组织的一种形式。
但是，什么意味着纷争？像库尔特和埃里克所说的机构是有争议的，当不同的政
治团体对一个确定的政治制度的基本政治原则都不同意时，如民主，专政或独裁政府。
在国家经历政治转型时，如民主化和革命，政治精英们将有两种选择：要么达成
对政治体制建立基本原则的一种协议，或者达不成任何协议。
在这种情况下，如果政治精英们反对政治的基本规则，他们必须尝试使用额外的
体制手段来巩固他们的权力。其中的一个倾向是行使强制能力。这些能力对试图控制
一个国家来说是最合适的方法。根据这个思路，拥有基本工具和强制能力的主要行动
者是军事组织，政治精英们将试图获得对军事武装力量的绝对控制权。
由这些政治精英关于基本原则执行引起的这些国内政治冲突，威胁了军事组织和
他们的利益。使他们更容易对外使用武力以保持其自主权，力量和权力。
政治体制之争带来的结果是国家内的政治混乱，两个强大的政治势力为了争夺这
个权力而斗争。因此，他们将用任何一种政治工具，来获得一个稳定的政治制度，例
如在军事组织中插入平民委员，在政治忠诚的基础上提高官员或破坏军事组织。因此，
政治将决定何时以及如何使用武力，而不是军事组织决定。面对这样的情景，军队将
更会对外使用武力，以转移国内敌人注意力，从而保护它们组织的利益。
在冷战爆发时，中美洲的两个国家，洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多的特点都是有国内纷争，
其中在每个国家都有两个强大的政党为了权力开展一场政治斗争。这种政治冲突是民
主化的产物，受美国肯尼迪政府强大的支持，政策更灵活，不太极端，根据他们的利
益，让组建新政党。由美国领导的这项政策，允许更多的民主和更少的专制政党，导
致当时执掌权力（军事）的一方政党与为了实施新的政治制度的另一方政党发生内部

IV
斗争。
政治精英之间的冲突导致了军事组织和军事自主权的破坏；而不是说这种情况下
军队没有更多的选择，挑起与邻国的外部战争。
在前几年，洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多之间的关系是在一个高度理解与认识的水平上，
作为一个区域性机构的成员，中美洲共同市场（ CACM ）和区域安全委员会，然而当
这种关系是在良好的水平上，地区冲突发生了。
1969 年，一场俗称为“足球战争”的局部战争在这两个国家之间爆发了，数百万
的平民被杀害。洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多之间的战争是不相关的，并且没有意义的，因为
他们没有互相竞争的历史，它们没有把它们自己看作是一个潜在的威胁。
这两个国家从来没有陷入安全困境，因为在这一地区美国行使霸权，强加区域秩
序在这一地区，特别是在这两个国家。
关于牵制武力使用的绝大多数研究强调的是美国的具体情况。本研究的目标是扩
大这些论点到另一个政治环境，那里的主要角色是军事组织。
据此，本研究将重点分析军事行为，以及误解或不安全感如何导致军事组织去使
用国外力量。对于国内的变量的考虑，是决定理解在洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多之间的发生
“足球战争”的好战的外交政策的原因。
考虑到洪都拉斯和萨尔瓦多两国军队行使的相关权力，做出可信的外部威胁更容
易，否则，军队在国内使用武力会相当严重，导致军事组织的瓦解和内战发生的高概
率，导致整个权力的丧失。
由于有许多类型的国内斗争（政变，暴动，领导者支持率低，）导致外来侵略，本
研究将明确说明什么样的国内斗争导致洪都拉斯军队和萨尔瓦多军队 1969 年对彼此用
兵？
研究一种类型的国内斗争（政治精英的斗争），它将证明有争议的政治制度导致洪
都拉斯和萨尔瓦多的军事组织在 1969 年对外使用武力。分析这两个国家同时进行政治
转型的考虑，政治精英们使用额外的习以为常的手段来达到自己的目的，试图获得对
武装力量的绝对控制权，产生政治制度的争论，最终威胁军事的利益，导致使用转移
性的国外行动，来保护他们的诚信和实力。
随着这些国家之间足球战争的发生，将证明军队创造了一个标志性影响，因此军

V
队特权和团结得到了加强，减少了国内的反对派，提高了军队的声望和控制公民规则。
就这个问题而言，本研究将有助于提供战争产生原因的广泛文献，找到政治制度
之争与军事组织作用之间的联系，从而为军事组织如何使用武力提供一个现实主义的
方法。它也将有助于拉丁美洲文献研究，其中拉丁美洲的多数学者在错误的假设基础
上对分析拉美政治做出了错误的解释。基于本国政治环境和地域特点，建立一个有别
于世界上其它地区的新核心是很有必要的。
研究小的国家发动的战争是很重要的，和对国际关系学领域的考虑；因为它有助
于了解在什么国内条件下效果会被迫去发动战争。
对于国内原因的分析可以增强国际关系领域，并允许更多有趣的方法构建，因为
主要研究对象并不总是相同的（大国），并且分析水平不经常集中在制度层面，就像大
国之间的战争已经是有许多的解释并被充分讨论的话题了。
尽管许多学者已经研究了政治领袖对使用武力的作用（主要是文职领导人通过选
举获得权力），只有少数学者深入研究军事机构的介入和政治体制中军事利益的重要性。
纵观来看，使用军事力量转移的方法将受到考验，当一个国家正处于政治转型时，
军事利益问题和军事体制的作用将成为一个关键因素去理解为什么一些友好的国家会
发动战争，尽管在经济力量和安全方面已经达成了一致。
关键词：政治转变，基本政治原则，非常的体制手段，有争议的政治制度，军事
利益，洪都拉斯，萨尔瓦多，足球战争，军事力量的转移性运用

IV
Abstract
Classical theory of war argues when political leaders are facing domestic strife, they feel
a sense of insecurity around him, attempting to develop external diversionary actions with the
purpose of divert the population away domestic problems. As many author said this theory
has been theoretically unsupported. The key factor is because it does not pay attention to the
relevant role of militaries in the use of force inside or abroad.
Domestic conflict will lead to internal or external aggression when it threatens the
military interest, otherwise they will reject to use force.
Only one kind of domestic struggle Contested Political Institutions generated by the
struggle of political elites threaten militaries organization encouraging the last one to use the
force abroad as a form of secure their military organization.
The concept of contested political institutions is a term that has been mentioned by
famous author as Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhart establishing that when institutions are
contested, diverse political groups disagree over fundamental political rules of a determined
political system such as democracy, dictatorship or autocratic governments.
In states undergoing political transitions - such as Democratizations and Revolutions -,
political elites will have two options: either to reach an agreement over fundamental rules or
do not to reach agreement at all.
In this case, if political elites do not agree over political fundamental rules, they will
attempt to use extra institutional means to get a consolidation of their power. One of these
tendencies is the exercise of coercive capabilities. These capabilities are the most suitable an
easy way for attempt to control one state. According to it, the essential actor who detent the
coercive capabilities is the military organization; then political elites will try to gain the
absolute control over the Armed Forces.
Facing with this situation Military Organization will use any kind of tools (force, wars,
revolutions) for avoid that political groups gain and destroy them.
The Contestation of political Institutions brings as a result a political chaos in states
where two strong political forces are fighting to get the power. Political groups will use any
kind of instruments to obtain the consolidation of a determined political system such as
inserting civilian commissary into the military organization, promoting officers on the basis

V
of political loyalty or destroying military organization. Consequently political leaders and not
military organization will choose when and how use the force. Facing with this panorama,
militaries will be more able to use force inside or abroad, as intent to divert their domestic
enemy and thus way protecting their organizational interest.
In the outbreak of the Cold War, two Central American states, Honduras and El Salvador
were characterized by having an international strife, without any reason. Beyond it two strong
political parties in each country were engaged in a struggle for the power.
This conflict takes place in the Democratization era, under Kennedys’ Government who
was strongly engaged in a more democratic strategic, and the containment of the communism
This policy more flexible and less radical, according with U.S interests, allowed the
emergence of more democratic parties and less authoritarian leaders in Central America,
resulting in an internal domestic struggle between who wield the power (Military) at that time
and political parties who want the power.
The conflict between two political elites brought the destruction of military organization
and military autonomy; facing with this dilemma, militaries did not have more option that
provoked an external war with this neighbor.
In spite that in previous years the relationship between Honduras and El Salvador was
in high levels of understanding and comprehension, being member of a regional institution,
Central American Common Market (CACM) and Central America Regional Security Council
(CARS), nevertheless when the level of this relationship was in good terms, a regional
conflict took place.
In 1969, a regional war commonly known such as “The Soccer War” broke out between
these two countries, resulting the murdered of millions of civilians. The war between
Honduras and El Salvador was irrelevant and did not have sense, because they do not have a
history of rivalries among themselves and they do not perceive themselves as a potential
threat.
Security Dilemma never took place in these two countries, because the power exercised
by the United States imposed a regional control, specifically in these two countries and also
in Central America.
The majority of the studies about diversionary actions give special emphasis to the
United States. The goal in this study is to expand these arguments to another political
environment, which is Central American and where the main actor are military organization.

VI
According to it, the focus in this study will be the analysis of military behavior and how
insecurities lead to military organization to the use of force. For that reasons the consideration
of domestic variables are decisive to understand the causes of belligerent foreign policy in
the break of the Soccer War between Honduras and El Salvador.
Given the relevant power exercised by militaries in Honduras and El Salvador in the
political context, is easier for them making credible external threats, otherwise the use of
force by militaries at home could be quite dramatic, leading to the disintegration of the
military organization and high probabilities of civil war, generating the loss of their entire
power.
Since there are many types of domestic strife leading to external aggression such Coup
d’état, riots, low approval of leader popularity, this research will propose to specify what kind
of domestic strife allowed to Honduran and Salvadoran militaries to use the force each other
in 1969.
Studying one kind of domestic strife (Political Elites Struggle), it will provide evidence
that Contested Political Institutions had influenced Honduran and Salvadoran Military
organizations to use the force abroad in 1969. Analyzing the consideration of political
transitions simultaneously in these two countries, political elites resorted to use extra-
institutional ways to achieve their ends, trying to gain absolute control over the Armed
Forces, threatening military interests and encouraging to the use of diversionary actions
abroad in order to protect their integrity and strength.
With the occurrence of the Soccer war among these countries, it will demonstrate that
the military created a rally around the flag effect, as a consequence militaries privileges and
unity was strengthened, decreasing the domestic opposition and increasing the military
popularity and control over civil rules.
Regarding this issue, this research will contribute to the widely literature of causes of
war, finding a linkage between conflict over basic political rules and diversionary theory.
Also it will contribute to the literature of Latin American Studies, where the majority of
scholars when analyze Latin American politics made incorrect interpretations in base of
misguided assumptions. It’s necessary to build a new hardcore based in Latin American
domestic political circumstances and geographical characteristics that are quite different than
other regions in the world.
The study of small states going to war is important and considerable to the field of

VII
International Relations; because it can contribute to understand under what domestic
conditions small states are forced go to war.
Analyzing domestic causes can strengthen the field of International Relations and allow
the building of more interesting approaches, because the main study actor is not always the
same (great power) and the analysis level is not often focus in systemic level, as war among
great powers that have been a topic amply discussed with many interpretations.
Although many scholars have been studied the role of political leaders on the use of
force; only few scholars have studied in depth terms related to the involvement of the military
institution and the importance of military interest into the political system.
Throughout The Military Diversionary Use of Force Approach will be tested that
military interests matter, because if the military organization feel threaten by political elites
disagreement, they will attempt to use the force to keep their autonomy and survive. The role
exercised by the military institution will be a crucial element to understand why some
partners states went to war in despite of the strength of economic and security terms signed
between them.
Key Words: Political Transition, Fundamental Political Rules, Extra institutional
means, Contested Political Institutions, Military Interests.

VIII
Content
Chapter 1 Introduction......................................................................................................1
1.1 Significance of this research..................................................................................4
1.2 Literature Review:..................................................................................................5
1.3 Methodology:.......................................................................................................11
1.4 Structure:.............................................................................................................11
Chapter 2 The link between Contested Political Institutions and the Initiation of
violence abroad: The Military Diversionary Use of Force ...........................................13
2.1 Domestic Sources of International Conflict:........................................................13
2.2 Classical Diversionary Theory: Critiques ............................................................17
2.3 Previous Researches about the Role of Military in the Use of Force Abroad .....23
2.4 The Military Diversionary Use of Force Approach:............................................25
Chapter 3 Domestic Sources of International Aggression: The Soccer War 1969 .....37
3.1 The Roots of Military Institution in El Salvador and Honduras: Iberian Legacies38
3.2 Honduras and El Salvador: Friends or Rivals:.....................................................40
3.3 Threats perceived toward Military Interests: Political changes in El Salvador ...44
3.4 Threats perceived to Military Interest: Political Changes in Honduras ...............48
Chapter 4 Political Outcomes and Military Influence after the War..........................55
4.1 The new reality of Military groups in Honduras and El Salvador .......................55
4.2 Military Institutions at the present era: Arbiter of Politics or Silent Institution ..58
Conclusion ........................................................................................................................65
Bibliography .....................................................................................................................68
Acknowledgments ............................................................................................................75

List of Abbreviations
 OEA or OAS (Organization of American States)
 CACJ (Central American Court of Justice)
 CAMC (Central American Common Market)
 SIECA (Secretariat for Central American Economic Integration)
 CDP (Christian Democratic Party El Salvador)
 CLAC(Economic Commission for Latin America)
 NAFTA (North American Free Trade Agreement)
 PLH (Liberal Party of Honduras)
 PDRH (Democratic Revolutionary Party of Honduras)
 PNH (National Party of Honduras)
 UFCO (United Fruit Company)
 UPCA (United Provinces of Central America)
 PCH (Communist Party of Honduras)
 MNR (National Reformist Movement of Honduras)
 PCN (National Conciliation Party El Salvador)
 FIFA (International Federation of Football Association)
 PNU or NUP (National Union Party)
 CARS (Central America Regional Security)

Chapter 1 Introduction
1
“The sad fact is that international politics has always been a ruthless and dangerous
business, and it is likely to remain that way. The overriding goals of each state is to
maximize its share of world power, which means gaining power at the expense of other
states”1
How much power does a state need to stop fighting? Through decades the struggle of the
states to be more and more powerful has brought the occurrence of numerous wars. Similarly
as Levy said the war not only destroy resources, expand diseases, reshape new cultures, ruins
economies but also kill women’s, children’s, and young people for that reasons is necessary
to analyze the causes that produce it, for avoid a major disaster as occurred in the Second
World War, when thousands of people were subject of this nightmare.
Based in Kurt Dassel argument the majority of the wars were launched by militaries
leaders, it’s important to analyze the role of militaries in the use of force abroad. As the
famous scholars Bruce Bueno de Mesquita said is time to bring to our study the leaders,
citizens and leadership, but also its time to study militaries behavior.
Regarding to this point, militaries have been an important player in some regions,
it’s important to identify what regions are more influenced by these subjects. Since the
colonial times until the 20th century, military organization (Armed Forces) has been an
important and dominant participant in Central and South American Region, specifically in
Honduras and El Salvador. Military Institution became a natural participant in the politics.
This dominant organization has been always occupied main positions into the public
administration.
Military Cultural has been historical pattern rooted since establishment of Spain
Government in the new world and present during these days.
Although cultural, institutional and historical patterns were present in the New
Colonized World, after the Independence these cultural norms are still persisting but with a
few variations. In this sense, history is not the past or what has the past, but rather a complex
set of enduring (and sometimes antagonistic) collective expectations, belief, social memories
1
John J.Mearsheimer, The tragedy of Great Power Politics. New York: W.W Norton &Company, Inc 2001, p.26

2
and institutionalized patterns of behavior that continues to operate as contingencies
influencing the present. 1
The Hispano-American Independence brought the emergence of new a dominant group
called The Criollos. During these times the new established states were characterized for
having constantly strife among civilian-military groups. With the purpose of diverting
domestic opposition, the military could initiate and engage in a war with a neighbor state, as
the following wars:
War among Salvador and Mexico (1822)
War among Salvador, Honduras, Nicaragua and Costa Rica and Panama (1826)
War among Salvador and Nicaragua (1863)
War among Salvador and Guatemala (1907)
War among Salvador and Honduras (1969)
The big War between Colombia and Peru (1828)
The Pacific War between Chile, Peru, Bolivia (1879)
The Falkland War between Argentina- England (1982)
In addition, the foreign policy of these established states were unpredictable, not linear
and even belligerent with their neighbors.
In the beginning of the 19th century, under civilian regimes; the relationship among
Honduras and El Salvador was better than ever. Positive trade expectations were reflected
through an important Economic regional integration called Central American Common
Market (CACM) and CARS.
According with trade expectations theory supported by Dale Copeland, pointed that
when states shared a good economic trade expectations, the probability of a future conflict or
war is lesser. Honduras and El Salvador were members of the most successfully economic
integration created in the Central American Region, including CACM, where both of them
perceived considerable gains, but in 1969, a war broke economic ties between these
countries.
The confrontation of 1969 was an unexpected war that surprised the international
community, resulting in the murdered of two thousand people in two consecutive days. El
Salvador and Honduras argued that the cause of war was the migration of thousands of
1
David Pion- Berlin Civil-Military relations in Latin American: New Analytical Perspectives. North Carolina:The University
of North Carolina Press, 2001, p.19.

3
Salvadoran to Honduras; however this cause is very weak. Hence, this thesis tries to see
beyond these weak circumstances.
Since there are many type of domestic strife that lead to external aggression (Coup d
etat, riots, low approval of leader popularity, strike) this thesis proposes to specify what kind
of domestic strife lead Salvadoran and Honduras militaries to use force with between them in
1969?
Studying one kind of domestic strife (Political Elites Struggle), it will prove that
Contested Political Institutions had influenced Honduran and Salvadoran Military
organizations to use the force abroad in 1969. Analyzing the consideration of political
transitions simultaneously in these two countries, political elites resorted to use extra-
institutional ways means to achieve their ends, contesting political institutions and trying to
gain absolute control over the armed forces, threatening military interests and leading to the
use of diversionary actions abroad in order to divert domestic situation and protect their
integrity and strength.
The causes of war have been a topic widely discussed by many scholars throughout
decades. The famous German-historian Hans-Ulrich Wehler attribute the causes of the
Second World War to domestic circumstances occurred in Germany in 1945, where a
dominant traditional elite played the nationalist card to avoid the democratization process and
more importantly to retain power, considering the use of domestic instruments implemented
by the dominant traditional elite that were “a penchant for authoritarian politics; a hostility
toward democracy in the educational and party system; the influence of preindustrial
leadership groups, values and ideas; the tenacity of German state ideology; the myth of the
bureaucracy; the superimposition of caste tendencies and class distinctions; and the
manipulation of political anti-Semitism.”
Structural Realism focuses on the analysis of the structure of international system as the
principal cause for states going to war. Defensive Realists such Kenneth Waltz attributes the
sources of war to international system.
As a result, a more specifically study concentrating on the role of domestic factors as a
cause of war is required. Consequently this research will provide a better understanding of
war and will also seek to support the notion that the causes of war are not merely caused by
external variables.

4
1.1 Significance ofthis research:
The majority of studies about diversionary use of force have been focus in United States
cases. Our main goal in this study is expanding these arguments to another political
environment, where the main actor is the military organization and the scenery is a small
state.
Although many scholars have been studied the role of political leaders (mostly civilian
leaders who came to the power through elections) on the use of force abroad, just few
scholars have been studying deeply terms related to the role of the military in the use of force
in autocratic governments.
Even though those scholars within the discipline of International Relations had studied
the use of force abroad, it has always been from the perspective of the government being a
group of leaders elected or appointed into power. Only few have really studied from the
military perspective, where the military is the government and dictates their own decisions
without any other executive authority or legitimacy over them. This is particularly interesting
and an important aspect to study because in many countries the military is merely a branch of
the government, however in the case of Honduras and El Salvador the military and the
government share the power.
Military organization has been a vital factor in the domestic politics of El Salvador and
Honduras since Independence Times. Even at this time, the effects of militaristic culture are
still reflected in the social and cultural patterns (political culture). This can clearly see in
many media platforms such as on a Honduran website which proclaims “The Army was born
with the nation”, and the Salvador army website declares that “the history of our nation has
been the very historic of the Army.”1
Most theories of International Relations have been focused on the interaction among
great powers, ignoring the study of the relations among small and weak states and their role
in the international system.
Thus this thesis has devoted the attention to the exploration of different analytical
perspectives that can explain the interaction among weak states. This is extremely essential
for the development of International Relations, because “Each generation’s research interest
1
David Pion- Berlin Civil-Military relations in Latin American: New Analytical Perspectives. North Carolina:The University
of North Carolina Press, 2001,p19.

5
is powerfully conditioned by the realities of the time”1 thus theories and predicted outcomes
can change overtime.”
With such events occurred in 1969, it is clearly necessary to conduct a proper analysis
and build some theoretical understanding of the nature of militaries organization to have a
better understanding about military interest that can lead to the use of diversionary actions.
As Fitch, although explanations of military behavior had become increasingly sophisticated
and complex, he still conclude that given the slow pace of scholarly research and the
enormous number of unanswered questions about military politics and military rule, more
researches are needed to be directed to theoretical issues with the direct policy
consequences.2
1.2 Literature Review:
The book Causes of War by Jacky Levy focuses in three types of analysis levels for
explain issues of War, the System Level (Structure System), where Realist like Waltz in the
book Social Theory of International Politics (2009) argues that international structure have a
certain effect in states-behavior.
Assuming that international system is considered as anarchic system, without central
authorities that can control states-behavior, states always will pursuit maximize their power to
protect them of future threats, considering the power as relative way for obtain it. Waltz
argues that in international politics what matters is only the number and power of states. 3
Realist schools represented by the majority of scholars like Thucydides, Machiavelli,
Hobbes, Rousseau, Waltz, Morgenthau, argue that states compete each other for power and
security.
Jacky Levy in his book Causes of War analyzes different assumptions of Realist school
focusing in first place “Realist generally accepts the core hypothesis that a primary
determinant of international outcome, including both wars and the peaceful settlement of
crises and disputes, is the distribution of the power in the international system or within a
particular dyad. Another point that nearly all realist theorists agree upon is the view that wars
1
David Pion- Berlin Civil-Military relations in Latin American: New Analytical Perspectives. North Carolina: The University
of North Carolina Press, 2001,p.19.
2
David Pion- Berlin Civil-Military relations in Latin American: New Analytical Perspectives. North Carolina: The
University of North Carolina Press, 2001,p.19.
3
Alexander Wendt Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge University Press, 1999. p.99.

6
can occur through deliberate and inadvertent processes, through different strands of realism
differ on which of these processes occurs most often. In the first path to war, two states have
a direct conflict of interest and at least one decides that is more likely to achieve its interest
through military force than through a negotiated settlement. The image here is one of
predatory states. In this view, a predatory “revisionist” state makes a deliberate decision to
initiate a war to change the status quo in its favor. Secondly and “Equally important,
however a second path to war that is involves states that are content with the status quo and
are more interested in maintaining their current position that extending their influence. Such
“security-seeking” states can end up in a war, often an inadvertent war that neither side wants
or expects at the onset of the crisis. 1
The Book Man, States and War by Waltz make a descriptive analysis about the causes of
war focuses in the nature of individual, in the structure of states and in the nature of
international system to find a relative determinant of occurrence of wars. Waltz after of
detailed analysis conclude that the causes of war can be better explained better in terms of
international system assuming that is the nature of anarchic system that make states more able
to use coercive capabilities in order to survive. Insecurity leads to states to going to war.
But the book Man, States and War by Kenneth Waltz did not exclude other images to
explain the same issue war; these images have also a relative importance. “The vogue of an
image varies with time and place, but not a single image is ever adequate. The prescriptions
directly derived from a single image are incomplete because they are based upon partial
analyses.”2
Based in the assumptions of Waltz that not only one image can give suitable predictions
about the issues of war, the second level analysis studied by Jacky Levy in his book Causes
of War give a different understanding that is necessary to clarify.
The State and Societal Level, focusing in explain the war in terms of internal factors:
type of government, state structure and nature of political institutions. In this level, it can find
theories as Democratic Peace Theory, Coalitional Theory and Classical Diversionary Theory.
Coalitional Theory by Jack Snyder in the book Causes of War argues that the key elites
justify their power and policies by promoting strategic myths providing a justification for
their expansionist policies. These myths include exaggeration of the current hostility of other
1
Jack S. Levy and William R.Thompson, Causes of War, United Kingdom, Willey-Blackwell, 2010, p.31-32
2
Kennet N. Waltz , Man States and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 230.

7
states and historical injustices committed by those states, of the strategic and economic value
of empire, and the likelihood that the adversary will back down in the face of hardliner
policies or that any war will involve minimal costs.1
Coalitional Theory focuses in the myths based in histories and culture to the use of
expansionist policies. The elites will play an important role in the belligerent foreign policy
of these states; however they will attempt to perceive individual interest. It’s important to
clarify that Snyder´s Theory did not mention what kind of elites will more likely going to war
(political elites, soldier elites, economic elites).
Hence there is variety of political elites that can influence a belligerent foreign policy of
one state; this thesis proposed that military elites under determined domestic circumstances
are more likely to go to war.
The book “What Causes War” by Greg Cashman analyzes the Democratization Theory
sustained by Mansfield and Snyder arguing that when autocracies begin to democratize,
political participation increase faster than the growth of democratic institutions such as an
independent judiciary and the rule of law, organized and competitive political parties, fair
organized elections, competitive political parties, and a professional new media. A large
number of individuals and groups are now participants in the political process thanks to
universal suffrages and elections, but the institutions and rules that exist to resolve between
these political actors are weak or non-existent.”2
Political elites threat the process of democratization when they are not agree about
political rules, this can lead to attempt to use any kind of political instruments to avoid such
process. But if political elites agree about political rules, democratization could be a peaceful
process. However elite’s insecurity make the war possible because they will use several
instruments if they do not have more options.
Mansfield and Snyder give as solution to avoid the war, as the strengthening of political
institutions strongly enough, that can constrain elite’s interest, for that reasons is necessary
before the elites come, build strong institutions.
For Mansfield and Snyder the type of state with the greatest risk of war is one where a
kind of arrested development takes place. This is a mixed regime (an anocracy), partially
1
Jacky S. Levy and William R Thompson ,Causes of War, United Kingdom, Willey-Blackwell, 2010, p.84-85.
2
Greg Cashman What cause War: an Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United
Kingdom:Rowman&Littelfield, 2014,p.180

8
democratic that has made an incomplete transition from autocracy to democracy. The danger
is not permanent. The probability of war is more likely to affect those transitional regimes
that have weak state institutions at the onset of the transition and have elites whose political
fortunes are in flux. 1
How does any of this process lead to war? Mansfield and Snyder distinguish two
pathways leading from democratization to war. In the first pathway incomplete, democratizes
with a strong administrative institutions and strong militaries but with weak or biased
representative institutions, pursue nationalist policies including war, as way of competing for
public support. War is consciously chosen as a strategy to enhance o preserve political
standing of governing elite. The second pathway leads to war through indirect process. As
part of nationalistic strategy, governments are likely to pursue aggressive or adventurist
foreign policy designed to curry favor with the public. Democratization is a relatively rare
event in and of itself and thus not likely to be major cause of war in general.”2
Studies made by other scholars have failed to replicate Mansfield and Snyder findings
about the dangers of democratization. Some have found no association at all between
democratization and war; others have found that democratization may actually reduce the
probability that the state will initiate a militarized dispute. 3
A number of several scholars argue that rogue states are more likely going to war. Such
as a can identify North Korea, Cuba, Iran, and Libya. However as it can see when an
international conflict in 2012 started between the U.S. and North Korea, the last state (North
Korea) stopped to pursue a belligerent foreign policy.
In early stages of research related to democracy and war, most scholars believe that
democracies were just as likely to get involved in wars (regardless of the adversary regime
type) as were non-democratic states. This was based on hard evidence that democratic-
autocratic were most prone war of all dyads, which countered the peaceful nature of
democratic-democratic dyads, with authoritarian dyads falling in between in terms of their
degree of war-proneness.4
1
Greg Cashman What cause War: an Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United
2
Greg Cashmanwhat causes War: An Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United
3
4

9
Some scholars are questioning this prescription, however and arguing that well-
established democratic dyads are peaceful, the process of transition to democracy can be a
particularly destabilizing period and democratizing states occasionally could go to war
against other states and even against each other (Mansfield and Snyder, 2002, 2005). The
democratization process brings new social groups with the widely divergent interest into the
political at a time, when the state is lacking of institutional capacity to accommodate
conflicting interest and respond to popular demands; this instability environment can create
enormous political conflict. This conflict can be exacerbated if democratization is coupled
with the introduction of market forces into non-market economies, which leads to popular
pressures for states protection against the pain of economic adjustment. The resulting of high
levels of political instability can contribute to war through a number of paths, including the
diversionary mechanism.”1
Greg Cashman in his book “What Causes War” analyzes The role of Business Cycle:
Good Times and Bad Times, one common held belief has been that states tend going to war
during times of economic distress and depression. First, some theorists suggest that economic
hard times create pressures on political leaders to expand the economy through searches for
greater markets, their products and investment or the access to more productive resources, a
process that eventually leads to war. In other words, war itself is believed to have a beneficial
impact on the economy. During economic hard times, political elites may seek war as a
method of diverting the attention of the public from internal woes. Several economic
conditions in Argentina in 1982 certainly led to the decision to invade the Falkland-Malvinas
Islands. 2
Cashman in the same book also analyzes, The diversionary scapegoat or theory of war,
this theory will be more analyzed deeper in the second chapter of this thesis, however some
conclusions will be useful for a better understanding about this assumption.
“The war may simply be used by the practice of government to divert attention of
citizens from internal situation or to achieve a foreign policy success as a way of increasing
its domestic popularity. Whether the use of war actually alleviates the internal situation is, of
course another question. What is important for a theory is that political elites believes that
1
Jacky S. Levy “DomesticPolitics and War”Journal of Interdisciplinary History Quartely 18,4(Spring, 1988):653.
2
Greg Cashman What Causes War: An Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United

10
precipitating a foreign conflict gives them a chance, however slim, to save their political
skins. As Jack Levy notes, this means that the diversionary theory is not really a theory of
war, but a partial theory of foreign policy behavior. Whether war occurs frequently depends
on the interaction between states, not on the behavior of a single state.”1
Other scholar’s as Sara McLaughlin Mitchell and Brandon C. Prins, thinks that rivalry
increases the risk of war, specifically when they are suffering economic downturn. Also these
scholars are taking in consideration historical context conditions, if the states must have an
historical background of enmity. However their argument can be true, but is not general
condition for states going to war. In the case of Honduras and El Salvador after the Grand
Depression, both of them were submerged in economic chaos, but did not lead a war between
these two countries, spite historical enmity shared both of them in the past.
Historical background and economic downturn are not the only and powerful factor to
explain war.
Recent attempts to assess the validity of the diversionary hypothesis have lent modest
support to the proposition that elites tend to use diversionary measures in response to internal
difficulties, but the results are somewhat mixed and hardly robust. Many studies use
economic indicators, such as economic growth rates, inflation, unemployment, rather than
actual domestic turmoil.2
“Another approach has been linked specific types of internal conflict and different
consequences. The idea is that some forms of domestic strife will lead to diversionary
aggression while others not. For instances in his study of Europe from 1810 to 1956, Mayer
(1997, 201-202) argues that conflict between elites and masses led to domestic repression
while conflicts between the aristocracy and the bourgeoisie led to foreign scapegoating. In a
similar vein, Morgan and Bickers (1992) find that a loss of support by fellow party members
encourages the president to resort to display of force.”3
Analyzing these findings, this research will develop a more specific realist approach
about causes of war, it will be demonstrated that the role of military in war is really useful to
understand why a war can be initiated and what specific domestic strife can increase this kind
1
Greg Cashman What causes War: An Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United
2
Greg Cashman “what cause War: an Introduction to theories of International Conflict”. United Kingdom:
Rowman&Littelfield, 2014,p.180
3
Kurt DasselEric Reinhard “ Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at home and Abroad” American Journal of
Political Science 43,1 (January 1999) :57

11
of practices and fulfilling some failures that other theories are failing to explain.
1.3 Methodology:
In this research paper it will employ a Qualitative Method. It will get data from
newspaper articles, research articles, government and other pertinent documents related to the
paper (mainly from Internet, Journals, Books and others related to the topic). It will show
some data and graphics taken by official websites in order to demonstrate the causes and
consequences related to the outbreak of war among Honduras and El Salvador in 1969. The
domestic conflicts occurred in 1969 in these two countries will be used amply with the
purpose to develop and test, a new realist approach.
1.4 Structure:
This Thesis Structure will be designed in order to obtain a better comprehensive view of
the topic and the origins about the problem described before, and it will be divided in four
chapters:
The first Chapter will contain a briefly introduction about the domestic variables that
caused the war between Honduras and El Salvador, main questions, arguments, the
significance of the research and the literature review that will be developed and analyzed
deeply in the following chapters.
The second Chapter will describe in first place, previous researches of different scholars
about the causes of war focusing in domestic variables as main determinant of international
conflict. Secondly, it will make a descriptive analysis about the diversionary classical theory
of war, focuses in the weaknesses related to this theory. Third it will analyze other different
approaches that linked military as main actor, specifically when militaries had used force
abroad and why. In the four statement through the Military Diversionary Use of Force
approach will be analyze the causes that originated the war among Honduras and El Salvador,
focuses in one type of domestic strife that finally lead to these two countries going to war.
The Third Chapter will contain a historical background about Honduras and El Salvador,
where will be explain that no historical major rivalries took place in these two countries. In
the decade of 60´s, the relation among these two countries was high level of comprehension;
both countries became members of the famous Central American Common Market that was

12
strongly supported by United States. The relationship of both countries with United States
was in the best moment; providing economic and military aid. In this chapter it will
demonstrate that no big war took place in Central American because, United States was a key
factor in the relations with Honduras and El Salvador. The United States imposed a regional
control in the Central American Hemispheric. Knowing these issues, it’s important to analyze
what circumstances lead to both countries going to war in 1969.
Also this chapter will help to comprehend the role of militaries in both countries, and
why militaries are more likely to use force, basing in historical and cultural legacies, the
capacity of enjoy a series of privileges that in other countries cannot have, certainly when
they are facing a series of threats, they will act. Finally in this chapter will analyze the
domestic origins of The Soccer War occurred in 1969 between Honduras and El Salvador in
order to establish a link between Contested Political Institutions and the Military institutions
as a main actor and initiator of the violence abroad.
The fourth and last Chapter will analyze the role of military in the contemporary era and
political consequences after the war in Central American Region, demonstrating that is not
necessary has militaries in the current governments of Central American to predict that
military interests matter in the domestic politics of Honduras and El Salvador.

Chapter 2 The link between Contested Political Institutions and the Initiation of violence abroad: The
Military Diversionary Use of Force
13
Chapter 2. The link between Contested Political Institutions and
the Initiation of violence abroad: The Military Diversionary Use
of Force
2.1 Domestic SourcesofInternational Conflict:
“Domestic political variables are not included in any of the leading theories of the
causes of war; instead, they appear only in a number of insolated hypotheses and in some
empirical studies that are generally noncumulative. This gap is troubling and suggests that
political scientists and historians who study war have learned little from each other. A
greater recognition of the role of domestic factors by political scientist would increase the
explanatory power of their theories and provide more useful conceptual frameworks for the
historical analysis of individual wars.”1
The literature of war has unobserved the role of domestic’s factors as an important
source to explain war.
The realist scholars such Kenneth Waltz, Morgenthau, Machiavelli argues that
international conflict can be better explain in terms of systemic level. They consider that the
causes of international conflict are placed at systematic level considering domestic variables
as a less relevant variable. “The dominant theoretical tradition of those whose study
international conflict, asserts that the primary factors determining foreign policy are found at
systemic level, often indicated by the distribution of military and economic power
(Morgenthau 1967, Waltz 1959, 1979), in the realist view, the distribution of power imposes a
structure that limits foreign policy to such an extent that domestic political consideration is
relatively unimportant in shaping their policy choices.”2
“Traditionally, most political science research on war has followed the realist paradigm
and has focused on the structure of the international system and strategic interaction between
states as the primary determinants of international conflict.”3
1
Jacky S. Levy “DomesticPolitics and War” Journal of Interdisciplinary History Quartely 18,4(Spring, 1988):654.
2
Ross A. Miller “Domestic Structure and the Diversionary Use of force. American Journal of Political Science Quarterly
39,3 (August 1995):761.
3
Jacky S. Levy “DomesticPolitics and War” Journal of Interdisciplinary History Quartely 18,4(Spring, 1988):654.

14
The understanding of causes of war not only can be comprehend in terms at system-
level, other scholars have different explanation about the issues of war, the lack of consensus
about the causes of war and the relative importance of which level is most important, giving
us the chance to draw attention in the state-level (domestic variables: contested political
institutions) attempting to develop a theoretical framework that can provide a better
comprehensive view about some unexplained wars.
“In the last few years, the effect of domestic variables in the foreign policy of states has
brought numerous researches focusing in regime type, where democracies are more prone to
use the force abroad that their counterpart (military regimes) (Small and Singer 1976; Chan
1984: Weede 1984;) or where the economic problems is a key word to use the force abroad
(Ostrobm and Job 1986; Jarnes and Oneal 1991, Morgan and Bickers 1992).”1
“Fisher asserts that domestic factor influenced the belligerent foreign policy of Germany
in 1929 (see Kerhr and Mayer, Fisher). “Fisher methodological emphasis on the importance
of socioeconomic variables is an important as his substantive emphasis on German
responsibility for the wars.”2
Bruce Bueno de Mesquita argues the need of taking to account domestic politics
approach in order to understand the world of international relations.
This thesis will focus in the level-analysis related to state-level or “The Second Image”.
“The Second image is mentioned for Kenneth Waltz in his book Man, States and War(1959)
referring to domestic internal structure such institutional structure, type of government and
elite influence (domestic structure is defined as a the social-political condition of states) see
Ross Miller 1995, Jacky Levy 2010, Waltz 2001 for a better understanding about domestic
structure.3
“Realist approach rejects the role of domestic politics in the foreign policy of states,
hence Waltz analysis of three images where the principal cause of war is placed in Third
image “International system” due with anarchic system and Michael Qui agree with Waltz
pointed that international system can affect the behavior of one country. Realists argue that
the foreign policy is constrained by the structure of international system”4. However the
1
Jacky S Levy.“DomesticPolitics and War”. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18,4 (Spring, 1988):655.
2
Jacky S Levy.“DomesticPolitics and War”. The Journal of Interdisciplinary History 18,4 (Spring, 1988):655.
3
Kennet N. Waltz , Man States and War. New York: Columbia University Press, 2001, p. 82.
4
Kennet Waltz third image focus in thenature of international systemarguing that international anarchy made international
war possible. A world- government is a remedy for international war; however this impossible to get hence all states are

15
international system cannot explain why states leaders behave different in the same
international conditions.
For example, Why Brazil and Argentina did not go to war?, in spite of power transitions
theory and rivalry theory that predicted high possibility of these countries going to war and
why El Salvador and Honduras did?. When leaders take unexpected decisions or change in
their foreign policy abruptly; it cannot understand at all why these decisions happened or
what circumstances influenced these changes. To understand these shifts, it must to look
inside of them to find the true responses.
In his influential book Man, State, and War (1959) “Waltz traces a long line of second
image theorist who identify the causes of war in the conditions and processes within states. It
is argued that certain factors such as state structure, specific conditions, and processes counts
to increase the likelihood of war. There is wide of more specific arguments to support this
assumption. Some cultures or ideologies may be particularly warlike, Wright though [1924-
1965] found little evidence to support that popular argument. Kant, Bentham and other
Enlightenment philosophers believed that the warfare that had plague Europe for centuries
could be traced to the personal and political interest of the aristocratic leadership that ruled
territorial states provoking a rally around the flag effect.”1
Scholars devoted a lot of attention to classic diversionary theory of war and more
recently to the impact of the domestic political economy on incentives and opportunities for
war and peace. “In its simplest form, diversionary or scapegoat theory argues that leaders of
nation states use foreign conflict involvement to divert domestic attention from internal
problems.”2
On the other hand Russet (1990) explains that domestic variables are considered an
unimportant issue factor, explaining belligerent foreign policy concerning weak states.
“Russet argues that he found a significant relationship between changing economic
conditions and the dispute behavior of major powers, but did not find a relationship for minor
powers. Thus the relationship between leader’s popularity and the diversionary use of force
independent sovereign states. Second image focus in the structureof states thesocio- economic conditions that are roots in
the one states. Domestic structuremade states going to war.
1
Jacky Levy and William Thompson, Causes of War .United Kingdom, Willey-Blackwell, 2010,p.87.
2
Ross Miller, “DomesticStructure and theDiversionary use of Force” American Journal of Political Science, 39,3 (August.,
1995):761.

16
may be restricted to major powers.” 1 Realist’s analysis argues that minor powers are
subordinated to decisions of great powers, whatever outcomes that affect great power are
certainly to affect minor powers.
However Balance of Power, Power Transition, and Hegemonic Theory are general
theories that grant us only general outcomes that cannot explain why some minor states fight
specific wars. The general idea sustained by these theories is that the changes of foreign
policies of small states are driven by the international system which constrains the foreign
policy of small countries.
Mirian Fendius and Elma highlight the importance of domestic variables to explain the
changes of foreign policy in small states. “She argued that domestic variables are an
important key factor to explain drastic changes in the foreign policy of small states. When
emerging states are faced with several external threats to their survival, regime reformers are
more likely to choose presidential institutional features. When such exogenous pressures are
absent, statesmen enjoy a wider range of alternatives. They may choose presidential type
systems, but parliamentary institutions may also appear attractive. U.S foreign policy during
the eighteenth and nineteenth century also provides a ready test for judging the merits of
domestic politics alternatives to the study of small states behavior. While international
relations theorists have addressed the foreign policies of great powers, they have largely
ignored the study of small and weak states. Moreover even when scholars do refers to weak
states, systemic rather than domestic factors are accorded causal primacy. The received
wisdom in the field is that domestic determinants will be less salient when are focused on the
study of small states behavior, because external constraints are more severe and the
international situation is more compelling.2
International conflicts among small states have generated a little attention. It’s important
to study the causes of violent conflicts, because has been present very often in the politics of
Central American Region transforming the states into a chaos, disorder, where a lot people
have resulting killed and general theories which were supported by data are not applicable to
war or conflict cases involving small states.
Therefore a specific theory that can explain causes of war or social conflict between
1
Ross A Miller “DomesticStructures and the Diversionary Use of force” American Journal of Political Science 39,3 (August
1995):761.
2
MirianFendius Elma, “Theforeign policies of small states:Challenging Neorealism in its own Backyard“British Journal of
Political Science 25,2 (Apr 1995):172.

17
states of Third World are required, considering that the majority of realist theories were made
only for a better interpretation of wars between strong states. Levy in his book “Causes of
War” mentions about the knowledge of Waltz weaknesses of his theory “Waltz acknowledges
that his theory is limited to explain international outcome and that it cannot explain the
specific foreign policy behaviors of states or specific wars.”1
Theories that can explain third world behavior does not exist yet, because small
countries often have a limited impact on the international structure. Analyzing domestic
causes that influence states-behavior, it would help to understand the unexpected foreign
policy taken by some states, especially small states.
2.2 ClassicalDiversionaryTheory:Critiques
Classic Diversionary Theory suggests that any type of domestic strife can lead to foreign
aggression. Ever since they argue that any type of strife (strike, riots, rebellions, coups, civil
wars, revolutions) can lead diversionary aggression, evidences fall short to maintain it (Levy
1989, Rummel 1969). 2
This chapter will analyze the diverse theoretical problems contained in the Classical
Theory of War and other theoretical findings for then identifying one type of domestic strife
that threaten militaries interests making them more likely to use diversionary actions as a
response to internal strife.
“Many international relations theorists accept as conventional wisdom the notion that
foreign policy is often initiated in an attempt to divert attention from domestic problems (e.g
Hass and Whiting 1956). Wright for example claims that foreign wars as remedy for internal
tension, revolution, or insurrection, has been an accepted principle of government (1965,
140). This hypothesis gains further support from a great deal of historical, anecdotal evidence
suggesting that decisions leading to particular wars are made for the purpose of bolstering
domestic support”.3
“Simmel and Coser (1956) argue that any kind of strife with out-group can increase the
cohesion with the out group, where external threats foster cohesion within a country.
1
Jacky S.Levy and WilliamR.Thompson, Causes of War.United Kingdom, Willey-Blackwell, 2010, p.34.
2
Kurt Dassel“Eric Reinhard Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at home and Abroad” American Journal of
Political Science 43,1 (January 1999):57.
3
Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force”, TheJournal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 6 No 1 (Mar., 1992):25.

18
However these activities must be considering actions short of war and the group must be
considering as entire group”.“Coser argues that external conflict will increase the cohesion of
the in group only if the group already exists as a going concern has some minimal level of
internal cohesion, perceives itself as a group and the preservation as worthwhile and believes
that the external threat menaces the in-group as whole and not just one part of it. In the
absence of these conditions, external conflict will exacerbate internal conflict, perhaps to the
point of disintegration, rather than moderate it.”1
“The in-group/out group or conflict-cohesion hypothesis now generally associated with
the Coser rather than Simmel has been so widely accepted among social scientist (although
often without acknowledgment of the Simmel Coser qualifications).
Danherdorf suggest that in group/out group cohesion has acquired the status of a general
law (It appears to be a general law that human groups react to external pressure by increased
internal coherence). The cohesion-building consequences of external conflict are recognized
by group leaders who often attempt to use this phenomenon to their own advantage.”2
“Coser argues that groups may actually search for enemies with the deliberate purpose
or the unwitting result of maintaining unity and internal cohesion. There is a conclusion
before moving on to the political science literature. There is substantial support for the group
cohesion hypothesis in the literature, but only under certain well defined conditions that are
quite similar to those suggested by Coser. The group must be an ongoing one with some
minimal level of cohesion prior to the external conflict, and the external conflict must involve
a threat that is believed to menace the group as whole and that is perceived as solvable by
group effort.”3
“Rummel (1963) argues that the classic theory of war have been unsupported
theoretically there is not a link among internal conflict and external conflict. “The studies of
Rummel were the first in found this problem. In his pioneering study, Rummel (1963) used a
factor analysis to evaluate the relationship among nine indicators of domestic conflict and
thirteen indicators of foreign policy conflict. His finding suggests rather strongly that
domestic conflict and foreign conflict are unrelated. His results have been replicated
numerous times in studies that have focused on a variety of spatial and temporal domains and
1
Manus I.Midlarsky, Handbook of War studies.New York, 1989,p.261.
2
Manus I.Midlarsky, Handbook of war studies.New York, 1989,p.261.
3
Manus I.Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies.New York,1989,p.261.

19
have used a number of different methodologies (Tanter 1966; Hass 1968; Burrowe and
Spector 1973; Zinnes and Wilkenfeld 1971). Other studies that have included additional
variables as controls have found evidence of a relationship. In particular there is some
indication that governmental structure may affect the domestic turmoil/war (Wilkenfed
1968;Zinnes and Wilkenfend 1971) as ethnic diversity (Hazelwood 1973) and the
militarization of a state (Kegley 1978)”.1
Ross Miller in his article Domestic Structure and the Diversionary Use of force have
focused on the effect of domestic variables to explain leader’s response to military threats
from outside. “The domestic variables include the popularity of the leaders, the policy
resources available to leaders, and the structure of domestic political institutions. These
variables represent the willingness of leaders to employ diversionary tactics. The capacity of
governments to extract resources to implement policies that benefit supporters varies
dramatically across states (Organski and Kugler 1980,72). Organski and Kugler say that the
failure to impose and extract taxes is one of the essential indicators of governmental
incapacity to obtain and maintain support. The greater capacity of leaders to extract
resources, the lower probability they will resort to diversionary tactic to manipulate domestic
audiences”2.
“Other studies found some evidence linking domestic political problems and the external
use of force by controlling the governmental structure (Wilkenfeld 1968; Zinnes and
Wilkenfeld 1971).”3
Graeme Davies pointed out that “Domestic dissatisfaction could decrease the likelihood
of a conflict (Salmore 1973; Hazlewood 1975; Kegley, Richardson and Richert 1978)”. The
political elite do not want to exacerbate internal problems by becoming involved in an
international conflict. Additionally the elites are too absorbed domestically to have the
capabilities or interest to externalize domestic dissatisfaction. This process of internal
preoccupation is known as “Encapsulation” (Hazlewood 1975)” 4 However theoretical
researchers have found little evidence to support this theoretical framework. Domestic
1
Clifton Morgan and Kenneth N. Bickers, “Domestic Discontent and the External Use of Force”, Thejournal of Conflict
Resolution, 36 (Mar.,1992):52.
2
1995):761.
3
1995):761.
4
Graeme A. M. Davies “DomesticStrife and the initiation of International Conflict: A directed dyad Analysis, 1950-1982”
The Journal of Conflict Resolution Quarterly 46,5 (Oct.,2002):673.

20
dissatisfaction can be understood as domestic struggle among political elites and population
in general.
Clifton Morgan points out that “there are two possible reasons for the incongruity
between the theoretical arguments and the quantitative empirical research in the diversionary
classical theory of war: (1) the theory might be incorrectly specified and (2) the statistical
analysis might not constitute appropriate test of theory”.1
“However Levy in the book Handbook of War found some theoretical problems with the
diversionary classical theory of war2 arguing that “The key question is not the connection
between internal and external conflict, but is the kind of internal conditions that commonly
lead to hostile external actions for diversionary purposes. Additional consideration needs to
be directed to the questions of what kinds of domestic conflicts are likely to lead diversionary
actions and what kinds of foreign conflicts serve a useful distraction for internal unrest.
Diversionary actions are more likely to occur under some domestic conditions than others,
but these conditions have not yet analyzed.”3 Levy analysis related to the type of domestic
conditions that connect internal causes with external conflict have not yet been determined
and give us the possibility to focus in one domestic strife that certainly lead to external
conflict.
The scholar Greg Cashman agrees with the point of view of Levy, specifying the type of
strife that lead to external diversionary actions, but more attention must be focus in leader
vulnerability. Vulnerability can exist without kind of strife.
“Leaders may simply feel politically insecure or feel that they are vulnerable to political
opponents, even in the absence of any real domestic turmoil, which might range from
antigovernment strike or demonstrations to armed rebellions. Political vulnerability may be
the result of declining economic or social conditions or just the routine cycle of elections.”4
The vulnerability is an essential factor for militaries doing diversionary actions, if they feel
insecure, they will use diversionary actions, other ways they must reject doing it, according
1
Resolution, 36 (Mar.,1992):71.
2
Diversionary war theory proposes that themain cause of some militarized international conflict is not a clash of interest but
rather problematic domestic circumstances such as economic adversity or political unrest. Under such conditions, the
countrys leaders may attempt to generate a foreign policy crisis in order both to divert domestic discontent and bolter his o
her political fortunes. Jaroslav Tir “Domestic Level Diversionary Theory of War”
3
Manus I.Midlarsky, Handbook of War Studies. New York, 1989, p.261.
4
Greg Cashman What Cause War: an Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United Kingdom:
Rowman&Littelfield, 2014, p.180.

21
with Kurt Dassel assumption.
“Richard Rosecrance in his classic study of international instability within nine different
European systems from 1740 to 1960, conclude that the domestic insecurity of political elites
was one of the most important cause of major-power war.”1 Elite insecurity is a determinant
factor that influences leaders to the use of diversionary actions, concluding that diversionary
actions will depend of leaders fear. It’s important clarify that Richard Rosecrance does not
mention what kind of elites will be more likely to do diversionary actions since there is a
variety of individuals with the capacity to do this type of actions (presidents, minister,
political parties, military). Under the approach of Kurt Dassel, only military elite will be
more likely to use diversionary actions, when they feel insecure.
Levy point out that “Not all diversionary theory lead to war, however an important
question is whether those that do (and those do not) follow any particular pattern. That is it
needs a theory that specifies the conditions under which certain pattern of diversionary
actions helps lead to war directly or indirectly and the processes through which this is likely
to occur. The diversionary theory of war is not a really a theory of war. It is a theory
(although an incomplete one) of the foreign policy behavior of an individual state with
respect to one particular issue area.”2
Morgan Clifton agreed with the point of view of Levy arguing that “Many international
relations theorists have treated and tested the diversionary hypothesis as universal dictum of
states behavior rather than partial explanation of some foreign policy decisions. Obviously
the presence of domestic political problems is not a necessary condition to foreign conflict
behavior; even highly cohesive states can be expected to fight back when they had attacked.
Further it is unlikely that domestic turmoil is a sufficient condition for foreign conflict. Other
variables as elite vulnerability must be taken into account.”3
“Russest (1990; Russet and Barzilai 1991) for example argues that major powers
because they are less constrained by the international environment, are more prone to
diversionary uses of force than minor powers; democratic governments may be more likely to
resort to diversionary behavior, because of their sensitivity to public opinion; and that
1
Greg Cashman What Cause War: an Introduction to theories of International Conflict. United Kingdom:
Rowman&Littelfield, 2014, p.180.
2
Manus I.Midlarsky, Handbook of war studies.New York, 1989,p.261.
3
Resolution, 36 (Mar., 1992):29.

22
democratic governments proclivity to resort to diversionary tactics varies with the election
cycle. Until the theoretical argument specifies the contingencies under which elite will resort
to foreign aggression as means of dealing with domestics political problems, it will be a
difficult to interpret any empirical findings.”1 Since Russet argues that major power are more
likely to use force outside because major powers contain with the coercive capabilities, but
minor powers spite that not contain with the same capabilities, they also use force abroad in
some specific circumstances (Argentina-Malvinas 1982), (Pakistan-India 1947). The need of
an approach that can specify these gaps is really needed to give an answer to questions as
why some minor power used force and under what circumstances.
Edward Mansfield and Jack Snider (2002) argues that states under the process of
democratization are more prone to initiate a War, political elites will influence the masses
(playing the nationalistic card) in order to contain the effect of democratization. However not
all the states undergoing the process of democratization are able going to war, however some
states make a peaceful transition. In South America region, almost all the states had peaceful
transitions with exception of Argentina.2 The key question is why does countries never went
to war.
Stuart Bremer (1992) argues that there is no evidence that the process of democratization
lead to states going to war. “The evidence as to whether or not democracies are less war
prone overall is far less conclusive, but the absence of strong evidence to the contrary leads
one to conclude that democracies have been neither more nor less way prone than no
democracies.”3
Tir and Jasinski argue that the lack of external target may affect the use of force abroad,
under these circumstances; states attempt to use the force at home against ethnic domestic
minority. “Given the most states live in those neighborhoods in which there are few
appropriate external targets for diversion or their neighbors are too strong or they have
powerful allies. Or they are not enduring rivals - what are unpopular and political vulnerable
leaders must do? Since most states are multiethnic in composition, and thus have ethnic
minorities who might effectively play the role of enemy outsider, they are much more likely
1
Resolution,36 (Mar.,1992):29.
2
Mansfield and Snyder “Democratic Transitions, InstitutionalStrength, and War” InternationalOrganization,56,22:298.
3
Stuart A. Bremer. “Dangerous Dyads:Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of InterstateWar 1816-1965”,The journal
Conflict Resolution, 36, 2 (Jun 1992):309.

23
to use the diversionary force against internal minorities than against external opponents.1
It’s important to admit the diverse theoretical problems that contained several
diversionary theories to start the development of new approaches with new cases and new
circumstances. The purpose is contribute in the discipline of International Relations to find an
alternative, a theoretical finding that can improve the way to understand specific domestic
causes about the initiation of war and the role of military institution in this course of action.
2.3 Previous Researches aboutthe Role of Military in the Use of Force
Abroad
The studies of Kurt Dassel are not the only study in the military field, there is another
preview researches that can be linear with the study of this author, focuses on the analysis of
military organization and considering the importance of military role in the world politics.
The studies of Schumpeter focus in parochialism interest as principal factor for states
initiated a conflict outside, but this analysis had been made several years ago, the need of
actualized studies about why and when the military’s going to war or exercise violence is
really wanted. “Warrior elites first came to power in earlier eras when war served a useful
function in the protection of empires and states against external predators. Once in power,
however warrior elites created a new military aristocracy and used war and the threat of war
to justify their policies and maintain their dominant positions despite the fact that state was
secure and that aggressive military policies no longer served a useful purpose. He further that
military elites are atavist holdovers from an earlier era when they played a useful role
providing external security for the state. This is the phrase “war make the states” variant
argument advanced by Till (1975, 1990). Schumpeter continues arguing “that wars result
primarily from the parochial interest of military organizations that seriously underestimated
the real conflicts of interest between states, the difficult of resolving those conflicts, and the
escalatory pressures induced by security dilemmas, misperceptions, ideological differences
and domestic pressures.”2 However Schumpeter is missing one important point related to
military interests that is the sense of insecurity perceived by the military organization to
proceed with the use of force, nevertheless Dassel and other scholars examines this absent
1
Stuart A. Bremer. “Dangerous Dyads:Conditions Affecting the Likelihood of InterstateWar 1816-1965”,The journal
Conflict Resolution, 36, 2 (Jun 1992):310.
2
Jacky Levy and William Thompson, Causes of War, United Kingdom, Willey-Blackwell, 2010, p.91-92.

24
point in Schumpeter study.
Other studies have been reflected that civilian are more prone to initiate war outside that
their militaries counterpart. “The dominant wisdom among the international relations scholars
is the military officers tend to be more cautious than their civilian counterparts about
initiating the use of force.”1Military Conservatism Theory sustained by Huntington argues
that military are less prone going to war and contains three important theoretical precepts:
First, it highlights military organizational interest that weigh against both the use of
force and the adoption of destabilizing military posture.
Second, it suggests that civilian’s inexperience with armed combat increases the
likelihood that they will favor using force in crises. Finally although the theory argues that
officers outlook on international affairs predisposes them to be pessimistic about the
inevitability of war, it maintains that civilians are generally more supportive of preventive
war options.”2 Certainly, if military are less prone going to war, it means that they only going
to war is when their organizational interest are threatened, supporting the argument that they
only fight a war for survival and power, not by other circumstances.
However the scholar Todd S. Secher argues that “the conventional belief about military
conservatism is overstated. Numerous studies have confirmed that military officers in the
United States display a conservative skepticism about the use of force. He argues that states
are lacking of strong civilian control to initiate armed conflict much more frequently than
states whose militaries are under tight civilian reins. From scholar’s perspective, theories of
military conservatism and civilian control play a central role in the study of causes of war;
indeed Sthephen Van Everas classic dissertation on the subject devoted no less than two
hundred eighty pages to questions about military issues.
“If theories of military conservatism are to be believed military adviser’s checks on
civilian leaders play an important role in the prevention of armed conflict. On the other hand,
if conservatism is wrong and military leaders are, in fact, prone to favor aggression, then the
absence of civilian control could constitute and important predictor of war”3 In many cases
strong civilian control do not avoid countries going to war, many democratic states with a
strong civilian control fought a war as for example United States with Iraq in 2003.
1
Tood.S. Secher, “Aresoldier less War pronethan Statesmen” The journal of Conflict Resolution 48,5 (Oct 2004):747.
2
Tood.S. Secher,, “Aresoldier less War pronethan Statesmen” The journal of Conflict Resolution 48,5 (Oct 2004):748.
3
Todd. S. Secher, “Aresoldier less War pronethan Statesmen” The journal of Conflict Resolution 48,5 (Oct 2004):748.

25
Not only civilians, but also the militaries can use the force abroad, the key factor is to
find under which specific domestic circumstances militaries are more prone to use the force
abroad.
2.4 The Military DiversionaryUse of Force Approach:
“Following Robert Putnam’s, Level Game Theory, decisions made by state leaders
regarding international relations can often be best understood when examining the internal
domestic political environment, and vice versa, as the conditions and actors at each level (for
example political parties domestically and allied-state leaders) directly and indirectly affect
political decisions at both levels.”1
Considering the lack of consensus among scholars about what kind of domestic strife
lead to war, this research will focus in a particular strife that threaten military interests.
Greg Cashman, contributes to analyze the studies of Kurt and Eric making a series of
assumptions. “Dassel argues that a specific kind of internal conflict is most likely to produce
external aggression-political transition characterized by contested institutions. Frequently this
strife is caused by transitions toward to democracy (and thus the theory also has links to
Mansfield and Snyder Theory). 2
During this research, it will attempt to make different contributions: first of all is to
contribute to the studies of third world focus in specifically areas (Central America) under
what condition small countries such as (El Salvador and Honduras went to war). Second,
contribute to a better understanding about the civil-military relations that dominated the
politics in these countries. Third, give enough evidence that support theoretical specification
discussed before, where states with (contested political institutions) military institution are
more likely to use the force abroad.
Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt had mentioned diverse requisites for the applicability of
the theory. “Countries experiencing a serious domestic strife, military institution often have a
relatively freedom (converting into autonomous actor) especially in issues of war and peace,
where they have veto-power.”3
1
Markie Robert “Master of Misdirection: Diversionary Conflict and Contested Institutions”Student Journal of Politics
(spring 2013):2.
2
Greg Cashman What Causes War: An Introduction to Theories of International Conflict. United Kingdom:
Rowman&Littelfield, 2014,p.180.
3
Kurt Dassel, “ Domestic Strife and the Initiation of Violence at home and Abroad” American Journal of Political Science
43,1 (January 1999) :57.

26
Military Power over decisions related to Honduras and El Salvador foreign policy in the
last decades has been dominated for military. The lacks of strong institutions that can
constrain individual interests were missing. Samuel Fitch argues that in Central America in
the 50s, 60s and 70s, military institutions took the most of the decisions involving states
foreign policy.
Often, the politics of Honduras and El Salvador were controlled by strong-mans (the
typical leader that through the force dominated the politics of these countries), strong mans
usually military leader’s controlled military organization and have alliances with dominant
economic class. Not only militaries have control upon domestic politics, also have the veto
power to use the force abroad. They were in the power for a long time, because they did not
face a strong opposition to their rules. To understand the future of civil-military relations, it
must to looking in the past to give predictable outcomes.
Many scholars have been focused their attention in the behavior of great powers
decreasing importance about the problems concerning to the Third World countries. Steven R.
David is one of the few scholars that wrote about the politics of Third World. The importance
of one theory that considers those characteristics is critical because understanding the Third
World is and will remain a central understanding of the course of international politics.1
Steven David in his article Explaining Third World Alignment explain how countries of third
world face diverse threat aligning with external power in ways that help them to resist
internal threats. He discuss about alignment and realignment in the third world, accepting the
idea that the principal threat in the third world are (domestic threats than external threats).
What kind of domestic strife threatens military organizational interests? Kurt
Dassel and Eric Reinhardt have been investigated this topic offering interesting outcomes
“Only a particular type of domestic strife (Contested Political Institutions) caused by
domestic struggles between political elites, necessarily threatens the military organizational
interests and thereby encourages aggression.” 2
But what means contested political institutions? “Contestation is the opposite of
consolidation, a concept which has been extensively studied in the context of transitional
democracy”. “Institutions are contested when reasonably powerful groups in each country
1
Steven David. “Explaining Third World Alignment” Cambridge University Press 43,2 (Jan 1991):234.
2
Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhard“ Domestic Strife and theInitiation of Violence at home and Abroad” American Journal of
Political Science 43,1 (January 1999) :57.

27
advocated different set of rules. Individuals dissatisfied with the system are not enough. They
must be organized into entities, such as parties, unions, states agencies and social movements,
specifically these revisionist groups must advocate other rules and procedures to choose the
political leadership, constraining the executive, regulating political participation by the
society and amending these basic constitutional guarantees.”1
If political groups agree about fundamental political rules, institutions will not be
contested, reducing the opportunity of a domestic conflict class. “First, Institutional
arrangements are said to influence the struggles between societal and governments actors.
They do so by providing the arenas within social forces content as well as by setting terms
and available. Institutions constrain and empower policy maker by delineating specific
repertories of policy instruments, thereby influencing the strategies ultimately adopted. Once
developed actors tend to view solutions to particular problems through the lens of the
instruments that are available to them, their options are limited or expanded by these tools
that they have at hand. Secondly, institutions will mediate the interest and capacities of states
and societal factor, even after the ideas and conditions responsible for their formation are no
longer present.”2
Concerning this regard, why contested institutions and no other type of domestic
strife threaten the organizational interest of military elite?
Contested political institutions in first place eliminate any kind of institutional
arrangements; second increase the levels of struggle among groups in one state (civilian,
military and politics parties) and third converting the state into states of war, where
individuals will use any instruments to accomplish their political interests.
Kenneth Waltz take into consideration the importance of stable political system pointed
that “An adequate political system permits to individuals to behave ethnically”. Politics must
resort to gain militaries support or must try to eliminate them.
1
Kurt Dassel “Civilians, Soldiers, and Strife: Domestic Sources of International Aggression: International Security 23,1
(Summer 1998):115.
2
Mirian Fendius Elman, “ The foreign policies of small states:Challenging Neorealism in its own Backyard“ British
Journal of Political Science 25,2 (Apr 1995):172.

28
Assuming this it can deduce that states with contested political institutions will present
the following characteristics:
 States are suffering internal politics chaos.
 Domestic Strife, Political groups, (government- opposition) must not agree to
follow political rules, originating a conflict of interests: political parties, large
social movements, legislatures and executives. Its necessary a political strife
between two parties, where two groups attempt to use extra-institutional means
for pursuit political objectives.
 More autonomy to military use of force at home or abroad.
Figure 1:
The figure 1 briefly summarizes how the struggle among two powerful political groups
creates a contestation of political institutions, producing a series effects. However a series of
requisites must be taking account. “First at all, contestation deprives the military and indeed
any political actor of legal procedural means for achieving its ends. In countries with
consolidated institutions, groups resolve their disputes by following mutually recognized set
Factor:
Political
transitions
Cause:
If political elites
reach agreement,
there is no
contestation of
political institutions
If political elites
do notreach
agreement
contestation will take
place producing the
next consequences.
Effects:
Contested
political institutions.
Political elites
must resort to gain
power over military
force.
Actions:
Military are
more likely to do
diversionary actions
to protect their
organizational
interests.

29
of laws and procedures.”1
“The military cannot resolve its disputes with other groups following political rules,
because the losers will reject the outcome as illegitimate and seek redress through extra
institutional means. Paraphrasing Huntington, when institutions are contested each group
employs means which reflect its peculiar nature capabilities to defend its interests.
For instances they may try to gain greater control over the Armed Forces by arrogating
decision-making authority, if they do not get the control over the military organization, they
will start promoting officers on the basis of political loyalty, or inserting civilian commissars
into the organization. Thus civilian, not the officers, would decide when and how to use the
force. Civilians may try to weaken military unity and gain the loyalty of groups within the
armed forces by appealing to soldiers from their own ethnicity, class, or region. Political
elites may try to break the military’s monopoly of the force by forming their own state
militias, palace guards, and guerrilla’s armies. Finally political elites may try to destroy the
organization by disbanding it or jailing and executing high ranking officers. Faced with these
threats to its interests, the military becomes more willing to use the force to defend their
integrity and autonomy.”2
Will contestation make the military willing to use the force? “Perhaps not in theory, but
almost certainly in practice, the military do not wish to use the force, a number of conditions
must be required and satisfied.”3
“First, there can be no a hard line faction within the military willing to defy high
command and use force domestically on its own. Second each political elite must decide it
use the force domestically on its own. Third each political elite must decide it is not in its best
interest to ally with the military or faction there of behind a common agenda of domestic
repression. Usually, however a hard line faction and at least one political group have a mutual
interest in targeting a domestic enemy. Fourth every political group must be willing to forgo
efforts to acquire the trump card-coercive capabilities. Because the military’s core interest
includes monopolizing the means of coercion and maintaining a unified chain of command
any efforts to gain control of arms will necessarily threaten their autonomy. Fifth, even if all
1
Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt, “DomesticStrife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad” American Journal of
Political Science 43,1 (Jan 1999):59.
2
Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt, “DomesticStrife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad.” American Journal of
3
Kurt Dassel and Eric Reinhardt, “DomesticStrife and the Initiation of Violence at Home and Abroad.” American Journal of

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